ID: nht87-1.22

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 01/15/87

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Barry Felrice; NHTSA

TO: Harry H. Kazakian -- President, Corleone International Traders, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. Harry H. Kazakian President Corleone International Traders, Inc. P.O. Box 3417 Los Angeles, Calif. 90028

Dear Mr. Kazakian:

This is in reply to your letter of April 29, 1986, to which was attached a "Magic Eyes Brake Light". This device consists of the small lamps whose primary functions are to flash automatically "upon catching light" within safety range and when the car's b rake is in use". The purpose of the device is to reduce rear end collisions. The artwork on the package shows the lamps mounted at the base of the rear window on either side of the vehicle's vertical centerline. You asked that your letter centerline as a petition for rulemaking to require the device as original equipment, or for the aftermarket.

I regret that we have decided to deny your petition that the device be required as original equipment. The agency's research has shown that the most effective device for reducing rear end collisions in the single center high-mounted stop lamp, and the ag ency now require that device to be installed as original equipment on passenger cars. You have presented no facts that demonstrate that an amendment of the nature you have requested is necessary. Although the agency has specified no requirements for afte rmarket supplementary stop lamps (other than those that replace original equipment), on the basis of the agency's research, we believe that aftermarket equipment should meet as closely as possible the specifications for original equipment. Therefore, we are also denying your petition for aftermarket equipment.

We would like to advise you that there are no Federal restrictions on the importation and sale of "Magic Eyes". However, any State may impose its own restrictions on the use of this lamp on roads within its borders, and you should consult these laws bef ore selling the device.

As a final note, the copy for model JA 201 on the package states "To comply with latest United States' regulations, this single lamp lights on automatically upon catching light within safety range and when the car's brake is in use". Please delete the re ference to United States regulations on your packages. The single lamp required by the United States is steady burning and has but one function, to indicate application of the brake pedal. It cannot be combined with any other light or device. In comparis on, your lamp has two functions, and appears to flash in each.

As an accessory item of motor vehicle equipment, your lamp is subject to the notification and remedy provisions of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. This means that if a safety related defect occurs in the lamp, the manufacturer or impor ter is obligated to inform dealers, distributors and purchasers to repair, repurchase, or replace the item. We are returning your device with this letter.

Sincerely,

Barry Felrice Associate Administrator for Rulemaking

APRIL 29, 1986 OUR REF. COR/030886 BANKERS: CALIFORNIA OVERSEAS BANK

INTERPRETATION CHIEF COUNCIL NATIONAL TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION Rm. # 5219 p 400, 7th St. South West Washington D.C. 20590

ATT: Erika Z Jones

Dear Erika,

In response to our conversation with Mr. Bob Nikelson in Department of Traffic Safety, after a long conversation over the phone about the "Magic Eyes Brake Lights" we were advised to get your attention with this safety device, which could reduce a large quantity of rear endings, help saving lives in U. S. highways an street roads and at the mean time be helpful financially. Therefore we would certainly appreciate to get your precious time and attention, if you would, to explain about this safety device after a small brief about our business.

Corleone International Traders Inc. is known as well established incorporation in U. S. A. with many satisfied customers. We have relations all over the world, we specialize medical items, auto accessories, foodstuff and many novelties. We also represent variety of manufacturers overseas on exclusive basis.

We would like to take this opportunity to introduce you one of our new sophisticated low coast brake light system which was invented and made with few of our engineers to reduce tail gating and rearending in U.S. highways. This magnificent system is "The Third Brake Light" of the car which has a built in sensor device. This system flashes automatically upon catching light within safety range and when the car's brake is in use.

Our main goal is to see less rear endings in U.S. highways. Therefore we would like to have this sophisticated light activated sensors to be included in every auto's brake system is being built in U.S.A.

We sincerely would like to ask to have this "Safety Device" to be treated as a petition for rule making to require this device or permitted originally or after market "Vehicle Safety Standard Cod--108."

For your research and study we are including a sample of this device on the back of the carton explains product No. "JA 101 WARNING LIGHTS" and "JA 105 MAGIC EYE SENSOR".

Dear Chief Council, we are taking this opportunities very seriously and depending on your full research and your answer.

At the mean time we are at your disposal for any information you may need or any questions you may ask. We are sincerely thanking you for your time and your attention at this matter and hoping to hear from you soon about your opinion, until than we remai n HARRY H. KAZAKIAN PRESIDENT

ID: nht92-9.50

DATE: January 15, 1992

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: William E. Kenyon -- Mr. K's Original Headsaver, Patented Restraint Systems

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 11/1/91 from William E. Kenyon to Chief Counsel, NHTSA (OCC 6670)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter regarding a head restraint system your company is producing for use in pickup trucks with bench seats. You indicated that your company's head restraints meet or exceed the performance requirements specified in Standard No. 202, Head Restraints. As support for this statement, you enclosed with your letter an affidavit, in which you stated that you had tested your company's head restraint in accordance with Standard No. 202 and that the results of the testing showed that your company's head restraint complied with the performance requirements of Standard No. 202. Accordingly, you stated that you would like your company's head restraint system to be "federally approved as an after-market safety product." As I will explain in more detail below, this agency has no authority to approve, endorse, or offer assurances of compliance for any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment.

By way of background information, Section 103 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Safety Act; 15 U.S.C. 1392) authorizes the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards for new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. We have exercised this authority to establish Standard No. 202, Head Restraints (49 CFR S571.213), which applies to all new passenger cars, and all new trucks, buses, and multipurpose passenger vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less. I have enclosed a copy of Standard No. 202 for your information.

The Safety Act requires that all motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment sold or imported into the United States comply with the safety standards adopted by NHTSA. Specifically, S108(a)(1)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A)) provides:

no person shall manufacture for sale, sell, offer for sale, or introduce or deliver into introduction in interstate commerce, or import into the United States, any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment manufactured on or after the date any applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard takes effect under this title unless it is in conformity with such standard and is covered by a certification issued under S114...

With respect to your company's product, please note that Standard No. 202 applies only to new motor vehicles and requires the motor vehicle manufacturer to certify that its VEHICLE complies with the standard. By its own terms, Standard No. 202 does not apply to head restraints as a separate item of motor vehicle equipment. Thus, the Safety Act does not

require manufacturers of head restraints to certify that the head restraint complies with Standard No. 202 before selling the product.

Additionally, the Safety Act does not authorize NHTSA to certify or approve motor vehicles or items of motor vehicle equipment as complying with our standards. In this regard, the process for certifying compliance with applicable safety standards under the Safety Act is substantially different than that used in many other countries. For instance, the European nations require manufacturers to deliver their products to a governmental entity for testing. After the governmental entity itself tests the product, the government approves the product for use and assigns it an approval code.

In place of this sort of process, section 114 of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1403) establishes a self-certification process under which every manufacturer is required to certify that each of its products meets all applicable Federal safety standards. The manufacturer's certification need not be based on actual tests in accordance with the standard. United States law only requires that the manufacturer's certification be made with the exercise of "due care" on the part of the manufacturer. It is up to the individual manufacturer in the first instance to determine what test results, engineering analyses, computer simulations, or other information it needs to certify compliance with the applicable safety standards. Once the manufacturer has made this determination and certified its product in accordance with the applicable standard, it is free to offer the product for sale in the United States. The agency periodically tests vehicles and items of equipment that have been certified by the manufacturer to ensure that they do, in fact, comply with the safety standards. NHTSA also investigates alleged defects related to motor vehicle safety.

Although we do not have any safety standards that directly apply to your product, there are several provisions of the Safety Act that apply to the sale of aftermarket items of motor vehicle equipment. Manufacturers of motor vehicle equipment such as your head restraints are subject to the requirements in sections 151-159 of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1411-1419) concerning the recall and remedy of products with defects related to motor vehicle safety. In addition, the use of aftermarket items could be affected by section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(A). That section prohibits any manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair shop from knowingly "rendering inoperative" any device or element of design installed on or in a vehicle in compliance with an applicable safety standard. The effect of this provision is to make it unlawful for any of the named commercial establishments to replace an original equipment head restraint with an aftermarket head restraint if the commercial establishment knows or should know that the switch to the aftermarket head restraint results in the vehicle no longer complying with Standard No. 202.

Finally, I have enclosed an information sheet which identifies relevant Federal statutes and NHTSA regulations affecting motor vehicle and motor vehicle equipment manufacturers. This information sheet also explains how to obtain copies of those regulations.

Attachments

NHTSA information sheet dated September, 1985 entitled Information for New Manufacturers of Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Equipment.

Copy of Standard No. 202, Head Restraints.

(Attachments omitted)

ID: nht78-1.25

DATE: 06/20/78

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; J. J. Levin, Jr.; NHTSA

TO: Norris Industries

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your January 7, 1978, letter asking whether a final-stage wheel manufacturer is permitted to mark a rim in accordance with Standard No. 120, Tire Selection and Rims for Motor Vehicles Other Than Passenger Cars. The standard currently specifies that rim marking shall be done by a rim manufacturer, not a final-stage wheel manufacturer.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has previously determined that a rim manufacturer is the responsible party for rim marking. The language of the standard is specific in this requirement. The agency, however, is reviewing the standard with a view to its possible modification along the lines suggested in your letter. Should the agency decide to amend the standard, a notice proposing such change would first be published in the Federal Register. A final rule would only be issued following analysis of comments submitted by interested parties.

SINCERELY,

Action: Norris Industries Petition, FMVSS No. 120

Acting Director Vehicle Safety Standards

Office of Chief Counsel, NHTSA

Reference: Subject petition dated January 7, 1978, requesting an interpretation of Standard No. 120 that will require the final assembler of a wheel to apply the specified rim markings.

Norris Industries is a major supplier of rims to the custom wheel industry. The rims are assembled with various designs of center member by the custom wheel manufacturer chiefly for the replacement and after-market trade. Multiple use of these wheels for light trucks and multipurpose passenger vehicles requires that labeling be in accordance with Standard No. 120. The final product which is a "single piece" or "unitized" wheel is permitted optionally to be labeled on the disc rather than the rim. This is readily done when the rim manufacturer is also the final wheel manufacturer.

The present interpretation of the standard requires rim markings to be applied by the rim manufacturer. The location of the markings on the rim is dependent upon the specific disc design used, and varies considerably among final wheel manufacturers. This presents a hardship in maintaining adequate supplies of the correct rims for each manufacturer as stated by Norris.

The Norris petition (or request) to place the requirement for rim marking on the final assembly manufacturer and to release the rim manufacturer from the requirement constitutes a major change in the standard and would require a rulemaking procedure. The scheme would not work for demountable rims which never become part of a manufactured wheel assembly. From this standpoint the Norris petition must be denied.

However, as an optional alternative, it would seem reasonable to expect that the final wheel manufacturer, purchasing rims from another manufacturer, with markings per S5.2(d) and (e) would be able and qualified to provide the certification and labeling required of the rim in S5.2(d) (b) and (c), on the strength of his purchase specifications and contract.

This option would relieve the difficulties now encountered by Norris and probably others in similar situations. The standard would have to make it clear that the rim manufacturer is responsible for the required rim identification markings unless the final wheel manufacturer assumes the option.

Unless there are legal objections to this concept, we would be pleased to work with you in developing a "statement of interpretation" or an "adjustment of language" as appropriate for the situation. Please advise us if amendment of the standard is found necessary. We believe that certification and labeling of the wheel assembly by the final manufacturer is reasonable and appropriate, and should be permitted by the standard.

A. Malliaris

Reference petition dated 3/7/78

CC: F. KOCH

NORRIS INDUSTRIES

(Illegible Word) WHEEL DIVISION

2-20-78

Administrator NHTSA

Dear Sir:

Norris Industries, on January 7, 1978, requested a change in the interpretation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard #120 to require the assemblers of the auto wheels to stamp the required information on the rim portion of the wheels.

Please advise us if this request is still to be considered and may we be informed of the decision as promptly as possible.

Please accept our thanks in advance of this information.

Don H. Pendergrass

CC: J. CROWLEY; C. MOORE; P. RYAN (S.E.M.A.)

NORRIS INDUSTRIES

(Illegible Word) WHEEL DIVISION PETITION

January 7, 1978

Administrator NHTSA

Dear Sir:

Norris Industries has supplied Automobile Wheel Component Parts to Members of the Custom Wheel Industry since 1961. These parts are then used as component parts for Custom Wheels. The majority of these customers are Members of the Specialty Equipment Manufacturers Association.

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard #120 requires that at least three pieces of information be stamped on the weather side of the rim by the rim manufacturer. Because our customers are the wheel assemblers, a common location of the stamp on the weather area of the rim is not acceptable to all. The size of our finished goods inventory, necessary to serve this industry, is such that it would be nearly impossible to have the various sizes of rims stamped in the locations that would be acceptable to all of our customers on hand at all times.

This is a request that the interpretation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard #120 be changed to require the assemblers of the wheels to stamp the required information on the rim portion of the wheels.

We trust this request is reasonable and may be acted upon without undue delay.

Donald H. Pendegrass Plant Manager

CC: J. CROWLEY; C. MOORE; P. RYAN (S.E.M.A.)

ID: nht95-1.43

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: February 2, 1995

FROM: Philip R. Recht -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Jane L. Dawson -- Specifications Engineer, Thomas Built Buses, Inc.

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached to 8/8/94 letter from Jane L. Dawson to NHTSA Chief Counsel

TEXT: Dear Ms. Dawson:

This responds to your letter of August 8, 1994, regarding the test procedure in Standard No. 210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages. I apologize for the delay in our response. Your letter asks whether a seat manufacturer can certify that a passenger seat c omplies with Standard No. 210 with the seat attached to a 1/2" steel plate test fixture rather than with the seat attached to a typical 14 gauge school bus floor. If the seat manufacturer can certify using 1/2" steel plate, your letter also asks whether the final stage school bus manufacturer must retest using a typical 14 gauge school bus floor to certify that the vehicle complies with Standard No. 210.

By way of background information, each of this agency's safety standards specifies the test conditions and procedures that this agency will use to evaluate the performance of the vehicle or equipment being tested for compliance with the particular safety standard. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration precisely follows each of the specified test procedures and conditions when conducting its compliance testing. However, as your letter recognizes, manufacturers are not required to test thei r products only in the manner specified in the relevant safety standard, or even to test the product at all, as their basis for certifying that the product complies with all relevant standards. A manufacturer may choose any means of evaluating its produ cts to determine whether the vehicle or equipment will comply with the safety standards when tested by the agency according to the procedures specified in the standard.

Section S2 of Standard No. 210 states that the standard applies to "passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses." The standard does not apply to seats as items of equipment. Therefore, it is the vehicle manufacturer rather than th e seat manufacturer that is required to certify compliance with the standard. More specifically, the vehicle manufacturer must certify that the vehicle, with the seat installed, complies with Standard No. 210. Of course, one of the bases for the vehicl e manufacturer's certification may be test results and other information provided by the seat manufacturer.

If the agency testing shows that an apparent noncompliance exists in a vehicle or item of equipment, the manufacturer is asked to show the basis for its certification that the vehicle or equipment complies with the relevant safety standard or standards. If in fact there is a noncompliance, the manufacturer is subject to civil penalties unless it can establish that it exercised "reasonable care" in the design and manufacture of the product (through actual testing, computer simulation, engineering analys is, or other means) to ensure compliance, but nevertheless did not have reason to know that the vehicle or item of equipment did not in fact comply with the safety standards (49 U.S.C. 30112(b) (2) (A)).

Standard No. 210 includes strength requirements for seat belt anchorages. The test procedure requires the specified force to be applied through body blocks at specified angles and for specified periods of time. As you state in your letter, the procedur e allows the agency to replace the seat belt webbing with "material whose breaking strength is equal to or greater than the breaking strength of the seat belt assembly." If substitute material is used, the test procedure requires the material to "duplica te the geometry, at the initiation of the test, of the attachment of the originally installed seat belt assembly." This provision was included to ensure that the material was strong enough to pass the load to the anchorage during the test and, therefore, that the strength of the test anchorage rather than the seat belt was tested.

Your letter asks whether a seat manufacturer may base its certification on a test performed with the seat attached to a 1/2" steel plate test fixture rather than with the seat attached to a typical 14 gauge school bus floor. This, in effect, is a reques t for a determination of whether a vehicle manufacturer's reliance on the fact that the seat belt anchorages did not fail when a 1/2" steel plate test fixture is used would constitute "reasonable care" in assuring that the completed vehicle complied with the standard. This agency has long said that it is unable to judge what efforts would constitute "reasonable care" in advance of the actual circumstances in which a noncompliance occurs. What constitutes "reasonable care" in a particular case depends on all relevant facts, including such things as the limitations of current technology, the availability of test equipment, the size of the manufacturer, and, above all, the diligence exercised by the manufacturer. However, I would like to say that attac hment of a seat or anchorage to stronger material (whether 1/2" steel plate or some other material) than the material used in the construction of the vehicle in which it will actually be installed would not appear to provide a manufacturer with informati on on whether or not the anchorage, when attached to the vehicle structure, will withstand the specified loads.

You should also note that, while the exercise of "reasonable care" may relieve a manufacturer of liability for civil penalties in connection with the manufacture and sale of noncomplying vehicles, it does not relieve a manufacturer of the responsibility to notify purchasers of the noncompliance and remedy the noncompliance without charge to the purchasers, if either the manufacturer or this agency determines that vehicles do not comply with all applicable safety standards.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Philip R. Recht

ID: nht92-3.24

DATE: October 5, 1992

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Takashi Odaira -- Chief Representative, Emissions & Safety, Isuzu Technical Center of America, Inc.

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 7/23/92 from Takashi Odaira to Paul Jackson Rice (OCC-7556)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter asking about the side door strength test procedures of Standard No. 214, Side Impact Protection, as they apply to a certain pickup truck design. You described three alternative methods of fixing the vehicle in position and asked whether they are consistent with the standard's test procedure.

By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration does not provide approvals of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, it is the responsibility of the manufacturer to ensure that its vehicles and equipment meet applicable requirements. The following represents our opinion based on the facts provided in your letter.

S4(a) of Standard No. 214 sets forth the following procedures for fixing a vehicle in position for the quasi-static side door strength test:

Place the sill of the side of the vehicle opposite to the side being tested against a rigid unyielding vertical surface. Fix the vehicle rigidly in position by means of tiedown attachments located at or forward of the front wheel centerline and at or rearward of the rear wheel centerline. (Emphasis added.)

The side door strength test is then conducted by applying a loading device to the outer surface of the door, until the loading device travels 18 inches. See S4(d).

You asked about these procedures in connection with a certain pickup truck design, which can be described as follows. The cab of the truck is attached to the frame by means of flexible rubber mountings. The rear body is installed separately on the frame. The cab of the truck is over the front wheels, and the rear body is over the rear wheels.

You requested our comments on three alternative methods of testing the pickup truck at issue. The first would involve fixing the frame of the vehicle at or forward of, and at or rearward of, the front and real wheel centerlines. You stated, however, that the rear portion of the cab would not be rigidly fixed by this method, and that the application of the Standard No. 214 loading device would result in the stretching of the cab's rubber mountings and upward tilting of the cab as a whole.

Your second alternative would involve adding a third fixing of the vehicle, in addition to the front and rear fixings of Alternative 1. This

additional fixing would be at the rear of the cab, on both sides. You indicated that this would permit the side door strength test to be conducted without tilting the vehicle, but that the relative cab to frame fixing would not be the same as on an actual vehicle.

Your third alternative would involve fixing the cab alone to a test fixture, at three locations. You stated that a problem with this method may be that the cab itself, and not the vehicle, is tested.

In considering how the Standard No. 214 quasi-static test should be conducted for a particular vehicle, it is important to bear in mind that the purpose of the test is to measure the crush resistance of a side door. The agency is not measuring the extent to which a vehicle's suspension or other design features permit the vehicle to tilt when specified loads are applied. In order to measure the crush resistance of a door in a test, it is necessary that the vehicle be fixed rigidly in position. Otherwise, the application of a load to the side door could simply result in movement of the vehicle as a whole.

Standard No. 214's test procedure was developed initially for cars. As noted by your letter, the combination of tying the vehicle down at or forward of, and at or rearward of, the front and rear wheel centerlines and placing the sill of the side of the vehicle opposite to the side being tested against a rigid unyielding vertical surface is sufficient to rigidly fix a passenger car in position for test purposes. Your letter raises the issue of how the Standard No. 214 test should be conducted if the specified procedure does not result in a particular vehicle, such as one with a divided body, being rigidly fixed in position.

For purposes of compliance testing, NHTSA would take the following actions. First, the agency would examine whether the procedure set forth in S4(a) would result in the vehicle being rigidly fixed in position. This could involve considering various tiedown arrangements within the areas specified by S4(a). If the agency determined that the procedure was not sufficient to rigidly fix a vehicle in position, e.g., the entire cab of a pickup truck would tilt upward during a test, it would then follow the specified procedure but also add an additional tiedown attachment as necessary to rigidly fix the vehicle in position. In making this additional attachment, the agency would take care to ensure that the attachment did not interfere with the side door strength test.

I can offer the following comments on the three alternative test methods you described. NHTSA would not follow the Alternative 1 test procedure since the vehicle would not be rigidly fixed in position under that procedure. The agency would also not follow the Alternative 3 test procedure since it does not include one of the tiedown arrangements specified by S4(a). The agency might follow an approach along the lines of Alternative 2, assuming that it determined that the S4(a) procedure was not sufficient to rigidly fix the vehicle in position.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Edward Glancy of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht91-4.31

DATE: June 28, 1991

FROM: Dwayne R. Szot

TO: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 7-5-91 from Paul Jackson Rice to Dwayne R. Szot (A38; Part 591)

TEXT:

I am writing to explain my situation regarding the importation of a Polish car, a Syrena, and to ask for special permission for this car to enter the United States. I am Dwayne R. Szot, a sculptor. I received my MFA from Cranbrook Arts Academy in 1989. The central theme of my work is the use of machinery as an expressive tool and a physical extension of ones'self. From October to June I was in Gdansk, Poland, working as an assistant sculpture instructor at the State Higher School of Fine Arts. It was during this time that I began the project known as "Kapsula Czasu" or "Capsule of Time." The capsule is the 10 year old Syrena that I mentioned. This car was painted red and white to resemble the Polish flag. It traveled throughout Poland collecting information and artifacts about peoples' hopes and dreams for the future, and their feelings about the past and the present. The car has been signed by hundreds of Poles. The objects placed within the car are, for the most part, private and will not be examined until the car is opened. These objects were, of necessity, shipped separately from the car, but will rejoin the car when it arrives. Objects within the car come from Solidarity, universities, school children, hospitals and politicians, the same people who signed or drew on the car. It was my original intention to entomb the car and leave it in Gdansk for 25 years, however, obtaining materials like the plexiglass necessary to encase the car, was impossible. It also became increasingly clear to me that the safety of the car could not be guaranteed. For example the present mayor of Gdansk could promise a safe place for the time capsule, but this promise would not be binding for the next mayor. This is a serious work. To have left the capsule in Poland would have been to risk its disappearance or destruction. I must say though, that the news of the cars' July 2 arrival came as a complete shock to my wife and myself. We had expected the car to be shipped in late August or early September, not June, and so we thought we had more time to prepare for its arrival.

Now, to outline my plans for the car in the U.S.. When the car arrives in New York, I will remove the engine to meet EPA approval. I view the car as being like an Egyptian sarcophagus in that it is not a car any more but a container, richly and artistically decorated. The car is not intended to be a mode of transportation on any highway or street, but to symbolize a journey through time. As a time traveler, it doesn't need an engine. There are practical considerations regarding this engine as well. This car can only go about 100 miles until it breaks down. Parts are difficult to get in Poland and would be impossible to get here and Syrena mechanics live a half a world away.

I would like to continue to collect information for the capsule from Poles living in the U.S.. This will be accomplished by transporting the car to Polish communities for scheduled showings. The car with its contents will then, be sealed in a plexiglass box marking the anniversary of Polands' first democratic election in November. The car will then be displayed at museums and art institutes but not removed from its box. Finally, after 25 years, the car will be returned to Poland and opened. In this way, the time capsule takes on international significance. I cannot claim to have a list of scheduled showings for the car yet, but I have begun contacting Polish-American organizations and various museums. I hope that I've convinced you that this car, Kapsula Czasu, is an art object and will not be driven or used for transportation. I realize that you would be allowing a very great exception by permiting the car to enter the U.S.. I have asked for professional letters of recommendation to be sent to you, knowing that you probably are not familiar with my work. I am also sending a copy of a newsletter put together by the children of one of the schools Kapsula Czasu visited. While you probably can't read this, and I don't know how well it will fax, you may still be interested in seeing it. My wife had a pleasant conversation with Mr. Taylor Vincent thursday about this matter, and we are hopeful. Thank you for your time and consideration.

Attachment A

Polish newspaper article regarding Kapsula Czasu (text and graphics omitted)

Attachment B

CRANBROOK ACADEMY OF ART

June 28, 1991

Chief Consul Paul Jackson Rice NHTSA Room 5219 400 7th Street, SW Washington, DC 20590

Dear Sir:

Dwayne Szot studied for two years at Cranbrook Academy of Art within the Sculpture Department and receive his Master of Fine Arts degree in May 1989.

During his two years at the Academy, I came to know Dwayne and his work well through student reviews and conversations that I had with him. He proved himself to be a hardworking and conscientious student. His work was imaginative and innovative.

Since leaving the Academy, I have kept in contact with Dwayne and followed the progress of his work. He has matured and has become a serious and dedicated artist.

Dwayne has spent the last nine months as a visiting artist in Poland. I look forward to seeing the work that he produced there.

Sincerely,

Roy Slade President

ID: BressantEPAltr

Mr. Kerrin Bressant
United States Environmental Protection Agency
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20460





Dear Mr. Bressant:

This is in reply to your fax to Stephen R. Kratzke, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA's) Associate Administrator for Safety Performance Standards, providing descriptions of three small vehicles--the Kawasaki Mule 520, the Polaris Ranger 4 x 4, and the Cushman White Truck 611. You asked whether these vehicles meet our definition of a "low-speed vehicle" even though they were designed or are advertised as "off-road" only use vehicles, and whether a vehicle can be considered both an off-road vehicle and a low-speed vehicle at the same time. Your questions are addressed below.

By way of background information, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Safety Act) authorizes our agency to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. (49 U.S.C. 30101 et seq.) NHTSA has no authority to approve or certify any commercial product. Instead, Congress established a self-certification process under which each manufacturer is required to certify that each of its products meets all applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards.

The term "motor vehicle" is defined by statute as "a vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power and manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways . . ." 49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(6). Accordingly, only vehicles that are operated on the public streets, roads, and highways, as one of their primary uses, are considered to be motor vehicles, and vehicles which are solely used "off-road" are excluded.

For purposes of our regulations, "low-speed vehicles" are one of several categories of motor vehicles. The term "low-speed vehicle" is defined as "a 4-wheeled motor vehicle, other than a truck, whose speed attainable in 1.6 [kilometers] (1 mile) is more than 32 kilometers per hour (20 miles per hour) and not more than 40 kilometers per hour (25 miles per hour) on a paved level surface." 49 CFR 571.3(b) (emphasis added). Other categories of motor vehicles include passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, buses, motorcycles, and trailers.

As to your question of whether a vehicle can be considered both an off-road vehicle and a low-speed vehicle at the same time, I note that because low-speed vehicles are a type of motor vehicle, vehicles that are excluded from the definition of motor vehicle because they are solely used "off-road" are not considered to be low-speed vehicles under our regulations.

Some vehicles can, of course, be used for either on-road use or off-road use. As we have explained in a number of interpretation letters, vehicles that use the public highways on a necessary and recurring basis are motor vehicles. For instance, a utility vehicle like the Jeep is plainly a motor vehicle, even though it is equipped with special features to permit off-road operation. Moreover, if a vehicle's greatest use will be off-road, but it will spend a substantial amount of time on-road, NHTSA has interpreted the vehicle to be a "motor vehicle." Further, the agency has determined that a vehicle such as a dune buggy is a motor vehicle if it is readily usable on the public roads and is in fact used on the public roads by a substantial number of owners, regardless of the manufacturer's stated intent regarding the terrain on which the vehicle is to be operated.

In instances where the agency is asked whether a vehicle is a motor vehicle when it has both off-road and on-road operating capabilities, and about which there is little or no evidence about the extent of the vehicle's on-road use, the agency has applied five factors in offering its advice. These factors are:

1. whether the vehicle will be advertised for use on-road as well as off-road, or whether it will be advertised exclusively for off-road use;
2. whether the vehicle's manufacturer or dealers will assist the vehicle's purchasers in obtaining certificates of origin or title documents to register the vehicle for on-road use;
3. whether the vehicle will be sold by dealers also selling vehicles that are classified as motor vehicles;
4. whether the vehicle has affixed to it a warning label stating that the vehicle is not intended for use on the public roads; and
5. whether states or foreign countries have permitted or are likely to permit the vehicle to be registered for on-road use.

I will now turn to the specific vehicles about which you inquire, the Kawasaki Mule 520, the Polaris Ranger 4 x 4, and the Cushman White Truck 611.

Because the Safety Act establishes a self-certification system, it is the manufacturer of each of these vehicles, and not this agency, that has the obligation to determine whether these products are motor vehicles. The manufacturers of each of these vehicles advertise them for off-road use and do not consider them to be motor vehicles.

NHTSA has issued interpretation letters addressing an earlier design of the Polaris Ranger and addressing vehicles which are similar to the other vehicles. I am enclosing copies of several of these letters for your information (addressed to Mr. Undlin, dated 8/6/99, Mr. Sanford, dated 1/25/99, Mr. Garcia, dated 1/17/95, and Mr. Kato, dated 10/13/88).

Finally, I would like to note that our definition of "low-speed vehicle" specifically excludes trucks. The vehicles you asked about all have cargo beds. If a manufacturer decided to produce vehicles similar to these for on-road use, they would not be low-speed vehicles under our regulations (regardless of their speed capability); they would be trucks.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any questions, you may contact Robert Knop of this Office at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosures
ref:571
d.3/7/02

ID: nht73-2.17

DATE: 11/08/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; James B. Gregory; NHTSA

TO: Department of California Highway Patrol

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of October 1, 1973, in which you asked that we review an enclosed opinion by the California Attorney General on the question of preemption of California motor vehicle regulations by Federal standards. The opinion concluded that the California requirement that motorcycles be wired so that their headlamps are lit whenever their engines are running was not preempted. This conclusion was contrary to the position taken in an NHTSA letter of November 14, 1972, to Mr. Edward Kearney.

We adhere to the position stated in the November 14, 1972, letter that the California requirement is preempted, and consider the legal opinion by the California Attorney General to be an erroneous view of the Federal law.

The opinion properly viewed the question as turning on the application of the phrase in @ 103(d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 1392(d), "applicable to the same aspect of performance." If the Federal standard (Standard No. 108, 49 CFR 571.108) covers a given aspect of performance, any State requirement must be identical to it. The California opinion relied on the language in the main opinion of one of the Super Lite cases, Chrysler Corp. v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499 (1969), that preemption should be "narrowly construed", and went on to find that since Standard 108 does not specifically address the matter of wiring the headlamps when the engine is running, that aspect of performance is not covered by the standard and the California law is valid.

More important, however, than the nebulous concept of whether preemption is "narrowly" construed (a concept with which Judge Friendly, concurring in Chrysler, did not agree) is the point made at the end of the main opinion, that the administering Federal agency was supporting the State's position regarding the scope of the Federal regulation. The Court quoted the U.S. Supreme Court in Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 276 (1969):

[W]hen construing an administrative regulation,'a court must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the words used is in doubt. . . .[T]he ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.'

In this case the situation is the opposite of that in the Super Lite cases. The NHTSA's position is that the standard does cover the aspect of performance in question. As stated in the NHTSA letter of November 14, 1972, the standard "establishes requirements for motorcycle headlighting, along with special wiring requirements for motorcycles and other vehicles." It is the intent of the NHTSA that its requirements for headlamp performance, configuration, and wiring cover all aspects of performance directly involving headlamps, and thus preempt any non-identical State Standards relating to headlamps.

The implication of the California opinion is that any mode of design or performance that is not expressly dealt with in the Federal standard is open to regulation by the States. Such a position is impractical, where the agency's intent is to have a comprehensive, uniform regulation in a given area. In order to preempt the field it would be necessary for a Federal agency to anticipate the imaginative regulatory impulses of future State agencies or legislatures and include in a standard such provisions as, "It is not required that motorcycle headlamps be wired to operate when the engine is running." Congress clearly intended the NHTSA to establish a single set of uniform standards to which manufacturers must comply, and that intent would tend to be defeated by the position taken in the California opinion. Federal regulation has a negative as well as a positive aspect: in determining that there should be certain requirements in an area, we also are deciding against imposing others. The only way to effectuate such a decision is to declare, as we have done here, that our regulation is intended to be exclusive, and to describe as necessary its outer limits.

The California opinion's factual comparison with the Super Lite cases is also inapt. The Super Lite itself was a new type of lighting equipment, a supplementary lamp, for which Standard 108 contained no requirements. Headlamps, by contrast, are comprehensively regulated by the standard.

For these reasons, we conclude that the California requirement that motorcycle headlamps be wired to operate when the engine is running is preempted by Standard 108, and void.

While we feel constrained by law to so conclude, I want you to know that I have instructed my staff to consider the merit of amending the Federal lighting standard to include the California requirement in 108.

Sincerely,

October 1, 1973

James B. Gregory -- Administrator, U. S. Dept. of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Dear Dr. Gregory:

A copy of Mr. Douglas Toms' letter of November 14, 1972, to Mr. Edward Kearney expressing his opinion that a recently passed California law relative to motorcycle headlamps was preempted by Federal Standard 108, was received by this Department on November 20, 1972.

The opinion expressed by Mr. Toms prompted a request by this Department to the Office of the Attorney General of the State of California for an opinion on the question of federal preemption as related to this recently enacted statute. A copy of the Attorney General's Opinion on this matter is enclosed for your review.

You will notice that the Attorney General's Opinion is not in accord with that expressed by Mr. Toms; therefore, we are proceeding on the premise that all motorcycles first manufactured and registered in California after January 1, 1975, will be required to meet these headlamp requirements.

After your review of the enclosed material, I would appreciate your comments on this very important issue.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely,

W. PUDINSKI Commissioner--Dept. of California Highway Patrol

Enclosure

cc: Senator Donald L. Grunsky; Edward Kearney

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

SAN FRANCISCO

September 13, 1973

W. Pudinski, Commissioner-- Department of California Highway Patrol

Dear Commissioner Pudinski:

You have requested the opinion of this office on the question of whether California Vehicle Code sections 25650.5 and 24253 are pre-empted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.

We conclude that these Vehicle Code provisions are not pre-empted by that Federal Act.

Our conclusion is based upon the following analysis:

In 1966 the Federal Government assumed a paramount role in the field of motor vehicle safety with the passage of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. 15 U.S.C. @ 1381 et seq. (hereafter Federal Act). Basically this Act establishes a comprehensive system for the formulation and implementation of safety standards for the performance and equipment of new motor vehicles.

The enactment of such an extensive federal law naturally gave rise to the question of whether State legislation in the same field was pre-empted. n1E. g., see Chrysler Corporation v. Rhodes, 416 F.2d 319 (1969); Chrysler Corporation v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499 (1969).

n1 See U.S. Const. art. VI, @ 2, the so-called Supremacy Clause.

Congress anticipated the question in their enactment of a provision in the Federal Act expressly dealing with issue of pre-emption, 15 U.S.C. @ 1392(d). It provides: "(d) Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the Federal Government or the government of any State or political subdivision thereof from establishing a safety requirement applicable to motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment procured for its own use if such requirement imposes a higher standard of performance than that required to comply with the otherwise applicable Federal standard."

This pre-emption provision (15 U.S.C. @ 1392(d)) was succinctly summarized by the United States Court of Appeals in Chrysler Corporation v. Tofany, supra, 419 F.2d 499 (1969). In that case the Court declared:

"This provision indicates that state regulation of an item of motor vehicle equipment will be preempted only if the following factors appear in combination: (1) a federal standard in effect which covers that item of equipment; (2) a state safety standard . . . for the item which is not identical to the federal standard; and (3) application of the state and federal regulations to 'the same aspect of performance' of the item of equipment." 419 F.2d at 506.

In connection with the present inquiry, the question of federal pre-emption has arisen with respect to two provisions in the State Vehicle Code: Vehicle Code section 25650.5 (relating to the activation of motorcycle headlights) and Vehicle Code section 24253 (relating to the duration of tail lamp illumination). It is noted that there are federal standards issued pursuant to the Federal Act which are (1) applicable to the same "items of equipment" (viz., motor cycle headlights and tail lamps); and (2) which are "not identical" to the State regulations. Hence in determining whether or not the State regulations are preempted, the specific question here is whether the State and federal regulations apply to "the same aspect of performance" of these specified items of equipment. In making this determination, it would be appropriate to first ascertain whether the phrase "same aspect of performance" is to be given a narrow or broad construction; i.e., whether the pre-emptive effect of the Federal Act is to be narrowly or broadly applied.

This specific point was considered by the United States Court of Appeals in Chrysler Corporation v. Tofanv, supra, 419 F.2d 499. In evaluating Congressional intent with respect to the Federal Act's pre-emptive effect, the Court noted that "uniformity through national standards" was merely "a secondary objective." 419 F.2d at 511. On the other hand, the Court declared that "the clear expression of purpose in section 1381 and other evidence of legislative intent indicate that the reduction of traffic accidents was the overriding concern of Congress. We think that these expressions of legislative purpose should govern our assessment of the preemptive effect of the Act and the standards issued under it." 419 F.2d at 508. (See also Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Lowery, 452 F.2d 431, 438 (1971), where the Court reiterates this conclusion.) Accordingly, the Court determined that "the 'aspect of performance' language in the preemption section of the Act must be construed narrowly." 419 F.2d at 510. The Court further stated: "If traffic safety is furthered by a traditional type of state regulation under the police power, . . . a narrow construction of the preemptive effect of the federal Act and [the standards issued pursuant thereto] is required." 419 F.2d at 511. n2.

n2 See Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of New York, 340 F.Supp. 1120, 1124 (1972), which cites Chrysler Corporation v. Tofanv, supra, for the proposition that "[w]here exercise of the local police power serves the purpose of a federal Act, the preemptive effect of that Act should be narrowly construed." See also Chrysler Corporation v. Rhodes, supra, 416 F.2d 319, 324, n. 8 (1969).

Thus in view of the judicial constraint upon the scope of the Federal Act's pre-emption provisions, it is apparent that the states are still afforded substantial leeway in the enactment of vehicle equipment safety regulations.

In this light we now compare the State statutes in question with the pertinent federal standards issued pursuant to the Federal Act to determine if they cover the "same aspect of performance."

With respect to motorcycle headlamps:

(1) State Law

Vehicle Code section 25650.5 provides that after January 1, 1975, all motorcycle headlamps shall "automatically turn on when the engine of the motorcycle is started and which remain lighted as long as the engine is running."

(2) Federal Standards

The standard pertinent to motorcycle headlamps is found in 49 CFR section 571.108, Standard 108, subsection S4.5.7(b). This standard provides: "When the headlamps are activated in a steady-burning state, the taillamps, parking lamps, license plate lamps and side marker lamps shall also be activated."

In comparing these two provisions, it can be seen that the State law relates to the mechanism or event of activation and duration of activation of the headlamps. The federal standard, on the other hand, is unconcerned with these factors. It merely constitutes a designation of other lamps whose activation is to accompany the activation of headlights. It would appear reasonable to conclude that these two provisions apply to different aspects of performance of motorcycle headlamps and that, accordingly, the State provision is not pre-empted. As will be seen, our conclusion is the same as to State law regulating taillamps.

With respect to taillamps:

(1) State Law

Vehicle Code section 24253 provides in essence that all motor vehicles and motorcycles shall be equipped with taillamps that will remain lighted at least one-quarter hour if the engine stops.

(2) Federal Standards

49 CFR section 571.108, Standard 108, subsections S4.5.3 and S4.5.7(b) provide that the taillamps shall be activated upon the activation of the headlamps. Subsection S4.5.7(a) provides that the taillamps shall be activated upon the activation of the parking lamps.

Thus the State law is solely concerned with the duration of illumination, while the federal standards are directed to the event of activation. Again, it would appear that, just as in the case of headlamps, these State and federal regulations are each addressed to separate and distinct aspects of taillamps performance. Accordingly then, the State provision is not pre-empted by the Federal Act.

Our conclusion that the State headlamp and taillamp regulations relate to aspects of performance different from those covered by federal standards, is fortified by the analysis engaged in by the Court in Chrysler Corporation v. Tofanv, supra, as it compared the state and federal standards at issue in that case. There state law prohibited a type of auxiliary headlight because of its unacceptable glare and dazzle effect (419 F.2d at 502, n. 5, 503) and because it emitted a blue light, a color of light which the states had reserved for emergency vehicles (419 F.2d at 503). The pertinent federal standards prohibited such auxiliary headlights only if they impaired the effectiveness of the required lights (419 F.2d at 506). The Court concluded that the federal standard applied to the impairment of light emission from the required headlights to the extent that such impairment affected the visibility of the driver of the car (419 F.2d at 511). On the other hand, the Court determined that the state provisions purported to regulate the effects of the light upon drivers of oncoming cars. The Court concluded that this was "a different aspect of performance" and thus the states' "attempts at regulation are not preempted." (Ibid.)

Thus we have a case where even though the state and federal regulations both related to the quality of the illumination itself which was emitted by the headlight, the Court nonetheless found that these regulations were directed to "different aspects of performance," because of the distinction between the effect of the illumination upon the driver of the car in question, and the effect upon drivers of oncoming cars.

If such closely related factors are deemed to constitute "different aspects of performance," a fortiori, such manifestly distinct elements of operation as the event or mechanism of light activation on the one hand, and the duration of illumination on the other hand, must be deemed to constitute "different aspects of performance."

In view of the explicit quality of this difference, our conclusion that it constitutes a different "aspect of performance" would appear to be warranted whether the phrase "aspect of performance," as used in the pre-emptive provisions of the Federal Act (viz., 15 U.S.C. @ 1392(d)), is given a narrow or broad construction. n3 It is thus our opinion that Vehicle Code sections 25650.5 and 24253 are not pre-empted.

n3 The concurring opinion in Chrysler Corporation v. Tofanv, supra, 419 F.2d at 512-515, argued that the pre-emptive provisions of the Federal Act should be broadly construed (419 F.2d at 512-513). Yet it concluded that the state regulations were not pre-empted because one of the basis for restricting the auxiliary headlight was the fact that it emitted light of a blue color (a color reserved for emergency vehicles), and that this was an aspect of performance different from that encompassed by the federal standard; viz., impairment of the effectiveness of the required lights (419 F.2d at 515). It would appear that the aspects of performance under consideration here are at least as distinct as those aspects of performance found to be different under the concurring opinion's broad construction of the Federal Act's pre-emption provisions.

Very truly yours,

EVELLE J. YOUNGER --

Attorney General,

VICTOR D. SONENBERG --

Deputy Attorney General

ID: aiam4240

Dear Senator Stevens: Thank you for your letter on behalf of your constituent, Ms. Bridge Ernst, regarding our regulations for safety belts on school buses. Your letter has been referred to my office for reply, since the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is responsible for administering Federal programs relating to school bus safety.; In her letter to you, Ms. Ernst enclosed materials issued by th National Coalition for Seat Belts on School Buses which explained why the Coalition believes safety belts should be required by Federal law on all school buses. You asked us to discuss the main counter-arguments against such a requirement, and asked also whether any Federal legislation has been introduced recently to increase the safety requirement on school buses. I am pleased to respond.; I would like to begin with some background information on our schoo bus regulations. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 authorizes NHTSA to issue motor vehicle safety standards for new motor vehicles, including school buses. Pursuant to that authority, NHTSA issued a comprehensive set of motor vehicle safety standards to improve school bus safety. Our school bus safety standards apply to various aspects of vehicle performance, including school bus windows and windshields, emergency exits, fuel systems and passenger seating and crash protection.; The safety belt issue your constituent raises involves the safet standard we issued for school bus passenger crash protection, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 222. Standard No. 222 requires that large school buses provide passenger crash protection through a concept called 'compartmentalization.' Compartmentalization requires that the interior of the school bus be improved with protective seat backs, additional seat padding, and better seat spacing and performance. These interior features are intended to keep occupants in their seating area during an accident. They ensure that a system of crash protection is provided to passengers independent of their actions to use safety belts. Standard No. 222 requires safety belts for passengers in smaller school buses since belts are needed on those vehicles to provide adequate crash protection.; The information from the Coalition that Ms. Ernst enclosed in he letter to you states that safety belts are needed on all school buses to protect children and keep them within their seating compartment in the event of a collision or rollover. We believe that effective passenger crash protection and containment is already provided by compartmentalization and that it would be inappropriate to issue a Federal mandate for safety belts on all school buses. While the effects of compartmentalization are expected to be greater in crashes involving front or rear impacts, the standard also has potential in side impacts and rollovers by minimizing the 'hostility' of the crash environment and by limiting the range of movement of an occupant in those two types of crashes.; For your information, I have enclosed a DOT report, 'Seat Belts i School Buses' (June 1985), which provides a thorough discussion of the safety belt issues raised by your constituent. As explained in the report, school buses in this country have compiled an excellent safety record. In addition to meeting compartmentalization requirements, large school buses incorporate more safety by virtue of their greater mass, higher seating height and high visibility to other motorists. Thus, the need for safety belts to mitigate against injuries and fatalities is not the same as that for other vehicles, such as passenger cars. Because the safety record of large school buses is very good, we must conclude that a Federal requirement for the installation of safety belts is not justified at this time.; The Coalition's material enclosed by Ms. Ernst included a statemen indicating that NHTSA 'supports local district seat belt programs.' NHTSA permits the voluntary installation of safety belts for passengers on large school buses if the purchaser wishes to have belts installed. We believe that such a decision should be made by individual schools and school districts that have made a reasoned assessment of their particular pupil transportation needs. However, because there are many effective ways to improve pupil transportation safety, such as improving driver training and school bus maintenance programs, it would be inappropriate for us to endorse local district programs for safety belts on school buses. Therefore, for purposes of clarification, we neither support nor discourage school districts' decisions to install safety belts on their large school buses.; You asked about any Federal legislation that had been recentl introduced to increase the safety of school buses. The Administration has not proposed any legislation affecting school buses. However, two bills were introduced in the 99th Congress concerning school buses. H.R. 3129 contained a provision calling for a school bus safety study to determine the measures most effective in protecting the safety of school children. H.R. 749 proposed incentive grants to the States encouraging the adoption and enforcement of laws requiring the use of safety belts in school buses. Neither H.R. 3129 nor H.R. 749 was enacted.; In addition, NHTSA has issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to amen Standard No. 222 by setting performance requirements for safety belts voluntarily installed in large school buses. If adopted, this rule would require safety belts voluntarily installed on new large school buses to meet Federal safety belt standards for strength and proper installation.; We are evaluating the comments submitted on our proposal and a fina decision on the rulemaking action is expected in the near future.; I hope this information is helpful. Please contact my office if we ca be of further assistance.; Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones, Chief Counsel

ID: aiam4939

"Dear Mr Kenyon: This responds to your letter regarding a hea restraint system your company is producing for use in pickup trucks with bench seats. You indicated that your company's head restraints meet or exceed the performance requirements specified in Standard No. 202, Head Restraints. As support for this statement, you enclosed with your letter an affadavit, in which you stated that you had tested your company's head restraint in accordance with Standard No. 202 and that the results of the testing showed that your company's head restraint complied with the performance requirements of Standard No. 202. Accordingly, you stated that you would like your company's head restraint system to be 'federally approved as an after-market safety product.' As I will explain in more detail below, this agency has no authority to approve, endorse, or offer assurances of compliance for any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment. By way of background information, Section 103 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 1392) authorizes the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards for new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. We have exercised this authority to establish Standard No. 202, Head Restraints (49 CFR 571.213), which applies to all new passenger cars, and all new trucks, buses, and multipurpose passenger vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less. I have enclosed a copy of Standard No. 202 for your information. The Safety Act requires that all motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment sold or imported into the United States comply with the safety standards adopted by NHTSA. Specifically, 108(a)(1)(A) of the Safety Act 15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A) provides: no person shall manufacture for sale, sell, offer for sale, or introduce or deliver into introduction in interstate commerce, or import into the United States, any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment manufactured on or after the date any applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard takes effect under this title unless it is in conformity with such standard and is covered by a certification issued under 114... With respect to your company's product, please note that Standard No. 202 applies only to new motor vehicles and requires the motor vehicle manufacturer to certify that its vehicle complies with the standard. By its own terms, Standard No. 202 does not apply to head restraints as a separate item of motor vehicle equipment. Thus, the Safety Act does not require manufacturers of head restraints to certify that the head restraint complies with Standard No. 202 before selling the product. Additionally, the Safety Act does not authorize NHTSA to certify or approve motor vehicles or items of motor vehicle equipment as complying with our standards. In this regard, the process for certifying compliance with applicable safety standards under the Safety Act is substantially different than that used in many other countries. For instance, the European nations require manufacturers to deliver their products to a governmental entity for testing. After the governmental entity itself tests the product, the government approves the product for use and assigns it an approval code. In place of this sort of process, section 114 of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1403) establishes a self-certification process under which every manufacturer is required to certify that each of its products meets all applicable Federal safety standards. The manufacturer's certification need not be based on actual tests in accordance with the standard. United States law only requires that the manufacturer's certification be made with the exercise of 'due care' on the part of the manufacturer. It is up to the individual manufacturer in the first instance to determine what test results, engineering analyses, computer simulations, or other information it needs to certify compliance with the applicable safety standards. Once the manufacturer has made this determination and certified its product in accordance with the applicable standard, it is free to offer the product for sale in the United States. The agency periodically tests vehicles and items of equipment that have been certified by the manufacturer to ensure that they do, in fact, comply with the safety standards. NHTSA also investigates alleged defects related to motor vehicle safety. Although we do not have any safety standards that directly apply to your product, there are several provisions of the Safety Act that apply to the sale of aftermarket items of motor vehicle equipment. Manufacturers of motor vehicle equipment such as your head restraints are subject to the requirements in sections 151-159 of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1411-1419) concerning the recall and remedy of products with defects related to motor vehicle safety. In addition, the use of aftermarket items could be affected by section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(A)). That section prohibits any manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair shop from knowingly 'rendering inoperative' any device or element of design installed on or in a vehicle in compliance with an applicable safety standard. The effect of this provision is to make it unlawful for any of the named commercial establishments to replace an original equipment head restraint with an aftermarket head restraint if the commercial establishment knows or should know that the switch to the aftermarket head restraint results in the vehicle no longer complying with Standard No. 202. Finally, I have enclosed an information sheet which identifies relevant Federal statutes and NHTSA regulations affecting motor vehicle and motor vehicle equipment manufacturers. This information sheet also explains how to obtain copies of those regulations. Sincerely, Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel Enclosures";