ID: nht76-5.44

DATE: 01/13/76

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank A. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: GENERAL Motors Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of December 2, 1975, asking this agency's opinion as to whether Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 115, Vehicle Identification Number, would preempt any differing State law or regulation specifying the content of a vehicle identification number. You asked the question in the context of a Vehicle Equipment Safety Commission action recommending such a regulation to the States.

Standard No. 115 requires a vehicle identification that is unique to a manufacturer during any ten-year period. It does not specify the length or the content of the number. The question, therefore, becomes whether the Federal safety standard on vehicle identification numbers was intended generally to cover all aspects to those numbers, and preempt any differing State rules, analogously to the situation in which Standard 108 was held to be preemptive in Motorcycle Industry Council v. Younger, No. CIV S74-126 (E. D. Cal. 1974). The guiding rule, as set forth by the U. S. Supreme Court in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 141-142 (1963), is "whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing federal superintendence of the field." Under the accepted doctrines as set forth in cases such as Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U. S. 268 (1969), and Chrysler v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499, 511-12 (2d Cir. 1969), the interpretation of this question by the administering agency is "of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."

The NHTSA has determined that the safety standard on vehicle identification numbers, No. 115, is intended to cover all aspects of vehicle identification numbering relative to the vehicles to which it applies, and that any aspects for which there are no specific requirements were intended by this agency to be left to the discretion of the manufacturers. State regulations differing from the Federal standard on this subject are found to "impair the federal superintendence of the field," within the meaning of the Florida Lime doctrine, and any such State regulation would be preempted under section 103(d), 15 U.S.C. 1392(d).

SINCERELY,

ATTACH.

November 14, 1975

James B. Gregory -- Administrator, U. S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration DEAR DR. GREGORY:

Re: Preemption and FMVSS 115

The Vehicle Equipment Safety Commission (VESC) will hold a hearing on December 11, 1975 in Kissimmee, Florida preliminary to adoption of a regulation entitled "Minimum requirements for the design of a vehicle identification number system for passenger cars". The regulation, if adopted at the VESC meeting, would apply to passenger cars registered in States that in turn adopt the VESC regulation.

Due to the relationship between the VESC and its member States [discussed in detail below], the December 11 hearing raises the real concern that one or more States will adopt the proposed VESC regulation as a part of their vehicle code within a few months thereafter. Thus, the VESC regulation can be expected to very quickly become part of the vehicle law in several states.

The proposed VESC regulation is not identical to the performance requirements of FMVSS 115, "Vehicle Identification Number". The difference will be discussed in detail below.

Section 103(d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 states in part:

Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard.

General Motors is of the opinion that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) intended FMVSS 115, "Vehicle Identification Number", to be a comprehensive, uniform and exclusive safety standard applicable" to all aspects of vehicle identification numbering; that generally those State vehicle identification numbering requirements which apply to passenger cars and which are not identical to FMVSS 115 are preempted by FMVSS 115 under

authority of Section 103(d) as quoted above; and that specifically those provisions dealing with the content of the digits and letters used in the vehicle identification number are preempted by FMVSS 115 under authority of Section 103(d). GM anticipates that NHTSA holds the same opinion in the matter as GM does and requests that NHTSA express its opinion on this important subject in response to this letter and to the VESC prior to the December 11 meeting.

VESC AND ITS MEMBER STATES

The Beamer Resolution, Public Law 85-684, August 20, 1958, gave Congressional assent to agreements or compacts among States for "cooperative effort and mutual assistance in the establishment and carrying out of traffic safety programs, including but not limited to, the enactment of uniform traffic laws . . . and . . . for the establishment of such agencies, joint or otherwise, as they deem desirable for the establishment and carrying out of such traffic safety programs". Attached is a copy of the Beamer Resolution.

The Vehicle Equipment Safety Compact was subsequently developed as the mechanism by which States could compact with one another for the purposes stated in Public Law 85-684. Attached is a copy of the Compact.

Article III of the Compact creates the VESC as the agency of the member States.

As stated in Article I, subsection (b)(1), of the Compact, one purpose of the Compact is to "promote uniformity in regulation of and standards for equipment". Article V of the Compact authorizes the VESC after hearings to adopt "rules, regulations or codes embodying performance requirements or restrictions for any item or items of equipment covered in the report [indicating the need for regulation]". (This provision appears in the Compact notwithstanding the fact that the Beamer Resolution relegates compact activities in the field of "safe automobile . . . design" to research only.) Under Article V of the Compact, once a regulation has been adopted by the VESC, each party State must duly consider it for adoption.

Sections (e), (f), and (g) of Article V of the Compact provide that member States may adopt or reject VESC regulations by administrative or legislative action as appropriate under individual State constitutions and statutes.

Forty-two States and the District of Columbia are now members of the Vehicle Equipment Safety Compact. The eight states that are not members are Alabama, Alaska, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, South Carolina, and West Virginia.

In thirty of the member States, a VESC regulation becomes a mandatory State equipment requirement only after the individual State's Legislature enacts it into law.

A VESC regulation, however, can be adopted by administrative action alone in the following twelve States: Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Maryland (deemed approved in absence of legislative disapproval), New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont and Virginia.

Under the procedure followed by VESC, the December 11 hearing may be the final administrative step before adoption by VESC of this regulation. Indeed, the first line of the attached Notice of Public Hearing states that the hearing is preliminary "to final adoption" of the regulation. Following VESC adoption, as many as twelve States can adopt the VESC regulation administratively without legislative action, whereupon the regulation acquires the force of law immediately in those States. In those twelve States, six months is the maximum time within which to act but no minimum time is specified.

The twelve States not only may adopt the VESC regulation but are required by statute to do so unless "the public safety" requires otherwise. Article V, section (g) of the Compact, which has been incorporated in the statutes of the member States, so provides. If only "public safety" is relevant in the State hearing prior to adoption of the regulation by an individual State, an objection that the regulation is preempted by FMVSS 115 under authority of Section 103(d) might not be heeded.

Since its establishment, the VESC had adopted a number of regulations. Among them are Regulation V-1, New Tires; Regulation (Illegible Word) Minimum Requirements For Motor Vehicle Connecting Devices and Towing Methods; Regulation VESC-6, Minimum Requirements For School Bus Construction and Equipment; and VESC-9, Safe Operating Condition of Truck and Bus Type Tires.

VESC can adopt the regulation soon after the December 11 hearing and thereby trigger simultaneous action in forty-two States and the District of Columbia to adopt the regulation as law. If the NHTSA does not express its opinion on preemption at the VESC hearing or prior to adoption by VESC of the regulation, it will be necessary for each of the forty-three member jurisidictions to consider the merits of the preemption argument individually with possibly differing results.

Thus, urgent need exists for the NHTSA to express its position on preemption at or soon after the December 11 VESC hearing.

DIFFERENCES IN CONTENT BETWEEN PROPOSED VESC REGULATION AND FMVSS 115

FMVSS 115 and the proposed VESC regulation apply to the same class of vehicles, namely, passenger cars. See paragraph 2, Scope, of proposed VESC regulation.

The attached yellow pages from the VESC proposal deal with the passenger car regulations. The pink pages deal with a proposal for non-motive power recreational vehicles which is included for information only.

Paragraph 6 of the proposed VESC regulation sets forth the basic requirements. These require the VIN to contain in sequence exactly two digits called the Make Code Field, five or fewer digits called the Identifier Field, and exactly eight digits called the Indicator Section.

FMVSS 115 does not expressly address the make-up of the vehicle identification number. However, it is GM's understanding that FMVSS 115 is intended by the NHTSA to be a comprehensive, uniform, and exclusive standard covering all aspects of vehicle identification numbering. As such, the absence of an express requirement concerning the make-up of the vehicle identification number does not permit a State to impose such a requirement. This understanding is supported by your letter of November 8, 1973 to Mr. W. Pudinski of the Department of California Highway Patrol concerning FMVSS 108. See Attachment. In that letter you stated:

The implication of the California opinion is that any mode of design or performance that is not expressly dealt with in the Federal standard is open to regulation by

the States. Such a position is impractical, where the agency's intent is to have a comprehensive, uniform regulation in a given area . . . Congress clearly intended the NHTSA to establish a single set of uniform standards to which manufacturers must comply, and that intent would tend to be defeated by the position taken in the California opinion. Federal regulation has a negative as well as a positive aspect: in determining that there should be certain requirements in an area, we also are deciding against imposing others. The only way to effectuate such a decision is to declare, as we have done here, that our regulation is intended to be exclusive, and to describe as necessary its outer limits. [Emphasis added]

POTENTIAL INTERFERENCE WITH FUTURE NHTSA PLANS

If it is assumed for sake of argument only that preemption is not present, adoption of the VESC regulation in any of the VESC member jurisdictions could result in serious practical complications of future NHTSA plans.

In September 1975, the International Standards Organization (ISO) adopted two vehicle identification number standards: Vehicle Identification Numbering System 3779

and World Manufacturer Identifier Coding System 3780, which apply to all "road vehicles" including passenger cars. The text of the officially adopted standards will issue in January 1976. The European Economic Community (EEC) or Common Market Council, at its November 7, 1975 meeting, began considering these ISO standards for incorporation in the proposed EEC Council directive for statutory places and inscriptions for motor vehicles and trailers. Once the Common Market Council has incorporated the ISO standard, all Common Market countries must within 18 months "accept" the standard, i.e., recognize the standard as the exclusive or an alternative method of compliance with vehicle identification numbering requirements.

The ISO standard sets a maximum of 17 digits in the VIN. Although the standard can be met by fewer than 17 digits, one or more of the Common Market countries may adopt the standard in a way that requires no more and no less than 17 digits. Regardless of whether this happens, there is a direct conflict between the ISO standard which sets a maximum of 17 digits and the proposed VESC regulation which sets a maximum of 15 digits.

The ISO standard includes a World Manufacturer Identifier in the vehicle identification number which makes it possible to identify the country of origin as well as the manufacturer. This feature of the standard presumably will facilitate efforts to curtail international taffic in stolen cars. For that reason, it may be favored by the Interagency (DOT-Justice) Committee on Auto Theft Prevention. If curtailing international traffic in stolen cars prevents some car thefts from occurring in the United States, it may be that the NHTSA would also favor incorporating the ISO standard in FMVSS 115. If so, there will be a

head-on conflict with any VESC member jurisdiction that has adopted the VESC regulation because the VESC regulation requires two and only two digits in the Make Code Field, whereas the ISO standard requires three.

In the absence of Federal preemption in this matter, if any of the Common Market countries adopt the ISO standard in such a way that the 17 digits permitted by that standard are mandatory, adoption of the VESC standard in any of the VESC member-state jurisdications would require domestic manufacturers to have two separate VIN systems, one for vehicles sold in the United States and another for vehicles sold for export. This would be a confusing, wasteful and untenable situation.

GM respectfully requests NHTSA's opinion regarding FMVSS 115 in relation to the VESC regulation and the adoption thereof by any State or the District of Columbia. Your opinion should also be conveyed directly to the Vehicle Equipment Safety Commission either at the December 11 meeting or at the VESC headquarters in Washington.

Frank W. Allen -- Assistant General Counsel, GENERAL MOTORS

ENCS.

ID: nht88-3.85

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 11/01/88 EST

FROM: ERIKA Z. JONES -- CHIEF COUNSEL NHTSA

TO: WILLIAM E. LAWLER -- SPECIFICATIONS MANAGER INDIANA MILLS & MANUFACTURING, INC.

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 08/01/88 TO ERICA Z. JONES FROM WILLIAM E. LAWLER; OCC - 2362

TEXT: Dear Mr. Lawler:

This responds to your request for an interpretation of Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR @ 571.208). Specifically, you noted that a final rule published July 6, 1988 (53 FR 25337) upgrades the safety belt requirements for heavy vehicl es manufactured on or after September 1, 1990. One of the new requirements for those safety belts is that, if an automatic locking retractor (ALR) is used, that retractor "shall not retract webbing to the next locking position until at least 3/4 inch of webbing has moved into the retractor." Standard No. 208 sets forth this requirement in section S4.3.2.2 for trucks and multipurpose passenger vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating of more than 10,000 pounds, and in section S4.4.2.2 for buses. You asked whether an ALR that depended on a mechanism external to the retractor itself to prevent it from retracting webbing to the next locking position would comply with S4.3.2.2 and S4.4.2.2. The answer to your question is no.

The agency explained in detail the reasons why the final rule did not adopt the proposed requirement for all heavy vehicle safety belts to be equipped with emergency locking retractors only; see 53 FR 25338-25340. The proposed prohibition of ALR's in he avy vehicles was based on the tendency of current designs of ALR's to become progressively tighter around an occupant as the vehicle travels over potholes or other jarring surfaces of the road. However, NHTSA acknowledged in the final rule that some nev er designs of ALR's do not exhibit this tendency. In response to these newer designs of ALR's, the agency said:

Therefore, this rule has been expanded from the proposal, in order to permit ALR's with anti-cinch capability to be installed in heavy vehicles. For the purposes of this rule, anti-cinch capability is determined by examining the working of the retrac tor after it has locked after the initial adjustment of the safety belt. 53 FR 25339.

This language explicitly states that the "working of the retractor" is what determines whether an ALR on a heavy vehicle belt complies with the requirements of Standard No. 208. Since the focus is exclusively on the "working of the retractor," an ALR mu st comply with these requirements without depending upon any external mechanisms to assist it. Any ALR that cannot satisfy these requirements without the assistance of external mechanisms would not comply with Standard No. 208's requirements for ALR's o n heavy vehicles.

This conclusion is reinforced by the agency's statement that:

"NHTSA believes it is appropriate to measure compliance with this new 3/4 inch minimum webbing travel requirement for ALR's in Standard No. 208 under the same conditions currently specified for determining compliance with the existing 1-inch maximum w ebbing travel requirement for ALR's in Standard No. 209." 53 FR 25340.

The 1-inch maximum webbing travel requirement for ALR's is set forth in section S4.3(i) of Standard No. 209. Since Standard No. 209 became effective in 1968, the agency has determined whether ALR's comply with this requirement by examining the performan ce of the retractor itself without any assistance from external mechanisms. As explained in the final rule, the same procedure (examining the performance of the retractor itself without any assistance from external mechanisms) will be used to measure co mpliance with the minimum webbing travel requirements in Standard No. 208.

In your letter, you requested that we issue an interpretation that any ALR that complies with Standard No. 209 can rely on the use of an external mechanism, such as your company's "Komfort-Lok," to comply with the minimum webbing travel requirements of S tandard No. 208 for ALR's on safety belts in heavy vehicles. I cannot do so, for the reasons explained above. Any ALR used on a heavy vehicle safety belt must satisfy the minimum webbing travel requirements in Standard No. 208 by the working of the ret ractor itself, without the use of any external mechanisms.

Sincerely,

ID: nht80-3.13

DATE: 06/30/80

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Mercedes-Benz

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

FMVSS INTERPRETATION

Mr. Craig Jones Mercedes-Benz One Mercedes Drive Montvale, New Jersey 07645

Dear Mr. Jones:

This responds to the questions you raised with Stephen Oesch and John Carson on May 8, 1980, about Standard No. 101-80, Controls and Displays. your question concerned a heating and windshield defrosting and defogging system developed by Mercedes. As requested, I have enclosed the originals of the drawing and photoqraph of the system you left with the agency.

The system consists of five controls: three rotating knobs, one of which controls the heat for the left side of the vehicle, one to control the heat on the right side, and one to control a fan. The other two controls are sliding levers, one of which directs the air flow to the windshield and the other directs air toward the floor. Your first question concerned the use of a green dot and the symbol specified by column 3 of Table 1 for identifying the defrosting and defogging system. You wish to place the symbol adjacent to the slide lever that controls air flow to the windshield and to place the green dot immediately below the symbol. The green dot would be used to identify the position on each of the other four controls that would provide the maximum defrosting or defogging of the windshield.

Section 5.2.1 provides that the identifying symbol specified in column 3 of Table 1 "shall be placed on or adjacent to the control." The section also provides that "additional words or symbols may be used at the manufacturer's discretion for the purpose of clarity." In this case, Mercedes has properly identified the control used to defrost or defog the windshield (the slide that directs air to the windshield) with the symbol specified in column 3 of Table 1 and placed it adjacent to the control. In addition, Mercedes has used the green dot to identify the positions on the heating system needed to obtain maximum defrosting and defogging. Since the additional symbols clarify the use of the heating controls, the use of the green dot is permissible.

Your second question concerned the identification required for the heating system. Section 5.2.2 specifies that "Identification shall be provided for each function of any ...heating and air conditioning control, and for the extreme positions of any such control that regulates a function over a quantitative range." Section 5.2.2 further provides that "If this identification is not specified in Tables 1 or 2, it shall be in word form unless color coding is used. If color coding is used to identify the extreme positions of a temperature control, the hot extreme shall be identified by the color red and the cold extreme by the color blue." The rotary knobs Mercedes uses for the heating system control a single function over a quantitative range, from no heat to maximum heat and thus the extreme positions require identification. The rotary knob shown in your drawing does not comply with section 5.2.2 because it does not identify the extreme positions of the control either in words or in the color coding system required for temperature controls.

Your final question concerned the identification necessary for the slide levers that control the air flow to the windshield or the floor. As mentioned above, section 5.2.2 specifies that "Identification shall be provided for each function of any...heating and air conditioning control, and for the extreme positions of any such control that regulates a function over a quantitative range." Section 5.2.2 further specifies that "If this identification is not specified in Tables 1 or 2, it shall be in word form unless color coding is used." The slide lever Mercedes uses for the air flow controls a single function over a quantitative range, from no air to maximum air, and thus the extreme positions require identification. Mercedes has used a series of geometric shapes-which are highlighted by a color (white) to indicate which direction to move the slide lever to obtain more air. That color in and of itself has no meaning and therefore, it is not part of a color coding system. Those geometric shapes must be accompanied by or replaced by words in order to identify the positions for minimum and maximum air or an appropriate color coding system should be used.

If you have any further questions, please let me know.

Sincerely,

Frank Berndt Chief Counsel

Enclosure

ID: aiam3454

Dear Mr. Adduci: On June 5, representatives of MVMA met with representatives of thi agency to discuss various issues concerning the application of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 115. At that meeting, the MVMA representatives requested clarification of the agency's policy on correction of errors made by vehicle manufacturers in their vehicle identification numbers (VIN's). This letter responds to that request.; The agency shares your concern about the potential difficultie associated with correcting erroneous VIN's and will attempt to minimize the burdens involved with any required corrective action. Nevertheless, the agency must consider the safety benefits of an accurate, national VIN system, as well as the anti-theft and other benefits of such a system.; This letter focuses on some of the most likely VIN errors and discusse whether those errors in vehicles sold to consumers would be inconsequential as the errors relate to safety, and, if not, what type of remedy would have to be provided to vehicle owners. Corrective action involving the replacing of an erroneous VIN plate or label or the restamping of the VIN on part of the vehicle is the most desirable remedy. However, there may be less burdensome remedies that would be effective and satisfy the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.; One type of error which could be easily corrected is an error in single VIN character other than the check digit or a character monitored by VIN users. The agency would likely regard such an error as inconsequential if the vehicle manufacturer submitted the necessary corrected decoding information to the agency. The agency would place this information in a public file, thereby making it available to other VIN users. With this corrected decoding information available, the agency's safety research activities would not be impaired and manufacturers would still be able to conduct recall campaigns where necessary.; A second type of error involves an erroneous check digit or othe character monitored by vehicle records systems of States or other VIN users. Erroneous check digits could adversely affect our ability to conduct research and to monitor recalls, since the error rate of VIN transcription would presumably be higher in the absence of a properly functioning check digit. Further, without some form of corrective action by the manufacturer (such as restamping or the use of a correction label), vehicle purchasers could face rejections by State, insurance, and other data-processing systems using the check digit to verify transcription accuracy. However, the agency is also concerned that the use of labels could create opportunities for auto theft operations to generate bogus VIN's. Therefore, the agency is presently inclined to treat erroneous check digits as inconsequential noncompliance if the manufacturer reports the errors to the agency. However, as discussed below, the agency is planning to invite public comment on this question before establishing a final position on the matter.; A third type of error involves the physical aspects of the VIN itself For example, a manufacturer might use a type face other than the sans serif type face required by the standard. Although errors of this type would have to be resolved on a case-by-case basis, they would likely be deemed inconsequential because they would present no problems to the agency, other VIN users, or vehicle owners.; The most difficult type of errors would involve a major error i numbering which would impair the safety and other uses of the VIN. An extreme example of such an error would be a situation where a manufacturer numbered many of its vehicles identically, or where the VIN's were totally illegible. An error of that magnitude could impair the manufacturers' (sic) ability to conduct recall campaigns and the ability of the agency to monitor them. It would also cause serious problems for all VIN users. In this type of situation (which should arise rarely, if ever), some form of corrective action would be necessary. The use of a correction label which meets all requirements of FMVSS 115 including indelibility would be one possible approach.; One final matter discussed at the June 5 meeting relates to th correction of VIN errors on vehicles already produced but still in the possession of the manufacturer. We would treat these vehicles the same as the vehicles already sold, i.e., if the noncompliance were inconsequential for the vehicles already sold, it would also be inconsequential for the vehicles produced but still in the manufacturer's possession. However, the agency would expect that once the error is detected, similar vehicles produced thereafter would fully comply with the standard. There is precedent for this approach, since the agency has previously treated as inconsequential noncompliance erroneous identification numbers on tires still in the manufacturer's possession, where an inconsequentiality petition has been granted with respect to tires already sold.; The agency will issue in the near future a notice inviting comment o MVMA's petition to change Standard 115 to a general regulation. In this notice, we will seek comment on the types of corrective action discussed above. If you have any thoughts on other means of making these types of corrections, we would of course be pleased to receive your views.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel

ID: aiam5249

"Dear Mr. Glover: This responds to your letter and telephone call about the child seat registration form you are considering. The form is required by S5.8 of Standard 213, 'Child Restraint Systems,' and is depicted in figures 9a and 9b of the standard. You ask whether S5.8(c) permits you to place certain additional information in the shaded area on the form. The information is a bar code that you said on the telephone contains information on 'date of manufacture, shift, location and serial number for the product that the card represents.' You explain that the bar code is desired because it can be automatically scanned, which would avoid possible 'mis-keying' of the information into the data record. Further, you state that the bar code has to be surrounded by a slightly larger unshaded 'quiet zone' to enable the scanner to record the bar code information. You are concerned whether NHTSA would conclude that the quiet zone renders a part of the shaded area unshaded. It is our opinion that a bar code that contains the information you described is permitted in the shaded area (the area outside of the space for the consumer to fill in). S5.8(c) of Standard 213 specifies the information that must be provided on the form and states the following: No other information shall appear on the postcard, except identifying information that distinguishes a particular child restraint system from other systems of that model name or number may be preprinted in the shaded area of the postcard, as shown in figure 9a. The bar code, printed in the shaded area, is permitted by S5.8(c). The information provided by the bar code distinguishes a particular child seat from another of the same model name or number. We consider the quiet zone as part of the bar code since it is needed for the bar code to be reliably read. The quiet zone therefore need not be shaded, since the printed bar code (or any other identifying information permitted by S5.8(c)) itself is not. Please note that, while the bar code is permitted, the information on the model name or number and date of manufacture must still be in English under S5.8(c). This information must be in English so that a consumer can see that this information has been provided and that only minimal effort is needed to fill out the registration form. We also wish to note another feature of the form you faxed. Your form has the words 'please print' after the instructions to the consumer 'just fill in your name and address.' 'Please print' is not on the form depicted in figures 9a and 9b of Standard 213. In an earlier letter, NHTSA decided that a minor variation in the wording of a warning expressly specified by Standard 213 was permitted when the change clarified the warning and did not make any substantive change to the warning's meaning. (Letter to Mr. McGuigan, December 18, 1980.) Similarly, 'please print' is a minor variation to the wording of the instructions that clarifies the instructions and does not substantively change them. Thus, it is permitted. I hope this information is helpful. Please call Ms. Fujita at (202) 366-2992 if you have further questions. Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel";

ID: aiam0638

Dear Mr. Nishibori: In your letter of March 3, 1972, you asked for our interpretation o how a rigid bracket installed on the B-pillar to guide the shoulder belt would be treated under Standard 210.; Although the bracket in question does not perform all the functions o the anchorage, in that it would sustain only a fraction of the total force imposed on the anchorage in an accident, it performs a significant anchorage function by controlling the angle at which the shoulder belt crosses the occupant's chest. It is therefore considered a part of the anchorage and must fall within the acceptable range for upper torso anchorage locations specified in Standard 210.; If you have information to indicate that the acceptable zone could b extended forward of its present position without lessening the effectiveness of the shoulder belt, we would be most interested in obtaining it for review.; Sincerely, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel

ID: nht76-5.64

DATE: 05/04/76

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; William T. Coleman; NHTSA

TO: Charles E. Wiggins; House of Representatives

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of March 9, 1976, concerning the Tire identification and Recordkeeping Requirements administered by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).

I very much appreciate your thoughtful comments concerning this program and your obvious efforts to familiarize yourself with the way it is administered. It is clear from your letter that you share my view that these requirements should be made as effective and efficient as possible, thereby increasing consumer safety while lessening the burden on tire dealers.

As you are aware, the Congress in 1970 amended the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act to require manufacturers and retreaders of tires to maintain the names and addresses of purchasers so that they could be notified of any defect. This step was taken only after attempts by manufacturers and the NHTSA to inform owners of defective tires proved ineffective. As you point out, Congressional action would be necessary to eliminate the program.

In your letter, you address four areas in which you believe the tire registration program is either ineffective or inefficient. I would like to discuss each one individually to ensure that your questions are answered comprehensively.

The first question you raise deals with the cost your constituent, a small tire dealer, is obligated to incur to satisfy the requirements of the program. In order to understand fully the cost involved, it would be useful to consider precisely what is required by the regulation.

1. A dealer must fill out a tire identification form supplied by the manufacturer for each purchase. This requires entering the name and address of the purchaser, the tire identification number which appears on the tire(s), and the company's name and address or number on the form. Only several minutes are required to complete the form.

2. Once a month, the dealer must send the forms to the manufacturer of the tires.

We are unable to understand how the regulation appreciably increases a small businessman's cost of doing business. It is our view that additional staff is not necessary to carry out the registration of tires, and we have no information which would suggest the contrary.

The situation would be somewhat more complex if your constituent sold tires manufactured by more than one firm, as each manufacturer supplies its own form which must, of course, be returned to the appropriate manufacturer. In this case, however, we have required that manufacturers supply to the dealers upon request a form with a standardized format to simplify completion.

The second matter you raise is the failure of some dealers to complete the registration forms. I share with you a concern that despite provision for substantial penalties, some dealers insist on breaking the law. It had been the policy of the NHTSA to delay strict enforcement of the regulation in the belief that dealer unfamiliarity with the regulation might be the cause of the poor response and that the situation would improve. In view of the continued unsatisfactory rate of compliance, the NHTSA has advised me that it will increase enforcement action to eliminate competitive advantage based on noncompliance.

Another issue raised in your letter is the cost of administering the regulation as compared to its benefit. I have queried the NHTSA as to their estimate of this cost and have been advised that the one dollar figure which you cited in your letter relates to all costs of both the manufacturer and dealer to register and maintain records for all four tires on a vehicle rather than a single tire. I am sorry for any confusion which might have arisen. Even utilizing a higher cost figure, however, it is NHTSA's view, in which I concur, that the expense of tire registration is not exorbitant in terms of helping to insure that a motorist will be advised if a tire he purchased is defective and could lead to death, a serious injury, or damage to his vehicle. As I am sure you realize, the purpose of any insurance program, be it fire insurance for the home or health insurance for the individual, is to protect all insured individuals against the catastrophic loss that only some of the insured individuals will actually experience.

It is of course difficult to associate a dollar figure with the potential damage which could be caused by a defective tire. In this regard, however, you may be interested in knowing that a Federal jury in Florida last year returned a $ 2,300,000 judgment against Sears Roebuck & Company in a tort action involving a defective tire.

You also suggest in your letter that only 25,000 tires were recalled in 1974. Our records, however, indicate that 1,098,000 tires were recalled in 1974 in 31 recall campaigns. Further, 2,526,480 tires have been recalled in the 119 recall campaigns initiated since the inception of the program. It is my view that the program should continue in light of the defect potential inherent in the sale of 200,000,000 tires annually.

In addition to planning increased enforcement, the NHTSA is evaluating the consumer response rate in tire defect notification campaigns to determine whether it can be improved and whether the low response rate is due in large part to tires no longer being in the hands of the initial purchaser. I have already requested the National Motor Vehicle Safety Advisory Council to conduct a broad study of the safety defect and recall problem, which includes a consideration of the adequacy of the tire recall effort. Based on these evaluations, the NHTSA should be able to determine if legislative action is necessary.

Let me assure you I appreciate your personal interest in this matter.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

March 9, 1976

The Honorable William T. Coleman, Jr. Secretary of the Department of Transportation

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Recently a constituent of mine who sells motor vehicle tires at retail took time to explain to me the "Tire Identification and Recordkeeping" program which you administer and which directly affects him.

I hadn't heard of such a program, but have since learned that Section 1402(f) of Title 15 of the United States Code requires that manufacturers of tires maintain a record of names and addresses of the purchasers of their products. Regulations implementing the requirement are in Section 574 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The obvious purpose of the law is to make efficient the recall of defective tires.

My constituent informed me that the requirements of this program are widely ignored by retail tire dealers who are the conduit of the purchasers' identity to the manufacturers. He complains that the program costs him money, and being a small businessman, he must pass this cost onto his customers. His competitors who ignore the requirements don't have the cost and so gain a competitive edge. Furthermore, he believes the program is not worth the effort to begin with; due to the fact that only a miniscule percentage of those notified they have a defective tire respond to the recall notice.

On January 21, 1976, Mr. Elwood Driver, an employee of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration came to my office with a number of his associates, to explain the program to me. Mr. Driver made it clear that DOT plays virtually no role in overseeing the registration program. He had no information to offer on how efficiently the program operated, nor how many defective tires were removed from motor vehicles because of it. Subsequent to the meeting he contacted several manufacturers, and informed me by letter that they had informed him that 90% of the manufacturer owned tire dealers and 40-50% of the independent dealers complied with the program. Those manufacturers stated that only 30% of the tire owners notified that they owned a potentially defective tire responded to the recall notice.

I was informed by Mr. Driver that more than 200 million tires are sold each year and that a conservative price for the paperwork required to properly "register" a single tire is one dollar. If 50% of the dealers are complying with the registration program, that represents a pass through to the American consumer of $ 100 million.

I have been informed from industry sources that approximately 25,000 tires were recalled in 1974 as being potentially defective. Only a certain percentage of owners of those tires were notified because only a percentage of the dealers comply with the program. However, if compliance was 100% and all the purchasers were notified, only 30% would respond. That means this $ 100 million program optimally would result in 7,500 potentially defective tires being removed from automobiles. (Parenthetically, if all the tires manufactured were properly registered this would be a $ 200 million program.)

I would hope, Mr. Secretary, that you could review this program to determine whether in your opinion it should be continued. Without question, it doesn't work efficiently or effectively. Without question, it is enormously expensive to the American consumer. On the other hand, if defective new tires pose a serious national threat, then this program should be made to operate efficiently. It is my opinion, that the appropriate Committees would seriously consider any constructive recommendations in this regard that you care to offer.

CHARLES E. WIGGINS Member of Congress

cc: HON. HARLEY O. STAGGERS;

HON. SAMUEL L. DEVINE;

HON. JOHN E. MOSS;

HON. JAMES COLLINS;

HON. FRED B. ROONEY;

HON. JOE SKUBITZ

ID: nht76-4.40

DATE: 03/10/76

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; R. L. Carter; NHTSA

TO: Monsanto Polymers and Petrochemicals Co.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of December 22, 1975, to Mr. Guy Hunter of my staff, concerning our reasons for prohibiting the use of tempered glass in windshields of motor vehicles.

The use of tempered glass in windshields is prohibited for the following reasons:

1. Tempered glass has little, if any, energy absorbing capability while laminated glass has intrinsic deflective characteristics that provide such capability.

2. When tempered glass breaks, it usually either "crazes" or shatters into many small pieces. If crazing occurs, the driver's vision becomes obscured thus not only endangering himself but others as well. If the glass shatters, the driver and other vehicle occupants are showered with glass pellets which could not only result in loss of control of the vehicle but is also likely to cause eye injuries.

3. When cracked, tempered glass has essentially no retentive capability, thus the likelihood of occupant ejection through the windshield opening is greatly increased in crash situations. Laminated glass, on the other hand, possesses significant retentive capability even after initial cracking of the glass laminate on either side of the plastic interlayer.

If I can be of further help, do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

MONSANTO POLYMERS & PETROCHEMICALS CO.

December 22, 1975

Guy Hunter -- National Highway Traffic Safety Admin.

Dear Guy:

Our Monsanto Europe associates receive, from time to time, inquiries from a variety of industry and independent sources concerning NHTSA's position on the question of tempered vs. laminated HPR windshields. While I am aware of your position in this matter, would you be willing to document your feelings in a letter which I could distribute to our associates.

Should you agree, it would be appreciated if you could define the reasons for which NHTSA would be opposed to permitting tempered windshield use in the American market, and perhaps include an endorsement of the HPR windshield.

Thank you for your assistance.

Kindest regards,

E. Lacey -- Industry Technical Specialist, Laminated Glass

ID: nht88-2.15

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 05/04/88

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Alberto Negro -- Director, Fiat Research & Development -- U.S.A. Branch

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. Alberto Negro Director Fiat Research & Development -- U.S.A. Branch Parklane Towers West Suite 1210 Dearborn, MI 48126

This responds both to your revised report, dated January 20, 1988, pursuant to 49 C.F.R. Part 585, on behalf of Alfa Lancia Industriale S.p.A. (Alfa Romeo), covering compliance with the automatic restraint "phase-in" requirements during the 1987 producti on year, and to your February 4, 1988, letter to Stephen Wood, our Assistant Chief Counsel for Rulemaking, seeking an interpretation of Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR S571. 208). Specifically, your question concerns whether Fiat may exclude automatic restraint-equipped convertibles from its determinations of annual production for the purpose of calculating the number of passenger cars that must comply with the automatic restraints requirements during the phase-in period.

Alfa Romeo, a subsidiary of Fiat, equipped some of its convertibles with automatic restraints during the 1987 model year, and Fiat counted those convertibles toward satisfying the requirement that 10 percent of 1987 production year cars be equipped with automatic restraints. You stated in your February 4 letter that you need clarification of whether Standard No. 208 permits you to exclude from your annual production calculations those convertibles that were equipped with automatic restraints and that we re counted in determining whether the requisite percentage of production complied with the automatic restraint requirements. In other words, you wish to know whether Fiat may "count" Alfa Romeo convertibles equipped with automatic seat belts for the purp ose of satisfying the 108 "phase-in" requirement for production year 1987, found at @4.1.3.1.2 of Standard No. 208, while excluding those same convertibles from the annual vehicle production calculations covering the 1987 production year.

The answer to your question is that Standard No. 208 does not allow Fiat to exclude from its annual production calculations any convertibles that comply with the automatic restraint requirements set forth in @4.1.2. 1 of the standard. Section @4.1.3.1.2 of Standard No. 208 specifies that the amount of passenger cars that comply with the automatic restraint production. Under these provisions, Fiat elected to use the average annual production from September 1, 1983, through August 31, 1986, for its 1987 m odel year report.

For the period of September 1, 1986, to August 31, 1987 section @4.1.3.3.3 of Standard No. 208 provides a single exception from the requirement to include all of a manufacturer's cars in determining annual production. Under that exception, a manufacturer has the following option in calculating annual production:

A manufacturer may exclude convertibles which do not comply with the requirements of @4.1.2.1, when it is calculating its average annual production under @4.1.3.1.2(a) or its annual production under @4.1.3.1.2(b). (Emphasis added.)

The same single exception is set forth in section @4.1.3.2.3 for the September 1, 1987, to August 31, 1988 reporting period, and in section @4.1.3.3.3 for the September 1, 1988, to August 31, 1989 reporting period. This exception expressly permits manufa cturers to exclude convertibles that do not comply with @4.1.2.1 from such calculations . However, this language does not permit manufacturers to exclude convertibles that are certified as complying with @4.1.2.1 from such calculations.

An old principle of legal interpretation is expressed in the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius": literally, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. Applying this principle to Standard No. 208, one would conclude that since the standard was drafted to provide one means of excluding convertibles from calculations of annual production, the standard does not allow any other means of excluding convertibles from those calculations. In other words, since the standard allows you to e xclude convertibles that do not comply with @4.1.2.1 when calculating annual production, the absence of a similar provision for convertibles that comply with @4.1.2.1 means that convertibles that are certified as complying cannot be excluded.

This interpretation does not raise any questions about the January 20 report's exclusion of all convertibles produced between September 1, 1983, and August 31, 1986, since your letter states that none of those convertibles complied with @4.1.2.1. However , this interpretation does mean that Fiat cannot exclude the 803 convertibles you reported as complying with @4.1.2.1 when making your 1988 model year calculations, as required by @4.1.3.2, if Fiat again elects to base its calculations on the average ann ual production of passenger cars during the preceding three years, as permitted by @4.1.3.2.2(a). Similarly, if Fiat elects to base its calculations on the actual production between September 1, 1987, and August 31, 1988, as permitted by @4.1.3.2.2(b), F iat cannot exclude convertibles that comply with the requirements of @4.1.2.1. September 1, 1987, and August 31, 1988, as permitted by @4.1.3.2.2(b) , Fiat cannot exclude convertibles that comply with the requirements of @4.1.2.1.

In this letter, we have assumed that the Alfa Romeo convertibles that are equipped with automatic seat belts are certified as complying with the automatic restraint provisions of @4.1.2.1 of Standard No. 208. If this is not the case, then fiat may not "c ount" those vehicles as complying with the automatic restraint phase-in requirements of @4.1.3.1.2 of Standard No. 208. See attached letter dated April 18, 1988 to Mr. Robert Munson of Ford Motor Company. Please notify Mr. George L. Parker, NHTSA's Assoc iate Administrator for Enforcement, within 10 business days of your receipt of this letter, whether the Alfa Romeo automatic seat belts are certified as complying with the automatic restraint requirements of @4.1.2.1 of Standard No. 208.

If you have any further questions or need more information on this subject, please feel free to contact Steve Kratzke of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

Mr. Stephen P. Wood Assistant Chief Counsel of Rulemaking National Highway Traffic Safety Administration NCC-20, Room 5219 4007th St., S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Mr. Wood:

We require clarification of the NHTSA regulation which allows certain vehicle types to be excluded from the set of vehicles which is used to determine passive restraint quotas.

In 49 CFR, Sections @4.l.3.l.3, @4.l.3.2.3, and @4.l.3.3.3 say that "convertibles which do not comply" with passive restraint requirements may be excluded from the set of vehicles which is used to determine the quota. We need to know whether convertibles which do comply with passive restraint requirements may also be excluded from the quota set.

On January 19, 1988 we presented this question by telephone to NHTSA and were told that convertibles which do comply could be excluded. Furthermore, we have reviewed the applicable Federal Register and found nothing within them that prohibited the exclus ion of convertibles which do comply.

Nevertheless, upon reviewing our passive restraint report (dated January 20, 1988) NHTSA expressed some doubt about whether convertibles which comply could be excluded. The doubt arose not because the report calculations were suspect, as all of the exclu ded convertibles in that report were without passive systems but rather because it was not clear whether we would be including complying convertibles in subsequent quota calculations.

We urgently need an official decision from NHTSA on this matter so that we may accurately forecast our future passive restraint liabilities. Hence, a prompt response will be most appropriate.

If you have any questions, please contact my office. Sincerely yours,

Alberto Negro Director

ID: aiam4989

Dear Mr. Ruff: This responds to your letter of February 10, 199 requesting advice regarding the location of the upper anchorage for the front passenger seat shoulder belt. By now, you should have received our reply (dated February 14, 1992) to your previous letter (dated October 30, 1991). In that letter, I explained that NHTSA will not conduct any crash testing of vehicles modified for operation by persons with disabilities while the agency reviews the petition from the Recreation Vehicle Industry Association to exclude these vehicle from the dynamic crash test requirement. Because this is now a pending rulemaking, the agency cannot discuss what requirements the agency will propose for these vehicles prior to the publication of the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). However, as explained in our previous letter, NHTSA is aware of the need of manufacturers such as yourself and your customers to have this matter addressed as soon as possible. Therefore, the agency is proceeding with preparation and publication of the NPRM as quickly as possible. I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel;