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NHTSA Interpretation File Search

Overview

NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies. 

Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage. 

An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.

  • Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
  • Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
  • The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
  • Some combination of the above, or other, factors.

Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.

Single word search

 Example: car
 Result: Any document containing that word.

Multiple word search

 Example: car seat requirements
 Result: Any document containing any of these words.

Connector word search

 Example: car AND seat AND requirements
 Result: Any document containing all of these words.

 Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.

Phrase in double quotes

 Example: "headlamp function"
 Result: Any document with that phrase.

Conjunctive search

Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.

Wildcard

Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).

Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).

Not

Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”

Complex searches

You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.

Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”). 

Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”

Search Tool

NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search



Displaying 3501 - 3510 of 16490
Interpretations Date

ID: 10188

Open

Ms. Frances J. Chamberlain
6724 63rd Place N.E.
Marysville, Washington 98270

Dear Ms. Chamberlain:

This responds to your letter asking about how this agency's regulations might apply to your product. I apologize for the delay in sending this letter. You explained in a telephone conversation with Paul Atelsek of this office that your product is an emergency kit the size of an "oversize notebook." The kit contains a radio. In completing your design, you are considering whether to attach it to the back side of the front seats or under those seats. You asked whether the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has any regulations as to the distance that must be kept clear between the back side of the driver's seat and the back seat. You are considering marketing the kit for passenger cars and light trucks through retail outlets, and possibly also through automobile dealerships as an optional accessory.

The short answer to your question is that, while there are no regulations concerning clearance between the front and back seats, there are Federal requirements that may affect the sale of this product. I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our regulations. I am also enclosing a copy of a fact sheet titled "Information for New Manufacturers of Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Equipment."

By way of background information, NHTSA is authorized to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS's) for new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. These are contained in title 49, part 571 of the Code of Federal Regulations. As you recognize in your letter, your safety kit is an accessory and thus an item of motor vehicle equipment.

While your emergency kit is an item of motor vehicle equipment, NHTSA has not issued any standards for such an item. Nevertheless, there are other provisions of law that may affect the manufacture and sale of your product. Installation of your product on the back of front seats could have an impact on compliance with Standard No. 201, Occupant

protection in interior impact. S3.2 of that standard basically requires that seat backs have a certain amount of cushioning to provide protection when struck by the head of rear seat passengers during a crash. If your emergency kit were installed so that a hard object (e.g., the radio) contained within it were to be struck by the head, the requisite amount of cushioning might not be achieved. We note that there are no safety standards regulating the underside of the seats, which you have said is another interior space where you are considering mounting the emergency kit.

Which legal requirements apply depends on how your product is marketed. If your product were installed by a vehicle manufacturer as original equipment, the vehicle manufacturer would have to certify that the vehicle with the emergency kit installed complies with all FMVSS's, including Standard No. 201.

A commercial business that installs your emergency kit would also be subject to provisions of the U.S. Code that affect modifications of new or used vehicles. Section 30122(b) of Title 49 provides that:

A manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business may not knowingly make inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle ... in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard . . .

This means that a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business must not install your device if the system renders inoperative the vehicle's compliance with the FMVSS's. For instance, compliance with Standard No. 201 might be degraded if the emergency kit were mounted in front of rear seat passengers. Any violation of this "make inoperative" prohibition would subject the violator to a potential civil penalty of up to $1,000 for each violation.

The "make inoperative" prohibition does not apply to modifications that vehicle owners make to their own vehicles. Thus, Federal law would not apply in situations where individual vehicle owners install your emergency kit in their own vehicles, even if the installation were to result in the vehicle no longer complying with the safety standards. However, NHTSA encourages vehicle owners not to degrade any safety device or system installed in their vehicles. In addition, individual States have the authority to regulate modifications that individual vehicle owners may make to their vehicles, so you might wish to consult State regulations to see whether your device would be permitted.

You as the product's manufacturer are subject to the requirements in sections 30118-30122 of Title 49 of the U.S. Code concerning the recall and remedy of products with defects related to motor vehicle safety. In the event that the manufacturer or NHTSA determines that the product contains a safety related defect, the manufacturer would be responsible for notifying purchasers of the defective equipment and remedying the problem free of charge.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions about NHTSA's safety standards, please feel free to contact Mr. Atelsek at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Philip R. Recht Chief Counsel

Enclosure

ref:VSA d:2/6/95

1995

ID: nht76-1.46

Open

DATE: 03/08/76

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; R. B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Georgette A. Sears

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of January 6, 1976, requesting information as to the Federal standards and regulations that are applicable to the manufacture of an "18' pull type horse/stock trailer combination."

Manufacturers of trailers of the type you describe must certify that their product is in compliance with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment, 49 CFR 571.108, and Standard No. 120, Tire Selections and Rims for Vehicles Other Than Passenger Cars, 49 CFR 571.120. Please note, however, that Standard No. 120 is not effective until August 1, 1976, for the rim marking requirements (S5.2), and September 1, 1976, for the remaining requirements, so trailers manufactured before these times will not have to be certified as being in compliance with Standard No. 120.

The procedure for certification is specified in 49 CFR Part 567, and requires the manufacturer to affix a label to his product certifying that it is in compliance with the requirements of applicable Federal regulations. You should check the trailer that you purchase to make certain there is a certification label. Part 567.4(d) specifies that the certification label for trailers shall be affixed to a location on the forward half of the left side, such that it is easily readable from outside the vehicle without moving any part of the vehicle.

There are no Federal regulations concerning the connection of trailers to trucks or other vehicles. Nevertheless, from a safety stand point it is important that you ascertain the hauling capacity of your truck-trailer system in order to avoid overloading that could create potential safety hazards. You should obtain information from the manufacturer concerning the "tongue weight" of the trailer when fully loaded, and relate it to the gross axle weight ratings of your towing vehicle, found on its certification label on the door or door post. The trailer manufacturer may also have further recommendations as to the capacity of the vehicle needed to tow one of his trailers safely.

Please contact us if we can of any further assistance.

YOURS TRULY,

EASTERN TURTLE TOP

TO: U.S. Gov't-Dept of Transportation National Transportation Safety Board General Info.

SUBJECT: Trailer Safety Date: Jan. 6, 1976

Gentlemen: I would like to know what Federal Standards apply to the building of an 18' pure type horse/stock trailer combination. I am in the process of ordering one from a company in Ohio (ARK) and want to be certain it is a safe carrier - including the connection to my pick-up truck. Can you help me to ascertain what is considered safest for our personal safety and the safety of others on the road? Thank you. (P.S. This transfer will haul 4-Horses or 6 (11001b) show cattle ----)

Sincerly, Georgette A. Sears

ID: nht95-2.73

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: May 9, 1995

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Musa K. Farmand -- Gonzalez & Farmand, P.A.

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 04/27/95 LETTER FROM MUSA K. FARMAND TO MARY VERSAILLES

TEXT: Dear Mr. Farmand:

This responds to your letter of April 27, 1995. Your letter concerns a law suit in which you represent plaintiffs injured in an automobile accident. In this law suit, the counsel for the defendant has moved to amend his answer to assert that 49 CFR 571 .208, paragraph S4.1.5.2(c)(2) requires each state to allow for mitigation of damages in any seat belt use law and that paragraph preempts the Florida mandatory seat belt law. According to your letter, the Florida law "does not allow a mitigation of dam ages defense with respect to an alleged failure to wear a seat belt." As explained below, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration agrees with you that the Florida safety belt use law is neither expressly nor impliedly preempted by Federal law.

Purpose of Paragraph S4.1.5.2(c) (2)

Before discussing the issue of preemption, I want to discuss the background and purpose of Paragraph S4.1.5.2(c)(2). That paragraph was added to Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208) as part of a final rule issued July 17, 1984 co ncerning automatic restraints (49 FR 28962). That final rule required all new cars to have automatic protection (air bags or automatic belts) starting in the 1990 model year. The final rule included a provision that the automatic restraint requirement would be rescinded if the Secretary of Transportation determined, not later than April 1, 1989, that a sufficient number of States had enacted belt use laws meeting certain minimum criteria to cover at least two-thirds of the U.S. population (paragraph S 4.1.5). Under S4.1.5, the Secretary was not required to make any determination about any State safety belt laws. In fact, the Secretary never did so, in part because not enough States adopted mandatory seat belt use laws of any sort prior to April 1, 1 989. Because no determination was made under S4.1.5, the automatic restraint requirements are now in effect for all passenger cars.

The minimum criteria were set forth in S4.1.5.2 of Standard No. 208. n1 One of the criteria was "a provision specifying that the violation of the belt usage requirement may be used to mitigate damages . . ." (S4.1.5.2(c)(2)). However, S4.1.5 neither pur ported to require nor was intended to require States to enact safety belt use laws. In addition, S4.1.5 did not require that any State safety belt use laws had to incorporate the minimum criteria of S4.1.5.2. Paragraph S4.1.5 merely provided that the S ecretary would rescind the automatic restraint requirement if he or she determined that a sufficient number of States enacted laws which met the criteria of S4.1.5.2 by April 1, 1989.

n1 Your letter correctly notes that this provision was deleted from Standard No. 208 by a final rule issued on September 2, 1993 (58 FR 46551).

Preemption

The Florida safety belt use law is not and never has been either expressly or impliedly preempted by Federal law.

Standard No. 208 was issued under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 which expressly preempts state laws only to the extent provided by section 30103. That section provides for the express preemption of State motor vehicle safety standards that are not identical to Federal standards. However, the Florida seat belt law is not a motor vehicle safety standard within the meaning of Chapter 301, since it does not regulate motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment performance. Accordingly, the Florida law is not express ly preempted.

The Florida law is not impliedly preempted because (1) Congress has not occupied the field of regulation of the behavior of motor vehicle occupants; and (2) the Florida seat belt law does not conflict with any Federal law or interfere with the objectives of Federal law.

I hope this information has been helpful. If you have other questions or need some additional information, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: 10878

Open

Mr. Musa K. Farmand
Gonz555-B Blanding Boulevard
Orange Park, FL 32073

Dear Mr. Farmand:

This responds to your letter of April 27, 1995. Your letter concerns a law suit in which you represent plaintiffs injured in an automobile accident. In this law suit, the counsel for the defendant has moved to amend his answer to assert that 49 CFR 571.208, paragraph S4.1.5.2(c)(2) requires each state to allow for mitigation of damages in any seat belt use law and that paragraph preempts the Florida mandatory seat belt law. According to your letter, the Florida law "does not allow a mitigation of damages defense with respect to an alleged failure to wear a seat belt." As explained below, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration agrees with you that the Florida safety belt use law is neither expressly nor impliedly preempted by Federal law.

Purpose of Paragraph S4.1.5.2(c)(2)

Before discussing the issue of preemption, I want to discuss the background and purpose of Paragraph S4.1.5.2(c)(2). That paragraph was added to Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208) as part of a final rule issued July 17, 1984 concerning automatic restraints (49 FR 28962). That final rule required all new cars to have automatic protection (air bags or automatic belts) starting in the 1990 model year. The final rule included a provision that the automatic restraint requirement would be rescinded if the Secretary of Transportation determined, not later than April 1, 1989, that a sufficient number of States had enacted belt use laws meeting certain minimum criteria to cover at least two-thirds of the U.S. population (paragraph S4.1.5). Under S4.1.5, the Secretary was not required to make any determination about any State safety belt laws. In fact, the Secretary never did so, in part because not enough States adopted mandatory seat belt use laws of any

sort prior to April 1, 1989. Because no determination was made under S4.1.5, the automatic restraint requirements are now in effect for all passenger cars.

The minimum criteria were set forth in S4.1.5.2 of Standard No. 208 . One of the criteria was "a provision specifying that the violation of the belt usage requirement may be used to mitigate damages..." (S4.1.5.2(c)(2)). However, S4.1.5 neither purported to require nor was intended to require States to enact safety belt use laws. In addition, S4.1.5 did not require that any State safety belt use laws had to incorporate the minimum criteria of S4.1.5.2. Paragraph S4.1.5 merely provided that the Secretary would rescind the automatic restraint requirement if he or she determined that a sufficient number of States enacted laws which met the criteria of S4.1.5.2 by April 1, 1989.

Preemption

The Florida safety belt use law is not and never has been either expressly or impliedly preempted by Federal law.

Standard No. 208 was issued under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 which expressly preempts state laws only to the extent provided by section 30103. That section provides for the express preemption of State motor vehicle safety standards that are not identical to Federal standards. However, the Florida seat belt law is not a motor vehicle safety standard within the meaning of Chapter 301, since it does not regulate motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment performance. Accordingly, the Florida law is not expressly preempted.

The Florida law is not impliedly preempted because (1) Congress has not occupied the field of regulation of the behavior of motor vehicle occupants; and (2) the Florida seat belt law does not conflict with any Federal law or interfere with the objectives of Federal law.

I hope this information has been helpful. If you have other questions or need some additional information, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

ref:208 d:5/9/95 Your letter correctly notes that this provision was deleted from Standard No. 208 by a final rule issued on September 2, 1993 (58 FR 46551).

1995

ID: 2707y

Open

Mr. M. Iwase
General Manager
Technical Administration Dept.
Shizuoka Works
Koito Manufacturing Co. Ltd.
500, Kitawaki
Shimizu-shi, Shizuoka-ken
Japan

Dear Mr. Iwase:

This is in reply to your letter of August 22, l990, to Erika Z. Jones, formerly the Chief Counsel, requesting an interpretation of Standard No. l08.

You state that section S7.7.5.2(a)(2)(iv) of Standard No. l08 requires that the horizontal indicator of a vehicle headlamp aiming device (VHAD) shall be capable of re-calibration over a movement of +/- 2.5 degrees, and you would like us to confirm our interpretation of the method and procedures of recalibration on the vehicle after repair from accident damage. You say that NHTSA "interprets as follows: If the dimensional specifications of vehicle body and appropriate instruction are described in shop manual, re-calibration could be addressed." (55 FR pages 4425 and 4426, February 8, l990). You stated that Koito did not believe that this method is practicable.

We believe that you have misunderstood the Federal Register notice. The notice was the agency's response to petitions for reconsideration of Section S7.7.5.2(a)(2)(iv). Subsection (iv) states that the horizontal aim indicator of a VHAD "shall be capable of recalibration over a movement of +/- 2.5 degrees . . . to accommodate any adjustment necessary for recalibrating the indicator after vehicle repair from accident damage." Ford Motor Company had commented that this requirement was unduly restrictive. It asked NHTSA to allow the option of a VHAD with only a vertical aim indicator if the headlamps as installed met a suggested horizontal aim specification of 0.0 +0.8/-0.4 degree.

NHTSA, believing in the importance of horizontal aim capablility, found that a principal area of concern was that circumstances could occur during the life of the vehicle that could adversely affect maintenance of correct horizontal aim, and that without horizontal aim capability, it was unclear that the accuracy of horizontal aim could be assured after repair of accident damage. It was at that point that NHTSA observed:

"Manufacturers could address this concern by providing dimensional data for precise structural alignment of the vehicle in shop manuals and appropriate instructions for performing the necessary and potentially extensive parts replacement and vehicle reconstruction requisite for correct horizontal aim."

However, NHTSA went on to say that this concern was already met by subsection (iv) which requires the horizontal aim indicator to be capable of recalibration after crash damage or vehicle repair. NHTSA denied Ford's petition. Thus, it did not propose or adopt a requirement, as Ford wanted, that a manufacturer could provide instructions in place of a VHAD with a horizontal aim indicator. The existing requirement of subsection (iv) remained unchanged. Thus, it is the manufacturer's decision on how to provide for recalibration after crash damage and vehicle repair. Therefore, as long as a VHAD complies with subsection (iv), a manufacturer may provide whatever re-calibration instructions it deems appropriate.

I hope that this answers your question.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel

ref:l08 d:l0/3/90

1989

ID: aiam1229

Open
Seymour Charles, M.D., Physicians for Automotive Safety, 50 Union Avenue, Irvington, NJ 07111; Seymour Charles
M.D.
Physicians for Automotive Safety
50 Union Avenue
Irvington
NJ 07111;

Dear Mr.(sic) Charles: This is in reply to your letter of July 12, 1973, concerning children' car harnesses and car seats.; In response to your inquiry about the Auto-babe' car harness, it i our opinion that the harness is a Type III seat belt assembly under Standard No. 209 and we presently are investigating the product as an apparent noncompliance with the standard.; The next stage in the rulemaking on child restraints will be reache this fall with a notice of proposed rulemaking on dynamic test requirements. We will be interested to have your comments on this proposal when it is issued.; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Acting Chief Counsel

ID: aiam4458

Open
Mrs. Charlotte E. O'Neil l46 Transit Street Waterbury, CT 06704; Mrs. Charlotte E. O'Neil l46 Transit Street Waterbury
CT 06704;

"Dear Mrs. O'Neil: This responds to your letter concerning the locatio of the clutch, brake and accelerator controls in a school bus that you drive. We apologize for the delay in our response. You stated that the seat of the school bus is about four inches too far to the right, and that these controls are therefore not in the usual location relative to the seat. You stated: 'In order to reach the brake pedal I have to cross my right foot over my left,' and expressed concern that a driver might accidentally hit the accelerator instead of the brake. You asked whether Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. l0l, Controls and Displays, prohibits placing controls in such difficult to reach locations and, if not, whether there is any way to get the law changed. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issues safety standards covering new motor vehicles and/or new motor vehicle equipment. Since these standards do not apply to used vehicles, the issue of whether the bus you drive was required to meet Standard No. l0l depends on its date of manufacture. As you noted in your letter, Section S5.l of Standard No. l0l requires that certain controls, including the service brake, accelerator, and clutch, be 'operable by the driver' when the driver is restrained by the crash protection equipment required by Standard No. 208. You asked whether, with this wording, any control that can be reached at all, even with difficulty, must be considered 'operable.' One of the stated purposes of Standard No. l0l is 'to ensure the accessibility . . . of motor vehicle controls . . . in order to reduce the safety hazards caused by the diversion of the driver's attention from the driving task, and by mistakes in selecting controls.' Thus, it is the intent of section S5.l to ensure that drivers are able to operate specified controls as part of the normal driving task. We note, however, that neither Standard No. l0l nor any other standard specifies the precise location of the service brake, accelerator and clutch controls, either relative to each other or to the seat. In answer to your question concerning how you may be able to get requirements changed 'to forbid putting controls in difficult to reach locations,' interested persons may petition the agency to commence rulemaking to issue or amend safety standards. I am enclosing a copy of the agency's regulation which sets forth procedures for submitting petitions for rulemaking. I am forwarding your letter to NHTSA's Office of Enforcement, which investigates consumer complaints about safety. A copy of this correspondence is being placed in the public docket. Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel Enclosure";

ID: aiam1438

Open
Mr. Philip H. Taft, Tire Retreading Institute, 1343 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005; Mr. Philip H. Taft
Tire Retreading Institute
1343 L Street
N.W.
Washington
D.C. 20005;

Dear Mr. Taft: This is in reply to your letter of February 22, 1974, concerning a article in the November 1973 *Retreader's Journal* entitled 'Repairing Torn Beads.' You ask whether the article is correct when it states that casings with cord exposed in the bead area may be retreaded.; Standard No. 117 (S5.2) prohibits the retreading of any casing on whic bead wire or cord fabric is exposed before processing. 'Processing' encompasses the entire process, including the making of any needed repairs, by which a casing is retreaded. The NHTSA has taken the position that the only exception to this prohibition is that casings with exposed chafer fabric bay be retreaded. A casing that before processing has any exposed bead or cord material other than chafer fabric, however, may not be retreaded. Therefore, insofar as the Retreader's Journal article states that casings with exposed cord in the bead area may not be retreaded it is incorrect. We have sent a copy of this letter to the *Retreader's Journal*.; Sincerely, Lawrence R. Schneider, Chief Counsel

ID: nht72-5.20

Open

DATE: 06/20/72

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Truck Equipment & Body Distributors Association

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of May 9, 1972, in which you asked several questions concerning certification of multistage vehicles.

Your first set of questions concerned the "altering distributor" label of @ 567.6. In the course of administering this regulation, we have come to regard this as an "optional" label -- one that is not absolutely required in any situation. If a person altering a completed vehicle does not make changes significant enough to make him a remanufacturer who recertifies the vehicle as a manufacturer, he may satisfy the requirements by allowing the existing label to remain in place. In the four examples that you provided in paragraph 2 of your letter, we would consider the first two examples (bumper and tail gate loader) to be marginal ones in which we would probably accept a good-faith determination either way by the person making the alterations, while the last two (brake fluid and fenders) appear to be minor enough that no recertification would be necessary. This also answers your last question.

(Paragraph 4) You are right in suggesting that once a vehicle purchaser takes possession of the vehicle, the standards and regulations no longer apply.

(Paragraph 5) It is true that if a person manufactures a vehicle and uses it himself, it must still conform when he sells it at a later time. To hold otherwise could create a loophole, whereby a manufacturer could make nominal use of his vehicles before selling them.

(Paragraph 6) The passage of the article on my discussion mentioning "liability" dealt with a question on remanufactured vehicles. I don't have a transcript, but it looks as though he was quoting a couple of sentences out of context (although the article was generally good reporting). I was making the point that there could be a level of "rebuilding" a vehicle where the work done, the parts replaced, are so extensive that we would consider it to be manufacturing. It would be an unusual situation. I was indeed referring to compliance with the standards and regulations, not product liability.

Your discussion of installation of third axles seems to reflect a proper understanding of our rules.

With reference to your question in paragraph 8 about the period of time a vehicle must be held by a customer before he can have non-standard alteranations made in it, there is no set period of time. After he has "purchased" it, he can have done with it what he wants. However, the Vehicle Safety Act @ 108(b)(1), does have one important phrase on that subject: "in good faith." If we found that a dealer or distributor were using the first-purchase clause as a ruse to do things that the standards and regulations would not otherwise allow, we would probably do everything we could to stop it--to show that it was not in good faith.

I am glad to be of help to you and your members. I hope, however, that you will limit your questions to situations that have actually arisen, since we do not have the resources to grapple with hypothetical questions.

ID: nht94-2.83

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: May 12, 1994

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: David Fabrycky

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached To Letter Dated 12/4/93 From David Fabrycky To NHTSA Chief Counsel (OCC-9433)

TEXT: Dear Mr. Fabrycky:

This responds to your letter about an aftermarket product you wish to manufacture. The product is a child safety seat buckle shield, which is intended to prevent a child from opening the buckle on a child restraint system. You state that your device wou ld cover the buckle and prevent the child from gaining access to the pushbutton of a child seat buckle. To depress the pushbutton, the device requires that a latch be actuated and the cover pivoted away from the buckle. You indicated that the device re quires "manual dexterity to exert the forces in many directions simultaneously."

Although we understand your concern that young children not be able to easily unbuckle a child safety seat, we have reservations about devices that interfere with the unbuckling of the seats. I hope the following discussion explains those reservations a nd answers the questions in your letter about the effect of our regulations on your product.

Our agency has the authority to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. We have exercised this authority to establish Safety Standard No. 213, "Child Restraint Systems," which applies to all new child restraint systems sold in this country. However, Standard 213 does not apply to aftermarket items for child restraint systems, such as your buckle shield. Hence, you are not required to certify that this product complies with Standard 213 before selling the product.

Additionally, you are not required to get "approval" from this agency before selling the buckle shield. NHTSA has no authority to "approve" motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, nor do we endorse any commercial product. Instead, the National Traff ic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act establishes a "self-certification" process under which each manufacturer is responsible for certifying that its products meet our safety standards. The agency periodically tests vehicles and equipment items for compliance with the standards, and also investigates alleged safety-related defects.

2

Although we do not have any standards that directly apply to your product, there are several statutory provisions that could affect it. Manufacturers of motor vehicle equipment such as your buckle shield are subject to the requirements in sections 151-1 59 of the Safety Act concerning the recall of products with defects related to motor vehicle safety. The agency does not determine the existence of safety defects except in the context of a defect proceeding, and thus is unable to say whether your produ ct might or might not contain such a defect. However, the agency is concerned that people be able to easily and quickly operate a child safety seat buckle in an emergency. As the agency said in a rule on the force level necessary to operate child restr aint buckles:

The agency's safety concerns over child restraint buckle force release and size stem from the need for convenient buckling and unbuckling of a child and, in emergencies, to quickly remove the child from the restraint. This latter situation can occur in instances of post-crash fires, immersions, etc. A restraint that is difficult to disengage, due to the need for excessive buckle pressure or difficulty in operating the release mechanism because of a very small release button, can unnecessarily endanger the child in the restraint and the adult attempting to release the child. (50 FR 33722; August 21, 1985)

It appears that your product could significantly increase the difficulty of using the buckle release and thus hinder a person attempting to release the belt in an emergency.

In addition, use of your product could be affected by section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act. That section prohibits commercial businesses from knowingly tampering with devices or elements of design installed in an item of motor vehicle equipment, such as a child safety seat, in compliance with the Federal motor vehicle safety standards. In determining the effect of a buckle shield on a child seat's compliance with Standard 213, NHTSA would evaluate the performance of the seat with the buckle shield i nstalled. Standard 213 specifies several elements of design with which a child restraint system is unlikely to comply if your buckle shield were installed. Section S5.4.3.5 of Standard 213 requires the pushbutton release for any buckle on a child restr aint to have a minimum area for applying the release force. Since your device will completely cover the buckle when installed, the buckle shield would cause the child restraint to no longer comply with this requirement. That section also requires the b uckle to release when a specified maximum force is applied. Your device will not allow the buckle to release when the force is applied because it will cover the buckle and require force to be applied "in many directions simultaneously." Your device woul d thus cause the child restraint to no longer comply with that requirement. Therefore, commercial establishments cannot

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legally install your device on customers' child safety seats. In addition, section S5.7 of Standard 213 requires each material used in a child restraint system to comply with the flammability resistance requirements of Standard 302, "Flammability of Int erior Materials." If your buckle shield does not comply with the requirements of Standard 302, commercial establishments cannot legally install your device.

The prohibition of section 108(a)(2)(A) does not apply to individual vehicle owners who may install or remove any items on child restraint systems regardless of the effect on compliance with Standard 213. However, our policy is to encourage child restra int owners not to tamper with or otherwise degrade the safety of their child restraints.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please contact Ms. Deirdre Fujita of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Request an Interpretation

You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:

The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590

If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.

Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.

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