ID: aiam1090

Dear Mr. Knight: This is in response to your letter of March 30, 1973, in which yo asked whether the date a vehicle is completed, with reference to the date of manufacture placed on the vehicle certification label, is the date a vehicle comes off the 'main production line' or the date it comes out of the 'final finish production area'.; On this question we are willing, in light of the wide variety o possible factual situations, to let a manufacturer use his own discretion within reasonable limits. As you have described your situation, either date may be used, up to the point where the last physical operations are completed. The 'final quality control checkout', however, would appear to be an operation taking place after the manufacture as we normally understand it is completed.; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel

ID: aiam1093

Dear Mr. Knight: This is in response to your letter of March 30, 1973, in which yo asked whether the date a vehicle is completed, with reference to the date of manufacture placed on the vehicle certification label, is the date a vehicle comes off the 'main production line' or the date it comes out of the 'final finish production area'.; On this question we are willing, in light of the wide variety o possible factual situations, to let a manufacturer use his own discretion within reasonable limits. As you have described your situation, either date may be used, up to the point where the last physical operations are completed. The 'final quality control checkout', however, would appear to be an operation taking place after the manufacture as we normally understand it is completed.; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel

ID: aiam2600

Dear Mr. Seib: This responds to United Brake and Clutch's June 1, 1977, request fo confirmation that use of a brake chamber equipped with separate diaphrams (sic) for application of service brake air pressure and isolated air pressure, along with a mechanical device that automatically holds the brakes in the applied position once they have been applied by means of the protected source of air, would comply with Standard No. 121, *Air Brake Systems*. The relevant provision of the standard states:; >>>S5.6.3 *Application and holding.* The parking brakes shall b applied by an energy source that is not affected by loss of air pressure or brake fluid pressure in the service brake system. Once applied, the parking brakes shall be held in the applied position solely by mechanical means.<<<; The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration is unable t 'approve' system designs for compliance with a standard in advance, because there is no way to establish that a vehicle so equipped actually meets the requirements until it has been manufactured.; From your description, it appears that the design would not violate an provision of the parking brake requirement. Our understanding is that the protected source of air pressure is connected separately to the brake chamber, that it is designed to operate even with failure of the service brake chamber diaphram (sic), and that the mechanical holding device operates automatically whenever air pressure in the trailer supply line is at atmospheric pressure. We assume also, that the braking force developed by the protected source of air pressure and maintained by the mechanical device would comply with the requirements of S5.6.1 or S5.6.2 of the standard.; Sincerely, Joseph J. Levin, Jr., Chief Counsel

ID: nht94-4.67

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: October 27, 1994

FROM: John E. Getz -- Director, Mobile Products Engineering, Ellis & Watts

TO: Taylor Vinson, NHTSA

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 3/2/95 LETTER FROM PHILIP R. RECHT TO JOHN E. GETZ (REDBOOK (2)); PART 571.7

TEXT: We are in the custom trailer manufacturing business. Most often we purchase new trailers and finish them, primarily inside, for specific applications such as medical trailers or trailers for specific electronic functions (see enclosed Brochure). In suc h cases our new trailer product is subject to all of the latest DOT regulations. However, in other cases we start with a used trailer and change its finishing and equipment for a new application. For example, we recently took an old (1985) vintage trai ler, stripped the inside, and refinished it for a major computer company to use as a mobile marketing facility. In this case the running gear did not change nor did the Vehicle Identification number. However, ownership did change which raised the questi on of "Newly Manufactured" as addressed in @ 571.7 "Applicability" (copy enclosed). Telephone discussions with Patrick Boyd and Ken Hardy in Vehicle Safety indicate preliminarily that this is not a newly manufactured trailer because the basic trailer st ructure did not change. However in some cases we may cut a hole in the side and install a door for a specific application.

What we are requesting is an interpretation as to whether we would fall in the category of a newly manufactured trailer if the running gear. VIN, and the basic trailer structure do not change, but the ownership does. In the example above we did add conspicuity treatment, not because it was thought to be legally required (although we did want to protect the company prior your interpretation), but mainly from a liability and safety standpoint in the event of an accident and subsequent litigation. If you have any questions regarding this request please call me at (513) 752-9000 ext. 208. Thanking you in advance. I am

Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association

RICHARD P. BOWLING

PRESIDENT

FAX TRANSMITTAL COVER SHEET

Date: October 18, 1994

Number of pages including this sheet: 1

From: Don Vierimaa

To: John Getz, 1-513-943-3395 TITLE 49 - TRAILERS

@ 671.7 Applicability.

(a) General. Except as provided in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section, each standard set forth in Subpart B of this part applies according to its terms to all motor vehicles or items of motor vehicle equipment the manufacture of which is completed on or after the effective date of the standard.

(f) Combining new and used components in trailer manufacture. When new materials are used in the assembly of a trailer, the trailer will be considered newly manufactured for purposes of paragraph (a) of this section, the application of the requirement s of this chapter, and the Act, unless, at a minimum, the trailer running gear assembly (axle(s), wheels, braking and suspension) is not new, and was taken from an existing trailer--

(1) Whose identity is continued in the reassembled vehicle with respect to the Vehicle Identification Number; and

(2) That is owned or leased by the user of the reassembled vehicle.

ID: 13415.ztv

Ms. Ana S. Salcedas
308 N. Forklanding Road
Maple Shade, NJ 08052

Dear Ms. Salcedas:

This responds to the letter that you and Mr. Silva sent us on December 14, 1996. We are sending a copy of our reply to Mr. Silva at his Philadelphia address. You have asked our "assistance in ensuring that the patent [for the Auto Brake Light] meets the requirements for Code 571.108."

The patent application indicates that the Auto Brake Light is a message-sending device that can take several forms. In one application, the center highmounted stop lamp can display the message "STOP". In another form, the left hand stop lamp, the center highmounted stop lamp, and the right hand stop lamp can display, one word to a lamp, the message "SLOW DOWN NOW". We assume that the lower stop lamps could also display the message "SLOW DOWN." The application states that "[o]ptimally, the present invention may be used with retrofitted light assemblies that are attached to a vehicle after its original manufacture."

Under our basic regulatory statute, 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301, a motor vehicle must conform with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards at the time it is sold and delivered to its initial purchaser. This means that, if the vehicle is modified after manufacture and before such sale, it must continue to comply with the Federal safety standards after the modifications. Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 Lamps, Reflective Devices and Associated Equipment, 49 CFR 571.108, permits the addition of supplementary lighting devices at the time of initial manufacture or before initial sale provided that they do not impair the effectiveness of lighting equipment required as original equipment by Standard No. 108.

As noted above, in one form of your invention, the center highmounted stop lamp can display the word "STOP." Figure 10 of Standard No. 108 establishes minimum candela intensity values that must be met at individual test points on the lamp, or the sum of such test points within zones. If any portion of the word "STOP" obscures the light at any individual test point so that the zone total falls below the minimum sum specified for the zone, that obscuration would create a noncompliance with Standard No. 108, and the retrofitted lamp would not be permissible. In addition, visibility of the center stoplamp signal must not be impaired by any part of the vehicle including the word "STOP" from test points 10U to 5D and from 10L to 10R, unless the lamp is designed to comply with all requirements when the obstruction is considered. If the letters can be arranged so that the lamp continues to comply, as discussed above, we do not believe that the word "STOP" would impair the effectiveness of the center stop lamp.

On the other hand, we believe that the message "SLOW DOWN" or "SLOW DOWN NOW" when placed on the lower stop lamps could create a momentary distraction, which would impair the effectiveness of the stop lamp system when used to signal that the vehicle is stopping. This aspect of your invention would not be permitted by Standard No. 108.

Once a motor vehicle is sold, 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 prohibits manufacturers, dealers, distributors, and motor vehicle repair businesses from making inoperative any device or element of design installed in accordance with a Federal motor vehicle safety standard. We view the phrase "making inoperative" in this case as the equivalent of creating a noncompliance with Standard No. 108. This means that the persons named in the previous sentence may not retrofit a center lamp with the word "STOP" if it obscures any of the required test points. Further, it means that such persons may not retrofit vehicles with lamps spelling "SLOW DOWN NOW."

Because existing lamps are designed to meet the required test points with an unobscured lens, it is almost a certainty that lamps on vehicles in use would become noncomplying if retrofitted with letters forming words such as "STOP" and "SLOW DOWN NOW."

You will note that the prohibition discussed above does not extend to the vehicle owner who, under the statute, may create a noncompliance in his or her vehicle without violating Federal law. But a vehicle modified by its owner remains subject to the laws of the States in which it is registered and used. We are unable to advise you on State laws that may affect your device, and recommend that you contact the Department of Motor Vehicles of the States where you intend to market it.

We offer no opinion on the validity under Federal law of the other patented lighting devices discussed in the application.

If you have any questions, you may contact Taylor Vinson of this Office (202-366-5263).

Sincerely,

John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel

cc: Mr. Armenio N. Silva
     5110 Arendele Ave.
     Philadelphia, PA 19114

ref:108
d:2/25/97

ID: nht90-2.20

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: April 20, 1990

FROM: Wayne Brush -- Director, Material Management, Conceptor Industries, Inc.

TO: Clive Van Orden, Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance, NHTSA

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 7-25-90 to W. Brush from P. J. Rice; signature by S. P. Wood

TEXT:

Conceptor Industries Inc. ("Conceptor"), a subsidiary of Magna International Inc., in conjunction with the Electric Vehicle Development Corporation, the Electric Power Research Institute and several U.S. Electric Utilities is modifying General Motors Van s to produce electric powered vehicles for sale into the United States and Canada.

In January 1989, Conceptor made an application for a temporary exemption from three Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. This exemption was subsequently granted in November 1989 (Docket No. EX 89-2; Notice 2) with an expiry date of November 1, 1990. Conceptor has completed its testing program and concluded that the vehicle meets paragraphs S5.1.1.3, S5.1.2, and S5.1.3 of 49 CFR 571.105 Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 105 Hydraulic Brake Systems, 49 CFR 571.124 Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 12 4 Accelerator Control Systems, and paragraphs S6.2/S6.4, and S6.3/S6.4 of 49 CFR 571.301 Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301 Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301 Fuel System Integrity.

The purpose of this letter is to seek your assistance in resolving a difficult administrative problem for both General Motors and Conceptor concerning the assignment of the vehicle identification number for the electric van. Both companies are aware tha t the vehicle may not fit the current definition of an incomplete vehicle as described in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 568 (49 CFR 568) due to the fact that the shell as manufactured by General Motors lacks a power train. However, the shel l does have the other minimum requirements, i.e. a frame and chassis structure, steering system, suspension system and braking system. Due to this variance from the definition your department has indicated that Conceptor must assign the VIN. While Conce ptor is prepared to do this, use of a VIN to that is to a large extent different than that used by General Motors causes serious administrative difficulties in terms of tracking warranty, safety recall campaigns, etc. With this in mind, General Motors h as suggested that Conceptor use a VIN while it uses the GM world manufacturer identifier, check digit, model, year and production sequence codes, has a unique vehicle description code placing an "X" as the engine type code. An example of the proposed VI N is shown below:

2GKGG35X1K4528366

I would appreciate your thoughts on whether this approach is acceptable to NHTSA and if so, some guidance on how to secure the necessary approval. Early resolution of this matter is very important to us as we hope to be in production on July 9, 1990.

I will contact your office early next week to set up a convenient time to meet and discuss this issue.

ID: 9058a

The Honorable Charles E. Schumer
Chairman
Subcommittee on Crime and
Criminal Justice
Committee on the Judiciary
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-6216

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter requesting NHTSA's views on whether Title VI "Theft Prevention" of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act (15 U.S.C. 1901 et seq., Cost Savings Act) places a limit of $15 on the cost of an antitheft device to be installed in a high theft vehicle pursuant to an exemption from the parts marking standard. You believe the answer is no. As explained below, we agree.

The $15 limitation applies only to the cost of complying with the parts marking standard. The cost limitation appears in 2024(a), which provides that "The standard under section 602 (section 2022) may not (1) impose costs upon any manufacturer of motor vehicles to comply with such standard in excess of $15 per motor vehicle..." (Emphasis added.) Further, 2024(a) makes no reference to 2025 or to the costs of installing antitheft devices pursuant to exemptions issued under that section.

Thus, unless the costs of an antitheft device installed in lieu of compliance with the standard can be regarded as costs imposed by the standard, the $15 maximum does not apply to the costs of those devices. We do not regard the costs of those devices to be costs imposed by the standard. Instead, they are costs which the manufacturer has chosen to bear by voluntarily seeking an exemption from the standard. Further, we note that 2025 does not itself contain any cost limitation.

Although the foregoing analysis of the statutory language is sufficient to answer your question, we note that the legislative history of the 1984 Theft Act speaks directly to that question. Chairman John Dingell of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce commented on concerns that the costs for antitheft devices will be far greater than the costs of parts marking. He believed that manufacturers will not install devices that add a substantial cost to a vehicle and indicated that, regardless of the potential costs, Title VI "does not provide for consideration of costs by DOT." (See, Congressional Record-House October 1, 1984, p. H 10462, at 10472.)

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Cost Savings Act does not limit the cost of an antitheft device that is installed pursuant to the issuance under 2025 of an exemption from the standard. Please note that the passage of the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992 (ACTA) did not amend, in any way relevant to our conclusions, the provisions limiting costs of parts marking and authorizing the installation of antitheft devices in lieu of parts marking.

I hope this satisfactorily responds to your concerns. If you have any further questions, please let us know.

Sincerely,

Howard M. Smolkin Acting Administrator

ref:CSA d:9/21/93

ID: aiam2016

Dear Mr. Hart: Please forgive the delay in responding to your letter of April 5, 1975 requesting an interpretation of Section 202 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.; Section 202 does not directly require any motor vehicle to be equippe with appropriate tires. It instructs this agency to establish, by regulation, motor vehicle safety standards which will in turn require vehicles to be so equipped. Standard No. 110, *Tire selection and rims--passenger cars*, implements this instruction with respect to passenger cars. A three-quarter-ton pick-up truck, however, would be subject instead to proposed Standard No. 120, *Tire selection and rims for motor vehicles other than passenger cars* (copy enclosed). The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration expects to act on that proposal in the near future.; Standards issued pursuant to section 202 do not apply to vehicles afte they have been purchased for the purpose of being rented of leased to the general public, they are applicable only to vehicles up to the point of first purchase.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Acting Chief Counsel

ID: nht79-3.5

DATE: 08/17/79

FROM: FRANK BERNDT -- NHTSA; SIGNATURE BY S. WOOD

TO: Mr. Mike Champagne

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your telephone conversations of July 13, 1979, with Mr. Steve Wood of my office, in which you requested a general explanation of the Federal law concerning auxiliary gasoline tanks and the conversion of gasoline-powered vehicles to propane-powered vehicles.

The following discussion sets forth the implications of these activities under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as amended. The discussion first looks at the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) applicable to fuel systems and then at the defect responsibilities that might be involved. Next, a brief mention is made of the possibility of product liability suits.

Before getting into the legalities of these installations and conversions, I want to stress my concern about the danger which these practices may pose to the occupants of vehicles which are altered and even to occupants of other vehicles. These practices may seriously increased the risk of fire if these altered vehicles are involved in accidents. Even where there are no legal liabilities, this threat to safety may be present.

The Act authorizes the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to issue FMVSS's applicable either to entire vehicles or to equipment for installation in vehicles. The only standard relevant to this discussion, FMVSS 301-75, is a vehicle standard. It applies to vehicles which use fuel with a boiling point above 32 degrees F. and which are (1) passenger cars, or (2) multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, or buses with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 10,000 pounds or less or (3) schoolbuses with a GVWR greater than 10,000 pounds. If the need were found, a standard could also be issued for fuel systems designed for installation in new or used vehicles.

Under section 108(a)(1)(A) and (b)(1) of the Act, new motor vehicles must comply with the FMVSS's applicable to them until they are first purchased by someone for purposes other than resale. That purchase is completed when the vehicle is delivered to the ultimate consumer. The NHTSA regulations include two measures designed to ensure compliance with applicable FMVSS's until this delivery. First, manufacturers of new vehicles are required to affix to each vehicle they produce a lable which certifies the vehicle's compliance with all applicable FMVSS's. In addition, any person who prior to the first sale, alters a certified vehicle in a manner that significantly affects either its configuration or purpose is considered to be not only an alterer but also a manufacturer and therefore, must recertify the entire vehicle as complying with all applicable FMVSS's. (49 CFR 567.7 and Preamble to 37 F.R. 22800, October 25, 1972). The only alterations that a person may make prior to the first sale of a vehicle without being considered a manufacturer subject to the recertification requirements are minor finishing operations or the addition, substitution or removal of readily attachable components such as mirrors, tires, or rim assemblies. (49 CFR 567.7).

Should a noncompliance be discovered in a recertified vehicle, as a result of an alterer's modification, the alterer would be liable for a civil penalty unless he or she could establish that he or she did not have actual knowledge of the noncompliance, and that he or she did not have reason to know in the exercise of due care that the vehicle did not comply. (Section 108(b)(2) of the Act). The civil penalty imposed could be up to $ 1000 for each violation of an applicable FMVSS. (Section 109 of the Act).

With respect to FMVSS 301, the effect of the alterer provisions is that not only must the original gasoline fuel system meet the performance requirements encompassed by the standard but that any auxiliary or replacement tank added by an alterer must meet them also.

If the alterer converts the gasoline fuel system to a propane fuel system, the vehicle must still be recertified. However, FMVSS 301-75 would cease to be a factor since the standard would no longer apply to the vehicle. Propane has a boiling point below 32 degrees F. and FMVSS 301-75 applies only to vehicles using fuel with a higher boiling point. Finally, if the alterer converts a gasoline-powered vehicle so that it is both gasoline-powered and propane-powered, he must recertify the entire vehicle as complying with all applicable standards, including FMVSS 301-75.

After the first purchase of a vehicle for purposes other than resale, tampering with the vehicle is limited by section 108(a)(2)(A). That section in essence prohibits the entities and persons listed below from knowingly removing, disconnecting or reducing performance of equipment or elements of design installed on a vehicle in accordance with applicable FMVSS's. There is no prohibition against an individual person modifying his or her own vehicle. Specifically, the section provides:

No manufacturer, distributor, dealer or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard . . .

A person or entity found to have violated this section would be liable for a civil penalty of up to $ 1000 for each violation. (Section 109 of the Act).

If a tamperer adds an auxiliary gasoline tank to a vehicle manufactured in accordance with FMVSS 301-75, and in the process knowingly reduces the performance of the fuel system originally installed in the motor vehicle, he or she has violated section 108(a)(2)(A). (H.R. No. 1191, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1974). Such reduction of performance could occur, for example, if gasoline from the original system (a fuel system includes the filler pipe, tank, gasoline lines, fuel pump, carburetor, and engine) could be leaked through a rupture in the auxiliary tank and fuel lines, and if the design, materials, construction, installation or location of the auxiliary tank and fuel lines made them more susceptible to rupture than the original fuel system.

If a tamperer removes the original gasoline tank and installs a replacement one, section 108(a)(2)(A) is violated unless the performance (as defined by FMVSS 301-75) of the replacement tank equals or exceeds the performance of the original tank. To determine the relative performance of the replacement tank, a number of issues would have to be examined, including the quality of the replacement tank, the connection of the tank with the filler pipe and fuel lines to the fuel pump, and the location of the tank with respect to surrounding vehicle structures. For example, if unlike the original tank, the replacement tank were sufficiently near surrounding vehicle structures so that those structures might be pushed against or into the replacement tank and cause a rupture in a collision, the performance of the fuel system would have been impermissibly reduced.

There is no liability under section 108(a)(2)(A) in connection with FMVSS 301-75 if the tamperer converts a used gasoline-powered vehicle into a propane-powered vehicle. Modifying safety systems of a vehicle being converted from one vehicle type to another would not violate section 108(a)(2)(A) so long as the modified systems complied with the FMVSS's that would have been applicable to the vehicle had it been originally manufactured as the vehicle type to which it is being converted. For example, in converting a 1978 gasoline-powered car to a propane-powered car, the converter would not be governed by FMVSS 301-75 since that standard did not apply to 1978 propane-powered cars.

The case of a tamperer who modifies a used gasoline-powered vehicle so that it has a dual gasoline/propane system would be essentially the same as that of the person who adds an auxiliary gasoline tank. If the tamperer knowingly reduces the performance of the gasoline system in adding the propane system, he or she has violated section 108(a)(2)(A).

As to safety defect responsibilities under sections 151 et seq. of the Act, persons who alter new vehicles by installing auxiliary or replacement gas tanks or by converting a gasoline fuel system to a propane fuel system as well persons who produce the equipment being installed are fully subject to those responsibilities. Sections 151 et seq. provide that manufacturers of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment must notify owners of vehicles and equipment with safety-related defects and remedy those defects free of charge. As explained earlier the term "manufacturer" includes persons who alter new vehicles by doing more than simply adding, substituting, or removing readily attachable components or performing minor finishing operations. Since alterations involving installation of auxiliary replacement gas tanks or conversion of gasoline systems to propane systems are more substantial, persons who make those alterations are manufacturers.

Thus the alterer who installs auxiliary or replacement tanks or makes propane conversions is responsible for safety defects in the installation of the tanks and propane systems. Installation defects include defects in the method and location of installation.

Under 49 CFR Part 579, the auxiliary and replacement tanks and the propane systems would all be treated as "replacement equipment." Part 579 places the responsibility for safety defects in the performance, construction components, or materials, of replacement equipment on the manufacturer of such equipment. Therefore, the manufacturer who produces auxiliary or replacement tanks or propane systems, as distinct from the alterer who installs such equipment, would be subject to these responsibilities for production defects. A person who both produces such equipment and installs it in new vehicles prior to their delivery to the ultimate consumer would be subject to responsibilities for safety defects stemming from both production and installation of the equipment.

Under section 108(a)(1)(D) and 109(a), any person who fails to provide notification of or remedy for a safety defect is liable for a civil penalty of up to $ 1000 per violation.

Tamperers have no safety defect responsibilities for their tampering. As noted above, only manufacturers of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment are subject to sections 151 et seq. Since the term "manufacturer" is interpreted to refer to those who produce, assemble or import new vehicles or equipment and since tamperers, by definition, deal with used vehicles only, tamperers are not manufacturers.

Finally, there is the larger and more far reaching question of the liability of the alterers, tamperers, and manufacturers in tort. Whether or not these parties are liable under the Act for their actions, they may well be liable in tort. Both alterers and tamperers may be liable for the manner and location in which they install auxiliary or replacement gasoline tanks or propane systems in vehicles. Likewise, the manufacturers of these items of motor vehicle equipment may be liable for their design, materials, maufacture or performance. These persons may wish to consult a local lawyer on their liability in tort.

I hope that you will find this discussion helpful. If you have any further questions I will be happy to answer them.

ID: nht93-6.41

DATE: September 21, 1993

FROM: Howard M. Smolkin -- Acting Administrator, NHTSA

TO: Charles E. Schumer -- Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 9/3/93 from Charles E. Schumer to Barry Felrice

TEXT:

Thank you for your letter requesting NHTSA's views on whether Title VI "Theft Prevention" of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act (15 U.S.C. 1901 et seq., Cost Savings Act) places a limit of $15 on the cost of an antitheft device to be installed in a high theft vehicle pursuant to an exemption from the parts marking standard. You believe the answer is no. As explained below, we agree.

The $15 limitation applies only to the cost of complying with the parts marking standard. The cost limitation appears in S2024(a), which provides that "The standard under section 602 (section 2022) may not (1) impose costs upon any manufacturer of motor vehicles to comply with such standard in excess of $15 per motor vehicle..." (Emphasis added.) Further, S2024(a) makes no reference to S2025 or to the costs of installing antitheft devices pursuant to exemptions issued under that section.

Thus, unless the costs of an antitheft device installed in lieu of compliance with the standard can be regarded as costs imposed by the standard, the $15 maximum does not apply to the costs of those devices. We do not regard the costs of those devices to be costs imposed by the standard. Instead, they are costs which the manufacturer has chosen to bear by voluntarily seeking an exemption from the standard. Further, we note that S2025 does not itself contain any cost limitation.

Although the foregoing analysis of the statutory language is sufficient to answer your question, we note that the legislative history of the 1984 Theft Act speaks directly to that question. Chairman John Dingell of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce commented on concerns that the costs for antitheft devices will be far greater than the costs of parts marking. He believed that manufacturers will not install devices that add a substantial cost to a vehicle and indicated that, regardless of the potential costs, Title VI "does not provide for consideration of costs by DOT." (See, Congressional Record-House October 1, 1984, p. H 10462, at 10472.)

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Cost Savings Act does not limit the cost of an antitheft device that is installed pursuant to the issuance under S2025 of an exemption from the standard. Please note that the passage of the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992 (ACTA) did not amend, in any way relevant to our conclusions, the provisions limiting costs of parts marking and authorizing the installation of antitheft devices in lieu of parts marking.

I hope this satisfactorily responds to your concerns. If you have any further questions, please let us know.