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NHTSA Interpretation File Search

Overview

NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies. 

Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage. 

An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.

  • Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
  • Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
  • The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
  • Some combination of the above, or other, factors.

Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.

Single word search

 Example: car
 Result: Any document containing that word.

Multiple word search

 Example: car seat requirements
 Result: Any document containing any of these words.

Connector word search

 Example: car AND seat AND requirements
 Result: Any document containing all of these words.

 Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.

Phrase in double quotes

 Example: "headlamp function"
 Result: Any document with that phrase.

Conjunctive search

Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.

Wildcard

Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).

Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).

Not

Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”

Complex searches

You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.

Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”). 

Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”

Search Tool

NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search



Displaying 351 - 360 of 2914
Interpretations Date

ID: 1985-04.46

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 12/19/85

FROM: TAKESHI TANUMA -- CHIEF OPERATING OFFICE; NISSAN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INC

TO: ERIKA JONES -- CHIEF COUNSEL NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

TITLE: W-139-H

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 07/21/86 TO TAKESHI TANUMA, FROM ERIKA Z. JONES, REDBOOK A29 (3), PART 543

TEXT: Dear Ms. Jones:

On behalf of Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. of Tokyo, Japan, Nissan Research & Development, Inc., herewith requests interpretation of the term "standard equipment" with respect to the vehicle theft prevention provisions of the Motor Vehicle Information & Cost-Savings Act. Our request follows:

Sections 2025 (a) (1) & 2025 (a) (3) of the Motor Vehicle Information & Cost-Savings Act read as follows:

"(a) (1) Any manufacturer may petition the Secretary for an exemption from the application of any of the requirements of the vehicle theft prevention standard under Section 2022 of this title for any line or lines of passenger motor vehicles which are equipped as standard equipment with an antitheft device which the Secretary determines is likely to be as effective in reducing and deterring motor vehicle theft as compliance with the requirements of such standard." (Emphasis added)

"(a) (3) For purposes of paragraph (1), the term 'standard equipment' means equipment which is installed in a vehicle at the time it is delivered from the manufacturer and which is not an accessory or other item which the first purchaser customarily has the option to have installed." (Emphasis added)

In consideration of these two citations, would the antitheft device be considered "standard equipment" in the following example?

Example -

99.9% of "A" model vehicles are equipped with an antitheft device, and this same rate is projected for the 1987 model year. Of all of "A" model sales, only rental cars destined for Hawaii, Guam and Saipan are not equipped with an antitheft device. Sales figures from October, 1984 through September, 1985 for the "A" model are shown in the table below.$ MO3,18,15,16 With or Without Sales Sales Volume Antitheft Device Destination (10/84 - 9/85) Without Hawaii, Guam 96 & Saipan (Rental cars only) With U.S. -- 101,758 EXCEPT Ren- tal cars in islands above TOTAL 101,854 Thus the non-equipped rate of model "A" is less than 0.1%: (96/101,854) x 100 = 0.094%

We at Nissan thank you for your cooperation and we look forward to your response at your earliest possible convenience. If you have questions or if you require further information, please contact Mr. Tomoyo Hayashi in our Washington, D.C. office at (202) 466-5284.

Sincerely,

ID: nht94-5.16

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: December 22, 1994

FROM: Philip R. Recht -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Michael Love -- Manager, Compliance, Porsche Cars North America, Inc.

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 11/29/94 FROM MICHAEL LOVE TO NHTSA CHIEF COUNSEL (OCC 10533)

TEXT: We have received your letter of November 29, 1994, asking for an interpretation of 49 CFR Part 591.

Specifically, Porsche wishes to import vehicles for the Canadian market through the Port of Charleston, where certain processing activities will be performed on the cars before they are exported to Canada. The temporary importation of Canadian-market ca rs would be through 591.5(c) which allows importation "solely for export", provided that the vehicle is so labeled. You have asked for our concurrence in your interpretation of 591.5(c). We agree that Porsche may import and export Canadian-market cars under this section of the importation regulation.

You foresee a situation in which "a Canadian vehicle with a unique combination of options might be sought by a U.S. customer". Porsche would like to be able to convert the vehicle to comply with the U.S. Federal motor vehicle safety standards after impo rtation and before it leaves Porsche's control. Porsche would also like to be able to re-import from Canada into the U.S. vehicles that would be converted to U.S. specifications. You have asked for confirmation that these operations would also be permi ssible under 591.5(c).

Importation of noncomplying motor vehicles into the United States and their subsequent conversion to the U.S. Federal motor vehicle safety standards must be accomplished through the mechanisms established by Congress in the Imported Vehicle Safety Compli ance Act of 1988 (now 49 U.S.C. 30141 et seq.). First, NHTSA must have decided that the vehicle is eligible for importation pursuant to 49 CFR Part 593. Second, a vehicle intended for sale must be imported under bond by one who has been designated a Re gistered Importer under 49 CFR Part 592, who will undertake to bring the vehicle into compliance and to submit appropriate proof of this to NHTSA. Porsche may become a Registered Importer by filing an application under Part 592.

If a vehicle intended for the Canadian market has been temporarily imported under 591.5(c), and Porsche then wishes to convert it to U.S. specifications rather than export it to Canada, you should telephone Clive Can Orden, Office of Vehicle Safety Compl iance (202-366-2830), to apprise him of the situation. We see no problem in this as long as NHTSA has decided that the vehicle is eligible for importation and Porsche provides a compliance package, in accordance with the requirements of Parts 592 and 59 3.

ID: nht90-2.66

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 05/31/90

FROM: STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL

TO: SATOSHI NISHIBORI -- VICE PRESIDENT INDUSTRY/GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS NISSAN RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT, INC.

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 02/15/90 FROM SATOSHI NISHIBORI -- NISSAN RESEARCH TO STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA; OCC 4485

TEXT: This responds to your letter requesting an interpretation of 49 CFR Part 575, Consumer Information Regulations. Specifically, you asked about the requirement in @ 575.6(a)(2)(i), which requires the "name of the manufacturer" to be inserted in two places in a statement required to appear in the owner's manual. You asked whether you could use the name "Infiniti" as the required "name of the manufacturer" for vehicles manufactured by that division of Nissan Motors, or whether Nissan would have to be ident ified as the manufacturer of those vehicles. The answer is that identifying Infiniti as the manufacturer of the vehicles produced by that division of your corporation would not violate @ 575.6(a)(2), as explained below.

The term "manufacturer" is not specifically defined for Part 575 in @ 575.2. However, @ 575.2(a) provides that all terms used in Part 575 that are defined in section 102 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Safety Act; 15 U.S.C. 1391 ) are used as defined in the Safety Act. Section 102(5) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1391(5)) defines a manufacturer as "any person engaged in the manufacturing or assembling of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, including any person importing m otor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment for resale." According to your letter, Infiniti is a division within Nissan Motor Corporation (USA), the importer of Nissan and Infiniti vehicles. The Infiniti vehicles are assembled by Nissan Motor Company, Ltd. , the parent corporation, in Japan. Hence, both the parent corporation, as the assembler of the Infiniti cars, and the U.S. subsidiary, as the importer of those cars, would be "manufacturers" of the Infiniti cars, within the meaning of the Safety Act.

Generally speaking, when this agency's regulations require disclosure of the name of the manufacturer, it is permissible to identify the

manufacturer as the division that sells and markets the vehicle, instead of naming the corporation of which the division is a part. The only exception to this general rule would arise if naming the division, instead of the whole corporation, as the manu facturer would be likely to confuse the public or otherwise frustrate the purposes of the regulation.

With respect to @ 575.6(a)(2), the preamble to the final rule that added these requirements identified their purpose as "to increase consumer awareness of the [Auto Safety] Hotline and the agency's efforts to strengthen its defect investigation activitie s." 54 FR 48745, at 48746; November 27, 1989. It does not appear that identifying Infiniti, instead of Nissan, as the manufacturer of the Infiniti cars would in any way hamper or frustrate this purpose. Additionally, that preamble also included the foll owing discussion:

NHTSA nevertheless agrees with the commenters that the public should be instructed to also contact the manufacturer. Therefore, the agency has revised the message to state that a consumer should also contact the manufacturer or its designate (e.g., i ts authorized dealer) to resolve safety-related or other problems with the vehicle. 54 FR 48747. (Emphasis added)

This language shows that NHTSA intended these requirements to provide the consumer with necessary information to resolve safety-related or other problems with the vehicle, not to provide the consumer with information about the corporate structure of the manufacturer. In fact, identifying Infiniti instead of Nissan as the manufacturer of Infiniti cars may be more useful information for the purchasers of those cars. Hence, we conclude that nothing in @ 575.6(a)(2) prohibits Nissan from identifying its I nfiniti division as the manufacturer of Infiniti cars.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Marvin Shaw of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

ID: aiam5147

Open
Jay Lee, President Pacific Agritrade Inc. 2601 Elliott Ave. Suite 5139 Seattle, WA 98121; Jay Lee
President Pacific Agritrade Inc. 2601 Elliott Ave. Suite 5139 Seattle
WA 98121;

"Dear Mr. Lee: This responds to your January 14, 1993, letter askin for information on how to have an air bag you wish to import from Korea tested by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our laws and regulations to you. NHTSA is authorized under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq., Safety Act) to issue motor vehicle safety standards that apply to the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA, however, does not approve motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, nor do we endorse any commercial products or conduct pre-sale testing of any commercial products. Instead, the Safety Act establishes a 'self-certification' process under which each manufacturer is responsible for certifying that its products meet all applicable safety standards. I note that the term 'manufacturer' is defined by section 102(5) of the Safety Act to mean 'any person engaged in the manufacturing or assembling of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, including any person importing motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment for resale.' (Emphasis added.) NHTSA has exercised its authority under the Safety Act to establish Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208). Standard No. 208 requires, among other things, that passenger cars provide automatic crash protection. Light trucks will also be required to provide automatic crash protection beginning with the 1995 model year. Vehicles equipped with automatic crash protection protect their occupants by means that require no action by vehicle occupants. Compliance with the automatic crash protection requirements of Standard No. 208 is determined in a dynamic crash test. That is, a vehicle must comply with specified injury criteria, as measured on a test dummy, when tested by this agency in a 30 mph barrier crash test. At this time, manufacturers are not required to use a specific method of automatic crash protection to meet the requirements of Standard No. 208. Instead, each automobile manufacturer is allowed to select the particular method for the automatic crash protection installed in its vehicles. The two types of automatic crash protection currently offered on new passenger cars are automatic safety belts (which help to assure belt use) and air bags (which supplement safety belts and offer some protection even when safety belts are not used). Please note that the automatic crash protection requirement applies to the performance of the vehicle as a whole, instead of setting requirements for the air bag as an individual item of equipment. This approach permits vehicle manufacturers to 'tune' the performance of the air bag to the crash pulse and other specific attributes of each of their vehicle models. However, this approach also means that the Federal standards do not specify specific performance attributes for air bags such as inflated dimensions, actuation time, and the like. It is unclear from your letter if the air bags you wish to import will be sold to manufacturers for installation in new vehicles or if the air bags will be sold as replacement air bags or retrofit air bags for vehicles which do not have air bags as original equipment. If the air bags are sold to manufacturers for installation in new vehicles, the vehicle manufacturer is required to certify that the vehicle complies with all applicable safety standards, including Standard No. 208. If the air bag is added to a previously certified new motor vehicle prior to its first sale, the person who modifies the vehicle would be an alterer of a previously certified motor vehicle and would be required to certify that, as altered, the vehicle continues to comply with all of the safety standards affected by the installation of the air bag. (See 49 CFR Part 567.7.) While most of Standard No. 208's requirements are expressed in terms of the performance of the vehicle as a whole and apply only to new vehicles and not to aftermarket equipment, there is one exception to this. Pressure vessels and explosive devices for use in air bag systems must comply with section S9 of Standard No. 208 whether they are part of a new motor vehicle or are aftermarket equipment. Therefore, the manufacturer of these items must certify that they comply with the requirements of S9 of Standard No. 208. Another Federal requirement that would affect the device if it were installed in a used vehicle, either as a replacement or retrofit air bag, is the 'render inoperative' prohibition in section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(A)) would apply. That section provides that: No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle ... in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard. The 'render inoperative' provision would prohibit a commercial business from installing an aftermarket air bag in a manner that would negatively affect the vehicle's compliance with Standard No. 208. You should also note that a replacement or retrofit air bag would be considered 'motor vehicle equipment' within the meaning of the Safety Act. Therefore, if the air bag contained a defect (either in manufacture, design, or performance) that relates to motor vehicle safety, the manufacturer would be required to conduct a recall campaign to notify owners and to remedy the defect free of charge. You should be aware that recently the manufacturer of an aftermarket air bag that did not provide crash protection benefits to vehicle occupants ceased offering its air bags following a NHTSA investigation. In addition, NHTSA provided information to the Federal Trade Commission concerning the claims made by the manufacturer in its advertising. We suggest you carefully review the manufacturer's test data on the devices you are considering importing to assure yourself that the air bag would afford adequate protection to vehicle occupants in crashes and that the claims made in the company's advertising are true. I have enclosed an information sheet that identifies relevant Federal statutes and NHTSA standards and regulations affecting motor vehicle and motor vehicle equipment manufacturers, and explains how to obtain copies of these materials. I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel Enclosure";

ID: aiam5148

Open
Mr. Steven C. Friedman Director of New Product Development Saddleman, Inc. P.O. Box 3656 80 West 900 South Logan, UT 84323-3656; Mr. Steven C. Friedman Director of New Product Development Saddleman
Inc. P.O. Box 3656 80 West 900 South Logan
UT 84323-3656;

"Dear Mr. Friedman: This responds to your January 19, 1993, lette asking for information on any Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to retrofit air bags. Your letter states that these devices are intended for vehicles which do not have factory-installed air bags. I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our laws and regulations to you. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.) authorizes this agency to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA has exercised this authority to establish Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208). Standard No. 208 requires, among other things, that passenger cars provide automatic crash protection. Light trucks will also be required to provide automatic crash protection beginning with the 1995 model year. Vehicles equipped with automatic crash protection protect their occupants by means that require no action by vehicle occupants. Compliance with the automatic crash protection requirements of Standard No. 208 is determined in a dynamic crash test. That is, a vehicle must comply with specified injury criteria, as measured on a test dummy, when tested by this agency in a 30 mph barrier crash test. At this time, manufacturers are not required to use a specific method of automatic crash protection to meet the requirements of Standard No. 208. Instead, each automobile manufacturer is allowed to select the particular method for the automatic crash protection installed in its vehicles. The two types of automatic crash protection currently offered on new passenger cars are automatic safety belts (which help to assure belt use) and air bags (which supplement safety belts and offer some protection even when safety belts are not used). Please note that the automatic crash protection requirement applies to the performance of the vehicle as a whole, instead of setting requirements for the air bag as an individual item of equipment. This approach permits vehicle manufacturers to 'tune' the performance of the air bag to the crash pulse and other specific attributes of each of their vehicle models. However, this approach also means that the Federal standards do not specify specific performance attributes for air bags such as inflated dimensions, actuation time, and the like. While most of Standard No. 208's requirements are expressed in terms of the performance of the vehicle as a whole and apply only to new vehicles and not to aftermarket equipment, there is one exception to this. Pressure vessels and explosive devices for use in air bag systems must comply with section S9 of Standard No. 208 whether they are part of a new motor vehicle or are aftermarket equipment. Therefore, the manufacturer of these items must certify that they comply with the requirements of S9 of Standard No. 208. Another Federal requirement that would affect a retrofit air bag is the 'render inoperative' prohibition in section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(A)). That section provides that: No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle ... in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard. The 'render inoperative' provision would prohibit a commercial business from installing an aftermarket air bag in a manner that would negatively affect the vehicle's compliance with Standard No. 208 or any other safety standard. You should also note that a replacement or retrofit air bag would be considered 'motor vehicle equipment' within the meaning of the Safety Act. Therefore, if the air bag contained a defect (either in manufacture, design, or performance) that relates to motor vehicle safety, the manufacturer would be required to conduct a recall campaign to notify owners and to remedy the defect free of charge. Please note that recently a manufacturer of an aftermarket air bag that did not provide any crash protection benefits to vehicle occupants recalled its air bags following a NHTSA investigation. In addition, NHTSA provided information to the Federal Trade Commission concerning the claims made by the manufacturer in its advertising. We suggest you carefully review the test data on the devices you are considering importing to assure yourself that the air bag would afford adequate protection to vehicle occupants in crashes and that the claims made in the company's advertising are true. I also note that, based on the product information you provided with your letter, NHTSA technical staff raised possible concerns about the air bag you are considering importing. The design differs from other air bags in two significant ways. First, while the crash sensor for air bag systems is normally located in the vehicle structure, yours is not. Second, while air bags generally are released toward the driver's chest from the steering wheel, your air bag would be released from above toward the driver's face and chest. For driver crash protection, the crash sensor of an air bag system must initiate deployment of the air bag early enough in a crash to position the inflated air bag between the driver and the steering wheel in time to cushion the impact. At the same time, it must not be so sensitive that it deploys the air bag in non-crash situations. Given the ways in which the crash sensor of your system differs from other air bag systems, our technical staff questions whether it is possible for it to initiate deployment early enough in a crash to provide occupant protection yet not be so sensitive that it deploys the air bag in non-crash situations. In addition, while the inadvertent deployment of any air bag system would raise safety concerns, the location of your air bag would increase those concerns, since it would appear to interfere with the driver's forward vision even after deflation. I have enclosed an information sheet that identifies relevant Federal statutes and NHTSA standards and regulations affecting motor vehicle and motor vehicle equipment manufacturers, and explains how to get copies of these materials. I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel Enclosure";

ID: aiam4800

Open
William F. Canever, Esq. Staff Attorney Office of General Counsel Ford Motor Company The American Road Dearborn, MI 48l2l; William F. Canever
Esq. Staff Attorney Office of General Counsel Ford Motor Company The American Road Dearborn
MI 48l2l;

"Dear Mr. Canever: This responds to your letter concerning th implications under the Corporate Average Fuel Economy ('CAFE') program of the acquisition by Ford Motor Company ('Ford') of Jaguar plc ('Jaguar'). You stated that you believe all Ford and Jaguar vehicles produced and imported for model year ('MY') 1989 should be placed in Ford's fleet. As discussed below, we have concluded that Ford's acquisition of Jaguar did not take place until MY 1990. Thus, Ford and Jaguar vehicles constituted separate fleets for MY 1989. As a consequence, while the fuel economy credits earned by the combined Ford/Jaguar fleet in MY l990 may be applied to reduce (or eliminate) Jaguar's CAFE shortfall in MY 1987 and later years, the credits earned by Ford in MY 1989 may not be applied to offset any Jaguar shortfall. According to your letter, Ford publicly announced its tender offer for Jaguar shares on November 2, l989. This occurred after Ford had obtained the agreement of the Board of Directors of Jaguar to recommend the offer. The offer document, which constituted the formal legal offer, was mailed on November 8. After over 50 percent of Jaguar stock had been tendered, Ford declared the tender offer 'unconditional' on December l0, l989. You stated that during the period of negotiation, tender offer, and acceptance, and continuing through the end of calender year l989, Ford was 'manufacturing' MY l989 vehicles. Apparently, that statement is based on your statement that a small number of MY l989 Jaguar and Aston Martin vehicles were imported into the United States 'through calendar year end l989.' You argued that because Ford controlled Jaguar and the importer of Jaguar vehicles prior to the time that the last of these MY l989 vehicles were imported, and because fuel economy standards apply to particular model years as a whole and not to separate parts of a model year, all Ford and Jaguar vehicles produced and imported for MY l989 should be placed in Ford's fleet. You contended that this treatment would be consistent with that accorded Chrysler Corporation ('Chrysler') and American Motors Corporation ('AMC') for model year l987. We disagree with your analysis comparing your situation to that of Chrysler/AMC, given significant differences in the timing of the respective acquisitions. In a letter to Chrysler dated April 4, l990, NHTSA stated the following: Another issue raised by Chrysler's memorandum is whether Chrysler and AMC became the same manufacturer for fuel economy purposes for model year l987. According to the memorandum, Chrysler agreed to acquire AMC in the spring of l987, and the transaction closed on August 6, l987. . . . Since Chrysler controlled AMC prior to the end of the l987 model year, and since fuel economy standards apply to particular model years as a whole and not to separate parts of a model year, it is our opinion that all of the vehicles produced by both Chrysler and AMC for model year l987 shall be treated as if manufactured by the same manufacturer, i.e., placed into one fleet. Otherwise, one or both of the manufacturers would have two separate CAFE values, pre-acquisition (or pre-control) and post-acquisition (or post-control), for the same model year. We continue to adhere to our view that where one manufacturer acquires another during a model year, they should be deemed as the same manufacturer, with a single CAFE value, for that model year. However, in the Chrysler/AMC acquisition, all relevant aspects of the transaction took place during the l987 model year. As you know, the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act ('Act') establishes time limits within which NHTSA must establish and/or amend fuel economy standards for a given model year that are based upon the beginning of the model year. See sections 502(b) and 502(f)(2) of the Act. In interpreting those provisions, both NHTSA and the courts have concluded that the model year is traditionally thought to start approximately October l. See In re Center for Auto Safety, 793 F.2d l346, l349 (D.C. Cir. l986), 49 Fed. Reg. 225l6 (May 30, l984), 49 Fed. Reg. 4l250 (October 22, l984). See also General Motors Corporation v. NHTSA, 898 F.2d l65, l76 (D.C. Cir. l990), Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 7l0 F.2d 842, 847 (D.C. Cir. l983). In the Chrysler/AMC case, all relevant aspects of the transaction were completed well before the completion of MY 1987, i.e., September 30, l987. Conversely, in the Ford/Jaguar transaction, Ford made its tender offer in early November 1989 and declared the tender offer 'unconditional' on December 10, 1989. These dates and any other possible date for the acquisition are clearly within the l990 model year, which began on approximately October l, l989. We recognize that manufacturers may produce or import vehicles that are designated as belonging to a particular model year after October l of that year. However, for purposes of deciding the model year in which one manufacturer acquires another, we have concluded that the traditional model year is the appropriate frame of reference. This conclusion is supported by the fact that by early November l989, the earliest date referred to in your letter, when Ford made its tender offer, it had been selling its MY l990 models for over a month. The fact that Ford or Jaguar may have produced or imported a small number of MY 1989 cars after the date of the acquisition is not determinative, since it has always been the case that model years can overlap for a given manufacturer, and some prior model year cars may be produced after the commencement of a given model year. Thus, any MY 1989 Jaguar vehicles that were imported during the last three months of 1989 should be included in Jaguar's MY 1989 fleet, as they would have been had the acquisition not occurred. I note that your letter indicated that Ford intended to file its Final l989 Model Year Report under the CAFE program with all MY 1989 Jaguar vehicles included in Ford's fleet. You stated, however, that you would not file that Report until you received this agency's views on the propriety of that action. For the reasons set out above, we believe that Ford and Jaguar had separate, distinct fleets in MY 1989, and that therefore separate information should be filed for that model year. I hope that this letter adequately explains our position on these issues. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Sincerely, Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel";

ID: nht88-4.27

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 12/07/88

FROM: ROBERT J. LATUS -- POSTMASTER US POST OFFICE PAW PAW, MICHIGAN

TO: NHTSA

TITLE: PRIMARY BRAKE LIGHT

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 03/02/89 FROM ERIKA Z. JONES -- NHTSA TO ROBERT J. LATUS, REDBOOK A33, STANDARD 108

TEXT: One of my Rural Carriers recently purchased a new 1989 Oldsmobile Ciera. She purchases a new car about every 4 years and prefers a new car over taking chances with a used one.

When she arrived at work with the new car, naturally she was proud and invited her co-workers and supervisor outside to look at it. The supervisor took the opportunity to check the lights turn signal etc. In checking it was discovered that when the 4-w ay hazard lights are activated, the only brake light is the much smaller light in the center of the trunk lid. The customary solid signal of the corner lights continue to flash instead of giving the STOP that they had in former models. When questioned, the dealer called Detroit, himself wondering why the change? and was told that this was the new federal regulation. He was also informed that any alteration of what came off of the assembly line was in violation of this new regulation.

I have visited many car lots and found that the "Big 3" auto makers have the same problem on their larger models. The small cars and foreign cars do not.

My question is, who changed the regulation and why? My safety and yours are at stake. Many delivery vehicles use these lights in fog, snow or rain, and their STOP is now hidden under mud, snow or a broken wire.

I have found it to be the opinion of the dealers that I have talked to that the reasoning must have been economics. Perhaps a savings of 60~ per car is more important than the safety of the delivery person or the person that is likely to run into them.

Outside warning devise on the top of these cars have proven to be less effective because of the elements. Lights that are permanently installed - and not on a extension cord as the center light brake light is in some models are much more dependable.

The center light, be it on the inside where melting snow will obscure it completely when the heating coil is activated or the outside light on the extreme rear of the trunk lid under a trim vane where it will accumulate a "back wash" of mud or snow are n ot adequate.

I have been in contact with Mr. Burl Ghastin, Michigan State Police Trafic Safety Division; Les Sokolowski, The National Safety Council, Chicago; and Postal Inspector Jerry Rosenthal in Detroit and they all feel that an explanation from your agency shoul d be sought.

In the interest of Safety, I am

ID: nht80-4.20

Open

DATE: 11/07/80

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: International Harvester

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. Stephen E. Mulligan International Harvester 4O1 North Michigan Avenue Chicago, IL 60611

Dear Mr. Mulligan:

This is in response to your letter of October 1, 1980, in which you ask whether compliance with 49 CFR 567, Certification, will satisfy the requirements of S4.3 of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 115, 49 CFR 571.115.

Section 4.3 of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 115 requires that the vehicle identification number (VIN) "appear clearly and indelibly upon either a part of the vehicle other than the glazing that is not designed to be removed except for repair or upon a separate plate or label which is permanently affixed to such a part." S4.3.1 requires each character to appear in a capital, sans typeface. In the case of passenger cars and trucks of 10,OOO pounds or less GVWR, each character must have a minimum height of 4 mm. s4.4 specifies that the VIN for passenger cars and trucks of 10,000 pounds or less GVWR shall be located within the passenger compartment.

Section 567.4 of Part 567, Certification (49 CFR 567), requires that the certification label be permanently affixed to the vehicle, and display the vehicle identification number. Consequently, for all vehicles except passenger cars and trucks of lO,OOO pounds or less GVWR, compliance with S 567.4 of Part 567 would also effect compliance with S4.3 of Standard No. 115 so long as capital, sans typeface was used.

Sincerely,

Frank Berndt Chief Counsel

October 1, 1980

Mr. Frank Berndt U.S. Department of Transportation Office of the Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 7th Street, S.W. Washington DC 20590

Dear Mr. Berndt:

I am writing to request clarification of requirements which arise under Part 567 - Certification. S 567.4 requires each manufacturer of motor vehicles to affix to each vehicle a label which shall be permanently placed so that it cannot be removed without destroying or defacing it. The label is required to contain the vehicle identification number (VIN).

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 115 requires that each vehicle manufactured have a VIN which shall appear clearly and indelibly upon either a part of the vehicle or upon a separate plate or label permanently affixed to such a part.

International Harvester Company requests confirmation that compliance with the certification label requirements of Part 567 insures that there is also compliance with the VIN requirements set forth in FMVSS 115.

Thank you for your time and attention to this matter.

Very truly yours,

Stephen E. Mulligan

SEM:sh

ID: nht80-1.18

Open

DATE: 02/28/80

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Hugh A. West, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your letter of October 22, 1979, addressed to Mr. Nelson Erickson. Please accept my apologies for the lateness of our reply. Your letter asked whether Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 114, Theft Protection, was intended to prevent a small child or animal left unattended in a parked automobile (model year 1973) from which the keys have been removed, from intentionally or accidentially moving the gear selection level from the "Park" position. The answer to your question is no, for the reasons noted below. You also requested a copy of any technical analysis that may have been done in the development of Safety Standard 114. Although the public docket contains analyses pertinent to later versions of Safety Standard 114 it contains none pertinent to any version of the standard applicable to passenger cars manufactured in 1973. The only analyses pertinent to these earlier versions of the standard are contained in documents which contain internal agency opinion and recommendations and thus are not publicly available.

When Safety Standard 114 was adopted in 1968 its stated purpose was to "reduce the incidence of accidents resulting from unauthorized use." (33 FR 6471, April 27, 1968). This goal was based on evidence which showed that: "cars operated by unauthorized persons are far more likely to cause unreasonable risk of accident, personal injury and death than those which are driven by authorized individuals," (33 FR 6471, preamble). Neither the rule nor the preamble states that the standard was intended to accomplish any other goal.

As adopted, the standard required that all passenger cars manufactured on or after January 1, 1970, be equipped with a key locking system that (upon removal of the key) would prevent "activation of the car's engine or other main source of motive power; and either steering or self-mobility or both." Safety Standard 114 in its current form also provides manufacturers with this option. The preamble to the standard simply stated that a steering or self-mobility lock was needed in order ". . . to defeat car thieves who start cars with so-called 'master keys' and devices which bypass the [ignition] lock . . ." (33 FR 6471).

In light of the compliance option described above and the purpose of Safety Standard 114 as expressed both in the standard itself and in the preambles of various Federal Register notices, it appears that Safety Standard 114 was not intended to apply to the situation described in your letter.

If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Ms. Debra Weiner of my staff at 202-426-2992.

Sincerely,

ATTACH.

HUGH A. WEST, INC.

ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT LAW

October 22, 1979

N. F. Erickson -- Safety Standards Engineer, U. S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Reference: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard #114

Dear Mr. Erickson:

I thank you for your letter of October 12, 1979 and the enclosed copy of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard #114 as I requested.

The purpose of my inquires have been to determine whether there was any Motor Vehicle Safety Standard which would require an automobile manufactured in 1973 (1973 Chevrolet Vega) to have as part of its safety equipment, a device which would lock the gear selection lever in the "Park" position when the key was removed from the ignition switch after the lever had been locked. I understand that automobile manufacturers would have little difficulty in having such a locking system as part of the steering column gear-selection method.

The particular gear-selection lever on the car in question was a console model. The car was parked on an incline, the gear selection lever being placed in the "Park" position, the ignition key removed after the ignition system had been placed in the locked position, and the driver exited the vehicle. Thereafter, the car rolled down the incline and a 5 year old child within the car was drowned. When the car was recovered, the gear selection lever was in the "Neutral" position. It is unknown whether the gear selection lever was intentionally or accidentally removed from the "Park" position.

We are particularly concerned as to whether or not this problem was a recognized hazard which the standard was trying to correct. It is obvious that if the steering column were locked so as to prevent the steering of the vehicle, and any child, or an animal, left unattended in the vehicle could move the gear shift lever, the vehicle would obviously be set into motion on an incline with absolutely no control over its movement. It would then become an extreme hazard not only to a small child, as here, being within the vehicle, but other users of the highways and streets toward whom the uncontrollable mass of metal was moving.

If there are other standards which may be applicable to our particular situation, I would appreciate your forwarding a copy of the same to me. We would also appreciate your sending to us a Technical Analysis Study, if any were done, on Standard #114.

We sincerely appreciate your kind assistance.

Very truly yours,

Walter S Felton

cc: Thomas L. Woodward, ESQ.

ID: 86-6.28

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 12/31/86

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Aaron M. Lowe -- Executive Director, Vehicle Security Association

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. Aaron M. Lowe Executive Director Vehicle Security Association 5100 Forbes Boulevard Lanham, MD 20706

This responds to your letter dated July 22, 1986, requesting this agency to withdraw the granting of four petitions for exemption from the vehicle theft prevention standard.

You state in your letter that the Vehicle Security Association (VSA) challenges the granting of petitions to Volkswagen of America, Inc., General Motors Corporation, Isuzu Motors Corporation, and Nissan Research and Development, Inc. for exemption of certain vehicle lines beginning in model year 1987. For the reasons given below, the agency believes these petitions for exemption from the vehicle theft prevention standard were properly granted according to the requirements of section 605 of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act and 49 CFR Part 543, Petition for Exemption from the Vehicle Theft Prevention Standard.

You state that the lack of theft data concerning vehicles marked in accordance with the theft prevention standard makes it difficult for NHTSA to make a determination, based upon substantial evidence, that a standard equipment antitheft device is likely to be as effective as compliance with Part 541 in reducing and deterring theft. You add that the agency is not required to approve petitions for exemption and request that the agency withdraw its grants of those petitions for that reason.

Section 605 of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act permits vehicle manufacturers to petition NHTSA to allow high theft vehicle lines to be exempted from the standard. To be exempted, a high theft line must be equipped with an antitheft device as standard equipment and NHTSA must determine that antitheft device is likely to be as effective as parts making in reducing and deterring theft. This section requires that the agency's determination to grant or deny a petition be made within 120 days after the date of filing the petition. If the agency fails to make a determination within the specified time period, this section also states that the petition shall be considered granted.

In the notices granting the petitions filed by these four manufacturers, NHTSA noted that the limited and apparently conflicting data on the effectiveness of the pre-standard parts marking programs makes it difficult in the first year of this legislation's implementation to compare the effectiveness of an antitheft device with the effectiveness of compliance with the theft prevention standard. Section 605 clearly requires such a comparison, which the agency has made on the basis of the limited data available. However, the House Committee Report states that section 605 was adopted because the Committee was willing to give standard equipment antitheft devices "an opportunity to be proved as effective in deterring theft as the numbering standard." H. R. Rep. No. 1087, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., at 17. The agency believes that Congress did not intend that the data limitations in the early phase of implementing the theft prevention standard result in across-the-board denials of exemption petitions.

If, as the standard is implemented, NHTSA receives data indicating that a manufacturer's antitheft device has not been as effective in reducing and deterring motor vehicle theft as compliance with the theft prevention standard, the agency may terminate the exemption under section 605(d). The agency will be monitoring these and other theft data in an attempt to effectively implement the purposes of the vehicle theft legislation.

Sincerely

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

July 22, 1986

Ms. Erika Jones Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 7th Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Ms. Jones:

VSA officially challenges the granting of petitions to Volkswagon/Audi, General Motors, Isuzu, and Nissan by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) for exemptions from the marking requirements of The Motor Vehicle Theft Law Enforcement Act of 1984. VSA firmly contends that the petitions did not meet the requirements as established by the Act and therefore should not have been granted.

VSA is a trade association representing manufacturers, manufacturer's representatives, distributors, and retailers of vehicles security systems. These companies sell primarily in the aftermarket. While VSA strongly believes that the installation of security systems in cars can be of great benefit in preventing the incidence of theft, we also must point out that one of the prime benefits of aftermarket security systems as they are installed today in the variety of systems and the differences in installation of each system on each car. These permutations add a degree of difficulty for thieves attempting to steal cars with aftermarket antitheft systems.

The opposite holds true for cars standard equipped with security systems. NHTSA itself provides the reasoning behind this difference. In its "Report on Automobile Antitheft Devices," NHTSA states "once thieves had determined the means to defeat one manufacturer's system, they would, in essence, be able to defeat all such systems since they would be manufactured to the same specifications. Such a result would clearly be inconsistent with the goals of the Theft Act."

Although the agency confines its discussion to a federal standard for security systems, the argument can be extended against original equipment systems. All manufacturers if they standard equip a car line with a security system, must manufacture the systems to the same specifications. Therefore what is true for a federal standard also is true for a standard equipped system. Once a thief disengages a security system on one car in a car line, he can perform the same feat with the remainder of the cars he comes upon in that line. The word "standard" in either case spells trouble for the car owner who possesses such a system. VSA admits that impressive data on the effectiveness of standard equipped security systems was reported in the NHTSA "Report on Automobile Antitheft Devices" regarding the Nissan 280 ZX and the Cadillac Eldorado Convertible; however, NHTSA itself admits that this data is inconclusive. NHTSA's statistics seem to show that in the short term, a standard equipped system could be beneficial. However, as thieves learn the systems, we we question how effective they will be in the long term.

NHTSA's regulations mention that this provision of the Theft Act is to provide this technology an opportunity. VSA wonders whether a car owner who spends over $20,000 for a new car will appreciate it being stolen in order to provide the car companies with an experiment which they could have accomplished without government sanction. We further question whether a car owner will be grateful to hear, that once the car is stolen, recovery of the vehicle will be less likely because the car maker was exempted from the parts marking standard.

NHTSA seems to be inventing Congressional intent rather than implementing the letter of the law. Section 605 (a) (1) of the theft auto states: "Any manufacturer may petition the Secretary for an exemption from the application of any of the requirements of the vehicle theft prevention standard under section 602 for any line or lines of passenger motor vehicles which are equipped as standard equipment with an antitheft device which the Secretary determines is likely to be as effective in reducing and deterring motor vehicle theft as compliance with the requirements of such standard." Part (c) of this section states that the Secretary shall make the determination based upon "substantial evidence".

NHTSA admits in its regulations that there is little substantial evidence from which to make that determination. "The agency realizes that empirical data bearing directly on the effectiveness of marking done in compliance with the theft prevention standard will not be available for petitions for model years 1987 or 1988. The agency will have to make determinations based partially on engineering judgements about the information otherwise available to the agency on the effectiveness of means for reducing and deterring theft".

VSA feels compelled to remind NHTSA that no where in the law is it required to approve exemptions. If NHTSA concludes that it cannot make a determination on whether a system will likely be as effective as marking parts based on substantial evidence, then the Agency should act responsibly and reject the petition. NHTSA appears to be struggling to justify the petitions based on "engineering judgements." Such tortured interpretations of the law are clearly contrary to public interest.

VSA therefore requests that NHTSA withdraw the granted petitions and instead require marking of the parts according to the law.

Thank you for your attention and we look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

Aaron M. Lowe Executive Director

Request an Interpretation

You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:

The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590

If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.

Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.

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