NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
| Interpretations | Date |
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ID: aiam1797OpenMr. J. T. Blewett, Great Dane Trailers, Inc., Lathrop Avenue, P.O. Box 67, Savannah, GA 31402; Mr. J. T. Blewett Great Dane Trailers Inc. Lathrop Avenue P.O. Box 67 Savannah GA 31402; Dear Mr. Blewett: This responds to your January 8, 1975, request for confirmation tha air-braked trailers built after January 1, 1975, for export to Mexico (and therefore without brake systems conforming to Standard No. 121, *Air brake systems*) may re-enter the United States on a continuing basis on railway cars for marshalling and unloading. Your letter states that the trailers would not be used in interstate commerce, by which we understand they would not operate on public streets or highways.; The NHTSA would not consider this limited introduction of non-complyin trailers into the United States an importation or introduction into interstate commerce for purposes of S108(a)(1)(A) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (15 U.S.C. 1397). This means that the trailer could legally be brought into the United States on a railway car to be unloaded on private property and returned by railway car to Mexico. These vehicles could not be operated on the public highway without violating S 108(a)(1)(A). I enclose a copy of a letter on this subject for your information.; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam1221OpenMr. M. Ryan, Kazmier Lincoln-Mercury, 500 E. Roosevelt Road, Lombard, IL 60148; Mr. M. Ryan Kazmier Lincoln-Mercury 500 E. Roosevelt Road Lombard IL 60148; Dear Mr. Ryan: It has come to the attention of the National Highway Traffic Safet Administration that Kazmier Lincoln- Mercury may have sold a 1971 Lincoln on April 13, 1973, to Mr. Robert P. Bartl of Westchester, Illinois, without making a written disclosure statement as required by the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act and Part 580 of Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations.; For your information, a transferor of a motor vehicle, including a ne or used car dealer, must make a written disclosure of the odometer reading to the transferee prior to transfer of ownership. The enclosed regulation lists the information which must be included in the statement. The regulation became effective on March 1, 1973.; It is the responsibility of the seller to make the statement whether o not the buyer requests it. Section 409 of the Act authorizes a civil action by a buyer who was not provided the statement, and it allows treble damages as proved or $1,500 without proof of damages.; I hope this letter makes clear your responsibilities to Mr. Bart concerning his purchase of a vehicle from your dealership.; Sincerely, Richard B. Dyson, Acting Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam5316OpenMr. William J. MacAdam President & CEO trans2 Corporation 37682 Enterprise Court Farmington Hills, MI 48331; Mr. William J. MacAdam President & CEO trans2 Corporation 37682 Enterprise Court Farmington Hills MI 48331; "Dear Mr. MacAdam: This responds to your request for an interpretatio that an electric vehicle that trans2 plans to manufacture is not a 'motor vehicle' within the meaning of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Safety Act). Your counsel, Mr. James Freeman, informed Ms. Dorothy Nakama of my staff that you do not object to the manner in which this letter describes the trans2 vehicle. We have determined that the trans2 electric vehicle is not a 'motor vehicle' under the Safety Act. 'Motor vehicle' is defined at Section 102(3) of the Act as: A ny vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, except any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails. It is unclear from your letter whether the trans2 vehicle is manufactured for on-road use. However, NHTSA has stated in past interpretations that vehicles that regularly use the public roads will not be considered 'motor vehicles' if such vehicles have a maximum attainable speed of 20 miles per hour or less and have an abnormal configuration that readily distinguishes them from other vehicles. These criteria appear to be met by trans2's vehicle. You stated that the top speed of the vehicle is 20 miles per hour. Photographs of trans2's vehicle show that it is approximately the size and height of a golf cart. From the side, the passenger compartment appears to be an oval. From the rear, the vehicle has tail lights built into the two headrests. These unusual body features make the trans2 vehicle readily distinguishable from 'motor vehicles.' Accordingly, we determine that trans2's vehicle is not a 'motor vehicle' within the meaning of the Safety Act. Since the trans2 vehicle is not a motor vehicle, none of NHTSA's regulations or standards apply to it. Please note that except for the features of the trans2's vehicle described herein, the remaining vehicle specifications described in your letter of November 3, 1993 are protected under Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act. The protection will continue until trans2 discloses details of its vehicle to the public. I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel cc: James Freeman, Esq. Hogan and Hartson Columbia Square 555 13th St., NW Washington, DC 20004-1109"; |
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ID: aiam4688OpenMr. Donald W. Vierimaa Vice President-Engineering Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association 1020 Princess Street Alexandria, Virginia 22314; Mr. Donald W. Vierimaa Vice President-Engineering Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association 1020 Princess Street Alexandria Virginia 22314; "Dear Mr. Vierimaa: This is in response to your association's reques that this office review the most recent revision of the Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association's (TTMA) Recommended Practice Number 56, 'Trailer Vehicle Identification Number.' After that review, we have the following comments. Please note, however, that these comments do not constitute any sort of NHTSA approval or endorsement of the TTMA's Recommended Practice. The TTMA Recommended Practice appears to provide correct information about NHTSA's vehicle identification number (VIN) requirements, as set forth in 49 CFR Part 565, Vehicle Identification Number-Content Requirements and Standard No. 115, Vehicle Identification Number-Basic Requirements (49 CFR 571.115). However, in several instances, the Recommended Practice goes beyond what is required by NHTSA's VIN regulations to recommend one particular means be used to assign a section of the VIN, when NHTSA's regulations leave the assignment of that section to the discretion of the vehicle manufacturer. Examples of the TTMA recommendations going beyond the NHTSA regulations may be found in the explanations provided in Part 13.0 on the Vehicle Descriptor (Second) Section Code, Part 14.0 Check Digit (Third) Section Code, and Part 15.0 Vehicle Indicator (Fourth) Section Code. While TTMA is free to make these recommendations, it may be helpful for your members to recognize the distinction between VIN information that is required by NHTSA, and therefore must follow an exact format according to Federal law, as opposed to matters that are within the discretion of the assigner of the VIN, and for which the TTMA provides one suggested means by which the requirement(s) may be fulfilled. We offer the following comments on particular sections of this recommended practice: Part 6.0 Definitions The definitions of 'body type,' 'line,' 'make,' and 'series' are not identical to the definitions in Title 49 CFR Part 565. In addition, since this section of your recommended practice states that the definitions in Part 6 'are used in NHTSA regulations,' you may wish to note that NHTSA does not define the terms 'production sequence,' and 'type of trailer' in its regulations. Part 9.1 Location This part should note that 49 CFR Part 567.4(d) requires certification labels (which must include VINs) to be affixed 'to a location on the forward half of the left side, such that it is easily readable from outside the vehicle without moving any part of the vehicle.' Part 11.0 VIN Content You may wish to note that the content requirements in this part of the recommended practice are a paraphrase and explanation of NHTSA's VIN content requirements, set forth at 49 CFR Part 565 Vehicle Identification Number-Content Requirements. 16.0 References Please note that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has issued a VIN system information bulletin dated July 1985. I am enclosing a copy of it. Please feel free to reproduce this information and provide it to your members. They may also receive it directly from NHTSA by writing to us. If there are any further questions or concerns, please contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel Enclosure"; |
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ID: aiam4856OpenMr. B. Wendling-Malusev Manager, Government Relations Yugo America, Inc. 120 Pleasant Avenue P.O. Box 730 Upper Saddle River, NJ 07458-0730; Mr. B. Wendling-Malusev Manager Government Relations Yugo America Inc. 120 Pleasant Avenue P.O. Box 730 Upper Saddle River NJ 07458-0730; "Dear Mr. Wendling-Malusev: This responds to your letter of March 5 1991, requesting an interpretation of Standard No. 103, Windshield Defrosting and Defogging Systems. Specifically, you requested an interpretation of the phrase 'without manual assist' as used in section S4.3 of that standard. You stated in your letter that Transport Canada interpreted the Canadian Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 103 in a way that is not used by U.S. testing facilities. Let me preface my discussion by stating that although the two standards may have identical wording, they remain different standards. Our interpretation relates only to the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 103 and has no bearing whatsoever on Transport Canada's interpretation of their own standard. Section S4.3 of the standard, Demonstration procedure, incorporates the testing procedure of paragraphs 4.1 through 4.4.7 of SAE Recommended Practice J902 or J902(a) (J902). Paragraph 4.2.6 of J902 requires that the windshield wiper not operate during the test. Section S4.3(d) of Standard No. 103 is one of the listed exceptions to the J902 test procedure. S4.3(d) allows the use of windshield wipers during the test 'if they are operated without manual assist.' Section S4.3(d) does not define 'manual assist.' When terms used by a regulation are not defined by the regulation, the terms are defined by their common, everyday use. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language defines 'manual' as 'involving or using human power, energy, etc.' That same dictionary defines 'assist' as 'to give support, aid, or help to.' Given this definition, human power used to assist the functioning of the wipers, beyond turning the wipers on or off, is precluded by the standard. As your letter correctly states, prohibited 'manual assist' would include such things as manually freeing the wipers of ice. This interpretation is supported by a consideration of windshield wiper system designs in use in 1968, the year in which the standard was promulgated. At that time, some vacuum and air-assisted windshield wiper systems were still in use. Having less power than electric windshield wiper systems, vacuum and air-assisted wipers were more susceptible to drag caused by ice on the windshield. Ice-induced drag severely limited the frost-clearing effectiveness of these wipers. The 'manual assist' provision was intended to prohibit the use of human energy to overcome this disadvantage. The 'manual assist' provision was not intended to prohibit those wipers being turned on or off by use of human power, as the wipers were designed to be used. Even today, except for the very few windshield wiper systems that operate automatically when they sense water or frost on the windshield, the vast majority of windshield wiper systems require manual switching to initiate operation. I hope that this information has been helpful. Please feel free to contact us if you have any further questions. Sincerely, Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel"; |
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ID: aiam5055OpenMr. William G. Rosoff Chief, Entry Rulings Branch Department of the Treasury U.S. Customs Service Washington, D.C. 20229; Mr. William G. Rosoff Chief Entry Rulings Branch Department of the Treasury U.S. Customs Service Washington D.C. 20229; "Dear Mr. Rosoff: This responds to your letter of September 18, 1992 forwarding a letter and documentation from Dr. Irina Elovaara. Dr. Elovaara imported a nonconforming motor vehicle into the United States around October 9, 1991, pursuant to 49 CFR 591.5(d), and is requesting permission to keep it here longer than the one year that the regulation permits. You inform us that Customs does not have the authority to grant an extension or exception. Paragraph 591.5(d) permits nonresidents of the United States to temporarily import a nonconforming motor vehicle into the United States for a period not to exceed one year, provided that the importer will export it not later than the end of one year after entry. Dr. Elovaara, who holds a visiting fellow appointment at the National Institutes of Health, apparently must export her vehicle not later than October 9, 1992. However, her one-year appointment has been extended for three months, through December 31, 1992, and she wishes to keep her car here until that time. In the meantime, according to Dr. Elovaara, her car has been insured, inspected, and titled in Maryland, as well as passing an emission test. Paragraph 591.5(d) reflects this agency's attempt to accommodate the terms of the Customs Convention on the Temporary Importation of Private Road Vehicles, to which the United States has subscribed. Under the Convention, a contracting state shall allow nonresidents to import a motor vehicle for their private use on the occasion of a temporary visit without payment of import duties and import taxes and free of import prohibitions and restrictions, and the importation shall be covered by temporary importation papers. However, the period of validity of the temporary importation papers shall not exceed a year from the date of issue. Thus, under the Convention, a 'temporary' importation would appear to be one that does not exceed a year. This is the genesis of our regulatory requirement that a nonresident, upon importing a nonconforming vehicle for private use, declare that the vehicle will be exported not later than a year after its entry, and the reason why the regulation contains no provisions for extension of a period beyond one year. Given the existence of the Convention, we believe you are correct in your conclusion that Customs has no authority to provide an extension or exception, and we have drawn the same conclusion as to the authority of this agency. The question becomes whether, in the absence of timely export of the vehicle, either agency effect to implement the remedies available to it. This is a matter within the general discretionary authority of each agency. The primary concern of this agency, as you know, is motor vehicle safety. Given the fact that Dr. Elovaara's vehicle has already been subjected to local registration, inspection, emissions and insurance laws, we do not believe that there would be any adverse impact upon safety if her vehicle remains in the United States for three additional months, even if that would constitute a technical violation of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. We hope that this resolves Dr. Elovaara's concerns. Sincerely, Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel"; |
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ID: aiam5444OpenHarleigh Ewell, Esq. Regulatory Affairs Division Office of the General Counsel Consumer Product Safety Commission Washington, D.C. 20207; Harleigh Ewell Esq. Regulatory Affairs Division Office of the General Counsel Consumer Product Safety Commission Washington D.C. 20207; Dear Mr. Ewell: This letter responds to your inquiry whether gasolin pump nozzle/hose assemblies (referred to collectively in this letter as 'gas nozzles') are an item of motor vehicle equipment. The answer is no. To answer your question, we conducted a detailed examination of our past interpretations of what constitutes 'motor vehicle equipment' under our statute. As you are aware, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards for new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA's authority was recently recodified in title 49 of the U.S. Code. Section 30102(a)(7) (formerly section 102(4) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966) defines the term 'motor vehicle equipment' as: (A) any system, part, or component of a motor vehicle as originally manufactured, (B) any similar part or component manufactured or sold for replacement or improvement of a system, part, or component, or as any accessory or addition to a motor vehicle, or (C) any device or an article ... that is not a system, part, or component of a motor vehicle and is manufactured, sold, delivered, offered, or intended to be used only to safeguard motor vehicles and highway users against risk of accident, injury, or death. (Emphasis added.) The only portion of this definition that gas nozzles could even conceivably fall within is the term 'accessories.' Proceeding by the process of elimination, a gas nozzle is neither a 'system, part, or component' of a motor vehicle as originally manufactured nor as a replacement or improvement for or to a system, part or component because a gas nozzle never becomes part of the vehicle and cannot realistically be considered part of the vehicle's fuel system. For the same reason, it is not an 'addition' to a motor vehicle. A gas nozzle is not a 'device, article, or apparel' because it is not exclusively used as a safeguard from risk of accident, injury, or death. The sole remaining possibility is that gas nozzles may be an 'accessory.' This question is addressed below. The agency has typically used two criteria in determining whether a device is an 'accessory.' These criteria were discussed extensively in a May 25, 1990 letter to Susan Birenbaum, at the time the Acting General Counsel of your commission. The first criterion is whether a substantial portion of the expected use of the item is related to the operation or maintenance of motor vehicles. We determine a product's expected use by considering product advertising, product labeling, and the type of store that retails the product, as well as available information about the actual use of the product. The second criterion is whether the product is intended to be used principally by ordinary users of motor vehicles. If a product satisfied both criteria, then the product has been considered to be an 'accessory.' An allied concept that has been implicit in NHTSA's interpretations is that the item be purchased or owned by the consumer. This concept reinforces the 'ordinary user' concept in the second criterion of the test by generally restricting accessories to consumer items that we believe Congress intended us to regulate. Examples of items that, without the purchase concept, might be accessories include self-serve car wash equipment, and air pumps and even gas pumps themselves. In making this concept explicit, NHTSA will be stating the criteria for determining whether an item is an accessory as follows: (1) A substantial portion of its expected uses are related to the operation or maintenance of motor vehicles, and (2) it is purchased or otherwise acquired, and principally used, by ordinary users of motor vehicles. Applying these criteria to gas nozzle/hose assemblies, we conclude that they are not accessories. While gas nozzles have a principal use that is arguably related to the operation and maintenance of motor vehicles, gas nozzles fail the second criterion of the test. While they are used by ordinary users of motor vehicles, they are not purchased or acquired by those users. It is therefore our opinion that gas nozzles are not motor vehicle equipment. I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact us at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel; |
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ID: aiam1676OpenMemorandum to Interpretation of Certification Regulations (49 CFR Part 567), From Acting Chief Counsel, Subject: Files; Memorandum to Interpretation of Certification Regulations (49 CFR Part 567) From Acting Chief Counsel Subject: Files; In a letter recently mailed by this agency in a current enforcemen action, the following interpretation of 49 CFR Part 567 appeared:; '567.5(g) - The information on the label is not presented in th specified order or form. Your use of a vehicle model designation within the body of the label is unacceptable. However, it is permissible to list your vehicle model after the last statement, which is the vehicle type.'; Richard B. Dyson |
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ID: aiam1284OpenMr. Robert G. Beaumont, President, Sebring Vanguard, Inc., P.O. Box 1479, Sebring Air Terminal, Sebring, FL 33870; Mr. Robert G. Beaumont President Sebring Vanguard Inc. P.O. Box 1479 Sebring Air Terminal Sebring FL 33870; Dear Mr. Beaumont: This is in response to your request for clarification of the meaning o 'truck chassis' as it appears in the definition of 'multipurpose passenger vehicle.'; The term 'truck chassis' has been used in the Motor Vehicle Safet Standards since their initial issuance in 1967. It was not explicitly defined at that time although it was and is in common use within the motor vehicle industry.; In light of the notice proposing redefinition of multipurpose passenge vehicle and the comments on that proposal, we are considering the desirability of further explanation of the term.; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam0588OpenMr. J. Michael Hartstein, Vice President, Campact Corporation, 3807 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA 90010; Mr. J. Michael Hartstein Vice President Campact Corporation 3807 Wilshire Boulevard Los Angeles CA 90010; Dear Mr. Hartstein: This is in reply to your letter of December 29, 1971, concerning th use of glazing materials in the Kangaroo Camper which your company manufacturers (sic). You ask whether Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205, 'Glazing Materials' (49 CFR S 571-205) applies to this item.; Because it is impossible for a person to ride in the Kangaroo campe while the vehicle is in motion, we would not consider this item to be a 'camper' within the meaning of Standard No. 205, and the standard does not apply to this product.; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.