NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
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ID: nht91-7.10OpenDATE: November 14, 1991 FROM: Anonymous TO: Paul Jackson Rice, Esq. -- Office of Chief Counsel, NHTSA TITLE: RE: Request for Interpretation of FMVSS 114; "Theft Protection" ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 2/11/92 from Paul Jackson Rice to Anonymous (A39; Std. 114) TEXT: A major automobile manufacturer (hereafter referred to as "The Company") is seeking an interpretation relating to the applicability of a transmission shift override mechanism concealment cover as it is applicable to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard FMVSS No. 114; "Theft Protection", as recently defined per notice of response to petitions for reconsideration of the final rule published in the Federal Register notice (56 FR 12464) of Tuesday, March 26, 1991. The Company is presently considering the incorporation of several possible transmission shift override mechanism concealment covers, and is requesting the NHTSA Office of Chief Counsel to interpret the applicability of these proposals as they relate to the requirements of 49 CFR Part 571.114, S4.2.2(b), which states that the transmission shift lock override device "... may be operable by another means which, when installed, prevents sight of and activation of the device and which is removable only by use of a screwdriver or other similar tool". The Company has proposed five (5) alternative systems that it believes will afford concealment for the transmission shift lock override mechanism. These proposals are set forth below. Proposal I The shift lock override mechanism access panel is a non transparent plastic applique that is affixed to the horizontal surface of the automatic transmission shift gate by vertical members with barbed formations that snap into position upon engagement with complementary vertical walls of the shift gate as shown in section A-A of Fig. #1. The shift lock override panel, when seated in position, has a flush fit arrangement with respect to the finisher panel horizontal plane on all of it's perimeter, with the exception of an approximately 10 millimeter horizontal spacing along it's rear most edge as oriented in car position. This horizontal spacing provides an approximately 2 millimeter vertical gap between the shift gate and the surface of the horizontal member of the cover. In order to remove the shift lock override mechanism cover, one must apply a blade like device such as a knife or screwdriver to the 2 millimeter vertical spacing and pry the cover upward, thus defeating the retention features (Fig. #2) and exposing a button. This button, when depressed, actuates the link mechanism that provides lock override. Company design engineers estimate that a vertical load of approximately 5 to 10 Kg applied normal to the horizontal surface is necessary to remove the shift lock override access panel. Once the cover is removed, transmission shift lock can be defeated by depressing the override button.
(Drawing omitted) Fig. #1 - Shift Lock Override Mechanism Cover Location (Drawing omitted) Section A-A (Drawing omitted) Fig. #2 - Removal of Shift Lock Override Mechanism Cover
Proposal II Proposal II is identical to Proposal I, except that the override button is replaced with a threaded screw with a conventional or cross recessed head that can be advanced by use of a screwdriver. The downward motion of the rotating screw depresses the override link which actuates the override mechanism (Fig. #3). (Drawing omitted) Fig. #3 - Override Actuation Using Screw to Depress Override Actuation Link
Proposal III Proposal III incorporates a cross recessed countersunk screw to retain the override mechanism cover rather than the barbed features that are incorporated into the cover in Proposals I and II (see Fig. #4 and Section B-B). In Proposal III, no actuation button or screw is provided. In order to actuate the override link, a screwdriver or similar tool must inserted the through the hole created by the removal of the cover screw to depress the override actuation link to override the transmission shift lock (Fig. #5). (Drawing omitted) Fig. #4 - Shift Override Mechanism Cover Affixed With Threaded Fastener (Drawing omitted) Fig. #5 - Actuation of Transmission Override By Depressing Link With Tool
Proposal IV Proposal IV utilizes the console finisher panel only in providing a concealment device for the shift override mechanism. The finisher panel, as designed, has a "line to line" interference to the console housing (Fig. #6 and Section C-C). The finisher panel is fabricated from injection molded plastic resin, which has some degree of flexibility. To remove the finisher panel, a screwdriver or similar tool is placed in a 6 millimeter crease at the surface of the panel to housing interface, and then applying a prying action. Removal of the panel exposes the shift override link, and actuation of the override is accomplished by depressing the actuation link (Fig. #7). (Drawing omitted) Fig. #6 - Console and Finisher Panel Assembly (Drawing omitted) Fig. #7 - A/T Shift Gate Removed Exposing Shift Override Mechanism
Proposal V Proposal V involves an identical shift override button actuation device as in Proposal I. Company designers have alternatively proposed to have a non removable cover with a slot to access the shift override incorporated as opposed to Proposal I, which has a removable cover. To actuate the override mechanism, a key, screwdriver or similar tool must be inserted into the slot and the shift override release button must be depressed in order to actuate the shift override. This proposal is illustrated in Figure #8 and Section D-D. (Drawing omitted) Fig. #8 - Proposal V With Key/Tool Access Slot in Shift Override Cover (Drawing omitted) Section D-D
Supplements to Proposals I and II (Anonymous) engineers have also proposed identify the transmission shift override mechanism by placing the verbiage "shift lock" in white lettering on the shift lock override mechanism access cover horizontal surface. An illustration is shown below. (Drawing omitted) Transmission shift lock cover with white lettering on black field |
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ID: nht92-4.19OpenDATE: September 4, 1992 FROM: Dale E. Dawkins -- Director, Vehicle Compliance and Safety Affairs, Chrysler TO: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA COPYEE: S. R. Kratzke -- NHTSA; S. Backaitis -- NHTSA; D. Cohen -- NHTSA TITLE: None ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 10/2/92 from Paul Jackson Rice to Dale E. Dawkins (A40; Std. 208) TEXT: Chrysler Corporation herein announces its intention of making a modification to the Hybrid III (49 CFR Part 572 Subpart E) test dummy for the purpose of enhancing the reliability of the chest deflection measurement system. Several years ago Chrysler elected to use the Hybrid III test dummy for motor vehicle occupant protection development and compliance testing. Recently, we have discovered what we consider to be a technical shortcoming of the Hybrid III test dummy chest deflection measurement system that makes it unacceptable, without modification, for testing two-point motorized seat belt systems. Chest deflection measurements have been an ongoing issue between the industry and NHTSA for some time. In angular and frontal impacts, the torso belt deflects the chest in a combination of fore-aft and lateral directions. The lateral deflection component in conjunction with fore-aft deflection causes the rubber bump stops (PN 78051-356) on the inside surface of the sternum to interfere with the slider rod (PN 78051-353) of the chest deflection transducer. When this interference occurs during a vehicle barrier impact test, frequently the ball on the end of the chest deflection rod will pop out of the Delrin guide track it rides in causing the chest deflection measurement to be erroneous. This malfunction of the Hybrid III test dummy has caused us to question several tests of future vehicles necessitating retest. We have made high speed fiber optic video recordings that confirm the sternum bump stops can interfere with the chest deflection rod, act as a fulcrum and pry the ball on the deflection rod out of its slider track. The rod and rotary potentiometer then indicate erroneous, erratic, nonsensical chest defections. Chrysler and others, through the SAE Dummy Testing Equipment Subcommittee, have learned that relocating one or both of the bump stops from the sternum to the spine of the Hybrid III dummy can alleviate this measurement problem and permit Hybrid III chest deflection measurements. We believe the relocation of the bump stops from the sternum to the spine box is useful and necessary and with due care will not affect the calibration or measurement accuracy of the chest deflection transducer or biofidelity of the Hybrid III thorax. It is our understanding that the changes proposed are consistent with NHTSA policy. Chrysler hereby notifies the agency of its intentions to relocate the sternum bump stops to the spine (as shown) so that certification testing of a 1994 model year motor vehicle to MVSS 208 may proceed using the Hybrid III. We understand that using the Hybrid II (49 CFR Part 572 Subpart B) test dummy is an option we have available to us. However, we are reluctant to use the Hybrid II because we prefer the Hybrid III for its superior biofidelity. Your expeditious acknowledgement of this notice will be very appreciated. |
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ID: aiam2841OpenMr. Robert Hoppe, 1436 So. Sherman Street, Longmont, CO 80501; Mr. Robert Hoppe 1436 So. Sherman Street Longmont CO 80501; Dear Mr. Hoppe: This responds to your letter of May 3, 1978, in which you request determination as to whether the three- wheeled motor vehicle which you are designing is a 'motorcycle' or an automobile ('passenger car') for purposes of complying with federal motor vehicle safety standards.; The vehicle falls within the definition of 'motorcycle' set forth i regulations under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966:; >>>'Motorcycle' means a motor vehicle with motive power having a sea or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel on not more than three wheels in contact with the ground. (49 CFR Part 571.3(b))<<<; Accordingly, the vehicle would have to meet the requirements of safet standards applicable to motorcycles. I have enclosed an information sheet explaining where you can obtain federal standards and regulations.; I want to point out that in April 1974, this agency proposed a revisio of the above definition of 'motorcycle' under which this term would be limited to two-wheeled motor vehicles and to three-wheeled motor vehicles with handlebars and no passenger enclosures. I have enclosed a copy of this proposal. However, in view of the time that has elapsed since the proposal was issued, the agency has decided not to issue a final rule on this subject without providing another opportunity to comment.; Sincerely, Joseph J. Levin, Jr., Chief Counsel |
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ID: nht75-6.19OpenDATE: 01/01/75 EST FROM: ROBERT L. CARTER -- NHTSA ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR MOTOR VEHICLE PROGRAMS TO: J.W. KENNEBECK -- EMISSIONS, SAFETY & DEVELOPMENT VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC. TITLE: NONE TEXT: Dear Mr. Kennebeck: This responds to Volkswagen of America's March 25, 1975, petition for rulemaking to amend S4.5.3.3 of Standard No. 208, Occupant crash protection, to allow, at the manufacturer's option, visual warning lamps which remain activated whenever front outboard safety belts are not in use. Your petition states that it supersedes Volkswagen's February 20, 1975 petition for rulemaking. Your petition explains that Volkswagen, in offering a passive belt system in its Rabbit model on an optional basis, provides an ignition interlock system and a passenger-side warning system to encourage passive belt usage, although such systems are not required by the standard. You correctly note that a January 16, 1975, letter to Volkswagen from the NHTSA Office of Chief Counsel indicates that additional safety devices such as these are not prohibited by our minimum safety standards, as long as their installation does not have the effect of causing required systems not to comply. Your petition requests an amendment of Standard No. 208's warning provisions to permit a visual warning longer than the 4- to 8-second reminder light presently required by S4.5.3.3. You apparently have concluded that language in our January 16 letter prohibits the provision of any additional visual warning with a duration different than 4-8 seconds. Our January 16 letter states "additional [safety] devices could not be installed if that installation has the effect of causing the required systems not to comply." This does not prevent the installation of a second visual warning which operates continuously when seat belts are not in use at either front designated seating position. The manufacturer who provides such additional warning would only have to ensure that the required 4- to 8-second visual reminder required under S4.5.3.3 operates independently of the additional warning. For this reason, we conclude that Volkswagen may provide the additional warning it desires without amendment of Standard No. 208. Accordingly, Volkswagen's petition is denied as unnecessary. Please advise the NHTSA if this interpretation does not permit Volkswagen to provide the degree of additional warning for which it petitioned. Sincerely, |
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ID: aiam0967OpenSatoshi Nishibori, Nissan Motor Co. Ltd., 650 Sylvan Avenue, Englewood Cliffs, NJ 07632; Satoshi Nishibori Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. 650 Sylvan Avenue Englewood Cliffs NJ 07632; Dear Mr. Nishibori: This is in reply to your letter of January 8, 1973, asking us t confirm your understanding of paragraph S4.3.1 of Standard 210.; It is our opinion that each of the three drawings attached to you letter correctly indicates the 'nearest contact point of the belt with the hardware' for the respective belt anchorage systems.; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: nht89-1.70OpenTYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA DATE: 04/13/89 FROM: ERIKA Z. JONES -- CHIEF COUNSEL NHTSA TO: MABEL Y. BULLOCK -- ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TITLE: NONE ATTACHMT: LETTER FROM MABEL Y. BULLOCK AND LACY H. THORNBURG TO SUSAN SCHRUTH -- NHTSA RE WINDOW TINTING, FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION OF STATE REGULATIONS, OCC 2142; NORTH CAROLINA STATUTE REGULATING WINDOW TINTING; LETTER DATED 12/18/87 FROM LACY H. THORNBURG A ND MABEL Y. BULLOCK, SUBJECT MOTOR VEHICLES REGULATIONS OF DARK SHADED WINDOWS; PREEMPTION; LETTER DATED 05/06/88 FROM DAIRL BRAGG TO WILLIAM S. HIATT; LETTER DATED 10/28/82 FROM FRANK BERNDT -- NHTSA TO LAWRENCE T. HIROHATA, NOA-30; LETTER DATED 04/04/8 5 FROM JEFFREY R. MILLER TO ARMOND CARDARELLI; REGULATIONS DATED 07/01/85 EST, FEDERAL AUTO SAFETY LAWS AND MOTOR VEHICLE WINDOW TINTING. TEXT: Dear Ms. Bullock: Thank you for your letter to Ms. Susan Schruth of my staff, regarding North Carolina General Statute 20-127, Windshields must be unobstructed. I regret the delay in responding. You enclosed a copy of the statute, the regulations implementing it, a copy of a December 18, 1987 legal memorandum prepared by your department concluding that a State statute or regulation allowing 35% light transmittance through windows in motor vehicles would be preempted by current Federal safety laws and standards regulati ng this same subject matter, and a copy of a May 6, 1988 letter from the Motor and Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA) to Mr. William S. Hiatt, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles for North Carolina, asserting that the North Carolina statute was no t preempted by Federal laws and regulations. You asked for my opinion as to whether the North Carolina statute conflicts with any provision of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. @ 1381 et seq.) or with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (49 CFR 571.1 et seq.). Some background information on Federal motor vehicle safety laws and regulations may be helpful. As you are aware, our agency is authorized, under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehic les and certain items of motor vehicle equipment. One of the standards that we have issued under this authority is Standard No. 205, Glazing Materials (49 CFR @ 571.205), which applies to all new vehicles and all new glazing materials for use in motor v ehicles. Among the requirements set forth in Standard No. 205 are specifications for minimum levels of light transmittance (70 percent light transmittance in areas requisite for driving visibility, which includes all windows in passenger cars). Section 108(a)(1)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A)) specifies that, "No person shall manufacture for sale, sell, offer for sale, or introduce or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce, or import into the United States, any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment manufactured on or after the date any applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard takes effect under this title unless it is in conformity with such standard . . ." Because of this statutory requirement, any manufacturer, importer, or dealer that installs solar films or other sun screen devices on new glazing materials or the glazing installed in new vehicles must certify that the vehicle continues to comply with th e light transmittance and other requirements of Standard No. 205. The requirement that a car comply with all applicable safety standards applies only until the car is first sold to a consumer. See section 108(b)(1) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(b)(1)). Both before and after a vehicle is first sold to a consumer, any modifications to the vehicle's windows, including tinting, are affected by section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(A)). That section prohibits any manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business from "rendering inoperative " any device or element of design installed in a vehicle in compliance with any safety standard. In the case of windows in a passenger car, this means that no manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business could install a sun screen device or win dow tinting that would result in a light transmittance of less than 70 percent for any window of the car, or otherwise cause the car to no longer comply with the other requirements of Standard No. 205. Violations of this "render inoperative" prohibition can result in Federal civil penalties to the manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business of up to $ 1000 for each noncomplying installation. Please note that Federal law does not affect vehicle owners. Vehicle owners may alter their own vehicles and operate them on the highways as they please, even if the vehicle's windows no longer comply with the requirements of Standard No. 205. Hence, n o provision of a Federal statute or this agency's regulations prevents individual vehicle owners themselves from tinting the windows on their vehicles. The authority of States to regulate glazing is affected by section 103(d) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. @ 1392(d)). This section provides that: [whenever] a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this title is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or ite m of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard. Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing any State from en forcing any safety standard which is identical to a Federal safety standard. The effect of this provision of the Safety Act, with respect to the light transmittance requirements of Standard No. 205, is to expressly prohibit any State from specifying some level of light transmittance other than than 70 percent specified in Standar d No. 205 for new motor vehicles and
new glazing for the use in motor vehicles. Each of the individual States has authority to enforce identical standards (i.e., a minimum of 70 percent light transmittance) for new motor vehicles and new glazing for use in motor vehicles. Additionally, eac h of the individual States has the authority to regulate the modifications that may be made to vehicles by their owners and to establish requirements for vehicles to be registered in that State. Having provided this background, we want to turn now to the results of our review of the North Carolina statute and regulations, along with your office's memorandum concluding that the statue is preempted by Federal law. 1. New vehicles and new glazing for use in vehicles. We concur with the conclusions in your memorandum that the North Carolina statute would be preempted if it specifies any requirements other than the requirements of Standard No. 205 (minimum of 70 per cent light transmittance) for new vehicles or few new glazing for use in motor vehicles. Section 108(a)(1) of the Safety Act and Standard No. 205 require all new vehicles and new glazing for use in motor vehicles to be delivered to the first purchaser w ith a light transmittance of at least 70 percent. Section 103(d) of the Safety Act expressly preempts any non-identical State standard on the subject of window tinting. Section 20-127(d) of the North Carolina statute appears to permit a single applicat ion of tinted film with a light transmittance of as little as 35 percent to be applied to vehicle glazing after factory delivery, but before sale to the public. This provision is preempted by Federal law, as is any other provision of North Carolina law which specifies that new glazing and glazing in new vehicles shall have some level of light transmittance other than the 70 percent minimum light transmittance requirement specified in Standard No. 205. 2. Modifications to vehicles and glazing by manufacturers, distributors, dealers and repair businesses after the first purchase of the vehicle or glazing in good faith for purposes other than resale. We concur with the conclusions in your memorandum tha t the North Carolina statute would be preempted by Federal law if it permits the commercial installation of sunscreen materials so that the combination of the sunscreen material and the existing glazing no longer meet the 70 percent light transmittance r equirement specified in Standard No. 205. This conclusion is based on the conflict between the North Carolina statute and the "render inoperative" provision of section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act. That provision prohibits any manufacturer, distributor , dealer, or repair business from rendering inoperative the compliance of a vehicle or an item of glazing with any of the requirements of Standard No. 205, including the minimum 70 percent light transmittance requirement. Apart from the issue of preemption, I want to note that the provisions of State law cannot alter the effect of the "render inoperative" prohibition in Federal law. Regardless of how North Carolina law treats the combination of the glazing and the tintin g, if it results in less than 70 percent light transmittance, a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business that installed such tinting on a vehicle would be liable for the Federal civil penalty discussed above. 3. Modifications to vehicles and glazing by individual owners themselves after the first purchase of the vehicle or glazing in good faith for purposes other than resale. As noted above, Federal law does not regulate modifications that individual owners themselves make to their vehicles or glazing after the first purchase in good faith for purposes other than resale, even if those modifications result in the vehicles or glazing on longer complying with the requirements of Standard No. 205, including the requirement for at least 70 percent light transmittance. The State of North Carolina is free to establish whatever restrictions, if any, it deems appropriate on individual owner modifications, without regard to the requirements of Standard No. 205. To the extent that the North Carolina statute seeks to address these individual owner modifications, it would not be preempted by Federal law. $4. Requirements for vehicles to be registered in the State of North Carolina. An individual State is free to establish whatever requirements it deems appropriate for vehicles to be registered in the State, provided that those State requirements would n ot prohibit the registration of vehicles that complied with the requirements of the Federal safety standards. Thus, the State of North Carolina is free to permit vehicles that do not comply with the requirements of Standard No. 205 to be registered in N orth Carolina. To the extent that the North Carolina window tinting statute seeks to establish requirements for vehicles to be registered in the State, it would not be preempted by Federal law. We have also reviewed the May 6, 1988 letter from MEMA to Mr. Hiatt, in which MEMA discusses why it believes North Carolina's statute would not be preempted by Federal law. The MEMA discussion does not address the "render inoperative" provision in secti on 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act, which prohibits commercial businesses from adversely affecting the compliance of elements of design installed in a vehicle or item of equipment in compliance with a safety standards, regardless of whether the vehicle is new or used. As was previously stated, Federal law prohibits any manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business from ever installing window tinting material for the owner of a car if the combination of the original glazing and the tinting materi al results in less than 70 percent light transmittance through any window of the car. To summarize, the North Carolina statute would be preempted to the extent that it seeks to permit some level of light transmittance other than that specified in Standard No. 205 for glazing in vehicles prior to the first purchase of the vehicles in good faith for purposes other than resale. Similarly, the statute would be preempted to the extent it seeks to permit the commercial installation of sunscreen materials with the result that the combination of the sunscreen material and the existing glazing n o longer complies with the requirements of Standard No. 205. However, the North Carolina statute would not be preempted to the extent that it seeks to regulate the modifications that owners themselves can make to their vehicles or to the extent that it seeks to establish requirements for vehicles to be registered in the State, even if those requirements differ from those specified in Standard No. 205. Sincerely, |
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ID: aiam0147OpenMr. Eugene D. Prahst, Chief Product Engineer, Dump Trailer Division, The Heil Company, 3000 W. Montana Street, Milwaukee, WI 53201; Mr. Eugene D. Prahst Chief Product Engineer Dump Trailer Division The Heil Company 3000 W. Montana Street Milwaukee WI 53201; Dear Mr. Prahst: Thank you for your letter of February 24, 1969, to the Office o Standards Preparation, concerning the proposed lighting equipment on your dump trailers.; The lamps and reflectors shown on your drawing 701B1907 dated Februar 20, 1969, appear to be in conformance with the requirements of Standard No. 108 with the following exceptions:; >>>1. The required license plate lamp is not shown. 2. The minimum mounting height for reflectors is 15 inches. 3. With respect to maximum mounting zones for lamps and reflectors, th limiting dimensions of 16, 30, and 24 inches indicated on your drawing appear to be too liberal for a trailer with essentially square corners.; 4. With reference to Notes 2 and 3 on your drawing, certai restrictions as specified in paragraph S3.3 of Standard No. 108 are applicable for combination lamps.<<<; With respect to the requirements of Standard No. 108, I must point ou that this Bureau does not issue approvals on items of lighting equipment or on vehicle designs incorporating this equipment. Therefore, the above comments are for your information only, and in no way relieve the vehicle manufacturer from his responsibility for certifying that the assembled vehicle meets the requirements of Standard No. 108.; Sincerely, Charles A. Baker, Office of Standards on Accident Avoidance Motor Vehicle Safety Performance Service; |
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ID: ConductorsAlliancedrnOpen
Mr. Robert Strassburger Dear Mr. Strassburger: This responds to your letter (Docket 15712-9) asking us to reevaluate the November 26, 2002, and July 23, 2003, interpretation letters that we issued to Mr. Larry Costa of Costa Industries, concerning whether Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 205, as amended on July 25, 2003 (68 FR 43964)(Docket No. 15712), further amended September 26, 2003 (68 FR 55544), January 5, 2004 (69 FR 279), August 18, 2004 (69 FR 51188), and July 12, 2005 (70 FR 39959), requires glazing fracture testing to be conducted with conductors or any other components attached. We have developed the enclosed paper, "The Definition of Conductor in Fracture, Test 7 of ANSI/SAE Z26.1-1996, Incorporated by Reference into FMVSS No. 205". This paper clarifies the meaning of "conductors" and "terminals" and distinguishes between the terms. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Stephen P. Wood Enclosure The Definition of "Conductor" in "Fracture, Test 7" of ANSI/SAE Z26.1-1996,
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ID: nht87-3.41OpenTYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA DATE: 12/10/87 FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA TO: Mercedes-Benz Truck Company, Inc. TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION TEXT: Mercedes-Benz Truck Company, Inc. 4747 N. Channel P.O. BOX 3849 Portland, Oregon 97208 Dear Mr. Rossow: This responds to your request for an interpretation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 121, Air Brake Systems. Section 56.2.1 of that standard specifies for certain tests conducted on a dynamometer that "(the dynamometer inertia for each wheel is equivalent to the load an the wheel with the axle loaded to its gross axle weight rating." According to your letter, you have interpreted the term "equivalent" in this section to "authorize compliance testing by reference to axle loads under actual st opping conditions." You requested confirmation of this interpretation. As discussed below, we disagree with your suggested interpretation. By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) does not provide approvals of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, it is the responsibility of the manufacturer to ensure that its vehicles or equipment comply with applicable standards. The following represents our opinion based on the facts provided in your letter. As indicated in your letter, your request for an interpretation was submitted in light of recent correspondence between your company and NHTSA's Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance (OVSC). OVSC requested you to submit information on the compliance with S tandard No. 121 of the Mercedes-Benz model L-1317, a two axle straight truck. You responded to that request by submitting a compliance certificate and interpretation concerning section 56.2.1. In letter dated April 9, 1987, OVSC informed you that it did not agree with your interpretation. Standard No. 121's dynamometer tests are set forth in section S5.4. That section specifies that brake assemblies must meet the requirements of 55.4.1 (brake retardation force-relevant only to towed vehicles), 55.4.2 (brake power), and 55.4.3 (brake recov ery), under the conditions of 56.2. One of those conditions, set forth in 56.2.1, is as follows: S6.2.1 The dynamometer inertia for each wheel is equivalent to the load on the wheel with the axle loaded to its gross axle weight rating. For a vehicle having additional gross axle weight ratings specified for operation at reduced speeds, the GAWR used is that specified for a speed of 50 mph, or, at the option of the manufacturer, any speed greater than 50 mph. In support of your suggested interpretation, you noted that axle loads of a decelerating vehicle vary under different deceleration conditions, i.e., as a vehicle traveling forward decelerates, the load of the axles shifts so that the front axle load rise s and the rear axle load falls. You stated that it is your reading of Standard No. 121 that the manufacturer "can assess compliance by either using a static load value or determining which of the varying values of the axle load should be considered in vi ew of actual vehicle behavior." With respect to gross axle weight rating (GAWR), you suggested that when used in the context of Parts 567 and 568, the GAWR is properly measured in a static manner, to permit a static determination of whether the load carr ying capacity of a vehicle axle in actual use has been reached. For dynamometer tests of service brakes under dynamic conditions, however, you argued that such tests should properly take into account the dynamic effects of deceleration. You then stated the following: The language of 56.2.1, setting dynamic test conditions, indicates that the dynamometer inertia for each wheel is to be set at the "equivalent" to the load on the wheel, when the axle is loaded to its GAWR (i.e., its load-carrying capacity). This languag e is not restrictive and grants a manufacturer the flexibility of determining an "equivalent" loading in consideration of the dynamic phenomena in conducting the texts required by 55.4. Thus, the static GAWR is permitted to be linked to dynamic condition s by the word "equivalent." We disagree with your suggested interpretation, which we believe is inconsistent with the language of S6.2.1, past interpretations of that provision, and the compliance test procedures the agency has long followed with respect to this provision. As indic ated above, 56.2.1 specifies that the dynamometer inertia for each wheel is "equivalent to the load on the wheel with the axle loaded to its gross axle weight rating." The phrase "equivalent to the load" uses the singular "load," instead of the plural "l oads," to show that the dynamometer inertia has only a single value. By itself, this suggests that 56.2.1 was not intended to provide multiple options for the dynamometer inertia setting, depending on the dynamic conditions simulated. Further, the overall language of 56.2.1 shows how the single dynamometer inertia setting is to be determined. The term "GAWR" is defined in 49 CFR Part 571.3 as "the value specified by the vehicle manufacturer as the load-carrying capacity of a single ax le system, as measured at the tire-ground interfaces." When an axle is loaded to its load-carrying" capacity, there is one "load on the wheel," at whose "equivalent" the dynamometer inertia must be set. While we believe that the language of section S6.2.1 is clear on the issue raised by your letter, we also note that agency guidance in the form of a past interpretation letter and OVSC's laboratory procedures for Standard No. 121 are also clear. In an in terpretation letter to Wagner Electric, dated May 26, 1972, the agency stated: In the dynamometer test conditions of S6.2.1, the dynamometer inertia for each brake assembly is based on 1/2 the GAWR of the axle. The rating for each axle is required to be stated separately. If, in the example you give, you choose to give 17,000 pound s as the rating for each axle, then the dynamometer inertia would be at 8,500 pounds for each brake assembly. That interpretation explicitly states that the dynamometer inertia is set with regard to the assigned GAWR, and makes no reference to the varying values of axle load during braking. This agency interpretation has been a matter of public record for the la st 15 years. Moreover, as OVSC noted in its letter of April 9, 1987, its test procedure TP-121-02 provides a specific formula for calculating "dynamometer inertia equivalent to the GAWR for the applicable vehicle axle." This test procedure has been used by the agency since March 163 1978, and has been available to the public since that date. You asserted in your letter that the static GAWR is "permitted to be linked to dynamic conditions by the word 'equivalent'." We find no basis in the word "equivalent" for your suggestion that the load on the wheel- should somehow be calculated during bra king. Section S6.2.1 uses the term "equivalent" to account for the fact that the terms "load" and "inertia" are different without the same dimensions and are not numerically equal; an axle's tire rolling radius must be considered in determining the prope r inertia as well as the load. We note that section S5.4.2.1 of Standard No. 121 uses the term "equivalent" in the same manner. That section specifies for dynamometer testing that the drum or disc be "rotating at a speed equivalent to 50 m.p.h." Since t he drum or disc is obviously not moving along longitudinally, the word "equivalent" in that section is used to bridge the gap between longitudinal and rotational movement. Your letter also argued that a February 18, 1976, interpretation letter to Oshkosh supports your suggested interpretation of 56.2.1. Oshkosh had asked whether a vehicle that meets section S5.1.1's requirements for air Compressor capacity when it is movin g must also comply when the vehicle is stationary. The agency stated: Section S5.1.1 does not specify whether or not the vehicle is moving as a test condition for the requirement. In view of the absence of this test condition, the NHTSA will resolve differences in this test condition in the manufacturer's favor if they aff ect the outcome of testing. We do not agree that this letter supports your suggested interpretation. The letter addressed only the issue of how a requirement should be read in view of the absence of a particular test condition. As explained at length above, we conclude that section S6.2.1 clearly specifies the particular test conditions to be followed for this section. Therefore, the Oshkosh letter is not relevant to requests for interpretation of S6.2.1. You also argued that in order to provide an appropriate braking system, with proper distribution of brake forces between the axles, its design must take into account the transfer of weight from the rear axle to the front axle during normal and emergency braking conditions. You stated that such a design and compliance test leads to a significant reduction in premature lockup of the rear axle. You also argued that NHTSA has recognized your braking system as "a safe and effective system" in its research te sting. We agree that a manufacturer must take into account the transfer of weight from the rear axle to the front axle when designing an appropriate braking system. This is necessary to provide safe brake performance during varying loading conditions, for norma l and emergency brake applications on varying road conditions: and it is so for all kinds of vehicles. However, the requirements of Standard No. 121 do not require vehicles to have too much rear braking, as you appear to imply. The requirements of S5.4.2 (Brake Power), and S5.4.3 (Brake Recovery), are minimum performance requirements intended to help ensure that brakes retain adequate stopping capacity during and after exposure to conditions caused by prolonged or severe use, such as long, downhill driv ing. In practice, in order to perform well in such conditions, both front and rear brakes must have a minimum capacity, and this capacity is related to GAWR despite the fact that the actual loads borne by the front and rear axles vary during different br ake applications. The agency therefore referred to GAWR in section 56.2.1, because this is an objective value that is readily ascertainable for every vehicle, and performance based on this value meets the particular safety need provided for by the requir ements of section S5.4. These minimum requirements are not intended, nor do they operate, as a restriction on the design decisions that manufacturers must make independently to distribute braking capacity to meet anticipated load distributions. Contrary to your assertion, NHTSA has not concluded that your brake system is "safe and effective." We also note that the quotations of the agency's research report cited in your letter address only limited aspects of braking performance and are taken ou t of context. We note that you stated that "(t)he Agency reported finding that the subject vehicle's front and rear axles were '. . . well balanced and tended to lock at close to the same pedal effort level.' (p. 19)." A more complete quotation is as fol lows: . . . In the empty driver best effort stops the driver was also able to utilize this peak friction, although not as effectively as the antilock, because the brakes on front and rear axles of the vehicle were well balanced and tended to lock at close to t he same pedal effort level. In the loaded case, however, the front axle tended to lock prematurely and it Has not possible for the driver to maintain all four wheels near the peak friction level. He could keep the front tires near the peak but when this occurred rear braking was relatively low. If he applied more braking, the front axle locked and he lost steering control due to lack of lateral traction at the front tires." Based on the information before the agency, OVSC is continuing its investigation concerning the compliance of your vehicles with Standard No. 121. Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel May 22,1987 Ms. Erika Z. Jones, Chief Counsel Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 Seventh Street, SW Washington, D.C. 20590 RE: Request for an Interpretation Concerning FMVSS 121, Air Brake Systems Dear Ms. Jones: On behalf of our parent company, Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft (DBAG), Mercedes-Benz Truck Company, Inc. (MBTC) requests an interpretation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 121, Air Brake Systems. This standard specifies that for tests c onducted on a dynamometer, "The dynamometer inertia for each wheel is equivalent to the load on the wheel with the axle loaded to its gross axle weight rating. 49 C.F.R. S 571.121.56.2.1. DBAG has interpreted the term "equivalent in this regulation to authorize compliance testing by reference to axle loads under actual stopping conditions. It is this interpretation which we are asking be confirmed by your offic e. The need for such an interpretation is the result of recent correspondence between MBTC and NHTSA. NHTSA's Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance has asked MBTC, as the manufacturer of trucks bearing the trade name of Mercedes-Benz, to submit information on the compliance with FMVSS 121 of Mercedes-Benz truck model L-1317. MBTC filed a response to this request containing the DBAG compliance certificate and the foregoing interpretation. In a letter dated April 9, 1987, NEF-31 HTS CIR 2879.1, the Office info rmed MBTC that it does not agree with the DBAG interpretation of FMVSS 121 used to assess compliance.
In determining compliance with FMVSS 121, DBAG recognizes, as do all automotive engineers, that axle loads of a decelerating vehicle vary under different deceleration conditions. That is, as a vehicle traveling forward decelerates, the load on the axles shifts so that the front axle load rises and the rear axle load falls. (See DBAG Compliance Certificate, section 2.16) Under Standard 121, the manufacturer must specify an axle load in connection with the tests conducted to assess compliance. It is DBAG' s reading of Standard 121 that the manufacturer can assess compliance by either using a static load value or determining which of the varying values of the axle load should be considered in view of actual vehicle behavior. As noted above, Standard 121 refers to the "gross axle weight rating" (GAWR) of the vehicle. GAWR is defined generally as "the value specified by the vehicle manufacturer as the load-carrying capacity of a single axle system, as measured at the tire-grou nd interfaces." 49 C.F.R. S 571.3(b). When used in the context of Parts 567 (Certification) and 568 (Vehicles Manufactured in Two or More Stages), the GAWR is properly measured in a static manner, to permit a static determination of whether the load carrying capacity of a vehicle axle in actual use has been reached. The nominal GAWR value on the certification label therefore must be used for such a determination. A test to represent a dynamic procedure such as braking presents quite different requirements. Instead of a static measurement, such a test should properly take into account the dynamic effects of deceleration. Standard 121 mandates dynamometer tests of service brakes under dynamic conditions. Thus, the question is whether the standard is specific in requiring a GAWR determined on a static test or whether language would permit the type of interpretation utilized by DBAG. The language of 56.2.1, setting dynamic test conditions, indicates that the dynamometer inertia for each wheel is to be set at the "equivalent" to the load on the wheel, when the axle is loaded to its GAwR (i.e., its load-carrying capacity). This languag e is not restrictive and grants a manufacturer the flexibility of determining an "equivalent. loading in consideration of the dynamic phenomena in conducting the tests required by 55.4. Thus, the static GAWR is permitted to be linked to dynamic conditions by the word "equivalent." The foregoing interpretation is supported by prior interpretative guidelines of the Agency. The standard itself does not specify that the "load on the wheel" must be evaluated in a static manner. In fact, it specifically uses the word "equivalent," a wor d not used in other sections of the standard. (See for comparison 5.5.6.1) In the context of braking, a manufacturer could, therefore, reasonably conclude that the dynamics of wheel loads under deceleration can be considered. In a letter to the Oshkosh T ruck Corporation, the Chief Counsel's Office has supported such an interpretation. In the Oshkosh case, the Agency indicated that, where the standard is silent as to an issue, the manufacturer may exercise its discretion. Oshkosh had asked whether a vehi cle that complies with S5.1.1 of the standard (air compressor capacity) when it is moving must also comply when the vehicle is stationary. The Chief Counsel replied: "Section S5.1.1 does not specify whether or not the vehicle is moving as a test condition for the requirement. In view of the absence of this test condition, the NHTSA will resolve differences in this test condition in the manufacturer's favor if they af fect the outcome of testing." Letter from Richard B. Dyson to Oshkosh Truck Corporation (February 18, 1976). For these reasons also, DBAG relies on the conclusion that Standard 121 does not specifically restrict the test procedure and permits a manufacturer to assess compliance by reference to the dynamics of braking for an actual vehicle. DBAG has concluded th at in order to provide an appropriate braking system, with proper distribution of brake forces between the axles, its design must take into account the transfer of weight from the rear axle to the front axle during normal and emergency braking conditions . Such a design and compliance test leads to a significant reduction in premature lockup of the rear axle. The Agency's own testing of the L-1317 supports this Conclusion. In August 1986, the Agency issued a report entitled, "Performance Evaluation of a Production Antilock System Installed on a Two Axle Straight Truck (NHTSA's Heavy Duty Vehicle Brake Researc h Program Report #6)" which included dynamic testing of this vehicle with and without the use of its ABS system. The Agency reported finding that the subject vehicle's front and rear axles were "... well balanced and tended to lock at close to the same p edal effort level." (p. 19). Further, the Agency reported that "... in the empty condition the vehicle has a relatively high braking efficiency over a broad range of road friction levels." The report explains that efficiency is a measure of the vehicle's ability to use available friction before lockup and loss of control occurs (p. 19). Finally, the report generally notes "if loss of control of the overbraked axle prevents the driver, no matter how skilled he is, from utiliz ing the full capability of the underbraked axle .." (p. 22). Accordingly, not only does FMVSS 121 provide sufficient breadth to allow the interpretation utilized by Daimler-Benz, its use results in a braking system which the Agency has recognized as a sa fe and effective system. Based on the foregoing request, we would appreciate your office responding with respect to the appropriateness of this interpretation. If you require any additional information, please do not hesitate to contact me. Sincerely, Gary W. Rossow Director, Government Technical Affairs cc: Mr. George L. Parker |
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ID: nht74-5.33OpenDATE: 04/09/74 FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA TO: Bruce J. Motyka TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of March 11, 1974, asking for suggestions regarding problems you have experienced with your pickup truck-camper unit. It appears from your letter that no violations of Federal requirements have occurred. Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 126 and its companion Consumer Information requirement (49 CFR @ 575.103) about which we wrote to you through Senator Percy's office did not become effective until January 1, 1973, well after the time you bought your vehicle. Moreover, it is not correct to characterize the dealer who sold you the unit as a "final-stage manufacturer." Under NHTSA requirements a pickup truck is a completed vehicle, and a person who installs a slide-in camper into the cargo area of a truck does not become a manufacturer. While this is not the case with chassis-mount campers, it is with respect to slide-in campers. I suggest that if you wish to proceed further you consult an attorney, who would be able to best assess your chances of success in civil litigation. The dealer's employee who told you that the "GVW plate meant nothing" was mistaken. The weight ratings provided on the plate represent the manufacturer's representation of the maximum safe weight of a fully loaded vehicle. You might wish to examine the labels attached, pursuant to Standard No. 126 and 49 CFR @ 575.103, to later models of both the pickup truck and camper you purchased. It is possible that those models and the ones you purchased are not substantially different. If that is the case the information on the labels can provide an indication of the extent that the weight ratings were exceeded by installation of the camper unit in question. While I regret we cannot be of further assistance I wish you success in your efforts to solve this problem. YOURS TRULY, March 11, 1974 Lawrence R. Schneider, Chief Counsel National Highway Safety Administration Re: January 22, 1974 N40-30 (MPP) Dear Mr. Schneider; I would like to thank you for the information which you sent in response to my inquiry to Senator Charles H. Percy. The information was quite informative, and answered many questions that I have had for some time. I was very happy to learn that the Federal Government has instituted various standards to protect the consumer from unscrupulous automobile and truck dealers. There are still several points which are not clear to me, and in order for you to understand my problem I must start at the beginning. During January 1972 I decided that the time had come to invest in a camper unit of some type. For a period of one month I shopped around quite diligently comparing various units and prices. On January 26, 1972 I finally decided that a neighborhood Dodge Dealer had a camper unit that was ideal for my needs and was in the price range that I could afford. For simplification, attached to this letter is a supplemental sheet giving truck and camper information. After taking delivery of the unit on January 31, 1972 I noticed that the truck appeared to be under great strain from the weight of the camper. One month later the engine was idling roughly, the transmission was not shifting properly, the engine was burning oil. I took the unit on a short weekend trip to a nearby lake and could hardly believe the lack of control I had on the highway due to high winds. On several occasions I honestly thought that at 50 M.P.H. the unit would tip right over and kill someone. I returned to the selling dealer and asked if they improperly matched the camper to the truck. I was assured that everything was OK and that it would take a little getting used to. As time went on the mechanical problems increased and the overall truck handling performance decreased. During the first six month's of ownership, I made an estimated 70 trips to the dealership to correct various mechanical problems. I also began reading various books on truck weights and truck capacities, since I was convinced that the mechanical problems were directly attributed to an overweight camper unit. It was determined at this time that the camper unit exceeded the G V W maximums for this truck. Armed with this information I paid a vist to Mr. Warren Johnson, General Manager of the Northwest Dodge Dealership. Mr. Johnson told me that the G V W plate meant nothing and that there was nothing at all wrong with the truck. Since I did not believe Mr. Johnson, I then paid a vist to the Dodge Motor Car Division Zone Office located in Elk Grove Village, Illinois. The Dodge zone office people understood my problem but told me there was nothing that they could do. They explained that the Dodge Corporation sold a 1972 Dodge D100 Pick-Up to Northwest Dodge, their dealer. Northwest Dodge purchased a Rover Camper from Coachmen Industries. I was told that Northwest Dodge was the final stage manufacturers and that they would be responsible. Still having severe mechanical problems with the unit, I went to another Dodge dealer and asked their service department to check the unit over and tell me what was wrong. This Dodge dealer told me and also put in writing that the unit was overweight. The D100 1/2 ton pick-up could not safely handle the weight of the camper. I might interject at this point that I received a recall notice from Dodge during the early part of 1972, asking me to return the unit to the selling dealer to have the bolts tightened on the truck bed. This I did, but the selling dealer charged me $ 20.00 to fullfill the obligation of the recall notice. Other problems which I have had with the unit which might be of interest to you: 1. Broken right front coil spring. 2. Transmission does not shift properly. 3. Engine overheats. 4. Chipped exhaust valve (1 cylinder). 5. Four leaking shock absorbers. 6. Uneven tire wear. 7. Engine burns oil. 8. Two tires developed "bubbles" on sides due to excess weight. 10. Cracked exhaust valve (another cylinder) and two bent pushrods. 11. Two rear leaf springs out of shape. The two rear leaf springs instead of retaining a "U" shape, point completely downward. This is completely opposite their normal shape. 12. Splits in the metal on the bed of the truck. In addition to all of these problems so far I now have a new problem. I recently took the unit to a State of Illinois safety test lane. This is a requirement in the State of Illinois before license plates are issued. Well naturally the unit was declared unsafe. It is quite obvious now that Northwest Dodge purchased a one half ton Dodge D100 Pick-Up from the Dodge people. They also purchased a Rover Slide On camper unit from Coachmen Industries and put the two units together, qualifying Northwest Dodge as a Final Stage Manufacturer. It seems that Northwest Dodge violated Federal standards. What can be done about it now? Can the Department of Transportation force Northwest Dodge to correct what they did? Can you force the dealership to reimburse me for the hundreds of dollars that I have been required to pay? Shouldn't Northwest Dodge be forced to beef up the truck to Federal specifications? Would it be wise or profitable to institute a civil action against Northwest Dodge for fraud? How can a consumer be treated this way by a dealership? It seems that there is no concern for the consumers safety at all! I hope that I have given you enough information to properly evaluate the situation. Any information, assistance, or help that you can provide will be sincerely appreciated. You people are the experts and I would be gratefull for any solutions that you can provide. Sincerely, Bruce J. Motyka Enclosure Bruce J. Motyka General Information Date of purchase: January 26, 1972 Date of delivery: January 31, 1972 Description of unit: 1972 Dodge-D100 1/2 ton Pick-Up 318-V8 Engine Power Disc Brakes Automatic Transmission Power Steering G78 X 15(Illegible Word) car tires Rover Slide on Camper Model #708-3M Purchased from: Northwest Dodge, Incorporated 1439 S. Lee Street Des Plaines Illinois 60018 G V W Weight Plate attached to truck: Make Dodge Model D10 V.I.N. D14AE23503564 T.O.N. R0912043 G V W as M F G D 05200 MAX FRONT CAP 2800 MAX G V W 05200 MAX REAR CAP 2945 Equipment I D: 1972 Dodge D100 Wheel Base 131 Rear Springs 1350 Front Springs 1300 Camper Unit: 1972 Rover Slide on Camper Model #: SM708 Serial #: 708721251 Unloaded Shipping Weight: 990 Vehicle Weighed: Front 2,800 LBS Rear 3,985 LBS Total 6,785 Truck camper weighed by licensed certified weigmaster. Truck camper loaded with gas, water, food, camping supplies, clothes and two adult males. |
Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.