ID: nht73-6.9

DATE: 12/21/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; James B. Gregory; NHTSA

TO: B. F. Goodrich Tire Company

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your petition, dated May 18, 1973, for amendments to Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 109 and the Tire Identification and Recordkeeping regulations (49 CFR Part 574). You request that the standard be amended to except tires having an "unusual configuration and construction," from that part of S4.3 which requires safety information to be labeled between each tire's safety information to be labeled between each tire's maximum section width and bead. You request a similar exception in Part 574 for the tire identification number. Goodrich has experienced difficulties in placing this information in the proper location in tire molds used to manufacture Goodrich's Space Saver Spare tire. You indicate this is caused by the thinness of the mold, which is apparently necessitated by the folding sidewall characteristics of the tire.

In the case of the Space Saver Spare, Goodrich wants to be able to place the labeling information and the identification number in the shoulder area of the tire. Your request is supported with pictures of a Space Saver Spare that has been run to wear-out yet still retains legible labeling in this area. In your view it is unlikely that this tire will be retreaded. You argue that the location you desire to use, while not between the maximum section width and bead, has the advantage of making the information and identification number visible both when the tire is inflated and deflated. The latter condition is important in this case in that this tire is generally carried in a deflated, folded condition when it is not in use.

We do not believe the facts you present justify an amendment to the standard, and have therefore determined that your petition should be denied. The purposes of requiring safety information and the tire identification number to be placed between each tire's maximum section width and the bead is to ensure, to the greatest extent possible, that the information will remain or the tire throughout its useful life, including a retreading process if the tire is retreaded. In our view, it is not all clear that the alternative location you suggest will still meet this objective. The justification which you provide does not show that labeled information cannot be removed in service or that these tires will not, in fact, be retreaded. We certainly would not object if Goodrich were to place identifying information in separate location in addition to that required by the standard.

With respect to the difficulty you have encountered in placing the information in the specified area, we do not find on the basis of the information you have supplied that the alternative possibilities are impracticable. For example, your letter does not mention whether you have attempted to engrave the safety information and that part of the identification number that is constant into the tire molds. While we understand engraving is generally more expensive and somewhat more inconvenient than branding the mold or using metal plates, we do not believe the added expense and inconvenience, particularly as it is amortized over the life of the mold, to be unreasonable in terms of the safety benefit achieved. It also appears that this labeling, in letters 0.078 inches in height, can be placed just above the rim centering rib, which from the sample submitted with your petition, does not appear to have been damaged upon removal. This location would allow removal of the tire from the mold without deformation of the lettering and would place the required information between the tire's maximum section width and bead. With respect to date codes, for which engraving is unsuited, it appears that the code stamp could be recessed so as to be flush with the mold surface, thus eliminating or substantially reducing the destruction of the lettering during removal.

SINCERELY,

July 10, 1973 . Wallace Dept. of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

A little slow perhaps, but here is a section of the B.F. Goodrich "Space Saver Spare" tire you asked me for. v.e are trying spring plates in the molds to get the prescribed branding below the curb rib as now required. As you can see it will not be visible for(Illegible Word) to see it when it is in the trunk and folded as is normally the case, this we must also put it below the tread edge as you can see it on the section. This means a "double" branding job on these tires.

I gathered from Mike Peskos concluding remarks after our meeting on our petition that he felt there was a good chance of us getting some relief from this multiple and unnecessary branding.

Any suggestions or ideas your office may have which can be accomplished by rewording and/or rewriting the petition to make acceptance more likely will be appreciated.

Please call any time you feel further discussion on the petition is necessary or might help solution of our problems in this area.

Yours very truly,

F. S. Vukan

May 18, 1973

The Administrator National Highway Traffic Administration

Dear Sir:

Ref: N40-30 (MPP)

With our letter of 7-30-71 which was in reply to your letter Ref. 40-30, Cir. 169 we submitted a petition for certain considerations and changes in FMVSS #109 and Part 574 "Tire Identification and Record Keeping". These were denied in your letter of 8-29-72, N40-30 (MPP), copies of our petition and your reply are attached as Attachments A and B respectively.

We have considered the recommendations contained in the last paragraph of your letter (Attachment B). We do not feel that a new size designation for the Space Saver Spare tire is desirable as it is used in conjunction with standard nomenclature tires and a different size designation would serve to confuse the tire users.

We are however still faced with a number of problems relating to location of branding and tire identification information as required by FMVSS #109 and Part 574. We investigated and tried many ways to meet these requirements but due to the mold design necessary to provide the unique folding capability of these tires we are unable to have the branding visible on both the inflated tire and the deflated tire in the area prescribed by FMVSS #109 and Part 574.

Although neither FMVSS #109 or Part 574 specifies the inflation conditions under which the required information must be visible we have strived to meet what we believe to be the intent of the regulations and the verbal guidance offered by the Office of the Counsel, NHTSA at our previous meetings which is to have the required branding visible to the user in event of a recall situation.

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We can meet the intent of the regulations but not the letter of the regulations as written at present. We therefore petition that the regulations be changed as indicated for the reasons indicated:

Changes Necessary to FMVSS #109

NOTE: Underlining indicates wording added, wording to be omitted is stricken out (dashes).

A. 1. Change S4.3 "Labeling Requirements" as follows:

S4.3 Labeling Requirements. Except as provided for in S4.3.1, and S4.3.2 and S4.3.3 each tire etc. . . .

2. Change present S4.3.3 to S4.3.4

3. Add new S4.3.3 as follows:

S4.3.3 Tires of (i) unusual configuration or construction or (ii) which are used in a special or unusual service need not be labeled as specified in S4.3 (a) through (g) between the maximum section width and the bead provided the branding is so located as to remain on the tire and be visible throughout its normal service life. The selection of alternate locations is to be at the discretion of and the responsibility of the tire manufacturer.

4. The above changes are necessary and will adequately protect the public for the following reasons:

a. Our Space Saver Spare tire and possibly other such tires meeting performance requirements of FMVSS #109 are in a service such that the branding will stay on the tires for their entire service life when located above the widest part of the tire.

b. If branding can be positioned above the maximum section width and remain there for the service life of the tire, major requirements have been met.

c. We are at present putting our branding in the area designated as "A" on the attached Figure 1. Attached are photographs from worn out tires showing that the branding is not removed at the point of tire wear out Tire sections are available and will be furnished if desired. With the wording as proposed it would be the manufacturers' responsibility to see that branding remains on the tire and is visible throughout its normal service life.

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d. We believe the need to position the branding for retreadability may not be applicable in the case of special tires for which we are asking the above variation (tires of unusual configuration or construction or which are used in a special or unusual service). In the case of our "Space Saver Spare" tire we believe retreading is unlikely.

B. 1. Change Part 574 Title 49 as follows:

S574.5 Tire Identification Requirements.

Each tire manufacturer shall conspicuously label on one sidewall of each tire he manufactures, except tires manufactured exclusively for mileage-contract purchasers, by permanently molding into or onto the sidewall, in the manner and location specified in Figure 1, a tire identification number containing the information set forth in paragraphs (a) through (d) of this section. Tires of (i) unusual configuration or construction or (ii) made for a special service condition need not have the tire identification number in the location specified in Figure 1 provided the number is located so that it remains visible on the tire throughout its normal service life. Each tire retreader, except tire retreaders who retread tires for their own use, shall conspicuously label one sidewall of each tire he retreads by permanently molding or branding into or onto the sidewall, in the manner and location specified in Figure 2, a tire identification number containing the information set forth in paragraphs (a) through (d) of this section. In addition, the DOT symbol required by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards shall be located as shown in Figures 1 and 2.

The DOT symbol shall not appear on tires to which no Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard is applicable. The symbols to be used in the tire identification number for tire manufacturers and retreaders are "A, B, C, D, E, F, H, J, K, L, M, N, P, R, T, U, V, W, X, Y, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0". Tires manufactured or retreaded exclusively for mileage contract purchasers are not required to contain the tire identification number if the tire contains the phrase "for mileage contract use only" permanently molded into or onto the tire sidewall in lettering at least one quarter inch high. 2. The above change will protect the public for the following reasons:

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a. A provision for unique and special tires should be included in the regulation to cover tires which otherwise meet FMVSS #109 and are subject to recall but which due to their unusual configuration, or construction, or special service cannot or, need not, have the serial in the lower sidewall region provided the serial can be located so that it is visible and not obliterated during its full service life. It would be the responsibility of a manufacturer marketing such tires to determine that the identification number remains on the tire throughout its service life and is visible in event recall or examination is necessary.

b. In the case of the "Space Saver Spare" tire, based on our road tests and on examination of tires returned from service, a serial number located in the Area "B" of Figure 1 remains legible, and is visible on both the inflated and the deflated tire throughout its service life.

SUMMARY

Figure 2 is a representation of a mold used for Space Saver Spare tires. The line around the Fin "F" from (1) to (3) through (2) designates the area normally called the tire sidewall. With (2) as the mid-sidewall, the portion from (1) to (2) is below the maximum section width and that from (2) to (3) is the maximum section width.

Because that portion of the mold shown as Fin "F" is very thin and unsupported it is virtually impossible to stamp any branding into the Fin without bending and/or breaking it during the stamping operation. We have tried putting both thin metal branding plates as well as the serial number in this area but due to the violent stripping action in disengaging the tire from the mold (Fin) all such "add on" plates are susceptible to bending and of being torn from their fastening screws.

Our previous practice of placing the serial number in the Area "C" as shown on Figure 1 makes it unreadable when the tire is inflated due to the normal rotation of the tire bead in the rim flange area as the tire is inflated and prepared for service. The serial location at "B" of Figure 1 is possible and would be permissible with the language changes and additions as outlined in our petition.

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The consideration of unusual configuration or construction or service is also desirable to cover tires which may have a service life or configuration or construction which makes it possible to conform to the intent of the regulation with the serial and/or branding in areas of the tire excluded by the present regulations.

Your consideration and approval of this petition is respectfully requested to enable us to produce a product which is filling a growing need but which because of its unusual configuration cannot meet the wording of the current regulations. If the regulations are amended as requested we can meet the wording as well as the intent of the law.

We would like very much to discuss our petition with you and your staff in greater detail or to revise it, as you may consider necessary, to achieve our mutual goals of providing tires to the tire users within the scope and the intent of the NHTSA regulations.

Very truly yours,

Patrick C. Ross

Text Omitted

ID: 86-5.28

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 10/01/86

TITLE: TEXT OF THE RULING BY THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT UPHOLDING THE STATE'S LAW REQUIRING SEAT BELT USE BY DRIVERS AND FRONT SEAT PASSENGERS IN AUTOMOBILES

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 07/32/89 FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA TO BUTLER DERRICK -- CONGRESS; REDBOOK A31; STANDARD 208 LETTER DATED 07/11/89 FROM BUTLER DERRICK -- CONGRESS TO STEVE WOOD -- NHTSA

TEXT: Docket Nos. 62719, 62799, 63705, 63224 cons -- Agenda 40 -- May 1986.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS et al., Appellants, v. ELIZABETH J. KOHRIG et al., Appellees.

PER CURIAM: The defendants in these four consolidated cases were issued traffic citations for failure to wear seat safety belts while operating their motor vehicles on a street or highway in violation of section 12-603.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1 (hereinafter the section).) In each case, the trial court concluded that the section was unconstitutional and dismissed the charge. The State appealed each case directly to this court pursuant to our Rule 302(a) (94 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)), and the cases were consolidated for purposes of appeal. Only two of the four defendants -- Elizabeth J. Kohrig and Regina L. Greene -- have filed briefs in this court; however, various parties have been permitted to file briefs as amicus curiae.

At issue is whether the section, which requires drivers of motor vehicles and their front-seat passengers to wear safety belts when driving on a public highway or street, violates the due process guarantees of the State and Federal constitutions. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 2; U.S. Const., amend. XIV, sec. 1.

The section, which became effective on July 1, 1985, provides in part:

"(a) Each driver and front seat passenger of a motor vehicle operated on a street or highway in this State shall wear a properly adjusted and fastened seat safety belt; except that, a child less than 6 years of age shall be protected as required pursuant to the Child Passenger Protection Act. Each driver of a motor vehicle transporting a child 6 years of age or more, but less than 16 years of age, in the front seat of a motor vehicle shall secure the child in a properly adjusted and fastened seat safety belt." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1(a).)

The statute also provides that certain persons are exempt from complying with the seat-belt-use requirement, including persons with a written medical waiver from a physician or government agency; those persons frequently stopping and leaving the vehicle or delivering property from the vehicle if its speed between stops does not exceed 15 miles per hour; and drivers operating a vehicle in reverse. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1(b)(1),

(b)(4).) Certain vehicles also are exempt from the statute's requirements, including motorcycles, motorized pedalcycles, and vehicles manufactured prior to 1965. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1(b)(5), (b)(9).) Violators of the section are guilty of a "petty offense and subject to a fine not to exceed $ 25." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.I(d).

At the outset we note that, in reviewing the constitutionality of Illinois' mandatory-seat-belt law, this court does not join in the debate over whether the law is desirable or necessary. Our nation was founded in large part on the democratic principle that the powers of government are to be exercised by the people through their elected representatives in the legislature, subject only to certain constitutional limitations. Although this court has never hesitated to invalidate laws that it believes to be unconstitutional, we emphasize that our role is a limited one. The issue here in "not what the legislature should do but what the legislature can do." City of Wichita v. While (1970), 205 Kan. 408, 409, 469 P.2d 287, 288.

Defendant Greene contends that the section violates her fundamental right to privacy protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. (U.S. Const., amend XIV, sec. 2.) Additionally, both defendants argue that the section is beyond the police powers of the legislature and thus violates the due process clauses of the State and Federal constitutions. We first turn to the issue of whether the section violates defendants' fundamental right to privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment.

Regulations that limit a person's constitutional right to privacy may be justified only by a "'compelling state interest,'" and the legislation "must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake." (Roe v. Wade (1973), 410 U.S. 113, 155, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 178, 93 S. Ct. 705, 728. See also Carey v. Population Services International (1977), 431 U.S. 678, 686, 52 L.Ed. 2d 675, 685, 97 S. Ct. 2010, 2016.) However, "'only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" [citation]'" (Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 65, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 462, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2639, quoting Roe v. Wade (1973), 410 U.S. 113, 152, 35 L. Ed.2d 147, 176, 93 S. Ct. 705, 726), or those liberties "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition'" (Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , , 92 L.Ed. 2d 140, 146, 106 S.

Ct. 2841, 2844; see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland (1977), 431 U.S. 494, 503, 52 L. Ed.2d 531, 540, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1938) are included in the right of privacy guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court has selected only a few rights for such an esteemed status: the "privacy right encompasses and protects the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing." Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 65, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 462, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2639. See Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , , 92 L. Ed. 2d 140, 148, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2346; Paul v. Davis (1976), 424 U.S. 693, 712-13, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, 420-21, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1166.

Moreover, recognizing that a court is "most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution," the Supreme Court has emphasized that there should be "great resistance" to further expanding the substantive due process right of privacy. (Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , , 92 L. Ed.2d 140, 148, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846.) Thus, attempts by litigants to expand the privacy right beyond matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relations, abortion, child rearing and education have largely been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , 92 L. Ed. 2d 140, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (right to privacy does not encompass right to engage in homosexual sodomy); Kelley v. Johnson (1977), 425 U.S. 231, 244, 47 L. Ed. 2d 708, 714, 96 S. Ct. 1440, 1444 (police officer does not have privacy right to choose hairstyle); Paul v. Davis (1976), 424 U.S. 693, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (no privacy protection of reputation); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 93 S. Ct. 2628 (privacy right does not encompass right of adults to watch obscene movies in places of public accommodation).

In the present case it cannot be said that defendant Greene's claimed right to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt on a public highway resembles those liberties identified by the Supreme Court as being included in the right of privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment. Although the section in question implicates a person's interest in "liberty" in the sense that it restricts his freedom of choice, the law here does not regulate those intimate

decisions relating to marriage, procreation, child rearing, education or family that have heretofore been recognized as deserving of heightened constitutional protection. (See Wells v. State (1985), A.D.2d , 495 N.Y.S. 2d 591 (mandatory-seat-belt-use law does not violate right of privacy). Cf. People v. Thomas (1984), 159 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 18, 206 Cal. Rptr. 84 (statute requiring the securing of a child passenger in a seat-restraint system does not infringe on defendant's fundamental right of privacy); State v. Fetterly (1969), 254 Or. 47, 456 P.2d 996 (motorcycle helmet law does not violate defendant's right of privacy).) Nor do we think that the right to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed" (Palko v. Connecticut (1937), 302 U.S. 319, 325-26, 82 L. Ed. 288, 292, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152), or a liberty "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" (Moore v. East Cleveland (1977), 431 U.S. 494, 503, 52 L. Ed. 2d 531, 540, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1938). The States historically have been given a wide latitude to regulate the use of motor vehicles (Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. (1959), 359 U.S. 520, 530, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1003, 1010, 79 S. Ct. 962, 968), and the individual driver's autonomy on the road has, out of necessity for the public safety and welfare, been significantly curtailed by State regulation. Like the court in Bisenius v. Karns (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 42, 165 N.W.2d 377, appeal dismissed (1969), 395 U.S. 709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 655, 89 S. Ct. 2033, we reject any notion that the right of privacy includes the right to "do one's thing" on an expressway:

"There is no place where any such right to be let alone would be less assertable than on a modern highway with cars, trucks, busses and cycles whizzing by at sixty or seventy miles an hour. When one ventures onto such a highway, he must be expected and required to conform to public safety regulations and controls, including some that would neither have been necessary nor reasonable in the era of horse-drawn vehicles." (42 Wis. 2d 42, 55, 165 N.W.2d 377, 384.)

We are unwilling to graft onto the Constitution a right of privacy to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt where there is no textual basis or a clear historical precedent for such a right in the language of the Constitution or the opinions of the Supreme Court. To do so woul be to place the court in a position of acting as a super legislature,

nullifying laws it does not like. That is not our proper role in a democratic society. Therefore, we hold that the section does not infringe upon defendant's fundamental right of privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment. Neither does it infringe upon any right to privacy arising under the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 6).

Defendants also argue that the section does not further the health, safety or welfare of the general public, asserting that the statute only protects the safety of the individual driver and passenger. They contend that since the section interferes with their right to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt, and has no corresponding public benefit, the statute exceeds the State's police power and violates the due process guarantees of the State and Federal constitutions.

It is well established that the legislatures, not the courts, have the primary role in our democratic society in deciding what the interests of the public require and in selecting the measures necessary to secure those interests. (City of Carbondale v. Brewster (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 111, 115; Memorial Gardens Association, Inc. v. Smith (1959), 16 Ill. 2d 116, 127.) Recognizing the legislature's broad power to provide for the public health, welfare and safety, the courts are hesitant to second-guess a legislative determination that a law is desirable or necessary. Only when the statute in question affects a fundamental constitutional right will the courts subject the legislation to strict or exacting scrutiny. In such cases, the State must have a "compelling" purpose for the law and show that it's goals cannot be accomplished by less restrictive means. (Carey v. Population Services International (1977), 431 U.S. 678, 686, 52 L. Ed. 2d 675, 685, 97 S. Ct. 2010, 2016.) Few rights, however, have been identified as "fundamental," since only those rights "that lie at the heart of the relationship between the individual and a republican form of nationally integrated government" are deemed deserving of heightened judicial scrutiny. (People ex rel. Tucker v. Kotsos (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 88, 97.) Thus, in most cases involving substantive due process challenges to statutes, the courts give substantial deference to the legislative enactments.

In the present case we already have determined that the section here involved does not infringe upon the defendants' right of privacy protected by the fourteenth

amendment, and defendants do not argue that the statute implicates any other fundamental constitutional right or liberty. As such, the State need not show a "compelling interest" for the law. It is sufficient that there is a rational basis for the statute. That is, the law will be upheld if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. (Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. (1955), 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 99 L. Ed. 563, 572, 75 S. Ct. 461, 464; Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368; Hayen v. County of Ogle (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 413, 419; Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association v. Block (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 443, 453.) Under the rational-basis test, a statute is presumed to be valid, and the party challenging the statute has the burden of proving that the statute is irrational. (Hayen v. County of Ogle (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 413, 419; Pozner v. Mauck (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 250, 255.) As long as there is a conceivable basis for finding a rational relationship, the law will be upheld. McGowan v. Maryland (1961), 366 U.S. 420, 426, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393, 399, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 1105; Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368.

In challenging the section as exceeding the scope of the State's police power, the defendants principally rely on the case of People v. Fries (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 446. In Fries the court held that a statute requiring the operator or passenger of a motorcycle to wear protective headgear was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the purpose of the headgear requirement was to "safeguard the person wearing it" and was unrelated to the safety of the public at large. (42 Ill. 2d 446, 450.) It concluded that the statute constituted a "regulation of what is essentially a matter of personal safety" and exceeded the scope of the State's police power. (42 Ill. 2d 446, 450.) Here, too, defendants argue that the decision of whether or not to wear a safety belt is "essentially a matter of personal safety" and that any regulation restricting the individual's right to make such a decision exceeds the State's police power.

The State, on the other hand, maintains that Fries was wrongly decided, and it urges us to overrule that decision. It correctly notes that at present Fries stands alone in holding that a motorcycle helmet law is unconstitutional. The overwhelming weight of authority is that motorcycle-helmet laws are a valid exercise of the State's police

power. (See Kingery v. Chapple (Alaska 1972), 504 P.2d 831; State v. Beeman (1975), 25 Ariz. App. 83, 541 P.2d 409; Penney v. City of North Little Rock (1970), 248 Ark. 1158, 455 S.W.2d 132; Love v. Bell (1970), 171 Colo. 27, 465 P.2d 118;State v. Brady (Del. Super. 1972), 290 A.2d 322; Hamm v. State (Fla. 1980), 387 So. 2d 946; State v. Cotton (1973), 55 Hawaii 138, 516 P.2d 709; State v. Albertson (1970), 93 Idaho 640, 470 P.2d 300; City of Wichita v. White (1970), 205 Kan. 408, 469 P.2d 287; Everhardt v. City of New Orleans (1968) 253 La. 285, 217 So. 2d 400, appeal dismissed and cert. denied (1969), 395 U.S. 212, 23 L. Ed. 2d 214, 89 S. Ct. 1775; State v. Quinnam (Me. 1977), 367 A.2d 1032; Simon v. Sargent (D. Mass. 1972), 346 F. Supp. 277, aff'd (1972), 409 U.S. 1020, 34 L. Ed. 2d 312, 93 S. Ct. 463; Commonwealth v. Howie (1968), 354 Mass. 769, 238 N.E.2d 373, cert. denied (1968), 393 U.S. 999, 21 L. Ed. 2d 464, 89 S. Ct. 485; City of Adrian v. Poucher (1976) 398 Mich. 316, 247 N.W.2d 798; State v. Edwards (1970), 287 Minn. 83, 177 N.W.2d 40; State v. Cushman (Mo. 1970), 451 S.W.2d 17; State v. Eight Judicial District Court (1985), 101 Nev. 658, 708 P.2d 1022; State v. Merski (1973), 113 N.H. 323, 307 A.2d 825; State v. Krammes (1969), 105 N.J. Super. 345, 252 A.2d 223; City of Albuquerque v.Jones (1975), 87 N.M. 486, 535 P.2d 1337; People v. Bennett (1977), 89 Misc. 2d 382, 391 N.Y.S.2d 506; State v. Anderson (1969), 275 N.C. 168, 166 S.E.2d 49; State v. Odegaard (N.D. 1969), 165 N.W.2d 677; State v. Stouffer (1971), 28 Ohio App. 2d 229, 276 N.E.2d 651; Elliott v. City of Oklahoma City (Okla. Crim. App. 1970), 471 P.2d 944; State v. Fetterly (1969), 254 Or. 47, 456 P.2d 996; Commonwealth v. Kautz (1985), 341 Pa. Super. 374, 491 A.2d 864; State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi (1968), 104 R.I. 28, 241 A.2d 625; Arutanoff v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County (1969), 223 Tenn. 535, 448 S.W.2d 408; Ex Parte Smith (Tex. Crim. App. 1969), 441 S.W.2d 544; State v. Acker (1971), 26 Utah 2d 104, 485 P.2d 1038; State v. Solomon (1969), 128 Vt. 197, 260 A.2d 377; State v. Laitinen (1969), 77 Wash. 2d 130, 459 P.2d 789; State v. Zektzer (1975), 13 Wash. App. 24, 533 P.2d 399, cert. denied (1975), 423 U.S. 1020, 46 L. Ed. 2d 392, 96 S. Ct. 457; Bisenius v. Karns (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 42, 165 N.W.2d 377, appeal dismissed (1969), 395 U.S. 709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 655, 89 S. Ct. 2033.) Alternatively, the State contends that the statute being challenged here promotes valid public

interests and thus is distinguishable from the motorcycle helmet law found to be unconstitutional in Fries.

Defendants are correct in asserting that the primary goal of the section is to protect the individual driver and front-seat passenger from death or serious injury. As such, the statute interfers with the individuals' choice concerning his or her personal safety. However, arriving at those conclusions does not ipso facto mean that the law is devoid of any public benefit and is unconstitutional. Regardless of a law's primary objective, it will be upheld if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose. (Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368-69; Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association v. Block (1979), 75 I11. 2d 443, 453.) In that regard, the defendants have not persuaded us that the legislature could not have found that the law bears a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. The legislative debates clearly indicate that the legislators believed that safety-belt use would protect persons other than the belt wearers by helping drivers to maintain control of their vehicles, and that the law would promote that economic welfare of the State by reducing the public and private costs associated with serious injuries and deaths caused by automobile accidents.

During debates in the House of Representatives, a principal sponsor of the safety-belt legislation remarked:

"The Bill would not only protect drivers and passengers in the front seat, the Bill would also protect other people. It would protect other drivers. It would protect pedestrains on our highways and on our sidewalks. The reason for that, of course, is that even a minor * * * accident, can if * * * a car is driven by a person who doesn't have a seat belt, * * * result in that person losing control of the car and injuring other people on or about the car." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 212 (statement of Representative John Cullerton).)

Another legislator argues that if she were to drive an automobile without her safety belt fastened "and I lose control of my car, I am endangering others." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 223 (statement of Representative Josephine Oblinger).) The Governor, in signing the seat-belt law, also agreed that the law would help drivers to maintain control of their vehicles and avoid accidents with other motorists and pedestrians:

"Unbelted passengers in a motor vehicle literally become human projectiles in the event of a crash. Unbelted passengers

can interfere with the ability of an operator to respond to the collision, and unbelted drivers may lose control of a vehicle and thus cause death and injury to others." Letter of Governor James R. Thompson to the General Assembly indicating his intent to sign House Bill 2800 (Jan. 8, 1985).

The State can enact laws aimed at reducting traffic accidents, since such laws are clearly related to the health, welfare and safety of the public. We also believe that the legislature could rationally conclude that unbelted drivers and passengers endanger the safety of others. In upholding a law similar to the one here under review, the court in People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, 494 N.Y.S.2d 960, stated:

"A driver who is injured or who is jolted away from his vehicle's controls during a skid or by an initial impact, may well be less able to prevent or minimize injuries caused by an accident. Also, an unrestrained occupant of a vehicle may injure others inside or out of the vehicle during an accident. The preventing or reduction of such an injury seems to the Court to be a valid State interest." (129 Misc. 2d 993, , 494 N.Y.S.2d 960, 963.)

It also is conceivable that drivers who wear safety belts are less likely to fall asleep at the wheel, or to lose control of their vehicles in situations where the driver must apply the brakes suddenly, or in cases where a vehicle begins to skid or swerve. Safety belts can also prevent passengers from being thrown against the driver. And, as the State observes, children and other occupants who are wearing safety belts are less likely to distract the driver. See People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, , 494 N.Y.S.2d 960, 963; Druhot, The Constitutionality of the Illinois Mandatory Seat Belt Use Legislation, 74 Ill. B.J. 290, 296 (1986); Werber, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach To Seat Belt Issues, 29 Cleve. St. L. Rev. 217, 244 (1980).

Defendants argue that there is no statistical evidence showing that seat-belt use helps the driver to maintain control of his vehicle and avoid accidents with other motorists or pedestrains. Even assuming this argument is correct, it is without merit. "The fact that a congressional directive reflects unprovable assumptions about what is good for the people * * * is not a sufficient reason to find that statute unconstitutional" (Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 62, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 460, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2638), and a court "will not disturb a police regulation merely where there is room for a difference of

opinion as to its wisdom, necessity and expendiency." (City of Carbondale v. Brewster (1979), 78 I11. 2d 111, 115. See also Schuringa v. City of Chicago (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 504, 515.) Moreover, "the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it." (Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. (1955), 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 99 L. Ed. 563, 572, 75 S. Ct. 461, 464.) Here, we think that the legislature could rationally determine that the seat-belt-use law would serve the public safety and welfare by reducing the likelihood that a driver would lose control of his vehicle and jeopardize other motorists or pedestrians.

Another reason advanced by the State for the section is that the law promotes the economic welfare of the State by reducing the public costs associated with serious injuries and deaths caused by automobile accidents. The legislative history of the section indicates that legislators were concerned about the financial costs associated with highway accidents. Representative Cullerton remarked that, the safety-belt legislation "would clearly save money," asserting that "it cost the State over 800,000 dollars for a 26 year old person who is made a paraplegic as a result of a car crash." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 212 (statement of Representative John Cullerton).) Another Representative stated: "The lives we were save and the injuries that we avoid are the injuries and lives that we, the taxpayers, are very likely to be responsible for in the long run. We're not talking about somebody's own individual decision to end up in a car crash and find him or herself in a hospital for 20 years with that individual paying the bill. It's the taxpayers that are going to be paying those bills." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 220 (statement of Barbara Currie).) Senator James Philip, in urging passage of the seat-belt law, observed that " in 1982 in Illinois some seventy-five people were killed in automobiles [while] performing their job * * *. This costs Illinois employers some twelve million dollars." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Debates, June 21, 1984, at 159 (statement of Senator James Philip).) Senator Dawn Netsch remarked: "We intrude because the consequences of the thousands of people * * * who are injured and whose affictions then are passed on

to their families, to all of us in society * * *." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Debates, June 21, 1984, at 162 (statement of Senator Dawn Netsch).) Governor Thompson, in explaining his reasons for signing the legislation, estimated that the seat belt law would "save more than 300 lives in Illinois in the first year, will avoid nearly 43,000 injuries and save more than $ 400 million in costs." Letter of Governor James R. Thompson to the General Assembly indicating his intent to sign House Bill 2800 (Jan. 8, 1985).

It cannot be seriously questioned that the police power may be used to promote the economic welfare of the State, its communities and its citizens. "[I]n the interest of general welfare, the police power may be exercised to protect citizens and their businesses in financial and economic matters, [and] it may be exercised to protect the governments itself against potential financial loss." (Sherman-Reynolds, Inc. v. Mahin (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 323, 326.) A law whose aim is to reduce the private and public costs resulting from injuries and deaths caused by motor vehicle accidents is therefore within the police power of the State. In finding that a motorcycle helmet law was rationally related to the public welfare, the court in Simon v. Sargent (D. Mass. 1972), 346 F. Supp. 277, aff'd (1972), 409 U.S. 1020, 34 L. Ed. 2d 312, 93 S. Ct. 463, stated:

"From the moment of the injury, society picks the person up off the highway; delivers him to a municipal hospital and municipal doctors; provides him with unemployment compensation if, after recovery, he cannot replace his lost job, and, if the injury causes permanent disability, may assume the responsibility for his and his family's continued subsistence. We do not understand a state of mind that permits plaintiff to think that only he himself is concerned." (346 F. Supp. 277, 279, aff'd (1972), 409 U.S. 1020, 34 L. Ed. 2d 312, 93 S. Ct. 463.)

Because of the drain on private and public financial resources caused by highway accidents, society has a legitimate interest in minimizing injuries which result from such accidents. See Wells v. State (1985), A.D.2d 495 N.Y.S.2d 591; People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, 494 N.Y.S.2d 960; State v. Eighth Judicial District Court (1985), 101 Nev. 658, 708 P.2d 1022; State v. Beeman (1975), 25 Ariz. App. 83, 541 P.2d 409; Love v. Bell (1970), 171 Colo. 27, 465 P.2d 118; See also Druhot, The Constitutionality of the Illinois Mandatory Seat belt Use Legislation, 74 Ill. B.J. 290 (1986); Note, The Illinois Seat Belt Law: Should those Who Ride Decide?, 19 John

Marshall L. Rev. 193 (1985); Werber, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to Seat Belt Issues, 29 Cleve, St. L. Rev. 217, 222 (1980).

Defendants make several arguments concerning the effectiveness of safety belts in reducing injuries and arguments regarding the merits of alternative safety devices such as air bags. Defendants also contend that in some instances safety belts may cause injuries instead of preventing them. We need not consider these arguments, however, since they are proper subjects of discussion for the legislature, not the courts. (Hayden v. County of Ogle (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 413, 421; City of Carbondale v. Brewster (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 111, 115; Pozner v. Mauck (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 250, 255.) We believe that the General Assembly could reasonably assume that a law requiring drivers and front-seat passengers to wear safety belts will reduce traffic-related injuries and fatalities. (Wells v. State (1985), A.D.2d , 495 N.Y.S.2d 591; People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, 494 N.Y.S.2d 960.) Therefore, we hold that section 12.603.1 does not violate the due process clauses of the State and Federal constitutions. To the extent that People v. Fries (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 446, is inconsistent with our opinion, it is overruled.

Defendant Greene also filed a motion to strike certain portions of the briefs and appendices filed by the State and certain parties amicus curiae. This motion was taken with the case. Our review of the record shows that certain safety statistics relied on by the State and the amicus were not presented in the trial courts. Accordingly, defendant Greene's motion to strike this information is allowed.

For the reasons stated the judgments of the circuit courts of Marion, Effingham, Fayette and Champaign counties in cause Nos. 62719, 62799, 63705 and 63224 are reversed, and said causes are remanded to those respective courts for further proceedings.

Motion allowed;

judgments reversed;

causes remanded.

CLARK, C.J., and SIMON, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

ID: nht88-1.69

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 03/14/88

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Karl-Heinz Faber Vice President Product Compliance and Service Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. P.O. box 350 Montvale, NJ 07645

Dear Mr. Faber:

Thank you for your letter concerning the requirements of Standard No. 210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages. In particular, you asked for an interpretation of the provisions of S4.3 of the standard. I regret the delay in answering your questions.

S4.3 of Standard No. 210 provides, in part, that "Anchorages for automatic and for dynamically tested seat belt assemblies that meet the frontal crash protection requirements of S5.1 of Standard No. 208 (49 CFR Part 571.208) are exempt from the location requirements of this section." (Emphasis added.) You first asked the agency to confirm that anchorages to be used with automatic and dynamically tested safety belts that meet the requirements of S5.1 of Standard No. 208 are exempt from all of the anchora ge location requirements of S4.3. You are correct that S4.3 of Standard No. 210 provides that such anchorages are exempt from all the location requirements.

The amendment to exempt anchorages of dynamically tested seat belt assemblies from the anchorage location requirements of Standard No. 210 became effective on May 5, 1986, well in advance of the September 1, 1989 effective date for dynamic testing of man ual belts. This effective date indicates that the agency did not intend to limit the exemption from the anchorage location requirements to manual safety belts that were required to be dynamically tested. Additionally, the exemption applies to dynamically tested seat belt assemblies that "meet" the frontal crash protection requirements of Standard No. 208, rather than to vehicles "subject to" the frontal crash protection requirements of that Standard. This language indicates that NHTSA intended to allow manufacturers to take advantage of the exemption from the anchorage location requirements for dynamically tested safety belts before the dynamic testing requirements were applicable to such belts. Accordingly, if a vehicle is equipped with a manual safet y belt at either or both front outboard seating positions, and the anchorage or anchorages for those belts do not comply with the anchorage location requirements set forth in S4.3 of Standard No. 210, the manufacturer must certify that the belts attached at any such anchorage points comply with 55.1 of Standard No. 208.

In your second question, you asked the following:

We also understand that such dynamic testing may be combined with other compliance testing, and the vehicle or vehicles used may be equipped "as delivered" for sale to a consumer. Accordingly, the vehicle structure with built-in energy management feature s, seats with designed-in anti-submarining construction, energy absorbing instrument panel, collapsible steering column, driver and/or passenger airbag(s), anti-lacerative windshield glass, emergency tensioning retractors, etc. may be installed and funct ional, where applicable, during the compliance crash test.

During its compliance testing, NHTSA combines a test of the occupant crash protection capabilities of automatic or manual safety belts with testing done to determine compliance with other standards. The agency tests vehicles to the frontal barrier crash requirements of Standard Nos. 208, 212, 219, and 301 in a single barrier impact. In conducting these compliance tests, NHTSA tests vehicles in their "as delivered" form with all items of standard equipment present in the vehicle. Thus, if a vehicle has d evices, such as an air bag system or pre-tensioning devices for the belts, installed in the vehicle as items of standard equipment, NHTSA's compliance testing is conducted with those items in place and fully functioning. If our compliance testing shows t hat a vehicle tested with a manual safety belt at one or both front outboard seating positions complies with the occupant crash protection requirements of S5.1 of Standard No. 208, then the anchorages for the belt or belts would not be subject to the anc horage location requirements of S4.3 of Standard No. 210.

If you have any further questions, please let me know.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

April 20, 1987

Ms. Erica Z. Jones, Chief Counsel Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 Seventh Street, S.W. Washington, DC. 20590

Subject: Request for Interpretation Concerning FMVSS-210

Dear Ms. Jones: Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc.(MBNA) requests an interpretation of FMVSS-2IC "Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages-Passenger Cars, Multi-Purpose Passenger Vehicles, Trucks, and Buses". Paragraph S4.3 Location states, "Anchorages for automatic and for dyna mically tested seat belt assemblies that meet the frontal crash protection requirements of S5.1 of Standard No. 208 (49 CFR Part 571.208) are exempt from the location requirements of this section."

MBNA interprets the foregoing provision to mean that all of the anchorage location requirements under paragraph S4.3 (i.e. S 4.3.1, S 4.3.1.1, S 4.3.1.2, S 4.3.1.3, S 4.3.1.4, and S 4.3.2) are not applicable to seat belt assemblies which have been dynami cally tested via a vehicle crash test and meet the occupant protection criteria described in S5.1 of Standard No. 208. We also understand that such dynamic testing may be combined with other compliance testing, and the vehicle or vehicles used may be equ ipped "as delivered" for sale to a consumer. Accordingly, the vehicle structure with built-in energy management features, seats with designed-in anti-submarining construction, energy absorbing instrument panel, collapsible steering column, driver and/or passenger airbag(s), anti-lacerative windshield glass: emergency tensioning retractors , etc. may be installed and functional, where applicable, during the compliance crash test.

Ms. Erika Z. Jones Request for Interpretation Concerning FMVSS-210

The basis for our interpretation is set forth in the Agency's preamble comments to MVSS-208 (Part 571; S208-PRE28B) concerning mandatory dynamic testing where the preamble provides that ". . . the (dynamic testing) standard will assure that the vehicle's structure, safety belts, steering column, etc., perform as a unit to protect occupants, as it is only in such a test that the synergistic and combination effects of these vehicle components can be measured". This factor when coupled with the Agency's st atement that the best way to measure the performance of the safety belt/vehicle combination is through a vehicle crash test" fully supports our interpretation.

Accordingly, we would request that you confirm our interpretation that, during dynamic testing of seat belts, the vehicle should be equipped and functional as closely as possible to a new vehicle which would be sold to the consumer, and that such testing supplants the requirements of 54.3

Thank you in advance for your response.

Sincerely,

ID: aiam4350

Dear Mr. McCormick: This responds to your letters to our Administrator, concerning whethe your company should be subject to 49 CFR Part 544, *Insurer Reporting Requirements*, for the reports due not later than October 25, 1987. I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our rulemaking procedures to you.; As you know, we publish annual amendments to the listing of insuranc companies subject to the reporting requirements of Part 544. These amendments are made in accordance with the informal rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553. Those provisions require the agency to publish a proposed listing of insurers subject to the reporting requirements, and give the public an opportunity to comment on the proposal. After all comments are received, the agency evaluates the comments and publishes a final listing.; On May 28, 1987, we published a proposed listing of insurers that woul be subject to the reporting requirements for the October, 1987 reports, 52 FR 19898 (copy enclosed). As you will see, this proposed listing identifies your company as one that would be subject to the reporting requirements. The comment period for this proposal closes on July 13, 1987. The agency will consider all comments received as of that date in preparing the final listing of insurance companies required to file a report in October, 1987.; Pursuant to normal informal rulemaking procedures, your first letter o this subject was treated as a comment on the proposed listing and put in the public docket for this rulemaking action, along with any other comments we receive on the proposed listing. In your most recent letter, you stated that, in a telephone conversation with agency staff, you 'did not receive an adequate explanation' of why your company would be subject to these reporting requirements. Therefore, you stated that your company does not plan to file an October, 1987 report. Agency staff *cannot* offer any opinions about what the final agency decision on this matter will be before the decision has been made. No final decision can be made until all comments have been considered and the statutory provisions and past agency positions reexamined. This procedure will begin after July 13, 1987, when the comment period closes.; You should be aware of the fact that if your company is included in th final listing of subject insurance companies and you do not file the required report, this agency has authority to seek both a civil penalty and injunctive relief against your company, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 2028.; Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones, Chief Counsel

ID: aiam3968

Dear Senator Riegle: This letter is in further response to your inquiry concerning schoo bus seating issues raised by your constituent, Mr. Dennis Furr. I regret the delay in our response.; Mr. Furr is interested in amending our safety standards to limit th number of passengers that a school bus may carry. He suggests reducing the passenger capacity of a standard 72- passenger school bus by the use of different seat configurations.; I would like to begin by explaining that our agency has two sets o regulations, issued under different acts of Congress, that apply to school buses. The first of these, the motor vehicle safety standards issued under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (15 U.S.C. 1381-1426), apply to the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles. In a 1974 amendment to the Vehicle Safety Act, Congress directed us to issue standards on specific aspects of school bus safety, such as seating systems, windows and windshields, emergency exits, and fuel systems. The standards we issued became effective April 1, 1977, and apply to each school bus manufactured on or after that date. One of those standards is Standard No. 222, *School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash Protection*.; Your constituent is correct that our safety standards do not limit th overall passenger capacity of a school bus. This is because the agency is not aware of any safety problem associated with the way manufacturers rate the capacity of their buses. We believe that manufacturers should be able to design their school buses to carry any number of passengers, provided that the appropriate occupant protection requirements of Standard No. 222 are met.; Paragraph S4.1 of Standard No. 222 states that: >>>The number of seating positions considered to be in a bench seat i expressed by the symbol W, and calculated as the bench width in inches divided by 15 and rounded to the nearest whole number.; The number of seating positions in a bench seat, expressed by 'W,' i calculated to determine the amount of force school bus seats must withstand in order to provide adequate crash protection for passengers. School bus seats must comply with the standard's requirements for forward and rearward performance by withstanding specified amounts of applied energy. The amount of energy applied to a particular bench seat is dependent on the number of seating positions. As that number increases, the amount of force the seat must withstand likewise increases.; In accordance with S4.1, a 39-inch bench seat is assumed to have designated seating positions. We recognize that such seats may be occupied by fewer persons, but that calculation helps to assure that the seat provides adequate protection when occupied by the maximum number. School buses with 24 39-inch bench seats are therefore assumed to carry 72 passengers. The school bus manufacturer must ensure that each bench seat meets the forward and rearward performance requirements, and all other applicable requirements of Standard No. 222, based on the calculations of seating positions and the required force applications.; Mr. Furr suggests alternative seating configurations for school buses He suggests that bench seats on a school bus, currently designated by a manufacturer to carry 72 passengers, should be designed with rows of 47-inch and 31-inch bench seats. Mr. Furr believed that 47-inch bench seat and a 31-inch bench seat could carry 3 and 2 passengers, respectively, for a total passengers capacity of 60 for the school bus. He suggests a change in the regulation to reflect this design change.; NHTSA is not aware of any data indicating that there is a safet problem associated with the seating capacity of school buses to justify a rulemaking action amending Standard No. 222. From our experience with Standard No. 222, some school districts appear to have concerns that actions reducing seating capacity in their vehicles might result in the need to purchase additional buses at substantial costs. Since we are not aware of any information indicating that a safety need exists to regulate the capacity of a school bus, we do not believe that it is necessary to amend Standard No. 222 in the manner suggested by Mr. Furr. Further, no amendment is necessary to permit local school districts to order seat configurations such as those suggested by Mr. Furr. The districts may do so now as long as manufacturers can ensure that their school buses meet all the applicable performance requirements of our safety standards.; The second set of regulations administered by NHTSA was issued unde the authority of the Highway Safety Act of 1966 (23 U.S.C. 401-408). Those regulations, which are more in the nature of guidelines, apply to state highway safety programs and cover a wide range of subjects, including school buses. Highway Safety Program Standard No. 17 (HSPS 17), *Pupil Transportation Safety*, contains guidelines for the identification, maintenance, and operation of school vehicles. HSPS 17 does not set a limit on the seating capacity of school buses. It does, however, recommend that school districts design their bus routes to utilize fully the capacity of the bus, while avoiding standees. You may wish to consult with the State of Michigan to determine to what extent that state has adopted the provisions of HSPS 17.; Again, my apologies for the delay in responding. I hope thi information is helpful in responding to your constituent. Please let us know if we can be of further assistance.; Sincerely, Jeffrey R. Miller, Chief Counsel

ID: 20663geninfokim.df

Mr. Hoon Young Kim
c/o Fullerton Restaurant
2400 W. Fullerton
Chicago, IL 60647

Dear Mr. Kim:

This responds to your recent letter to us generally describing a child restraint system that you wish to manufacture. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) administers Federal requirements for the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles and certain items of new motor vehicle equipment, including child restraint systems.

We are authorized to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards to reduce highway crashes and deaths and injuries resulting from crashes. Under that authority, we issued Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 213, Child Restraint Systems (49 CFR 571.213), which sets forth requirements which must be met by all devices designed for use in a motor vehicle to restrain, seat or position children who weigh not more that 50 pounds. Standard No. 213 requires, among other things, that the restraint protect a test dummy during a 30 miles-per-hour (mph) crash while the restraint is secured to a test seat assembly with just a lap belt, that the restraint meet the flammability resistance requirements of Standard No. 302 and that the manufacturer provide detailed instructions on the proper use of the restraint. I have enclosed an information sheet that describes how you can obtain copies of these standards.

The United States does not use a certification process similar to that of the European community in which a manufacturer of motor vehicle equipment is required to deliver the equipment to be certified to a governmental agency for testing and approval. Instead, in the United States, the individual manufacturer must certify that its product complies with all applicable safety standards. It is up to the individual manufacturer to determine what data, test results, or other information it needs to enable it to certify that its child restraint complies with the requirements of Standard No. 213. We would certainly recommend that a manufacturer producing child restraints for the first time conduct some testing of the restraint prior to certifying compliance with Standard No. 213, especially for the protection requirements in a 30 mph crash. Once the manufacturer determines that its child restraint meets the requirements of Standard No. 213, it certifies that compliance by putting the appropriate language on the label permanently attached to the restraint.

For purposes of enforcement, this agency conducts spot checks of child restraints after they have been certified as complying with Standard No. 213, by purchasing and testing the child restraints according to the procedures specified in the standard. If the restraints pass the tests, no further steps are taken. If the child restraints fail the test and are determined not to comply with Standard No. 213, the manufacturer of the child restraint is subject to the recall responsibilities of our statute. Manufacturers must also ensure that their products are free of safety-related defects. Our statute specifies that, in the case of a child restraint which fails to comply with Standard No. 213 or contains a safety-related defect, the manufacturer must notify purchasers and either:

1. repair the child restraint, so that the defect or noncompliance is removed; or
2. replace the child restraint with an identical or reasonably equivalent child restraint which does not have the defect or noncompliance.

Whichever of these options is chosen, the child restraint manufacturer must bear the expense and cannot charge the child restraint owner for the remedy.

I have enclosed an information sheet that briefly describes the responsibilities of manufacturers of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment. Included among those responsibilities is a procedural requirement for manufacturer identification (49 CFR Part 566). Our regulation requires a manufacturer of equipment to which a standard applies (e.g., child restraint systems) to submit its name, address, and a brief description of the items of equipment it manufacturers to NHTSA within 30 days after it begins manufacture.

Please note two recent amendments to Standard No. 213 made by a March 5, 1999 final rule (copy enclosed). The first requires forward-facing child restraints to meet a new 28-inch head excursion requirement in addition to an existing 32-inch head excursion requirement. Another amendment requires child restraint systems manufactured on or after September 1, 2002 to be equipped with connectors that attach to an independent child restraint anchorage system in vehicles. We are in the process of completing our response to petitions for reconsideration of the March 1999 final rule. (The first part of our response was published on August 31, 1999, 64 FR 47566, copy enclosed.) As part of your responsibility as a manufacturer, you must keep current on the requirements affecting your manufacture and sale of child restraint systems.

Should you have any further questions or need more information on this subject, please contact Ms. Deirdre Fujita of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,
Frank Seales, Jr.
Chief Counsel
Enclosures
ref:213
d.11/5/99

ID: 86-6.1

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 12/01/86

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Francois Louis -- Governmental Affairs Director, Renault USA

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

ATTACHMT: 10/13/88 letter from Erika Z. Jones to Paul Utans (Std. 208); 8/11/88 letter from Paul Utans to Erika Z. Jones (occ 2405); 8/18/78 letter from Joseph J. Levin to D. Black (Std. 210)

TEXT:

Mr. Francis Louis Governmental Affairs Director Renault USA 1111 19th Street, NW Suite 1000 Washington, DC 20036

Thank you for your letter of October 17, 1986, to Dr. Richard Strombotne of this agency concerning Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection. Your letter was referred to this office for reply. You have asked a number of questions concerning how the requirements of the standard apply to the automatic restraint system Renault intends to use in one of its vehicles. The answers to your questions are discussed below.

You explained that Renault plans to use, at both front outboard seating positions, an automatic restraint system consisting of a motorized, detachable, two-point automatic belt and a knee bolster. You stated that the automatic restraint system meets all the Injury criteria of the standard when tested in the 30 mile per hour frontal barrier test of S5.1 of the standard. You also explained that Renault has decided to install voluntarily a manual lap belt with your automatic restraint system. You further stated that the addition of the manual lap belt does not affect the performance of the automatic restraint system, since your testing shows that the automatic restraint system can meet the injury criteria in a 30 mile per hour frontal barrier crash test both with and without the manual lap belt fastened.

As I understand your first question, you are, in essence, asking the agency to confirm that under S4.5.3 of the standard an automatic belt system with a single diagonal torso belt can be used to meet the frontal crash protection requirements of S4.1.2.1(a) and can also be substituted for a Type 1 or Type 2 safety belt to meet the requirements of S4.1.2.1(c)(2). As provided in S4.5.3 of the standard, an automatic safety belt system can be "used to meet the crash protection requirements of any option under S4 and in place of any seat belt assembly otherwise required by that option." Thus, you are correct that an automatic safety belt can be substituted for the Type 1 or Type 2 safety belt otherwise required by S4.1.2.1 (c)(2) of the standard. This means that a Renault vehicle equipped with an automatic safety belt would not be subjected to the lateral crash test of S5.2 or the dynamic rollover test of S5.3.

Your second and final question concerned how our safety standards, in particular Standard No. 210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages, would apply to a manual lap belt voluntarily installed by manufacturers with an automatic safety belt system. In a March 1, 1979 letter to Ford Motor Company, NHTSA stated that "active lap belts and their associated anchorages are not required to comply with Federal safety standards if installed voluntarily by a manufacturer in addition to a single, diagonal passive belt." In responding to Ford, NHTSA also noted that in past interpretations the agency has stated that "systems or components installed in addition to required safety systems are not required to meet Federal safety standards, provided the additional components or systems do not destroy the ability of required systems (the passive belt in this case) to comply with Federal safety systems." In Renault's case, the addition of the manual lap belt does not appear to affect the automatic safety belt, since you stated that Renault can meet the frontal crash protection requirements of Standard No. 208 both with and without the manual lap belt fastened.

If you have any further questions, please let me know.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

October 17, 1986

Dr. Richard Strombotne Office of Vehicle Safety Standards National Highway Transportation Safety Administration Room 5320 400 Seventh Street, SW Washington, DC 20590

Reference: FMVSS 208 - Request for Interpretation

Dear Dr. Strombotne:

As of September 1, 1987, Renault intends to sell on the US market a vehicle equipped with a passive restraint system at both front out-board seating positions consisting of:

- a motorized detachable thoracic diagonal belt, with a 2-point anchorage on the body of the vehicle, and - a knee bolster.

As required by Standard 208, all injury criteria are satisfied when the vehicle is tested in accordance with S.5.1.

Since a webbing is an integral part of our passive protection device, S.4.5.3 is applicable. We interpret S.4.5.3 to say that "the torso webbing offers a similar level of protection in lateral/rollover crashes as does a single lap belt mounted in conjunction with the knee bolster".

In other words, this means that "in passive systems including a knee bolster, a webbing that is exclusively pelvic or the addition of a lap belt to the existing torso belt would not appreciably upgrade the quality of protection that is offered to the occupants in lateral/rollover crashes by a purely thoracic webbing".

We voluntarily chose to comply with S4.1.2.1.c.2 of Standard 208, that is. to furnish a lap belt, so that compliance with the lateral/ rollover test requirements would not be necessary. Consequently, the upper webbing is no less efficient than a lap belt. Therefore, we are not obligated to provide a lap belt at all, and if we do, it is purely on a non-compulsory basis (this obviously does not apply to air bags when no torso webbing is supplied). However, in order to cover the widest range of crash situations, we decided to offer a seat-mounted lap belt anyway. The requirements of S.5.1 are still met with or with- out that additional belt. As our lap belt is not compulsory, it is installed voluntarily, and thus does not have to comply with any other requirement.

Could you please confirm to us that our interpretation as stated here is correct in its entirety? If it is incorrect, how are we to interpret S.4.5.3 properly and what requirements then apply to our active lap belt? In particular, what loads and location requirements have to be considered in order to meet FMVSS 210?

Thank you in advance for your response to these questions.

Sincerely,

Francois Louis Governmental Affairs Director Washington, DC

ID: nht92-9.23

DATE: February 5, 1992

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: William A. Boehly -- Associate Administrator for Enforcement, NHTSA

COPYEE: Associate Administrator for Rulemaking; Director, Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance

TITLE: Subject: ACTION: OVSC's Request for Legal Interpretation, FMVSS 210

TEXT:

This responds to the December 20, 1991, request from the Director of the Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance for an interpretation of the phrase "the nearest contact point of the belt with the hardware attaching it to the anchorage" in S4.3.1.1 of Standard No. 210 as it applies to a conversion van manufactured by Glaval, Inc.

These Glaval vans have seats in which a rigid metal bracket is attached to the anchorage by means of a bolt on one end and the webbing of the belt passes through the rigid metal bracket at the other end. The rigid metal brackets can pivot around the bolt, depending on how tightly the bolt is fastened down. Regardless of how much the bolt is tightened, it would seem that the bracket would pivot if the belt system were restraining an occupant in a crash.

S4.3.1.1 of Standard No. 210 requires a line from either the seating reference point or another point to the nearest contact point of the belt with the hardware attaching it to the anchorage to form an angle with the horizontal of not less than 20 degrees and not more than 75 degrees. The issue in this instance is whether the "nearest contact point of the belt with the hardware attaching it to the anchorage" should be determined with reference to where the webbing passes through the upper end of the rigid metal bracket or with reference to the bolt on the lower end of the rigid metal bracket.

Previous agency interpretations have defined the "nearest contact point of the belt with the hardware attaching it to the anchorage" as the contact point between the webbing and the metal or rigid plastic hardware which is nearest the SgRP. Applying this concept to the design in question would result in the nearest contact point being determined with reference to the upper end of the rigid metal bracket through which the belt webbing passes.

An exception to this general rule is belt designs with flexible wire stalks. Even though these stalks are typically plastic-coated metal, the wire stalks are more akin to webbing (because of their flexibility) than to metal or rigid plastic hardware. Because of this flexibility, NHTSA has said that the nearest contact point for these wire stalks is not the upper end of these stalks where the webbing contacts it, but the lower end of the stalk where it is anchored to the vehicle.

In addition, NHTSA said in a February 15, 1973 letter to Mr. Kato of Nissan that, if a rigid bracket can be rotated around its attachment bolt, the centerline of the attachment bolt would be considered the "nearest contact point" for the purposes of S4.3.1.1 of Standard No. 210.

It is my opinion that the letter to Nissan is of general applicability to safety belt systems in which the terminal hardware on the belt is free to pivot around the anchorage bolt. The purpose of the anchorage location requirement is to ensure that the webbing crosses an occupant's body at an angle that is neither too shallow or too steep. The effective angle of the webbing is determined by the nearest point on the vehicle that does not alter its location under the influence of non-crash stresses on the webbing. In the case of the Glaval vans, as in the Nissan situation, the anchorage bolt is the fixed point around which the belt and its related hardware pivot and should be used as the "nearest contact point" under S4.3.1.1 of Standard No. 210.

You should note that my opinion is premised on the assumption that the metal bracket used by Glaval is free to pivot around the anchorage bolt. If the bracket were fixed in place, the "nearest contact point" for purposes of S4.3.1.1 would be the point at which the webbing contacts the upper end of the bracket.

ID: aiam0301

Dear Mr. McDonald: This is in reply to your letter of February 4, 1971, in which yo submitted for our review a draft of a label that you intend to use on your Bobby-Mac baby chair in accordance with paragraph S4.1 of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 213. We have restated the parts of your label whose compliance with the requirements of S4.1 is questionable, followed by our comments.; >>>1. 'In each position, reclining to upright, Bobby-Mac exceed Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 213 requirements for child seating systems.'<<<; We assume that you intend this statement to be your certification pursuant to Section 114 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, that the Bobby-Mac seat complies with Standard No. 213. While certification is not required to be placed on the label by S4.1, placing it there is not inconsistent with either Section 114 of the Act of Standard No. 213. However, we do not consider the statement you have used to be an adequate certification statement. This is because when read literally, the statement deals only with the static force requirements of the standard, as the other requirements, such as those for labeling (S4.1), providing instructions (S4.2), adjustments (S4.3), and others, are neither concerned with the 'position' of the child seat nor can they be 'exceeded.' You must certify compliance with all the requirements of the standard, and your statement should be changed accordingly. Should you wish to use it, the following statement, for child seats manufactured on or after April 1, 1971, would be satisfactory: 'This child seating system conforms to all Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to it on the date of manufacture shown below.'; >>>2. 'Bobby-Mac can only be used in cars with standard auto seat bel which must be used to secure Bobby-Mac safely on front or rear auto seat. In vehicles with seats more elevated from floor than usual passenger auto, thereby not permitting sufficient length in auto seat belt to loop around Bobby-Mac, or if for any reason auto seat belt is short, auto dealer or auto belt manufacturer can supply belt lengthener.'<<<; You have apparently placed this statement on the label to comply wit paragraph S4.1(e) of the standard which requires a statement describing in general terms the types of vehicles and designated seating positions in those vehicles in which the system is recommended or not recommended for use. It is your responsibility under the requirement to make certain that the types of vehicles you recommend have seat belts that are long enough to use the Bobby-Mac as recommended. You have stated that the Bobby-Mac can be used with a standard auto seat belt, but you have also indicated that there are types of vehicles or belt conditions with which the Bobby-Mac should not be used without some modification. We believe that your exceptions should be stated more objectively, such as prescribing the minimum belt loop length above the seat cushion that is required, so that a consumer can more accurately determine whether you are recommending the Bobby-Mac for use in his vehicle.; With reference to your recommendation concerning seat belt lengthener if these lengtheners are not available by April 1, 1971, your label would not comply with the requirement. If they are available your label should describe them in sufficient detail, such as by part number, so that consumers will know precisely what they must obtain in order to properly install the Bobby-Mac seat. Your seat would be required to meet the force requirements of the standard when tested in the vehicles in which you recommend it for use and using any of the seat belt modifiers that you recommend for use with it.; >>>3. 'When Bobby-Mac is used for older, taller youngster, it must b used on auto seat whose seat back or head restraint extends at least 6 inches above top of Bobby-Mac seat bucket.'<<<; In this case, you indicate that a child of a certain height must b placed at only certain seating positions. In order to provide consumers with some objective criteria by which they can determine whether Bobby-Mac is appropriate for their vehicles, the minimum height of the child that needs the additional head restraint protection should be provided, rather than describing him as merely 'older' or 'taller.' In addition, it would be preferable if you specified the total seat back height above the seat cushion that is necessary for the children you have in mind, rather than indicating this measurement as the distance from the top of the child seat bucket. The information would be more useful to consumers, as it would allow them to determine the appropriateness of the Bobby-Mac without first obtaining one.; >>>4. Finally, based upon the photographs submitted with your letter the Bobby-Mac seat does not appear to be a rearward-facing child seat. If this is the case, the statement, 'For use only on forward-facing vehicle seats,' as required by S4.1(g), must be included on the label.<<<; Please write if you have further questions. Sincerely, Lawrence R. Schneider, Acting Chief Counsel

ID: nht71-4.36

DATE: 11/01/71

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Lawrence R. Schneider; NHTSA

TO: Renault, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: We regret the continuing difficulty of communication concerning paragraph S4.1.2.2 of Standard No. 208. As we understand the question stated in your letters of September 14 and October 11, 1971, you have asked whether a passenger car that has passive 3-point belts at the front positions and that conforms to S4.1.2.2(b) by use of these belts will also have to have Type 1 belts at those positions and conform to S4.1.2.2(c).

It was our intent in adopting the passive seat belt requirement, S4.5.3 to permit manufacturers to substitute a Type 1 passive assembly or a Type 2 passive assembly with detachable or non-detachable shoulder belt for any assembly under an option that specifies a Type 1 assembly or a Type 2 assembly with detachable shoulder belt. Therefore, even though the assemblies specified under S4.1.2.2 are required to be Type 1 or Type 2 with detachable shoulder belts, a passive assembly used in place of any belt under S4.1.2.2 could have a non-detachable shoulder belt. In the light of questions rained by Renault and others, we are considering an amendment to S4.5.3 to clarify this point.

With specific reference to your question, a 3-point passive assembly may be used to meet the passive protection requirements of S4.1.2.2(b). Such an assembly(Illegible Word) not have a detachable shoulder belt. Since S4.5.3 provides that it may be used in

place of a Type 1 assembly, the passive assembly may be used in its 3-point configuration to meet the requirements of S4.1.2.2(c). The effect of using a 3-point passive assembly to meet subparagraph (c) is to make the test requirements of (b) and (c) identical.

Please advise us if further clarification is necessary.