ID: aiam4909

"Dear Dr. Adams: This responds to the petition by Solar Car Corporatio dated September 12, l991, for a temporary exemption from the Federal motor vehicle safety standards. The basis of the petition is 'low-emission engine features.' According to the petition, Solar Car 'retrofits' Ford Festivas, Dodge Colts, and Chevrolet S 10 pickup trucks to electric and solar electric configuration. We understand this to mean that Solar Car converts new, previously untitled vehicles, rather than that it converts vehicles that are brought to it by their owners. If the latter is the situation, a temporary exemption is unavailable for these vehicles, as our authority to provide exemptions does not cover vehicles that have been in use. The petition requests a blanket exemption from compliance with the Federal motor vehicle safety standards. If such a petition is to be submitted, it must follow the format specified by the exemption regulation, 49 CFR 555.6(c), providing information with respect to each standard as to how an exempted vehicle would differ from a conforming one, and why an exemption from that standard would not unduly degrade motor vehicle safety. This information is completely lacking from the Solar Car petition. As you might imagine, NHTSA does not encourage petitions that request exemption from all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards, and, in point of fact, has never considered such a petition. Furthermore, in the case of Solar Car, such a comprehensive petition does not appear necessary for it to pursue its business plan. The base car or truck converted by Solar Car will already have been certified by its manufacturer as complying with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards (which are found at 49 CFR Part 571). What Solar Car must do is to determine which of those standards may be affected by its conversion operations, and then determine the extent of any noncompliance that may be created. With the thought that it may assist you, I enclose a copy of a Federal Register notice that discusses the petition of another vehicle converter, and the standards which appeared to be affected by its conversion operations. Although the notice was published in l975, our requirements have not changed since that time. We shall be pleased to consider this matter further when we have received a petition that meets the procedural requirements of Part 555. If you have any questions, Taylor Vinson of my staff is available to answer them (202-366-5263). Sincerely, Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel Enclosure";

ID: nht71-4.15

DATE: 09/20/71

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; L. R. Schneider; NHTSA

TO: Phillips Petroleum Company

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of June 29, 1971, requesting that we reconsider certain opinions provided to you in a letter dated June 4, 1971, which was in response to your letter of May 11, 1971. The opinions you wish us to reconsider concern whether certain tires used by Phillips for experimental purposes must comply with Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 109. The facts as you state them are that Phillips purchases new passenger car tires that have been certified as conforming to Standard No. 109, buffs them down, and then applies new tread, consisting of experimental rubber compounds, to them. You state that these experimental tires are tested by using them on the public roads, as well as by other methods.

In our letter to you of June 4 we stated that we consider these tires to be new pneumatic tires, and subject to Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 109. He further stated that we considered the testing of them on public highways to be an introduction of these tires in interstate commerce, and that if the tires failed to conform to the standard, then such testing would be in violation of @ 109(a)(1) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, (11 U.S.C. @ 1397(a)(1)). For the reasons given below, we affirm our earlier opinion. In addition, while not stated in our earlier letter, the failure by Phillips to certify these tires as conforming to Standard No. 109, pursuant to section 114 of the Act (13 U.S.C. @ 1403), Standard No. 109, and the Tire Identification and Recordkeeping regulations (49 CFR Part 574) constitutes a violation of section 108(a)(3) of the Act (15 U.S.C. @ 1397(a)(3)). Each violation of section 108(a)(1) and 108(a)(3) is subject to a civil penalty, as provided in section 109 of the Act, and to other sections as provided in section 110 (15 U.S.C. @@ 1373, 1399).

Your position appears to be that the tires in question are not covered by either Standard No. 109 or Standard No. 117 (Retreaded Pneumatic Tires) as the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act does not apply to the use of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment after the first purchase for a purpose other than resale. You claim that Phillips' activity with respect to these tires is merely to use them and, citing section 108(b)(1) of the Act (15 U.S.C. @ 1397(b)(1)), takes place after the first purchase for a purpose other than resale and is consequently not within the scope of section 108(a)(1). The tires, therefore, need not comply with the standards.

You make a concurrent argument as well, in which you state that the prohibitions in section 108(a)(1) are "restricted to controlling the sale or resale of tires in commercial channels." You go on to state that if this were not true, the government would be forced to control the use and resale of the tires by the consumer. You feel that this argument is substantiated by the exemption in Standard No. 109 concerning the sale (your emphasis) of "reclassified tires."

Phillips' activity under the Act with respect to the tires in question is not that of a user or consumer, but that of a manufacturer. According to your letter Phillips purchases new passenger tires for the purpose of transforming them into experimental tires. In this regard Phillips is manufacturing a new and different tire, and the original tires are no more than raw materials which become part of the final product manufactured by Phillips. Whether or not Phillips ultimately sells or intends to sell the tires is unimportant in determining whether Phillips is a statutory manufacturer, as the definition of "manufacturer" under the Act (@ 102(3), 15 U.S.C. @ 1391(3)) does not require that the product be manufactured or assembled for sale.

Moreover, you are incorrect in your analysis of the provisions of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. Section 108(a)(1) prescribes more than the manufacturing for sale, or the sale of motor vehicle and motor vehicle equipment. In clear language it also prescribes the introduction of such components in interstate commerce, and prohibits the latter as well as the former activities after the effective date of a motor vehicle safety standard, unless the vehicle or item of equipment conforms to the standard. Contrary to the arguments in your letter, the use of such components on the public highways is an introduction of them in interstate commerce and subject to the prohibitions of section 108(c)(1). The exception to this, "after the first purchase . . . in good faith for purposes other than resale" (@ 108(b)(2)), is intended to exempt used

vehicles (and equipment) manufactured after a standard's effective date, as a continued reading of the section, which authorizes the establishment of used vehicle standards, indicates. It allows, for example, a vehicle or item of equipment that was manufactured after the effective date of applicable standards to be resold without requiring the seller to ensure that the vehicle or equipment is in the same condition with regard to the standards as when it was new. This section is not intended to allow individuals to manufacture vehicles or equipment for their own use on public highways without complying with applicable standards.

Your reference to the treatment of reclassified tires is not in point. The decision in that rulemaking action was to prohibit either the manufacture or the sale of these tires, and the latter course was chosen so that manufacturers would not be required to destroy noncertified tires that would be inexpensive and not unsafe for a narrowly prescribed use. In no way does this exemption reflect the limitation that you suggest on the authority of the NHTSA.

As we stated to you in our letter of June 4, 1971, the tires that you manufacture are not retreaded tires as the casings used in their manufacturer do not come from used tires. However, these tires are new pneumatic tires, and as such are subject to Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 109.

ID: nht73-3.21

DATE: 02/07/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Mr. Satoshi Nishibori

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letters of December 15, 1972, and January 3, 1973, concerning paragraph S7.4.3 of Standard 208.

As I understand the question, you are positing a situation in which the occupants have correctly operated their belts, thereby permitting the engine starting system to operate, but in which the cranking of the engine by the starter motor does not start the engine and the key is returned to the "on" position. Your question is whether the ignition can thereafter be turned from "on" to "start" in repeated efforts to start the engine, without interference from the interlock.

Our reply is that S7.4.3 permits a system in which the initial correct operation of the belts, followed by operation of the starting system, places the system in a "free-start" mode so long as the ignition is not turned to "off". Repeated efforts to start the engine would therefore be permitted, regardless of the status of the belts.

If the ignition has been turned off and if the system is not in another of the "free-start" modes allowed by S7.4.3, then the engine starting system will not be operable with an unbelted driver on the seat unless an engine compartment switch is operated pursuant to S7.4.4.

ID: aiam5644

Dear Ms. Carroll: This responds to your question whether a chil sitting on a school bus seat with part of his body extending into the aisle, is afforded the compartmentalization protection of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 222, School bus passenger seating and crash protection. We have addressed this issue in an October 26, 1994, letter to Ms. Debra Platt of Stuart, Florida, and have enclosed a copy of our response for your information. In the Platt letter, NHTSA agrees that it is far less safe for children to sit on the edge of school bus seats, rather than face forward. We are enclosing a copy of Highway Safety Program Guideline No. 17, Pupil Transportation Safety, which is referenced in the Platt letter. Guideline 17 uses specific wording with regard to seating of school children. It says: 'Seating should be provided that will permit each occupant to sit in a seat intended by the vehicle's manufacturer to provide accommodation for a person at least as large as a 5th percentile adult female, as defined in 49 CFR 571.208.' We are also enclosing a copy of a report prepared by this agency entitled School Bus Safety Report, and a copy of a Report Summary prepared by the Transportation Research Board in May 1989. The latter two reports give a good overview of school bus safety issues, and they and Guideline 17 contain recommendations to the various states in developing their own pupil transportation safety programs. As noted in the Platt letter, since the States regulate school bus use, we recommend that you contact your State and/or local pupil transportation or school officials to inform them of your concerns. The Pennsylvania Governor's highway safety representative is: Mr. Michael Ryan Governor's Highway Safety Representative Deputy Secretary Highway Safety Administration Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 1220 Transportation & Safety Building Harrisburg, PA 17120 Telephone: (717) 787-6815 I hope the enclosed information is helpful to you. Should you have any other questions or need additional information, please feel free to contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Samuel J. Dubbin Chief Counsel Enclosures;

ID: aiam5278

"Dear Mr. Peepas: This is in reply to your FAX of November 12, 1993, t Taylor Vinson of this Office, the latest in a series of communications about how the conspicuity requirements of Standard No. 108 are to be applied to gooseneck trailers. On October 20, we sent you a correction of our earlier interpretation of S5.7.1.4.2(a). Our correction stated that the requirement is that conspicuity treatment not be obscured by trailer cargo. If conspicuity treatment is applied to the gooseneck of a container trailer, we understand that it will be obscured by the container (cargo) when it is in place. S5.7.1.4.2(a) also specifies that conspicuity treatment 'need not be continuous as long as not less than half of the length of the trailer is covered and the spaces are distributed as evenly as practicable.' The length of the gooseneck is included in determining the overall length of the trailer for purposes of calculating the half length that must be covered by the conspicuity treatment (which, of course, would be greater than half the length behind the gooseneck). You have suggested that we reevaluate the effect of excluding the gooseneck from compliance with the conspicuity requirements. There is nothing in Standard No. 108 that prohibits a manufacturer from applying retroreflective sheeting to the gooseneck. Indeed, some manufacturers may wish to do so to provide conspicuity of the entire trailer side when the trailer is traveling without its cargo. However, conspicuity treatment on a gooseneck is not counted in determining whether at least half the trailer side is covered. An example may clarify this for you. Let us say that the overall length of the trailer is 40 feet, including an 8-foot gooseneck. The amount of the side to be covered is not less than 20 feet. The area to be covered is the 32 feet between the rear bolster to the point immediately behind the gooseneck's terminus. Thus, regardless of whether conspicuity treatment is applied to the gooseneck, at least 20 feet of this 32-foot length must be covered in order to comply with Standard No. 108, and the spaces must be distributed as evenly as practicable. Standard No. 108 does not address the issue of the length of the spaces between strips, and a manufacturer may choose 4 feet or whatever is feasible for the trailer at hand. On the basis of this interpretation letter, we believe that Selecto-Flash ought to be able to judge whether the conspicuity treatments on Prints A-1, A-2, B-1 and B-2 accord with Standard No. 108. Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel";

ID: Koito.2

Mr. Takayuki Amma
Manager, Regulations & Certification
Koito Manufacturing Co., Ltd.
4-8-3, Takanawa
Minato-ku Tokyo
Japan




Dear Mr. Amma:

This responds to your recent letter, in which you asked whether it would be permissible under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment, to manufacture and sell a headlamp that automatically reduces intensity when the vehicle is stopped. Your letter stated that the lamp (which includes a fail-safe performance feature) would operate at full intensity when the vehicle is in forward motion, but that an electronic light source control gear would reduce the intensity once the vehicle comes to a rest. According to your letter, "[a]t all times through the change of the intensity, the lamps provide sufficient level of intensity and will be within the parameters of the minimum and maximum values of candela specified in FMVSS No. 108," and you further suggested that such headlamps would have the potential for significant energy conservation (about a 20-40% reduction in wattage), depending upon the optical design of the headlamps. As discussed below, we believe that the intensity-reducing headlamps described in your letter would not be permissible under FMVSS No. 108, because the would not meet the "steady-burning" requirement of S5.5.10.

By way of background, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue FMVSSs that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. It is the responsibility of manufacturers to certify that their products conform to all applicable safety standards before they can be offered for sale (see 49 CFR Part 571). After the first sale of the vehicle, manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and repair businesses are prohibited from "knowingly making inoperative" any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle in compliance with an applicable standard.49 U.S.C. 30122.

As you are aware, the requirements for lighting equipment are contained in FMVSS No. 108, which provides in relevant part:

S5.5.10 The wiring requirements for lighting equipment in use are:
(a) Turn signal lamps, hazard warning signal lamps, and school bus warning lamps shall be wired to flash;
(b) Headlamps and side marker lamps may be wired to flash for signaling purposes;
(c) A motorcycle headlamp may be wired to allow either its upper beam or its lower beam, but not both, to modulate from a higher intensity to a lower intensity in accordance with section S5.6;
(d) All other lamps shall be wired to be steady-burning.

In short, S5.5.10(d) of FMVSS No. 108 requires that all lamps must be "steady burning," unless otherwise permitted, and while S5.5.10(b) does permit headlamps to be wired to flash for signaling purposes, we note that paragraph S3 of FMVSS No. 108 defines "flash" as meaning "a cycle of activation and deactivation of a lamp by automatic means."

Your proposed headlamp would not fall within any of the standards express exceptions, and therefore, must be "steady-burning." Through our interpretations, we have explained that the "steady-burning" requirement under the standard means "a light that is essentially unvarying in intensity" (see e.g., February 9, 1982, letter of interpretation to Dr. H.A. Kendall). However, as stated in your letter, your proposed headlamp would routinely experience perceptible intensity changes resulting in a 20-40% reduction in wattage, so the lamp would not meet above definition of "steady-burning."

There are several reasons for the requirement for headlamps to be steady-burning. For example, several States have expressed concern that lights of variable intensity could be confused with emergency vehicles, which are allowed to have flashing headlamps. We also note that motorcycle headlamp modulation, while permitted under S5.5.10(c), must meet the requirements of S7.9.4; the modulation rate is regulated to prevent seizures in susceptible individuals. Furthermore, we believe that motor vehicle safety is best promoted by standardization of lighting signals.

In your letter, you pointed to our July 21, 1998, letter of interpretation to Mr. Ian Goldstein in support of your position that Standard No. 108 should permit headlamps that reduce intensity when stopped. The letter to Mr. Goldstein discussed "gradational" daytime running lamps (DRLs), devices that are capable of modulating the intensity of the DRLs according to ambient light conditions. You quoted from the portion of that letter which provides, "The standard does not prohibit changes in intensity, which we presume will be within the parameters of the minimum and maximum values of candela specified".However, your letter omitted the immediately preceding sentence, which provided, "A DRL with a gradational feature would continue to provide the steady-burning light that is required for DRLs".

The situation presented in your letter is distinguishable from the one presented in our letter to Mr. Goldstein. In the case of gradational DRLs, the lamps would be expected to determine an appropriate level of intensity based upon ambient lighting conditions and then maintain that level until conditions had changed sufficiently to potentially warrant a further change in intensity. In that case, intensity changes would be expected to occur infrequently and could occur gradually, such that the change would not be perceptible to oncoming drivers.

In contrast to gradational DRLs, the changes in intensity that would accompany your proposed headlamp design would be anticipated to result in frequent modulation, particularly during instances of stop-and-go city driving. Assuming that the intensity change is perceptible, we believe that such a design could be a source of distraction to other drivers, which could have negative consequences for safety. Accordingly, we believe that the headlamp design presented in your letter would not meet the requirements of S5.5.10 of FMVSS No. 108.

If you have further questions, please feel free to contact Eric Stas of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:108
d.8/1/05

ID: nht91-6.42

DATE: October 28, 1991

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Satoshi Nishibori -- Vice President, Industry/Government Affairs, Nissan Research & Development, Inc.

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 9-3-91 from Satoshi Nishibori to Paul Jackson Rice (OCC 6427)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter seeking an interpretation of the phase-in requirements for automatic crash protection in light trucks under Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR S571.208). Specifically, you described a situation in which Nissan and another manufacturer will enter into a joint program to produce multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPVs). According to your letter, Nissan has undertaken the majority of the design and development tasks and will supply the major powertrain components to the other company for the purposes of assembly. The other company will assemble the powertrain and the rest of the vehicle in the United States. Some of the MPVS will be badged as the other company's vehicles and some will be badged as Nissan vehicles.

Your letter stated that Nissan and the other company have entered into a contract that states that the other company "is the manufacturer of the vehicle and will inscribe its name on the certification label." Both companies will mutally agree to an addendum of the previous contract that provides that each company will be treated as the manufacturer of the vehicles badged as their vehicles for the purposes of the phase-in of the automatic crash protection requirements for light trucks. You asked for an interpretation of two points. First, you asked if Nissan would be considered a manufacturer of these vehicles. NHTSA set forth the agency's position on this subject in the notice proposing to establish the phase-in of the automatic crash protection requirements for passenger cars. The following explanation appears at 50 FR 14596, April 12, 1985:

Since the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act places the responsibility of compliance with safety standards on manufacturers, the agency does not have authority to attribute a vehicle to a party other than one of the vehicle's manufacturers. However, the agency considers the language in section 102(5) of the Vehicle Safety Act that a manufacturer is "any person engaged in the manufacturing or assembling of motor vehicles . . ." to be sufficiently broad to include sponsors, depending on the circumstances. For example, if a sponsor contracts for another manufacturer to produce a design exclusively for the sponsor, the sponsor may be considered the manufacturer. This follows from application of basic principles of agency law. In this case, the sponsor is the principal. On the other hand, the mere purchase of vehicles for resale by a company which also is a manufacturer of motor vehicles does not make the purchaser the manufacturer of those vehicles.

Applying these principles to the situation described in your letter, NHTSA concludes that Nissan would be considered a manufacturer of the jointly produced MPVs. Your letter indicates that Nissan will have done more than simply purchase another manufacturer's vehicles. Based on your representations that Nissan has undertaken the majority of design and development tasks and will supply the major powertrain components for these MPVs, we would view Nissan as a sponsor, and therefore a manufacturer, of these MPVS.

Second, you asked if Nissan can count those jointly produced MPVs that are badged as Nissans as its vehicles for the purposes of the phase-in of the automatic crash protection requirements for light trucks. This question is answered in the attribution rules for the light truck automatic crash protection phase-in, which appear at S4.2.5.6 of Standard No. 208. S4.2.5.6.2 provides that, in situations where a light truck is produced by more than one manufacturer, the manufacturers may agree among themselves which one will be considered the manufacturer of the light trucks in question for the purposes of the phase-in. When such an agreement is reached, it must be set forth in an express written contract and reported to this agency. Absent such an agreement, S4.2.5.6.1 provides that, for light trucks manufactured in the United States, the manufacturer that markets the light trucks will have those vehicles counted in its production.

If there were no contract between Nissan and the other manufacturer, Nissan would be considered the manufacturer of the Nissan badged light trucks for the purposes of the phase-in, pursuant to S4.2.5.6.1 of Standard No. 208. However, since there is a contract, its provisions will be applied to determine to which party the Nissan badged MPVs will be attributed during the phase-in, pursuant to S4.2.5.6.2. Your letter suggests that the contract between Nissan and the other manufacturer currently provides that the other manufacturer is the manufacturer of these vehicles and will identify itself as such on the vehicle's certification label. In that case, the other manufacturer would have the Nissan badged vehicles attributed to it during the phase-in.

Please note that Nissan and the other manufacturer are free to change the current attribution of the Nissan badged MPVs, by executing an addendum to the previous contract. Any such addendum must, of course, be reported to NHTSA pursuant to the requirements of 49 CFR S585.5(b)(3).

I hope that this information is helpful. Please let me know if you have any further questions or need some additional information on this subject.

ID: aiam3105

Dear Mr. Delgado: This responds to your recent letter requesting information concernin Federal and State laws applicable to the manufacture of van seats.; The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration issues safet standards and regulations governing the manufacture of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment. Safety Standard No. 207, *Seating Systems* (49 CFR 571.207), specifies performance requirements for seats, their attachment assemblies and their installation to minimize the possibility of seat failure resulting from crash forces. This standard is applicable to seats as installed in vehicles, including vans, but is not applicable to seats as individual pieces of motor vehicle equipment. Therefore, the vehicle manufacturer, not the seat manufacturer, would be responsible for compliance with Standard No. 207. However, under section 151, *et seq*., of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, a manufacturer of vehicle seats would be responsible for any safety related defects in his products and would be required to notify owners and remedy the defects.; I am enclosing a copy of Safety Standard No. 207 for your information as well as an information sheet that explains where you can obtain copies of all our standards and regulations. You will have to contact the individual States in which you are interested to find out if there are any State or local laws applicable to your business.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel

ID: aiam2467

Dear Mr. Crampton: This is in response to your letter of November 2, 1976, in which yo ask for an interpretation of the term 'absorbed' as it is used in Standard No. 222, *School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash Protection*. Further, you request that the NHTSA withdraw its earlier interpretation of the same term made on July 30, 1976, to Thomas Built Buses.; In your letter, you outline data showing that a seat may meet th energy absorbtion requirements of S5.1.3 when recoil energy is included, while failing those same requirements when recoil energy is subtracted from the total energy. You further argue that the NHTSA interpretation of July 30, 1976, which explained the subtraction of recoil energy, is at variance with the wording of the standard, because the standard does not explicitly require the subtraction of recoil energy and speaks only to the application of force upon the seat. Moreover, you suggest that plotting the recoil energy results in insufficient area under the force/deflection curve to meet S5.1.3. For these reasons, you request that the term 'absorbed' be defined as the total energy received by the seat without subtracting energy that is returned through recoil.; The NHTSA declines to adopt the interpretation that you suggest. Th dictionary definition of the term 'absorbed' is 'to receive without recoil.' This definition, when applied to energy absorbed by a seat, contemplates the subtraction of recoil energy in the computation of absorbed energy. The NHTSA intentionally chose the term 'absorbed' to denote exactly this meaning. Therefore, according to the common usage of the term 'absorbed,' the standard does require the subtraction of recoil energy even though those express words are never used.; Your assertion that plotting the recoil energy results in force/deflection curve that falls within the prohibited zones indicates a misunderstanding of the force/deflection zone requirements. The force deflection zone requirements (S5.1.3(a), S5.1.3(b), S5.1.4(a), and S5.1.4(b)) prescribe limits within which the seats must perform only during the force application phase of the test procedure.; Sincerely, Frank A. Berndt, Acting Chief Counsel

ID: aiam1626

Dear Mr. Wirt: This is in reference to your letter of October 4, 1974, concerning you recall campaign (NHTSA No. 74-0124) involving improperly machined P.O.L. nipples which were attached to L.P. gas regulators furnished by the Marshall Brass Company for use on camping trailers.; Since your company had not determined that a safety-related defec within the meaning of the National Highway Traffic Safety Act of 1966 (the Act) existed until after receipt of our letter of September 23, 1974, we agree with your reasoning that the first quarterly report should cover the period ending December 31, 1974.; Although your revised owner notification letter is not technicall correct, it appears to be adequate from the owner's point of view. An additional revision and mailing will therefore not be necessary. Specifically, the second sentence of your letter is incorrect in that it states that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administrator has determined the existence of the safety-related defect. Our letter of September 23, 1974, did not constitute a formal determination by the Administrator, but was merely intended to explain your company's legal obligations and to persuade your company to make such a determination. Since you stated in your letter of August 5, 1974, that a potential defect exists, but only expressed your opinion that the Act did not apply, it was felt that a defect determination by your company was likely to occur. A campaign number was therefore assigned for recordkeeping purposes.; The second sentence of your letter should also have described th defect as existing in the vehicle itself, rather than describing the defective part. The reference to 'item of motor vehicle equipment' in Part 577.4(b) refers only to campaigns in which vehicles are not involved.; It is hoped that these comments will assist you if the necessity o conducting another safety defect notification campaign should ever occur in the future.; Sincerely, Andrew G. Detrick, Acting Director, Office of Defect Investigation, Motor Vehicle Programs;