ID: 12261GM.fix

Mr. Milford R. Bennett
Director, Safety Affairs & Regulations
General Motors Corporation (GM)
Mail Code 480-111-S56, Box 9010
Engineering Building 1-11
30200 Mound Rd.
Warren, MI 48090-9010

Dear Mr. Bennett:

This responds to a question you had in a petition for rulemaking concerning a "uniform child restraint anchorage" (UCRA) system that your company developed for attaching add-on child seats in vehicles. You ask whether the UCRA system may be installed prior to completion of the requested rulemaking. The answer is yes.

The UCRA system consists of two lower anchorages near the intersection of the vehicle seat back and cushion (the "bight" line), and an upper tether anchorage. The lower anchorages are each equipped with a latchplate that is smaller than and incompatible with the latchplate provided in seat belt systems for adult passengers. Child seats would be manufactured to have equipment that is compatible with the UCRA system, such as small buckles and a tether to attach to the small latches at the vehicle seat bite line and top tether anchorage.

Your company, as a member of the American Automobile Manufacturers Association, along with specified companies of the Association of International Automobile Manufacturers and the Juvenile Products Manufacturer's Association, petitioned the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to require vehicle manufacturers to provide a UCRA system in their vehicles, and require child restraint manufacturers to provide child seats that are "compatible with both the UCRA system (used alone) and the existing vehicle seat belt systems (used alone)."

Among other things, the petition asks whether "1) the proposed UCRA system can be incorporated into future vehicles, and 2) compatible CRSs can be offered for sale, provided the CRS and vehicle belt systems continue to comply with current Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) requirements." From various conversations between Jack Havelin and Dick Humphrey of GM and George Mouchahoir and Deirdre Fujita of NHTSA, we understand you to ask whether the UCRA system may be installed on

vehicles, and compatible componentry installed on child seats, before completion of the requested rulemaking on UCRAs, if the vehicles and child seats meet the standards currently applying to them.

Our answer is the UCRA may be installed. The preamble for the 1979 final rule adopting dynamic test requirements in Standard 213 (44 FR 72131) addressed the issue of "vehicle specific" child restraints, i.e., "systems uniquely designed for installation in a particular make and model which do not utilize vehicle seat belts for anchorages." 44 FR at 72136. The agency emphasized in the preamble that standardizing all child restraints, including vehicle specific ones, by requiring them to be capable of being secured to a vehicle seat by a lap belt is an important way to prevent misuse. However, the agency also stated:

[S]ince vehicle specific child restraints can provide adequate levels of protection when installed correctly, NHTSA is not prohibiting the manufacture of these devices. The new standard requires them to meet the performance requirements of the standard when secured by a vehicle lap belt. As long as child restraints can pass the performance requirements of the standard secured only by a lap belt, a manufacturer is free to specify other 'vehicle specific' installation conditions." 44 FR 72131, 72136; December 13, 1979.

We believe that the system you describe is a "vehicle specific" system similar to that discussed in the preamble. While the discussion quoted above pertained to vehicle specific child seats, by implication the child seat could be attached to the vehicle in a way other than by use of a lap belt. Generally speaking, our standards do not prohibit manufacturers from voluntarily installing items and features on their vehicles or equipment that are not regulated by the safety standards. The only limit is that the vehicle or equipment must meet applicable safety standards when equipped with the voluntary items and features, and must contain no safety-related defect.

Thus, the UCRA system you wish to voluntarily install would be permitted, provided that the vehicle meets all standards currently applying to the vehicle, e.g., standards for seat belt assemblies and anchorages, occupant crash protection and seat strength. Components may be voluntarily installed on a child seat to make the seat compatible with a UCRA, provided that the child seat can pass all requirements of the standard, including the requirement that the seat meet the dynamic test requirements when secured only by a lap belt.

However, please note the following concerns. First, under S5.6 of Standard 213, child seat manufacturers are required to provide step-by-step instructions for securing the child restraint in vehicle-specific applications, as well as providing such instructions for securing the child restraint when it is used in vehicles for which no vehicle-specific installation is recommended.

Second, under NHTSA's defect authority, manufacturers must ensure that their design and production of the UCRA system does not result in unsafe attachments between vehicle and child seats.

Third, assuming that NHTSA issues a rule specifying requirements for a universal child restraint attachment system, such a rule could have requirements that differ from those suggested in your petition. Manufacturers would be responsible for ensuring that UCRA systems installed on vehicles and child seats on or after the effective date of the rule comply with the adopted requirements.

If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact Ms. Fujita at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel

ref:213
d:8/27/96

ID: NCC-240821-001 Letter_WMI for Foreign Built Vehicles-Ford-565_Final

September 11, 2024

Ms. Emily Frascaroli 

Ford Motor Company 

330 Town Center Drive 

Dearborn, MI 48126-2738 

Dear Ms. Frascaroli:

This responds to your August 9, 2022 letter asking about the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA’s) requirements regarding the characters in vehicle identification numbers (VINs) that identify the manufacturer. These characters are commonly referred to as the World Manufacturer Identifier (WMI). You ask whether Ford Motor Company (Ford) may use one of its U.S.-assigned WMIs in the VINs of vehicles Ford manufacturers outside of the United States for importation into and sale in the United States. The answer is yes. 

For the benefit of the public and to clarify NHTSA’s position on WMI requirements more generally, this letter also rescinds a previous interpretation on a similar issue. In a November 3, 2000 letter to Mr. Karl-Heinz Ziwica of BMW of North America, NHTSA addressed the use of a German-issued WMI in the VIN of a vehicle assembled in the United States. Because we believe the two issues are related, this letter also includes a discussion of that letter and NHTSA’s decision to rescind it. 

In responding to this request, NHTSA notes that the contents of this letter do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. This letter is only intended to provide clarity regarding existing requirements under the law at the time of signature.

Facts Presented 

In your letter, you explain that Ford was evaluating plans to manufacture vehicles in another country (“Country X”) that will be sold in the United States. Your letter states that this manufacturing would be done through a 50/50 joint venture. The vehicles, you state, would be classified as multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPVs) under 49 CFR § 571.3. As you explain, Country X has assigned Ford a WMI for passenger cars and a WMI for light trucks. However, because Country X’s regulations do not recognize the classification of a vehicle as an MPV, you state that it will not assign Ford a WMI for this type of vehicle. Instead, the WMI-issuing authority in Country X has suggested that Ford use the WMI it issued to Ford for “passenger car” types.1 You explain that this solution could complicate VIN assignment in the future if Ford later decides to also manufacture passenger cars in Country X for sale in the United States. Specifically, because NHTSA requires a WMI to uniquely identify both manufacturer and vehicle type, Ford cannot use a single WMI for both MPVs and passenger cars. See 49 CFR§ 565.15(a). To avoid this possible complication, you ask whether Ford may use a U.S.-assigned WMI that identifies Ford as the manufacturer and MPV as the vehicle type for the MPVs manufactured in Country X for the U.S. market. You state that this approach would not obscure that the vehicle was manufactured in Country X because the manufacturing location in Country X will be noted in position eleven (11) of the VIN. 

Background and Relevant Provisions 

The VIN is the cornerstone of NHTSA’s safety defect and standard noncompliance recall program.2 NHTSA’s VIN requirements must ensure effective identification of vehicles and vehicle manufacturers. To this end, NHTSA established a 17-character VIN system, whose requirements are found at 49 CFR Part 565. This system requires manufacturers to assign VINs that meet certain formatting requirements and have certain information encoded into them.
NHTSA also requires manufacturers to submit deciphering information that allows the agency to decode the information in the VINs.3 

NHTSA’s VIN regulation requires that “[e]ach vehicle manufactured in one stage shall have a VIN that is assigned by the manufacturer.”4 For large-volume manufacturers, the first three characters of a VIN serve as the manufacturer identifier, which is commonly referred to as the WMI.5 The manufacturer identifier uniquely identifies the manufacturer and the type of motor vehicle.6 These characters are assigned in accordance with section 565.16(a) of the VIN regulation, which states that NHTSA “has contracted with SAE International to coordinate the assignment of manufacturer identifiers to manufacturers in the United States.” Section 565.16(a), however, does not address the assignment of WMIs to manufacturers located outside of the United States. Instead, those WMIs are typically issued by WMI-issuing entities in the country in which the manufacturer is located.

The WMI system depends on international cooperation, which is facilitated by SAE International and the use of ISO 3780, an international standard that sets forth general specifications for WMIs and explains how the issuance of WMIs will be coordinated at the international level. This international cooperation is necessary to ensure that two countries do not issue the same WMI. In addition to serving as NHTSA’s contractor for the purpose of issuing WMIs to U.S. manufacturers, SAE International also coordinates WMIs on an international level, by

1 According to your letter, the vehicles at issue would be considered “passenger cars” in Country X.
2 Final rule amending NHTSA’s VIN requirements, 44 FR 17489, 17490 (Mar. 22, 1979).
3 See 49 CFR § 565.16(c).
4 49 CFR § 565.13(a).
5 If the manufacturer is a low-volume manufacturer, the manufacturer identifier is six characters. 49 CFR § 565.15(a).
6 See 49 CFR § 565.15(a).

coordinating the assignment of ranges of WMIs to countries, as well as by keeping a repository of assigned WMIs. Ranges of WMIs are assigned based on the first and second characters of a WMI, with the first character generally identifying a particular geographic area, and the second character identifying a particular country within the geographic area (e.g., a WMI with the first character of S through Z indicates Europe, and WMIs beginning with ZA to ZU are assigned to Italy). The WMI-issuing authorities in each country then assign WMIs to individual manufacturers. 

Discussion

Your situation presents a new issue for NHTSA to consider. To respond to your request, we will address two issues: (1) whether Ford is the manufacturer of the vehicles at issue for the purposes of being identified by the WMI in the VIN of the vehicles at issue; and (2) whether NHTSA requires the WMI to indicate the country of manufacture, either by being issued in the country of manufacture or by otherwise identifying the country of manufacture. 

Manufacturer Identified by the WMI 

We will first consider whether Ford may be identified as the manufacturer of the vehicles produced by the 50/50 joint venture in Country X, or whether the company that actually builds the vehicles must be identified as the manufacturer in the WMI. Although your letter did not ask this question, it is a threshold question for your inquiry. One of the key requirements for the WMI, found at section 565.15(a) of the VIN regulation, is that it must uniquely identify the manufacturer. Therefore, we will first address whether one of Ford’s WMIs may be used in the VINs of the subject vehicles. While Ford may not be the assembler of the vehicles,7 NHTSA believes that the 50/50 joint venture may still allow Ford to “control” production of the vehicles sufficiently to be designated as the manufacturer for WMI purposes.8 

For purposes of assigning VINs, NHTSA interprets the requirement for the WMI to identify the manufacturer to mean that the WMI must identify the manufacturer that certifies the vehicle under 49 CFR Part 567, NHTSA’s certification regulation. The VIN’s primary purpose is to facilitate the identification of vehicles and the manufacturers responsible for those vehicles. Therefore, it would be inconsistent to allow different entities to be identified on the certification 

7 As Ford explained, the vehicles will be manufactured by the 50/50 joint venture.
8 Additionally, Ford could not be considered the “manufacturer” for WMI purposes based on its being the vehicle’s importer because 49 CFR § 565.14(a) states that importers must use the VIN “assigned by the original manufacturer of the motor vehicle.” Accordingly, even though 49 CFR § 565.12(b) defines a manufacturer as including a person “importing motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment for resale,” consistent with the Safety Act’s definition of “manufacturer” at 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(6), NHTSA does not consider importers to be manufacturers for purposes of VIN assignment. Rather, NHTSA only considers entities that are “manufacturing or assembling motor vehicles,” id. § 30102(a)(6)(A), to be manufacturers for purposes of the WMI.

label and in the VIN.9 This reading is consistent with ISO 3780,10 and with a past NHTSA interpretation in which Volkswagen asked which WMI should be used when vehicle assembly is carried out by one company on behalf of another.11 In that interpretation, NHTSA stated that the WMI of the company under whose authority the assembly is carried out and which maintains responsibility for the vehicle’s compliance with safety standards should be used.12 NHTSA continues to believe this is the most appropriate reading of the regulation. 

The next question is which manufacturer in a joint venture would certify the vehicle, which would also determine which manufacturer’s WMI should be used in the VIN. Typically, under 49 CFR § 567, the name of the actual assembler must appear on the certification label. This requirement reflects that the purpose of the manufacturer’s designation in the certification regulations is to identify the entity that has “primary technical responsibility for conformity of the design and quality control of the assembly.”13 

However, NHTSA also explicitly permits other entities to assume responsibility for motor vehicles’ compliance and to make certifications to that effect. Accordingly, if a vehicle is assembled by a corporation that is controlled by another corporation that assumes responsibility for conformity with the standards, the name of that controlling corporation may be used on the certification label.14 

In a 1981 letter to Paccar Inc. (Paccar), NHTSA considered how this certification standard would apply where an entity owned a partial percent interest in a motor vehicle assembler.15 We believe the analysis in that letter is relevant to determining whether Ford is in “control” of the assembler of the vehicles at issue. In the Paccar letter, NHTSA concluded that Paccar could be identified as the manufacturer on the certification label for vehicles assembled by Kenworth Mexicana, a Mexican affiliate. NHTSA observed that even though Paccar owned only a 49

9 We note that for vehicles built in more than one stage, the VIN must be assigned by the incomplete vehicle manufacturer and the incomplete vehicle manufacturer, any intermediate vehicle manufacturers, and the final stage manufacturer each have certification responsibilities.
10 In its 2008 final rule amending its VIN regulations, NHTSA stated that when issuing identifiers to U.S. manufacturers, SAE also ensures that the identifiers comply with the specifications in ISO Standard 3780. See 73 FR 23367, 23369 (Apr. 30, 2008). In specifying requirements for WMIs, ISO 3780:2009 references the definition of “manufacturer” found in ISO Standard 3779. Section 3.5 of ISO Standard 3779:2009 in turn defines manufacturer as the “person, firm, or corporation that issues the certificate of conformity or that demonstrates compliance and assumes product liability for a vehicle ready for operation, independent of the location of the assembly plant.”
11 See Letter to Volkswagen of America Inc. (November 20, 1978), available at https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/aiam2885.
12 While this 1978 interpretation has been superseded in part, NHTSA has not reconsidered its conclusion that the WMI should identify the certifying manufacturer.
13 See Letter to Kawasaki Motors Corporation (August 15, 1969), available at https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/nht69-228.
14 See 49 CFR § 567.4(g)(1)(i). As NHTSA explained in its 1969 final rule on Part 567, this exception was adopted in recognition of the fact that, “particularly in some foreign countries, assembly of a vehicle may be performed by a subsidiary corporation controlled by a parent that is the generally known ‘nameplate company.’” The agency determined that in such a situation, “no important purpose is served by requiring the name of a lesser-known subsidiary corporation on the label.” 34 FR 11360 (Jul. 9, 1969).
15 The letter is available at https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/nht81-326.

percent interest in Kenworth Mexicana, it was responsible for the design of the vehicles produced in Mexico and exercised control over all matters relating to their compliance with safety standards. In this circumstance, the letter concluded that Paccar’s name could appear on the certification label and noted that allowing Paccar to be identified as the manufacturer was consistent with the reasons the agency had adopted the controlling corporation exception to the requirement that the vehicle assembler’s name must appear on the certification label.16 

The reasoning in the Paccar letter applies to joint ventures as well. We believe that the ownership interest and the entity’s involvement in the vehicles’ design, production, and compliance—not the particular corporate structure—are the most relevant factors for determining “control.” Accordingly, we conclude that a partner owning 50 percent of a joint venture that is also responsible for a vehicle’s design and exercises control over all matters relating to its compliance with safety standards may be identified as the manufacturer for purposes of Part 567. Therefore, if Ford meets these requirements, Ford may be identified as the manufacturer on the certification labels of the subject vehicles even though Ford is not the actual assembler of the vehicles. Moreover, if Ford is the manufacturer on the certification labels, then Ford may also be the manufacturer for purposes of the VIN’s WMI. 

Thus, based on the facts presented, and assuming that Ford would be permitted to certify the vehicles pursuant to Part 567, NHTSA would conclude that the vehicles produced through Ford’s joint venture in Country X may have VINs that are assigned by Ford and contain a WMI assigned to Ford. 

Country of Manufacture 

The second part of the analysis considers whether the WMI must indicate the country of manufacture either by (1) being issued by the country in which the vehicle was manufactured or (2) otherwise identifying the country of manufacture. We find that the answer is no: Part 565 does not require this.

NHTSA’s VIN regulation is silent as to whether the WMI must indicate the country of manufacture. Since NHTSA regulations do not prohibit the use of a U.S.-assigned WMI in VINs of vehicles manufactured in Country X for sale in the United States, such practice is permissible under the circumstances described in this letter.17

16 Relatedly, other NHTSA interpretations have held that vehicles manufactured under contract may not be certified by the entity that assumes responsibility for the compliance of those vehicles unless that entity has an ownership interest in the assembler. See Letter to Howard A. Silverman (November 11, 2000), available at https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/gm3crs; Letter to Mr. Larry Smith (January 15, 2002), available at https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/londontaxi2.
17 We also note that in the 2008 final rule that amended Part 565, we stated that, to comply with ISO 3780, the first three digits of a VIN “must also indicate the country in which the vehicle was manufactured.” 73 FR 23367, 23369 (Apr. 30, 2008). However, ISO 3780 has always specified that WMIs are assigned by the WMI-issuing entity in the country in which the manufacturer is headquartered, not that WMIs must indicate the country in which the vehicle was manufactured. Similarly, the BMW interpretation letter discussed below, which we are now rescinding, indicated in a footnote that German-issued WMIs did not conform to SAE’s WMI format for U.S.-manufactured

Based on the information you provided, and assuming that Ford would be permitted to certify the vehicles and in fact does so, NHTSA’s regulations would not prohibit Ford from using one of its U.S.-assigned WMIs for vehicles produced in Country X through Ford’s 50/50 joint venture.
However, as explained above, if Ford did not certify the vehicles, NHTSA would not consider it appropriate for a Ford WMI to be used. 

Further, while NHTSA still believes that knowing the vehicle’s location of manufacture is important for NHTSA’s enforcement purposes, the WMI alone is not necessary to serve this function. NHTSA requires manufacturers to code information about plant of manufacture into position 11 of the VIN, thus providing more detailed information about where the vehicle was produced.18 

BMW Interpretation 

As mentioned above, your letter presented a new issue to consider. However, in considering that issue, we identified prior guidance that now requires updating. In an interpretation dated November 3, 2000, that we issued to Mr. Karl-Heinz Ziwica of BMW of North America, we addressed the use of a German-issued WMI on a motor vehicle assembled in the United States. BMW had been using German-issued WMIs on vehicles manufactured at its plant in Greer, South Carolina. We concluded that the VINs of vehicles produced at the Greer plant must bear WMIs assigned or approved by NHTSA or its contractor. We now rescind that interpretation to ensure consistent guidance. 

The BMW letter relied on an earlier version of what is now section 565.16(a) of the VIN regulation. The previous version was found at 49 CFR § 565.7(a) and was similar though not identical to the current rule. The BMW letter interpreted the provision then-section 565.7(a) as requiring the vehicles at issue, which had been manufactured in the United States, to have VINs with WMIs that had been assigned or approved by NHTSA. However, Part 565 was subsequently updated in 2008. The updated, recodified version of what is now section 565.16(a) clarified that the provision simply provides an explanation of a process and does not itself create any substantive requirements. The rule does not provide that NHTSA must assign or approve WMIs; rather, it simply observes that NHTSA contracts with SAE to assign WMIs. 

If we were to consider BMW’s request today, we would find that there is no requirement in Part 565 that prohibits the use of non-U.S. WMIs on vehicles produced in the United States. As discussed above, the WMI must uniquely identify the certifying manufacturer and the vehicle type. Kraftfahrt Bundesamt is the WMI-issuing authority for Germany and fulfills a similar role 

vehicles because the WMIs in the subject VINs did not fall within the range that would indicate that the WMI had been assigned by the United States. See Letter to Mr. Karl-Heinz Ziwica (November 3, 2000), available at https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/21915drn. With this interpretation and the rescission of the BMW letter, NHTSA’s requirements for WMIs will be more consistent with ISO 3780. Nonetheless, we also note that NHTSA’s requirements are still not in complete alignment with ISO 3780 because NHTSA does not require WMIs to be issued in the country in which the manufacturer is headquartered.
18 49 CFR § 565.15(d)(2).

to the one SAE International fulfills under its contract with NHTSA to assign WMIs to U.S. manufacturers. Because NHTSA does not require vehicles manufactured in the United States to have VINs that include a U.S.-assigned WMI, NHTSA now concludes that it would be permissible for BMW to use German-issued WMIs on vehicles produced in the United States by a BMW subsidiary that are certified by the BMW parent company headquartered in Germany. 

Conclusion 

As discussed above, NHTSA’s regulations do not prohibit the use of a U.S.-issued WMI in the VINs of vehicles manufactured outside of the United States for importation into and sale in the United States. Accordingly, assuming Ford may be identified as the manufacturer on the certification labels of the subject vehicles manufactured in Country X, we believe it would be permissible for Ford’s U.S.-issued WMI for MPVs to be incorporated into the VINs affixed to those vehicles. Moreover, with the rescission of the BMW interpretation and the issuance of this interpretation, we now conclude that vehicles manufactured in the United States that are certified by controlling companies may have VINs that incorporate the controlling company’s WMI, regardless of whether the controlling company has a U.S.-issued WMI. 

NHTSA would like to note, however, that there are still restrictions on who can be identified as the manufacturer in the WMI. As explained above, the WMI must identify the certifying manufacturer. Additionally, out of concern for the dwindling supply of WMIs, NHTSA will direct its contractor not to issue new U.S. WMIs specifically for vehicles produced outside of the United States, even when the manufacturer is a U.S-headquartered company.19 That is, manufacturers that are headquartered in the United States may use existing WMIs on vehicles they produce in other countries, but they will not be able to obtain new WMIs for that purpose.20 Because Ford is headquartered in the U.S. and has been issued U.S. WMIs, NHTSA regulation would not prohibit Ford from using its U.S.-issued WMIs on vehicles it manufactures in Country X for sale in the United States. 

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Callie Roach of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992.
 

Sincerely,
ADAM RAVIV
Adam Raviv Chief Counsel

Dated: 9/11/24
Ref: Part 565

19 This decision to deviate from ISO 3780, which specifies that WMIs are issued by the WMI-issuing authority in the country in which it is headquartered, ensures that U.S. WMIs are not issued to entities lacking a substantial presence in the United States.
20 When requesting a new U.S. WMI for a particular vehicle type, manufacturers will need to provide information substantiating that they will be producing that vehicle type in the United States.

ID: nht90-4.40

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: October 11, 1990

FROM: Robert H. Jones -- President, Triple J Enterprises, Inc.

TO: Ben Blaz -- Congressman

TITLE: Re Ref: C-3J0039

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 7-6-89 from Bob Jones to Ben Blas; Also attached to letter dated 7-5-90 from Robert H. Jones to Director, Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance Enforcement, NHTSA; Also attached to letter dated 3-11-91 from Paul Jackson R ice to Robert H. Jones (A37; VSA Sec. 103(8)); Also attached to letter dated 1-22-91 from Robert H. Jones to Clive Van Orden (OCC 5733); Also attached to letter dated 12-11-90 from Robert H. Jones to Clive Van Orden

TEXT:

Thank you for your letter of October 4th. I fully understand the need for you to communicate with Governor Guerrero and Representative Juan Babauta about your assistance with FMVSS and FMCSR regulations.

I believe they are working on this problem at this very moment. Just yesterday, I received a call from Governor Guerrero's legal counsel Tim Bruce Esq. I believe they will develop a position that the DOT regulations should not apply to the CNMI. I agr ee with this position which has been consistent with past administrations. This, in my view, would be the best outcome for all concerned. These regulations cost 3 to 4 hundred dollars extra per vehicle in specialized equipment.

The DOT regulations are great in areas like Los Angeles, where there is a real smog problem and where the average speed limit is 50 to 60 miles per hour on the freeways. I doubt that the people in the CNMI, or of any Island in Micronesia get their monie s worth for these regulations. As you know, most speed limits are 25 to 35 miles per hour and smog is the least of their problems.

Congressman, the bottom line however, is that the CNMI position and the Federal Governments position should be consistent if we are to solve our problems. If the Federal Government insists on taking a different position than the CNMI Government, then th e Federal Government should do their job and enforce their own position.

Then, and only then, will all the Distributors and Dealers of Automobiles and the people of the CNMI know what the ground rules are.

ID: 6918

Mr. William H. Spain
Touch Wood
5417 Caldwell Mill Road
Birmingham, AL 35242

Dear Mr. Spain:

This responds to your letter of January 21, 1992, to Taylor Vinson of this office, with reference to your "Auxiliary Lighting Device". I understand that you have also discussed the Device on the phone with Mr. Vinson on March 3, and with Mr. Van Iderstine of the Office of Rulemaking on March 26. You have referenced sections S5.1.3, S5.1.1.11, S5.3.1.1, S5.5.3 and S5.5.10(a) of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, and ask for an "initial first impression as to whether or not we might have a problem."

In your experience, "it is not an uncommon occurrence for a tractor/trailer to lose its taillamps due to a circuit or wiring malfunction." When this occurs, you point out that the driver's only choice is to activate his hazard warning system, which is not its intended purpose, and which defeats the normal turn signal circuits. Your Device would permit the operator of the tractor to employ the rear turn signal lamps as surrogate taillamps if the vehicle's standard taillamps were inoperative. Specifically, "a reduced voltage is fed through both right and left rear turn signal circuits to cause both turn signal lamps to illuminate at a reduced brilliance equal to that of a normal tail lamp." The Device has an alternative function. It permits the turn signal lamps to be used at full intensity as fog lamps to increase rear visibility. The activation of the turn signal switch within 1/2 second overrides the Device and allows normal operation of the turn signal lamps. The Device is activated through a toggle switch on the dash, which glows to indicate to the driver that it is engaged.

The applicability of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (the "Act") and Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 to tractor-trailer combinations is not well defined. Standard No. 108 is, in essence, a manufacturing standard that applies to individual motor vehicles. It ceases to apply at the time of purchase by its first owner (other than the manufacturer or dealer). Once a vehicle is sold, questions of continued compliance with the standards, including Standard No. 108, must be answered with reference to the Act. The question presented by your letter concerns a device added to one vehicle before its first sale that is intended to affect the lighting performance on another vehicle after the sale of the second vehicle (i.e., when it has become a "vehicle in use", to use the statutory term). We recently provided another interpretation of the applicability of Standard No. 108 and the Act to towing and towed vehicle combinations which I would like to discuss, as it provides a basis for our interpretation to you, but is nevertheless distinguishable from it by its facts (letter of April 3, 1992, to Echlin Corp.)

The Echlin Corp. device (the "Control") was intended to control trailer sway by allowing the towing vehicle's driver to apply the towed vehicle's brakes through modulated pressure by use of a hand control in the towing vehicle. The wiring of the Control was such that the trailer stop lamps were not activated when the Control was in use. Standard No. 108 and the laws of some States require that the stop lamps be activated when the service brakes are applied. We informed the manufacturer of the Control that, under the specific facts of the case, the question was not one to be answered under Standard No. 108 as applying to new vehicles, but to be answered under the Act as it affects vehicles in use. The Act contains a general prohibition (l5 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(A)) against knowingly rendering inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design on a vehicle in use that has been installed in accordance with a Federal motor vehicle safety standard. The prohibition applies to any manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or motor vehicle repair business. With respect to the Control, the dealer of the towed vehicle adds the Control to the towing vehicle (a vehicle in use) at the time that the towed vehicle is purchased. In our opinion, the legal question was whether the dealer of the towed vehicle had rendered the stop lamps of the towed vehicle partially inoperative by its installation of the Control on the towed vehicle. In our opinion, it was not the installation of the Control but its use that was critical. The user of the Control, the vehicle operator, is not covered by the prohibition. Therefore, we informed Echlin that the sale and use of the Control does not violate the Act.

This interpretation can also be viewed as stating that "inoperability" as the word is used in the statute must result from a direct act, and not an indirect one. This, however, was not our intent. We do not believe that a person should be excused from responsibility simply because an intervening agency is required to operate a device that that person has manufactured or sold. Although many of the facts concerning the use of the Control and your Device are similar, the fact of importance in this instance is the primary purpose of the equipment in question. The primary purpose of the Control was to control trailer sway, not to affect the operation of the stop lamps. The primary purpose of your Device is to affect vehicle lighting, by serving as surrogate and supplementary lighting equipment.

A further fact in difference is that you envision the Device to be installed as part of the manufacture of the tractor trailer, and not added by the dealer of the trailer to a tractor trailer in use. This raises the question of the certification that the Act requires by the truck tractor manufacturer of compliance with Standard No. 108, specifically S5.1.3. As your letter indicates, you are aware that S5.1.3 prohibits the installation of additional lamps or reflectors "or other motor vehicle equipment that impairs the effectiveness of lighting equipment required by" Standard No. 108. It is manifest that installation of the Device has no effect upon the lighting equipment of the vehicle on which it is installed, the truck tractor. The question is whether S5.1.3 can be read as prohibiting the installation of a device on one vehicle that may affect the operation of lighting equipment on another vehicle.

We believe that S5.1.3. can be so read because the term "lighting equipment required by" Standard No. 108 is general in nature, and not restricted to the vehicle on which the additional equipment is installed. Although Standard No. 108 does not establish lighting requirements to be met by combinations of towing and towed vehicles, we interpret S5.1.3 as prohibiting installation of any original equipment on the towing vehicle that could impair the effectiveness of the lighting equipment required by Standard No. 108 to be installed on a towed vehicle. The determination of whether impairment exists is initially made by the manufacturer in certifying compliance of the towing vehicle to all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards. If a manufacturer installs as original equipment on one motor vehicle a device whose sole purpose is to affect the lighting performance of another motor vehicle, then that manufacturer must take into account whether that device would impair the effectiveness of the other vehicle's lighting equipment in certifying compliance to S5.1.3. If that decision appears clearly erroneous, NHTSA may make its own determination in order to effect compliance with Standard No. 108.

We turn first to the question of the use of the Device as a surrogate taillamp on a vehicle equipped with red rear turn signal lamps. When used as a taillamp surrogate, the Device would substitute one steady-burning red rear light for another. If, as you indicate, the intensity of the surrogate taillamp is no greater than that of the original taillamp (and thereby maintains the ratio of difference required in combination turn signal- taillamps), there would appear to be no impairment of rear lighting equipment.

When used as a fog lamp on a vehicle equipped with red rear turn signal lamps, the taillamps are not disabled, and the Device activates the turn signal lamps at full intensity in a steady burning mode. Commonly, combination rear lamps on large vehicles also include the stop function as well. Because of the similarity of intensity between the steady burning fog lamp and the stop function provided by the same filament, or the stop function in an adjacent lamp, we believe that the stop signal would be impaired when the Device is used as a fog lamp in a lamp configured as described in this paragraph.

When used on a trailer equipped with the amber turn signal lamps that Standard No. 108 permits, different considerations apply. All lamps that serve as marker lamps on the rear (taillamps, identification lamps, clearance lamps) are required by Standard No. 108 to be red in color. On a trailer equipped with amber rear turn signals, the use of your Device would result in a pair of steady burning amber marker lamps on the trailer rear where, heretofore, the motoring public has not been accustomed to seeing them. Thus, the question arises under S5.1.3 whether the effectiveness of the required red rear lighting equipment is impaired when the Device activates steady burning amber rear lamps.

You are aware of this possibility, but have pointed out to Mr. Vinson that the Device is intended for use when the taillamps are not available. Because taillamps, identification lamps, and clearance lamps share the same wiring, inoperability of the taillamps often means inoperability of the other rear marker lights. Thus, the steady burning amber lamps provided by the Device may be the only operating marker lamps on the rear of the vehicle. You believe that this is preferable to no lights at all. We would agree that, in this circumstance, there would be no impairment of required rear lighting equipment within the meaning of S5.1.3.

However, the Device provides no safeguards against operation of the amber turn signal lamps in the taillamp mode when the taillamps (and other rear marker lamps) remain operative. Further, it permits operation of the amber turn signal lamps in the fog lamp mode regardless of the operability of the other rear marker lamps. Because the Device is intended for use only under conditions of reduced visibility, such as night and fog, when the headlamps are activated, there is a potential for confusion when a motorist is confronted with simultaneously operating steady burning red and amber lamps. In this situation, a conclusion could be drawn that the utilization of the Device to create a steady burning amber lamp could, within the meaning of S5.1.3, impair the effectiveness of the lighting equipment that is required to be red. You told Mr. Vinson of your willingness to provide a warning with the Device cautioning against its use when the taillamps are operative, and we appreciate your concern with the issue. You may wish to reexamine the efficacy of amber lamps as fog lamps. We understand that the most effective rear fog lamps are red, and that red is the only color permitted in Europe.

You pointed out in your letter that, absent the Device, the tractor operator might choose to employ the flashing hazard warning lights for other than their intended purpose. We believe that today's motorists interpret flashing red or amber hazard lamps on moving vehicles as a signal that the vehicle is moving slower than the stream of traffic, and that caution is advised. Thus, safety may be enhanced when the hazard lamps flash, as they provide a contrast with the steady burning but less intense red rear taillamps.

Finally, even if acceptable under the regulations and statutes administered by this agency, vehicles engaged in the commercial aspects of interstate commerce are subject to the regulations of the Office of Motor Carrier Standards (OMCS) Federal Highway Administration, and to the regulations of the individual States where the trailer is operated. We are not able to advise you of their restrictions, if any. You may write the Director, OMCS, Room 3404, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 for an interpretation. The American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, 4600 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22203, may be able to provide you with an interpretation of State laws. Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel ref:108 d:4/27/92

ID: nht92-7.26

DATE: April 27, 1992

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: William H. Spain -- Touch Wood

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 1/21/92 from William H. Spain to Taylor Vinson (OCC 6918)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter of January 21, 1992, to Taylor Vinson of this office, with reference to your "Auxiliary Lighting Device". I understand that you have also discussed the Device on the phone with Mr. Vinson on March 3, and with Mr. Van Iderstine of the Office of Rulemaking on March 26. You have referenced sections S5.1.3, S5.1.1.11, S5.3.1.1, S5.5.3 and S5.5.10(a) of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, and ask for an "initial first impression as to whether or not we might have a problem."

In your experience, "it is not an uncommon occurrence for a tractor/trailer to lose its taillamps due to a circuit or wiring malfunction." When this occurs, you point out that the driver's only choice is to activate his hazard warning system, which is not its intended purpose, and which defeats the normal turn signal circuits. Your Device would permit the operator of the tractor to employ the rear turn signal lamps as surrogate taillamps if the vehicle's standard taillamps were inoperative. Specifically, "a reduced voltage is fed through both right and left rear turn signal circuits to cause both turn signal lamps to illuminate at a reduced brilliance equal to that of a normal tail lamp." The Device has an alternative function. It permits the turn signal lamps to be used at full intensity as fog lamps to increase rear visibility. The activation of the turn signal switch within 1/2 second overrides the Device and allows normal operation of the turn signal lamps. The Device is activated through a toggle switch on the dash, which glows to indicate to the driver that it is engaged.

The applicability of the National Traffic and Motor vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (the "Act") and Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 to tractor-trailer combinations is not well defined. Standard No. 108 is, in essence, a manufacturing standard that applies to individual motor vehicles. It ceases to apply at the time of purchase by its first owner (other than the manufacturer or dealer). Once a vehicle is sold, questions of continued compliance with the standards, including Standard No. 108, must be answered with reference to the Act. The question presented by your letter concerns a device added to one vehicle before its first sale that is intended to affect the lighting performance on another vehicle after the sale of the second vehicle (i.e., when it has become a "vehicle in use", to use the statutory term). We recently provided another interpretation of the applicability of Standard No. 108 and the Act to towing and towed vehicle combinations which I would like to discuss, as it provides a basis for our interpretation to you, but is nevertheless distinguishable from it by its facts (letter of April 3, 1992, to Echlin Corp.)

The Echlin Corp. device (the "Control") was intended to control trailer sway by allowing the towing vehicle's driver to apply the towed vehicle's brakes through modulated pressure by use of a hand control in the towing vehicle. The wiring of the Control was such that the trailer stop lamps were not activated

when the Control was in use. Standard No. 108 and the laws of some States require that the stop lamps be activated when the service brakes are applied. We informed the manufacturer of the Control that, under the specific facts of the case, the question was not one to be answered under Standard No. 108 as applying to new vehicles, but to be answered under the Act as it affects vehicles in use. The Act contains a general prohibition (15 U.S.C. 1397 (a) (2)(A)) against knowingly rendering inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design on a vehicle in use that has been installed in accordance with a Federal motor vehicle safety standard. The prohibition applies to any manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or motor vehicle repair business. With respect to the Control, the dealer of the towed vehicle adds the Control to the towing vehicle (a vehicle in use) at the time that the towed vehicle is purchased. In our opinion, the legal question was whether the dealer of the towed vehicle had rendered the stop lamps of the towed vehicle partially inoperative by its installation of the Control on the towed vehicle. In our opinion, it was not the installation of the Control but its use that was critical. The user of the Control, the vehicle operator, is not covered by the prohibition. Therefore, we informed Echlin that the sale and use of the Control does not violate the Act.

This interpretation can also be viewed as stating that "inoperability" as the word is used in the statute must result from a direct act, and not an indirect one. This, however, was not our intent. We do not believe that a person should be excused from responsibility simply because an intervening agency is required to operate a device that that person has manufactured or sold. Although many of the facts concerning the use of the Control and your Device are similar, the fact of importance in this instance is the primary purpose of the equipment in question. The primary purpose of the Control was to control trailer sway, not to affect the operation of the stop lamps. The primary purpose of your Device is to affect vehicle lighting, by serving as surrogate and supplementary lighting equipment.

A further fact in difference is that you envision the Device to be installed as part of the manufacture of the tractor trailer, and not added by the dealer of the trailer to a tractor trailer in use. This raises the question of the certification that the Act requires by the truck tractor manufacturer of compliance with Standard No. 108, specifically S5.1.3. As your letter indicates, you are aware that S5.1.3 prohibits the installation of additional lamps or reflectors "or other motor vehicle equipment that impairs the effectiveness of lighting equipment required by" Standard No. 108. It is manifest that installation of the Device has no effect upon the lighting equipment of the vehicle on which it is installed, the truck tractor. The question is whether S5.1.3 can be read as prohibiting the installation of a device on one vehicle that may affect the operation of lighting equipment on another vehicle.

We believe that S5.1.3. can be so read because the term "lighting equipment required by" Standard No. 108 is general in nature, and not restricted to the vehicle on which the additional equipment is installed. Although Standard No. 108 does not establish lighting requirements to be met by combinations of towing and towed vehicles, we interpret S5.1.3 as prohibiting installation of any original equipment on the towing vehicle that could impair the effectiveness of the lighting equipment required by Standard No. 108 to be installed on a towed vehicle. The determination of whether impairment exists

is initially made by the manufacturer in certifying compliance of the towing vehicle to all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards. If a manufacturer installs as original equipment on one motor vehicle a device whose sole purpose is to affect the lighting performance of another motor vehicle, then that manufacturer must take into account whether that device would impair the effectiveness of the other vehicle's lighting equipment in certifying compliance to S5.1.3. If that decision appears clearly erroneous, NHTSA may make its own determination in order to effect compliance with Standard No. 108.

We turn first to the question of the use of the Device as a surrogate taillamp on a vehicle equipped with red rear turn signal lamps. When used as a taillamp surrogate, the Device would substitute one steady-burning red rear light for another. If, as you indicate, the intensity of the surrogate taillamp is no greater than that of the original taillamp (and thereby maintains the ratio of difference required in combination turn signal- taillamps), there would appear to be no impairment of rear lighting equipment.

When used as a fog lamp on a vehicle equipped with red rear turn signal lamps, the taillamps are not disabled, and the Device activates the turn signal lamps at full intensity in a steady burning mode. Commonly, combination rear lamps on large vehicles also include the stop function as well. Because of the similarity of intensity between the steady burning fog lamp and the stop function provided by the same filament, or the stop function in an adjacent lamp, we believe that the stop signal would be impaired when the Device is used as a fog lamp in a lamp configured as described in this paragraph.

When used on a trailer equipped with the amber turn signal lamps that Standard No. 108 permits, different considerations apply. All lamps that serve as marker lamps on the rear (taillamps, identification lamps, clearance lamps) are required by Standard No. 108 to be red in color. On a trailer equipped with amber rear turn signals, the use of your Device would result in a pair of steady burning amber marker lamps on the trailer rear where, heretofore, the motoring public has not been accustomed to seeing them. Thus, the question arises under S5.1.3 whether the effectiveness of the required red rear lighting equipment is impaired when the Device activates steady burning amber rear lamps.

You are aware of this possibility, but have pointed out to Mr. Vinson that the Device is intended for use when the taillamps are not available. Because taillamps, identification lamps, and clearance lamps share the same wiring, inoperability of the taillamps often means inoperability of the other rear marker lights. Thus, the steady burning amber lamps provided by the Device may be the only operating marker lamps on the rear of the vehicle. You believe that this is preferable to no lights at all. We would agree that, in this circumstance, there would be no impairment of required rear lighting equipment within the meaning of S5.1.3.

However, the Device provides no safeguards against operation of the amber turn signal lamps in the taillamp mode when the taillamps (and other rear marker lamps) remain operative.

Further, it permits operation of the amber turn signal lamps in the fog lamp mode regardless of the operability of the other rear marker lamps. Because the Device is intended for use only under conditions of reduced visibility, such as night and fog, when the headlamps are activated, there is a potential for confusion when a motorist is confronted with simultaneously operating steady burning red and amber lamps. In this situation, a conclusion could be drawn that the utilization of the Device to create a steady burning amber lamp could, within the meaning of S5.1.3, impair the effectiveness of the lighting equipment that is required to be red. You told Mr. Vinson of your willingness to provide a warning with the Device cautioning against its use when the taillamps are operative, and we appreciate your concern with the issue. You may wish to reexamine the efficacy of amber lamps as fog lamps. We understand that the most effective rear fog lamps are red, and that red is the only color permitted in Europe.

You pointed out in your letter that, absent the Device, the tractor operator might choose to employ the flashing hazard warning lights for other than their intended purpose. We believe that today's motorists interpret flashing red or amber hazard lamps on moving vehicles as a signal that the vehicle is moving slower than the stream of traffic, and that caution is advised. Thus, safety may be enhanced when the hazard lamps flash, as they provide a contrast with the steady burning but less intense red rear taillamps.

Finally, even if acceptable under the regulations and statutes administered by this agency, vehicles engaged in the commercial aspects of interstate commerce are subject to the regulations of the Office of Motor Carrier Standards (OMCS) Federal Highway Administration, and to the regulations of the individual States where the trailer is operated. We are not able to advise you of their restrictions, if any. You may write the Director, OMCS, Room 3404, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 for an interpretation. The American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, 4600 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22203, may be able to provide you with an interpretation of State laws.

ID: aiam2258

Dear Mr. Yamada: This responds to your February 24, 1976, request for affirmation that particular Takata Kojyo test procedure for applying force to a continuous loop Type 2 belt system meet[s] the requirements set forth in Standard 209, Seat Belt Assemblies.'; Section S4.4 of Standard No. 209 sets forth the requirements of th standard for assembly performance. Section S5.3(b) sets forth test methods that would be used in a determination of whether a Type 2 seat belt assembly conforms to the requirements of S4.4. Takata Kojyo's obligation as a manufacturer is to ensure that its certification of compliance is not false or misleading in a material respect, and that it has exercised due care in manufacturing to conform to Standard No. 209 (15 U.S.C. S 1397 (b) (2)). A manufacturer is not required to follow specifically the test procedures of the standards, but to ascertain, in the exercise of due care, that its product will conform to the standard's requirements when it is tested by the stated methods.; From your description, you have modified the existing procedures by us of a clamp to ensure that all force is applied to the lower torso webbing and hardware or, alternatively, to the upper torso webbing and hardware. While it appears that the contemplated test procedure may evidence the exercise of due care to certify compliance with S4.4, the NHTSA cannot approve a manufacturer's test procedure as the basis of due care in advance of the actual events that underlie certification. It is the manufacturer's responsibility to utilize sound engineering judgment in the exercise of due care.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Acting Chief Counsel

ID: 08-002986drn Angle Guard

ID: 16689b.nhf

Mr. George W. Hicks
Ingenium Services
3889 Mildred Avenue
Rochester Hills, MI 48309-4269

Dear Mr. Hicks:

This responds to your letter requesting permission from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to modify a 1996 Braun Windstar II (Windstar) for a client who has progressive muscular dystrophy (MD). I apologize for the delay in my response. You explain that you need to replace the power seat base originally installed in the Windstar with the smaller power seat base from a 1989 Kneelcar your client drove for six years. You explain that the size of the Windstar's power seat base interferes with your client's ability to drive and requires her to exert considerable physical effort transferring to and from the driver's seat, which you state is problematic due to your client's physical condition. You explain that, with the smaller power seat base from the Kneelcar, your client will only have to exert minimal physical effort transferring to and from the driver's seat. Further, you explain that, due to its smaller size, the Kneelcar's power seat base does not interfere with your client's ability to drive.

While NHTSA cannot provide the specific relief you seek, since we are not authorized to grant waivers of safety standards under these circumstances, we can assure you that we will not institute enforcement proceedings against a commercial entity that modifies the seat base on a vehicle to accommodate the condition you described.

We would like to begin by explaining that NHTSA is authorized to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. Manufacturers are required to certify that their products conform to our safety standards before they can be offered for sale. After the first sale of the vehicle, manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and repair businesses are prohibited from "knowingly making inoperative" any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle in compliance with an applicable standard. In general, the "make inoperative" prohibition (49 U.S.C. 30122) requires businesses which modify motor vehicles to ensure that they do not remove, disconnect, or degrade the performance of safety equipment installed in compliance with an applicable standard. Violations of this prohibition are punishable by civil penalties of up to $1,100 per violation.

There is no procedure by which businesses petition for and are granted permission from NHTSA to modify a motor vehicle. Businesses are permitted to modify vehicles without obtaining permission from NHTSA to do so, but are subject to the make inoperative provision of 49 U.S.C. 30122. In certain limited situations, we have exercised our discretion in enforcing our requirements to provide some allowances to a business which cannot conform to our requirements when making modifications to accommodate the special needs of persons with disabilities.

Removing the original power seat base and replacing it with the power seat base from the 1989 Kneelcar could affect compliance with four standards: Standard No. 207, Seating Systems, Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection, Standard No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies, and Standard No. 210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages. For example, Standard No. 208 requires vehicles to be equipped with specific manual and automatic restraint systems (e.g. seat belts and air bags) and to meet specified injury criteria during a test. Removing the original power seat base and replacing it with a smaller one could affect the vehicle's ability to meet the injury criteria specified in Standard No. 208. In situations such as yours where a vehicle must be modified to accommodate the needs of a particular disability, we have been willing to consider any violations of the "make inoperative" prohibition to be justified by public need. As I have already noted above, NHTSA will not institute enforcement proceedings against a business that replaces the original power seat base with the Kneelcar's power seat base to accommodate the condition you describe.

We caution, however, that only necessary modifications should be made. In addition, you should consult with the manufacturer to determine how to safely install and secure the power seat base to the Windstar. The manufacturer should be able to provide information on how the modification can be safely performed. Finally, if the vehicle is sold, we urge the owner to advise the purchaser that the vehicle has been modified and consider reinstalling the removed safety equipment if appropriate.

You may be interested in knowing that the agency is working on a proposal to regulate the aftermarket modification of vehicles for persons with disabilities by setting out exemptions from the make inoperative prohibition only for certain standards, including Standard 208, and under certain conditions. In place of the agency's current approach where each request for exemption from the make inoperative prohibition is reviewed case-by-case, this proposal would give clear guidance to modifiers about principles to follow when considering vehicle modifications to accommodate someone's disabilities. We intend to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking shortly.

I hope this information has been helpful. If you have any other questions or need some additional information in this area, please contact Nicole Fradette of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,
John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel
ref:VSA
d.5/113/98

ID: nht88-4.4

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 11/07/88

FROM: ERIKA Z. JONES -- NHTSA

TO: SPENCER A. DARBY -- STATE-LITE MFG. CO.

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 05/19/88 FROM SPENCER A. DARBY TO JOAN TILGHMAN RE REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION OF FMVSS 125; OCC-2166; TELECOPY DATED 08/30/88 FROM SPENCER A DARBY TO JOAN TILGHMAN RE 2166

TEXT: Dear Mr. Darby:

This is a response to your letter asking for an interpretation of Standard 125, Warning Devices (49 CFR @ 571.125). I apoligize for the delay in this response. You were particularly interested in learning how Standard 125 affects the use of warning devi ces for vehicles that are 60 inches wide, and that travel in interstate commerce.

Before I answer your specific questions, I would like to present some background information about the authority of this agency which may help you better to understand my answers. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Safety Act) gives this agency authority to establish Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and/or items of motor vehicle equipment. When a standard is established for items of motor vehicle equipment, such as Standard 125 is with respect to warning devices, section 108(a)(1)(A) of the Safety Act specifies that "no person shall manufacture for sale, sell, offer for sale, or introduce or deliver for introduction, or import into the United States" any warning device manufactured after the effective date of Standard 125 that does not comply with Standard 125. Accordingly, Standard 125 regulates the manufacture, distribution, and sale of warning devices.

Note that Standard 125 does not regulate the use of warning devices, because the Safety Act does not give this agency any authority to regulate the operator or operation of any vehicle. The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) does have authority to re gulate some motor vehicle operators and operations. Thus, to the extent that you have any questions about possible Federal regulations regarding the use of warning devices, you should address those questions to the Chief Counsel of the Federal Highway A dministration, located in Room 4213, 400 7th Street, Washington DC 20590. I can only answer questions about how Standard 125 affects your company as a manufacturer of warning devices.

Your questions involve the correct interpretation of @5.1.5 of Standard 125, which reads as follows:

S5.1.5. Each warning device shall have instructions for its erection and display.

(a) The instructions shall be either indelibly printed on the warning device or attached in such a manner that they cannot easily be removed.

(b) Instructions for each warning device shall include a recommendation that the driver activate the vehicular hazard warning signal lamps before leaving the vehicle to erect the warning device.

(c) Instructions shall include the illustration depicted in Figure 3 indicating recommended positioning.

Figure 3, to which S5.1.5(c) refers, shows a disabled vehicle on the side of the road with the warning device positioned one hundred feet to the rear of the vehicle.

Your first question was why Figure 3 in Standard 125 shows a vehicle with only one warning device behind the disabled vehicle, since the FHWA requires vehicles over 80 inches wide to carry three warning devices. The answer is that Standard 125 applies t o warning devices designed to be carried in any motor vehicle, not just those that are over 80 inches wide. Thus, the positioning shown for the warning device in Figure 3 is a recommendation for the proper positioning of a single warning device carried in any vehicle. I note that NHTSA originally proposed to require seven different Figures showing recommended positioning of warning devices for different vehicle types on various highway configurations. In the final rule establishing Standard 125, NHTSA decided that a single figure was sufficient to show the user how to position an erected warning device behind any vehicle type on any highway configuration. See 37 FR 5038, March 9, 1972.

As a part of your first question, you stated that your company includes figures showing how to position three warning devices for a disabled truck on a divided highway and on a non-divided highway in addition to Figure 3. You asked if these additional f igures are permitted by Standard 125. The answer to this question is yes. NHTSA has long said that manufacturers are free to provide additional information, provided that the additional information does not obscure or confuse the meaning of the require d information, or otherwise defeat its purpose. In this case, we have no reason to believe that vehicle operators would be confused or misled by information about how to position three warning devices if they have them. Therefore, Standard 125 does not prohibit the inclusion of these additional figures in your instructions.

Your second question was whether you are required to attach the instructions to the warning device itself, on warning devices sold for use with vehicles under 80 inches wide. The answer to your question is yes. S5.1.5(a) explicitly states: "The instruc tions shall be either indelibly printed on the warning device or attached in such a manner that they cannot easily be removed." This requirement applies to all warning devices, not just to those for use by vehicles more than 80 inches wide. Thus, if the instructions were located on the inside cover of the container, as suggested in your letter, the warning device would not comply with Standard 125.

Your third question was whether NHTSA should amend Standard 125 to include additional illustrative figures showing recommended positioning for warning devices used in vehicles over 80 inches wide. We do not believe there is any reason to do so. As note d above, NHTSA proposed adopting seven figures to show appropriate positioning of warning devices, but determined in the final rule that the single figure provided sufficient information to show users how to position the warning device in relation to any disabled vehicle. As also noted above, manufacturers of warning devices are permitted to include additional illustrative figures to show appropriate positioning of warning devices with particular vehicle types on particular highways.

If you have some further questions or need further information on this subject, please contact Joan Tilghman of my staff at our address, or telephone (202) 366-2992.

ID: 1984-3.23

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 09/12/84

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: M.D. Carter -- International Legal Dept., Hope Computer Corporation AS

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. M. D. Carter International Legal Department Hope Computer Corporation As 1 Hobrovej DK-9560, Hadsund Denmark

This responds to your recent letter requesting clarification of certain of the agency's standards. The answers to your question are discussed below.

1. Standard No. 203, impact protection for the driver from the Steering Control System, does not require the use of a specific design for the steering column. It requires that when the steering column is tested, it must absorb a certain amount of energy. Manufacturers have thus far chosen to meet this requirement by using a steering wheel and column which incorporate an energy-absorbing unit in them so that the column collapses in a controlled manner in a crash. You are correct that an air cushion equipped vehicle complying with the occupant crash protection criterion of Standard No. 208 in a frontal barrier crash does not have to comply with Standard No. 203.

2. You pointed out an inconsistency between the description of Standard No. 216 in DOT pamphlet HS 805 674 and the text of Standard No. 216 codified in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The text in the CFR is correct. Compliance with Standard No. 216 was an alternative to the rollover test of Standard No. 208 prior to August 15, 1977. When the provision allowing compliance with Standard No. 216 as an alternative to the rollover test of Standard No. 208 was eliminated, the text of DOT pamphlet HS 805 674 was not corrected. Thank you for calling this matter to my attention.

3. Your third question asks, in effect, whether automatic or motorized belts are considered automatic restraints under Standard No. 208. You question whether they would qualify since "they still have to be latched." You are correct that if automatic or motorized blts have be latched by an occupant before they will provide protection, they would not be considered automatic restraints by this agency. However, Volkswagen currently sells in the United States an automatic belt system which does not require latching before each use and which is certified as complying with the automatic restraint requirements of Standard No. 208. Like wise, Toyota sells a motorized belt system which does not require latching and is certified as complying with Standard No. 208. I have enclosed for you information a copy of the Department's July 11, 1984, final rule on the automatic restraint requirements of Standard No. 208.

4. Neither Standard No. 301 nor the requirements of Section S9.2 of Standards No. 208 apply to batteries used in battery-powered vehicles. There are no other safety standards that set performance requirement for batteries.

5. Your final question asked whether S4.5.3.3(b) of Standard 208 should conclude with the words "or condition (C). You are correct that the words "or condition (c)" should appear at the end of S4.5.3.3(b). On January 8, 1981, the agency amended section S4.5.3.3(b). The amendment as published in the Federal Register include the words "or condition (c). Unfortunately, the the correct text was not adopted in the Code Federal Regulation. Thank you for bringing this matter to my attention.

Sincerely,

Original Signed by

Frank Berndt Chief Counsel

Enclosure

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 Seventh Street, S.W. Washington D.C. 20590

Att: Mr. Oesch, Office of the Chief Counsel

Dear Sir

I am writing to obtain clarification/interpretation of certain Motor Vehicle Safety Standards contained in 49 CFR 571, certain sections of 14 U.S.C.A., as well as a DOT pamphlet which, though not a statue or regulation, is an official publication providing guidance concerning NHTSA practice which the user cannot glean from the statutes and regulations. Our lack of clarity may be due to inability to promptly obtain the latest changes and materials; thus, I am enclosing photocopies of the sections to which I refer.

1. According to DOT pamphlet HS 805 674, revised November 1983, page 7, SN 203, it would appear that the forward yielding steering column is required ("by providing"), though this requirement nowhere appears in the test of SN 203; is the forward yielding steering column required by the SAE "Steering wheel Assembly Laboratory Test Procedure" or has the forward-yielding steering column proven to be the only way of meeting the requirement in practice in the absence of an air cushion ("by means other than seat belt assemblies",S2)?

2. According to the same DOT pamphlet, SN 216 "provides an alternative to conformity with the rollover tests of SN 208." This alternative is stated in general terms. However, SN 216, S3 expressly exempts convertibles from meeting the rollover standards of SN 208 if they meet the roof crush resistance standards of SN 216. Has this exemption been extended in practice to all passenger cars? Quite clearly, the wording of SN 216 exempts passenger cars meeting the requirements of SN 208's rollover test by means that require no action by vehicle occupants from the roof crush requirements of SN 216, but how is the contrary read form the wording of SN 216?

3. Note on page 312 of 49 CFR 571, 1.Oct.82, defines "no action by vehicle occupants" as used in 49 CFR 571. 208 as "a system that requires no action other than would be required if the protective system were not present in the vehicle. Under this interpretation, the concept does not include 'forced action' systems as described above". Thus, since automatic or motorized belts still have to be latched, they would not qualify as passive restraints, since passive belts are defined in 49 CFR 571. 208 S4.5.3 as requiring "no action by vehicle occupants". The note on page 312 concludes "This interpretation is not intended to rule out the possibility that further rulemaking action may be taken in the future to permit such systems in certain cases." Recent articles have led me to believe that subsequent to 1. October 1982, "passive restraints" have been interpreted to include automatic or motorized belt systems, as will as air cushions and energy-absorbing interiors. Please inform us on the current concepts of "passive restraint" and "no action by vehicle occupants".

4. It is not immediately clear that car batteries or battery-powered cars are covered by 49 CFR 571.301; neither does 49 CFR 571.208 (S9.2) seem to cover batteries. What standards are controlling for the battery power system in a motor vehicle?

5. Hope Motor Company A/S of Denmark has undertaken to import battery-powered motor cars into the United States. If we should need to apply for a 15 USCA 1410(a)(1)(c) exemption, the battery-powered vehicle may be required to quality as a "low-emission vehicle", as defined in 15 USCA 1410(g). Could you confirm that the battery-powered car does indeed qualify as a "low-emission" vehicle? The relevant data are enclosed in schematic form.

6. Should 49 CFR 571.208, S4.5.3.3 in fin (just prior to subsection A) conclude with the words "or condition (C)"?

I would appreciate your prompt assistance in this matter.

Sincerely, HOPE COMPUTER CORPORATION AS M.D. Carter International Legal Department

Encs.