NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
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ID: 08-003469drn-revOpenDavid M. Mihalick, Standards Compliance Manager Thor Industries, Inc. 419 West Pike Street, P.O. Box 629 Jackson Center, OH 45334-0629 Dear Mr. Mihalick: This responds to your letter in which you asked about certain labeling requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) Nos. 110, Tire selection and rims and motor home/recreation vehicle trailer load carrying capacity information for motor vehicles with a GVWR of 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) or less, and 120, Tire selection and rims and motor home/recreation vehicle trailer load carrying capacity information for motor vehicles with a GVWR of more than 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds), with respect to motor homes. You wrote your letter in light of amendments made to the standards in a final rule published in December 2007.[1] You asked whether the number of safety belt-equipped seating positions and their resulting occupant weight can be greater than the stated occupant and cargo carrying capacity (OCCC). For reasons discussed below, the answer to this question is no. By way of background, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue and enforce Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSSs) for new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. See 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301. FMVSS Nos. 110 and 120 are two of the standards we have issued. Manufacturers are required to certify that their vehicles and equipment meet applicable standards. NHTSA does not approve motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, nor do we endorse any commercial products. FMVSS Nos. 110 and 120 require motor homes to have OCCC labels that, among other things, include the following information: THE COMBINED WEIGHT OF OCCUPANTS AND CARGO SHOULD NEVER EXCEED XXX KG OR XXX LBS and Safety belt equipped seating capacity: XXX. Under NHTSA's certification regulation, Part 567, manufacturers must assign a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) to a new vehicle. The term GVWR is defined in 49 CFR Part 571.3 as "the value specified by the manufacturer as the loaded weight of a single vehicle." The GVWR informs vehicle owners how heavily the vehicle may safely be loaded. It also affects the vehicle's loading and other test conditions for the safety standards to which the vehicle must be certified, and at which NHTSA conducts any relevant compliance testing. Under Part 567, vehicle manufacturers cannot specify a GVWR that is less than the sum of (1) the unloaded vehicle weight (including maximum capacity of all fluids necessary for operation of the vehicle),[2] (2) the rated cargo and luggage load, and (3) 150 pounds times the number of the vehicles designated seating positions.[3] See 567.4(g)(3), 567.5(b)(2)(iii) and 567.5(d)(2)(iii). The combined weight for occupants (calculated by multiplying 150 pounds times the number of the vehicles designated seating positions) and cargo cannot, therefore, be more than the GVWR of the vehicle minus the unloaded vehicle weight. You specifically asked whether the number of safety belt-equipped seating positions and their resulting occupant weight can be greater than the stated occupant and cargo carrying capacity (OCCC). We assume that each safety belt-equipped seating position would be consistent with the definition of designated seating position set forth at 49 CFR 571.3. Thus, the requirements of Part 567 would prohibit any design where the sum of the vehicles unloaded vehicle weight plus 150 pounds times the number of safety-belt equipped seating positions exceeded the GVWR, irrespective of the rated cargo and luggage load. The requirements of FMVSS Nos. 110 and 120 serve to reinforce these requirements of Part 567. Standard No. 110 - In the December 2007 final rule, a new S9 was added to FMVSS No. 110. For motor homes and recreation vehicle (RV) trailers, the single stage or final stage manufacturer must affix either a motor home occupant and cargo carrying capacity (OCCC) label (Figure 3) or a RV trailer cargo carrying capacity (CCC) label (Figure 4) to its vehicles that meets specified requirements, including the following: S9.3.2 The weight value for load carrying capacity on the RV load carrying capacity labels (Figures 3 and 4) must be displayed to the nearest kilogram with conversion to the nearest pound and must be such that the vehicle does not exceed its GVWR when loaded with the stated load carrying capacity. The UVW and the GVWR used to determine the RVs load carrying capacity must reflect the weights and design of the motor home or RV trailer as configured for delivery to the dealer/service facility. Moreover, S9.3.6 states: For RVs, the vehicle capacity weight values and the seating capacity values (motor homes only) on the placard required by S4.3 or S4.3.5 must agree with the load carrying capacity weight values and the safety belt equipped seating capacity (motor homes only) on the RV load carrying capacity labels. (Figures 3 and 4). To clarify, FMVSS No. 110, paragraph S.4.3, requires that vehicles including motor homes be labeled with a value for the vehicle capacity weight on the vehicle placard. The vehicle capacity weight is defined as, the rated cargo and luggage load plus 68 kilograms (150 pounds) times the vehicle designated seating capacity. The requirement that these various values must agree with each other means that for motor homes with GVWR of 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) or less, the number of designated seating positions (at 150 pounds per position, as specified in 49 CFR Part 567) must equal the number of safety belt-equipped seating positions. The occupant weight subtotal added to the cargo carrying capacity must equal the load carrying capacity weight on the OCCC label. In addition, the load carrying capacity weight values must be the same on both labels required by FMVSS No. 110. Finally, as provided in S9.3.2, the vehicle must not exceed its GVWR when loaded with the stated load carrying capacity weight. Standard No. 120 In the December 2007 final rule, a new S10. was added to FMVSS No. 120. For motor homes and recreation vehicles, the single stage or final stage manufacturer must affix either a motor home occupant and cargo carrying capacity (OCCC) label (Figure 1) or a RV trailer cargo carrying capacity (CCC) label (Figure 2) to its vehicles that meets specified requirements, including the following: S10.4.2 The weight value for load carrying capacity on the RV load carrying capacity labels (Figures 1 and 2) must be displayed to the nearest kilogram with conversion to the nearest pound and must be such that the vehicles weight does not exceed its GVWR when loaded with the stated load carrying capacity. The UVW and the GVWR used to determine the RVs load carrying capacity must reflect the weights and design of the motor home or RV trailer as configured for delivery to the dealer/service facility. Standard No. 120 does not include a provision comparable to S9.3.6 of Standard No. 110, since it does not include a separate placard requirement for information about vehicle capacity weight values and seating capacity values. However, given the fact that Standard Nos. 110 and 120 use the same terminology for the OCCC labels, as well as the relationship between the OCCC label requirements and those of Part 567, we interpret these terms to have the same meaning. Thus, the load carrying capacity weight on the Standard No. 120 OCCC label must reflect the sum of the rated cargo and luggage load plus 68 kilograms (150 pounds) times the number of designated seating positions. As noted earlier, we assume that each safety belt-equipped seating position would be consistent with the definition of designated seating position set forth at 49 CFR 571.3. Finally, as provided in S10.4.2, the vehicle must not exceed its GVWR when loaded with the stated load carrying capacity weight. We note that, in your letter, you stated that Giving a vehicle owner the flexibility to choose between the amount of cargo and number of people they transport is a definite advantage to that customer. FMVSS No 110 and 120 permit this type of flexibility. The OCCC labels provide owners with a load carrying capacity value that they may use for various combinations of number of occupants and cargo. However, vehicles may not have a GVWR that is less than the sum of (1) the unloaded vehicle weight (including maximum capacity of all fluids necessary for operation of the vehicle), (2) the rated cargo and luggage load, and (3) 150 pounds times the number of the vehicles designated seating positions. I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely yours, Stephen P. Wood Acting Chief Counsel ref:110#120#567 d.7/24/09 [1] 72 FR 68442, December 4, 2007. [2] "Unloaded vehicle weight" is defined in 49 CFR 571.3 as "the weight of a vehicle with maximum capacity of all fluids necessary for operation of the vehicle, but without cargo, occupants, or accessories that are ordinarily removed from the vehicle when they are not in use." [3] A different requirement applies to school buses. |
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ID: nht90-4.42OpenTYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA DATE: October 12, 1990 FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA (Signature by Kenneth N. Weinstein) TO: Don James -- Contracts, Stone Bennett Corporation TITLE: None ATTACHMT: Attached to copy of 54 FR 29042, July 11, 1989 and 55 FR 1226, January 12, 1990 regarding 49 CFR Part 571 (text omitted); Also attached to letter dated 2-27-90 from D. James to NHTSA (OCC 4486); Also attached to diagram of the toggle installati on & envelope (graphics omitted); Also attached to diagram of control panel with auto neutral (graphics omitted); Also attached to diagram of control panels (text and graphics omitted). TEXT: This responds to your letter concerning Federal Motor vehicle Safety Standard No. 102, Transmission Shift Lever Sequence, Starter Interlock, and Transmission Braking Effect. You asked about the standard's display identification requirements for automati c transmission vehicles without a gear shift lever park position. Your questions are addressed below. By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) does not provide approvals of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, it is the responsibility of th e manufacturer to ensure that its vehicles and equipment meet all applicable requirements. The following represents our opinion based on the facts provided in your letter. Standard No. 102 sets forth the following display identification requirements for automatic transmission vehicles without a gear shift park position: S3.1.4 Identification of shift lever positions. . . . S3.1.4.2 Except as specified in S3.1 4.3, if the transmission shift lever sequence does not include a park position, identification of shift lever positions, including the positions in relation to each other and the position selected, shall be displayed in view of the driver at all times when a driver is present in the driver's seating position. S3.1.4.3 Such information need not be displayed when the ignition is in a position that is used only to start the vehicle. You asked about several similar designs for shift control consoles. In addition to including a mechanism for shifting the transmission (push buttons or toggle levers), the consoles incorporate a display which lists the particular gear position which has been selected, e.g., "R" for reverse. No other gear positions are shown. In at least some of the designs, the display is an electronic one. You asked about the "acceptability" of providing a label indicating the gear position sequence on the body of the shift control consoler e.g., "1 2 D N R." Drawings provided with your letter indicate that the label would be provided directly adjacent to the gear position display. As indicated above, section S3.1.4.2 requires identification of shift lever positions, including the positions in relation to each other and the position selected, to be displayed in view of the driver. While your designs do identify the gear position selected, they do not , in the absence of an added label, identify the shift lever positions in relation to each other. The additional label would, however, provide such information. Section S3.1.4.2 also requires that the specified information be displayed in view of the driver at all times when a driver is present in the driver's seating position (except when the ignition is in a position that is used only to start the vehicle). T he times when display is required includes situations in which the ignition is "off." Since your designs use electronic technology to identify the gear position selected, a vehicle equipped with your design might not meet this requirement, at least in t he absence of a device which activates the display whenever a driver is present. It is our understanding that "permanent" display is not possible with electronic technology, due to battery drain. However, if the gear position display is turned off with the ignition (the most obvious means of avoiding battery drain), this requirement would not be met. This is because the display would not function when a driver is in the driver's seating position (before leaving the vehicle upon entering the vehicle a t a later time) while the ignition is "off". As you are aware, NHTSA has proposed new requirements for the purpose of facilitating the use of electronic technology. See 55 FR 1226, January 12, 1990. If amendments are adopted based on that proposal, the analysis presented above could change. Attached is a copy of 54 FR 29042, 7-11-89 and 55 FR 1226, 1-12-90 regarding 49 CFR Part 571 and FMVSS 201 (text omitted). |
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ID: nht76-2.29OpenDATE: 01/07/76 FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; R. B. Dyson; NHTSA TO: Motorcycle Industry Council, Inc. TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of December 30, 1975, asking whether Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, which permits the manufacture of motor-driven cycles whose top speed is 30 mph, without turn signal lamps, preempts a State requirement that all motor vehicles be equipped with such lamps. The answer to your question is yes. Even though a State as in your hypothetical may not have defined "motor vehicle," or its definition of a vehicle category differs from a definition in 49 CFR 571.3(b) (e.g. where a State defines a motor-driven cycle as a "bicycle"), it is preempted by Section 103(d) from establishing or maintaining in effect a safety standard that differs from a Federal standard covering the same aspect of performance. Accordingly, since @ 4.1.1.26 of 49 CFR 571.108, Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment excuses low speed motor-driven cycles from the requirement that they be equipped with turn signal lamps, a State cannot require them on identical vehicles. I hope this answers your question. YOURS TRULY, MOTORCYCLE INDUSTRY COUNCIL, December 30, 1975 Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration The Motorcycle Industry Council, Inc., representing manufacturers and distributors of motorcycles and motorcycle parts and accessories requests an advisory opinion from counsel regarding certain issues that have surfaced at the state level subsequent to NATSA's motordriven cycle/moped ruling of October 1974. Issue: Equipment requirements When state law requires that "every licensed motor vehicle . . . shall be equipped with electric turn signal lamps . . ." without further defining "motor vehicle". There appears to be a conflict between the state statute and the federal regulation which exempts certain motor driven cycles from this requirement. Question: Does Federal Regulation (49 CFR 571.108) exempting motordriven cycles of 5 hp or less whose speed attainable in one mile is 30 mph or less from the requirement to be equipped with turn signals, preempt in the case where equipment requirements (turn signals) are specified by the state for all licensed motor vehicles? Melvin R. Stahl Vice President Government Relations MOTOR VEHICLE DEPARTMENT May 17, 1972 MEMORANDUM: KANSAS COUNTY TREASURERS, SHERIFFS' DEPARTMENTS AND KANSAS HIGHWAY PATROL Re: ELECTRIC TURN SIGNAL LAMPS. K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 8-590a(b) "After December 31, 1971, every licensed motor vehicle; also every licensed trailer, semitrailer and pole trailer shall be equipped with electric turn signal lamps meeting the requirements of K.S.A. 1970 Supp. 8-590(b): (Emphasis added) K.S.A. 8-126(b), the registration section of the Motor Vehicle Code, defines a motor vehicle as "Every vehicle, as herein defined, which is self-propelled." K.S.A. 8-501, the regulatory or enforcement section of the Motor Vehicle Code, defines a motor vehicle as "Every vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolly wires, but not operated upon rails." K.S.A. 8-126(d), the registration section of the Motor Vehicle Code, defines a motorcycle as "Every motor vehicle designed to travel on not more than three (3) wheels in contact with the ground, except any such vehicle as may be included within the term "tractor" as herein defined. K.S.A. 9-501, the regulatory or enforcement section of the Motor Vehicle Code, defines a motorcycle as "Every motor vehicle having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel on not more than three (3) wheels in contact with the ground, but excluding a tractor." Based upon the foregoing definitions from the registration section of the Motor Vehicle Code and the regulatory or enforcement section of the Motor Vehicle Code, it does appear that they are generally in harmony in the definition of a motorcycle as a motor vehicle. The question then arises -- are the County Treasures of Kansas obligated to sell registration (license plates or tags) to those persons making application therefore, assuming the application is otherwise in proper form, if such person in fact does not have his motor vehicle (motorcycle) equipped with electric turn signal lamps? It is our opinion that they are so obligated. The Legislature of Kansas did not set forth any provision for refusing the sale of registration or license plates in the registration section of the Motor Vehicle Code for failing to have the motor vehicle (motorcycle) equipped with electric turn signal lamps. Such equipment is not a condition precedent to the sale of registration. The next question for consideration -- Are the law enforcement officers of Kansas obligated to enforce the provision of K.S.A. 8-590a(b)? It is our opinion that they are so obligated. The 1971 Sessin of the Kansas Legislature clearly set forth their mandate in K.S.A. 8-590a(b) that "After December 31, 1971, every licensed motor vehicle . . . shall be equipped with electric turn signal lamps meeting the requirements of K.S.A. 1970 Supp. 8-590a(b). K.S.A. 8-590(b) clearly sets forth the requirements for electric turn signals and K.S.A. 8-590(b) sets forth that the "Preceding section [is] supplemental to [the] uniform act. Thus, there can be no mistake in determining legislative intent. The question then arises -- May a State Legislature pass a law which interferes with or is contrary to the laws of Congress? We are of the opinion that they cannot. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution was challenged as early as 1824 in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 1. At page 210 and 211, Chief Justice Marshall said that: ". . . in exercising the power of regulating their own purely internal affairs, whether "of trading or police, the states may sometimes enact laws, the validity of which depends on their interfering with, and being contrary to, an act of congress passed in pursuance of the constitution, the court will enter upon the inquiry, whether the laws of New York, as expounded by the highest tribunal of that state, have, in their application to this case, come into collision with an act of congress, and deprived a citizen of a right to which that act entitles him. Should this collision exist, it will be immaterial, whether those laws were passed in virtue of a concurrent power 'to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states,' or, in virtue of a power to regulate their domestic trade and police. In one case and the other, the acts of New York must yield to the law of congress; and the decision sustaining the privileges they confer, against a right given by a law of the Union, must be erroneous. This opinion has been frequently expressed in this court, and is founded, as well on the nature of the government, however, it has been contended, that if a law passed by a state, in the exercise of its acknowledged sovereignty comes into conflict with a law passed by congress in pursuance of the constitution, they affect the subject, and each other, like equal opposing powers. But the framers of our constitution foresaw this state of things, and provided for it, by declaring the supremacy not only of itself, but of the laws made in pursuance of it. The nullity of any act, *inconsistent with the constitution, is produced by the declaration, that the constitution is the supreme law. The appropriate application of that part of the clause which confers the same supremacy on laws and treaties, is to such acts of the state legislatures as do not transcend their powers, interfere with, or are contrary to, the laws of congress, made in pursuance of the constitution, or some treaty made under the authority of the United States. In every such case, the act of congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the state, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it." This decision in the Gibbons Case supra has been followed in many other cases before the United States Supreme Court among those cases are Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, Florida Lime and Avocado Growers Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, and Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637. Finally, congress in its wisdom has delegated to the Secretary of Transportation the duty and obligation of establishing certain Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards of which the foregoing statute relating to electric turn devices is one. However, Congress had indicated to the states that such standard should be effective on December 31, 1972 (or January 1, 1973). Following this congressional mandate the Kansas Legislature enacted into law K.S.A. 8-590a(b) to be effective after December 31, 1971. The final question than -- Does K.S.A. 8-590a(b) passed by the 1971 Session of the Kansas Legislature interfere with, or is it contrary to the laws of Congress? We are of the opinion it is not. December 31, 1972 was the final date -- not the commencement date -- that states would enact a law relating to turn signal devices on motorcycles. Further, K.S.A. 8-590a(b) does not interfere with the marketing of the manufacturers products. The manufacturers remain free to market their products -- (there is no such restriction in K.S.A. 8-590a(b)) -- the purchaser may register his vehicle -- (there is no such restriction on registration) -- and thereupon, the burden, if any, is upon the owner to have his vehicle equipped with the proper electric turn signal devices. Paragraph 571.20 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards issued on May 13, 1971, provided in part as follows: "It is the position of this agency, therefore, that under the Act and the regulatory scheme that has been established by its authority a State may not regulate motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment, with respect to aspects of performance covered by Federal standards, by requiring prior State approval before sale or otherwise restricting the manufacture, sale or movement with the State of products that conform to the standards. This interpretation does not preclude State enforcement of standards by other reasonable procedures that do not impose undue burdens on the manufacturers, including submission of products for approval within reasonable time limits, as long as manufacturers are free to market their products while the procedures are being followed, as they are under the Federal scheme. (36 F.R. 10744--June 2, 1971)" (emphasis added) In conclusion, it is our opinion that the manufacturer and dealer may sell motorcycles until December 31, 1972 without having electric turn signal devices; that the purchaser may register such vehicle so purchased; but during the course of operation of a motorcycle on the streets and highways in Kansas such operator of a motorcycle without the electric turn signal devices would be amenable to the regulatory and enforcement section of the motor vehicle code K.S.A. 8-501 et seq. VERN MILLER, Attorney General State of Kansas ELTON D. LOBBAN, Superintendent Motor Vehicle Department State of Kansas |
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ID: aiam3090OpenMr. Karl-Heinz Ziwica, Safety & Emission Control Engineering, BMW of North America, Inc., Montvale, New Jersey 07645; Mr. Karl-Heinz Ziwica Safety & Emission Control Engineering BMW of North America Inc. Montvale New Jersey 07645; Dear Mr. Ziwica: This is in reply to your letter of May 16, 1979, to Mr. Schwartz of m office, and in confirmation of your subsequent telephone conversation with him.; You wish to know whether Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 115 *Vehicle identification number*, permits BMW to use all the permissible numerical digits in the 11th position of the vehicle identification number (VIN) for each of its two plants, as long as each VIN in its entirety assigned to each individual vehicle uniquely identifies its plant of manufacture. A system such as you suggest was proposed in the notice of proposed rulemaking for this standard issued on January 16, 1978 (Docket No. 1-22, Notice 4, 43 FR 2189). The response to this particular proposal was negative, and the rule issued on August 17, 1978, withdrew it. Consequently, the 11th character of the VIN must in and of itself be decipherable into the plant of manufacture (S4.5.3.2).; This is not to say, however, that BMW does not have considerabl flexibility in its utilization of the 11th position. A pointed out in Notice 8 (44 FR 17489, March 22, 1979), BMW can submit more than one character to represent a single plant. While this restriction unfortunately may result in some change to the system which BMW is currently employing, the agency believes that a sophisticated allotment of sequential blocks will alleviate at least some of the problems which you foresee.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel |
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ID: nht90-3.15OpenTYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA DATE: July 12, 1990 FROM: Michael L. Hayes TO: General Curry -- Administrator, NHTSA TITLE: Re Petition for the Establishment of Transport Safety Standards Regarding Incubators Used to Transport New Born Infants ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 7-12-90 from Michael L. Hayes to James Gilkey (OCC 5046); Also attached to letter dated 1-15-91 from Paul J. Rice to Michael L. Hayes (A37; Std. 213; FMVSS 102(4)) TEXT: This petition prays that transport safety standards be established to provide the new born infant, institutionally transported for medical reasons, with the same basic protection (per F.M.V.S.S. 213) as that of a privately transported infant. The transport incubators currently in use needlessly endanger the new born due to the lack of occupant protection, proper construction methods, and adequate anchoring systems. The principal reason given by some of the companies involved for the lack of compliance with child transport safety standards was due to the belief that the fragile nature of the new born renders known restraint techniques useless in providing the infant with a reasonable chance of survival. This is no longer the case. The development of the moldable air-bag can provide even the most frail infant with a reasonable chance of survival as well as meet the special needs associated with the new born while under medical care. This is accomplished by providing the infant wit h a non-constricting pouch made of small air-bags that can be positioned within a larger bag and the air removed from same, thus locking into a customized shape (pouch). This system of restraint is more clearly described in the attached engineering anal ysis and patent disclosure. As this is a well established industry, resistance to change by the manufacturers is substantial and is the principal reason for this petition. The medical personnel directly responsible for the new born, however, greatly support the upgrading of the sa fety standards and equipment. The manufacturers belief that this upgrading would not be profitable enough has placed transport safety as a low or non-existent priority. It is believed that the only way to insure that transport safety for the medically distressed infant is to receive the needed priority by the manufacturers is though the establishment of safety standards or the enforcement of F.M.V.S.S. 213 in this area. Marginalia: Checked w/ Hayes 7/20 is submitting separate petition to administration |
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ID: aiam2341OpenMr. R. L. Ratz, Safety Engineering Specialist, ROHR Industries, Inc., Post Office Box 878, Chula Vista, CA 92012; Mr. R. L. Ratz Safety Engineering Specialist ROHR Industries Inc. Post Office Box 878 Chula Vista CA 92012; Dear Mr. Ratz: This responds to Rohr Industries' April 27, 1976, letter asking how t test an emergency exit that contains no glazing in conformity with the provision of Standard No. 217, *Bus Window Retention and Release*, that specifies testing before and after a window retention test (S5.3.2). You also ask whether the emergency exit identification requirements of S5.5.1 specify the placement of operating instructions at a designated seating position which does not qualify as an adjacent seat' under the definition found in S4 of the standard.; The window retention requirement is not required in the case of a emergency exit that contains no glazing. Because this requirement is clearly inapplicable to such an exit, the emergency exit release requirements of S5.3.2 must be met, but without the need to conduct a window retention test.; In answer to your second question, S5.5.1 requires that a labe indicating the location of the nearest exit release mechanism be placed at adjacent seats' to any exit whose release mechanism is not located within the occupant space of that adjacent seat. There are no labeling requirements in S5.5.1 for seating that is not adjacent' to the exit. As you note, some interior configurations result in seating whose occupant space' is not within 10 inches of any emergency exit (measured as set forth in S4). Such seating would not have to be labeled with the location of the nearest release mechanism, although some manufacturers do provide this information voluntarily. The agency has evaluated a requirement for this labeling but considers present labelling practices adequate at this time.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Acting Chief Counsel |
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ID: 2794oOpen Mr. Koji Tokunaga Dear Mr. Tokunaga: This letter responds to your inquiry in which you ask a number of questions concerning Federal motor vehicle safety standard (FMVSS) 124, Accelerator Control Systems. I apologize for the delay in this response. In your letter, you describe a new accelerator control system that operates through electrical rather than mechanical signals. You state that the moving components of this system are the accelerator pedal, stepping motor arm, linkage, and the throttle lever. When a driver depresses the accelerator pedal, a pedal sensor converts the displacement into a proportional electric signal. The signal goes through a control unit to a position switch, and then to a stepping motor. This stepping motor works to move the motor's arm and linkage, and they in turn work the throttle lever. Therefore, you say, the engine speed is controlled in proportion to the amount of accelerator pedal displacement. You further inform us that Isuzu already has distributed vehicles equipped with this system in Japan, and that the company would like to market this kind of vehicle in the United States. You present three questions and a diagram of the system components, and request an agency response. First, please be aware that in issuing this interpretation, NHTSA is neither approving, certifying, nor endorsing your new accelerator control system. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, each manufacturer must certify that its product meets agency safety standards, or other applicable standards. However, based on the information you supplied in your letter, I have the following responses. Question I: In this vehicle, Isuzu considers the battery that drives the stepping motor to be one of the energy sources under S5.1, and the return springs (accelerator pedal and throttle lever return springs) the other sources. Is this interpretation correct? We do not have enough information to state whether the battery that drives the stepping motor, or the return springs would be considered energy sources under S5.1. Section S5.1 of Standard 124 requires, among other things, that there be a minimum of two energy sources capable of returning the throttle to idle whenever the driver removes the opposing actuating force, or if there is a single severance or disconnection in the accelerator control system. With respect to the battery, if all system elements are operating properly, then it would appear that removing the actuating force will cause the electrical circuit from accelerator pedal sensor to stepping motor to return the throttle to idle. On the other hand, if there is a failure caused by a severance or disconnection in the accelerator control system between the pedal and the stepping motor, it is not clear to me whether the stepping motor will return to zero, and bring the throttle springs back to idle; or lock the arm and linkage in an "open-throttle" position. Similarly, it is not clear to me that the accelerator pedal and throttle return springs are capable of returning the throttle to idle in the event of a failure caused by an ACS severance or disconnection. (While you include the throttle lever in your description of the accelerator control system, the agency considers it as part of the fuel metering device. However, as NHTSA explained in the preamble to 124, an energy source under the Standard may be attached to the fuel metering device. [37 FR 20033, September 23, 1972.]) Ordinarily, the agency would have no difficulty in finding that either of the throttle return springs is an energy source capable of returning the throttle to idle. But I cannot tell from your description and diagram whether a severance or disconnection in the electrical system would cause the throttle to lock in a position other than idle. I would make the same observation with respect to the accelerator pedal. I can not tell from the information you supplied what impact a severance or disconnection failure would have on the pedal. For example, it is not apparent whether some element in the electrical system senses a severance or disconnection in the accelerator control system, so that a sensor transmits a signal to the appropriate energy sources that the throttle should return to idle. If the pedal and return springs can operate mechanically and in concert to return the throttle to idle in the event of a failure in the accelerator control system caused by a severance or disconnection, then together they may be an energy source under the Standard. Question 2a: Is a severance in electric wires in this system a severance or disconnection within the meaning of S5.2? Isuzu considers negative because electric wires are not a moving part. A severance or disconnection of the electric wires in this system would be a severance or disconnection within the meaning of S5.2 of Standard 124. Section S4.1 of Standard 124 defines a "driver-operated accelerator control system" as "all vehicle components, except the fuel metering device, that regulate engine speed in direct response to movement of the driver-operated control and that return the throttle to the idle position upon release of the actuating force." You stated in your letter that, in this new system, when the driver depresses the accelerator pedal, the mechanical displacement is converted into electrical signals. These electrical signals are transmitted by wires to a control unit that regulates engine speed in direct response to pressure on the accelerator pedal, again by means of wires that connect the control unit's electrical signal to the appropriate components. Thus, the control unit, all of the components to which it is connected, and the wires that make those connections are "vehicle components ... that regulate engine speed in direct response to movement of the driver-operated control and that return the throttle to the idle position upon release of the actuating force." Under S4.1, then, the control unit, the components to which it is connected, and the wires that make the connection are components of the driver-operated accelerator control system. Section S5.2 of Standard 124 requires that the throttle return to idle "from any accelerator position or any speed...whenever any one component of the accelerator control system is disconnected or severed at a single point." Please note that this language does not limit the requirement to disconnections or severances of components that are moving parts. Thus, all severances or disconnections of any component of the accelerator control system are within the ambit of the standard. In this case, since the wires are a component of the accelerator control system, the throttle must return to idle whenever a wire is disconnected or severed. Question 2b: If a severance in electric wires were a severance or disconnection under S5.2, what about a short-circuiting that may result from such a severance? Does the Standard require that the throttle returns to the idle position even in such a condition? Yes. Section S5.2 of Standard 124 requires the throttle to return to the idle position whenever any component of the accelerator control system is disconnected or severed at a single point, regardless of the other consequences of the disconnection or severance. In the case of this system, this language requires the throttle to return to idle when any wire is severed, even if the severance results in a short circuit. Question 2c: Our understanding is that a failure (other than severance or disconnection) of a system component itself (i.e. a failure in the accelerator pedal sensor with pedal position switches, control unit, throttle valve position switch, or stepping motor) is not subject to the throttle return requirement under the Standard. Is this correct? Your understanding is partially correct. Standard 124 addresses those circumstances where (1) the driver removes the opposing actuating force; and (2) a severance or disconnection in the ACS causes a failure. Therefore, you are correct that Standard 124 addresses only those failures resulting from a severance or disconnection within the system. However, for electrical systems, shorted or open circuits are the consequence of a change in one or more of the electrical components in the system. The agency would consider such a change a disconnection or severance in the context of this Standard. Question 3: It is our interpretation that the battery and the electric wires from the battery to the control unit are not a part of the accelerator control system under this definition. (That is, the definition of "driver-operated accelerator control system.") Is this interpretation correct? No, your interpretation is incorrect. We have set out the definition of "driver-operated accelerator control system" in section S4.1 above, in response to your Question 2a. With respect to your electrical accelerator control system, the electrical impulse that travels between the vehicle battery and the control unit is a direct consequence of the driver's applying an actuating force to the accelerator pedal. Given this aspect of your system's design, both the vehicle battery and the electric wires from the battery to the control unit fall within the definition of "driver-operated accelerator control system." I hope you find this information helpful. Sincerely,
Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel ref:124 d:8/8/88 |
1988 |
ID: aiam1524OpenHonorable Edwin D. Eshleman, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. 20515; Honorable Edwin D. Eshleman House of Representatives Washington D.C. 20515; Dear Congressman Eshleman: This is in reply to your letter of May 29, 1974, concerning a proble with retreaded tires experienced by your constituent, Mr. Leon Mentzer of Lancaster. Mr. Mentzer was concerned that a pair of retreaded tires which he purchased and returned as the new tread came off after 15 miles were, according to the dealer, to be retreaded again and resold. He asks if there are Federal regulation regarding retreads.; Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 117 (49 CFR 571.117 (cop enclosed)) does specify certain requirements for passenger car retreaded tires, primarily in the areas of casing selection and processing, treadwear indicators, and labeling. The standard at one time contained performance requirements as well, but these requirements were successfully challenged in an industry-sponsored lawsuit (*H & H Tire Company v. Volpe*, 471 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1972)). The re-retreading of a tire in the situation described by Mr. Mentzer would not fail to conform to Standard No. 117 if the casing were not damaged in a manner described in the standard. A further retreading, if done properly, would not necessarily be unsafe.; Sincerely, James B. Gregory, Administrator |
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ID: nht95-4.13OpenTYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA DATE: September 1, 1995 FROM: Dorothy Jean Arnold -- M.D. TO: Safety Administration TITLE: NONE ATTACHMT: 12/11/95 letter from Samuel J. Dubbin to Dorothy Jean Arnold, M.D. (A43; Std. 208) TEXT: [Illegible Words] I contact you about having the airbags in my car disconnected or [Illegible Words] event I trade cars in the future, I am requesting that this same [Illegible Words] apply to any new vehicle. [Illegible Words] physician, with an excellent driving record, who is physically impaired [Illegible Words] of osteomyelitis that occurred at eighteen months of age. Some [Illegible Words] of both hips and spine are present. I cannot use a seatbelt wit h comfort [Illegible Words] was granted dispensation from such usage several years ago. [Illegible Words] please advise me regarding the legal procedure I must implement in order to remove [Illegible Words] disconnect the airbags. Your prompt response to this letter will be deeply appreciated. |
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ID: nht89-1.51OpenTYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA DATE: 03/24/89 FROM: DIANE K. STEED -- NHTSA TO: ROBERT C. SMITH -- U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TITLE: NONE ATTACHMT: LETTER FROM ROBERT C. SMITH TO SAMUEL K. SKINNER, DATED 02/28/89; LETTER FROM MAUREEN ANDREWS TO ROBERT C. SMITH TEXT: Dear Mr. Smith: Thank you for your letter to Secretary Skinner on behalf of your constituent, Mrs. Maureen Andrews, of Derry. You expressed concern about the absence of safety belts for school bus passengers and about the number of persons to occupy a school bus seat. I've been asked to respond to your letter since the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is responsible for administering Federal programs relating to school bus safety. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 authorizes NHTSA to issue motor vehicle safety standards for new motor vehicles, including school buses. In 1974, Congress amended the Act to direct NHTSA to issue motor vehicle safety standards addressing various aspects of school bus safety, such as seating systems, windows and windshields, emergency exits, and fuel system integrity. Pursuant to that authority, NHTSA issued a comprehensive set of motor vehicle safety standards to make school buses, already a safe mode of transportation, even safer. We have considered the safety belt issue in connection with our safety standard for school bus passenger crash protection, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 222. Standard No. 222 requires that large school buses provide passenger crash protectio n through a concept called "compartmentalization." Providing compartmentalization entails improving the interior of the school bus with protective seat backs, additional seat padding, and better seat spacing and performance. These interior features are intended to keep occupants in their seating area and protect them during a crash. They ensure that a system of crash protection is provided to passengers independent of whether these passengers use safety belts. For your information, I have enclosed a copy of our notice terminating a rulemaking proceeding to decide whether Standard No. 222 should be amended to specify certain requirements for safety belts voluntarily installed on new large school buses. We deci ded not to amend the standard since these belts appear to be currently installed in a manner that ensures adequate safety performance. The notice provides a thorough discussion of the safety belt issues raised by Mrs. Andrews. As explained in the notice , school buses in this country have compiled an
excellent safety record. In addition to meeting compartmentalization requirements, large school buses differ from small school buses in that they have greater mass, higher seating height and high visibility to other motorists. For all of these reasons, the need for safety belts to mitigate against injuries and fatalities in large school buses is not the same as that for smaller vehicles, such as small school buses. Thus, although Standard No. 222 does require safety belts for passengers in small schoo l buses, we conclude that a Federal requirement for the installation of safety belts in large school buses is not justified at this time. Mrs. Andrews also asks about requirements that apply to the number of children that are allowed to sit on a bench seat. We are not authorized by Congress to regulate the number of persons that may occupy a school bus seat. However, for the purposes of ensuring that school bus manufacturers properly design their large buses, we do specify the method for establishing the number of designated seating positions on a bench seat. The number of seating positions on a bench seat is calculated under Standard No. 222 by dividing the bench width in inches by 15 and rounding the result to the nearest whole number. Under this formula, a 39 inch bench seat has three seating positions. (39 divided by 15 = 2.6, which is rounded to 3) For small school buses, the determination of the number of positions ensures that the bench seat would have sufficient restraint systems for the maximum number of persons that should ever occupy the seat, a nd that the seat provides crash protection to all these persons. For large school buses, the determination ensures that the forces applied to the seat during compliance tests are reasonable reflections of the number of occupants and of the crash forces that would be involved in a real-world crash. It should be noted, however, that the number of seating positions derived from the Standard No. 222 formula is not meant to be an absolute measure of the seating capacity of the bus, irrespective of occupant size. We recognize that, in practice, school buses transport a tremendously wide variety of student sizes. For example, while a bus that may be capable of easily accommodating 65 preschool or elementary students, it may be capable of carrying only 43 high school students. When the bus is used to transport students of widely varying ages and sizes,the appropriate decision on how many passengers may be comfortably and safely accommodated, therefore, it is a decision that must be reached by the bus operator, in light of the ages and sizes of passen gers involved, and in accordance with state and local requirements. Since NHTSA does not have the authority to regulate how States use school buses, the agency could not preclude a State from allowing the number of passengers on a bench seat to exceed the number of designated seating positions on that seat. However, we a gree with Mrs. Andrews that a student should not stand while riding in a school bus. We agree further that a student should not sit on a seat unless the student can sit fully on the seat instead of sitting only partially on the seat and thus only being partially protected by the compartmentalization. We believe that Mrs. Andrews' concerns as they apply to public schools would be best addressed by her working with the local school board and state officials. I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Sincerely, ENCLOSURE |
Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
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