ID: aiam4798

Dear Mr. Kadoya: This responds to your request for interpretations o several safety standards and the Bumper Standard, in connection with a planned 'active' suspension system. I regret the delay in responding to your letter. Your questions are responded to below. By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) does not provide approvals of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Under the statutes administered by this agency, it is the responsibility of the manufacturer to ensure that its vehicles and equipment comply with applicable standards. The following represents our opinion based on the facts provided in your letter. According to your letter, Mazda is concerned about the protocol of compliance testing of vehicles equipped with an active suspension system. This concern arises because many standards do not specify a suspension height that is to be used during compliance testing. As you noted, this has not been a concern for conventional suspension systems, since they do not provide for variable height. NOTE: THIS IS PART II OF AN INTERPRETATION LETTER TOO LONG TO BE ACCEPTED INTO THE DATABASE AS IS. PART I COVERS COMPLIANCE ISSUES (PART 571), AND STANDARDS 108, 211 AND 204. ITS KEY NUMBER IS 5023. Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection In asking about Standard No. 208, you stated the following: Section S8.1.1.(d), 'Vehicle test attitude,' specifies the test procedure for determining the vehicle test attitude that is to be used for testing. Specifically, this section requires that the vehicle's pretest attitude, '...shall be equal to either the as delivered or fully loaded attitude or between the as delivered and fully loaded attitude.' The as delivered attitude is defined by S8.1.1(d) as being, '...the distance between a level surface and a standard reference point on the test vehicle's body, directly above each wheel opening, when the vehicle is in its 'as delivered' condition. The 'as delivered' condition is the vehicle as received at the test site...' Because it is highly likely that the test vehicle will not have been operated for a period of days prior to arriving at the test site, the suspension height may have fallen by 'y' mm. The fully loaded attitude is defined as the attitude of the vehicle when loaded in accordance with S8.1.1(a) or (b) and a determination of the height of the suspension at the fully loaded condition is made from the same level surface, using the same standard reference points, as were used to determine the 'as delivered' condition. The definition of the 'as delivered' condition is quite clear. However, Mazda interprets the 'fully loaded condition' of the vehicle to be the condition when the vehicle's ignition is 'on.' In this instance it is likely that the height of the standard reference points on the vehicles body when in the 'fully loaded condition' relative to the level surface will be greater than for the 'as delivered' condition. Conversely, conventional vehicle suspension systems will likely have an 'as delivered' height greater than the 'full loaded' height. However, this fact is of no importance as S8.1.1(d) states that the pretest vehicle attitude may be, '...between the as delivered and the fully loaded attitude.' With respect to the injury criteria specified by section S6 of this standard, Mazda's interpretation is that these criteria must be met with the vehicle's ignition in the 'on' position only. You then asked three questions, (1) whether Mazda's interpretation of the definition of the 'fully loaded condition' is correct with respect to the condition of the ignition switch, (2) whether Mazda's interpretation of the irrelevance of the relative relationship between the 'as delivered' and 'fully loaded' conditions is correct, and (3) whether Mazda's interpretation of the meaning of 'between the as delivered and the fully loaded attitude' is correct. In addressing you questions, I will begin by noting that Standard No. 208 specifies occupant protection requirements which must be met in specified crash tests at any impact speed up to and including 30 mph. While the standard specifies a number of test conditions, it does not specify suspension height. However, the standard does specify vehicle attitude, which is closely related to suspension height. In addressing how Standard No. 208 applies in the absence of a specification for vehicle height, the relationship between the standard's attitude specification and vehicle height must be considered. Section S8.1.1(d) specifies the attitude of the vehicle during testing, i.e., the angle of the vehicle relative to the ground. This test condition ensures that the vehicle is not overly tilted toward the front or back, or to one side. The section accomplishes this purpose by specifying that, during a compliance test, the height of the vehicle at each wheel is within a specified range. This range, which may be somewhat different for each wheel, is determined by looking at the vehicle in the 'as delivered' condition an the 'fully loaded' condition. A vehicle must meet the requirements of Standard No. 208 when its height at each wheel is anywhere within the specified ranges. On first glance, one might read section S8.1.1(d) to create a height requirement, since ranges of height are determined under that section (at each wheel). This would be incorrect, except in a very narrow sense, since Standard No. 208 does not specify, for vehicles with variable height suspension systems, what suspension height should be used in the two conditions ('as delivered' and 'fully loaded') where the specified ranges of height are determined under section S8.1.1(d). Looking at the Standard No. 208 as a whole, we believe it is clear that NHTSA explicitly decided to limit the standard's evaluation of occupant crash protection in frontal impacts to how vehicles perform in impacts of 30 mph or less, even though the requirements also have relevance at higher speeds. It is our interpretation that the frontal crash test requirements need to be met at all suspension heights that can occur at speeds of 30 mph or less, with the vehicle operational. It is also our interpretation that the crash test requirements need to be met only at suspension heights that can occur at the speed used in the crash test. A remaining issue is how section S8.1.1(d) applies for vehicles with variable height suspension systems. As discussed below, vehicle attitude should be determined under this section using the actual suspension setting (or equivalent, if the setting is automatic) to be used in a crash test. For purposes of illustration, I will assume a vehicle with two very different suspension height settings. It would not be appropriate to conclude that the ranges of height determined under section S8.1.1(d) should simultaneously cover both suspension heights. Such ranges would be very large, and would not ensure that the vehicle is not overly tilted toward the front or back, or to one side. Moreover, such ranges would not be relevant to the real world, with respect to vehicle attitude. Traditional vehicles can be viewed as having a single suspension 'setting.' This single suspension condition is used in determining vehicle attitude under section S5.8.8.1. The ranges of height result from the differences in loading under the 'as delivered' and 'fully loaded' conditions. A single suspension 'setting' (or equivalent, if the setting is automatic) should similarly be used in determining vehicle attitude for vehicles with variable height suspension systems. The 'setting' should be the one to be used in a crash test. With respect to Mazda's question concerning means of maintaining intended suspension height for compliance testing, please see our discussion provided with respect to Standard No. 111. You also asked for an interpretation of section S8.2.7 of Standard No. 208. That section specifies additional conditions to be used for lateral moving barrier crash testing. Section S8.2.7(a) states that the vehicle is at rest in its 'normal attitude.' You stated that Mazda interprets the meaning of 'normal attitude' to be that vehicle attitude which is intended when the vehicle's ignition is in the 'on' condition, with the vehicle loaded pursuant to S8.1.1(a) or (b), and while the vehicle is at rest. Standard No. 208 provides manufacturers the option of either equipping their vehicles with safety belts or meeting certain alternative requirements, including lateral moving barrier crash test requirements. These requirements are relevant at all vehicle heights that can occur during vehicle operation, regardless of speed. Moreover, NHTSA has not decided to limit the standard's evaluation of this aspect of safety performance to how vehicles perform at certain limited speeds. It is our interpretation that the lateral moving barrier crash test requirements, if applicable, must be met at all suspension heights that can occur with the vehicle operational. 'Normal attitude' is the attitude determined under section S8.1.1(d). As discussed above, attitude for vehicles equipped with variable height suspension systems is determined under section S8.1.1.(d) using the actual suspension setting (or equivalent, if the setting is automatic) to be used in a crash test. Standards No. 212, Windshield Mounting, No. 219, Windshield Zone Intrusion, No. 301, Fuel System Integrity In asking about Standards NO. 212, No. 219, and No. 301, you noted that NHTSA has previously issued an interpretation to Mazda about how these standards apply to adjustable height suspension systems. In a letter dated August 10, 1982, the agency addressed a vehicle equipped with a suspension system having two height positions, one for normal highway driving and another for off-road driving, which could be selected by the driver. NHTSA stated the following: Safety Standards No. 212, No. 219, and No. 301 do not specify a height adjustment because almost all vehicles have a single, set adjustment . . . . After careful consideration, it is the agency's position that such a vehicle capable of variable height adjustment would have to comply with the vehicle adjusted to any position that is possible. This is true because the vehicle could be driven on the highway, for example, even if it were adjusted to the off-road position. Consequently, it is important that the vehicle comply with the standards in all positions. You noted that while suspension height could be adjusted by the driver for the system discussed in the agency's previous interpretation, the active suspension system you are currently considering would use an on-board electronic controller to select suspension height, and suspension height would not be adjustable by the driver. Consequently, according to your letter, only one unique set of suspension height parameters is possible for a given vehicle speed and loading condition as is the case with conventional suspension systems. You stated that because it is possible to determine exactly what the intended suspension height should be for a given situation, it is Mazda's opinion that the test vehicle should be tested at the intended suspension height given the specified speed and loading conditions. You also stated that , using an 'intended purpose' argument, Mazda concludes that the requirements of the three standards are to be met only when the vehicle's ignition is 'on.' You then asked whether these suggested interpretations are correct. Standard No. 212 specifies windshield retention requirements that must be met in a specified frontal crash test at any impact speed up to and including 30 mph. Similarly, Standard No. 219 specifies windshield zone intrusion requirements that must be met in a specified frontal crash test at any impact speed up to and including 30 mph. Standard No. 301 specifies fuel system integrity requirements for several specified crash tests. These include a frontal crash test similar to those in Standards No. 212 and No. 219. Requirements for this test must be met at any impact speed up to and including 30 mph. Other tests include a rear moving barrier crash test, a lateral moving barrier crash test, and a static rollover test. We agree that the requirements of Standards No. 212, No. 219, and No. 301 need not be met for vehicle heights that only occur when the engine is not on, since the requirements are only relevant is situations where the vehicle is operating. Looking at the three standards as a whole, were believe it is clear that, for the frontal tests specified by the three standards, NHTSA decided to limit the standards' evaluation of safety performance to how vehicles perform in impacts of 30 mph or less, even thought the requirements have relevance at higher speeds. It is our interpretation that the frontal crash test requirements specified by these standards need to be met at all suspension heights that can occur at speeds of 30 mph or less, with the vehicle operational. It is also our interpretation that the crash test requirements need to be met only at suspension heights that can occur at the speed used in the crash test. We reach a different conclusion for Standard No. 301's other crash test requirements. These requirements are relevant at all vehicle speeds and suspension heights. Moreover, NHTSA has not decided to limit the standard's evaluation of these aspects of safety performance to how vehicles perform at certain limited speeds. It is our interpretation that these crash test requirements must be met at all suspension heights that can occur with the vehicle operational. Part 581 Bumper Standard In asking about the Part 581 Bumper Standard, you noted that NHTSA has previously issued several interpretations of how the standard applies to vehicles with adjustable height suspension systems. In a letter to Subaru dated May 6, 1986, NHTSA stated the following: Given the absence of a specific test condition concerning suspension height, it is our interpretation that a vehicle must be capable of meeting the standard's damage criteria at any height position to which the suspension can be adjusted. There is no language in the test requirements of the standard limiting their applicability to 'the manufacturer's nominal design highway adjusted height position.' This interpretation is consistent with the purpose of the Bumper Standard, set forth in section 581.2, to reduce physical damage to the front and rear ends of a passenger motor vehicle from low speed collisions. If a vehicle's suspension could be adjusted so that its bumper height resulted in bumper mismatch with other vehicles in the event of low speed collision, the reduction in physical damage attributable to the Bumper Standard would be defeated in whole or part. In another letter, dated February 12, 1985, NHTSA stated that a vehicle is 'required to meet the pendulum test of Part 581 in any vehicle use scenario in which the vehicle operates, and the barrier test of Part 581 when the engine is idling.' You suggested , for the barrier test, that the agency's May 1986 interpretation may be inappropriate for your active suspension system, since your system provides for only one suspension height when the engine is idling. You also suggested, for the pendulum test, that these interpretations seem to be in conflict with the Bumper Standard's stated purpose to reduce physical damage to motor vehicles in low speed collisions. We assume that you are referring to the fact that your suspension system has heights that occur only at speeds greater than 35 mph. You then requested that NHTSA provide an interpretation of Part 581 with respect to your system. In addressing how Part 581 applies to vehicles equipped with an active suspension system, I will address separately the standard's barrier and pendulum tests. For the barrier test, a vehicle must meet specified damage criteria after an impact into a fixed barrier that is perpendicular to the line of travel of the vehicle, at 2.5 mph. Section 581.6 sets forth conditions applicable to bumper testing. Under section 581.6(c), at the onset of a barrier impact, the vehicle's engine is operating at idling speed. Looking at the Bumper Standard as a whole, we believe it is clear that NHTSA decided to limit the barrier test's evaluation of bumper performance to how vehicles perform in 2.5 mph frontal impacts, event though the requirements have relevance at lower and higher speeds and when the vehicle is nonoperational. It is our interpretation that the barrier test requirements specified by this standard need to be met at all suspension heights that can occur at 2.5 mph. We reach a different conclusion for the pendulum test, which serves the purpose of creating a bumper height requirement. This requirement is relevant at all vehicle speeds and suspension heights, and when the vehicle is nonoperational. I note that while Mazda is correct that the Bumper Standard's stated purpose is to reduce physical damage to motor vehicles in low speed collision, NHTSA has justified the bumper height requirement on safety concerns related to 'higher speed collisions.' In proposing Standard No. 215, the predecessor of Part 581, the agency stated: . . . in higher speed collisions the tendency of a bumper to override another or to ride under or over a guardrail creates hazards for vehicle occupants. Vehicles with interlocking bumpers block traffic and expose their occupant to considerable danger, particularly if they attempt to get out to unlock bumpers. By overriding or underriding a guardrail, a bumper may strike a supporting post, or similar fixed object, with serious consequences for the vehicle and its occupants. 35 FR 17999, November 24, 1970. The relevance of the bumper height requirement to nonoperational situations is also clear, e.g., to help protect parked cars. Moreover, NHTSA has not decided to limit the bumper height requirements to how vehicles perform at certain limited speeds. It is our interpretation that the pendulum test requirements must be met at all suspension heights that can occur, regardless of vehicle speed or whether the ignition is turned on. This interpretation is consistent with an October 18, 1978 letter to Nissan, in which NHTSA addressed how the pendulum test applies to vehicles equipped with height control systems, including automatic height control systems. Among other things, the agency stated the following: . . . There is no language in the pendulum test requirements of the standard which would limit their applicability to only the ignition-on or ignition-off situation or to the recommended driving position for normal roadways. The vehicle must be capable of meeting the pendulum test requirements at all stable bumper heights possible at unloaded vehicle weight. Thus, in the situations described in Question 1 and 2 of your letter, in which an automatic height control system is employed, the vehicle must comply with the pendulum test requirements in both the ignition-on and ignition-off positions . . . . I note that one of our past letters, a December 24, 1984 letter addressed to Porsche, appears to suggest that the pendulum test must be met in any setting in which the system operates 'when the engine is idling.' This might be read to suggest that the pendulum test need not be met when the vehicle is nonoperational. However, this interpretation cited section 581.6(c) in concluding that the engine is idling during Part 581 testing. Section 581.6(c) applies only to the barrier test and not the pendulum test. We therefore consider this interpretation to be incorrect to the extent that it is inconsistent with the analysis presented above. Sincerely, Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel;

ID: 86-5.28

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 10/01/86

TITLE: TEXT OF THE RULING BY THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT UPHOLDING THE STATE'S LAW REQUIRING SEAT BELT USE BY DRIVERS AND FRONT SEAT PASSENGERS IN AUTOMOBILES

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 07/32/89 FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA TO BUTLER DERRICK -- CONGRESS; REDBOOK A31; STANDARD 208 LETTER DATED 07/11/89 FROM BUTLER DERRICK -- CONGRESS TO STEVE WOOD -- NHTSA

TEXT: Docket Nos. 62719, 62799, 63705, 63224 cons -- Agenda 40 -- May 1986.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS et al., Appellants, v. ELIZABETH J. KOHRIG et al., Appellees.

PER CURIAM: The defendants in these four consolidated cases were issued traffic citations for failure to wear seat safety belts while operating their motor vehicles on a street or highway in violation of section 12-603.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1 (hereinafter the section).) In each case, the trial court concluded that the section was unconstitutional and dismissed the charge. The State appealed each case directly to this court pursuant to our Rule 302(a) (94 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)), and the cases were consolidated for purposes of appeal. Only two of the four defendants -- Elizabeth J. Kohrig and Regina L. Greene -- have filed briefs in this court; however, various parties have been permitted to file briefs as amicus curiae.

At issue is whether the section, which requires drivers of motor vehicles and their front-seat passengers to wear safety belts when driving on a public highway or street, violates the due process guarantees of the State and Federal constitutions. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 2; U.S. Const., amend. XIV, sec. 1.

The section, which became effective on July 1, 1985, provides in part:

"(a) Each driver and front seat passenger of a motor vehicle operated on a street or highway in this State shall wear a properly adjusted and fastened seat safety belt; except that, a child less than 6 years of age shall be protected as required pursuant to the Child Passenger Protection Act. Each driver of a motor vehicle transporting a child 6 years of age or more, but less than 16 years of age, in the front seat of a motor vehicle shall secure the child in a properly adjusted and fastened seat safety belt." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1(a).)

The statute also provides that certain persons are exempt from complying with the seat-belt-use requirement, including persons with a written medical waiver from a physician or government agency; those persons frequently stopping and leaving the vehicle or delivering property from the vehicle if its speed between stops does not exceed 15 miles per hour; and drivers operating a vehicle in reverse. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1(b)(1),

(b)(4).) Certain vehicles also are exempt from the statute's requirements, including motorcycles, motorized pedalcycles, and vehicles manufactured prior to 1965. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1(b)(5), (b)(9).) Violators of the section are guilty of a "petty offense and subject to a fine not to exceed $ 25." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.I(d).

At the outset we note that, in reviewing the constitutionality of Illinois' mandatory-seat-belt law, this court does not join in the debate over whether the law is desirable or necessary. Our nation was founded in large part on the democratic principle that the powers of government are to be exercised by the people through their elected representatives in the legislature, subject only to certain constitutional limitations. Although this court has never hesitated to invalidate laws that it believes to be unconstitutional, we emphasize that our role is a limited one. The issue here in "not what the legislature should do but what the legislature can do." City of Wichita v. While (1970), 205 Kan. 408, 409, 469 P.2d 287, 288.

Defendant Greene contends that the section violates her fundamental right to privacy protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. (U.S. Const., amend XIV, sec. 2.) Additionally, both defendants argue that the section is beyond the police powers of the legislature and thus violates the due process clauses of the State and Federal constitutions. We first turn to the issue of whether the section violates defendants' fundamental right to privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment.

Regulations that limit a person's constitutional right to privacy may be justified only by a "'compelling state interest,'" and the legislation "must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake." (Roe v. Wade (1973), 410 U.S. 113, 155, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 178, 93 S. Ct. 705, 728. See also Carey v. Population Services International (1977), 431 U.S. 678, 686, 52 L.Ed. 2d 675, 685, 97 S. Ct. 2010, 2016.) However, "'only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" [citation]'" (Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 65, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 462, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2639, quoting Roe v. Wade (1973), 410 U.S. 113, 152, 35 L. Ed.2d 147, 176, 93 S. Ct. 705, 726), or those liberties "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition'" (Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , , 92 L.Ed. 2d 140, 146, 106 S.

Ct. 2841, 2844; see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland (1977), 431 U.S. 494, 503, 52 L. Ed.2d 531, 540, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1938) are included in the right of privacy guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court has selected only a few rights for such an esteemed status: the "privacy right encompasses and protects the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing." Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 65, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 462, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2639. See Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , , 92 L. Ed. 2d 140, 148, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2346; Paul v. Davis (1976), 424 U.S. 693, 712-13, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, 420-21, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1166.

Moreover, recognizing that a court is "most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution," the Supreme Court has emphasized that there should be "great resistance" to further expanding the substantive due process right of privacy. (Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , , 92 L. Ed.2d 140, 148, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846.) Thus, attempts by litigants to expand the privacy right beyond matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relations, abortion, child rearing and education have largely been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , 92 L. Ed. 2d 140, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (right to privacy does not encompass right to engage in homosexual sodomy); Kelley v. Johnson (1977), 425 U.S. 231, 244, 47 L. Ed. 2d 708, 714, 96 S. Ct. 1440, 1444 (police officer does not have privacy right to choose hairstyle); Paul v. Davis (1976), 424 U.S. 693, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (no privacy protection of reputation); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 93 S. Ct. 2628 (privacy right does not encompass right of adults to watch obscene movies in places of public accommodation).

In the present case it cannot be said that defendant Greene's claimed right to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt on a public highway resembles those liberties identified by the Supreme Court as being included in the right of privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment. Although the section in question implicates a person's interest in "liberty" in the sense that it restricts his freedom of choice, the law here does not regulate those intimate

decisions relating to marriage, procreation, child rearing, education or family that have heretofore been recognized as deserving of heightened constitutional protection. (See Wells v. State (1985), A.D.2d , 495 N.Y.S. 2d 591 (mandatory-seat-belt-use law does not violate right of privacy). Cf. People v. Thomas (1984), 159 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 18, 206 Cal. Rptr. 84 (statute requiring the securing of a child passenger in a seat-restraint system does not infringe on defendant's fundamental right of privacy); State v. Fetterly (1969), 254 Or. 47, 456 P.2d 996 (motorcycle helmet law does not violate defendant's right of privacy).) Nor do we think that the right to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed" (Palko v. Connecticut (1937), 302 U.S. 319, 325-26, 82 L. Ed. 288, 292, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152), or a liberty "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" (Moore v. East Cleveland (1977), 431 U.S. 494, 503, 52 L. Ed. 2d 531, 540, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1938). The States historically have been given a wide latitude to regulate the use of motor vehicles (Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. (1959), 359 U.S. 520, 530, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1003, 1010, 79 S. Ct. 962, 968), and the individual driver's autonomy on the road has, out of necessity for the public safety and welfare, been significantly curtailed by State regulation. Like the court in Bisenius v. Karns (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 42, 165 N.W.2d 377, appeal dismissed (1969), 395 U.S. 709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 655, 89 S. Ct. 2033, we reject any notion that the right of privacy includes the right to "do one's thing" on an expressway:

"There is no place where any such right to be let alone would be less assertable than on a modern highway with cars, trucks, busses and cycles whizzing by at sixty or seventy miles an hour. When one ventures onto such a highway, he must be expected and required to conform to public safety regulations and controls, including some that would neither have been necessary nor reasonable in the era of horse-drawn vehicles." (42 Wis. 2d 42, 55, 165 N.W.2d 377, 384.)

We are unwilling to graft onto the Constitution a right of privacy to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt where there is no textual basis or a clear historical precedent for such a right in the language of the Constitution or the opinions of the Supreme Court. To do so woul be to place the court in a position of acting as a super legislature,

nullifying laws it does not like. That is not our proper role in a democratic society. Therefore, we hold that the section does not infringe upon defendant's fundamental right of privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment. Neither does it infringe upon any right to privacy arising under the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 6).

Defendants also argue that the section does not further the health, safety or welfare of the general public, asserting that the statute only protects the safety of the individual driver and passenger. They contend that since the section interferes with their right to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt, and has no corresponding public benefit, the statute exceeds the State's police power and violates the due process guarantees of the State and Federal constitutions.

It is well established that the legislatures, not the courts, have the primary role in our democratic society in deciding what the interests of the public require and in selecting the measures necessary to secure those interests. (City of Carbondale v. Brewster (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 111, 115; Memorial Gardens Association, Inc. v. Smith (1959), 16 Ill. 2d 116, 127.) Recognizing the legislature's broad power to provide for the public health, welfare and safety, the courts are hesitant to second-guess a legislative determination that a law is desirable or necessary. Only when the statute in question affects a fundamental constitutional right will the courts subject the legislation to strict or exacting scrutiny. In such cases, the State must have a "compelling" purpose for the law and show that it's goals cannot be accomplished by less restrictive means. (Carey v. Population Services International (1977), 431 U.S. 678, 686, 52 L. Ed. 2d 675, 685, 97 S. Ct. 2010, 2016.) Few rights, however, have been identified as "fundamental," since only those rights "that lie at the heart of the relationship between the individual and a republican form of nationally integrated government" are deemed deserving of heightened judicial scrutiny. (People ex rel. Tucker v. Kotsos (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 88, 97.) Thus, in most cases involving substantive due process challenges to statutes, the courts give substantial deference to the legislative enactments.

In the present case we already have determined that the section here involved does not infringe upon the defendants' right of privacy protected by the fourteenth

amendment, and defendants do not argue that the statute implicates any other fundamental constitutional right or liberty. As such, the State need not show a "compelling interest" for the law. It is sufficient that there is a rational basis for the statute. That is, the law will be upheld if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. (Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. (1955), 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 99 L. Ed. 563, 572, 75 S. Ct. 461, 464; Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368; Hayen v. County of Ogle (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 413, 419; Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association v. Block (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 443, 453.) Under the rational-basis test, a statute is presumed to be valid, and the party challenging the statute has the burden of proving that the statute is irrational. (Hayen v. County of Ogle (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 413, 419; Pozner v. Mauck (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 250, 255.) As long as there is a conceivable basis for finding a rational relationship, the law will be upheld. McGowan v. Maryland (1961), 366 U.S. 420, 426, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393, 399, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 1105; Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368.

In challenging the section as exceeding the scope of the State's police power, the defendants principally rely on the case of People v. Fries (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 446. In Fries the court held that a statute requiring the operator or passenger of a motorcycle to wear protective headgear was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the purpose of the headgear requirement was to "safeguard the person wearing it" and was unrelated to the safety of the public at large. (42 Ill. 2d 446, 450.) It concluded that the statute constituted a "regulation of what is essentially a matter of personal safety" and exceeded the scope of the State's police power. (42 Ill. 2d 446, 450.) Here, too, defendants argue that the decision of whether or not to wear a safety belt is "essentially a matter of personal safety" and that any regulation restricting the individual's right to make such a decision exceeds the State's police power.

The State, on the other hand, maintains that Fries was wrongly decided, and it urges us to overrule that decision. It correctly notes that at present Fries stands alone in holding that a motorcycle helmet law is unconstitutional. The overwhelming weight of authority is that motorcycle-helmet laws are a valid exercise of the State's police

power. (See Kingery v. Chapple (Alaska 1972), 504 P.2d 831; State v. Beeman (1975), 25 Ariz. App. 83, 541 P.2d 409; Penney v. City of North Little Rock (1970), 248 Ark. 1158, 455 S.W.2d 132; Love v. Bell (1970), 171 Colo. 27, 465 P.2d 118;State v. Brady (Del. Super. 1972), 290 A.2d 322; Hamm v. State (Fla. 1980), 387 So. 2d 946; State v. Cotton (1973), 55 Hawaii 138, 516 P.2d 709; State v. Albertson (1970), 93 Idaho 640, 470 P.2d 300; City of Wichita v. White (1970), 205 Kan. 408, 469 P.2d 287; Everhardt v. City of New Orleans (1968) 253 La. 285, 217 So. 2d 400, appeal dismissed and cert. denied (1969), 395 U.S. 212, 23 L. Ed. 2d 214, 89 S. Ct. 1775; State v. Quinnam (Me. 1977), 367 A.2d 1032; Simon v. Sargent (D. Mass. 1972), 346 F. Supp. 277, aff'd (1972), 409 U.S. 1020, 34 L. Ed. 2d 312, 93 S. Ct. 463; Commonwealth v. Howie (1968), 354 Mass. 769, 238 N.E.2d 373, cert. denied (1968), 393 U.S. 999, 21 L. Ed. 2d 464, 89 S. Ct. 485; City of Adrian v. Poucher (1976) 398 Mich. 316, 247 N.W.2d 798; State v. Edwards (1970), 287 Minn. 83, 177 N.W.2d 40; State v. Cushman (Mo. 1970), 451 S.W.2d 17; State v. Eight Judicial District Court (1985), 101 Nev. 658, 708 P.2d 1022; State v. Merski (1973), 113 N.H. 323, 307 A.2d 825; State v. Krammes (1969), 105 N.J. Super. 345, 252 A.2d 223; City of Albuquerque v.Jones (1975), 87 N.M. 486, 535 P.2d 1337; People v. Bennett (1977), 89 Misc. 2d 382, 391 N.Y.S.2d 506; State v. Anderson (1969), 275 N.C. 168, 166 S.E.2d 49; State v. Odegaard (N.D. 1969), 165 N.W.2d 677; State v. Stouffer (1971), 28 Ohio App. 2d 229, 276 N.E.2d 651; Elliott v. City of Oklahoma City (Okla. Crim. App. 1970), 471 P.2d 944; State v. Fetterly (1969), 254 Or. 47, 456 P.2d 996; Commonwealth v. Kautz (1985), 341 Pa. Super. 374, 491 A.2d 864; State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi (1968), 104 R.I. 28, 241 A.2d 625; Arutanoff v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County (1969), 223 Tenn. 535, 448 S.W.2d 408; Ex Parte Smith (Tex. Crim. App. 1969), 441 S.W.2d 544; State v. Acker (1971), 26 Utah 2d 104, 485 P.2d 1038; State v. Solomon (1969), 128 Vt. 197, 260 A.2d 377; State v. Laitinen (1969), 77 Wash. 2d 130, 459 P.2d 789; State v. Zektzer (1975), 13 Wash. App. 24, 533 P.2d 399, cert. denied (1975), 423 U.S. 1020, 46 L. Ed. 2d 392, 96 S. Ct. 457; Bisenius v. Karns (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 42, 165 N.W.2d 377, appeal dismissed (1969), 395 U.S. 709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 655, 89 S. Ct. 2033.) Alternatively, the State contends that the statute being challenged here promotes valid public

interests and thus is distinguishable from the motorcycle helmet law found to be unconstitutional in Fries.

Defendants are correct in asserting that the primary goal of the section is to protect the individual driver and front-seat passenger from death or serious injury. As such, the statute interfers with the individuals' choice concerning his or her personal safety. However, arriving at those conclusions does not ipso facto mean that the law is devoid of any public benefit and is unconstitutional. Regardless of a law's primary objective, it will be upheld if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose. (Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368-69; Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association v. Block (1979), 75 I11. 2d 443, 453.) In that regard, the defendants have not persuaded us that the legislature could not have found that the law bears a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. The legislative debates clearly indicate that the legislators believed that safety-belt use would protect persons other than the belt wearers by helping drivers to maintain control of their vehicles, and that the law would promote that economic welfare of the State by reducing the public and private costs associated with serious injuries and deaths caused by automobile accidents.

During debates in the House of Representatives, a principal sponsor of the safety-belt legislation remarked:

"The Bill would not only protect drivers and passengers in the front seat, the Bill would also protect other people. It would protect other drivers. It would protect pedestrains on our highways and on our sidewalks. The reason for that, of course, is that even a minor * * * accident, can if * * * a car is driven by a person who doesn't have a seat belt, * * * result in that person losing control of the car and injuring other people on or about the car." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 212 (statement of Representative John Cullerton).)

Another legislator argues that if she were to drive an automobile without her safety belt fastened "and I lose control of my car, I am endangering others." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 223 (statement of Representative Josephine Oblinger).) The Governor, in signing the seat-belt law, also agreed that the law would help drivers to maintain control of their vehicles and avoid accidents with other motorists and pedestrians:

"Unbelted passengers in a motor vehicle literally become human projectiles in the event of a crash. Unbelted passengers

can interfere with the ability of an operator to respond to the collision, and unbelted drivers may lose control of a vehicle and thus cause death and injury to others." Letter of Governor James R. Thompson to the General Assembly indicating his intent to sign House Bill 2800 (Jan. 8, 1985).

The State can enact laws aimed at reducting traffic accidents, since such laws are clearly related to the health, welfare and safety of the public. We also believe that the legislature could rationally conclude that unbelted drivers and passengers endanger the safety of others. In upholding a law similar to the one here under review, the court in People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, 494 N.Y.S.2d 960, stated:

"A driver who is injured or who is jolted away from his vehicle's controls during a skid or by an initial impact, may well be less able to prevent or minimize injuries caused by an accident. Also, an unrestrained occupant of a vehicle may injure others inside or out of the vehicle during an accident. The preventing or reduction of such an injury seems to the Court to be a valid State interest." (129 Misc. 2d 993, , 494 N.Y.S.2d 960, 963.)

It also is conceivable that drivers who wear safety belts are less likely to fall asleep at the wheel, or to lose control of their vehicles in situations where the driver must apply the brakes suddenly, or in cases where a vehicle begins to skid or swerve. Safety belts can also prevent passengers from being thrown against the driver. And, as the State observes, children and other occupants who are wearing safety belts are less likely to distract the driver. See People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, , 494 N.Y.S.2d 960, 963; Druhot, The Constitutionality of the Illinois Mandatory Seat Belt Use Legislation, 74 Ill. B.J. 290, 296 (1986); Werber, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach To Seat Belt Issues, 29 Cleve. St. L. Rev. 217, 244 (1980).

Defendants argue that there is no statistical evidence showing that seat-belt use helps the driver to maintain control of his vehicle and avoid accidents with other motorists or pedestrains. Even assuming this argument is correct, it is without merit. "The fact that a congressional directive reflects unprovable assumptions about what is good for the people * * * is not a sufficient reason to find that statute unconstitutional" (Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 62, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 460, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2638), and a court "will not disturb a police regulation merely where there is room for a difference of

opinion as to its wisdom, necessity and expendiency." (City of Carbondale v. Brewster (1979), 78 I11. 2d 111, 115. See also Schuringa v. City of Chicago (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 504, 515.) Moreover, "the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it." (Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. (1955), 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 99 L. Ed. 563, 572, 75 S. Ct. 461, 464.) Here, we think that the legislature could rationally determine that the seat-belt-use law would serve the public safety and welfare by reducing the likelihood that a driver would lose control of his vehicle and jeopardize other motorists or pedestrians.

Another reason advanced by the State for the section is that the law promotes the economic welfare of the State by reducing the public costs associated with serious injuries and deaths caused by automobile accidents. The legislative history of the section indicates that legislators were concerned about the financial costs associated with highway accidents. Representative Cullerton remarked that, the safety-belt legislation "would clearly save money," asserting that "it cost the State over 800,000 dollars for a 26 year old person who is made a paraplegic as a result of a car crash." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 212 (statement of Representative John Cullerton).) Another Representative stated: "The lives we were save and the injuries that we avoid are the injuries and lives that we, the taxpayers, are very likely to be responsible for in the long run. We're not talking about somebody's own individual decision to end up in a car crash and find him or herself in a hospital for 20 years with that individual paying the bill. It's the taxpayers that are going to be paying those bills." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 220 (statement of Barbara Currie).) Senator James Philip, in urging passage of the seat-belt law, observed that " in 1982 in Illinois some seventy-five people were killed in automobiles [while] performing their job * * *. This costs Illinois employers some twelve million dollars." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Debates, June 21, 1984, at 159 (statement of Senator James Philip).) Senator Dawn Netsch remarked: "We intrude because the consequences of the thousands of people * * * who are injured and whose affictions then are passed on

to their families, to all of us in society * * *." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Debates, June 21, 1984, at 162 (statement of Senator Dawn Netsch).) Governor Thompson, in explaining his reasons for signing the legislation, estimated that the seat belt law would "save more than 300 lives in Illinois in the first year, will avoid nearly 43,000 injuries and save more than $ 400 million in costs." Letter of Governor James R. Thompson to the General Assembly indicating his intent to sign House Bill 2800 (Jan. 8, 1985).

It cannot be seriously questioned that the police power may be used to promote the economic welfare of the State, its communities and its citizens. "[I]n the interest of general welfare, the police power may be exercised to protect citizens and their businesses in financial and economic matters, [and] it may be exercised to protect the governments itself against potential financial loss." (Sherman-Reynolds, Inc. v. Mahin (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 323, 326.) A law whose aim is to reduce the private and public costs resulting from injuries and deaths caused by motor vehicle accidents is therefore within the police power of the State. In finding that a motorcycle helmet law was rationally related to the public welfare, the court in Simon v. Sargent (D. Mass. 1972), 346 F. Supp. 277, aff'd (1972), 409 U.S. 1020, 34 L. Ed. 2d 312, 93 S. Ct. 463, stated:

"From the moment of the injury, society picks the person up off the highway; delivers him to a municipal hospital and municipal doctors; provides him with unemployment compensation if, after recovery, he cannot replace his lost job, and, if the injury causes permanent disability, may assume the responsibility for his and his family's continued subsistence. We do not understand a state of mind that permits plaintiff to think that only he himself is concerned." (346 F. Supp. 277, 279, aff'd (1972), 409 U.S. 1020, 34 L. Ed. 2d 312, 93 S. Ct. 463.)

Because of the drain on private and public financial resources caused by highway accidents, society has a legitimate interest in minimizing injuries which result from such accidents. See Wells v. State (1985), A.D.2d 495 N.Y.S.2d 591; People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, 494 N.Y.S.2d 960; State v. Eighth Judicial District Court (1985), 101 Nev. 658, 708 P.2d 1022; State v. Beeman (1975), 25 Ariz. App. 83, 541 P.2d 409; Love v. Bell (1970), 171 Colo. 27, 465 P.2d 118; See also Druhot, The Constitutionality of the Illinois Mandatory Seat belt Use Legislation, 74 Ill. B.J. 290 (1986); Note, The Illinois Seat Belt Law: Should those Who Ride Decide?, 19 John

Marshall L. Rev. 193 (1985); Werber, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to Seat Belt Issues, 29 Cleve, St. L. Rev. 217, 222 (1980).

Defendants make several arguments concerning the effectiveness of safety belts in reducing injuries and arguments regarding the merits of alternative safety devices such as air bags. Defendants also contend that in some instances safety belts may cause injuries instead of preventing them. We need not consider these arguments, however, since they are proper subjects of discussion for the legislature, not the courts. (Hayden v. County of Ogle (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 413, 421; City of Carbondale v. Brewster (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 111, 115; Pozner v. Mauck (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 250, 255.) We believe that the General Assembly could reasonably assume that a law requiring drivers and front-seat passengers to wear safety belts will reduce traffic-related injuries and fatalities. (Wells v. State (1985), A.D.2d , 495 N.Y.S.2d 591; People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, 494 N.Y.S.2d 960.) Therefore, we hold that section 12.603.1 does not violate the due process clauses of the State and Federal constitutions. To the extent that People v. Fries (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 446, is inconsistent with our opinion, it is overruled.

Defendant Greene also filed a motion to strike certain portions of the briefs and appendices filed by the State and certain parties amicus curiae. This motion was taken with the case. Our review of the record shows that certain safety statistics relied on by the State and the amicus were not presented in the trial courts. Accordingly, defendant Greene's motion to strike this information is allowed.

For the reasons stated the judgments of the circuit courts of Marion, Effingham, Fayette and Champaign counties in cause Nos. 62719, 62799, 63705 and 63224 are reversed, and said causes are remanded to those respective courts for further proceedings.

Motion allowed;

judgments reversed;

causes remanded.

CLARK, C.J., and SIMON, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

ID: nht90-4.30

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: October 2, 1990

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: S. Kadoya -- Manager, Safety and Technology, Mazda Research and Development of North America, Inc.

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 11-7-89 from S. Kadoya to S.P. Wood

TEXT:

This responds to your request for interpretations of several safety standards and the Bumper Standard, in connection with a planned "active" suspension system. I regret the delay in responding to your letter. Your questions are responded to below.

By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) does not provide approvals of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Under the statutes administered by this agency, it is the responsibility of the manufac turer to ensure that its vehicles and equipment comply with applicable standards. The following represents our opinion based on the facts provided in your letter.

According to your letter, Mazda is concerned about the protocol of compliance testing of vehicles equipped with an active suspension system. This concern arises because many standards do not specify a suspension height that is to be used during complianc e testing. As you noted, this has not been a concern for conventional suspension systems, since they do not provide for variable height.

Mazda's planned active suspension system would be actuated by hydraulic fluid or compressed air, with control pressure being developed by a hydraulic pump or air compressor driven off the engine. Consequently, the active suspension system would be opera tional only when the vehicle's engine is operating. At vehicle speeds in excess of "z" mph, where z is greater than 35 mph, the suspension height would be lowered by "x" mm from the nominal or design position for vehicle operation. If the engine/vehicl e were not used for several consecutive days, pressure in the control system would fall such that the supension height may be lowered from the nominal or design position for vehicle operation by "y" mm, where y is greater than x. The suspension height w ould return to the nominal or design position for vehicle operation after such an extended period of inoperation almost immediately after starting the vehicle's engine.

Before discussing your specific questions, I would like to discuss more generally the issue of how compliance is determined in situations where a standard does not specify a particular test condition. In issuing Federal motor vehicle safety standards, N HTSA attempts to specify all relevant test conditions. The agency does this as part of ensuring that its standards are objective and practicable. As a practical matter, however, it is not possible to specify every conceivable test condition. This is p articularly true for ones which may only be relevant to

as-yet-undeveloped technologies.

In cases where a standard does not specify a particular test condition, we believe there are several relevant factors to consider in interpreting the standard. First, in the absence of specification of a particular test condition, we believe there is a presumption that the requirements need to be met regardless of such test condition, since the standard does not include any language which specifically limits applicability of its requirements to such test condition. For example, where a standard does n ot specify suspension height, its requirements may need to be met at all heights to which the suspension can be adjusted. Before reaching such a conclusion, however, we also consider the language of the standard as a whole and its purposes. Even if a s tandard is silent as to a particular test condition, the language of the standard or its purposes may indicate limitations on such test condition. Finally, in situations where a limitation on a particular test condition may appear to be appropriate, we also must consider whether the limitation is sufficiently clear, both with respect to justification and specificity, to be appropriate for interpretation. For example, in a situation where it may appear to be reasonable to limit a particular test condit ion but it is not obvious what particular limitation should be adopted, it would be inappropriate to select a particular limitation by interpretation. Instead, such a decision should be reached in rulemaking.

I will now address the specific questions asked in your letter.

Standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment

In asking about Standard No. 108, you stated the following:

NHTSA has previously issued an interpretation of the requirements of FMVSS No. 108; at the request of a confidential applicant and dated February 12, 1985, with respect to active suspension equipped vehicles. This interpretation stated that the requirem ents of FMVSS 108 must be meet (sic),"...at any time in which..." lamps, reflective devices, and associated equipment are to be,"...operated for its intended purpose." Consequently, headlamps, tailamps, stoplamps, the license plate lamp, and side marker lamps, must comply with the location requirements of FMVSS No. 108 whenever the vehicle's ignition is in the "on" postiion. Conversely, reflex reflectors, and turn signal lamps that also function as hazard warning signal flashers must comply with the lo cation requirements when the vehicle's ignition is in either the "on" or "off" position. However, it is Mazda's interpretation that hazard warning flashers are not intended to be operational for a period of days, but rather for a period of hours, at max imum, only.

You then asked two questions, (1) whether Mazda's understanding of the subject NHTSA interpretation is accurate, and (2) whether Mazda's interpretation of the maximum intended operating duration of hazard warning signal flashers is correct.

I note that the February 1985 interpretation was written in the context of a vehicle with a variable height system actuated by hydraulic fluid. In that particular system, the hydraulic pressure relaxed over a period of

about three hours after the ignition was turned off, with the result that the vehicle assumed a lower height than it would have during driving. NHTSA stated the following:

We believe that the minimum height requirement should be met for any lamp at any time in which it is operated for its intended purpose. Since vehicles at rest do not require use of headlamps, the minimum height requirement would be measured at the point after the ignition is on and when the car begins to travel (your letter implies that the time lag between turning on the ignition and restoration of a complying mounting height is a matter of seconds). On the other hand, the hazard warning signal lamps are frequently operated when the vehicle is stopped, and therefore the minimum mounting height of turn signal lamps, through which they operate, must be met with the ignition off, even if the system requires three hours to deplete itself and lower the v ehicle to its minimum height.

With respect to your question of whether Mazda's understanding of the interpretation is correct, I would like to note two points. First, while you state that "the requirements of FMVSS 108" must be met at any time in which lamps, reflective devices, and associated equipment are to be operated for their intended purpose, our interpretation was limited to standard's minimum height requirement. While we are prepared, if asked, to address other requirements, our interpretations should be understood to be limited to their specific facts and conclusions. Second, while our interpretation only addressed headlamps and hazard warning signal lamps, you applied the interpretation for headlamps to taillamps, stoplamps, the license plate lamp, and side marker lam ps, and the interpretation for hazard warning signal lamps to reflex reflectors. We concur with this application, with respect to Standard No. 108's minimum height requirement.

We do not agree with Mazda's suggested interpretation of the maximum intended operating duration of hazard warning signal flashers. You would apparently like us to conclude that Standard No. 108's minimum height requirement for hazard warning signal fla shers does not apply after a vehicle's ignition has been turned off for a matter of days.

In addressing how Standard No. 108 applies in the absence of a specification for vehicle height, our February 1985 interpretation differentiates between situations where the vehicle is operating and where it is not. Looking at the purpose of the require ments in question, we believe it is obvious that the minimum height requirement for headlamps is only relevant in situations where the vehicle is operating, while the minimum height for hazard warning signal lamps is also relevant to situations where the vehicle is stopped and the ignition turned off. However, we believe that any determination that Standard No. 108's minimum height requirement for hazard warning signal flashers should not apply after a specified number of hours after the ignition has be en turned off is one that would need to be addressed in rulemaking.

It is therefore my opinion that the minimum mounting height of hazard warning signal lamps must be met at all heights with the ignition off, even if the system requires days to deplete itself and lower the vehicle

to its minimum height. If you believe that a time limitation should be placed on this requirement, I note that you can submit a petition for rulemaking requesting such a change.

Standard No. 111, Rearview Mirrors

You requested an interpretation of section S5.1.1 of Standard No. 111, which generally requires a passenger car's rearview mirror to "provide a field of view with an included horizontal angle measured from the projected eye point of at least 20 degrees, and sufficient angle to provide a view of level road surface extending to the horizon beginning at a point not greater than 200 feet to the rear of the vehicle...." You noted that since the specified procedures for determining the location of the driver 's eye reference points are made referenced to points with the vehicle's cabin, your active suspension system would not affect these measurements. However, different vehicle heights would be relevant to whether there is a view of level road surface exte nding to the horizon beginning at a point not greater than 200 feet to the rear of the vehicle. You stated that, based on "intended purpose," Mazda's interpretation of Standard No. 111 is that the requirements of this standard are to be met when the vehi cle's ignition is in the "on" position as rearview mirrors are not intended to be used when the vehicle's engine is not operating.

You then asked two questions, (1) whether Mazda's interpretation of the requirements of FMVSS No. 111 with respect to the state of the vehicle's ignition switch is correct, and (2) for the purposes of compliance testing to the requirements of FMVSS No. 1 11, what means of maintaining the intended suspension height for a given speed and operating condition would be satisfactory to NHTSA.

We agree that the field of view requirement specified in S5.1.1 for rearview mirrors need not be met for vehicle heights that only occur when the engine is not on, since the requirement is only relevant in situations where the vehicle is operating. Howe ver, the requirement would need to be at all vehicle heights that occur during vehicle operation, under the loading conditions specified in S5.1.1.

With respect to the issue of how suspension height should be maintained for purposes of compliance testing, you note early in your letter that, for reasons of practicality and safety, a vehicle's engine is not actually operational during compliance testi ng. However, since the active suspension system derives its power from the vehicle's engine, the system's ability to maintain and regulate suspension height is only possible during engine operation. You therefore indicated that Mazda is seeking guideli nes (for several standards) by which Mazda may be able to establish a means to maintain the intended suspension height for compliance testing purposes in the absence of engine operation.

We are not able, in an interpretation, to specify a particular means for maintaining suspension height for compliance testing in the absence of engine operation. However, the basic principle that should be followed in selecting a means for maintaining s uspension height is that it should not result in different test results than would occur if testing could be conducted with suspension height being maintained by engine operation,

i.e., what would happen in the real world. This should be relatively straightforward for section S5.1.1 of Standard No. 111, since the test is static. For a crash test, it is important that a vehicle not be altered in any way that would change the vehi cle's crash performance relevant to the aspect of performance being tested.

Standard No. 204, Steering Control Rearward Displacement

In asking about Standard No. 204, you stated the following:

Section S4 of this standard specifies the compliance parameter for this standard. Section S5 specifies the testing conditions to determine compliance with this standard. Section S5.1 specifies that the vehicle be loaded to its unloaded vehicle weight. Section S5.5 specifies that the vehicles fuel tank be filled with Stoddard solvent to any capacity between 90 and 95 percent of the total capacity of the tank. Mazda's interpretation of the requirements of this standard is that they are to be met when the vehicle's ignition switch is in the "on" position only. Furthermore, Mazda interprets the vehicles suspension height pursuant to S5.1 and S5.5 to be the intended suspension height for the vehicle given the conditions of S4, i.e., 30 mph vehicle speed and steered wheels are positioned straight ahead.

You then asked whether Mazda's interpretation of the requirements of FMVSS No. 204 are correct. As discussed below, we agree that Standard No. 204's requirements need to be met only at the suspension height that occurs at a 30 mph vehicle speed and with steered wheels positioned straight ahead.

Standard No. 204 specifies requirements limiting the rearward displacement of the steering control into the passenger compartment to reduce the likelihood of chest, neck, or head injury. These requirements must be met in a 30 mile per hour perpendicular impact into a fixed collision barrier. While the standard specifies a number of test conditions, it does not specify suspension height.

Looking at the Standard No. 204 as a whole, we believe it is clear that NHTSA explicitly decided to limit the standard's evaluation of steering control rearward displacement to how vehicles perform in 30 mph perpendicular impacts, even though the require ments have relevance at lower and higher speeds. Therefore, we agree that the standard's requirements need to be met only at suspension heights that occur at a 30 mph vehicle speed and with steered wheels positioned straight ahead.

With respect to Mazda's question concerning means of maintaining intended suspension height for compliance testing, please see our discussion provided with respect to Standard No. 111.

Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection

In asking about Standard No. 208, you stated the following:

Section S8.1.1(d), "Vehicle test attitude," specifies the procedure for determining the vehicle test attitude that is to be used for testing. Specifically, this section requires that the vehicle's pretest attitude,

"...shall be equal to either the as delivered or fully loaded attitude or between the as delivered and fully loaded attitude." The as delivered attitude is defined by S8.1.1(d) as being, "...the distance between a level surface and a standard reference point on the test vehicle's body, directly above each wheel opening, when the vehicle is in its "as delivered" condition. The "as delivered" condition is the vehicle as received at the test site..." Because it is highly likely that the test vehicle wil l not have been operated for a period of days prior to arriving at the test site, the suspension height may have fallen by "y" mm. The fully loaded attitude is defined as the attitude of the vehicle when loaded in accordance with S8.1.1(a) or (b) and a determination of the height of the suspension at the fully loaded condition is made from the same level surface, using the same standard reference points, as were used to determine the "as delivered" condition. The definition of the "as delivered" condi tion is quite clear. However, Mazda interprets the "fully loaded condition" of the vehicle to be the condition when the vehicle's ignition is "on." In this instance it is likely that the height of the standard reference points on the vehicles body when in the "fully loaded condition" relative to the level surface will be greater than for the "as delivered" condition. Conversely, conventional vehicle suspension systems will likely have an "as delivered" height greater than the "full loaded" height. H owever, this fact is of no importance as S8.1.1(d) states that the pretest vehicle attitude may be, "...between the as delivered and the fully loaded attitude." With respect to the injury criteria specified by section S6 of this standard, Mazda's interp retation is that these criteria must be met with the vehicle's ignition in the "on" position only.

You then asked three questions, (1) whether Mazda's interpretation of the definition of the "fully loaded condition" is correct with respect to the condition of the ignition switch, (2) whether Mazda's interpretation of the irrelevance of the relative re lationship between the "as delivered" and "fully loaded" conditions is correct, and (3) whether Mazda's interpretation of the meaning of "between the as delivered and the fully loaded attitude" is correct.

In addressing your questions, I will begin by noting that Standard No. 208 specifies occupant protection requirements which must be met in specified crash tests at any impact speed up to and including 30 mph. While the standard specifies a number of tes t conditions, it does not specify suspension height. However, the standard does specify vehicle attitude, which is closely related to suspension height. In addressing how Standard No. 208 applies in the absence of a specification for vehicle height, th e relationship between the standard's attitude specification and vehicle height must be considered.

Section S8.1.1(d) specifies the attitude of the vehicle during testing, i.e., the angle of the vehicle relative to the ground. This test condition ensures that the vehicle is not overly tilted toward the front or back, or to one side. The section accom plishes this purpose by specifying that, during a compliance test, the height of the vehicle at each wheel is within a specified range. This range, which may be somewhat different for each wheel, is determined by looking at the vehicle in the "as delive red" condition and the "fully loaded" condition. A vehicle must meet the requirements of Standard No. 208 when its height at each wheel is

anywhere within the specified ranges.

On first glance, one might read section S8.1.1(d) to create a height requirement, since ranges of height are determined under that section (at each wheel). This would be incorrect, except in a very narrow sense, since Standard No. 208 does not specify, for vehicles with variable height suspension systems, what suspension height should be used in the two conditions ("as delivered" and "fully loaded") where the specified ranges of height are determined under section S8.1.1(d).

Looking at the Standard No. 208 as a whole, we believe it is clear that NHTSA explicitly decided to limit the standard's evaluation of occupant crash protection in frontal impacts to how vehicles perform in impacts of 30 mph or less, even though the requ irements also have relevance at higher speeds. It is our interpretation that the frontal crash test requirements need to be met at all suspension heights that can occur at speeds of 30 mph or less, with the vehicle operational. It is also our interpret ation that the crash test requirements need to be met only at suspension heights that can occur at the speed used in the crash test.

A remaining issue is how section S8.1.1(d) applies for vehicles with variable height suspension systems. As discussed below, vehicle attitude should be determined under this section using the actual suspension setting (or equivalent, if the setting is a utomatic) to be used in a crash test.

For purposes of illustration, I will assume a vehicle with two very different suspension height settings. It would not be appropriate to conclude that the ranges of height determined under section S8.1.1(d) should simultaneously cover both suspension he ights. Such ranges would be very large, and would not ensure that the vehicle is not overly tilted toward the front or back, or to one side. Moreover, such ranges would not be relevant to the real world, with respect to vehicle attitude.

Traditional vehicles can be viewed as having a single suspension "setting." This single suspension condition is used in determining vehicle attitude under section S5.8.8.1. The ranges of height result from the differences in loading under the "as deliv ered" and "fully loaded" conditions.

A single suspension "setting" (or equivalent, if the setting is automatic) should similarly be used in determining vehicle attitude for vehicles with variable height suspension systems. The "setting" should be the one to be used in a crash test.

With respect to Mazda's question concerning means of maintaining intended suspension height for compliance testing, please see our discussion provided with respect to Standard No. 111.

You also asked for an interpretation of section S8.2.7 of Standard No. 208. That section specifies additional conditions to be used for lateral moving barrier crash testing. Section S8.2.7(a) states that the vehicle is at rest in its "normal attitude." You stated that Mazda interprets the meaning of "normal attitude" to be that vehicle attitude which is intended

when the vehicle's ignition is in the "on" condition, with the vehicle loaded pursuant to S8.1.1(a) or (b), and while the vehicle is at rest. Standard No. 208 provides manufacturers the option of either equipping their vehicles with safety belts or meeti ng certain alternative requirements, including lateral moving barrier crash test requirements. These requirements are relevant at all vehicle heights that can occur during vehicle operation, regardless of speed. Moreover, NHTSA has not decided to limit the standard's evaluation of this aspect of safety performance to how vehicles perform at certain limited speeds. It is our interpretation that the lateral moving barrier crash test requirements, if applicable, must be met at all suspension heights that can occur with the vehicle operational. "Normal attitude" is the attitude determined under section S8.1.1(d). As discussed above, attitude for vehicles equipped with variable height suspension systems is determined under section S8.1.1(d) using the ac tual suspension setting (or equivalent, if the setting is automatic) to be used in a crash test.

Standards No. 212, Windshield Mounting; No. 219, Windshield Zone Intrusion; No. 301, Fuel System Integrity

In asking about Standards No. 212, No. 219, and No. 301, you noted that NHTSA has previously issued an interpretation to Mazda about how these standards apply to adjustable height suspension systems. In a letter dated August 10, 1982, the agency address ed a vehicle equipped with a suspension system having two height positions, one for normal highway driving and another for off-road driving, which could be selected by the driver. NHTSA stated the following:

(Safety Standards No. 212, No. 219, and No. 301) do not specify a height adjustment because almost all vehicles have a single, set adjustment. . . After careful consideration, it is the agency's position that such a vehicle capable of variable height adj ustment would have to comply with the vehicle adjusted to any position that is possible. This is true because the vehicle could be driven on the highway, for example, even if it were adjusted to the off-road position. Consequently, it is important that the vehicle comply with the standards in all positions.

You noted that while suspension height could be adjusted by the driver for the system discussed in the agency's previous interpretation, the active suspension system you are currently considering would use an on-board electronic controller to select susp ension height, and suspension height would not be adjustable by the driver. Consequently, according to your letter, only one unique set of suspension height parameters is possible for a given vehicle speed and loading condition as is the case with conve ntional suspension systems. You stated that because it is possible to determine exactly what the intended suspension height should be for a given situation, it is Mazda's opinion that the test vehicle should be tested at the intended suspension height g iven the specified speed and loading conditions. You also stated that, using an "intended purpose" argument, Mazda concludes that the requirements of the three standards are to be met only when the vehicle's ignition is "on." You then asked whether thes e suggested interpretations are correct.

Standard No. 212 specifies windshield retention requirements that must be

met in a specified frontal crash test at any impact speed up to and including 30 mph. Similarly, Standard No. 219 specifies windshield zone intrusion requirements that must be met in a specified frontal crash test at any impact speed up to and including 30 mph. Standard No. 301 specifies fuel system integrity requirements for several specified crash tests. These include a frontal crash test similar to those in Standards No. 212 and No. 219. Requirements for this test must be met at any impact speed up to and including 30 mph. Other tests include a rear moving barrier crash test, a lateral moving barrier crash test, and a static rollover test.

We agree that the requirements of Standards No. 212, No. 219, and No. 301 need not be met for vehicle heights that only occur when the engine is not on, since the requirements are only relevant in situations where the vehicle is operating. Looking at th e three standards as a whole, we believe it is clear that, for the frontal tests specified by the three standards, NHTSA decided to limit the standards' evaluation of safety performance to how vehicles perform in impacts of 30 mph or less, even though th e requirements have relevance at higher speeds. It is our interpretation that the frontal crash test requirements specified by these standards need to be met at all suspension heights that can occur at speeds of 30 mph or less, with the vehicle operatio nal. It is also our interpretation that the crash test requirements need to be met only at suspension heights that can occur at the speed used in the crash test.

We reach a different conclusion for Standard No. 301's other crash test requirements. These requirements are relevant at all vehicle speeds and suspension heights. Moreover, NHTSA has not decided to limit the standard's evaluation of these aspects of s afety performance to how vehicles perform at certain limited speeds. It is our interpretation that these crash test requirements must be met at all suspension heights that can occur with the vehicle operational.

Part 581 Bumper Standard

In asking about the Part 581 Bumper Standard, you noted that NHTSA has previously issued several interpretations of how the standard applies to vehicles with adjustable height suspension systems. In a letter to Subaru dated May 6, 1986, NHTSA stated the following:

Given the absence of a specific test condition concerning suspension height, it is our interpretation that a vehicle must be capable of meeting the standard's damage criteria at any height position to which the suspension can be adjusted. There is no la nguage in the test requirements of the standard limiting their applicability to "the manufacturer's nominal design highway adjusted height position."

This interpretation is consistent with the purpose of the Bumper Standard, set forth in section 581.2, to reduce physical damage to the front and rear ends of a passenger motor vehicle from low speed collisions. If a vehicle's suspension could be adjust ed so that its bumper height resulted in bumper mismatch with other vehicles in the event of low speed collisions, the reduction in physical damage attributable to the Bumper Standard would be defeated in whole or part.

In another letter, dated February 12, 1985, NHTSA stated that a vehicle is "required to meet the pendulum test of Part 581 in any vehicle use scenario in which the vehicle operates, and the barrier test of Part 581 when the engine is idling."

You suggested, for the barrier test, that the agency's May 1986 interpretation may be inappropriate for your active suspension system, since your system provides for only one suspension height when the engine is idling. You also suggested, for the pendu lum test, that these interpretations seem to be in conflict with the Bumper Standard's stated purpose to reduce physical damage to motor vehicles in low speed collisions. We assume that you are referring to the fact that your suspension system has heigh ts that occur only at speeds greater than 35 mph. You then requested that NHTSA provide an interpretation of Part 581 with respect to your system.

In addressing how Part 581 applies to vehicles equipped with an active suspension system, I will address separately the standard's barrier and pendulum tests. For the barrier test, a vehicle must meet specified damage criteria after an impact into a fix ed barrier that is perpendicular to the line of travel of the vehicle, at 2.5 mph. Section 581.6 sets forth conditions applicable to bumper testing. Under section 581.6(c), at the onset of a barrier impact, the vehicle's engine is operating at idling s peed.

Looking at the Bumper Standard as a whole, we believe it is clear that NHTSA decided to limit the barrier test's evaluation of bumper performance to how vehicles perform in 2.5 mph frontal impacts, even though the requirements have relevance at lower and higher speeds and when the vehicle is nonoperational. It is our interpretation that the barrier test requirements specified by this standard need to be met at all suspension heights that can occur at 2.5 mph.

We reach a different conclusion for the pendulum test, which serves the purpose of creating a bumper height requirement. This requirement is relevant at all vehicle speeds and suspension heights, and when the vehicle is nonoperational. I note that whil e Mazda is correct that the Bumper Standard's stated purpose is to reduce physical damage to motor vehicles in low speed collisions, NHTSA has justified the bumper height requirement on safety concerns related to "higher speed collisions." In proposing Standard No. 215, the predecessor of Part 581, the agency stated:

. . . in higher speed collisions the tendency of a bumper to override another or to ride under or over a guardrail creates hazards for vehicle occupants. Vehicles with interlocking bumpers block traffic and expose their occupants to considerable danger, particularly if they attempt to get out to unlock bumpers. By overriding or underriding a guardrail, a bumper may strike a supporting post, or similar fixed object, with serious consequences for the vehicle and its occupants. 35 FR 17999, November 24, 1970.

The relevance of the bumper height requirement to nonoperational

situations is also clear, e.g., to help protect parked cars.

Moreover, NHTSA has not decided to limit the bumper height requirement to how vehicles perform at certain limited speeds. It is our interpretation that the pendulum test requirements must be met at all suspension heights that can occur, regardless of ve hicle speed or whether the ignition is turned on.

This interpretation is consistent with an October 18, 1978 letter to Nissan, in which NHTSA addressed how the pendulum test applies to vehicles equipped with height control systems, including automatic height control systems. Among other things, the age ncy stated the following:

. . . There is no language in the pendulum test requirements of the standard which would limit their applicability to only the ignition-on or ignition-off situation or to the recommended driving position for normal roadways. The vehicle must be capable of meeting the pendulum test requirements at all stable bumper heights possible at unloaded vehicle weight.

Thus, in the situations described in Question 1 and 2 of your letter, in which an automatic height control system is employed, the vehicle must comply with the pendulum test requirements in both the ignition-on and ignition-off positions . . . .

I note that one of our past letters, a December 24, 1984 letter addressed to Porsche, appears to suggest that the pendulum test must be met in any setting in which the system operates "when the engine is idling." This might be read to suggest that the p endulum test need not be met when the vehicle is nonoperational. However, this interpretation cited section 581.6(c) in concluding that the engine is idling during Part 581 testing. Section 581.6(c) applies only to the barrier test and not the pendulum test. We therefore consider this interpretation to be incorrect to the extent that it is inconsistent with the analysis presented above.

ID: 2705y

Mr. S. Kadoya
Manager
Safety and Technology
Mazda Research and Development
of North America, Inc.
l203 Woodbridge Avenue
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48l05

Dear Mr. Kadoya:

This responds to your request for interpretations of several safety standards and the Bumper Standard, in connection with a planned "active" suspension system. I regret the delay in responding to your letter. Your questions are responded to below.

By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) does not provide approvals of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Under the statutes administered by this agency, it is the responsibility of the manufacturer to ensure that its vehicles and equipment comply with applicable standards. The following represents our opinion based on the facts provided in your letter.

According to your letter, Mazda is concerned about the protocol of compliance testing of vehicles equipped with an active suspension system. This concern arises because many standards do not specify a suspension height that is to be used during compliance testing. As you noted, this has not been a concern for conventional suspension systems, since they do not provide for variable height.

Mazda's planned active suspension system would be actuated by hydraulic fluid or compressed air, with control pressure being developed by a hydraulic pump or air compressor driven off the engine. Consequently, the active suspension system would be operational only when the vehicle's engine is operating. At vehicle speeds in excess of "z" mph, where z is greater than 35 mph, the suspension height would be lowered by "x" mm from the nominal or design position for vehicle operation. If the engine/vehicle were not used for several consecutive days, pressure in the control system would fall such that the supension height may be lowered from the nominal or design position for vehicle operation by "y" mm, where y is greater than x. The suspension height would return to the nominal or design position for vehicle operation after such an extended period of inoperation almost immediately after starting the vehicle's engine.

Before discussing your specific questions, I would like to discuss more generally the issue of how compliance is determined in situations where a standard does not specify a particular test condition. In issuing Federal motor vehicle safety standards, NHTSA attempts to specify all relevant test conditions. The agency does this as part of ensuring that its standards are objective and practicable. As a practical matter, however, it is not possible to specify every conceivable test condition. This is particularly true for ones which may only be relevant to as-yet-undeveloped technologies.

In cases where a standard does not specify a particular test condition, we believe there are several relevant factors to consider in interpreting the standard. First, in the absence of specification of a particular test condition, we believe there is a presumption that the requirements need to be met regardless of such test condition, since the standard does not include any language which specifically limits applicability of its requirements to such test condition. For example, where a standard does not specify suspension height, its requirements may need to be met at all heights to which the suspension can be adjusted. Before reaching such a conclusion, however, we also consider the language of the standard as a whole and its purposes. Even if a standard is silent as to a particular test condition, the language of the standard or its purposes may indicate limitations on such test condition. Finally, in situations where a limitation on a particular test condition may appear to be appropriate, we also must consider whether the limitation is sufficiently clear, both with respect to justification and specificity, to be appropriate for interpretation. For example, in a situation where it may appear to be reasonable to limit a particular test condition but it is not obvious what particular limitation should be adopted, it would be inappropriate to select a particular limitation by interpretation. Instead, such a decision should be reached in rulemaking.

I will now address the specific questions asked in your letter.

Standard No. l08, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment

In asking about Standard No. l08, you stated the following:

NHTSA has previously issued an interpretation of the requirements of FMVSS No. l08; at the request of a confidential applicant and dated February l2, l985, with respect to active suspension equipped vehicles. This interpretation stated that the requirements of FMVSS l08 must be meet (sic),"...at any time in which..." lamps, reflective devices, and associated equipment are to be,"...operated for its intended purpose." Consequently, headlamps, tailamps, stoplamps, the license plate lamp, and side marker lamps, must comply with the location requirements of FMVSS No. l08 whenever the vehicle's ignition is in the "on" postiion. Conversely, reflex reflectors, and turn signal lamps that also function as hazard warning signal flashers must comply with the location requirements when the vehicle's ignition is in either the "on" or "off" position. However, it is Mazda's interpretation that hazard warning flashers are not intended to be operational for a period of days, but rather for a period of hours, at maximum, only.

You then asked two questions, (l) whether Mazda's understanding of the subject NHTSA interpretation is accurate, and (2) whether Mazda's interpretation of the maximum intended operating duration of hazard warning signal flashers is correct.

I note that the February l985 interpretation was written in the context of a vehicle with a variable height system actuated by hydraulic fluid. In that particular system, the hydraulic pressure relaxed over a period of about three hours after the ignition was turned off, with the result that the vehicle assumed a lower height than it would have during driving. NHTSA stated the following:

We believe that the minimum height requirement should be met for any lamp at any time in which it is operated for its intended purpose. Since vehicles at rest do not require use of headlamps, the minimum height requirement would be measured at the point after the ignition is on and when the car begins to travel (your letter implies that the time lag between turning on the ignition and restoration of a complying mounting height is a matter of seconds). On the other hand, the hazard warning signal lamps are frequently operated when the vehicle is stopped, and therefore the minimum mounting height of turn signal lamps, through which they operate, must be met with the ignition off, even if the system requires three hours to deplete itself and lower the vehicle to its minimum height.

With respect to your question of whether Mazda's understanding of the interpretation is correct, I would like to note two points. First, while you state that "the requirements of FMVSS l08" must be met at any time in which lamps, reflective devices, and associated equipment are to be operated for their intended purpose, our interpretation was limited to standard's minimum height requirement. While we are prepared, if asked, to address other requirements, our interpretations should be understood to be limited to their specific facts and conclusions. Second, while our interpretation only addressed headlamps and hazard warning signal lamps, you applied the interpretation for headlamps to taillamps, stoplamps, the license plate lamp, and side marker lamps, and the interpretation for hazard warning signal lamps to reflex reflectors. We concur with this application, with respect to Standard No. l08's minimum height requirement.

We do not agree with Mazda's suggested interpretation of the maximum intended operating duration of hazard warning signal flashers. You would apparently like us to conclude that Standard No. l08's minimum height requirement for hazard warning signal flashers does not apply after a vehicle's ignition has been turned off for a matter of days.

In addressing how Standard No. l08 applies in the absence of a specification for vehicle height, our February l985 interpretation differentiates between situations where the vehicle is operating and where it is not. Looking at the purposes of the requirements in question, we believe it is obvious that the minimum height requirement for headlamps is only relevant in situations where the vehicle is operating, while the minimum height for hazard warning signal lamps is also relevant to situations where the vehicle is stopped and the ignition turned off. However, we believe that any determination that Standard No. l08's minimum height requirement for hazard warning signal flashers should not apply after a specified number of hours after the ignition has been turned off is one that would need to be addressed in rulemaking.

It is therefore my opinion that the minimum mounting height of hazard warning signal lamps must be met at all heights with the ignition off, even if the system requires days to deplete itself and lower the vehicle to its minimum height. If you believe that a time limitation should be placed on this requirement, I note that you can submit a petition for rulemaking requesting such a change.

Standard No. lll, Rearview Mirrors

You requested an interpretation of section S5.l.l of Standard No. lll, which generally requires a passenger car's rearview mirror to "provide a field of view with an included horizontal angle measured from the projected eye point of at least 20 degrees, and sufficient angle to provide a view of level road surface extending to the horizon beginning at a point not greater than 200 feet to the rear of the vehicle...." You noted that since the specified procedures for determining the location of the driver's eye reference points are made referenced to points with the vehicle's cabin, your active suspension system would not affect these measurements. However, different vehicle heights would be relevant to whether there is a view of level road surface extending to the horizon beginning at a point not greater than 200 feet to the rear of the vehicle. You stated that, based on "intended purpose," Mazda's interpretation of Standard No. lll is that the requirements of this standard are to be met when the vehicle's ignition is in the "on" position as rearview mirrors are not intended to be used when the vehicle's engine is not operating.

You then asked two questions, (l) whether Mazda's interpretation of the requirements of FMVSS No. lll with respect to the state of the vehicle's ignition switch is correct, and (2) for the purposes of compliance testing to the requirements of FMVSS No. lll, what means of maintaining the intended suspension height for a given speed and operating condition would be satisfactory to NHTSA.

We agree that the field of view requirement specified in S5.l.l for rearview mirrors need not be met for vehicle heights that only occur when the engine is not on, since the requirement is only relevant in situations where the vehicle is operating. However, the requirement would need to be at all vehicle heights that occur during vehicle operation, under the loading conditions specified in S5.l.l.

With respect to the issue of how suspension height should be maintained for purposes of compliance testing, you note early in your letter that, for reasons of practicality and safety, a vehicle's engine is not actually operational during compliance testing. However, since the active suspension system derives its power from the vehicle's engine, the system's ability to maintain and regulate suspension height is only possible during engine operation. You therefore indicated that Mazda is seeking guidelines (for several standards) by which Mazda may be able to establish a means to maintain the intended suspension height for compliance testing purposes in the absence of engine operation.

We are not able, in an interpretation, to specify a particular means for maintaining suspension height for compliance testing in the absence of engine operation. However, the basic principle that should be followed in selecting a means for maintaining suspension height is that it should not result in different test results than would occur if testing could be conducted with suspension height being maintained by engine operation, i.e., what would happen in the real world. This should be relatively straightforward for section S5.l.l of Standard No. lll, since the test is static. For a crash test, it is important that a vehicle not be altered in any way that would change the vehicle's crash performance relevant to the aspect of performance being tested.

Standard No. 204, Steering Control Rearward Displacement

In asking about Standard No. 204, you stated the following:

Section S4 of this standard specifies the compliance parameter for this standard. Section S5 specifies the testing conditions to determine compliance with this standard. Section S5.l specifies that the vehicle be loaded to its unloaded vehicle weight. Section S5.5 specifies that the vehicles fuel tank be filled with Stoddard solvent to any capacity between 90 and 95 percent of the total capacity of the tank. Mazda's interpretation of the requirements of this standard is that they are to be met when the vehicle's ignition switch is in the "on" position only. Furthermore, Mazda interprets the vehicles suspension height pursuant to S5.l and S5.5 to be the intended suspension height for the vehicle given the conditions of S4, i.e., 30 mph vehicle speed and steered wheels are positioned straight ahead.

You then asked whether Mazda's interpretation of the requirements of FMVSS No. 204 are correct. As discussed below, we agree that Standard No. 204's requirements need to be met only at the suspension height that occurs at a 30 mph vehicle speed and with steered wheels positioned straight ahead.

Standard No. 204 specifies requirements limiting the rearward displacement of the steering control into the passenger compartment to reduce the likelihood of chest, neck, or head injury. These requirements must be met in a 30 mile per hour perpendicular impact into a fixed collision barrier. While the standard specifies a number of test conditions, it does not specify suspension height.

Looking at the Standard No. 204 as a whole, we believe it is clear that NHTSA explicitly decided to limit the standard's evaluation of steering control rearward displacement to how vehicles perform in 30 mph perpendicular impacts, even though the requirements have relevance at lower and higher speeds. Therefore, we agree that the standard's requirements need to be met only at suspension heights that occur at a 30 mph vehicle speed and with steered wheels positioned straight ahead.

With respect to Mazda's question concerning means of maintaining intended suspension height for compliance testing, please see our discussion provided with respect to Standard No. lll.

Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection

In asking about Standard No. 208, you stated the following:

Section S8.l.l(d), "Vehicle test attitude," specifies the procedure for determining the vehicle test attitude that is to be used for testing. Specifically, this section requires that the vehicle's pretest attitude, "...shall be equal to either the as delivered or fully loaded attitude or between the as delivered and fully loaded attitude." The as delivered attitude is defined by S8.l.l(d) as being, "...the distance between a level surface and a standard reference point on the test vehicle's body, directly above each wheel opening, when the vehicle is in its "as delivered" condition. The "as delivered" condition is the vehicle as received at the test site..." Because it is highly likely that the test vehicle will not have been operated for a period of days prior to arriving at the test site, the suspension height may have fallen by "y" mm. The fully loaded attitude is defined as the attitude of the vehicle when loaded in accordance with S8.l.l(a) or (b) and a determination of the height of the suspension at the fully loaded condition is made from the same level surface, using the same standard reference points, as were used to determine the "as delivered" condition. The definition of the "as delivered" condition is quite clear. However, Mazda interprets the "fully loaded condition" of the vehicle to be the condition when the vehicle's ignition is "on." In this instance it is likely that the height of the standard reference points on the vehicles body when in the "fully loaded condition" relative to the level surface will be greater than for the "as delivered" condition. Conversely, conventional vehicle suspension systems will likely have an "as delivered" height greater than the "full loaded" height. However, this fact is of no importance as S8.l.l(d) states that the pretest vehicle attitude may be, "...between the as delivered and the fully loaded attitude." With respect to the injury criteria specified by section S6 of this standard, Mazda's interpretation is that these criteria must be met with the vehicle's ignition in the "on" position only.

You then asked three questions, (l) whether Mazda's interpretation of the definition of the "fully loaded condition" is correct with respect to the condition of the ignition switch, (2) whether Mazda's interpretation of the irrelevance of the relative relationship between the "as delivered" and "fully loaded" conditions is correct, and (3) whether Mazda's interpretation of the meaning of "between the as delivered and the fully loaded attitude" is correct.

In addressing your questions, I will begin by noting that Standard No. 208 specifies occupant protection requirements which must be met in specified crash tests at any impact speed up to and including 30 mph. While the standard specifies a number of test conditions, it does not specify suspension height. However, the standard does specify vehicle attitude, which is closely related to suspension height. In addressing how Standard No. 208 applies in the absence of a specification for vehicle height, the relationship between the standard's attitude specification and vehicle height must be considered.

Section S8.l.l(d) specifies the attitude of the vehicle during testing, i.e., the angle of the vehicle relative to the ground. This test condition ensures that the vehicle is not overly tilted toward the front or back, or to one side. The section accomplishes this purpose by specifying that, during a compliance test, the height of the vehicle at each wheel is within a specified range. This range, which may be somewhat different for each wheel, is determined by looking at the vehicle in the "as delivered" condition and the "fully loaded" condition. A vehicle must meet the requirements of Standard No. 208 when its height at each wheel is anywhere within the specified ranges.

On first glance, one might read section S8.l.l(d) to create a height requirement, since ranges of height are determined under that section (at each wheel). This would be incorrect, except in a very narrow sense, since Standard No. 208 does not specify, for vehicles with variable height suspension systems, what suspension height should be used in the two conditions ("as delivered" and "fully loaded") where the specified ranges of height are determined under section S8.l.l(d).

Looking at the Standard No. 208 as a whole, we believe it is clear that NHTSA explicitly decided to limit the standard's evaluation of occupant crash protection in frontal impacts to how vehicles perform in impacts of 30 mph or less, even though the requirements also have relevance at higher speeds. It is our interpretation that the frontal crash test requirements need to be met at all suspension heights that can occur at speeds of 30 mph or less, with the vehicle operational. It is also our interpretation that the crash test requirements need to be met only at suspension heights that can occur at the speed used in the crash test.

A remaining issue is how section S8.l.l(d) applies for vehicles with variable height suspension systems. As discussed below, vehicle attitude should be determined under this section using the actual suspension setting (or equivalent, if the setting is automatic) to be used in a crash test.

For purposes of illustration, I will assume a vehicle with two very different suspension height settings. It would not be appropriate to conclude that the ranges of height determined under section S8.l.l(d) should simultaneously cover both suspension heights. Such ranges would be very large, and would not ensure that the vehicle is not overly tilted toward the front or back, or to one side. Moreover, such ranges would not be relevant to the real world, with respect to vehicle attitude.

Traditional vehicles can be viewed as having a single suspension "setting." This single suspension condition is used in determining vehicle attitude under section S5.8.8.l. The ranges of height result from the differences in loading under the "as delivered" and "fully loaded" conditions.

A single suspension "setting" (or equivalent, if the setting is automatic) should similarly be used in determining vehicle attitude for vehicles with variable height suspension systems. The "setting" should be the one to be used in a crash test.

With respect to Mazda's question concerning means of maintaining intended suspension height for compliance testing, please see our discussion provided with respect to Standard No. lll.

You also asked for an interpretation of section S8.2.7 of Standard No. 208. That section specifies additional conditions to be used for lateral moving barrier crash testing. Section S8.2.7(a) states that the vehicle is at rest in its "normal attitude." You stated that Mazda interprets the meaning of "normal attitude" to be that vehicle attitude which is intended when the vehicle's ignition is in the "on" condition, with the vehicle loaded pursuant to S8.l.l(a) or (b), and while the vehicle is at rest.

Standard No. 208 provides manufacturers the option of either equipping their vehicles with safety belts or meeting certain alternative requirements, including lateral moving barrier crash test requirements. These requirements are relevant at all vehicle heights that can occur during vehicle operation, regardless of speed. Moreover, NHTSA has not decided to limit the standard's evaluation of this aspect of safety performance to how vehicles perform at certain limited speeds. It is our interpretation that the lateral moving barrier crash test requirements, if applicable, must be met at all suspension heights that can occur with the vehicle operational. "Normal attitude" is the attitude determined under section S8.l.l(d). As discussed above, attitude for vehicles equipped with variable height suspension systems is determined under section S8.l.l(d) using the actual suspension setting (or equivalent, if the setting is automatic) to be used in a crash test. Standards No. 2l2, Windshield Mounting; No. 2l9, Windshield Zone Intrusion; No. 30l, Fuel System Integrity

In asking about Standards No. 2l2, No. 2l9, and No. 30l, you noted that NHTSA has previously issued an interpretation to Mazda about how these standards apply to adjustable height suspension systems. In a letter dated August l0, l982, the agency addressed a vehicle equipped with a suspension system having two height positions, one for normal highway driving and another for off-road driving, which could be selected by the driver. NHTSA stated the following:

[Safety Standards No. 2l2, No. 2l9, and No. 30l] do not specify a height adjustment because almost all vehicles have a single, set adjustment. . . . After careful consideration, it is the agency's position that such a vehicle capable of variable height adjustment would have to comply with the vehicle adjusted to any position that is possible. This is true because the vehicle could be driven on the highway, for example, even if it were adjusted to the off-road position. Consequently, it is important that the vehicle comply with the standards in all positions.

You noted that while suspension height could be adjusted by the driver for the system discussed in the agency's previous interpretation, the active suspension system you are currently considering would use an on-board electronic controller to select suspension height, and suspension height would not be adjustable by the driver. Consequently, according to your letter, only one unique set of suspension height parameters is possible for a given vehicle speed and loading condition as is the case with conventional suspension systems. You stated that because it is possible to determine exactly what the intended suspension height should be for a given situation, it is Mazda's opinion that the test vehicle should be tested at the intended suspension height given the specified speed and loading conditions. You also stated that, using an "intended purpose" argument, Mazda concludes that the requirements of the three standards are to be met only when the vehicle's ignition is "on." You then asked whether these suggested interpretations are correct.

Standard No. 2l2 specifies windshield retention requirements that must be met in a specified frontal crash test at any impact speed up to and including 30 mph. Similarly, Standard No. 2l9 specifies windshield zone intrusion requirements that must be met in a specified frontal crash test at any impact speed up to and including 30 mph. Standard No. 30l specifies fuel system integrity requirements for several specified crash tests. These include a frontal crash test similar to those in Standards No. 2l2 and No. 2l9. Requirements for this test must be met at any impact speed up to and including 30 mph. Other tests include a rear moving barrier crash test, a lateral moving barrier crash test, and a static rollover test.

We agree that the requirements of Standards No. 2l2, No. 2l9, and No. 30l need not be met for vehicle heights that only occur when the engine is not on, since the requirements are only relevant in situations where the vehicle is operating. Looking at the three standards as a whole, we believe it is clear that, for the frontal tests specified by the three standards, NHTSA decided to limit the standards' evaluation of safety performance to how vehicles perform in impacts of 30 mph or less, even though the requirements have relevance at higher speeds. It is our interpretation that the frontal crash test requirements specified by these standards need to be met at all suspension heights that can occur at speeds of 30 mph or less, with the vehicle operational. It is also our interpretation that the crash test requirements need to be met only at suspension heights that can occur at the speed used in the crash test.

We reach a different conclusion for Standard No. 30l's other crash test requirements. These requirements are relevant at all vehicle speeds and suspension heights. Moreover, NHTSA has not decided to limit the standard's evaluation of these aspects of safety performance to how vehicles perform at certain limited speeds. It is our interpretation that these crash test requirements must be met at all suspension heights that can occur with the vehicle operational.

Part 58l Bumper Standard

In asking about the Part 58l Bumper Standard, you noted that NHTSA has previously issued several interpretations of how the standard applies to vehicles with adjustable height suspension systems. In a letter to Subaru dated May 6, l986, NHTSA stated the following:

Given the absence of a specific test condition concerning suspension height, it is our interpretation that a vehicle must be capable of meeting the standard's damage criteria at any height position to which the suspension can be adjusted. There is no language in the test requirements of the standard limiting their applicability to "the manufacturer's nominal design highway adjusted height position."

This interpretation is consistent with the purpose of the Bumper Standard, set forth in section 58l.2, to reduce physical damage to the front and rear ends of a passenger motor vehicle from low speed collisions. If a vehicle's suspension could be adjusted so that its bumper height resulted in bumper mismatch with other vehicles in the event of low speed collisions, the reduction in physical damage attributable to the Bumper Standard would be defeated in whole or part.

In another letter, dated February l2, l985, NHTSA stated that a vehicle is "required to meet the pendulum test of Part 58l in any vehicle use scenario in which the vehicle operates, and the barrier test of Part 58l when the engine is idling."

You suggested, for the barrier test, that the agency's May l986 interpretation may be inappropriate for your active suspension system, since your system provides for only one suspension height when the engine is idling. You also suggested, for the pendulum test, that these interpretations seem to be in conflict with the Bumper Standard's stated purpose to reduce physical damage to motor vehicles in low speed collisions. We assume that you are referring to the fact that your suspension system has heights that occur only at speeds greater than 35 mph. You then requested that NHTSA provide an interpretation of Part 58l with respect to your system.

In addressing how Part 58l applies to vehicles equipped with an active suspension system, I will address separately the standard's barrier and pendulum tests. For the barrier test, a vehicle must meet specified damage criteria after an impact into a fixed barrier that is perpendicular to the line of travel of the vehicle, at 2.5 mph. Section 58l.6 sets forth conditions applicable to bumper testing. Under section 58l.6(c), at the onset of a barrier impact, the vehicle's engine is operating at idling speed.

Looking at the Bumper Standard as a whole, we believe it is clear that NHTSA decided to limit the barrier test's evaluation of bumper performance to how vehicles perform in 2.5 mph frontal impacts, even though the requirements have relevance at lower and higher speeds and when the vehicle is nonoperational. It is our interpretation that the barrier test requirements specified by this standard need to be met at all suspension heights that can occur at 2.5 mph.

We reach a different conclusion for the pendulum test, which serves the purpose of creating a bumper height requirement. This requirement is relevant at all vehicle speeds and suspension heights, and when the vehicle is nonoperational. I note that while Mazda is correct that the Bumper Standard's stated purpose is to reduce physical damage to motor vehicles in low speed collisions, NHTSA has justified the bumper height requirement on safety concerns related to "higher speed collisions." In proposing Standard No. 2l5, the predecessor of Part 58l, the agency stated:

. . . in higher speed collisions the tendency of a bumper to override another or to ride under or over a guardrail creates hazards for vehicle occupants. Vehicles with interlocking bumpers block traffic and expose their occupants to considerable danger, particularly if they attempt to get out to unlock bumpers. By overriding or underriding a guardrail, a bumper may strike a supporting post, or similar fixed object, with serious consequences for the vehicle and its occupants. 35 FR l7999, November 24, l970.

The relevance of the bumper height requirement to nonoperational situations is also clear, e.g., to help protect parked cars.

Moreover, NHTSA has not decided to limit the bumper height requirement to how vehicles perform at certain limited speeds. It is our interpretation that the pendulum test requirements must be met at all suspension heights that can occur, regardless of vehicle speed or whether the ignition is turned on.

This interpretation is consistent with an October l8, l978 letter to Nissan, in which NHTSA addressed how the pendulum test applies to vehicles equipped with height control systems, including automatic height control systems. Among other things, the agency stated the following:

. . . There is no language in the pendulum test requirements of the standard which would limit their applicability to only the ignition-on or ignition-off situation or to the recommended driving position for normal roadways. The vehicle must be capable of meeting the pendulum test requirements at all stable bumper heights possible at unloaded vehicle weight.

Thus, in the situations described in Question l and 2 of your letter, in which an automatic height control system is employed, the vehicle must comply with the pendulum test requirements in both the ignition-on and ignition-off positions . . . .

I note that one of our past letters, a December 24, l984 letter addressed to Porsche, appears to suggest that the pendulum test must be met in any setting in which the system operates "when the engine is idling." This might be read to suggest that the pendulum test need not be met when the vehicle is nonoperational. However, this interpretation cited section 58l.6(c) in concluding that the engine is idling during Part 58l testing. Section 58l.6(c) applies only to the barrier test and not the pendulum test. We therefore consider this interpretation to be incorrect to the extent that it is inconsistent with the analysis presented above.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel

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