ID: nht80-4.9

DATE: 10/07/80

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Mr. C. Rodney Kuhns

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your letter of August 10, 1980, in which you ask whether your proposed urban transport vehicle would be classified as an automoble or a motorcycle.

The agency's definition of "motorcycle" is given in 49 CFR @ 571.3, which reads in part:

"Motorcycle" means a motor vehicle with motive power having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel on not more than three wheels in contact with the ground.

Based on our understanding of your drawings, your proposed vehicle has more than three wheels. If our understanding is correct, your vehicle would be classified as a passenger car rather than as a motorcycle.

The requirements for passenger cars are more stringent than for motorcycles. We have enclosed a pamphlet prepared by the agency which gives a brief summary of the requirements and applicability of each of the Federal motor vehicle safety standards (issued as of August 1978). However, because of the volume of these standards, we do not provide copies directly. We have enclosed an information sheet which explains how you can obtain up-to-date copies of our standards and other regulations.

This agency does not license any vehicles for street or highway use. Licensing is handled by the States. We specify performance requirements, and any motor vehicle must be certified by its manufacturers as being in compliance with all applicable safety standards as of the date of its manufacture. If the vehicle complies with these requirements, we specify no further steps which must be taken.

The agency will provide confidential treatment for your letter and accompanying drawings.

ID: nht95-1.3

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: January 3, 1995

FROM: Philip R. Recht -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: James D. Murphy, Jr.

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached to 11/1/94 letter from James D. Murphy, Jr. to Mr. Recht (Occ 10478); Also attached to 6/11/86 letter from Erika Jones to Terry W. Wager

TEXT: Dear Mr. Murphy:

This responds to your request for an interpretation whether a vehicle with two main wheels and two auxiliary wheels may be considered a "motorcycle." As explained below, the answer is yes.

Your letter describes your vehicle's design as having two main wheels, and left and right side auxiliary wheels that are elevated off the ground. You informed Dorothy Nakama of my staff that the auxiliary wheels are to facilitate vehicle turning, when n o more than three wheels would touch the ground.

NHTSA defines "motorcycle" at 49 CFR Section 571.5(b) as:

a motor vehicle with motive power having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel on not more than three wheels in contact with the ground.

In a previous letter, NHTSA stated that a two wheeled vehicle whose auxiliary wheels are used only for stabilization in turns is considered a "motorcycle" since the vehicle is designed to travel on not more than three wheels in contact with the ground. (See enclosed letter of June 11, 1986 to the NY State Department of Motor Vehicles.) Since your vehicle is also designed to travel with at most three wheels in contact with the ground, we would consider your vehicle a "motorcycle" for purposes of complia nce with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions please contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992

Sincerely,

Philip R. Recht

ID: 1982-2.38

DATE: 08/12/82

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Middlekauf Inc.

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your petition of July 16, 1982, for a temporary exemption from Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity.

You have told us that "as a seller and installer of truck bodies, we are frequently called upon to install a body on an incomplete vehicle furnished to us by a major manufacturer through his dealer." Our regulation on vehicles manufactured in two or more stages (49 CFR Part 568) requires the manufacturer of an incomplete vehicle to furnish, with the vehicle, statements with respect to each of the standards which inform the final stage manufacturer of the vehicle's compliance status. With respect to Standard No. 301, each manufacturer should provide you with a statement of specific conditions of final manufacture under which the completed vehicle will conform or, alernatively, a statement that the vehicle when completed will conform if no alternations are made in identified components of the incomplete vehicle.

These statements afford a basis for your certification of compliance with Standard No. 301 without the necessity of testing. We would like to know which of these statements have been provided and why you may believe your manufacturing operations are such that you could not certify compliance with Standard No. 301.

We would also like to make clear that there is no legal requirement that you crash test a $ 10,000 vehicle in order to demonstrate compliance. Certification may be based upon computer simulation, mathematical calculation, or engineering studies. Upon reflection you may decide that you have an adequate basis for certification with Standard No. 301.

Until we hear further from you, we shall hold your petition in abeyance.

SINCERELY,

July 16, 1982

The Administrator National Highway Traffic Safety Adm.

Dear Sir:

Under the provisions of section 123 par (1) (A) of public law 89-563, we should like to apply for a temporary exemption for a period of three years from Standard 301-75 of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards.

The name of our organization, which is a corporation, incorporated under the laws of the state of Ohio, is: Middlekauff, Inc. 1615 Ketcham Ave. Toledo, OHIO 43608

This temporary exemption of three years from Federal Standard 301-75 is requested as full compliance would cause a substantial economic hardship on our organization. As a seller and installer of truck bodies, we are frequently called upon to install a body on an incomplete vehicle furnished to us by a major manufacturer through his dealer. In many of these cases, we are called upon to extend the filler pipe to the gas tank and relocate the filler cap for such gas tank. While all due care is exercised in this operation to the extent of duplicating the hose and clamps used by the original manufacturer, and in many cases, utilizing the original gas cap, it is not always possible to recess the gas cap itself. We are referring to vehicles of 10,000 GVW or less and in limited quantities.

It is our understanding that in order to achieve full compliance with 301-75, it would be necessary for us to crash test a vehicle or vehicles, in order to determine if such a crash would result in material fuel leakage. As each vehicle, complete with body, would cost approximately $ 10,000, the cost of demolishing such vehicle or vehicles would be prohibitive.

Corporate Balance Sheets and Income Statements for the last three fiscal years are attached to this application in an effort to substantiate our exemption.

A denial of this petition would result in a complete loss to us of this market, while not great in numbers, represents a substantial amount of sales to our organization.

We can devise no alternate means of compliance with 301-75 other than those we have taken in exercising due care in our installation, and have no reason to believe that our methods of installation of this filler cap would not live up to the regulations, but are in no position to fully test it to prove full satisfaction in view of a crash.

The total number of motor vehicles referred to above, delivered from July 1, 1981 to July 1, 1982, was 95. No expectations are had that the total number of vehicles of the type referred to above would exceed 250 in any given year.

Sincerely hoping that the information furnished will be sufficient to allow the administration to grant the exemption requested at the earliest opportunity so that we may satisfy our suppliers,

F. E. Bettridge, Board Chairman

ID: 2865yy

Mr. Robert H. Jones
President, Triple J Enterprises, Inc.
P.O. Box 6066
Tamuning, Guam 96931

Dear Mr. Jones:

This responds to your letters of December 11, l990, and January 22, l99l, to Clive Van Orden of this agency, enclosing copies of your letters to Representative Blaz, dated July 6 and October 11, 1990, and to our Office of Enforcement dated July 5, l990. You have also enclosed a copy of a letter that Governor Guerrero of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) wrote on your behalf on October 11, l990, to Representative Blaz.

Your letter to us of July 5, l990, expresses your understanding that the Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS) apply in the CNMI, and that you, as an importer, have imported only vehicles that are certified as conforming to the FMVSS; however, certain of your competitors have not. You asked "Will I get compliance enforcement? Or should I join the competition and bring in the vehicles that do not comply?" To similar effect is your letter of the next day to Representative Blaz. Governor Guerrero's letter to Mr. Blaz expresses his opinion that the FMVSS do not apply in the CNMI.

The Governor explains:

By our Covenant with the United States, we were obliged to except [NHTSA believes he means "accept"] federal laws that applied to Guam and the several states as of January 9, 1978. Federal enabling legislation behind the FMVSS has been on the books since l966. The legislation applied to Guam and the states on January 9, 1979 [sic]. It looks like we get the law. But that is not the end of the analysis.

We would accept application of the FMVSS here only if such federal law did not deny us our guaranteed right of local self-government with respect to internal affairs. It is my view that automobile safety is an internal affair. It is the subject for self- government. The Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards do not apply in the CNMI. These federal safety standards are imposed on the states by virtue of the Commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. The federal Commerce clause does not apply in the CNMI; it cannot carry the FMVSS into our islands.

[I]t is our position that the FMVSS does [sic] apply here and will not be enforced by my Administration.

We cannot agree with the Governor's conclusion. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of l966 (l5 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.), does apply in the CNMI, as do all regulations such as the FMVSS that are issued under the authority of that law.

The Governor believes that "automobile safety is an internal affair". For the most part we agree, but not with respect to the primacy of the FMVSS. We agree that vehicle registration, taxation, and use of the roads in the CNMI are matters properly under the jurisdiction of the CNMI. Further, the Act permits local jurisdictions to enact or continue in effect their own vehicle safety standards provided that they do not differ from the FMVSS (except as may apply to their own official vehicles). The FMVSS are manufacturing standards that apply when the vehicles are built, imported, and sold.

We are sorry that your observance of the law may have put you at a competitive disadvantage. If you have specific information regarding possible violations of the importation provisions of the Act in the CNMI including the names and addresses of specific businesses or individuals, please communicate that information to Mr. Van Orden. Our sources of information are kept confidential.

Although the FMVSS apply in the CNMI, it is obvious that enforcement of them by this agency is made more difficult by the absence of agency staff in the CNMI. If local government would "move for immediate adoption of those standards ... by local law", then they may be enforced locally. I cannot think of a single one of the FMVSS that would not be of benefit. Although speeds may be low on the roads of the CNMI, many of the FMVSS are intended to provide crash protection at 30 m.p.h. Obviously, FMVSS that pertain to vehicle lighting, windshield wiping and washing, etc. provide protection at any speed.

We appreciate your bringing this matter to our attention.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel

cc: Thomas Rabago Highway Safety Coordinator /ref:VSA d:3/ll/9l

ID: nht75-3.9

DATE: 11/28/75

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank A. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Ford Motor Company

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of September 24, 1975, in which you ask whether it is permissible to test certain 1978 vehicles for compliance with Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, with open vapor vent tube pressure relief valves.

The Federal motor vehicle safety standards do not specify the tests which you must perform. They do specify the conditions and procedures under which the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) will conduct its compliance testing. S7.1.1 and S7.1.2 of Standard No. 301 specify that the vehicle's fuel system shall contain Stoddard solvent rather than fuel and, by implication, that the engine shall not be running. If, as you indicate, one consequence of the engine's not running is that a certain pressure relief valve in the vapor vent tube is closed, then that valve must remain closed during the NHTSA's compliance testing; the existing standard could not be interpreted otherwise. Although in an actual collision any rollover would probably occur immediately after the initial impact, in some accidents vehicle occupants would be trapped for some period of time after rollover. Therefore, we do not consider that this interpretation creates, as you suggest, an artificial condition by subjecting the fuel tank to a potential vapor pressure build-up during preparation for the rollover test.

Sincerely,

ATTACH.

September 24, 1975

James B. Gregory -- Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Dear Dr. Gregory:

Re: Request for Interpretation in Relation to Conducting FMVSS 301-75 Tests with Proposed 1978 Evaporative Emission System

In preparing for compliance with 1978 California SHED evaporative emission requirements (presently under consideration by EPA for application in all areas), Ford Motor Company (Ford) is considering modifications to the fuel tank vapor venting system. At this time, Ford's primary design direction for certain of its 1978 vehicles is to incorporate a pressure relief valve in the vapor vent tube between the fuel tank vapor separator/rollover valve and the carbon canister (see Attachment).

When the engine is operating, this pressure relief valve will be open and the fuel tank will vent in a normal manner through the carbon canister. When testing according to the procedure set forth in FMVSS 301-75, the pressure relief valve would be closed, contrary to its normal open position when the engine is operating, and such closure would prevent venting of vapor from the fuel tank into the carbon canister. As a result, vapor pressure could build up within the fuel tank during FMVSS 301-75 testing, and indeed would do so if the fuel tank were exposed to elevated ambient temperatures during the substantial time period (in some instances several hours) required to ready the test vehicle for the rollover test following an impact test. If such pressure built up, it (taken together with the hydrostatic pressure of the Stoddard solvent in the tank) might force open the vacuum/pressure valve in the fuel tank cap and permit leakage through that valve (cap).

Such leakage would not occur in an accident involving a rollover because, in such a situation, vapor pressure would not build up in the fuel tank, and therefore, the vacuum/pressure valve in the cap would not open. Any rollover of the vehicle that may occur would happen immediately after the collision, before vapor pressure build-up. Hence the vacuum/pressure valve (cap) would remain closed after rollover. More particularly, just before the accident, the vapor vent tube pressure relief valve would be open, preventing vapor pressure build-up.

Accordingly, Ford proposes to perform tests relating to compliance with FMVSS 301-75 with the vapor vent tube pressure relief valve open, the better to simulate actual usage conditions. Before testing in this manner, Ford would appreciate receiving assurance from the Administration that it regards as appropriate the maintaining open of this pressure relief valve during rollover tests, and would conduct in that manner its rollover tests of those Ford vehicles equipped with such a valve.

As you are undoubtedly aware, in addition to design and development work, a test program required to obtain emission certification covers a period of many months. Therefore, since Ford has only a limited time in which to develop a 1978 evaporative emission system complying with the SHED requirements, an early response to this letter is urgently requested.

Respectfully submitted,

J. C. Eckhold -- Director, Automotive Safety Office, FORD MOTOR COMPANY

ATTACH.

PROPOSED 1978 EVAPORATIVE EMISSION SYSTEM

(Graphics omitted)

Automotive Safety Office September 22, 1975

ID: nht90-4.27

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: October 1, 1990

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Philip A. Hutchinson, Jr. -- Vice President, Public Affairs, General Counsel and Secretary, Volkswagen of America, Inc.

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 2-2-90 from P.A. Hutchinson, Jr. to J.R. Curry

TEXT:

Thank you for your letter to Administrator Curry inquiring about the status of Volkswagen's exemption from certain provisions relating to the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program. The Administrator has asked me to respond. Your letter requeste d NHTSA's position on the status of Volkswagen's exemption from the provisions of section 503(b)(1) of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act (15 U.S.C 1901 et seq.), and indicated that Volkswagen considers the exemption moot and terminated. As explained below, NHTSA considers the exemption terminated as of the beginning of model year (MY) 1989.

In 1981 (46 FR 54453, November 2, 1981), NHTSA granted Volkswagen's petition seeking an exemption from the general statutory provision that a manufacturer's domestically manufactured passenger automobiles and non-domestically manufactured passenger autom obiles be placed in separate fleets for purposes of determining compliance with CAFE standards. Such an exemption is authorized under section 503(b)(3)(A) of the statute. The statute prohibits a manufacturer so exempted from earning CAFE credits during the period of the exemption.

At Volkswagen's request, NHTSA granted the exemption for the indefinite future, reserving the agency's right to reconsider its action if it appeared that the exemption was no longer consistent with the purposes of the Act.

Your letter indicates that Volkswagen terminated the production of "domestically manufactured" vehicles (i.e., vehicles whose domestic content exceeds 75 percent) on June 30, 1987, and that Volkswagen's U.S. production was terminated entirely effective J uly 14, 1988. You believe the exemption (including its prohibition on the accumulation of CAFE credits) should have ended on June 30, 1987, but in no event later than July 14, 1988.

The primary legal issue raised by your letter is how exemptions can be terminated. Although the agency expects that exemptions will normally terminate only after affirmative agency action, automatic terminations are not precluded. However, we do not be lieve that an exemption terminates "automatically" merely because a manufacturer terminates its production of vehicles with more than 75 percent domestic content or halts all U.S. production. To conclude otherwise could create confusion and result in ex emptions being terminated in instances in which the exempted manufacturer wanted its exemption to continue. The possibility of such problems may be seen in a number of circumstances, e.g., if a manufacturer

temporarily halts U.S. production and then resumes it, or if it permits domestic content to fall below 75 percent temporarily and then raises it. We note that, in situations in which a manufacturer allows the percent domestic content to fall below 75 per cent and continues to produce vehicles in the U.S. with that level of domestic content, it is likely to be relatively easy for the manufacturer to raise the level back above 75 percent.

There are circumstances in Volkswagen's case, however, that lead us to conclude its exemption terminated at the time Volkswagen's U.S. production terminated in its entirety (July 14, 1988). We believe it was evident at that time that Volkswagen was not merely halting U.S. production, but doing so with an intention to permanently abandon such production. We note, for example, that Volkswagen actively sought purchasers for its U.S. production facility in advance of its termination of U.S. production. W hile a manufacturer could change its mind after permanently abandoning U.S. production, resumption of U.S. production would be relatively difficult. Further, subsequent events, up to and including Volkswagen's February 1990 letter, have confirmed the ap pearances in 1988 of permanent termination of production.

While it would have been preferable for those appearances to have been confirmed essentially contemporaneously, we conclude that Volkswagen terminated U.S. production with an intention to permanently abandon it, and that its exemption became moot at that time. Since Volkswagen could receive no benefit from the exemption, and clearly had no intention of resuming U.S. production, I conclude that the exemption should be considered terminated effective with the beginning of the first model year following t he company's cessation of U.S. production, i.e., MY 1989.

This decision is consistent with section 503(b)(3)(F) which provides that in any model year in which an exemption is effective, no credits may be earned. We interpret that section as requiring the bar to continue to the end of the model year in which th e exemption terminated. Hence, the prohibition against earned credits is deemed to have ended with the beginning of the 1989 model year. I note that during MY 1989, Volkswagen accrued a CAFE credit excess of $28,798,575 for its passenger cars, and $56, 310 for its light trucks.

I hope you have found this information useful. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions concerning this matter.

ID: 2678y

Mr. Philip A. Hutchinson, Jr.
Vice President, Public Affairs,
General Counsel and Secretary
Volkswagen of America, Inc.
P.O. Box 3951
Troy, MI 48007-3951

Dear Mr. Hutchinson:

Thank you for your letter to Administrator Curry inquiring about the status of Volkswagen's exemption from certain provisions relating to the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program. The Administrator has asked me to respond. Your letter requested NHTSA's position on the status of Volkswagen's exemption from the provisions of section 503(b)(1) of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act (15 U.S.C 1901 et seq.), and indicated that Volkswagen considers the exemption moot and terminated. As explained below, NHTSA considers the exemption terminated as of the beginning of model year (MY) 1989.

In 1981 (46 FR 54453, November 2, 1981), NHTSA granted Volkswagen's petition seeking an exemption from the general statutory provision that a manufacturer's domestically manufactured passenger automobiles and non-domestically manufactured passenger automobiles be placed in separate fleets for purposes of determining compliance with CAFE standards. Such an exemption is authorized under section 503(b)(3)(A) of the statute. The statute prohibits a manufacturer so exempted from earning CAFE credits during the period of the exemption.

At Volkswagen's request, NHTSA granted the exemption for the indefinite future, reserving the agency's right to reconsider its action if it appeared that the exemption was no longer consistent with the purposes of the Act.

Your letter indicates that Volkswagen terminated the production of "domestically manufactured" vehicles (i.e., vehicles whose domestic content exceeds 75 percent) on June 30, 1987, and that Volkswagen's U.S. production was terminated entirely effective July 14, 1988. You believe the exemption (including its prohibition on the accumulation of CAFE credits) should have ended on June 30, 1987, but in no event later than July 14, 1988. The primary legal issue raised by your letter is how exemptions can be terminated. Although the agency expects that exemptions will normally terminate only after affirmative agency action, automatic terminations are not precluded. However, we do not believe that an exemption terminates "automatically" merely because a manufacturer terminates its production of vehicles with more than 75 percent domestic content or halts all U.S. production. To conclude otherwise could create confusion and result in exemptions being terminated in instances in which the exempted manufacturer wanted its exemption to continue. The possibility of such problems may be seen in a number of circumstances, e.g., if a manufacturer temporarily halts U.S. production and then resumes it, or if it permits domestic content to fall below 75 percent temporarily and then raises it. We note that, in situations in which a manufacturer allows the percent domestic content to fall below 75 percent and continues to produce vehicles in the U.S. with that level of domestic content, it is likely to be relatively easy for the manufacturer to raise the level back above 75 percent.

There are circumstances in Volkswagen's case, however, that lead us to conclude its exemption terminated at the time Volkswagen's U.S. production terminated in its entirety (July 14, 1988). We believe it was evident at that time that Volkswagen was not merely halting U.S. production, but doing so with an intention to permanently abandon such production. We note, for example, that Volkswagen actively sought purchasers for its U.S. production facility in advance of its termination of U.S. production. While a manufacturer could change its mind after permanently abandoning U.S. production, resumption of U.S. production would be relatively difficult. Further, subsequent events, up to and including Volkswagen's February 1990 letter, have confirmed the appearances in 1988 of permanent termination of production.

While it would have been preferable for those appearances to have been confirmed essentially contemporaneously, we conclude that Volkswagen terminated U.S. production with an intention to permanently abandon it, and that its exemption became moot at that time. Since Volkswagen could receive no benefit from the exemption, and clearly had no intention of resuming U.S. production, I conclude that the exemption should be considered terminated effective with the beginning of the first model year following the company's cessation of U.S. production, i.e., MY 1989.

This decision is consistent with section 503(b)(3)(F) which provides that in any model year in which an exemption is effective, no credits may be earned. We interpret that section as requiring the bar to continue to the end of the model year in which the exemption terminated. Hence, the prohibition against earned credits is deemed to have ended with the beginning of the 1989 model year. I note that during MY 1989, Volkswagen accrued a CAFE credit excess of $28,798,575 for its passenger cars, and $56,310 for its light trucks. I hope you have found this information useful. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions concerning this matter.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel

ref:CSA d:l0/l/90

ID: 11989.mls

Mr. Bradley J. Schnittjer
President
Satellite Screens, Inc.
221 East 2nd Street
DeWitt, IA 52742

Dear Mr. Schnittjer:

This responds to your inquiry about whether your product, a piece of equipment that screens materials, is a motor vehicle. You state that your product can either be trailer mounted or skid mounted. In a telephone conversation with Mr. Marvin Shaw of my staff, you stated that your trailer typically stays at an off-road job site the majority of the time and is infrequently transported on the public roads between job sites.

As way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) interprets and enforces the laws under which the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSSs) are promulgated. The statute defines the term "motor vehicle" as follows:

"Any vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, except any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails."

Whether the agency considers your trailer mounted equipment to be a motor vehicle depends on its use. It is the agency's position that this statutory definition does not encompass mobile construction equipment, such as cranes and scrapers, which use the highway only to move between job sites and which typically spend extended periods of time at a single job site. In such cases, the on-highway use of the vehicle is merely incidental and is not the primary purpose for which the vehicle was manufactured. In contrast are instances where vehicles, such as dump trucks, frequently use the highway going to and from job sites, and stay at a job site for only a limited time. Such vehicles are considered motor vehicles for purposes of the Safety Act, since the on-highway use is more than "incidental."

Based on the available information, it appears that your equipment is not a "motor vehicle" within the meaning of the statutory definition. This conclusion is based on your statements in the above mentioned telephone conversation that this equipment typically spends extended periods of time at a single construction site and only uses the public roads infrequently to move between job sites. Thus, the agency would consider the use of your device on the public roads to be incidental and not its primary purpose. Since your equipment is not a motor vehicle, it would not be subject to our Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards.

If NHTSA were to receive additional information indicating that your equipment used the roads more than on an incidental basis, then the agency would reassess this interpretation. If the agency were to determine that your equipment is a motor vehicle, then it would have to comply with the applicable Standards, including Standard No. 108 Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment, which addresses conspicuity, Standard No. 119, New Pneumatic Tires for Vehicles Other Than Passenger Cars, and Standard No. 120, Tire Selection and Rims for Motor Vehicles Other Than Passenger Cars. The content requirements for the vehicle identification number are found at 49 CFR Part 565. In addition, while your vehicle is not required to be equipped with brakes, if it is equipped with hydraulic brakes, then you would need to use brake hoses and brake fluids that comply with Standard No. 106, Brake Hoses and Standard No. 116, Motor Vehicle Brake Fluids. Please note that trailers equipped with air brakes are required to comply with Standard No. 121, Air Brake Systems.

In addition, as a manufacturer of motor vehicles, you would be required to submit identification information to this agency in accordance with 49 CFR Part 566, Manufacturer Identification. You would also be required to certify that each trailer complies with all applicable Federal safety standards. This certification procedure is set out in 49 CFR Part 567.

Please note that since a State may require an off-road vehicle to be registered, you may wish to contact the States about the status of your equipment in their State.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions about NHTSA's safety standards, please feel free to contact Marvin Shaw of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Samuel J. Dubbin

Chief Counsel

ref:VSA

d:8/5/96

ID: 7067

Mr. Nathan W. Randall
14195 Westchester Drive
Colorado Springs, CO 80921

Dear Mr. Randall:

This responds to your letter of March 2, 1992, asking for confirmation that you will be a manufacturer of "used" motor vehicles under the fact situation that you outlined and a previous interpretation of this agency.

You intend to assemble replica vehicles which will incorporate new items of motor vehicle equipment except for "previously used engine/transmission/drive axle/gearing combinations." Because "its running gear is not new", you believe that we would consider your vehicle "as 'used' even thought its body and chassis are previously unused." In support you cite a l980 interpretation of this Office under which the then Chief Counsel stated that "the agency tends to view as 'used' a motor vehicle whose running gear is not new even though its body and chassis may be previously unused." In that instance, the vehicle for which the interpretation was given was to be constructed from new parts except for the front suspension and axle, engine, and transmission.

Your letter has provided an opportunity for the agency to review its position on motor vehicles constructed from a mixture of old and new parts. When the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act was enacted in 1966, such motor vehicles were primarily "kit cars." A "kit car" in those days consisted usually of a new body placed upon the chassis of an older Volkswagen from which the original body had been removed. The resulting assemblage generally retained the title of the original vehicle. The agency termed this type of vehicle a "used" vehicle, and stated that the assemblage did not have to comply with the Federal motor vehicle safety standards that apply to vehicles at the time they are manufactured. The primary reason for this interpretation was the realization that it would be impracticable, if not impossible, for a motor vehicle to meet all contemporary Federal motor vehicle safety standards if that vehicle used a chassis that was manufactured before January 1, 1968, the date that the Federal standards began to apply to motor vehicles.

Over the years, the body-on-chassis type of construction has grown less, and more complex fact situations have arisen with respect to motor vehicles constructed from old and new parts. Yet with the introduction of an increasing number of new parts, including the construction of a new chassis, the agency has applied the same rationale. With respect to the use of an older engine, NHTSA realized that compliance with two specific standards could be affected by the design of the engine and its components: Standard No. 124 Accelerator Control Systems, and Standard No. 301 Fuel System Integrity.

Your letter affords the opportunity to review that rationale. Standard No. 124 has been in effect since September 1, 1973. Standard No. 301, initially effective January 1, 1968, contains upgraded performance requirements applicable to passenger cars as of September 1, 1977. Given the substantial number of motor vehicles that have been produced in accordance with these standards, and the probability that engines from these motor vehicles, though "used", are likely to be incorporated into the manufacture of vehicles that are otherwise new, we have concluded that this rationale no longer supports an interpretation that relieves the manufacturer of a motor vehicle that uses all new components, except engine and drive train, from the responsibility of producing and certifying a motor vehicle that complies with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards.

Although you are correct that your situation appears analogous to the one in the 1980 letter, the passage of time has rendered that opinion untenable today. In a somewhat similar situation, on April 22, 1991, we informed Memory Motors, a replica manufacturer, that its product would be considered a "new" vehicle for purpose of compliance with the Federal motor vehicle safety standards where the previously used chassis was retained in modified form, and the only used components retained included the rear axle assembly and front end components.

As a small volume manufacturer of new motor vehicles, however, under 49 CFR Part 555 you become eligible to apply for a temporary exemption from one or more of the Federal motor vehicle safety standards for a period of up to three years if immediate compliance with the standard(s) would create substantial economic hardship. Although NHTSA does not grant blanket exemptions from the standards, it is sympathetic to small manufacturers who appear to have attempted in good faith to meet the standards but whose economic circumstances do not permit total compliance before manufacture of the vehicle is scheduled to commence. If you are interested in pursuing this possibility, we shall be pleased to advise you accordingly.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel ref:VSA d:5/21/92

ID: nht92-3.23

DATE: 10/07/92

FROM: M. FRANCES PARTON

TO: JACK RICE -- OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, NHTSA

COPYEE: MR. BEN WATTS -- FLORIDA FLA. SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 11-25-92 FROM PAUL J. RICE TO M. FRANCES PARTON (A40; STD. 207; STD. 208; STD. 209; STD. 210)

TEXT: We purchased a 1992 Van to be used by me, a disabled person, for my transportation. We asked that they put swivel bases on the seats so that I could turn a half a turn to be able to get out of the seat and get into my three wheeler. This to transport me out of the van on my lift. We were told that there was a law stating that they could not do this.

I called the Florida Transportation Secretary and there office told me they knew nothing about this law. However, counsel from the HRS, stated that it was a Florida law, but my question was if that was so why did not the Secretary of Transportation not know of this. After trying several numbers I finally was given a Mr. Neil, counsel for the disabled in the Highway Traffic Safety He tells a bill #208, I believe was passed but that stated you could not put in the large windows in vans, but he thought that they were stretching the law in regards to seats. Mr. Neil was kind enough to refer me to you. I feel that I need to express that for a handicap person these will be necessary, because the alternative is an electric tract, which cost an estimated $ 1350.00, which I think is an exorbitant price.

I would appreciate hearing from you in regards to this matter.