ID: nht72-5.15

DATE: 12/14/72

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Jerome Palisi; Highway Safety Management Specialist

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: SUBJECT: YOUR MEMORANDUM OF NOV. 9, 1972, REGARDING THE CERTIFICATION REGULATION

In your memorandum of November 9 you discuss a statement in a TBEA Bulletin, brought to your attention by Mr. Edward Bristol of the Bristol-Donald Company, Newark, New Jersey, which Mr. Bristol interprets as holding a manufacturer responsible for a safety defect if an operator overloads a vehicle, exceeding its GVWR or GAWR's. You ask us to forward you copies of any correspondence with Mr. Bristol or TBEA regarding this matter.

We have attached a recent letter to TBEA, dated November 22, 1972, which clarifies our position, and should alleviate Mr. Bristol's concern. Our position on this issue has been that a manufacturer who properly derives his GVWR and GAWR cannot be held responsible for noncompliance with the certification regulations or a safety defect.

ID: nht93-8.19

DATE: November 16, 1993

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Michinori Hachiya -- Director and General Manager, Nissan Research and Development, Inc.

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 10/12/93 from Michinori Hachiya to John Womack (OCC-9190)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter of October 12, 1993, asking several questions concerning the labeling requirements of the recent final rule mandating the installation of air bags in passenger cars and light trucks (58 FR 46551, September 2, 1993). Your questions concern the labeling requirements in this final rule.

As you may know, NHTSA has received two petitions for reconsideration of the September 2 final rule. The petitions raise issues concerning the labeling requirements. We will address your first, second, and fourth questions in the notice responding to the petitions for reconsideration.

Your other questions and the response to each follow.

The mandatory air bag rule establishes type size and format requirements for the air bag maintenance label (section 4.5.1(a)), but no similar requirements for the air bag warning label in section 4.5.1(b). Are we correct in understanding that the lettering of the warning label may be of any size or format, so long as the letters are legible? May different type size and formats be used if the two labels are combined?

You are correct that there are not any size requirements for the air bag warning label. Therefore, so long as the information on the label is legible, the lettering may be of any size. It is unclear what you mean by format, but the warning label must contain the exact words, in the exact order, as specified in section 4.5.1(b). The issue of combining warning and maintenance labels will be addressed in the notice responding to the petitions for reconsideration.

It is our understanding that warning labels that do not refer to air bags or seat belts may continue to be placed on the side of the sun visor opposite from the air bag warning label. Nissan currently places a label on the sun visor of a convertible model which provides instructions regarding the use of the convertible top. May this type of label continue to be placed on the sun visor, so long as it is on the side of the visor opposite from the air bag warning label?

Section S4.5.1(b)(2) specifies (1) that no other information shall be on the same side of the sun visor as the air bag warning label, and (2) that no other information concerning air bags or seat belts shall appear anywhere on the sun visor. Therefore, you are correct that information concerning the operation of a convertible top could be placed on the side of the sun visor opposite the side with the air bag warning label.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: 9190

Mr. Michinori Hachiya
Director and General Manager
Nissan Research and Development, Inc.
750 17th Street, N.W.
Suite 902
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. Hachiya:

This responds to your letter of October 12, 1993, asking several questions concerning the labeling requirements of the recent final rule mandating the installation of air bags in passenger cars and light trucks (58 FR 46551, September 2, 1993). Your questions concern the labeling requirements in this final rule.

As you may know, NHTSA has received two petitions for reconsideration of the September 2 final rule. The petitions raise issues concerning the labeling requirements. We will address your first, second, and fourth questions in the notice responding to the petitions for reconsideration.

Your other questions and the response to each follow.

The mandatory air bag rule establishes type size and format requirements for the air bag maintenance label (section 4.5.1(a)), but no similar requirements for the air bag warning label in section 4.5.1(b). Are we correct in understanding that the lettering of the warning label may be of any size or format, so long as the letters are legible? May different type size and formats be used if the two labels are combined?

You are correct that there are not any size requirements for the air bag warning label. Therefore, so long as the information on the label is legible, the lettering may be of any size. It is unclear what you mean by format, but the warning label must contain the exact words, in the exact order, as specified in section 4.5.1(b). The issue of combining warning and maintenance labels will be addressed in the notice responding to the petitions for reconsideration.

It is our understanding that warning labels that do not refer to air bags or seat belts may continue to be placed on the side of the sun visor opposite from the air bag warning label. Nissan currently places a label on the sun visor of a convertible model which provides instructions regarding the use of the convertible top. May this type of label continue to be placed on the sun visor, so long as it is on the side of the visor opposite from the air bag warning label?

Section S4.5.1(b)(2) specifies (1) that no other information shall be on the same side of the sun visor as the air bag warning label, and (2) that no other information concerning air bags or seat belts shall appear anywhere on the sun visor. Therefore, you are correct that information concerning the operation of a convertible top could be placed on the side of the sun visor opposite the side with the air bag warning label.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

ref:208 d:11/18/93

ID: nht78-2.46

DATE: 01/26/78

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; J. J. Levin, Jr.; NHTSA

TO: AM General Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your December 12, 1977, request for confirmation that an air-braked electric trackless trolley may be tested for compliance with S5.3.1 of Standard No. 121, Air Brake Systems, with its transmission selector control in the "DRIVE" position if the drive wheels and motor are permanantly mechanically connected and the motor automatically provides retardation when the service brake control is depressed. Your other requests for interpretation have been answered by separate letters.

Section S6.1.3 of Standard No. 121 specifies:

S6.1.3 Unless otherwise specified, the transmission selector control is in neutral or the clutch is disengaged during all decelerations and during static parking brake tests.

This test condition does not permit testing for compliance with the transmission selector control in the "DRIVE" position. The performance levels of the standard were established at levels intended for the foundation brakes alone, exclusive of engine braking, and it is for this reason that the selector must be in neutral or the clutch disengaged. This is true both for vehicles with manual and automatic transmissions.

It does appear that a case may be made for testing the bus you describe with the selector in "DRIVE". One important factor would be whether the field in the motor generator is permanent or electrically induced. In the event you wish to petition for an amendment of S6.3.1, information of this nature should accompany your petition.

In response to your other question, the agency's July 10, 1974, letter to Flyer Industries remains valid.

ID: 86-4.2

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 06/25/86

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Donald L. Anglin

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. Donald L. Anglin Consulting Editor McGraw-Hill Book Company 706 Rose Hill Drive Charlottesville, Virginia 22901

Dear Mr. Anglin:

Your May 1, 1986 letter to Administrator Steed requesting information on Federal regulations applying to removal of motor vehicle safety equipment has been referred to this office for reply. Unfortunately, we never received the previous letter you sent to NHTSA in December 1985. We regret any inconvenience to you.

Your letter asked whether it is a violation of Federal law for a mechanic or vehicle owner to remove or otherwise tamper with any item of motor vehicle safety equipment. As explained below, there would be a violation with respect to commercial businesses "tampering" with used vehicles or altering new vehicles if the modification affected negatively the vehicle's compliance with applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards. On the other hand, no Federal requirements apply to individual vehicle owners who tamper with safety equipment on or in their own vehicles.

In 1974, Congress amended the Vehicle Safety Act to address the problem of persons tampering with safety equipment installed on motor vehicles by adding section 108(a)(21(A) to the Act. That section provides, in part, that:

No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard . . . .

Thus, Federal law prohibits the aforementioned commercial businesses from tampering with safety equipment installed in compliance with an applicable safety standard by either removing, disconnecting or degrading the performance of the safety equipment. For example, none of the commercial businesses referenced in section 108(a)(2)(A) could remove the safety belts in a motor vehicle if by doing so they would "render inoperative" the compliance of the vehicle or the safety belt system with Safety Standards No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection, and No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies. Violations of section 108(a)(2)(A) are subject to civil penalties up to $1,000 for each violation.

The second part of your question asked about individual vehicle owners. Since section 108(a)(2)(A) does not apply to owners, an owner could remove the safety belts from his or her vehicle without violating Federal law. Of course, such removals or alterations could be affected by State law and the agency encourages vehicle owners not to tamper with safety equipment.

Persons tampering with safety equipment on new motor vehicles prior to their first sale to consumers could be considered vehicle "alterers" under our certification regulations (49 CFR Part 567). Part 567.7 requires alterers to certify that the vehicle, as altered, complies with all applicable safety standards. Thus, a vehicle alterer could not remove am item of safety equipment from a new vehicle if this would prevent him or her from certifying that the vehicle, as altered, complies with all applicable safety standards.

I have enclosed copies of the Vehicle Safety Act and Part 567.7, for your information. I have enclosed also an information sheet entitled "Federal Auto Safety Laws and Motor Vehicle Window Tinting" which discuss section 108(a)(2)(A) and Part 567.7 as they apply to persons modifying motor vehicle window glazing.

I hope this information is helpful. Please contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

Enclosures

May 1, 1986

Diane K. Steed, Administrator National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 Seventh Street SW Washington, DC 20590

Dear Ms. Steed:

Attached is a copy of a letter I sent to the public Affairs Director of your organization on December 18, 1985.

As yet, I have received no answer.

Would you please forward the copy of my December letter to someone knowledgeable in these areas.

Thank you very much for your assistance.

Sincerely,

DONALD L. ANGLIN

December 18, 1985

Public Affairs Director National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 Seventh Street, SW Washington, DC 20590

Dear Sir:

Tampering seems to be defined generally as pertaining to emission control devices and odometers. But the issue of the car owner or mechanic tampering with safety equipment is not so clear.

Is it a violation of Federal law for a mechanic or a car owner to remove any piece of safety equipment designed into an automobile?

For example, is it illegal for a car owner to remove the seat belts from a new car, or for a mechanic to remove the self-adjusters from drum brakes or to disconnect the parking brake?

Would you please send me copies of the current or proposed laws or regulations that apply to tampering with safety equipment, and copies of any pamphlets or articles on the subject.

Thank you very much for your assistance.

Sincerely,

DONALD L. ANGLIN

ID: nht89-2.50

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 07/31/89

FROM: STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL

TO: BUTLER DERRICK -- UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: TEXT OF THE RULING BY THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT UPHOLDING THE STATE'S LAW REQUIRING SEAT BELT USE BY DRIVERS AND FRONT SEAT PASSENGERS IN AUTOMOBILES; DATED 10/01/86; LETTER DATED 07/11/89 FROM BUTLER DERRICK -- CONGRESS TO STEVE WOOD -- NHTSA

TEXT: Dear Mr. Derrick:

Thank you for your July 11, 1989 letter on behalf of one of your constituents in South Carolina, asking whether mandatory safety belt use laws are constitutional. I am pleased to have this chance to provide you with the following information.

Before addressing your specific question, I would like to emphasize that effectively enforced State laws requiring the proper use of safety belts offer our best opportunity to save lives today at virtually no cost to the consumer. We recognize that a saf ety belt use law requires an action that many people do not take voluntarily. However, all traffic laws involve some restraint on individual behavior. Most are accepted without a second thought: we drive on the right side of the road, instead of the le ft, we stop for red lights, and we obey speed limits. In many cases, the failure of motorists to obey these traffic laws will have an impact on motorists besides the violator.

The same is true when motorists fail to wear safety belts. Automobile accidents have many victims -- family, friends, employers, and taxpayers -- all of whom bear some measure of the human and economic cost. During the past decade, 470,000 persons have died on American highways. Each year, an estimated 300,000 are injured seriously enough to require hospital treatment. These traffic injuries and deaths have resulted in an annual cost to society of $ 57 billion, including such costs as workman's comp ensation, welfare payments and lost tax revenues. Because of the substantial societal burden imposed by vehicle-related deaths and injuries, we believe that State legislatures have more than adequate justification to impose the relatively small intrusio n on individual liberties that results from mandatory safety belt use laws.

The constitutionality of State mandatory use laws has been upheld by the courts of three different States, Illinois, Nebraska, and New York. I have enclosed a copy of the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion on this issue (Illinois v. Kohrig, decided Octobe r 1, 1986). The Supreme Court of the United States dismissed an appeal from the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Kohrig, on the grounds that it did not present a substantial Federal question. This dismissal suggests that the[Illegible Words]

You also stated that your constituent believes that the Supreme Court has declared laws requiring the use of motorcycle helmets to be unconstitutional.

This belief is inaccurate. Page 7 of the enclosed Kohrig decision lists 35 different State and Federal cases that have held that State laws requiring the use of motorcycle helmets are a valid exercise of a State's powers and not unconstitutional. That list shows that the Supreme Court has affirmed a lower court decision that the Massachusetts motorcycle helmet use law was a constitutional exercise of a State's power (Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277, aff'd, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972)). Additionally, the Supreme Court has refused to review decisions by State Courts in Lousiana, Massachusetts, Washington, and Wisconsin upholding the constitutionality of State motorcycle helmet use laws. There are no Supreme Court decisions suggesting that State motorcycle helmet use laws are unconstitutional exercises of the State's power.

I hope this information is helpful. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any further questions or need some additional information on this subject.

Sincerely,

ENCLOSURE

ID: nht95-3.10

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: June 12, 1995

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Andrew Grubb -- Steve's Moped & Bicycle World

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO UNDATED LETTER FROM ANDREW GRUBB TO NHTSA

TEXT: Dear Mr. Grubb:

This responds to your letter asking whether this agency's requirements apply to several products you are selling. One is called the "California Go-Ped," a small push scooter with non-pneumatic tires, a 2-cycle motor mounted above the rear wheel, and a t op speed of 20 mph. Another is called the "Tsi Power Scooter," and resembles a scooter in frame style, but has larger pneumatic tires and can be outfitted with a seat. The Power Scooter has a top speed of 15 mph. You cited a previous interpretation sta ting that a scooter (similar to the Go-Ped) is not a motor vehicle, and thus not subject to our requirements, so I assume that you are asking whether the products you sell are motor vehicles. You also asked about motorized "skateboards" and motors for mo unting on a conventional bicycle.

The short answer to your question is that the Go-Ped is not a motor vehicle but the Power Scooter may be, depending on whether it is sold with a seat. Motorized "skateboards" are not motor vehicles, but motors for mounting on bicycles are "motor vehicle equipment".

You indicated that you have a copy of a letter dated April 1, 1991, in which we discussed whether a small push scooter called a "Walk Machine" is considered a motor vehicle for purposes of our standards. In that letter, we discussed the general principl es for determining whether a product is a motor vehicle.

As discussed in that letter, vehicles that are equipped with tracks or are otherwise incapable of highway travel are plainly not motor vehicles. Further, vehicles designed and sold solely for off-road use (e.g., airport runway vehicles and underground m ining devices) are not considered motor vehicles, even though they may be operationally capable of highway travel.

On the other hand, vehicles that are or can be operated off-road, but are also used on the public highways on a necessary and recurring basis are motor vehicles. For instance, utility vehicles like the Jeep are plainly motor vehicles, even though they a re equipped with special features to permit off-road operation. If a vehicle will spend a substantial amount of time on-road, even though its greatest use will be off-road, NHTSA has found the vehicle to be a "motor vehicle." Further, if a vehicle is re adily usable on the public roads and is in fact used on the public roads by a substantial number of owners, NHTSA has found the vehicle to be a motor vehicle. This finding was made with respect to dune buggies and regardless of the manufacturer's stated intent regarding the terrain on which the vehicles were to be operated.

In discussing whether the Walk Machine is considered a motor vehicle, we noted that NHTSA has stated in previous interpretations that vehicles that regularly use the public roads will not be considered "motor vehicles" if such vehicles have a maximum att ainable speed of 20 miles per hour (mph) or less and an abnormal configuration which readily distinguishes them from other vehicles. We concluded that the Walk Machine is not a motor vehicle since it has a top speed of 16 mph and a configuration that re adily distinguishes it from motorcycles and other two-wheeled vehicles.

I will now apply these principles to the products you ask about in your letter. First, the California Go-Ped has an almost identical configuration to that of the Walk Machine and a maximum speed of 20 mph. Therefore, we do not consider it to be a motor vehicle, for the same reasons that apply to the Walk Machine.

Second, the Power Scooter has a maximum speed of 15 mph and, when sold without a seat, has a configuration similar to that of the Walk Machine. In that configuration, we do not consider it to be a motor vehicle.

When equipped with a seat, however, the Power Scooter is considered to be a motor vehicle. Although the advertising literature states that the Power Scooter is "not for in-street use," NHTSA believes that it is indistinguishable from a moped, which is a n on-street vehicle that we have long interpreted as a motor vehicle. Although most mopeds have chain drives, pedal starters, and lower-mounted engines, we do not think that these distinctions are important. The seated rider on the power scooter appears to other traffic to be riding a moped. We also note that the low ground clearance of the central platform appears poorly suited to off-road use.

Further, we consider the Power Scooter, when equipped with a seat, to be a type of motorcycle. A motorcycle is defined as "a motor vehicle with motive power having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel on not more than three w heels in contact with the ground" (Title 49, section 571.3 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)). Motorcycles are subject to our regulations in 49 CFR Part 571, including Standards for lights (No. 108), rear view mirrors (111), brakes (122), and con trols and displays (123). The materials you sent do not disclose the horsepower of the 21 cc engine, but we assume that it is less than 5 brake horsepower. If that assumption is correct, the vehicle would be a "motor-driven cycle," a type of motorcycle that is subject to less stringent requirements under our regulations. However, the Power Scooter does not appear to meet even the less stringent requirements. For example, the Scooter lacks lights, dual braking systems, and rear view mirrors.

The motors for mounting on a conventional bicycle are designed specifically to convert the bicycle into a motorcycle. Therefore, they are motor vehicle equipment. Despite the notation "not for in-street use" in the advertising brochure, bicycles are pr edominantly used in the streets. Merely adding a motor does not change this fact.

The motorized "skateboard" is not a motor vehicle because it was not manufactured for in-street use and is also not used on the public roads.

You stated in your letter that you want to clarify the application of our motor vehicle requirements to your products so that you can advise your customers exactly where they can and cannot operate them. We strongly encourage you to read the enclosed in formation sheet on your responsibilities under Federal law as a retailer of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment. In addition, while the location of use of particular vehicles can affect our determination of whether a vehicle is a motor vehicle, t he actual regulation of the operation of vehicles and motor vehicles is a matter of State law. For information on State laws, you may contact the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administators at: 4200 Wilson Blvd., Suite 600, Arlington, VA 22203.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions about NHTSA's safety standards, please feel free to contact Mr. Paul Atelsek at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: 10821-6

Mr. Andrew Grubb
Steve's Moped & Bicycle World
40 Park Avenue
Dumont, NJ 07628

Dear Mr. Grubb:

This responds to your letter asking whether this agency's requirements apply to several products you are selling. One is called the "California Go-Ped," a small push scooter with non-pneumatic tires, a 2-cycle motor mounted above the rear wheel, and a top speed of 20 mph. Another is called the "Tsi Power Scooter," and resembles a scooter in frame style, but has larger pneumatic tires and can be outfitted with a seat. The Power Scooter has a top speed of 15 mph. You cited a previous interpretation stating that a scooter (similar to the Go-Ped) is not a motor vehicle, and thus not subject to our requirements, so I assume that you are asking whether the products you sell are motor vehicles. You also asked about motorized "skateboards" and motors for mounting on a conventional bicycle.

The short answer to your question is that the Go-Ped is not a motor vehicle but the Power Scooter may be, depending on whether it is sold with a seat. Motorized "skateboards" are not motor vehicles, but motors for mounting on bicycles are "motor vehicle equipment."

You indicated that you have a copy of a letter dated April 1, 1991, in which we discussed whether a small push scooter called a "Walk Machine" is considered a motor vehicle for purposes of our standards. In that letter, we discussed the general principles for determining whether a product is a motor vehicle.

As discussed in that letter, vehicles that are equipped with tracks or are otherwise incapable of highway travel are plainly not motor vehicles. Further, vehicles designed and sold solely for off-road use (e.g., airport runway vehicles and underground mining devices) are not considered motor vehicles, even though they may be operationally capable of highway travel.

On the other hand, vehicles that are or can be operated off-road, but are also used on the public highways on a necessary and recurring basis are motor vehicles. For instance, utility vehicles like the Jeep are plainly motor vehicles, even though they are equipped with special features to permit off-road operation. If a vehicle will spend a substantial amount of time on- road, even though its greatest use will be off-road, NHTSA has found the vehicle to be a "motor vehicle." Further, if a vehicle is readily usable on the public roads and is in fact used on the public roads by a substantial number of owners, NHTSA has found the vehicle to be a motor vehicle. This finding was made with respect to dune buggies and regardless of the manufacturer's stated intent regarding the terrain on which the vehicles were to be operated.

In discussing whether the Walk Machine is considered a motor vehicle, we noted that NHTSA has stated in previous interpretations that vehicles that regularly use the public roads will not be considered "motor vehicles" if such vehicles have a maximum attainable speed of 20 miles per hour (mph) or less and an abnormal configuration which readily distinguishes them from other vehicles. We concluded that the Walk Machine is not a motor vehicle since it has a top speed of 16 mph and a configuration that readily distinguishes it from motorcycles and other two-wheeled vehicles.

I will now apply these principles to the products you ask about in your letter. First, the California Go-Ped has an almost identical configuration to that of the Walk Machine and a maximum speed of 20 mph. Therefore, we do not consider it to be a motor vehicle, for the same reasons that apply to the Walk Machine.

Second, the Power Scooter has a maximum speed of 15 mph and, when sold without a seat, has a configuration similar to that of the Walk Machine. In that configuration, we do not consider it to be a motor vehicle.

When equipped with a seat, however, the Power Scooter is considered to be a motor vehicle. Although the advertising literature states that the Power Scooter is "not for in-street use," NHTSA believes that it is indistinguishable from a moped, which is an on-street vehicle that we have long interpreted as a motor vehicle. Although most mopeds have chain drives, pedal starters, and lower-mounted engines, we do not think that these distinctions are important. The seated rider on the power scooter appears to other traffic to be riding a moped. We also note that the low ground clearance of the central platform appears poorly suited to off-road use.

Further, we consider the Power Scooter, when equipped with a seat, to be a type of motorcycle. A motorcycle is defined as "a motor vehicle with motive power having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel on not more than three wheels in contact with the ground" (Title 49, section 571.3 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)). Motorcycles are subject to our regulations in 49 CFR Part 571, including Standards for lights (No. 108), rear view mirrors (111), brakes (122), and controls and displays (123). The materials you sent do not disclose the horsepower of the 21 cc engine, but we assume that it is less than 5 brake horsepower. If that assumption is correct, the vehicle would be a "motor-driven cycle," a type of motorcycle that is subject to less stringent requirements under our regulations. However, the Power Scooter does not appear to meet even the less stringent requirements. For example, the Scooter lacks lights, dual braking systems, and rear view mirrors.

The motors for mounting on a conventional bicycle are designed specifically to convert the bicycle into a motorcycle. Therefore, they are motor vehicle equipment. Despite the notation "not for in-street use" in the advertising brochure, bicycles are predominantly used in the streets. Merely adding a motor does not change this fact.

The motorized "skateboard" is not a motor vehicle because it was not manufactured for in-street use and is also not used on the public roads.

You stated in your letter that you want to clarify the application of our motor vehicle requirements to your products so that you can advise your customers exactly where they can and cannot operate them. We strongly encourage you to read the enclosed information sheet on your responsibilities under Federal law as a retailer of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment. In addition, while the location of use of particular vehicles can affect our determination of whether a vehicle is a motor vehicle, the actual regulation of the operation of vehicles and motor vehicles is a matter of State law. For information on State laws, you may contact the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators at: 4200 Wilson Blvd., Suite 600, Arlington, VA 22203.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions about NHTSA's safety standards, please feel free to contact Mr. Paul Atelsek at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosure ref:VSA d:6/12/95

ID: 1984-3.20

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 09/06/84

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Phillip Ables -- Association for Retarded Citizens/Quachita

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. Phillip Ables Work Activity Director Association for Retarded Citizens/Quachita Rt. #1 1908 Winnsboro Rd. Monroe, LA 71202

This responds to your recent letter to Mr. Kratzke of my staff, making for information and assistance regarding regulations applicable to child car seats, any safety standards applicable to those seats and the agency responsible for testing.

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 213, Child restraint systems (49 CFR 571.213) sets forth requirements which must be set by all devices designed for use in a motor vehicle to seat children who weigh not more that 50 pounds. I have enclosed a copy of this standard for your information. As you will see, Standard No. 213 requires, among other things, that the restraint protect a test dummy during a 30 mph crash, that the restraint meet the flammability resistance requirements of Standard No. 302 (copy attached) and that the manufacturer provide detailed instructions on the proper use of the restraint.

The United States does not use a certification process similar to the European Economic Community, in which a manufacturer of motor vehicle equipment is required to deliver the equipment to be certified to a governmental agency for testing and approval. Instead, in the United States the individual manufacturer must certify that its product complies with all applicable safety standards. Further, this agency does not require that the certification be based on a specified number of tests or any tests at all; we only require that the certification tbe made with the exercise of due care on the part of the manufacturer. It is up to the individual manufacturer in the first instance to determine what data, test results, or other information it needs to enable it to certify that its child restraint complies with the requirements of Standard No. 213. We would certainly recommend that a manufacturer producing child restraints certifying compliance with Standard No. 213, especially for the protection requirements in a 30 mph crash. Once the manufacturer determines that its child restraint meets the requirements of Standard No. 213, it certifies that compliance by putting the appropriate language on the label permanently attached to the restraint.

For purposes of enforcement, this agency conducts spot checks of child restraints after they have been certified as complying with Standard No. 213, by purchasing and testing the child restraints according to the procedures specified in the standard. If the restraints pass the tests, no further steps are taken.

If the child restraints fail the test and are determined not to comply with Standard No. 213 or if it is determined that the child restraints contain a safety-related defect, the manufacturer of the child restraint is required to remedy the problem. Section 154(a)(2)(8) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of l966, as amended (15 U.S.C. 1414(a)(2)(8) specifies that, in the case of a child restraint which fails to comply with Standard No. 213 or contains a safety-related defect, the manufacturer any elect to either:

l. repair the child restraint, so that the defect or noncompliance is removed; or

2. replace the child restraint with an identical or reasonably equivalent child restraint which does not have the defect or noncompliance.

Whichever of these options is chosen, the child restraint manufacturer must bear the expense and cannot charge the child restraint owner for the remedy.

You noted in your letter that your group had been asked to make car seats for children with physical disabilities. Since you are getting into a highly technical area, you may wish to contact Dr. John Melvin, who is associated with the Transportation Research Institute of the University of Michigan. Dr. Melvin has experience testing child restraints designed for use by physically handicapped children, and could provide you with information concerning that testing. His telephone number is (313) 763-3462.

Should you have any further questions or need more information on this subject, please contact Mr. Kratzke at this address or by telephone at (202) 426-2992.

Sincerely, Frank Berndt Chief Council Enclosures

July 30, l984 Mr. Steve Kratske Office of Chief Council NHTSA 4007 Street Southwest Washington, DC Dear Mr. Kratske:

ARC/O Industries is a sheltered workshop for the handicapped operated by the Association for Retarded Citizens/Quachita. For the past year, we have been manufacturing customized, adaptive equipment-side lyers, prone standers, wheelchair inserts, etc. -for handicapped children.

The equipment we manufacture is made from a special type of laminated cardboard, four sheets thick, of remarkable strength and durability. The material is cheap, resilient and may be cut, painted, glued and doweled without difficulty.

Recently, we have begun manufacturing adaptive inserts for Handicapped Children's Services, a State Agency serving children with physical disabilities. This agency has asked us to make car seats to be used in the transportation of their clients.

I would appreciate any information or assistance you could give us regarding the regulations for manufactured car seats, safety standards, and agency responsible for testing. Thank you for your time and help. Sincerely, Philip Ablas Work Activity Director Association for Retarded Citizens/Quachita

ID: nht80-3.29

DATE: 08/04/80

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Baker Equipment Engineering Company

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. John Deeter Baker Equipment Engineering Company P.O. Box 25609 Richmond, Virginia 23260

Dear Mr. Deeter:

This is in reply to your letter of June 23, 1980, to Mr. Finkelstein of this agency.

You have enclosed a drawing showing clearance lamps mounted on the widest and highest part of a truck body but in that location their light causes undesirable reflections in the truck's rearview mirrors. You have asked if a relocation to the truck cab would be an acceptable substitution since many of the chassis-cabs you now receive have a combination turn signal/front side marker lamp mounted on the fenders, "which almost blocks the front clearance lamp on the body, and would seem to negate the requirement of this lamp".

We have no objection to relocation of the clearance lamps to the cab on the configuration you have described since the utility body is not higher than the truck cab and the position of the front lamp is, for all practical purposes, as wide as the utility body. This is a location frequently used for clearance lamps and we believe that they would be perceived as such, even though the truck body is slightly wider than the extremities of the cab. Because a potential hazard to the driver would be diminished by this relocation, we believe that this would better meet the needs of motor vehicle safety. Further, in the relocated position, the clearance lamps would not be blocked by the front fender mounted combination lamps.

Sincerely,

Frank Berndt Chief Counsel

June 23, 1980

Mr. Michael M. Finkelstein

U. S. Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Washington, D. C. 20590

Dear Mr. Finkelstein:

I had previously written you concerning the subject of clearance lights on the front of utility bodies in my letter of October 19, 1980.

Your answer of November 19, 1979 indicated that this request would be considered along with a TBEA petition to revise FMVSS 108.

Have any changes or decisions been rendered? I'm particularly interested since many of the chassis / cabs we are now receiving have a combination turn and front side marker light mounted on the chassis / cab fender (position 4a.), which almost blocks the front clearance lamp on the body, and would seem to negate the requirement for this lamp.

Your comments will be greatly appreciated.

Cordially,

John Deeter Director of Operations

JD/cm Attachment