ID: nht78-1.25

DATE: 06/20/78

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; J. J. Levin, Jr.; NHTSA

TO: Norris Industries

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your January 7, 1978, letter asking whether a final-stage wheel manufacturer is permitted to mark a rim in accordance with Standard No. 120, Tire Selection and Rims for Motor Vehicles Other Than Passenger Cars. The standard currently specifies that rim marking shall be done by a rim manufacturer, not a final-stage wheel manufacturer.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has previously determined that a rim manufacturer is the responsible party for rim marking. The language of the standard is specific in this requirement. The agency, however, is reviewing the standard with a view to its possible modification along the lines suggested in your letter. Should the agency decide to amend the standard, a notice proposing such change would first be published in the Federal Register. A final rule would only be issued following analysis of comments submitted by interested parties.

SINCERELY,

Action: Norris Industries Petition, FMVSS No. 120

Acting Director Vehicle Safety Standards

Office of Chief Counsel, NHTSA

Reference: Subject petition dated January 7, 1978, requesting an interpretation of Standard No. 120 that will require the final assembler of a wheel to apply the specified rim markings.

Norris Industries is a major supplier of rims to the custom wheel industry. The rims are assembled with various designs of center member by the custom wheel manufacturer chiefly for the replacement and after-market trade. Multiple use of these wheels for light trucks and multipurpose passenger vehicles requires that labeling be in accordance with Standard No. 120. The final product which is a "single piece" or "unitized" wheel is permitted optionally to be labeled on the disc rather than the rim. This is readily done when the rim manufacturer is also the final wheel manufacturer.

The present interpretation of the standard requires rim markings to be applied by the rim manufacturer. The location of the markings on the rim is dependent upon the specific disc design used, and varies considerably among final wheel manufacturers. This presents a hardship in maintaining adequate supplies of the correct rims for each manufacturer as stated by Norris.

The Norris petition (or request) to place the requirement for rim marking on the final assembly manufacturer and to release the rim manufacturer from the requirement constitutes a major change in the standard and would require a rulemaking procedure. The scheme would not work for demountable rims which never become part of a manufactured wheel assembly. From this standpoint the Norris petition must be denied.

However, as an optional alternative, it would seem reasonable to expect that the final wheel manufacturer, purchasing rims from another manufacturer, with markings per S5.2(d) and (e) would be able and qualified to provide the certification and labeling required of the rim in S5.2(d) (b) and (c), on the strength of his purchase specifications and contract.

This option would relieve the difficulties now encountered by Norris and probably others in similar situations. The standard would have to make it clear that the rim manufacturer is responsible for the required rim identification markings unless the final wheel manufacturer assumes the option.

Unless there are legal objections to this concept, we would be pleased to work with you in developing a "statement of interpretation" or an "adjustment of language" as appropriate for the situation. Please advise us if amendment of the standard is found necessary. We believe that certification and labeling of the wheel assembly by the final manufacturer is reasonable and appropriate, and should be permitted by the standard.

A. Malliaris

Reference petition dated 3/7/78

CC: F. KOCH

NORRIS INDUSTRIES

(Illegible Word) WHEEL DIVISION

2-20-78

Administrator NHTSA

Dear Sir:

Norris Industries, on January 7, 1978, requested a change in the interpretation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard #120 to require the assemblers of the auto wheels to stamp the required information on the rim portion of the wheels.

Please advise us if this request is still to be considered and may we be informed of the decision as promptly as possible.

Please accept our thanks in advance of this information.

Don H. Pendergrass

CC: J. CROWLEY; C. MOORE; P. RYAN (S.E.M.A.)

NORRIS INDUSTRIES

(Illegible Word) WHEEL DIVISION PETITION

January 7, 1978

Administrator NHTSA

Dear Sir:

Norris Industries has supplied Automobile Wheel Component Parts to Members of the Custom Wheel Industry since 1961. These parts are then used as component parts for Custom Wheels. The majority of these customers are Members of the Specialty Equipment Manufacturers Association.

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard #120 requires that at least three pieces of information be stamped on the weather side of the rim by the rim manufacturer. Because our customers are the wheel assemblers, a common location of the stamp on the weather area of the rim is not acceptable to all. The size of our finished goods inventory, necessary to serve this industry, is such that it would be nearly impossible to have the various sizes of rims stamped in the locations that would be acceptable to all of our customers on hand at all times.

This is a request that the interpretation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard #120 be changed to require the assemblers of the wheels to stamp the required information on the rim portion of the wheels.

We trust this request is reasonable and may be acted upon without undue delay.

Donald H. Pendegrass Plant Manager

CC: J. CROWLEY; C. MOORE; P. RYAN (S.E.M.A.)

ID: nht73-1.22

DATE: 09/25/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Thomas Built Buses, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letters of July 26 and August 7, 1973, requesting an opinion on the applicability of the emergency exit provisions (S5.3 to S5.5) of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 217, "Bus Window Retention and Release" (49 CFR 571.217), to buses that are of the same design as "school buses," but which are not manufactured (they are not painted yellow, nor do they have warning devices) nor used as school buses. You ask further that the standard exempt prison buses.

We interpret the exemption for school buses to include buses similarly designed, without regard to their intended use. School bus is defined in 49 CFR 571.3 to mean,

"a bus designed primarily to carry children to and from school . . . ."

We are of the opinion that buses which share the same design as buses that clearly fall within the definition of "school bus" are school buses under Standard No. 217, and are therefore exempt from the emergency exit provisions of the standard. No modification of the standard is accordingly called for.

With respect to your request regarding prison buses, we are presently considering similar requests previously received, and plan to respond by notice published in the Federal Register in the near future.

Yours truly,

August 7, 1973

Robert L. Carter Associate Administrator for Vehicles U.S. Department of Transportation

Re: Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 217 Bus Window Retention and Release

Thomas Built Buses, Inc., High Point, North Carolina, a manufacturer of school bus bodies, respectfully petitions the Department of Transportation for a revision in wording of said Standard, particularly section S5.2.3 School Buses. We petition that the wording in this section be changed to read as follows: "The emergency exit requirements do not apply to school buses or buses of like design adapted for use for other than transporting children to and from school, but if such buses contain any pushout windows or other emergency exits, these exits shall conform to S5.3 through S5.5."

We base our petition on the fact that we as a body manufacturer do offer our base product design for other uses such as churches, activity buses for schools used for field trips and other school events, Boy Scouts, YMCA's, Salvation Army Clubs, etc. These units are constructed of the same basic design as what is termed a school bus but may vary as to color and omission of specific school bus safety warning systems. Our conclusion is that as the Standard is presently worded, it is a double Standard in that it states the Standard applies not to school buses but to those same buses if used for other than hauling children to and from school. We feel strongly that the Standard should apply to neither school buses or those of like design used by other groups or the Standard should apply to all buses including school buses. Due to the basic design of the product for school use, we are in agreement with the Standard as proposed but suggest the above additions.

In addition to the above, we respectfully submit to the Department of Transportation that prison buses which are vehicles manufactured to haul prisoners from one point to another, should not be included under this Standard. Prison buses should be exempt along with school buses and the others listed. The basis for this petition on prison buses is due to the fact that the Standard contradicts the specific purpose of a prison bus. In other words, prison buses are security vehicles with a minimum of escape possibility whereby the Standard increases escape possibility.

We would respectfully request your expediting a ruling on this petition since all body manufacturers have buses as described in this petition on order to build after September 1, 1973, and the effective date of said Standard is September 1, 1973. If further information is required by you, please advise us immediately.

Respectfully submitted,

James Tydings Chief Engineer

c.c. Berkley Sweet Executive Secretary School Bus Manufacturers Institute 5530 Wisconsin Avenue Washington, D. C. 20015

July 26, 1973

Berkley C. Sweet Truck Body & Equipment Association

Dear Mr. Sweet:

Kindly forward this letter to the Department of Transportation for the purpose of obtaining an interpretation on FMVSS #217 - Bus Window Retention and Release.

We request an interpretation on the definition of "School Bus" as applied to units which we sell to school bus route contractors. Many contractors use their buses for purposes other than just carrying school children. For example, they may carry a Sunday School class to the beach for a weekend. Will the requirement for a minimum number of emergency exits be applicable to a bus used in such a case?

We request that the "designated seating capacity" for a handicapped persons vehicle be taken as the number of wheelchair spaces plus the seated passenger capacity.

Are "School Activity Buses" required to have a minimum number of emergency exits? Such buses are used to carry sports teams to games and classes on field trips. These buses are owned by the schools and used because most states have laws that preclude the use of state owned route buses for such activities.

We request an exemption for buses which are sold to prisons on the basis that we sold less than 100 of them during 1972. We expect to sell approximately 30 such vehicles this year. Also, there is the reason of possible prison escape.

Thanking you in advance for your services, we remain

Very truly yours,

James Tydings Chief Engineer

ID: nht91-7.10

DATE: November 14, 1991

FROM: Anonymous

TO: Paul Jackson Rice, Esq. -- Office of Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: RE: Request for Interpretation of FMVSS 114; "Theft Protection"

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 2/11/92 from Paul Jackson Rice to Anonymous (A39; Std. 114)

TEXT:

A major automobile manufacturer (hereafter referred to as "The Company") is seeking an interpretation relating to the applicability of a transmission shift override mechanism concealment cover as it is applicable to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard FMVSS No. 114; "Theft Protection", as recently defined per notice of response to petitions for reconsideration of the final rule published in the Federal Register notice (56 FR 12464) of Tuesday, March 26, 1991.

The Company is presently considering the incorporation of several possible transmission shift override mechanism concealment covers, and is requesting the NHTSA Office of Chief Counsel to interpret the applicability of these proposals as they relate to the requirements of 49 CFR Part 571.114, S4.2.2(b), which states that the transmission shift lock override device "... may be operable by another means which, when installed, prevents sight of and activation of the device and which is removable only by use of a screwdriver or other similar tool".

The Company has proposed five (5) alternative systems that it believes will afford concealment for the transmission shift lock override mechanism. These proposals are set forth below.

Proposal I

The shift lock override mechanism access panel is a non transparent plastic applique that is affixed to the horizontal surface of the automatic transmission shift gate by vertical members with barbed formations that snap into position upon engagement with complementary vertical walls of the shift gate as shown in section A-A of Fig. #1. The shift lock override panel, when seated in position, has a flush fit arrangement with respect to the finisher panel horizontal plane on all of it's perimeter, with the exception of an approximately 10 millimeter horizontal spacing along it's rear most edge as oriented in car position. This horizontal spacing provides an approximately 2 millimeter vertical gap between the shift gate and the surface of the horizontal member of the cover. In order to remove the shift lock override mechanism cover, one must apply a blade like device such as a knife or screwdriver to the 2 millimeter vertical spacing and pry the cover upward, thus defeating the retention features (Fig. #2) and exposing a button. This button, when depressed, actuates the link mechanism that provides lock override. Company design engineers estimate that a vertical load of approximately 5 to 10 Kg applied normal to the horizontal surface is necessary to remove the shift lock override access panel. Once the cover is removed, transmission shift lock can be defeated by depressing the override button.

(Drawing omitted) Fig. #1 - Shift Lock Override Mechanism Cover Location

(Drawing omitted) Section A-A

(Drawing omitted) Fig. #2 - Removal of Shift Lock Override Mechanism Cover

Proposal II

Proposal II is identical to Proposal I, except that the override button is replaced with a threaded screw with a conventional or cross recessed head that can be advanced by use of a screwdriver. The downward motion of the rotating screw depresses the override link which actuates the override mechanism (Fig. #3).

(Drawing omitted) Fig. #3 - Override Actuation Using Screw to Depress Override Actuation Link

Proposal III

Proposal III incorporates a cross recessed countersunk screw to retain the override mechanism cover rather than the barbed features that are incorporated into the cover in Proposals I and II (see Fig. #4 and Section B-B). In Proposal III, no actuation button or screw is provided. In order to actuate the override link, a screwdriver or similar tool must inserted the through the hole created by the removal of the cover screw to depress the override actuation link to override the transmission shift lock (Fig. #5).

(Drawing omitted) Fig. #4 - Shift Override Mechanism Cover Affixed With Threaded Fastener

(Drawing omitted) Fig. #5 - Actuation of Transmission Override By Depressing Link With Tool

Proposal IV

Proposal IV utilizes the console finisher panel only in providing a concealment device for the shift override mechanism. The finisher panel, as designed, has a "line to line" interference to the console housing (Fig. #6 and Section C-C). The finisher panel is fabricated from injection molded plastic resin, which has some degree of flexibility. To remove the finisher panel, a screwdriver or similar tool is placed in a 6 millimeter crease at the surface of the panel to housing interface, and then applying a prying action. Removal of the panel exposes the shift override link, and actuation of the override is accomplished by depressing the actuation link (Fig. #7).

(Drawing omitted) Fig. #6 - Console and Finisher Panel Assembly

(Drawing omitted) Fig. #7 - A/T Shift Gate Removed Exposing Shift Override Mechanism

Proposal V

Proposal V involves an identical shift override button actuation device as in Proposal I. Company designers have alternatively proposed to have a non removable cover with a slot to access the shift override incorporated as opposed to Proposal I, which has a removable cover. To actuate the override mechanism, a key, screwdriver or similar tool must be inserted into the slot and the shift override release button must be depressed in order to actuate the shift override. This proposal is illustrated in Figure #8 and Section D-D.

(Drawing omitted) Fig. #8 - Proposal V With Key/Tool Access Slot in Shift Override Cover

(Drawing omitted) Section D-D

Supplements to Proposals I and II

(Anonymous) engineers have also proposed identify the transmission shift override mechanism by placing the verbiage "shift lock" in white lettering on the shift lock override mechanism access cover horizontal surface. An illustration is shown below.

(Drawing omitted) Transmission shift lock cover with white lettering on black field

ID: nht95-5.43

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: July 31, 1995

FROM: Dennis G. Moore -- President, Sierra Products Inc.

TO: Chief Council -- NHTSA

TITLE: Legal Interpretation Request for FMVSS # 108

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 9/20/95 LETTER FROM JOHN WOMACK TO DENNIS G. MOORE (A43; REDBOOK 2; STD. 108)

TEXT: Around 1985 * , NHTSA significantly reduced the Amber (Yellow) Photometric output minimals for all Rear Amber Turn Signal Lights. This reduction was implemented, I believe, partially as an act of Common Sense and partially as a positive Harmonization gesture to European Vehicle Safety people. Whereas these European Safety people did then and still do require "significantly less" Amber Photometric Output area, which was not correspondingly reduced when NHTSA reduced the required Photometric Output. Further, the Europeans still require significantly less Area for Amber lenses than the U.S. still requires.

* Presently I can't find the Federal Register Announcement with Details on this issue, however, I will attempt to send it later. I do know this data is readily available from your Docket Files.

European Safety leaders, I've been told, have "tests" that substantiate their position that a "Smaller" and less bright Amber Turn Singal yields "less conspicuosity", which is a desirable feature when compared to the Conspicuosity demanded by the Very Important Red Brake Lights . . . and rightfully so. As one can see for themselves . . . just the fact that a Turn Signal is Amber and not Red (as are all other Rear Safety Lights) makes it adequately "conspicuous", even if it is "smaller" and significantly less bright compared to the Brake Lights.

Also, European Scientists contend they have always had a "safer system" than the U.S. System as they have always required Two Brightly Lit Brake Lights, whereas the U.S. System allows only One Brake Light to be illuminated, leaving the other as a "Red" Turn (Blinking) Signal -- They contend that the U.S. approach can confuse the human mind and in fact, perhaps be comprehended as an Impending Turn and "not specifically" as a Braking Action whereas their system using. Two Brake Lights - both clearly Lit - means nothing but "Braking . . . Danger!"

They indicate that their smaller in size and brightness, Rear Amber Turn Signal "clearly indicates" to following traffic the situation when a Turn is occurring by itself or simultaneously with the Braking Action.

In any case, I believe our U.S. NHTSA Rulemakers of several years past were in error or experienced an oversight when they reduced and Harmonized the U.S.'s Rear Amber Turn Singal's required output but at the same time did not reduce the "Area" of output which would have kept the "Density * "of U.S. Amber Lights output about the same as the Europeans have found to be effective . . . thus making the U.S. more or less completely Harmonized with the New EU Specifications effective January 1, 1996.

* "Density", a better layman's term than getting into Luminesec and Luminous intensity . . . at this time.

Any American that is actively involved in the Manufacturing of Vehicle Lights knows it is ludicrous to require U.S. Manufacturers to Design Amber Turn Singal lenses in the 12in<2> range * , and then ask them to try and Balance our Trade by attempting to sell larger than necessary (therefore more expensive Lights) in Europe whereas European Manufacturers enjoy the advantage over U.S. Manufacturers of less expense simply because of size.

* which is what is now required for Big Rig and RV Rear Amber Turn Signals

I am asking that a better Trade Balance Policy be adopted as well as seeing that Common Sense reasoning prevails at NHTSA by asking that this situation be corrected.

If NHTSA's Legal Council feels this error should be corrected through the Petitioning Process, I ask that this writing be considered a "Petition for Change of FMVSS # 108 Request" and given consideration for "rapid processing" through the Public Commenting period. I seriously doubt if any American Company or Engineer is in possession of any Scientific Data that would refute what reasoning and facts I have presented here. By reducing the minimal area of the Amber Turn Signal light lens from 12 in<2> to approximately 8 in<2> or 6 in<2>, the U.S. would have more practical Rules for U.S. Exports at no expense to Safety.

Please handle this expendiently!

Yours truly,

Dennis G. Moore President

P.S. Please understand that I believe I speak primarily for the "Big Rig", Small Trailer and RV Type Lighting Manufacturers in the U.S., not for the typical S.A.E. Detroit Auto Designer and/or Auto Engineer.

My type of manufacturing is forced, through extreme competition pressure, to make Multi-purpose Rear Lights for about $ 3.00 each in order to be competitive here in the U.S., whereas, Detroit Auto Stylists know that small Amber Turn Signal Lights on Autos look puny and degrading to their potential customers. They know the bigger these Amber Lenses are, the better they look, the more they cost, and, therefore, the more overall profit is made on them as they are broken and replaced during the life of the Vehicle. Therefore, Detroit stylists and economists don't really want small sized Amber Turn Signals even if they know that small ones do the Safety Job they're intended to do -- they must compete in "Styling" whereas larger and more elaborate lights sell cars and makes them more money in the long run than what would be saved on small lights, whereas this is not at all true with "Other" Vehicle Lighting Manufacturers like I represent who are trying to Compete in the U.S. and Europe in the Non-Auto Vehicle Lighting business.

I believe, and apparently so do most European Safety people, that Location, Color and the Density * Output of a Safety Light is more important for "Conspicuosity" than a large lens with low output.

ID: nht95-3.64

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: July 31, 1995

FROM: Dennis G. Moore -- President, Sierra Products Inc.

TO: Chief Council -- NHTSA

TITLE: Legal Interpretation Request for FMVSS # 108

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 9/20/95 LETTER FROM JOHN WOMACK TO DENNIS G. MOORE (A43; REDBOOK 2; STD. 108)

TEXT: Around 1985 * , NHTSA significantly reduced the Amber (Yellow) Photometric output minimals for all Rear Amber Turn Signal Lights. This reduction was implemented, I believe, partially as an act of Common Sense and partially as a positive Harmonization ge sture to European Vehicle Safety people. Whereas these European Safety people did then and still do require "significantly less" Amber Photometric Output area, which was not correspondingly reduced when NHTSA reduced the required Photometric Output. Fu rther, the Europeans still require significantly less Area for Amber lenses than the U.S. still requires.

* Presently I can't find the Federal Register Announcement with Details on this issue, however, I will attempt to send it later. I do know this data is readily available from your Docket Files.

European Safety leaders, I've been told, have "tests" that substantiate their position that a "Smaller" and less bright Amber Turn Singal yields "less conspicuosity", which is a desirable feature when compared to the Conspicuosity demanded by the Very Im portant Red Brake Lights . . . and rightfully so. As one can see for themselves . . . just the fact that a Turn Signal is Amber and not Red (as are all other Rear Safety Lights) makes it adequately "conspicuous", even if it is "smaller" and significantl y less bright compared to the Brake Lights.

Also, European Scientists contend they have always had a "safer system" than the U.S. System as they have always required Two Brightly Lit Brake Lights, whereas the U.S. System allows only One Brake Light to be illuminated, leaving the other as a "Red" T urn (Blinking) Signal -- They contend that the U.S. approach can confuse the human mind and in fact, perhaps be comprehended as an Impending Turn and "not specifically" as a Braking Action whereas their system using. Two Brake Lights - both clearly Lit - means nothing but "Braking . . . Danger!"

They indicate that their smaller in size and brightness, Rear Amber Turn Signal "clearly indicates" to following traffic the situation when a Turn is occurring by itself or simultaneously with the Braking Action.

In any case, I believe our U.S. NHTSA Rulemakers of several years past were in error or experienced an oversight when they reduced and Harmonized the U.S.'s Rear Amber Turn Singal's required output but at the same time did not reduce the "Area" of output which would have kept the "Density * "of U.S. Amber Lights output about the same as the Europeans have found to be effective . . . thus making the U.S. more or less completely Harmonized with the New EU Specifications effective January 1, 1996.

* "Density", a better layman's term than getting into Luminesec and Luminous intensity . . . at this time.

Any American that is actively involved in the Manufacturing of Vehicle Lights knows it is ludicrous to require U.S. Manufacturers to Design Amber Turn Singal lenses in the 12in<2> range * , and then ask them to try and Balance our Trade by attempting to sell larger than necessary (therefore more expensive Lights) in Europe whereas European Manufacturers enjoy the advantage over U.S. Manufacturers of less expense simply because of size.

* which is what is now required for Big Rig and RV Rear Amber Turn Signals

I am asking that a better Trade Balance Policy be adopted as well as seeing that Common Sense reasoning prevails at NHTSA by asking that this situation be corrected.

If NHTSA's Legal Council feels this error should be corrected through the Petitioning Process, I ask that this writing be considered a "Petition for Change of FMVSS # 108 Request" and given consideration for "rapid processing" through the Public Commenti ng period. I seriously doubt if any American Company or Engineer is in possession of any Scientific Data that would refute what reasoning and facts I have presented here. By reducing the minimal area of the Amber Turn Signal light lens from 12 in<2> to approximately 8 in<2> or 6 in<2>, the U.S. would have more practical Rules for U.S. Exports at no expense to Safety.

Please handle this expendiently!

Yours truly,

Dennis G. Moore President

P.S. Please understand that I believe I speak primarily for the "Big Rig", Small Trailer and RV Type Lighting Manufacturers in the U.S., not for the typical S.A.E. Detroit Auto Designer and/or Auto Engineer.

My type of manufacturing is forced, through extreme competition pressure, to make Multi-purpose Rear Lights for about $ 3.00 each in order to be competitive here in the U.S., whereas, Detroit Auto Stylists know that small Amber Turn Signal Lights on Auto s look puny and degrading to their potential customers. They know the bigger these Amber Lenses are, the better they look, the more they cost, and, therefore, the more overall profit is made on them as they are broken and replaced during the life of the Vehicle. Therefore, Detroit stylists and economists don't really want small sized Amber Turn Signals even if they know that small ones do the Safety Job they're intended to do -- they must compete in "Styling" whereas larger and more elaborate lights se ll cars and makes them more money in the long run than what would be saved on small lights, whereas this is not at all true with "Other" Vehicle Lighting Manufacturers like I represent who are trying to Compete in the U.S. and Europe in the Non-Auto Vehi cle Lighting business.

I believe, and apparently so do most European Safety people, that Location, Color and the Density * Output of a Safety Light is more important for "Conspicuosity" than a large lens with low output.

ID: aiam4740

"Dear Mr. Kelly: This responds to your request for an interpretation o Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 217, Bus Window Retention and Release as it applies to roof exits. You asked four specific questions which I have addressed below. First, you asked for confirmation that the only specification in Standard No. 217 concerning the size of roof exits is the requirement that the exit be able to accommodate an ellipsoid with a major axis of 20 inches and a minor axis of 13 inches pushed horizontally through the exit opening. Your understanding is not entirely correct. The ellipsoid requirement to which you refer, set forth in S5.4.1 of Standard No. 217, is the only provision in the standard that specifies a minimum size requirement for roof exit openings. Although there is no maximum size limit, you should be aware that S5.2 of Standard No. 217 provides that, in determining the total unobstructed openings for emergency exit provided by a bus, no emergency exit, regardless of its area shall be credited with more than 536 square inches of the total area requirement. Thus, if a roof exit is larger than 536 square inches, only 536 square inches will be counted for the exit in determining whether the bus complies with the unobstructed openings requirement of S5.2 of Standard No. 217. Second, you asked for confirmation that Standard No. 217 does not permit the use of escape hatches or ventilators in the roof of school buses as a substitute for any of the emergency exits required on school buses by S5.2.3 of Standard No. 217. This understanding is correct. Additionally, you should be aware that the agency has a longstanding position that any emergency exits, including any roof exits, installed on a school bus in addition to the emergency exits required by S5.2.3 must conform to the requirements of Standard No. 217 for emergency exits installed on buses other than school buses. See the enclosed July 6, 1979 interpretation to Robert Kurre on this issue. Third, you asked for confirmation that Standard No. 217 permits the use of roof exits as a substitute for the rear exit door on buses other than school buses. This statement is not entirely correct. S5.2.1 of Standard No. 217 requires the use of a rear exit door on all non-school buses with a GVWR of more than 10,000 lbs., except where the configuration of the bus precludes the installation of an accessible rear exit. In that case, S5.2.1 requires the installation of a roof exit in the rear half of the bus in lieu of the rear exit. This substitution of a roof exit for a rear exit door is allowed only where the bus design precludes the use of a rear exit (such as on rear-engine buses). It is not an option allowing the substitution of a roof exit for the rear door in any design. Fourth, you asked whether the addition of more than one roof exit on a non-school bus would allow a manufacturer to delete any other required exits in addition to the rear door. It is possible that increasing the total exit space on the bus by adding roof exits could enable a manufacturer to reduce the number or size of other emergency exits on the bus and still comply with the unobstructed openings requirement of S5.2. You should be aware that exit space provided by roof exits is not counted in determining compliance with the requirement in S5.2 that 40 percent of the total unobstructed openings be located on each side of the bus. Whether this substitution of additional roof exits could be made on any particular non-school bus would depend upon whether the bus complied with the exit space and location requirements of S5.2.1 (if the bus has a GVWR of more than 10,000 pounds) and the applicable requirements of S5.2.2 (if the bus has a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less). I hope you have found this information helpful. Please do not hesitate to contact David Greenburg of my staff at (202) 366-2992 if you have any further questions or need additional information. Sincerely, Stephen P. Wood Acting Chief Counsel Enclosure";

ID: aiam3242

Dear Mr. Martin: This responds to your letter of February 20, 1980, in which yo requested information concerning this agency's requirements that motor vehicles be equipped with tamper-resistant odometers and the method used to enforce this requirement. As described below, I have enclosed copies of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) pertinent regulations and enabling legislation as well as some background material.; Among the enclosures to this letter are a series of Federal Registe notices which trace the development of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 127, *Speedometers and Odometers*. As you will see, (43 FR 10919, March 16, 1978, Notice 4) the initial requirement that odometers 'be moveable in the forward direction only' has been modified several times largely in response to comments from the public and from the automobile manufactures (examples enclosed). The rule in effect at present requires either that (1) odometers be irreversible 'whether installed in or removed from a vehicle' unless one or more of five specified operations is necessary to achieve reversal or (2) that odometers be equipped with a marking system which permanently marks the wheel registering ten thousands of miles as the numeral disappears from the driver's view (see 44 FR 17500, March 22, 1979). changes to standard have been proposed (see 44 FR 17532, March 22, 1979) and this agency expects to publish a final rule incorporating some of these changes in the near future. Upon its publication I will be happy to send you a copy. In anticipation. of publication of this rule, the agency has not yet conducted an evaluation in the field of the effectiveness of the odometer provisions of Safety Standard No. 127. However, The agency is now preparing to begin such an evaluation. At this point I am unable to provide you with any details on the form which the evaluation will take.; I have also enclosed an economic impact analysis prepared in 1978 whic discusses, among other things, an early version of Safety Standard 127's odometer tampering provision. Please note that this analysis was not updated as the odometer requirements of Safety Standard No. 127 were modified because this agency concluded that these changes would not significantly alter the standard's economic impact.; You may also be interested to know that SAfety Standard 127 is not thi agency's only tool against odometer tampering. Title IV, Odometer Requirements, of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act (copy enclosed) which is enforced in part, by this agency states that no person shall (1) disconnect reset or alter or cause to be disconnected reset or altered the odometer of a motor vehicle with intent to change the number of miles indicated thereon, (2) with intent to defraud, operate a motor vehicle on any street or highway knowing that the odometer of such vehicle is disconnected or nonfunctional of (3) advertise for sale, sell, use or install or cause to be installed any device which causes an odometer to register any milage other that the true milage driver.; In addition, the act authorizes this agency to develop regulation requiring any transferor of ownership of a motor vehicle to provide to the transferee written disclosure of the cumulative milage registered on the odometer or, in cases where the transferor knows that the odometer reading is different from the number of miles the vehicle has actually traveled, disclosure of that fact. The agency's regulations concerning these disclosures are enclosed for your information.; In your letter, you also requested information indicative of the exten to which odometer tampering presents a problem in the United States.; Unfortunately, I am unable to provide you with any reliable studie conducted in this area. The legislation and regulations aimed at reducing the incidence of odometer tampering have all rested upon a common but un-quantified consensus that odometer tampering is a significant problem in the United States. Safety engineers in this agency have estimated, simply on the basis of their experience, that between 50% and 75% of the used cars sold in the United States contain odometers whose readings have been reduced.; I hope that you will find this information helpful in preparing you project on tamper-proof odometers.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel

ID: 1987y

Mr. Michael E. Kastner
National Truck Equipment
Association--Washington Office
1350 New York Avenue, N.W., Suite 800
Washington, D.C. 20005-4797

Dear Mr. Kastner:

Thank you for your letter to Secretary Skinner concerning the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA's) actions to extend certain Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS's) to light trucks and vans. The Secretary has asked me to reply.

Your letter was especially concerned with NHTSA's November 1987 amendment to FMVSS 204, Steering Control Rearward Displacement, and our denial of NTEA's petition for reconsideration of that rule. I regret that I am unable to respond to your comments at this time. As you know, the Department and NTEA are presently involved in litigation concerning those actions. In view of the litigation, we feel it would be inappropriate to address your comments in this letter.

We appreciate your interest in informing the Department of your views. I can assure you that Secretary Skinner is actively interested in each of the letters he receives regarding NHTSA's mission to improve motor vehicle safety. Let me assure you also that the potential impacts on small businesses is one of our concerns in each of our rulemaking actions.

A copy of your letter, and this response, will be placed in NHTSA's docket section.

Sincerely,

Jeffrey R. Miller Acting Administrator ref:204 d:8/22/89

ID: 07-003932as

ID: nht80-2.6

DATE: 04/17/80

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: State of Florida, Earl H. Wright

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

ATTACHMT: 8/17/79 letter from Frank Berndt to Mike Champagne

TEXT:

Mr. Earl H. Wright Administrator Department of Education State of Florida Tallahassee, Florida 32304

Dear Mr. Wright:

This responds to your recent letter requesting information concerning the legal ramifications of converting school buses with gasoline fuel systems to liquefied fuel systems.

I am enclosing a copy of a letter that we issued last year which discusses the Federal requirements and implications of making such conversions of vehicle fuel systems. That letter should answer all of your questions. Please note that an individual or an entity such as a State agency or school board can make modifications to his or its own vehicles with impunity as far as Federal requirements are concerned, if that individual or entity performs the work. For example, district school board employees could make the conversion you desire without regard to Federal requirements, whereas a motor vehicle repair business or the L.P. gas dealer would be responsible for complying with all Federal requirements.

I hope this has been responsive to your inquiry. If you have any further questions, please contact Hugh Oates of my office at 202-426-2992.

Sincerely,

Frank Berndt Chief Counsel

Enclosure

[letter dated 8/17/79 from Frank Berndt to Mike Champagne omitted here.]

March 21, 1980

Mr. Frank Berndt Chief Counsel U.S. Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Mr. Berndt:

At least two county district school boards in Florida have converted school buses from a gasoline fuel system to a liquefied petroleum (L.P.) gas fuel system. Other district school boards are considering making such conversions to school buses.

The conversions include removing, from the school bus chassis, a fuel system certified to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration by the chassis manufacturer as meeting Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 301, Fuel System Integrity, and installing in its place an L.P. gas system that has not met certification requirements for F.M.V.S.S. 301. In some cases the conversions were done to new buses immediately after they were delivered to the school district by the manufacturer. In other cases the conversions were done to one- or two-year old used school buses. Some conversions were made by L.P. gas dealers and some were made by district school board employees.

In that some school buses have been converted to L.P. gas and there is an indicating that such a conversion program involving hundreds of school buses in Florida may be begun soon, I am requesting answers as follows:

(1) If a state agency, or person, knowingly renders inoperative a fuel system installed on a school bus in compliance with F.M.V.S.S. 301 by removing the fuel system from the bus and replacing it with a fuel system that does not meet the requirements of F.M.V.S.S. 301, has the state agency, or person, committed a violation of a federal law or of a rule or safety standard authorized by law?

(2) If a state agency, or person, is found to be responsible for noncompliance with a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard because of actions described in item (1) above, is there a penalty for being responsible for such noncompliance?

Your consideration and response to the above request will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

Earl H. Wright Administrator School Transportation