ID: nht92-9.42

DATE: January 22, 1992

FROM: Gordon W. Didier -- Butzel Long

TO: Office of the General Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: Re: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 118

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 2/14/92 from Paul Jackson Rice to Gordon W. Didier (A39; Std. 118)

TEXT:

We are counsel for a United States manufacturer of automobile sunroofs. Included among our client's production are sunroofs incorporating power operated roof panels which are affected by the amendments to Standard No. 118 to become effective September 1, 1992. Our client is proceeding with development and production of an automobile sunroof product which will comply with the requirements of Standard No. 118 under both Sections S4 and S5 of the Standard, as described below.

The power operated roof panel system of this sunroof incorporates a feature which can be set to automatically close the roof panel when the ignition key is turned to the "off" position. In addition, the sunroof will incorporate a feature which provides for an express close of the roof panel system while the ignition key is in the "on," "start" or "accessory" position upon the one-time activation of actuation control within the interior of the vehicle. During operation of either of these closing methods, the roof panel system will reverse direction when it meets a resistive force of 22 pounds or more as specified in Section S5 of amended Standard No. 118.

In addition to the automatic close and express close features described above, this same sunroof will also incorporate an override feature which provides for closing of the roof panel system upon continuous activation of an actuation control within the interior of the vehicle while the ignition key is in the "on," "start" or "accessory" position. When this feature is in operation and the actuation control is continuously activated, the roof panel system will not reverse direction when it meets a resistive force of 22 pounds or more since the control on the interior of the vehicle will be continuously activated as provided under Section S4 of amended Standard No. 118.

Many owners of sunroof equipped vehicles rely on opening the roof panel systems for ventilation during the winter months. It is important that they be able to close the roof panels as necessary for safety, comfort and security despite any accumulation of ice or snow. This override feature is essential in order to ensure that the roof panel system will be able to be closed after being opened under winter weather conditions when the tracks of the sunroof may become covered with ice or snow. However, the closing force necessary to overcome a resistive force of 22 pounds or more will only be available upon continuous activation of the actuation control within the vehicle while the ignition is in the "on," "start" or "accessory" position.

We have reviewed these design features with technical personnel in the Agency's Office of Crash Avoidance and understand that they believe these features will comply fully with the requirements of amended Standard No. 118. However, we will also appreciate receiving written confirmation from the Agency that these features will be in compliance with the new amendments to Standard No. 118.

Please call me if you have any questions or if I can provide any further information, and I will look forward to your earliest response.

ID: wagar.ztv

Mr. Terry W. Wagar
Vehicle Safety Technical Analyst III
Technical Services Bureau
Office of Vehicle Safety & Clean Air
Department of Motor Vehicles
State of New York
6 Empire State Plaza
Albany, NY 12228
FAX 518-473-9903





Dear Mr. Wagar:

This is in reply to your letter of June 18, 2001, to Thomas M. Louizou, NHTSA Regional Administrator, and confirms our telephone discussion of July 27, 2001.

You have written to us about several aspects of the relationship between State and Federal requirements for low-speed vehicles (LSV). Under Federal law, a "low-speed vehicle" is defined as a "4-wheeled motor vehicle, other than a truck, whose speed attainable in 1.6 km (1 mile) is more than 32 kilometers per hour (20 miles per hour) and not more than 40 kilometers per hour (25 miles per hour) on a paved level surface." A "truck" is a motor vehicle "designed primarily for the transportation of property or special purpose equipment." These definitions are found at 49 CFR 571.3(b). In addition, the enclosed letter of March 8, 2001, to Neil Mardell clarifies that a truck cannot be a LSV. At this time, we do not have sufficient information about the vehicles you describe as "small trucks" to offer an opinion as to whether they meet the Federal description of low speed vehicle or truck.

A vehicle that meets the definition of "low-speed vehicle" must be manufactured to conform to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 500, Low-speed vehicles (49 CFR 571.500). You have informed us that "New York State law and regulation recognize the vehicles that have speeds not to exceed 40 MPH as limited use vehicles and must be uniquely registered and operated." There is no conflict here between State and Federal authority. NHTSA has no authority to prescribe conditions for registration and operation of motor vehicles, and with respect to LSVs (as opposed to other types of motor vehicles), New York may adopt and enforce whatever conditions for registration and operation it deems appropriate, including a total prohibition against the use of these vehicles on public roads.

You relate your initial understanding that "where equipment was addressed under 500, New York State would be preempted and could not have more stringent standards." However, "more recently, the answer from NHTSA has been that low speed vehicles only have to meet a specific seatbelt and windshield glazing requirement." You ask for a clarification.

Under Federal law (49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1)), when a Federal motor vehicle safety standard is in effect, a State may prescribe its own standard "applicable to the same aspect of performance . . . only if the standard is identical to the [Federal] standard. . . ." Standard No. 500 requires LSVs to be equipped with a windshield of AS-1 or AS-5 composition, and a Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly conforming to Standard No. 209. These are performance standards, and New York State's windshield glazing and seat belt standards as they apply to low-speed vehicles (i.e., limited use passenger-carrying vehicles with a maximum speed of more than 20 miles per hour but not more than 25 miles per hour) must be identical to those of Standard No. 500.

Standard No. 500 also requires LSVs to be equipped with certain items of lighting equipment, mirrors, and parking brakes, but it does not specify that these items must comply with Standards Nos. 108, 111, and 135, the Federal standards establishing performance requirements for lighting equipment, mirrors, and parking brakes. The American Association for Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) petitioned for reconsideration of Standard No. 500 and asked that States be allowed to establish their own performance requirements for these equipment items. We agreed, and on September 1, 2000, we published a notice (65 FR 53219), copy enclosed, saying (at 53221) that States "may adopt and apply their own performance requirements for required LSV lighting equipment, mirrors, and parking brakes until we have established performance requirements for those items of equipment." To date we have neither proposed nor established these requirements.

You mentioned that the GEM LSV appears to have a SAE "Y" symbol on the lens of its headlamp, indicating that the lamp is a driving light. As noted above, NHTSA has not proposed nor established requirements for the headlamp required by Standard No. 500, although we may do so in the future. A lamp with the SAE "Y" symbol on its lens is one that has been manufactured to comply with SAE Standard J581, Auxiliary Driving Lamps. The SAE defines an auxiliarly driving lamp as "a lighting device . . . intended to supplement the upper beam of a standard headlamp system. It is not intended for use alone or with the lower beam of a standard headlamp system." Thus, while the SAE clearly does not consider a driving lamp to be a headlamp, we have concluded that 49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1) permits a State to make its own decision as to whether it will accept a driving lamp as a headlamp for low-speed vehicles.

You also mentioned bumpers. As with the Federal motor vehicle safety standards, "a State or political subdivision of a State may prescribe or enforce a bumper standard for a passenger motor vehicle or passenger motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to" 49 CFR Part 581, Bumper Standard (49 U.S.C. 32511(a)). However, Section 581.3 specifically excludes low-speed vehicles from the applicability of the bumper standard. This means that New York, or any other jurisdiction, may establish a bumper standard for low-speed vehicles until such time as NHTSA may prescribe its own.

If you have any further questions, you may call Taylor Vinson of this Office (202-366-5263).

Sincerely,

John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosure

ID: aiam4805

"Dear Mr. Nishibori: This responds to your letter seeking to confir your understanding of the scope and application of the 'captive import' definition set forth at 49 CFR 533.4(b)(2), and used in specifying light truck CAFE standards. NHTSA's regulations define a 'captive import' as a light truck which is 'not domestically manufactured but which is imported in the 1980 model year or thereafter by a manufacturer whose principal place of business is in the United States.' The agency adopted this definition beginning with the 1980 model year in order to prevent the standards from encouraging the increased importation of these vehicles and exportation of domestic jobs. See 43 FR ll996, March 23, l978. Your letter explains that you do not believe that the light trucks manufactured in the U.S. by Nissan's U.S. manufacturing subsidiary (NMM, which is jointly-owned by the parent Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. (NML) in Japan and its wholly-owned U.S. importation and distribution subsidiary (NMC)), should be classified as captive imports. Your letter also states that light trucks imported by NMC should not be classified as captive imports. As explained below, I have concluded that neither the light trucks imported by your U.S. subsidiary, nor trucks manufactured by your U.S. manufacturing operation should be considered 'captive imports.' Section 501(8) of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act (the Act) defines the term 'manufacturer' as meaning 'any person engaged in the business of manufacturing automobiles. . . .' The term 'manufacture' is then defined in section 50l(9) as meaning to 'produce or assemble in the customs territory of the United States, or to import.' Under these definitions, which are also used in Part 533, NMC is a manufacturer of light trucks imported for the parent company. Since NMC's principal place of business is in the U.S., one might initially conclude that all of Nissan's imported light trucks should be classified as captive imports. However, that is not a necessary conclusion since there may be more than one manufacturer of these vehicles. NHTSA has concluded in the past that a second person may be regarded as a manufacturer of a vehicle manufactured by another person if that second person has a sufficient role in the manufacturing process that it can be deemed the 'sponsor' of the vehicle. See, for example, the enclosed February 19, 1987 interpretation to a confidential addressee. For Nissan's imported light trucks, the act of importation is the key manufacturing activity under the statute. While NMC does the actual importing, NML is responsible for the creation and production of the vehicles imported to the U.S. It designs models specifically for the U.S. market, and created NMC for the purpose of importing and marketing these vehicles. NML can be seen as 'sponsoring' the importation of Nissan light trucks. Moreover, applying basic principles of the law of agency, NML, as sponsor, may be considered the principal. It is therefore our opinion that NML and NMC are both importers of the Nissan vehicles being brought into the U.S., and hence both are manufacturers under the statute. This situation is obviously distinguished from circumstances where the importer is not connected with the foreign manufacturer, e.g., so called grey market importers. NHTSA believes it is appropriate, in determining whether the vehicles are 'captive imports,' to look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the production, importation and marketing of the vehicles. In this case, NML controls all aspects of the Nissan light trucks imported into the U.S. Further, NML exercises complete control over NMC, and created NMC for the purpose of importing and marketing NML's products in the U.S. Indeed, NMC exists primarily to serve NML as a conduit into the U.S. market. I note that this relationship is clearly distinguished from the circumstances of the typical captive import. In lieu of producing certain vehicles in this country, a domestic manufacturer imports and markets in this country vehicles (captive imports) supplied by a foreign manufacturer with which it has a special relationship. In such a case, the domestic manufacturer is not under control of the foreign company. Moreover, the domestic manufacturer does not serve primarily as a conduit to the U.S. market for the imported vehicles. Since NML has its principal place of business in Japan, and exercises complete control over NMC, I conclude that vehicles manufactured by NML and imported into the U.S. by NMC are not captive imports. Moreover, since almost all foreign manufacturers utilize U.S. subsidiaries to import vehicles into the U.S., any other conclusion would have the effect of making virtually all imports 'captive imports,' a result which would clearly be inconsistent with the agency's intent in establishing the captive import category. I also agree with the statement in your letter that light trucks manufactured in the U.S. by NMM are not captive imports. While we understand that these vehicles are not 'domestically manufactured' as that term is defined in the statute, neither are they imported. The term 'import' is defined in section 502(l0) of the Act as meaning 'to import into the customs territory of the United States.' Since these vehicles are not imported, it is impossible for them to be considered captive imports. Your letter also enclosed a copy of a letter you sent to EPA, requesting that agency's interpretation of portions of EPA's fuel economy calculation regulations at 40 CFR Part 600. You sought clarification from EPA on the apparent inconsistency between EPA's regulations, which provide separate treatment for 'domestically produced' and 'not domestically produced' light trucks, and NHTSA's classification regulations, which distinguish only between 'captive imports' and 'others.' You requested this agency's comments on the issues raised in the letter to EPA. I am not in a position to comment on EPA's regulations, or on that agency's interpretation of its regulations. I will confirm, however, that NHTSA intended for different procedures to be applied to the determination of CAFE for light trucks than those for passenger cars. The primary distinction is that under the statute, passenger cars are divided into 'domestically manufactured' and 'not domestically manufactured' fleets. The statute contains no comparable distinction for light trucks. However, under NHTSA's regulations, light trucks are divided into captive imports and 'others,' which encompasses all light trucks which are not captive imports. This issue is discussed in some detail in the final rule establishing the captive import definition. See, 43 FR 11995, 11998-9, March 23, 1978. I hope you have found this information helpful. Please do not hesitate to contact this office if you have any further questions. Sincerely, Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel Enclosure";

ID: aiam4800

"Dear Mr. Canever: This responds to your letter concerning th implications under the Corporate Average Fuel Economy ('CAFE') program of the acquisition by Ford Motor Company ('Ford') of Jaguar plc ('Jaguar'). You stated that you believe all Ford and Jaguar vehicles produced and imported for model year ('MY') 1989 should be placed in Ford's fleet. As discussed below, we have concluded that Ford's acquisition of Jaguar did not take place until MY 1990. Thus, Ford and Jaguar vehicles constituted separate fleets for MY 1989. As a consequence, while the fuel economy credits earned by the combined Ford/Jaguar fleet in MY l990 may be applied to reduce (or eliminate) Jaguar's CAFE shortfall in MY 1987 and later years, the credits earned by Ford in MY 1989 may not be applied to offset any Jaguar shortfall. According to your letter, Ford publicly announced its tender offer for Jaguar shares on November 2, l989. This occurred after Ford had obtained the agreement of the Board of Directors of Jaguar to recommend the offer. The offer document, which constituted the formal legal offer, was mailed on November 8. After over 50 percent of Jaguar stock had been tendered, Ford declared the tender offer 'unconditional' on December l0, l989. You stated that during the period of negotiation, tender offer, and acceptance, and continuing through the end of calender year l989, Ford was 'manufacturing' MY l989 vehicles. Apparently, that statement is based on your statement that a small number of MY l989 Jaguar and Aston Martin vehicles were imported into the United States 'through calendar year end l989.' You argued that because Ford controlled Jaguar and the importer of Jaguar vehicles prior to the time that the last of these MY l989 vehicles were imported, and because fuel economy standards apply to particular model years as a whole and not to separate parts of a model year, all Ford and Jaguar vehicles produced and imported for MY l989 should be placed in Ford's fleet. You contended that this treatment would be consistent with that accorded Chrysler Corporation ('Chrysler') and American Motors Corporation ('AMC') for model year l987. We disagree with your analysis comparing your situation to that of Chrysler/AMC, given significant differences in the timing of the respective acquisitions. In a letter to Chrysler dated April 4, l990, NHTSA stated the following: Another issue raised by Chrysler's memorandum is whether Chrysler and AMC became the same manufacturer for fuel economy purposes for model year l987. According to the memorandum, Chrysler agreed to acquire AMC in the spring of l987, and the transaction closed on August 6, l987. . . . Since Chrysler controlled AMC prior to the end of the l987 model year, and since fuel economy standards apply to particular model years as a whole and not to separate parts of a model year, it is our opinion that all of the vehicles produced by both Chrysler and AMC for model year l987 shall be treated as if manufactured by the same manufacturer, i.e., placed into one fleet. Otherwise, one or both of the manufacturers would have two separate CAFE values, pre-acquisition (or pre-control) and post-acquisition (or post-control), for the same model year. We continue to adhere to our view that where one manufacturer acquires another during a model year, they should be deemed as the same manufacturer, with a single CAFE value, for that model year. However, in the Chrysler/AMC acquisition, all relevant aspects of the transaction took place during the l987 model year. As you know, the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act ('Act') establishes time limits within which NHTSA must establish and/or amend fuel economy standards for a given model year that are based upon the beginning of the model year. See sections 502(b) and 502(f)(2) of the Act. In interpreting those provisions, both NHTSA and the courts have concluded that the model year is traditionally thought to start approximately October l. See In re Center for Auto Safety, 793 F.2d l346, l349 (D.C. Cir. l986), 49 Fed. Reg. 225l6 (May 30, l984), 49 Fed. Reg. 4l250 (October 22, l984). See also General Motors Corporation v. NHTSA, 898 F.2d l65, l76 (D.C. Cir. l990), Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 7l0 F.2d 842, 847 (D.C. Cir. l983). In the Chrysler/AMC case, all relevant aspects of the transaction were completed well before the completion of MY 1987, i.e., September 30, l987. Conversely, in the Ford/Jaguar transaction, Ford made its tender offer in early November 1989 and declared the tender offer 'unconditional' on December 10, 1989. These dates and any other possible date for the acquisition are clearly within the l990 model year, which began on approximately October l, l989. We recognize that manufacturers may produce or import vehicles that are designated as belonging to a particular model year after October l of that year. However, for purposes of deciding the model year in which one manufacturer acquires another, we have concluded that the traditional model year is the appropriate frame of reference. This conclusion is supported by the fact that by early November l989, the earliest date referred to in your letter, when Ford made its tender offer, it had been selling its MY l990 models for over a month. The fact that Ford or Jaguar may have produced or imported a small number of MY 1989 cars after the date of the acquisition is not determinative, since it has always been the case that model years can overlap for a given manufacturer, and some prior model year cars may be produced after the commencement of a given model year. Thus, any MY 1989 Jaguar vehicles that were imported during the last three months of 1989 should be included in Jaguar's MY 1989 fleet, as they would have been had the acquisition not occurred. I note that your letter indicated that Ford intended to file its Final l989 Model Year Report under the CAFE program with all MY 1989 Jaguar vehicles included in Ford's fleet. You stated, however, that you would not file that Report until you received this agency's views on the propriety of that action. For the reasons set out above, we believe that Ford and Jaguar had separate, distinct fleets in MY 1989, and that therefore separate information should be filed for that model year. I hope that this letter adequately explains our position on these issues. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Sincerely, Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel";

ID: nht93-6.16

DATE: August 17, 1993

FROM: Erika Z. Jones -- Mayer, Brown & Platt

TO: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 10/7/93 from John Womack to Erika Z. Jones (A41; Std. 213)

TEXT:

I am writing to confirm our interpretation of FMVSS 213, S5.2.3.2, regarding the covering required on a surface that can be contactable by a child's head.

That provision requires that a contactable surface be covered by material with a specified compression deflection and a minimum thickness of 3/4 inch for materials having a 25 percent compression-deflection resistance of less than 1.8 psi.

As I understand this provision, the required covering material need not be provided in a single piece, as long as the material taken together would satisfy the compression deflection and minimum thickness requirements. Specifically, we understand that the requirement could be met by providing energy absorbing material in two pieces -- one piece bonded to the seat shell and one piece contained within the back of the permanently attached seat cushion, if the combined thickness of the two pieces is at least 3/4 of an inch.

We appreciate knowing whether you concur with this understanding of the requirements of FMVSS 213. Thank you for your attention to this request.

ID: nht87-2.41

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 07/09/87

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Mr. Alberto Negro

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. Alberto Negro Fiat Research & Development - USA Branch Parklane Towers West Suite 1210 Dearborn, MI 48216

Dear Mr. Negro:

This is a response to Mr. Rossi's request for an interpretation of the Federal motor vehicle theft prevention standard (49 CFR Part 541), which he asked that I direct to you. That standard requires that certain parts of high-theft carlines, including the engine and transmission, be marked with the vehicle identification number, if the part is an original equipment part, or with the letter "R" and the manufacturer's trademark, if the part is a replacement part. Mr. Rossi stated that it is occasionally ne cessary to remove the original equipment engine or transmission from one of these cars and install a replacement engine or transmission in the car. The original equipment engine and/or transmission is then sent to the factory to be repaired and reconditi oned. Following such repair, the engine and/or transmission is then put into the replacement parts network.

Mr. Rossi stated his belief that the original equipment part should have the original equipment identification removed and a replacement marking put onto the part. He then asked whether Ferrari was required to remove the footprint left by the original eq uipment identification marking or if that should be left on the part. The answer is that Ferrari and all other reconditioners are not permitted to remove from any reconditioned part the original equipment identification marking inscribed or affixed to th e part in compliance with Part 541. further, reconditioners are not required to inscribe or affix any additional markings to parts they have reconditioned.

Title II of the Motor Vehicle Theft Prevention Act of 1984 (Pub. L. 98-547: the Theft Act) includes a provision that addresses this question. This section (18 U.S.C. 511) reads as follows:

S511. Altering or removing motor vehicle identification numbers

(a) Whoever knowingly removes, obliterates, tampers with, or alters an identification number for a motor vehicle, or motor vehicle part, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

(b)(1) Subsection (a) of this section does not apply to a removal, obliteration, tampering, or alteration by a person specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection (unless such person knows that the vehicle or part involved is stolen).

(2) The persons referred to in paragraph (1) of this subsection are

(A) a motor vehicle scrap processor or a motor vehicle demolisher who complies with applicable State law with respect to such vehicle or part;

(B) a person who repairs such vehicle or part, if the removal, obliteration, tampering, or alteration is reasonably necessary for the repair; and

(C) a person who restores or replaces an identification number for such vehicle or part in accordance with applicable State law.

None of the exceptions set forth in 18 U.S.C. 511(b)(2) would permit Ferrari to routinely remove original equipment markings from reconditioned engines and transmissions. The first exception is not applicable, since Ferrari is clearly not a motor vehicle scrap processor or demolisher. The second exception would be applicable only in rare instances, since it is not usually necessary to remove the original equipment identification marking in order to recondition engines or transmissions. The third excepti on was explained as follows in the House Report on the Theft Act (H.R. Rep. No. 1087, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., at 24 (1984)): "The exemption also applies to persons acting under the authority of the Secretary of Transportation or State law to restore or rep lace such markings." for the policy reasons discussed below, we will not give reconditioners authority to routinely remove original equipment identification markings from engines and transmissions. Assuming Ferrari does not have authority under applicabl e State law to remove such markings, the third exception does not apply to Ferrari when it is reconditioning engines and transmissions.

If reconditioners of engines and transmissions were allowed to routinely remove the original equipment identification markings, the law enforcement purposes of the Theft Act would be seriously undermined. In response to some comments received on the prop osed Part 541, a new S541.6(b) was added to the final rule. This section expressly prohibits covered major parts from being marked as both original equipment and replacement parts. The preamble to the final rule explained the reasons for prohibiting such "dual markings" as follows:

Dual markings would give thieves the opportunity to present stolen original equipment parts as properly marked replacement parts. Once the original equipment identification (the VIN) had been obliterated from those stolen parts, a legitimate replacement part marking would remain. Assuming that the obliteration of the VIN were performed reasonably proficiently, repair shops and investigators would have little reason to suspect chat this part was anything other than a properly identified replacement part. 50 FR 43178; October 24, 1985.

These same law enforcement concerns would arise if Ferrari were to remove the VIN markings from its reconditioned engines and transmissions. If those parts were marked as both original equipment and replacement parts, the problems associated with dual ma rkings would arise. If, on the other hand, Ferrari were to try to obliterate the footprint from the original equipment, law enforcement officials would have no means of distinguishing engines Ferrari had reconditioned from stolen engines on which thieves had obliterated the original equipment marking and added a counterfeit replacement marking. In either case, it would cause confusion and uncertainty for law enforcement officials if Ferrari and the large number of other reconditioners were legitimately and routinely to remove the original equipment identification from reconditioned parts and add a replacement part marking to those parts.

Indeed, such action by reconditioners would serve to defeat the purpose of the Theft Act, which was to "decrease the ease with which stolen vehicles and their major parts can be fenced." If reconditioners routinely removed the original equipment markings from the engines and transmissions they reconditioned, car thieves could also remove those original equipment markings with impunity. If the thieves were ever questioned by law enforcement officials about the obliterated original equipment marking, they could respond that the marking must have been obliterated during reconditioning. If obliterated original equipment markings on parts do not provide law enforcement officials with evidence of illegal activity, there would seem to be no reason to require the original equipment markings on the parts.

Further, a requirement that all persons reconditioning engines and transmissions obliterate the original equipment marking and add a replacement part marking would impose significant additional costs and burdens on those persons. This would be inconsiste nt with the Theft Act's stated purpose of minimizing regulation of the aftermarket motor vehicle industry.

All of these potential problems can be avoided if reconditioners simply leave the original equipment marking on the parts after reconditioning. When those markings are left in place by reconditioners, thieves cannot claim that an engine or transmission t hat has a "footprint" in the area where the original equipment identification is placed is just a reconditioned part. Instead, the "footprint" would alert law enforcement officials to the likelihood that the original equipment marking had been unlawfully removed from the part. Further, no burdens are imposed in reconditioners if they must leave the original equipment markings in place and are not required to add any markings of their own. Therefore, we conclude that the Theft Act and Part 541 require th at businesses that recondition any major parts required to be marked pursuant to Part 541 leave those markings in place on the reconditioned parts. Part 541 does not require reconditioners to add any further identification markings to these parts.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

Ms. Erika Jones Office of Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 Seventh St., S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

SUBJECT: Theft Prevention Standard Request for Agency Interpretation

Dear Ms. Jones:

On October 24, 1985, the agency published in the Federal Register (50 FR 43166) the final rule for the Vehicle Theft Prevention Standard and Selection of Covered Major Parts as required by the Motor Vehicle Theft law Enforcement Act of 1984.

The Vehicle Theft Prevention Standard requires a manufacture whose car line(s) fall above the median theft rate to mark the fourteen (14) major parts with the vehicle identification number (VIN) and replacement parts for those high theft lines are to be marked with the manufacturers logo and the letter "R". The standard also requires that the "target area" for marking of the replacement parts be different from the marking of the original parts marking so that repair shops and investigators can identify an original part from a replacement part.

On occasions, it becomes necessary for Ferrari to replace the original engine and/or gearbox in a customers vehicle in order to prevent tying up a customer's vehicle for an extended period to correct a major problem in the engine and/or gearbox. This rep lacement engine and/or gearbox will contain the label with the Ferrari logo and the letter "R" beginning with 1987 models.

The original engine and/or gearbox is then sent to the factory to be repaired and re-conditioned and at that point is placed in the spare parts network. The re-conditioned part will have the label containing the VIN removed and a replacement label affixe d prior to going into the spare parts network. The removal of the original parts marking label and the affixing of the replacement label is causing Ferrari some concern and they have asked that we request an agency interpretation on how to best handle th is matter.

The regulations in paragraph 541.5(d)(v)(8) requires that the removal of the label must "discernibly alter the appearance of that area of the part where the label was affixed by leaving residual parts of the label or adhesive in that area, so that invest igators will have , evidence that a label was originally present". The label to be affixed to the original engine and gearbox will be riveted and glued to the part so that when it is removed a "footprint" will be left behind.

The concern that Ferrari has for which they are requesting an agency interpretation is what to do with the "footprint" left by the original label after it is removed once the engine and/or gearbox has been re-conditioned prior to going into the spare par ts network? Do they remove the footprint or do they leave it on the part? If they are to remove it, do they have to fill in the two holes which were drilled for the rivets?

Ferrari does not want to cause confusion with repair shops or investigators when the "re-conditioned" engine and/or gearbox is used at some later date to replace a customers engine and/or gearbox that is in need of some major repair.

The agency's response to this request of interpretation should be sent to the Fiat R & D office in Dearborn, Michigan to the attention of Mr. Alberto Negro. We are prepared to supply you with any further information you may need to respond to our request .

Sincerely yours,

Ing. M. Rossi FSM/ai

ID: nht94-4.22

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: September 7, 1994

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: David Ori, Manager -- Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Vehicle Control Division, Harrisburg, PA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 05/06/94 from David L. Ori to Jim Gilkey (OCC 9977)

TEXT: This responds to your letter to Mr. James Gilkey of this agency's Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance, requesting confirmation of your understanding of the applicability of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205 to certain limousines. You were co ncerned about the permissibility of applying sun screening or window tinting to such vehicles during the original manufacturing process, and during the "second stage or alteration phase of the manufacturing process."

By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. Und er this authority, NHTSA issued Standard No. 205, "Glazing Materials," to specify performance requirements for various types of glazing and to specify the location in the vehicles in which each item of glazing may be used. One provision in Standard No. 205 requires a minimum of 70 percent light transmittance in any glazing area requisite for driving visibility. The primary purpose of this requirement is to ensure adequate visibility through the vehicles's windows, thereby reducing the risk of a motor v ehicle crash.

NHTSA does not approve or certify any vehicles or items of equipment. Instead, each manufacturer is responsible for "self-certifying" that its products meet all applicable safety standards. NHTSA's certification regulations are set forth in 49 CFR Part 567. Under this regulation, each manufacturer is required to certify that its motor vehicles comply with all applicable Federal safety standards, including Standard No. 205. As you correctly state, second stage manufacturers and alterers also have cer tification responsibilities. Specifically, a final stage manufacturer is responsible for certifying a vehicle pursuant to 49 CFR @ 567.5. Accordingly, you are correct that a final stage manufacturer is required to certify that its finished product, incl uding the glazing materials, complies with all applicable Federal safety standards.

A person who alters a previously certified new vehicle also must certify that the altered vehicle complies with all applicable standards. 49 CFR @ 567.7. However, this provision does not apply to the "addition, substitution, or removal of readily attach able components ... or minor finishing operations, such as painting." NHTSA views the addition of window tint film as a "minor finishing operation." Accordingly, a person adding such tint film would not be considered an alterer and therefore would not be subject to certification responsibilities.

However, aside from certification responsibilities, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. @ 30112a, "a person may not ... sell, offer for sale, [or] introduce or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce ... any motor vehicle...unless the vehicle...complies with [ all applicable standards]." Thus, it would be a violation of the statute to sell a new vehicle whose windows which are requisite for driving visibility had been tinted to allow less than 70 percent light transmittance.

Moreover, with respect to vehicles that are no longer new, a motor vehicle manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business "may not knowingly make inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or motor veh icle equipment in compliance with an applicable motor vehicle safety standard." Thus, a person in any of these categories may not apply tint film that would cause the light transmittance of the glazing requisite for driving visibility to be under 70 perc ent.

You stated your belief that limousines that seat less than 10 persons may not be equipped with any sun screening or window tinting product, since such products would violate Standard No. 205. We wish to clarify one aspect of your statement. Limousines that seat less than 10 persons are considered "passenger cars" n1 under NHTSA's regulations. NHTSA considers all windows in a passenger car to be requisite for driving visibility; accordingly, all windows in a passenger car/limousine must have a minimum 70 percent light transmittance. However, please note that tinting may be used in these vehicles, provided the tinted windows meet the minimum 70 percent light transmittance requirement.

n1 The agency defines "passenger car" as a "motor vehicle with motive power, except a multipurpose passenger vehicle, motorcycle, or trailer, designed for carrying 10 persons or less." In turn, "multipurpose passenger vehicle" is defined as a "motor v ehicle with motive power, except a trailer, designed to carry 10 persons or less which is constructed on a truck chassis or with special features for occasional off-road operation." A "bus" is defined as a "motor vehicle with motive power, except a trail er, designed for carrying more than 10 persons."

You further asked whether a limousine that seats 10 or more persons is subject to the Federal window tinting requirements. A limousine with a capacity of more than 10 persons is considered a "bus" under our regulations. There are specific requirements in Standard No. 205 that apply to buses (or bus/limousines). Under these requirements, only the windshield and the windows to the immediate left and right of the driver are considered to be requisite for driving visibility (if they are equipped with dua l outside mirrors satisfying section S6.1 (b) of Standard No. 111), and thus subject to the minimum 70 percent light transmittance requirement. The windows to the rear of the driver in a bus/limousine, including the rear side and rear windows, are not r equired to meet the light transmittance requirement. Accordingly, Standard No. 205 does not prohibit the use of tinted glazing materials for bus/limousine windows to the rear of the driver when the vehicle is equipped with dual outside mirrors larger th an those usually used on passenger cars.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Mr. Marvin Shaw of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

ID: 9977

Mr. David Ori, Manager
Bureau of Motor Vehicles
Vehicle Control Division, Room 104
T&S Building
Harrisburg, PA 17120

Dear Mr. Ori:

This responds to your letter to Mr. James Gilkey of this agency's Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance, requesting confirmation of your understanding of the applicability of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205 to certain limousines. You were concerned about the permissibility of applying sun screening or window tinting to such vehicles during the original manufacturing process, and during the "second stage or alteration phase of the manufacturing process."

By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. Under this authority, NHTSA issued Standard No. 205, "Glazing Materials," to specify performance requirements for various types of glazing and to specify the location in the vehicles in which each item of glazing may be used. One provision in Standard No. 205 requires a minimum of 70 percent light transmittance in any glazing area requisite for driving visibility. The primary purpose of this requirement is to ensure adequate visibility through the vehicle's windows, thereby reducing the risk of a motor vehicle crash.

NHTSA does not approve or certify any vehicles or items of equipment. Instead, each manufacturer is responsible for "self-certifying" that its products meet all applicable safety standards. NHTSA's certification regulations are set forth in 49 CFR Part 567. Under this regulation, each manufacturer is required to certify that its motor vehicles comply with all applicable Federal safety standards, including Standard No. 205. As you correctly state, second stage manufacturers and alterers also have certification responsibilities. Specifically, a final stage manufacturer is responsible for certifying a vehicle pursuant to 49 CFR '567.5. Accordingly, you are correct that a final stage manufacturer is

required to certify that its finished product, including the glazing materials, complies with all applicable Federal safety standards.

A person who alters a previously certified new vehicle also must certify that the altered vehicle complies with all applicable standards. 49 CFR '567.7. However, this provision does not apply to the "addition, substitution, or removal of readily attachable components ... or minor finishing operations, such as painting." NHTSA views the addition of window tint film as a "minor finishing operation." Accordingly, a person adding such tint film would not be considered an alterer and therefore would not be subject to certification responsibilities.

However, aside from certification responsibilities, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. ' 30112a, "a person may not...sell, offer for sale, [or] introduce or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce...any motor vehicle...unless the vehicle...complies with [all applicable standards]." Thus, it would be a violation of the statute to sell a new vehicle whose windows which are requisite for driving visibility had been tinted to allow less than 70 percent light transmittance.

Moreover, with respect to vehicles that are no longer new, a motor vehicle manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business "may not knowingly make inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable motor vehicle safety standard." Thus, a person in any of these categories may not apply tint film that would cause the light transmittance of the glazing requisite for driving visibility to be under 70 percent.

You stated your belief that limousines that seat less than 10 persons may not be equipped with any sun screening or window tinting product, since such products would violate Standard No. 205. We wish to clarify one aspect of your statement. Limousines that seat less than 10 persons are considered "passenger cars" under NHTSA's regulations. NHTSA considers all windows in a passenger car to be requisite for driving visibility; accordingly, all windows in a passenger car/limousine must have a minimum 70 percent light transmittance. However, please note that tinting may be used in these vehicles, provided the tinted windows meet the minimum 70 percent light transmittance requirement.

You further asked whether a limousine that seats 10 or more persons is subject to the Federal window tinting requirements. A limousine with a capacity of more than 10 persons is considered a "bus" under our regulations. There are specific requirements in Standard No. 205 that apply to buses (or bus/limousines). Under these requirements, only the windshield and the windows to the immediate left and right of the driver are considered to be requisite for driving visibility (if they are equipped with dual outside mirrors satisfying section S6.1(b) of Standard No. 111), and thus subject to the minimum 70 percent light transmittance requirement. The windows to the rear of the driver in a bus/limousine, including the rear side and rear windows, are not required to meet the light transmittance requirement. Accordingly, Standard No. 205 does not prohibit the use of tinted glazing materials for bus/limousine windows to the rear of the driver when the vehicle is equipped with dual outside mirrors larger than those usually used on passenger cars.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Mr. Marvin Shaw of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

ref:205#567 d:9/7/94 The agency defines "passenger car" as a "motor vehicle with motive power, except a multipurpose passenger vehicle, motorcycle, or trailer, designed for carrying 10 persons or less." In turn, "multipurpose passenger vehicle" is defined as a "motor vehicle with motive power, except a trailer, designed to carry 10 persons or less which is constructed on a truck chassis or with special features for occasional off-road operation." A "bus" is defined as a "motor vehicle with motive power, except a trailer, designed for carrying more than 10 persons."

ID: 18644kwii.ogm

William Shapiro, P.E.
Manager
Regulatory Compliance and Environmental Affairs
Volvo Cars of North America
7 Volvo Drive
Rockleigh, NJ 07647-0913

Dear Mr. Shapiro:

This is in response to your letter of August 6, 1998 regarding the impact of amendments adopted by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) pursuant to the Debt Collection Improvement Act (DCIA) on applicable penalties for violations by Volvo Cars of North America (Volvo) of the corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standard applicable to model year (MY) 1998 passenger cars.

Pursuant to 49 U.S.C.  32912(b), a manufacturer that violates a CAFE standard (after applying any applicable carry-back or carry-forward credits) is liable for a civil penalty of $5.00 for each tenth of a mile per gallon (mpg) by which the standard exceeds its average fuel economy for that year, multiplied by the number of automobiles in its fleet. Pursuant to the DCIA, NHTSA raised that amount to $5.50 per tenth of an mpg. 49 CFR 578; 62 Fed. Reg. 5167 (January 30, 1997). The effective date of the increase was March 6, 1997.

In your letter, you refer to a July 23, 1998 letter from me to you, in which I stated that the increase in the CAFE penalty amount would apply beginning with the 1998 model year. You assert, however, that the penalty increase should not apply to Volvo's MY 1998 fleet because certain MY 1998 Volvos were produced and sold prior to the effective date of the increase.

In my July 23, 1998 letter, I explained that NHTSA has long maintained that CAFE standards apply to model years as a whole, and not to separate parts of a model year. The letter also set forth the agency's rationale for concluding that the applicable CAFE penalty is the penalty in effect at the beginning of the model year in question. Since the effective date of the DCIA increase was after the beginning of the 1997 model year, we announced that the penalty increase would apply to violations of the MY 1998 CAFE standards.

You have advised us that, beginning in February 1997, Volvo began selling S/V70 model vehicles that it designated as MY 1998 models. Since this preceded the effective date of the penalty increase, you contend that applying the increased penalty to Volvo's MY 1998 fleet would be inconsistent with the agency's decision that CAFE standards apply only to model years as a whole.

The agency does not agree with your interpretation. Rather, as explained below, we have determined that all DCIA amendments to CAFE civil penalty levels that are effective prior to October 1 of a given year will apply to violations of CAFE standards applicable to the subsequent model year.

As you know, 49 U.S.C. Chapter 329, "Automobile Fuel Economy," establishes time limits within which NHTSA must prescribe and/or amend fuel economy standards for a given model year that are based upon the beginning of the model year. See 49 U.S.C.  32902(a) and (g)(2). In interpreting those provisions, both NHTSA and the courts have concluded that the model year will be deemed to begin on October l. See 49 Fed. Reg.225l6 (May 30, l984); 49 Fed. Reg. 4l250 (October 22, l984); In re Center for Auto Safety, 793 F.2d l346, l349 (D.C. Cir. l986). See also General Motors Corporation v. NHTSA, 898 F.2d l65, l76 (D.C. Cir. l990); and Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 7l0 F.2d 842, 847 (D.C. Cir. l983).

The use of October 1 to mark the commencement of a model year provides NHTSA with a consistent benchmark for satisfying its statutory obligation to promulgate and amend CAFE standards on a timely basis. If, for example, the agency were to recognize model years that were selected by manufacturers for marketing or other purposes as the model year for the purposes of prescribing or amending CAFE standards, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for NHTSA to issue such standards in a timely fashion.

We recognize that a manufacturer may produce or import vehicles that it designates as belonging to a particular model year before October l of the preceding year. However, for purposes of deciding the model year to which any enhanced penalties imposed under the DCIA apply, we need to have a standardized model year that applies to the industry as a whole. We have concluded that since we have previously utilized October 1 as the relevant date for other purposes under the CAFE statute, we will use it for this purpose as well.

If, as you suggest, NHTSA did not apply the enhanced penalties to Volvo's MY 1998 fleet, Volvo would be subject to lesser CAFE penalties than other manufacturers simply by virtue of having produced a small number of vehicles prior to March 6, 1997 that it unilaterally chose to designate as MY 1998 models. We believe that it would be inequitable for the agency to apply the CAFE penalties in such a fashion.

Moreover, if NHTSA were to adopt the position urged by your company, we would encourage manufacturers to time the introduction of new model year vehicles to avoid future penalty increases adopted pursuant to the DCIA. It could also lead to claims that newly adopted or amended CAFE standards for a future model year that were issued on a timely basis should not apply to any manufacturer that sold some of that model year's vehicles prior to October 1 of the preceding year. Such a result would be contrary to the purposes of both Chapter 329 and the DCIA.

Accordingly, NHTSA has concluded that, for purposes of deciding when the enhanced CAFE penalties will apply, the 1998 model year began on October 1, 1997, which was well after the effective date of the penalty increase. Of course, as has always been the case, all of the vehicles that Volvo designated as MY 1998 vehicles will be considered to be part of Volvo's MY 1998 fleet for purposed of calculating its CAFE for that model year.

Accordingly, it is our position that any CAFE penalties applicable to Volvo for the 1998 model year must be calculated using the $5.50 per tenth of an mpg rate required by the DCIA and NHTSA's implementing regulation. However, it also my understanding that Volvo intends to submit another request for interpretation that may further impact on any penalties owed for MY 1998. Provided that this request is submitted prior to the current deadline for the company's payment of the MY 1998 penalty, NHTSA will not take further actions until your request is resolved.

I hope that this is responsive to your request. If you have any questions, please contact Otto Matheke of my staff at (202) 366-5253.

Sincerely,
Frank Seales, Jr.
Chief Counsel
ref:578
d.1/13/00

ID: 18644KWII.ogms

William Shapiro, P.E.
Manager
Regulatory Compliance and Environmental Affairs
Volvo Cars of North America
7 Volvo Drive
Rockleigh, NJ 07647-0913

Dear Mr. Shapiro:

This is in response to your letter of August 6, 1998 regarding the impact of amendments adopted by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) pursuant to the Debt Collection Improvement Act (DCIA) on applicable penalties for violations by Volvo Cars of North America (Volvo) of the corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standard applicable to model year (MY) 1998 passenger cars.

Pursuant to 49 U.S.C.  32912(b), a manufacturer that violates a CAFE standard (after applying any applicable carry-back or carry-forward credits) is liable for a civil penalty of $5.00 for each tenth of a mile per gallon (mpg) by which the standard exceeds its average fuel economy for that year, multiplied by the number of automobiles in its fleet. Pursuant to the DCIA, NHTSA raised that amount to $5.50 per tenth of an mpg. 49 CFR 578; 62 Fed. Reg. 5167 (January 30, 1997). The effective date of the increase was March 6, 1997.

In your letter, you refer to a July 23, 1998 letter from me to you, in which I stated that the increase in the CAFE penalty amount would apply beginning with the 1998 model year. You assert, however, that the penalty increase should not apply to Volvo's MY 1998 fleet because certain MY 1998 Volvos were produced and sold prior to the effective date of the increase.

In my July 23, 1998 letter, I explained that NHTSA has long maintained that CAFE standards apply to model years as a whole, and not to separate parts of a model year. The letter also set forth the agency's rationale for concluding that the applicable CAFE penalty is the penalty in effect at the beginning of the model year in question. Since the effective date of the DCIA increase was after the beginning of the 1997 model year, we announced that the penalty increase would apply to violations of the MY 1998 CAFE standards.

You have advised us that, beginning in February 1997, Volvo began selling S/V70 model vehicles that it designated as MY 1998 models. Since this preceded the effective date of the penalty increase, you contend that applying the increased penalty to Volvo's MY 1998 fleet would be inconsistent with the agency's decision that CAFE standards apply only to model years as a whole.

The agency does not agree with your interpretation. Rather, as explained below, we have determined that all DCIA amendments to CAFE civil penalty levels that are effective prior to October 1 of a given year will apply to violations of CAFE standards applicable to the subsequent model year.

As you know, 49 U.S.C. Chapter 329, "Automobile Fuel Economy," establishes time limits within which NHTSA must prescribe and/or amend fuel economy standards for a given model year that are based upon the beginning of the model year. See 49 U.S.C.  32902(a) and (g)(2). In interpreting those provisions, both NHTSA and the courts have concluded that the model year will be deemed to begin on October l. See 49 Fed. Reg.225l6 (May 30, l984); 49 Fed. Reg. 4l250 (October 22, l984); In re Center for Auto Safety, 793 F.2d l346, l349 (D.C. Cir. l986). See also General Motors Corporation v. NHTSA, 898 F.2d l65, l76 (D.C. Cir. l990); and Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 7l0 F.2d 842, 847 (D.C. Cir. l983).

The use of October 1 to mark the commencement of a model year provides NHTSA with a consistent benchmark for satisfying its statutory obligation to promulgate and amend CAFE standards on a timely basis. If, for example, the agency were to recognize model years that were selected by manufacturers for marketing or other purposes as the model year for the purposes of prescribing or amending CAFE standards, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for NHTSA to issue such standards in a timely fashion.

We recognize that a manufacturer may produce or import vehicles that it designates as belonging to a particular model year before October l of the preceding year. However, for purposes of deciding the model year to which any enhanced penalties imposed under the DCIA apply, we need to have a standardized model year that applies to the industry as a whole. We have concluded that since we have previously utilized October 1 as the relevant date for other purposes under the CAFE statute, we will use it for this purpose as well.

If, as you suggest, NHTSA did not apply the enhanced penalties to Volvo's MY 1998 fleet, Volvo would be subject to lesser CAFE penalties than other manufacturers simply by virtue of having produced a small number of vehicles prior to March 6, 1997 that it unilaterally chose to designate as MY 1998 models. We believe that it would be inequitable for the agency to apply the CAFE penalties in such a fashion.

Moreover, if NHTSA were to adopt the position urged by your company, we would encourage manufacturers to time the introduction of new model year vehicles to avoid future penalty increases adopted pursuant to the DCIA. It could also lead to claims that newly adopted or amended CAFE standards for a future model year that were issued on a timely basis should not apply to any manufacturer that sold some of that model year's vehicles prior to October 1 of the preceding year. Such a result would be contrary to the purposes of both Chapter 329 and the DCIA.

Accordingly, NHTSA has concluded that, for purposes of deciding when the enhanced CAFE penalties will apply, the 1998 model year began on October 1, 1997, which was well after the effective date of the penalty increase. Of course, as has always been the case, all of the vehicles that Volvo designated as MY 1998 vehicles will be considered to be part of Volvo's MY 1998 fleet for purposed of calculating its CAFE for that model year.

Accordingly, it is our position that any CAFE penalties applicable to Volvo for the 1998 model year must be calculated using the $5.50 per tenth of an mpg rate required by the DCIA and NHTSA's implementing regulation. However, it also my understanding that Volvo intends to submit another request for interpretation that may further impact on any penalties owed for MY 1998. Provided that this request is submitted prior to the current deadline for the company's payment of the MY 1998 penalty, NHTSA will not take further actions until your request is resolved.

I hope that this is responsive to your request. If you have any questions, please contact Otto Matheke of my staff at (202) 366-5253.

Sincerely,
Frank Seales, Jr.
Chief Counsel
ref:578
d.1/13/00