ID: 3109yy

Mr. Ivan Lee
Deputy General Manager
Regulation Affairs
Hyundai America Technical Center, Inc.
5075 Venture Drive
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48108

Dear Mr. Lee:

This responds to your letter of June 17, 1991 concerning an interpretation of Standard No. 214. You state that Hyundai would like to have the following percentage of its passenger cars meet the dynamic performance requirements of the standard in each applicable year:

1994 model year -- 20 percent 1995 model year -- 20 percent 1996 model year -- 50 percent 1997 model year -- 100 percent

You ask whether this compliance schedule is acceptable.

I am pleased to have the opportunity to discuss the requirements of Standard No. 214. The new dynamic test requirements of Standard No. 214 are phased in over a three-year period, beginning on September 1, 1993. The October 30, 1990 final rule established two alternative compliance schedules. Each manufacturer must comply with either alternative, at its discretion. Under the first schedule, each manufacturer will have to meet the new side impact performance requirements based on the following phase-in schedule:

10 percent of automobiles it manufactures during the l2 month period beginning September l, l993;

25 percent of automobiles it manufactures during the l2 month period beginning September l, l994;

40 percent of automobiles it manufactures during the l2 month period beginning September l, l995; and

All automobiles it manufactures on or after September l, l996. To accommodate variation in the numbers of vehicles manufactured each year, the standard also permits these percentages to be applied to a three-year average annual production rather than to a single year's production. See section S8 of Standard No. 214.

Under the second schedule, no compliance will be required during the production year beginning September 1, l993, but full implementation will be required effective September 1, l994.

The compliance schedule you suggest would not appear to comply with either alternative. Since your suggested schedule does not achieve full implementation until the 1997 model year, it clearly does not comply with the second schedule. Under the first schedule, for passenger cars manufactured between September l, l994 and August 3l, l995, the number of passenger cars complying with the dynamic performance requirements must not be less than 25 percent of (a) the average annual production of passenger cars manufactured on or after September l, l99l, and before September l, l994, by each manufacturer, or (b) the manufacturer's annual production of passenger cars between September l, l994 and August 3l, l995. See sections S3(c) and S8.2 of Standard No. 214. However, under the compliance schedule you suggest, only 20 percent of Hyundai's vehicles would meet the requirements during the 1995 model year. (I assume that, by 1995 model year, you mean the period from September 1, 1994 through August 31, 1995. The rule refers to time periods, rather than to model years.)

The agency has received three petitions for reconsideration of the final rule requesting that the agency allow use of "carry-forward credits" during the phase-in of the dynamic test requirements. Such an approach could allow a compliance schedule like the one you suggested. The agency response to the petition will address the issue raised in your letter. The agency response is expected to be published in the Federal Register later this summer.

Please review the agency response to the petitions for reconsideration when it is published. If you believe that you need further clarification, please contact us again.

I hope that this information has been useful. If there are any further questions, please contact John Rigby of this office at 202-366-2992.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel Ref#: Std. 214 d:7/23/9l

ID: nht91-5.5

DATE: July 23, 1991

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Ivan Lee -- Deputy General Manager, Regulation Affairs, Hyundai America Technical Center, Inc.

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 6-17-91 from Ivan Lee to Paul Jackson Rice (OCC 6151)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter of June 17, 1991 concerning an interpretation of Standard No. 214. You state that Hyundai would like to have the following percentage of its passenger cars meet the dynamic performance requirements of the standard in each applicable year:

1994 model year -- 20 percent 1995 model year -- 20 percent 1996 model year -- 50 percent 1997 model year -- 100 percent

You ask whether this compliance schedule is acceptable.

I am pleased to have the opportunity to discuss the requirements of Standard No. 214. The new dynamic test requirements of Standard No. 214 are phased in over a three-year period, beginning on September 1, 1993. The October 30, 1990 final rule established two alternative compliance schedules. Each manufacturer must comply with either alternative, at its discretion. Under the first schedule, each manufacturer will have to meet the new side impact performance requirements based on the following phase-in schedule:

10 percent of automobiles it manufactures during the 12 month period beginning September 1, 1993;

25 percent of automobiles it manufactures during the 12 month period beginning September 1, 1994;

40 percent of automobiles it manufactures during the 12 month period beginning September 1, 1995; and All automobiles it manufactures on or after September 1, 1996.

To accommodate variation in the numbers of vehicles manufactured each year, the standard also permits these percentages to be applied to a three-year average annual production rather than to a single year's production. See section S8 of Standard No. 214.

Under the second schedule, no compliance will be required during the production year beginning September 1, 1993, but full implementation will be required effective September 1, 1994.

The compliance schedule you suggest would not appear to comply with either alternative. Since your suggested schedule does not achieve full implementation until the 1997 model year, it clearly does not comply with the second schedule. Under the first schedule, for passenger cars manufactured between September 1, 1994 and August 31, 1995, the number of passenger cars complying with the dynamic performance requirements must not be less than 25 percent of (a) the average annual production of passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1991, and before September 1, 1994, by each manufacturer, or (b) the manufacturer's annual production of passenger cars between September 1, 1994 and August 31, 1995. See sections S3(c) and S8.2 of Standard No. 214. However, under the compliance schedule you suggest, only 20 percent of Hyundai's vehicles would meet the requirements during the 1995 model year. (I assume that, by 1995 model year, you mean the period from September 1, 1994 through August 31, 1995. The rule refers to time periods, rather than to model years.)

The agency has received three petitions for reconsideration of the final rule requesting that the agency allow use of "carry-forward credits" during the phase-in of the dynamic test requirements. Such an approach could allow a compliance schedule like the one you suggested. The agency response to the petition will address the issue raised in your letter. The agency response is expected to be published in the Federal Register later this summer.

Please review the agency response to the petitions for reconsideration when it is published. If you believe that you need further clarification, please contact us again.

I hope that this information has been useful. If there are any further questions, please contact John Rigby of this office at 202-366-2992.

ID: nht79-2.4

DATE: 03/28/79

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Cars & Concepts, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

ATTACHMT: 4/21/76 letter from S.P. Wood to Nissan Motor Co., Ltd.

TEXT:

March 28, 1979

Mr. Moe Pare, Jr. Director of Design Cars & Concepts, Inc. 12500 E. Grand River Brighton, Michigan 48116

Dear Mr. Pare:

This responds to your March 2, 1979, letter concerning the definition of the vehicle sub-classification, "convertible." your letter included several Figures of various vehicle designs and asked whether each would be considered a "convertible" by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

While our regulations do not include a formal definition of "convertible," the agency has stated that it considers a convertible to be a vehicle whose "A" pillar or windshield peripheral support is not joined with the "B" pillar (or rear roof support rearward of the "B" pillar position) by a fixed rigid structural member. Therefore, passenger cars equipped with a "sun roof" or a "Hurst hatch roof" do not qualify as convertibles, because they have a fixed, rigid structural member in the described location (April 21, 1976, letter of interpretation enclosed). This interpretation applies, moreover, whether the rigid structural member joining the "A" and "B" pillars is a hidden reinforcing component or whether the structural member is part of the exterior roof panel.

Given this interpretation, only the Fiat X-19 vehicle design illustrated in your Figure 5 would qualify as a "convertible." Each vehicle design in your other illustrations (Figures 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9) include fixed, rigid structural components joining the "A" and "B" pillar sections of the vehicles and, therefore, would not be classified as convertibles. Likewise, the designs would not be considered "open-body type vehicles" (49 CFR 571.3) for the same reason; the structural member, whether hidden or not, would be considered part of the vehicle top. Also, I would point out that the "open-body vehicle" designation generally refers to multi-purpose passenger vehicles such as "jeeps" or "dune buggies."

I hope this clarification is responsive to your inquiry. If you have any further questions please contact Hugh Oates of my office (202-426-2992).

Sincerely,

Frank Berndt Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosure (See 4/21/76 letter from S.P. Wood to Nissan Motor Co., Ltd.)

March 2, 1979

Mr. Hugh Oates Office of the Chief Council N.H.T.S.A. 400 Seventh Street S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Hugh:

Per our telephone conversation, I have become confused regarding the legal definition for a "convertible body". At one time I had felt that any vehicle with structure extending from "A" to "B" pillar would not be classified as a convertible; however, I am unable to locate documentation to that effect.

The only definition I can locate is carried in Part 571.3(b) of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety standards, which defines an "open-body type vehicle" (a term which is used interchangeably with "convertible" in FMVSS No. 208.S4.1.1.3.2. and No. 208.S4.1.2.3.2.) as a vehicle with no occupant compartment top or one which can be installed or removed by the user at his convenience.

By both definitions, I feel that Figure 1, showing a Mazda RX7 with a removable roof panel, does not qualify as a convertible. As this vehicle has roof side rail structures that go directly from "A" to "B" pillar and a full exterior roof stamping, this car, I feel, ought be classified as a coupe.

Similarly, the Renault Gordini (Figure 2) has a much larger opening (extending from "A" to "C" pillar); however, as the "opening" is still surrounded by roof structure (in plan view), I feel secure in assuming that such a vehicle is a coupe also.

Please look at Figures 3 and 4. These photographs show a 1977 Pontiac Grand Prix with a Hurst hatch roof, and a 1979 Chrysler Cordoba with an ASC (American Sunroof Corporation) hatch roof installation. These roofs are similar in that both rely on two "U"-shape openings cut into the roof in a manner that would allow an exterior "roof panel section" along the vehicle's longitudinal centerline. These roofs are installed on "coupe" bodies, but as part of this installation the entire "occupant compartment top" /refer to Part 571.3(b)/, from left, side DLO to right, side DLO, is never removed (either by the manufacturer or user). Again, using both mentioned definitions, I feel these vehicles fall outside the classification of a convertible or "open-body type vehicle".

Now examine Figure 5 showing a Fiat X-19 targa top. As is clear from the photo, this vehicle has "A" and "B" pillars with transverse (to the plan view centerline) structure extending from both "A" and "B" pillars, but clearly has a completely removable "occupant compartment top" with no structure at all between the "A" and "B" pillars (above the beltline). Using both above definitions, this car is clearly a convertible.

Figure 6 shows the roof structure employed on a 1977 Corvette. While this car does have centerline reinforcement member, it is not part of the exterior roof panel sections. Because this center member is not part of the roof panel, and is usually hidden from view, I feel this component takes on the character of a "central (in side view)" reinforcing member and is therefore more closely related to the conventional old style convertible chassis reinforcements than the vehicle's occupant compartment top.

Finally I have come to my real area of concern, shown in Figures 7, 8, and 9. These Cars & Concepts roofs have been granted U.S. Patent No. 4,138,155 which is based largely on the Cars & Concepts installation requirement that the entire occupant compartment top (from right, side DLO to left, side DLO) is completely removed. Similar to the Corvette, our roof also uses a hidden centerline structure which takes the place of the needed chassis reinforcements. Also similar is the "panel to panel" configuration used in our roofs (see Page 2 of Figure 6). These two removable panels comprise (virtually) the entire "occupant compartment top". A basic difference between our roof and that of the Corvette is that our roof has a full width exterior roof panel at the windshield header (as does the X-19), and Chevrolet never actually removes the entire occupant compartment top (including center reinforcement; this center reinforcement is part of the windshield header structure and is basic to the vehicle's construction) of the Corvette.

To summarize, it seems obvious to me that a Fiat X-19 is a convertible, while a coupe with a sunroof is not. It does not seem to me, however, that a car with a Hurst hatch which does not remove the entire occupant compartment top (roof panel) is a convertible. By the same token, a Corvette never exists without an overhead centerline reinforcement member, but the entire exterior roof portion is removable creating a vehicle that fits the N.H.T.S.A.'s criterion for an "open-body". Finally on the Cars & Concepts roof installation, the entire occupant section of a coupe is removed (at this stage it is clearly a targa type vehicle); then in place of chassis reinforcement, we add a centerline structural member and install a removable two piece occupant compartment top.

My question obviously is: between the Fiat, the Corvette, Hurst's roof, and our roof, which (if any) would the N.H.T.S.A. consider a convertible? Thank you for your consideration; please call with any questions.

Sincerely,

Moe Pare, Jr. Director of Design

MP/dma

cc: D. Draper

ID: aiam5251

"Dear Mr. Gach: We are replying to your letter of September 1, 1993, t Richard Van Iderstine of this agency with respect to the 'Blu-Lite.' You would like our views on this product 'in both OEM and aftermarket applications.' The advertising circular which you enclosed shows Blu-Lite to be a three- compartment stop lamp that is mounted in the center of the parcel shelf adjacent to the rear window. The center compartment contains a blue light 'that comes on immediately with heavy brake pressure and flashes quickly and independently from your regular brake lights.' The center blue light compartment is flanked by compartments that contain a 'red stop light.' It is clear that Blu-Light is intended as a substitute for the center highmounted stop lamp that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 has required to be installed as original equipment on passenger cars manufactured on and after September 1, 1985, (and light trucks and vans since September 1, 1993). Blu-Light does not meet the original equipment specifications of Standard No. 108 because, among other things, it is not a single red lamp mounted on the vertical centerline of the vehicle. Therefore, Blu-Light is impermissible under Federal law as original motor vehicle lighting equipment. With respect to aftermarket applications, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act prohibits any manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business from 'knowingly rendering inoperative in whole or in part' any equipment installed in accordance with a Federal motor vehicle safety standard. Removal of the original equipment center lamp and replacement with Blu-Light would be a 'rendering inoperative' as we interpret that term, and, hence, a prohibited act. However, the prohibition does not extend to persons outside the four named categories, such as the vehicle owner, and installation of Blu-Light by persons not named in the prohibition would not violate any Federal requirement. But the legality of the use of Blu- Light is determinable under the laws of each State in which the device is operated. As you note, many States reserve the color blue for lamps used to indicate emergencies. If you are interested in pursuing this question further, the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, 4600 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22203, can advise you whether any State allows the use of blue lamps for other than emergency use. Further, there is no violation of Federal law involved in installing Blu-Lite on vehicles that were not required by Standard No. 108 to be originally equipped with one, i.e., cars manufactured before September 1, 1985, and other vehicles manufactured before September 1 of this year. In this instance, too, legality of use is determinable under State law. I hope that this answers your questions. Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel ";

ID: nht89-1.59

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 03/31/89 EST

FROM: VERNON ROBERTS -- NHTSA NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

TITLE: RESEARCH NOTES; CRASH EXPERIENCE OF GOVERNMENT SPONSORED AIR BAG VEHICLES THROUGH MARCH 31, 1989

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 05/25/89 FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA TO HARRY REID -- SENATE. RED BOOK A33 [4] USA 108 [A] [2] [A]; STANDARD 208; LETTER DATED 03/08/89 FROM PATRICIA KLINGER WATHEN -- DOT TO HARRY REID -- SENATE; LETTER DATED 02/23/ 89 FROM HARRY REID -- SENATE TO DOT; LETTER DATED 02/03/89 FROM STEVEN P. ELLIOTT TO HARRY REID -- SENATE, RE AUTHORIZATION TO DISCONNECT AUTOMOBILE AIR BAGS; REPORT FROM DAVID J. ROMEO AND JOHN B. MORRIS, DRIVER AIR BAG POLICE FLEET DEMONSTRATION PROGRA M A 24 MONTH PROGRESS REPORT AT EXPERIMENTAL SAFETY VEHICLE CONFERENCE OXFORD, ENGLAND, JULY 1-5, 1985

TEXT: In 1983 and 1984, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) began two air bag fleet programs. The purpose was to demonstrate that both original equipment and retrofit air bag systems would provide occupant crash protection, with no sign ificant operational problems.

The air bags in these fleets have performed well in service. There have been a total of 167 crash deployments. We know of no cases where the air bags failed to deploy as designed and only two non-crash deployments (neither of which resulted in any pers onal injury or crash damage).

NHTSA supported the development, procurement, installation, and evaluation of 539 retrofit air bag systems in state police vehicles. The agency also joined the General Services Administration (GSA) in the purchase of 5,000 1985 Ford Tempos that were fac tory-equipped with driver air bags for use as Federal government fleet vehicles. GSA subsequently purchased 1,500 1987 Ford Tempos with air bags. The Department of Defense purchased 300 air bag equipped 1985 Ford Tempos for its use.

Air bags are designed to protect drivers in frontal crashes in which the change in velocity is greater than approximately 10 miles per hour (mph): speeds at which serious injuries may occur. Both the car makers and NHTSA recommend that vehicle occupants also wear the available safety belts.

In the operation of these NHTSA sponsored air bag fleets through March 31, 1989:

* There were no severe or critical injuries in any of the 167 deployment crashes. The drivers of these cars typically had no injury or only minor injury. Only 14 had moderate to serious level injuries, but none received more serious injuries.

* The most severe deployment crash was a frontal collision with a velocity change of approximately 25 mph. The primary injury to the driver was a mild concussion.

* There was one catastrophic, fatal, non-deployment crash judged as non-survivable (see the third footnote on the summary table overleaf). In all other crashes where the air bags did not deploy, the crashes were of such a low severity that the air bags were not designed to deploy, and did not.

* There were two air bag deployments in the absence of a collision. In one case involving a police car, the air bag readiness indicator light on the dashboard gave adequate warning of a fault in the electrical system, but no action was taken. The bag d eployed while the car was parked with no occupant. In the other case involving a Tempo, the bag also deployed while the car was parked unoccupied. Design changes were made in both systems to prevent similar occurrences.

SUMMARY OF THE CRASH EXPERIENCE OF GOVERNMENT SPONSORED AIR BAG EQUIPPED FLEET VEHICLES AS OF MARCH 31, 1989

Government Air Bag Fleets Originally Placed Currently in Vehicle Fleet in Fleet Service Fleet Service 1985 Ford Tempos - Federal Government 5,300 1,974 1987 Ford Tempo - Federal Government 1,500 1,3421983-1985 Police Cars (retrofit systems) 539 240

Air Bag Fleet Crash Experience Deployment Injuries to Drivers/Right Front Passengers n1 Crashes AIS-0 AIS-1 AIS-2 AIS-3 AIS-4 AIS-5 AIS-6 Unknown n2 Fed. Tempo 126 31/1 82/21 8/1 3/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 Police Cars n3 41 9/2 26/5 2/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 Total 167 40/3 108/26 10/1 4/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 n1 Injuries are classified according to the Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS): AIS 1 = minor, AIS 2 = moderate, AIS 3 = serious, AIS 4 = severe, AIS 5 = critical, and AIS 6 = untreatable (usually fatal).

n2 One deployment occurred when a driverless, stolen Tempo was pushed off a river bank and struck a tree. Another stolen Tempo was recovered with frontal damage and a deployed air bag. Nothing else is known about the driver or crash.

n3 There were three deployments in unoccupied police cars. They were parked with engines running when struck by other vehicles.

Number of Vehicles Involved in Each Deployment Crash by Mode:

Front . . . 139 Side . . . 16 Rollover . . . 4 Undercarriage . . . 8 Non-Deployment n4 Injuries to Drivers & Right Front Passengers Crashes AIS-0 AIS-1 AIS-2 AIS-3 AIS-4 AIS-5 AIS-6 Fed. Tempos 764 713 50 0 0 0 0 1 Police Cars 29 28 1 0 0 0 0 0 Total 793 741 51 0 0 0 0 1

n4 The information is incomplete because the crash notification criteria and injury information available on non-deployment crashes varies with each fleet. One Tempo crashed into a heavy truck at a closing speed of approximately 95 mph. This crash wa s so severe that the vehicle's electrical system was destroyed before the crash sensors could actuate the air bag. The car was catastrophically destroyed by the truck, fatally injuring the driver who could not have been protected by the air bag even had it deployed.

Air Bag Equipped Vehicle Exposure Vehicle Fleet Total Estimated Mileage Federal Tempos 250 million Police Cars 65 million

Results of Fleet Experience to Date

Experience with this current generation air bag fleet has been very positive. The air bags deployed in cases where the crash protection was needed. When air bags deployed, injuries typically were relatively minor.

ID: nht92-3.32

DATE: 10/02/92

FROM: FREDD SCHEYS -- PRESIDENT, S.C.C. CARAT INC.

TO: PAUL J. RICE -- CHIEF COUNSIL, NHTSA; TAYLOR VINSON

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 11-16-92 FROM PAUL J. RICE TO FREDD SCHEYS (A40; PART 567)

TEXT: Since our phone convertation on monday 9, 28, 1992, I would like to ask four your advice regarding the following questions.

I am the official importer for CARAT DUCHATELET from Belgium. From the accompanying literature you can see the history of our company and the kind of work we do on Mercedes Benz and Rolls Royce motorcars.

Since my first year here, I have conducted market surveys pertaining to the need for the type of convertions which we offer.

I now have a customer here in the United States who would like his cars under go our conversion process. This particular klient lives in California and has allready purchased two new Mercedes Benz cars, U.S. specs, type 600 SEL. Both cars are titled in de owners name. He would like for our company to install a stretch convertion and in this case I would send these cars to our company in Belgium. There they would be stretched by an additional thirty-nine inches and the cars would than be shipped back to the United States. My questions is, what are the regulations which we will have to follow in this case?

Also I would like to ask four your advice for the next case; An American klient can buy his U.S. spec car from a local Mercedes dealership with delivery from the Mercedes factory in Germany. When the car is ready he flyes to the factory and takes delivery of his car. After a trip in Europe he leaves his car in our company for a stretch convertion. After this convertion is done we ship the car back to the customer in the United States. . What are the regulations we will have to follow in this case?

Also I like to ask your advice for the case where we have to convert a car into a armoured car.

I would like to thank you for your help and advice in these matters.

(ATTACHMENT OMITTED.)

ID: 86-4.49

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 08/18/86

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: William Shapiro

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

William Shapiro, P.E. Manager, Regulatory Affairs Volvo Cars of North America Rockleigh, NJ 07647

Dear Mr. Shapiro:

Thank you for your letter of May 5, 1986, requesting an interpretation of how the requirements of Standard No. 212, Windshield Retention, apply to a passenger car that is equipped with a driver-only air bag system. As explained below, such a vehicle must retain not less than 50 percent of the windshield periphery after being tested in accordance with Standard No. 212.

Standard No. 212 sets different windshield retention requirements for a vehicle depending on whether it is equipped with passive or manual restraints. S5.1 of the standard provides that vehicles equipped with passive restraints must retain not less than 50 percent of the windshield periphery after crash testing. S5.2 of the standard provides that vehicle that are not equipped with passive restraints must retain not less than 75 percent of the windshield periphery.

You noted that S4.1.3.4(b) of Standard No. 208 provides that, for purpose of calculating the number of passive restraint-equipped cars during the phase-in of passive restraints, a car with a driver-only, non-belt passive restraint will be counted as a vehicle complying with the passive restraint requirements of S4.1.2.1(a). Such a driver-only system can have a manual safety belt installed at the right front passenger position. You said that Volvo considers a vehicle with a driver-only, non-belt system to be a passive restraint vehicle and thus subject to the 50 percent windshield retention requirement of S5.1

As discussed in a July 5, 1977, Federal Register notice (42 FR 34288), one of the reasons the agency adopted the 50 percent retention requirement for passive restraint-equipped vehicles has because there could be contact between an air bag system and the windshield. In addition, there could be incidental contact between an air bag-restrained test dummy and the windshield. Because the same air bag-to-windshield and dummy-to-windshield contact is possible in a vehicle equipped with a driver-only air bag system, the agency believes that it is appropriate to apply the 50 percent retention requirement to a driver-only air bag system.

If you have any further questions, please let me know.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

May 5, 1986

Ms. Erika Jones Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 Seventh Street, S.W. Washington, D. C. 20590

Re: Request for Interpretation FMVSS #212 Windshield Mounting

Dear Ms. Jones:

FMVSS #212 requires passive restraint equipped vehicles to retain not less than 50% of the portion of the windshield periphery on each side of the vehicle longitudinal centerline and vehicles not equipped with passive restraints to retain not less than 75% of the windshield periphery.

FMVSS #208 Section 4. 1.3.4(b) states, for purposes of calculating the numbers of cars manufactured under Section 4. 1.3. 1 .2, Section 4. 1.3.2.2, or Section 4.1.3.3.2 L; comply with Section 4.1.2.1. (first option - frontal/angular automatic protection system): "Each car whose driver's seating position with comply with the requirements of Section 4.1.2.1(a) by means not including any type or seat belt ad whose front right seating position is equipped with a Type 2 seat belt is counted as a vehicle conforming to Section 4,1.2.1.",

During the period 1987-89MY, NHTSA has classified cars with a non-belt passive restraint on the driver's side and a Type 2 seat belt on the passenger's side as "passive restraint vehicles".

Volvo interprets that the vehicles covered under Section 4.1.3.4(b) are passive restraint vehicles ad the requirements of FMVSS #212 for those vehicles are the ones that apply to passive restraint vehicles, i.e. , minimum 50% windshield periphery retention on each side of the vehicle longitudinal centerline.

We would appreciate your confirmation of that position as soon as possible.

If additional information is required on this matter, don't hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

VOLVO CARS OF NORTH AMERICA Product Planning and Development

William Shapiro, P.E. Manager, Regulatory Affairs

ID: 1737y

Ms. Juanita P. Davison
1516 E. Hernandez Street
Pensacola, FL 32503

Dear Ms. Davison:

Thank you for your letter describing your impressions of the automatic safety belts on your 1987 Toyota. I apologize for the delay in this reply. You said that this motorized automatic belt system "takes away the roominess of the front," because it is in the way when getting in the car with a handbag or package and that it is cumbersome to get out of the belt system. I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our law and regulations to you.

Before I respond to your specific concerns, I would like to give you some background information on our requirement for automatic occupant protection systems in new cars. Pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act in 1966 (the Safety Act; 15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.), a Federal safety standard on occupant crash protection was issued in 1967 requiring the installation of manual safety belts in all new passenger vehicles. Although these manual safety belts showed their effectiveness as safety devices, only a relatively small number of motorists used their manual belts. As recently as 1984, only 12.5 percent of front seat occupants wore their manual belts. Because so few people used their manual safety belts, the Department issued the first requirement for automatic restraints in passenger cars in 1970, and it was scheduled to take effect in 1973. That implementation date was delayed for a variety of reasons. On June 24, 1983, the Supreme Court of the United States found our decision to repeal the requirement for automatic restraints was "arbitrary and capricious," and ordered us to reconsider the decision (Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29). Against this background, former Secretary of Transportation Dole issued a final rule amending the Federal safety standard on occupant crash protection on July 17, 1984.

That decision, which promotes both automatic restraints and State safety belt use laws, provides a comprehensive approach designed to save as many lives as possible as quickly as possible. We believe that effectively enforced State laws requiring the proper use of the manual safety belts that are in most cars on the road today offer our best opportunity to save lives at virtually no cost to the consumer. The decision also reflects our belief in the value of automatic occupant protection systems, such as air bags and automatic belts, by requiring all new cars to have automatic protection starting with the 1990 model year. The decision required further that automatic protection be phased in during the three years preceding that model year. Each manufacturer was required to equip 10 percent of its model year 1987 cars with automatic restraints. That percentage rose to 25 percent for model year 1988, and 40 percent for model year 1989. However, if the Secretary determines not later than April 1, l989, that State belt use laws have been enacted that meet certain criteria and that are applicable to two-thirds of the U.S. population, then the automatic restraint requirements will be rescinded.

You had three specific concerns with your automatic belt system. First, you asked if the motorized automatic belt system in your car was installed to meet some safety regulation. The answer is yes. As explained above, our Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection requires all 1990 model year cars to be equipped with automatic occupant crash protection. Please note that this requirement permits manufacturers to install any automatic occupant protection technology that meets the occupant protection requirements set forth in Standard No. 208. Thus, manufacturers may choose to install motorized, or nonmotorized, automatic safety belts, air bags, other technologies such as "passive interiors," or any combination of these technologies.

Your second question was whether you can legally disengage the motorized mechanism on the automatic belts in your car. Section 108 of the Safety Act provides that: "No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative ... any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle ... in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard ..." In this case, the automatic belts in your car are a "device or element of design installed in a motor vehicle in compliance with a Federal motor vehicle safety standard." Disengaging the motorized mechanism would render the automatic belts inoperative. Therefore, Federal law prohibits Toyota, any other manufacturer, and any distributor, dealer, or repair shop from disengaging the motorized mechanism on your automatic belts.

Please note that this Federal prohibition does not prevent you, yourself, from disengaging the motorized mechanism on your automatic belts. However, each of the individual States has the authority to regulate the modifications that may be made to vehicles by their owners and to establish requirements for vehicles to be registered or operated in that State. You may wish to contact the State of Florida to learn if they have exercised their authority to prohibit the disabling of automatic belts. Even if neither Federal nor State law prohibits you from disabling your automatic belt, we encourage vehicle owners not to tamper with the occupant crash protection systems installed in their vehicles. If you were to improperly disengage the motorized mechanism, you would put yourself, other occupants of your car and subsequent owners and users of the car at substantially greater risk of injury in a crash.

Third and finally, you said that you have been told it is not safe to wear your automatic belts without also fastening the manual lap belt, because of the possibility of choking. The manual lap belt was voluntarily provided by the manufacturer of your car to provide an even higher level of crash protection for those occupants who choose to use the lap belt. However, the manufacturer of your car has certified that, in a 30 mph frontal crash into a concrete barrier, a test dummy restrained only by the automatic belt in your car would not experience injury-producing forces in excess of the levels specified in Standard No. 208. Hence, the suggestion that the automatic belt by itself is somehow unsafe is simply not true.

I would like to thank you for taking the time to express your views on this subject. We welcome the interest of all concerned citizens on this important question and appreciate this opportunity to advise you of our efforts to improve occupant crash protection for all Americans.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel ref:208 d:3/22/89

ID: nht89-1.46

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 03/22/89

FROM: ERIKA Z. JONES -- CHIEF COUNSEL NHTSA

TO: JUNITA P. DAVISON

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 04/22/88 FROM JUANITA P. DAVISON TO NHTSA, OCC 2041

TEXT: Dear Ms. Davison:

Thank you for your letter describing your impressions of the automatic safety belts on your 1987 Toyota. I apologize for the delay in this reply. You said that this motorized automatic belt system "takes away the roominess of the front," because it is in the way when getting in the car with a handbag or package and that it is cumbersome to get out of the belt system. I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our law and regulations to you.

Before I respond to your specific concerns, I would like to give you some background information on our requirement for automatic occupant protection systems in new cars. Pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act in 1966 (the Safety Act; 15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.), a Federal safety standard on occupant crash protection was issued in 1967 requiring the installation of manual safety belts in all new passenger vehicles. Although these manual safety belts showed their effectiveness as saf ety devices, only a relatively small number of motorists used their manual belts. As recently as 1984, only 12.5 percent of front seat occupants wore their manual belts. Because so few people used their manual safety belts, the Department issued the fi rst requirement for automatic restraints in passenger cars in 1970, and it was scheduled to take effect in 1973. That implementation date was delayed for a variety of reasons. On June 24, 1983, the Supreme Court of the United States found our decision t o repeal the requirement for automatic restraints was "arbitrary and capricious," and ordered us to reconsider the decision (Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29). Against this background, for mer Secretary of Transportation Dole issued a final rule amending the Federal safety standard on occupant crash protection on July 17, 1984.

That decision, which promotes both automatic restraints and State safety belt use laws, provides a comprehensive approach designed to save as many lives as possible as quickly as possible. We believe that effectively enforced State laws requiring the pr oper use of the manual safety belts that are in most cars on the road today offer our best opportunity to

save lives at virtually no cost to the customer. The decision also reflects our belief in the value of automatic occupant protection systems, such as air bags and automatic belts, by requiring all new cars to have automatic protection starting with the 1990 model year. The decision requiring further that automatic protection be phased in during the three years preceding that model year. Each manufacturer was required to equip 10 percent of its model year 1987 cars with automatic restraints. That per centage rose to 25 percent for model year 1988, and 40 percent for model year 1989. However, if the Secretary determines not later than April 1, 989, that State belt use laws have been enacted that meet certain criteria and that are applicable to two-th irds of the U.S. population, then the automatic restraint requirements will be rescinded.

You have three specific concerns with your automatic belt system. First, you asked if the motorized automatic belt system in your car was installed to meet some safety regulation. The answer is yes. As explained above, our Standard No. 208, Occupant C rash Protection request all 1990 model year cars to be equipped with automatic occupant crash protection. Please note that this requirement permits manufacturers to install any automatic occupant protection technology that meets the occupant protection requirements set forth in Standard No. 208. Thus, manufacturers may choose to install motorized, or nonmotorized, automatic safety belts, air bags, other technologies such as "passive interiors," or any combination of these technologies.

Your second question was whether you can legally disengage the motorized mechanism on the automatic belts in your car. Section 108 of the Safety Act provides that: "No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly r ender inoperative . . . any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle . . . in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard . . ." In this case, the automatic belts in your car are a "device or element of desig n installed in a motor vehicle in compliance with a Federal motor vehicle safety standard." Disengaging the motorized mechanism would render the automatic belts inoperative. Therefore, Federal law prohibits Toyota, any other manufacturer, and any distri butor, dealer, or repair shop from disengaging the motorized mechanism on your automatic belts.

Please note that this Federal prohibition does not prevent you, yourself, from disengaging the motorized mechanism on your automatic belts. However, each of the individual States has the authority to regulate the modifications that may be made to vehicl es by their owners and to establish requirements for vehicles to be registered or operated in that State. You may wish to contact the State of Florida to learn if they have exercised their authority to prohibit the disabling of automatic belts. Even if neither Federal nor State law prohibits you from disabling your automatic belt, we encourage vehicle owners not to tamper with the occupant crash protection systems installed in their vehicles. If you were to improperly disengage the motorized mechanism , you would put yourself, other occupants of your car and subsequent owners and users of the car at substantially greater risk of injury in a crash.

Third and finally, you said that you have been told it is not safe to wear your automatic belts without also fastening the manual lap belt,

because of the possibility of choking. The manual lap belt was voluntarily provided by the manufacturer of your car to provide an even higher level of crash protection for those occupants who choose to use the lap belt. However, the manufacturer of you r car has certified that, in a 30 mph frontal crash into a concrete barrier, a test dummy restrained only by the automatic belt in your car would not experience injury-producing forces in excess of the levels specified in Standard No. 208. Hence, the su ggestion that the automatic belt by itself is somehow unsafe is simply not true.

I would like to thank you for taking the time to express your views on this subject. We welcome the interest of all concerned citizens on this important question and appreciate this opportunity to advise you of our efforts to improve occupant crash prot ection for all Americans.

Sincerely,

ID: nht81-2.6

DATE: 03/20/81

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Boyd, Payne, Gates & Farthing

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

MARCH 20, 1981 NOA-30

Mr. Charles E. Payne Boyd, Payne, Gates & Farthing Virginia National Bank Building Suite 1240 One Commercial Place Norfolk, Virginia 23510

Dear Mr. Payne:

This responds to your recent letter concerning the problem plaintiffs' lawyers in civil cases have in obtaining certain data from foreign manufacturers of automobiles. Your letter specifically asked if there are any Federal safety standards concerning the crashworthiness of automobile seats. You state that the Department of Transportation informed you by letter that there are no such standards.

This is incorrect. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 207, Seating Systems (49 CFR 571.207), specifies performance requirements for vehicle seats in passenger cars and other vehicles. The standard requires passenger seats to be able to withstand forces equal to twenty times the weight of the seat without collapsing. This is a static test in which the force is applied directly to the seat. The standard does not, however, require a dynamic crash test of vehicles to determine seat integrity, such as the tests used by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety cited in your letter. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, as amended 1974 (15 U.S.C. 1381, et seq.), Toyota Motor Company is required to certify that its vehicles comply with Safety Standard No. 207. I am enclosing a copy of the standard for your information.

Please contact Hugh Oates of my office if you require any further information (202-426-2992).

Sincerely,

Frank Berndt Chief Counsel Enclosure

March 5, 1981

Frank Berndt, Esquire Chief Counsel U.S. Department of Transportation 400 7th Street S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Mr. Berndt:

Congressman Bill Whitehurst forwarded to you my recommendation concerning legislation or regulations aimed at forcing foreign manufacturers of mechanical products imported into this country, to file for record with your agency certain data accessable to private litigants. You sent him a reply letter dated February 18th and he sent me a copy.

Your letter was informative and helpful. I would even agree that the regulations that you referred to are of some help. However, I do not think they truly meet the problem.

A news release issued by the Department of Transportation reported that foreign imports were notably less safe than their American counterpart automobiles. I also have in my possession in connection with litigation I am now pursuing against Toyota, data from various organizations around the country which data discloses that occupant safety and crashworthiness are of little concern to those who manufacture their cars and ship them into our country from abroad. The same data also diclosed that American manufacturers, on the other hand, have by-in-large, done very well in comparison to the foreign manufacturers in the area of crashworthiness and occupant safety.

I believe that most attorneys who practice products liability litigation will agree that the greatest single impetus for improved crashworthiness and occupant safety of American automobiles has been our system of tort liability, and the effectiveness of our courts and plaintiff's counsel in bringing to light defects and unsafe designs in automobiles.

Apparently however, most notably our Japanese friends have by-in-large not been subjected to the same examination by litigation of their design concepts and practices with respect to occupant safety. I for one am convinced, as are a good many of my colleagues at the plaintiff's bar, that part of the reason for this is the substantial difficulty of gaining access to files and records of the foreign manufacturers. This same difficulty was a subject of an in depth investigative reporting effort by "60 Minutes" last year. Perhaps you are aware of it.

The problem has not been an inability to gain in personam jurisdiction over the foreign manufacturers. That is the easiest part of it. However, once they are in court, they have proven very adroit at using every conceivable tool to preclude production for examination by plaintiff's experts of such things as design specifications, computer simulation data, and films of crash testing. Their excuses include the language barrier, the transoceanic legistics and communications probIems, as well as the "We are a multi-national corporation with warehouses full of documents, and it is impossible to locate what you want" excuse.

I believe that if the Japanese and Germans, whose cars are the principal culprits, were forced by the spector of substantial civil liability quickly and efficiently imposed, they would build their cars with the crashworthiness and occupant protection equal to American cars. I also dare say that if they had to do so, they could not market their cars at a price competitive to American makes.

While I appreciate the intent of the regulations you cite which require all automobiles imported to be certified to meet the Department of Transportation safety standard, that program does not appear to have yet begun to prove effective. One reason is that the Department of Transportation safety standards are by no means comprehensive. In particular, with respect to the suit I now have against Toyota, the Department of Transportation has advised me by letter J that there is no safety standard currently in existence with respect to the crashworthiness and design safety of passenger seats. The decedent, whom I epresent, died as a result of his seat collapsing upon moderate rear end impact making it possible for his upper torso, neck and head to be whipsawed, and in turn resulting in a fatal injury to the brain stem. It is with somewhat bitter irony that I refer you to report A-4650.01, dated November 1973, issued by General Environments Corporation and prepared for the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. That report and others like it cite over and over again that upon moderate impact from the rear, the seats of most of the foreign imports collapsed, exposing the occupant to serious and avoidable risk injury, whereas the same testing done on American makes shows a dramatically lower incidence of seat failure.

If I have been misinformed, and if there truly is a Department of Transportation safety standard concerning the crashworthiness of automobile seats, I would appreciate a copy of such standard. Also, if there is such a standard I should like to report that I have serious reason to believe that Toyota automobiles manufactured between 1973 and 1979 do not meet anyones safety standard with respect to the design of their seats, and especially the bucket seats.

I appreciate your time and attention to this letter and its intent.

Yours very truly,

BOYD, PAYND, GATES & FARTHING

Charles E. Payne

CEP:wjb

cc: Mr. James Kelly