ID: 1985-02.21

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 04/29/85

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Jeffrey R. Miller; NHTSA

TO: Wataru Hayashibara -- Manager, Certification Business Division, Mazda Motor Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. Wataru Hayashibara Manager Certification Business Division Mazda Motor Corporation P.O. Box 18, Hiroshima, 730-91 Japan

This responds to your letter concerning Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 101, Controls and Displays. According to your letter, you are considering a bulb check system for telltales that operates while the ignition switch is turned to the "ON" position and the engine is not running. You stated that the proposed design of this system is such that all telltales subjected to the bulb check may emit light simultaneously when any malfunction occurs in the electrical charging system. You asked whether the proposed system would comply with the requirements of section S5.3.1 of the standard. You also asked whether the answer is dependent on whether a vehicle is equipped with a telltale for electrical charge. As discussed below, the answer to both of your questions is no.

By way of background information, this agency does not provide approvals of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, it is the responsibility of the manufacturer to ensure that its vehicles or equipment comply with applicable safety standards. The following represents our opinion based on the facts provided in your letter.

Section S5.3.1 of Standard No. 101 states:

A telltale shall not emit light except when identifying the malfunction or vehicle condition for whose indication it is designed or during a bulb check upon vehicle starting.

There are thus only two situations in which it is permissible for a telltale to emit light: (1) when the telltale is actually identifying the malfunction or vehicle condition for which it is designed, and (2) during a bulb check upon vehicle starting. The emitting of light by all telltales whenever a malfunction occurs in the electrical charging system does not fall within either of these categories and is therefore not permitted by the standard.

This interpretation is limited to the specific factual situation described above, i.e., where light would be emitted by all telltales whenever a malfunction occurs in the electrical charging system. In essence, your proposed design would replace the telltale for electrical charge, which is provided by most manufacturers to warn of such things as low voltage, with a warning message in the form of all telltales simultaneously emitting light. This is not permitted by Standard No. 101, for the reasons stated above.

Your letter suggests an interpretation that the simultaneous lighting of all telltales subjected to the bulb check when any malfunction occurs in the electrical charging system could not be any violation of the requirements of S5.3.1, because it is the vehicle condition which "is designed" by a manufacturer for all telltales to emit light. We do not agree with that suggested interpretation. Section S5.3.1's use of the words "malfunction or vehicle condition for whose indication it is designed" refers back to the term "(a) telltale." It is our opinion that the phrase is applicable only to the specific malfunction or vehicle condition for which a particular telltale is designed to warn the driver and not to a situation where all telltales are designed to collectively warn of a malfunction or vehicle condition.

Our interpretation is not dependent on whether a vehicle is equipped with a telltale for electrical charge or not.

Sincerely,

Jeffrey R. Miller Chief Counsel

Mr. Frank Berndt Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 Seventh Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590 U. S. A.

December 26, 1980 Our Ref. No. NH84/20

Re: Request for Interpretation of FMVSS 101 Controls and Displays

Dear Mr. Berndt:

This is to request your interpretation regarding the telltale lighting condition specified in the last sentence, shown below, of S5.3.1 of Standards No. 101.

"A telltale shall not emit light except when identifying the malfunction or vehicle condition for whose indication it is designed or during a bulb check upon vehicle starting."

(Underline is added.)

We are now studying a bulb check system that operates while the ignition switch is turned to "ON" position and the engine is not running. If this system is adopted, all telltales subjected to the bulb check may emit light simultaneously when any malfunction occurs in the electrical charging system.

Under the above-mentioned conditions, we would like to have your confirmation whether the following interpretation is correct.

The simultaneous lighting of all telltales subjected to the bulb check when any malfunction occurs in the electrical charging system could not be any violation of the requirements of S5.3.1, because it is the vehicle condition which "is designed" for all telltales to emit light by a manufacturer.

If the interpretation depends on whether a vehicle is equipped with "a telltale for electrical charge" or not, the interpretations in both cases would be appreciated.

Your prompt interpretation on this matter would be appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Wataru Hayashibara Manager Certification Business Division

cc: Mazda (North America), Inc. Mazda (North America), Inc. Detroit Office

ID: aiam5348

Dear Mr. Scott: This responds to your letter of March 8, 1994, askin for information about this agency's regulations regarding importation and sale of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment. You intend to import 'fiberglass kit cars.' The cars may be imported 'either disassembled or partially assembled.' Your company 'will then be providing and/or installing American parts in the U.S. for the major mechanical portions like engines, transmissions, suspension systems, tires, etc.' It appears from your letter that you intend to import items of equipment, either individually or as part of a larger assembly, which, after entry into the United States, will have the drive train and related components installed that are necessary to complete its manufacture as a motor vehicle. For purposes of this interpretation, it is unimportant whether the equipment is imported as individual items, or assembled into a vehicle lacking a power train. Some items of motor vehicle equipment are subject to the Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS). In order to be imported into the United States, they must comply with all applicable FMVSS. Passenger car equipment that must comply includes brake hoses, brake fluid, lamps and reflectors, tires, glazing material, and seat belt assemblies. It is mandatory that all these items (except lamps and reflectors) bear a DOT symbol in order to be imported, the symbol is the manufacturer's certification of compliance with the FMVSS. It is optional for lamps and reflectors to be marked with the DOT symbol. If they are not marked, permissible options include a certification statement attached to the equipment item or on the container in which the item is shipped. When assembly of the vehicle is completed in the United States, its assembler must satisfy itself that it conforms to all applicable FMVSS and affix a label certifying that the vehicle complies. I have enclosed a copy of an information sheet for new manufacturers of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment. It identifies relevant Federal statutes and this agency's standards and regulations affecting motor vehicle and motor vehicle equipment manufacturers. It also explains how to obtain this agency's safety standards and regulations. If you have further questions we shall be pleased to answer them. Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel Enclosure;

ID: aiam4710

"Dear Mr. Goldfarb: This responds to your letter concerning the fue economy implications of Chrysler's acquisition of American Motors Corporation (AMC). You stated that you were writing to obtain confirmation of Chrysler's 'understanding' that fuel economy credits earned by AMC, for exceeding light truck standards in model years l984-86, are now available to Chrysler. You enclosed a memorandum of law explaining your position. As discussed below, it is our opinion that even if Chrysler is considered the 'successor' to AMC under the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, that fact would not result in the conclusion that credits earned, prior to the acquisition, by AMC for exceeding a fuel economy standard could be applied to shortfalls incurred by Chrysler's pre-acquisition fleet, under the three-year carryforward and carryback provisions of the Act and regulations. However, credits earned by AMC could be applied to the pre-acquisition AMC fleet and to the post-acquisition Chrysler/AMC fleet. Also, credits earned by post-acquisition Chrysler/AMC could be applied to the pre-acquisition Chrysler fleet and/or AMC fleet, provided that double counting does not take place. Other issues raised by your letter and legal memorandum are also addressed below. Section 50l(8) of the Cost Savings Act defines 'manufacturer' as follows: The term 'manufacturer' means any person engaged in the business of manufacturing automobiles. The Secretary shall prescribe rules for determining, in cases where more than one person is the manufacturer of an automobile, which person is to be treated as the manufacturer of such automobile for purposes of this part. Such term also includes any predecessor or successor of such a manufacturer to the extent provided under rules which the Secretary shall prescribe. One issue raised by Chrysler's memorandum is whether Chrysler is the successor of AMC. The term 'successor,' as used in the definition of 'manufacturer' quoted above, is not defined in the statute or in agency regulations. Under general principles of corporate law, the term 'successor' ordinarily refers to a corporation which, through amalgamation, consolidation, or other legal succession, becomes invested with the rights and assumes the burdens of another corporation. Based on our general understanding of Chrysler's acquisition of AMC, we have no reason to doubt your conclusion that Chrysler is the successor of AMC. However, your letter does not provide specific facts concerning the structure of Chrysler's acquisition of AMC or whether Chrysler is invested with the rights and has assumed the burdens of AMC. In the absence of such facts, we are unable to provide an opinion that Chrysler is the successor of AMC. However, for purposes of this letter, it will be assumed that a factual showing can be made that Chrysler is the successor to AMC. It should be noted that the mere fact that one corporation acquires another corporation does not necessarily mean that the acquiring corporation is a 'successor.' In the context of the Cost Savings Act, manufacturer A may be wholly owned by manufacturer B, yet still be a manufacturer itself. Under sections 503(a) and (c), however, the automobiles of such related manufacturers would be combined for purposes of calculating average fuel economy. Another issue raised by Chrysler's memorandum is whether Chrysler and AMC became the same manufacturer for fuel economy purposes for model year l987. According to the memorandum, Chrysler agreed to acquire AMC in the spring of l987, and the transaction closed on August 6, l987. The memorandum concludes that Chrysler and AMC became the same manufacturer for fuel economy purposes in model year l987. Based on the above facts, it is our opinion that all of Chrysler's and AMC's vehicles should be treated as manufactured by the same manufacturer for model year l987. Fuel economy standards apply to passenger automobiles manufactured by a manufacturer, for a particular model year. See section 502(a)(l). Moreover, average fuel economy is calculated based on the total number of passenger automobiles manufactured in a given model year by a manufacturer. See section 503(a)(l). Under section 503(c), the term 'passenger automobiles manufactured by a manufacturer' includes all automobiles manufactured by persons who control, are controlled by, or are under common control with, such manufacturer.' Since Chrysler controlled AMC prior to the end of the l987 model year, and since fuel economy standards apply to particular model years as a whole and not to separate parts of a model year, it is our opinion that all of the vehicles produced by both Chrysler and AMC for model year l987 shall be treated as if manufactured by the same manufacturer, i.e., placed into one fleet. Otherwise, one or both of the manufacturers would have two separate CAFE values, pre-acquisition (or pre-control) and post-acquisition (or post-control), for the same model year. We will now address generally the issue of how credits may be used where one manufacturer is the successor of another. In discussing the issue, we will refer to the following hypothetical example: A and B are both car manufacturers. After consolidation, A is the only surviving corporation and is invested with the rights and assumes the burdens of B. Thus, A is the 'successor' of B. While this example and subsequent discussion is for passenger automobiles, the relevant requirements concerning the earning and availability of credits are essentially identical for passenger automobile standards and light truck standards. Compare section 502(l)(1)(B) and 49 CFR Part 535, and see 45 FR 83233-36, December l8, l980. Thus, our analysis for passenger automobile standards is also relevant to light truck standards. Section 502(l)(1)(B) states: Whenever the average fuel economy of the passenger automobiles manufactured by a manufacturer in a particular model year exceeds an applicable average fuel economy standard . . ., such manufacturer shall be entitled to a credit calculated under subparagraph (C), which-- (i) shall be available to be taken into account with respect to the average fuel economy of that manufacturer for any of the three consecutive model years immediately prior to the model year in which such manufacturer exceeds such applicable average fuel economy standard, and (ii) to the extent that such credit is not so taken into account pursuant to clause (i), shall be available to be taken into account with respect to the average fuel economy of that manufacturer for any of the three consecutive model years immediately following the model year in which such manufacturer exceeds such applicable average fuel economy standard. We note first that credits earned by a particular manufacturer are only 'available to be taken into account with respect to the average fuel economy of that manufacturer,' for any of the three model years before, or after, the model year in which the credits are earned. (Emphasis added.) In the example set forth above, B is no longer a manufacturer under the Cost Savings Act. (Indeed, it is no longer a 'person' under section 50l(8).) Thus, in the absence of some provision concerning 'successors,' any unused credits that B had earned prior to the consolidation would expire unused, since the only manufacturer to which they are available no longer exists. However, for some purposes B continues to exist as part of A, its 'successor.' Section 50l(8)'s definition of 'manufacturer' does not provide that the term 'manufacturer' necessarily includes any precedessor or successor but instead provides that the term does so 'to the extent provided under rules which the Secretary shall prescribe.' This provision was added by the Automobile Fuel Efficiency Act of l980 as a conforming amendment to the section concerning modification of local content requirements to encourage domestic production of fuel efficient automobiles and not to the section concerning credits. The legislative history does not provide any indication as to why the provision was added, and, to date, NHTSA's administration of the statutory provisions concerning modification of the local content requirements has not turned up a situation for which such rules would be relevant. Should rules be issued under section 50l(8), NHTSA would do so by notice-and-comment rulemaking, taking account of the purposes of that section and the statutory scheme as a whole. Notwithstanding the absence of rules, we do not believe that Congress intended to require the forfeit of a manufacturer's unused credits in a situation where that manufacturer's substance continues to exist as part of a 'successor.' Thus, taking account of section 50l(8) and the statutory scheme as a whole, we conclude that, in the example set forth above, B can be deemed as continuing to exist as part of A, from the time of succession. This conclusion does not, however, permit the general integration of A's and B's credits and shortfalls. Under section 502(l)(1)(B), credits earned by a particular manufacturer are only 'available to be taken into account with respect to the average fuel economy of that manufacturer.' Since B's existence as part of A only dates from the time of succession, B is not the same manufacturer as A prior to the time of succession. Thus, any credits earned by B would only be available to offset A's shortfalls for the model years during which B exists as part of A, since it is only at that time that the credits earned by B and applied to A can be considered to be taken into account with respect to the average fuel economy of 'that manufacturer.' Similarly, the only credits earned by A which would be available to B would be those credits earned during the time when B exists as part of A. The general integration of A's and B's credits would be inconsistent with the basic structure of section 502(l)(l). Assume, for example, that A and B are separate manufacturers for model years 1 through 6, and A is the successor of B for model year 7. If general integration of credits were permitted, credits earned by B in model year 4 could be applied to A's CAFE for model years l-6, as well as model year 7. However, the structure of section 502(l)(l) does not permit this result. Under paragraph (B)(i), any credits earned by B in model year 4 are available to be carried back with respect to B's CAFE for any of model years l, 2 and 3. To the extent that such credits are not so used, paragraph (B)(ii) makes those credits available to be carried forward with respect to B's CAFE for any of model years 5, 6 and 7. In order for credits earned by B in model year 4 to be applied to A's CAFE for model years l-6, B's credits would first have to be carried forward to model year 7 (the model year where A is B's successor) and then be carried back to model years l-6 (for application to A's CAFE), a process which has no statutory basis. We will now apply the general analysis discussed above to the particular facts cited in Chrysler's letter. Prior to MY l987, Chrysler and AMC were two separate manufacturers. Chrysler acquired AMC during MY l987, and became the 'successor' to AMC at that time. Under section 502(l)(1)(B), credits earned by a particular manufacturer are only 'available to be taken into account with respect to the average fuel economy of that manufacturer.' Since AMC's existence as part of Chrysler only dates from MY l987, AMC was not the same manufacturer as Chrysler prior to MY l987. Thus, any credits earned by AMC would only be available to Chrysler to offset CAFE shortfalls incurred in the model years during which AMC exists as part of Chrysler, i.e., MY l987 and thereafter, since it is only at that time that the credits earned by AMC and applied to Chrysler can be considered to be taken into account with respect to the average fuel economy of 'that manufacturer.' Similarly, the only credits earned by Chrysler which would be available to AMC would be those credits earned during the time when AMC exists as part of Chrysler, i.e., credits earned in MY l987 and thereafter. Chrysler's memorandum argues that section 502(l) must mean more than that the predecessor's credits can be carried forward and used for the successor firm for l987 and subsequent years. The memorandum states: 'Manufacturer' is a defined term, and it must be read in light of its definition. The only satisfactory reading of this provision is that the reference to 'that manufacturer' includes its predecessors and successors--that is, the successor firm may use the credits available to it for calculating its own fuel economy for l987 and subsequent model years or that of its predecessors, including pre-acquisition Chrysler, for the years before l987. On any other reading, the definition of 'manufacturer' would be meaningless, and the term would mean different things in different places in the Act. Chrysler also asserts that its approach would represent a 'literal' reading of the Act, and that the agency should not seek to import into the carryover scheme a qualification on the use of credits that Congress did not impose. We believe that Chrysler's analysis is incorrect since it does not take into account fundamental differences in the timing of the earning of the credits and of Chrysler's becoming a successor. Chrysler was not the successor to AMC during the model years prior to Chrysler's acquisition of AMC in which AMC earned credits. In MY l984, for example, Chrysler and AMC were two separate manufacturers. In particular, Chrysler is incorrect in concluding that AMC's l984-l986 credits can be applied to Chrysler for model years before l987. Chrysler cannot succeed to rights greater than AMC possessed at the time of the acquisition. As of its acquisition in MY l987, AMC's 'rights' as to its MY 1984 credits were to apply them to its own fleet in MY l981-l983 and l985-l986 (since it had no successor in that time period) and to apply them to itself/successor in MY l987. In construing the Act, we believe that it is appropriate and necessary to read its provisions in the correct temporal context. Thus, we do not believe that the term 'manufacturer' means different things in different places in the Act, but instead recognize that corporate relationships, and thus manufacturer identities, may differ for different model years. Moreover, we believe that Chrysler's memorandum itself construes the term 'manufacturer' differently in different parts of the Act. As indicated above, section 502(l)(l)(B) states that 'whenever the average fuel economy of the passenger automobiles manufactured by a manufacturer in a particular model year exceeds an applicable average fuel economy standard . . ., such manufacturer shall be entitled to a credit . . . .' Emphasis added. In concluding that Chrysler is entitled to AMC's l984 credits, Chrysler's memorandum apparently reads 'manufacturer' to mean 'AMC only' the first time it is used in this section, and 'AMC and its future successors' the second time it is used. We also note that Chrysler's current position would lead to absurd results. For example, if the term 'manufacturer' were consistently read to include future successors, Chrysler's acquisition of AMC would presumably require calculation of new CAFE values, for the combined Chrysler/AMC fleet, for each model year all the way back to the beginning of the CAFE program. See section 503(a)(l). Moreover, if a company which paid penalties in a particular model year were later acquired by another company which had earned credits in that same model year, but never used the credits, under Chrysler's retroactive successorship interpretation NHTSA could be required to refund those penalties, even if the acquisition took place ten or twenty years later. The Cost Savings Act was designed to encourage manufacturers to improve their CAFE performance, not to allow them to avoid penalties for non-compliance by acquiring companies that had, independently, earned credits in prior years. Finally, we reject the argument that we are importing into the carryover scheme a qualification on the use of credits that Congress did not impose. Congress expressly chose to limit the ability to use credits to the manufacturer that exceeded an applicable average fuel economy standard and thereby earned the credits. Credits earned by AMC are only available to Chrysler for the model years during which AMC exists as part of Chrysler, since it is only at that time that the credits earned by AMC can be considered as being 'taken into account with respect to the average fuel economy' of the manufacturer that earned them. Sincerely, Stephen P. Wood Acting Chief Counsel";

ID: nht74-5.40

DATE: 04/03/74

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Lawrence R. Schneider; NHTSA

TO: House of Representatives

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your March 19, 1974, request for information in behalf of Mr. Robert J. Jones, concerning the commercial offer he received for a device that would defeat the ignition interlock device found on 1974 model passenger cars.

The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 authorizes the issuance of motor vehicle safety standards, one of which requires occupant crash protection, one aspect of which is the ignition interlock system. Section 108(a)(1) of the Act prohibits the sale, offer for sale, introduction into interstate commerce, or the importation of any motor vehicle which does not conform to the standards. Our regulatory authority over new vehicles ends, however, with the first purchase of the vehicle in good faith for purposes other than resale. While we can prohibit arrangements between a dealer and a purchaser to disconnect the interlock, where they are part of the sales transaction, we have no remedy against arrangements to defeat the safety features made after the sales transaction.

Nevertheless, while selling devices intended to defeat safety equipment may be legal, we consider such practices reprehensible since they increase the chances of death and injury on the highways. We are considering a variety of remedies for the situation reported by Mr. Jones.

ENCLS.

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.

March 19 1974

Congressional Liasion National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 Seventh Street S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

Sir:

The attached communication is sent for your consideration. Please investigate the statements contained therein and forward me the necessary information for reply, returning the enclosed correspondence with your answer.

Yours truly,

Frank Thompson, Jr.

M.C.

Re: Mr. Robert J. Jones

FEBRUARY 27, 1974

Honorable Francis Thompson House of Representatives Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Thompson:

The enclosed letter arrived in the mail today.

Could you have someone on your staff direct this letter from Merit Enterprise to the proper "Consumer Advocate Bureau" or governmental watch dog agency as a register of my protest against obvious effort to thwart the new safety laws?

I protest this crazy bridgefree enterprise that allows groups like Merit Enterprise to make a buck by devising ways to short cut and render unworkable good laws.

Sincerely yours,

Robert J. Jones Lawrenceville, N.J.

Dear New Car Owner:

We trust that you are pleased with your 1974 automobile. We are not so sure that you are pleased with the seal belt-starter interlock system which is standard equipment under a Congressional mandate.

There are times when this system is not only inconvenient, uncomfortable, and impractical, but also unsafe. For instance, when a child is buckled in the passenger's seat, there is a chance that his face or neck can be severely injured in a collision by the shoulder harness.

We are sure that you have already found that an article in either the passenger or center seat makes it necessary to buckle the article up to start the vehicle. This is most inconvenient for those of us who transport a briefcase, a bowling ball, or even a bag of groceries.

Recognizing these shortcomings in the seat belt interlock system, Merit Enterprises manufacturers and markets BELT-MATE, a product which allows you, the vehicle owner to temporarily override the system when it isn't prudent for personal safety.

If you feel the decision, "To Buckle or Not to Buckle", should be made by you instead of Congress, send $ 4.98 in cash, check or money order for your BELT-MATE to Merit Enterprises, Box 4068, Hampstead, N. C. 28443. Your Belt-Mate comes complete with instructions - no wiring needed, and your satisfaction is guaranteed.

Allow 2 to 3 weeks for delivery. North Carolina residents add 4% sales tax.

Awaiting your reply.

Very truly yours,

John R. Merit

ID: nht94-3.81

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: July 25, 1994

FROM: Kover, Joe

TO: Medlin, Jere -- NHTSA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached To A Letter Dated 10/14/94 From Philip R. Recht To Joe Kover (A42; STD. 108)

TEXT: I am writing to you for your opinion regarding an electronic circuit which I have designed for use in motor vehicles. The device to which I refer is the Light Control Unit (LCU) which currently has a patent pending. The LCU is designed to perform the f unctions which are frequently ignored by the motor vehicle operator. The LCU may easily be integrated into the light system of new production vehicles or currently registered vehicles.

The LCU automatically turns off the head and tail/park lights when turning off the ignition switch, therefore, circumventing the inadvertent discharge of the battery.

The LCU automatically turns on the head and tail/park lights in conjunction with the windshield wiper switch and the lights will remain on until the ignition switch is placed in the off position. This feature precludes the operator from inadvertently turning off the head and tail/park lights, during the hours of darkness, when placing the windshield wiper switch in the off position.

The use of the motor vehicle windshield wipers is generally in conjunction with adverse weather conditions which results in poor visibility.

The LCU also extends an exclusive feature over other light units, this feature is the Light Bus Monitor.

The Light Bus Monitor in combination with the auxiliary circuit automatically restores the head and tail/park lights if the LCU should fail.

The LCU also can be employed as a Daytime Running Light (DRL) unit by maintaining the light switch in the on position. However, unlike conventional DRL units the LCU gives the operator the latitude to make this determination. Also, the LCU allows the op erator to turn off either the head lights only or both the head and tail/park lights via the light switch. Furthermore, unlike conventional DRL units which fail to automatically turn off the lights with the light switch in the on position and the igniti on switch in the off position, the LCU does automatically turn off the lights. Therefore these concepts in conjunction with the Light Bus Monitor serve to make the LCU a more desirable alternative over conventional DRL units. However, one question does surface, would a motor vehicle operator be in violation of the federal motor vehicle safety standards by maintaining both the head and tail/park lights on during the hours of daylight?

In conclusion based upon the information contained herein, does the LCU meet the federal motor vehicle safety standards? Also, could the LCU be integrated into the light system of new production vehicles or currently registered vehicles; I remind you th at the LCU is not a DRL unit. However, the LCU may be employed as a DRL unit, and if the operator should elect to employ the LCU as a DRL unit does it meet the federal motor vehicle safety standards? Also, could you please include the federal specifica tions for electronic devices. Please forward your expeditious response to me at the above address.

ID: aiam1309

Dear Mr. Kalberlon: This is in reply to your letter of October 10, 1973, concerning th legality of disconnecting seat belt interlocks.; The interlock is a required item of safety equipment that must b operable on any new car when it is sold or offered for sale, pursuant to section 108(a)(1) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. After an interlock equipped car is sold, however, the purchaser may disconnect the interlock, without violating the Act, by virtue of section 108(b)(1), which exempts transactions after the first purchase of the vehicle.; If a dealer offers to disconnect an interlock as an inducement to th sale of the vehicle, it is our opinion that a violation of the act occurs even though the actual disconnection may take place after delivery of the vehicle. If, on the other hand, the subject of the interlock is not discussed during the sale and the buyer subsequently requests disconnection on the basis of his experience with the vehicle, the dealer would not violate the Act if he disconnected the interlock.; Although a dealer does not violate the act by suggesting that the buye go somewhere else to have the interlock disconnected, I am sure you appreciate the troublesome consequences such advice may bring for the buyer if the resulting disconnection is carelessly performed.; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel

ID: nht93-6.37

DATE: September 17, 1993

FROM: Angela R. Caron

TO: Office of Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 3/16/94 from John Womack to Angela R. Caron (A42; Redbook (2); Std. 208; Std. 213)

TEXT:

My letter is pertaining to the height of seat belts in cars. As you are probably aware, seat belts are not made for smaller people. Since the seat belts are not adjustable in either of my vehicles, I have been looking for alternative solutions. Enclosed are two ideas, SafeFit and the Child safer. My question is, is either of these restraints safe for an adult? I am 5 feet and of average weight. I would appreciate your input. It just seems so unsafe to have the seat belt across my neck, besides being very uncomfortable.

I was also curious about the travel vest for my 2 1/2 year old son. Can it really replace his child safety seat? I thank you for your help on an issue as important as this.

ATTACHMENT

SafeFit and Child Safer brochures. (Text omitted)

ID: 04-004579drn

Stephen E. Selander, Esq.
Senior Counsel
Warner Norcross & Judd LLP
2000 Town Center, Suite 2700
Southfield, MI 48075-1318

Dear Mr. Selander:

This responds to your request for an interpretation whether your clients (Morbarks) products, portable brush chippers, are "motor vehicles" for purposes of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, including the TREAD Act. We will identify the relevant factors that should be considered in making such determinations.

Title 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 authorizes the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to prescribe Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSSs) applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. Section 30102(a)(6) defines "motor vehicle" as:

"[A] vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power and manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, but does not include a vehicle operated only on a rail line."

We have issued a number of interpretations of this language. We have stated that vehicles equipped with tracks, agricultural equipment, and other vehicles incapable of highway travel are not motor vehicles. We have also determined that certain vehicles designed and sold solely for off-road use (e.g., airport runway vehicles and underground mining vehicles) are not motor vehicles, even if they may be operationally capable of highway travel. Finally, we have concluded that items of mobile construction equipment that use the highways only to move between job sites and that typically spend extended periods of time at a single site are not motor vehicles. However, we do consider vehicles that use the public roads on a necessary and recurring basis to be motor vehicles.

You provided information about several models of brush chippers. You write that:"Eight of the models have axles, tires and wheels, and can be easily moved around a site or from site-to-site by towing."

You stated that Morbark believes that its portable brush chippers are not covered by the Vehicle Safety Act or the TREAD Act. You stated that Morbark brush chippers are designed primarily for use off-highway in helping to clear sites of trees and brush by chipping the brush, tree limbs, and small tree trunks.

You also stated that Morbark believes that its portable brush chippers are not trailers as defined in 49 CFR 571.3. That regulation defines trailer as "a motor vehicle with or without motive power, designed for carrying persons or property and for being drawn by another motor vehicle."

We have reviewed the videotape you enclosed with your letter. We note that in some instances, the Morbark brush chipper and vehicle towing the chipper were depicted as parked on the side of the road in what appears to be a residential area. We also understand from the information you provided that some of these products are used by tree service and landscape companies. We have also reviewed information provided at Morbarks web site: www.morbark.com.

Whether Morbarks portable brush chippers are considered motor vehicles under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act depends on their use, i.e., whether they typically spend extended periods of time at a single site or, by contrast, use the public roads on a necessary and recurring basis. By way of example, in a letter to DuraTech dated June 4, 1997, we took the position that mobile tub grinders are not motor vehicles because they stay on job sites for extended periods of time (usually for months and very rarely for less than a week). Similarly, we have concluded that mobile waterjet cutting and cleaning equipment was not a motor vehicle, based on the fact that it appeared to stay on job sites for extended periods of time ranging from a week to over a year.

We do not have information concerning the specific usage patterns of each of Morbarks brush chippers to determine whether they are motor vehicles. Moreover, while we seek to be helpful in providing opinions about our statutes, we do not have the resources to provide a detailed review of the products of each company. However, if the brush chippers use the public roads on a necessary and recurring basis, they would be motor vehicles. We would think that would likely be the case for at least some of Morbarks portable brush chippers, since tree service and landscape companies would tow the portable brush chippers by trucks to jobs, park them along the curb during work, and then tow them to the next job or, at the end of the day, return them to the companys facilities. Tree service company crews commonly complete one to two jobs per day. We also note that, in a letter to Lindig Manufacturing Corporation dated January 5, 1984, we took the position that brush chipper trailers are motor vehicles.

As to your question concerning the definition of trailer, we would consider the brush chipper itself to be the property being transported.

I have enclosed a fact sheet entitled "Information for New Manufacturers of Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Equipment."I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

Enclosure
ref:VSA102(4)
d.8/27/04

ID: 8258

Mr. Raymond S. Byers
Engineering Manager, Research,
Testing, and Certification
Utilimaster Motor Corporation
65598 State Road #19
P.O. Box 860
Wakarusa, IN 46573

Dear Mr. Byers:

This letter responds to your inquiry regarding the alternate placement of a vehicle certification label in your "Aeromate" van. I apologize for the delay in responding.

As you noted in your letter, 49 CFR 567.4 requires that a motor vehicle manufacturer affix a certification label to each vehicle it makes, and permits the manufacturer to place the label in any one of the places listed in that provision. If none of the listed locations is practicable, 567.4 directs the manufacturer to suggest an alternate position for the affixed label, and to request National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) approval for that position.

You explain in your letter that in your "Aeromate" vehicle, the driver's door slides between an inner and outer metal panel, thus making it impossible to affix the label to the hinge pillar, door-latch post, or the door edge that meets the door-latch post. Based on the photographs you included with your letter, affixing the label to the inside of the driver's side door would be unacceptable because, when opened, the door slides between the two metal panels. Thus, when the door is in the open position, the label would be obscured from the view of any observer. You propose installing the label on the inner metal panel in front of the driver's side door opening, to the left of the driver's legs under the instrument panel, and include photographs showing the label affixed to the proposed position. You state, and your photographs appear to confirm, that the location would be visible from the driver's position, and for inspection by officials.

In directing a manufacturer to put its certification label in those places set out in 567.4, NHTSA's purpose is to make these labels easy to see and read. Based on the information you supplied, the agency determines that for this particular vehicle design, installing the certification label as you propose will facilitate seeing and reading the label. On the other hand, placing the label as specified in 567.4 may not be practicable and might interfere with unobstructed viewing of the label. Therefore, on the condition that your company's label complies in all other respects with 567.4, NHTSA grants your request to install the certification label on the inner metal panel in front of the driver's door opening as shown in the photographs that you provided to us.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, feel free to contact David Elias of my office at the above address or by phone, at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

ref:567 d:4/27/93

ID: nht80-3.11

DATE: 06/25/80

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Vetter Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of May 28, 1980, with respect to your proposals for lighting requirements for a motorcycle sidecar currently under development. Your letter does not state so, but you indicated in your telephone conversation with Mr. Vinson of this office that the sidecar is detachable.

It has been the position of this agency that a detachable sidecar is an item of motor vehicle equipment to which no Federal motor vehicle safety standards apply. Conformance of the motorcycle therefore is judged without the sidecar attached. Therefore, the front turn signal configuration in Figure F2 would appear to meet Standard No. 108 but the asymmetrical one in Figures F1 and F3 would not. Similarly, the rear turn signal and stop lamp configurations in Figure R2 appear to comply, but those of Figures R1 and R3 do not. The configuration of Figure R4 is not prohibited by S4.1.2 since it does not appear to impair the effectiveness of the required lighting equipment. As for Figure R5, the reflective material required by the standard must be on the motorcycle itself and its appearance solely on the sidecar, as indicated on your drawing, is improper. Finally, your Figure S1 depicts front and rear reflex reflectors mounted on the right side of the sidecar. This is not acceptable as a substitute for the required front and rear reflectors on the right side of the motor as you indicate but we believe it would enhance safety if you incorporated this idea into production.

If you have any further questions, please let us know.

SINCERELY,

Vetter Corporation

May 28, 1980

Frank Berndt NHTSA Dept. of Transportation

Dear Frank:

Per a phone conversation with Taylor Vincent on May 19, 1980, we are enclosing our proposals for lighting requirements for a motorcycle sidecar currently under development.

The drawings are numbered in our order of preference. Listed below are explanations of each lighting arrangement. We would like specific information as to which proposals are acceptable. Please note that a complete view of the lighting proposal consists of front, back, and side views (F1, R1, S1).

FRONT VIEWS

Figure F1 (First Choice):

Standard left turnsignal/running light on motorcycle. Amber turnsignal/running light on sidecar. (NOTE: The motorcycle may or may not have a running light function in its turnsignal assembly. If not, the sidecar would not have a running light.)

Also, note the difference in the horizontal position of the turnsignals. (The left turnsignal is located on the left side of the fairing - see side view on F1).

The motorcycle's right turnsignal would remain attached but would be electrically disconnected.

Figure F2 (2nd Choice):

Standard right and left turnsignal/running lights on the motorcycle. No front lights on sidecar.

Figure F3 (3rd Choice):

Standard left turnsignal/running light on motorcycle. Right turnsignal/running light mounted on sidecar as shown.

Right turnsignal on motorcycle remains attached but is electrically disconnected.

Note the differences in horizontal and vertical placement of the right and left turnsignals.

REAR VIEWS

Figure R1 (1st Choice):

Left turnsignal on motorcycle. Right turnsignal/running light on sidecar. The right turnsignal on the motorcycle will remain attached but will be electrically disconnected. Does the sidecar need a running light where shown? Can it be red or amber? Note that the motorcycle's running light is red.

Figure R2 (2nd Choice):

Standard lighting on motorcycle as shown. No lighting on sidecar.

Figure R3 (3rd Choice):

Left turnsignal on motorcycle. Right turnsignal on sidecar. Stop/running light on motorcycle and sidecar.

Which color running light would have to be used on the sidecar in this case? We feel it should be red to match the red running light on the motorcycle.

Again, the right turnsignal on the motorcycle will remain attach but will be electrically disconnected.

Figure R4 (4th Choice): Standard right/left turnsignals and stop/running light on motorcycle. Red stop/running light on sidecar.

Figure R5 (Option):

3 1/2" x 16" reflective material on back of sidecar. Is this legal with any or all of the preceeding lighting arrangements?

SIDE VIEW

Figure S1 (1st Choice):

Reflex reflector at front and rear of sidecar as shown. Note differences in height. Standard approved reflectors will remain on left side of motorcycle.

Both reflectors on sidecar meet all requirements of SAE J594e of Federal Standard 108.

SUMMARY

We urge you to seriously consider our first proposal, which we feel is the simplest, safest approach. Your speed and cooperation on returning documented answers to these questions is extremely important in order for us to remain current on our development schedule. Per Taylor Vincent, we hope to have a reply within three weeks.

If I can be of any assistance, please don't hesitate to call me at (805) 541-2900.

Rick Golde, Project Engineer

cc: DUANE ANDERSON; STEVE BERN