ID: nht73-6.13

DATE: 12/13/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Truck Equipment & Body Distributors Association

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of November 6, 1973, requesting information on whether vehicle certification labels must be affixed by persons who for their own use install fifth wheels on chassis cabs.

The NHTSA takes the position that vehicles completed by persons for their own use must conform to all applicable motor vehicle safety standards and be certified (by affixing the appropriate label) as conforming. The NHTSA considers the use of these vehicles to be an introduction or delivery for introduction in interstate commerce and subject to the prohibitions of section 108 of the Safety Act. Persons who complete incomplete vehicles are final-stage manufacturers and all other regulations applicable to manufacturers (Parts 566, 573, and 577) apply to them.

November 6, 1973

Richard B. Dyson Assistant Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Adm.

We have run into a situation in which a trucking firm told us that they had received some information "from Washington" that they did not have to affix Vehicle Certification Labels to the chassis-cabs to which they installed fifth wheels. These truck-tractors would then be placed into their fleet for their own use.

While Section 108 of Public Law 89-563 provides that "no person shall manufacturer for sale, sell, offer to sell or introduce or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce . . . " it would seem that part 568 of the current Certification regulations provides that any vehicle completed must be certified -- regardless of whether the vehicle is for sale or use by the Final-Stage Manufacturer.

We would appreciate your comments on this matter, as well as a statement regarding the Manufacturer Identification Reports and the various parts of the Defect Regulation. We are of the opinion that they have received some erroneous information, and would like to help them set the record straight.

Thank you.

THOMAS S. PIERATT Executive Secretary

ID: aiam0596

Dear Mr. Allison: This is in reply to your letter of January 18, 1972, on the subject o an automobile dealer's obligations regarding seatbelts in new cars.; Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208 requires seatbelts to b installed at all seating positions. Under the requirements of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, which we administer, it is a violation of the law to sell a vehicle that does not conform to an applicable standard. A dealer may not, therefore, sell an automobile that does not have the required number of seatbelts.; Although the act does not prevent the purchaser of a vehicle fro removing the belts, after he has completed the purchase, we strongly advise him to leave the belts in and to wear them. A dealer who removes the belts after he has sold the vehicle does not violate the law, but he does his customer a disservice.; Sincerely, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel

ID: nht91-3.26

DATE: April 22, 1991

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Kent Morris -- President, Memory Motors

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 3-6-91 from Kent Morris to Paul Jackson Rice (OCC 5812)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter of March 6, 1991, with reference to compliance of your product, the M-53 replica of the 1953-55 Corvette, with Federal regulations. You have also asked two specific questions which I shall answer first.

You report that Texas does not consider a "manufacturer" to include persons assembling vehicles with any used components, and you ask whether this is correct, and whether it matters "on a national basis". We are unable to advise you on Texas law. However, whether a person is a "manufacturer" under the laws that this agency administers is determined with reference to Federal statutory definitions and not State laws. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, a "manufacturer" is defined in pertinent part as "any person engaged in the manufacturing or assembling of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment . . . ." As no qualifier is used in the definition, a "manufacturer" is any person assembling more than one motor vehicle, whether or not the parts are new.

Your second question is whether production quantity has "any bearing on compliance with federal safety laws or emissions." We are unable to answer your question with respect to emissions, as relevant statutes and regulations are enforced by an agency outside the Department of Transportation, the Environmental Protection Agency. However, production quantity is irrelevant to the obligation to comply with the Federal motor vehicle safety standards, even if only one vehicle per month is produced (such as the turnkey version of the M-53). Nevertheless, the Safety Act permits low-volume manufacturers (those producing 10,000 or less new motor vehicles a year) to petition for a temporary exemption of up to three years from any standard where immediate compliance would create a substantial economic hardship for the manufacturer.

Kit cars, especially those manufactured from a combination of new and previously used parts, have presented problems of interpretation for the agency from the beginning. The root of the difficulty is that Congress apparently did not consider this type of manufacturing operation when it promulgated the Safety Act, and we have had to use the authority that was provided us to fashion interpretations on an ad hoc basis as varied fact situations arise.

With respect to the M-53, you state that it is sold both as a "kit" and as a "turnkey." As a kit, the M-53 is sold as a rolling unit, and you have enclosed a list of "Donor Parts Necessary to complete the M-53", the items that the kit purchaser must furnish. As both a "kit" and a "turnkey", a

new fiberglass body is mounted on "a used chassis from a 1978-85 Chevrolet Monte Carlo", but one that is shortened and given new side rails. The Memory kit retains the existing rear axle assembly and front end components. On the turnkey, Memory installs a new engine and a used (but rebuilt) automatic transmission.

Under our interpretations, the kit M-53, lacking an engine, is an assemblage of motor vehicle equipment, not a motor vehicle. None of the Federal motor vehicle safety standards apply to assemblages of this nature, or continue to apply to assemblage equipment items previously in use on the Monte Carlo that may have been refurbished for use on the M-53. Certain of the safety standards do apply to new equipment items. The standards that apply to components that appear to be used in the M-53 cover brake hoses, brake fluid, lighting equipment, tires, glazing, and seat belt assemblies. Thus, if your company is fabricating (or causing to be fabricated) any of these items for the M-53 kit, they must meet Federal standards that apply to them. In general, items manufactured in the United States for sale in the aftermarket ought to comply with these standards. However, the windshield and other glazing for the M-53 will be newly fabricated and you must ensure that they comply with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205. In addition, as the manufacturer of the assemblage, Memory is responsible for notification of owners should an item in the kit fail to comply with a Federal standard or if the assemblage contains a safety related defect, and for remedy of the noncompliance or defect. After a kit is sold, the person completing the assemblage into a motor vehicle is legally responsible for ensuring its compliance with the Federal safety standards that apply to passenger cars, if the motor vehicle appears to be "new", as subsequently discussed.

With respect to the "turnkey" vehicle, different considerations apply. The Safety Act states that Paragraph (1)(A) of subsection (a) (which establishes the requirement that motor vehicles must comply with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards) shall not apply to the sale, the offer for sale, or the introduction or delivery for introduction in interstate commerce of any motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment after the first purchase of it in good faith for purposes other than resale" (15 U.S.C. 1397(b)(1)). The basic legal question with respect to a turnkey kit car is whether it has so deviated from the original components (such as engine and chassis), and attributes (such as VIN and original registration) of a donor car that it may be considered a new vehicle, and one for which compliance with the safety standards is legally required, or whether it has retained a sufficient number of components and characteristics to be considered a vehicle which has been previously purchased. For example, a kit car consisting of a new body on a used Volkswagen chassis, and which continues the original VW registration is considered to be a used vehicle, and one not required to conform to safety standards applicable to newly manufactured vehicles.

After review of this matter, we have decided that if the chassis of a donor vehicle has been modified to such an extent that it would no longer accept the original body, the chassis will be considered "new". Under your operation, the chassis is shortened, so that the original Monte Carlo body will no longer fit. Further, the body is new, and a new engine is used. The old Monte Carlo components retained include the rear axle

assembly and front end components. On balance, we believe that the M-53 turnkey is a "new" passenger car, and one that must comply with all today's safety standards, including the requirement for automatic restraint systems.

I hope that this information is useful to you. We appreciate your efforts to determine your responsibilities.

ID: nht93-3.14

DATE: April 23, 1993

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, U.S. Department of Transportation, NHTSA

TO: Dann T. Deaver -- President, Origins International Corporation

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 3-30-93 from Dann T. Deaver to Taylor Vinson (OCC 8516); Also attached to letter dated 12-3-91 from Paul Jackson Rice to Matthew J. Plache; Also attached to letter dated 10-31-88 from Erika Z. Jones (Signature by Stephen P. Wood) to Hiroshi Kato; Also attached to letter dated 4-16-85 from Jeffrey R. Miller to Alexander E. Nagy

TEXT: This responds to your letter of March 30, 1993, to Taylor Vinson of this office. You have asked for the Department's position on an electric vehicle to be developed by your company. You state that the vehicle "will be marketed as a closed community vehicle for retirement communities, closed club grounds, on site/off road/construction vehicles, theme parks, resorts, etc." It is also designed for use as a golf cart. The vehicle would have a top speed of 25 mph.

The jurisdiction of this agency over a vehicle depends upon whether it is a "motor vehicle" as defined by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. Under the Act, a motor vehicle is one that is "manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways."

It appears from your letter that your planned vehicle could readily be used on the public highways. On the other hand, you plan to market the vehicle exclusively for off-road use. I have attached copies of two previous letters (December 3, 1991, addressed to Matthew J. Plache, Esq., and October 31, 1988, addressed to Mitsubishi) which address five factors that are relevant for determining whether such a vehicle is considered a motor vehicle. I have also enclosed a copy of an April 16, 1985 letter, addressed to Mr. Alexander E. Nagy, which discusses whether golf carts are considered motor vehicles.

If you wish to submit information relevant to the factors discussed in the enclosed letters, we would be pleased to consider it and offer you an opinion regarding your vehicle.

ID: 1838y

Mrs. Blanche Kozak
49 Sorrento Avenue
Methuen, MA 01844

Dear Mrs. Kozak:

Thank you for your letter concerning the applicable classification and regulation of a three-wheeled vehicle manufactured by Cushman. I was saddened to learn that your husband died while operating such a vehicle at his job.

Before addressing your specific questions, I would like to provide some general background information about this agency's laws and regulations. Our agency, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), is authorized by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Safety Act) to issue safety standards applicable to new "motor vehicles" and new items of "motor vehicle equipment." The Safety Act defines a motor vehicle as:

any vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, except any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails.

According to your letters, there are two different models of the three-wheeled Cushman vehicle. One of these models is intended solely for off-road use. This model would not be a "motor vehicle" within the meaning of the Safety Act, so NHTSA has no authority to regulate this model. The other model is intended for use on the public roads. According to your letter, your husband was operating the on-road model at his job. The on-road model plainly appears to be a "motor vehicle" for the purposes of the Safety Act.

Cushman and every other manufacturer of motor vehicles must certify that each of their vehicles complies with all applicable safety standards. Both eighteen-wheel tractor trailers and motor scooters are "motor vehicles" within the meaning of the Safety Act, but the safety standards specify different requirements for those two types of vehicles. To determine the applicable requirements in the safety standards, one must determine into which of several vehicle classes the vehicle in question will fall. As our Associate Administrator for Rulemaking explained in his July 25, 1988 letter to Chairman Florio, the on-road model of the Cushman three-wheeled vehicle would appear to be classified as a "motorcycle" for the purposes of our safety standards.

NHTSA has authority to regulate the manufacture and sale of motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. Thus, the Safety Act prohbits any person from manufacturing, importing, or selling any new vehicle that does not comply with all applicable safety standards. See 15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A). The Safety Act also required Cushman to certify that each of its on road three-wheeled vehicles conformed to all applicable safety standards. See 15 U.S.C. 1403. Additionally, the Safety Act requires Cushman to recall and repair those vehicles if either Cushman or this agency determine that the vehicles contain a defect related to motor vehicle safety. See 15 U.S.C. 1411-1419. It is the individual State, Massachusetts in this case, that has authority to regulate the operation and use of motor vehicles in that State.

I would now like to respond to the particular statements and concerns expressed in your letters.

Statement One: You said: "I feel a determination should be made as to what agency should regulate the use of this vehicle on the Public Highways and the person required to operate should be warned of the hazards inherent in the unit." (emphasis added)

Response: As explained above, NHTSA cannot regulate the operation or use of these vehicles. That is a question that is entirely within the authority of the State of Massachusetts. You may wish to express to the appropriate persons in the State of Massachusetts your belief that the State ought to regulate the operation and use of these vehicles.

Statement Two: You then noted that "similar units are presently being used in the Commonwealth without a seat belt despite the fact that the Registry of Motor Vehicles considers them to be motor vehicles and not motorcycles."

Response: This statement suggests that you may have some uncertainties about the relationship of the vehicles called "motorcycles" to the larger vehicle group called "motor vehicles." As explained above, for the purposes of Federal law, "motorcycle" is a subset within the broad category of "motor vehicles." Other subsets of "motor vehicles" include "passenger car," "truck," and "bus." Thus, for Federal purposes, all motorcycles are motor vehicles.

Our July 25, 1988 letter to Chairman Florio indicated that the on-road version of the Cushman three-wheeled vehicle is a motor vehicle that would appear to be classified as a "motorcycle." Our safety standard that requires most motor vehicles to be equipped with safety belts or other types of occupant crash protection is Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208). However, this standard does not apply to vehicles classified as motorcycles. Accordingly, none of our safety standards require Cushman to install safety belts on these vehicles.

Statement Three: You noted that this vehicle "does not have a solid door, only a canvas one." Response: Our safety standard that specifies requirements for side doors on vehicles is Standard No. 214, Side Door Strength (49 CFR 571.214). Standard No. 214 currently applies only to passenger cars. Since the vehicle in question is a "motorcycle," our safety standards do not require the manufacturer to provide doors on it.

Statement Four: You suggested that the hospital and its employees "were possibly subjected to a fraudulent act," because the vehicle did not indicate a helmet is required when operating the Cushman vehicle.

Response: You are correct in assuming that the State of Massachusetts has a motorcycle helmet use law for all riders. If you are interested in learning more details about that law, you may wish to contact the appropriate persons in the Massachusetts state government.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions or need some more information on this subject, please do not hesitate to contact Mr. Marvin Shaw of my staff at this address, or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Wood Acting Chief Counsel /ref:VSA d:6/9/89

ID: nht91-7.54

DATE: December 26, 1991

FROM: Charles W. O'Connor -- Assistant Secretary, Echlin Inc.

TO: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

COPYEE: C. Scott Greer; Lawrence F. Henneberger; Jon P. Leckerling; Joan McKinnon; Larry Pavey

TITLE: Re: Commander and Voyager Electronic Brake Controls

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 3/26/92 from Paul J. Rice to Charles W. O'Connor (A39; Std. 108)

TEXT:

This letter comments on your letters of May 23, 1991 and November 22, 1991 to Mr. William J. Lewandoski of Kelsey-Hayes Corporation ("Kelsey-Hayes"), a manufacturer of electronic brake controls and a competitor of Tekonsha Engineering Company ("Tekonsha"), the manufacturer of the Commander and Voyager electronic brake controls. Tekonsha is a subsidiary of Echlin Inc. Our comments are first directed at your conclusion in your November 23, 1991 letter that Tekonsha's Commander and Voyager electronic brake controls "appear to violate Standard No. 108 and the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Device." The reference to "Device" and precise meaning of the language following the words "Standard No. 108" is not clear to us.

Section S4.5.4 of Standard No. 108 (49 CFR Section 571.108) provides in pertinent part that "The stoplamps on each vehicle shall be activated upon application of the service brakes." Your interpretation appears to be based on the theory that the trailer brakes, standing alone, are "service brakes." It seems clear to us that "service brakes" refers to the brakes of each vehicle together because it takes both sets of brakes to stop both vehicles in a reasonably effective manner. This interpretation is consistent with the common sense view that the service brakes are applied by stepping on the foot pedal as well as the wording of Section 24603(f) of the California Vehicle Code which states, in pertinent part, "Stoplamps shall be activated upon application of the service (foot) brake..."

The term "service brake" is defined in the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards at 49CFR Section 571.3 as follows: "'Service brake' means the primary mechanism designed to stop a motor vehicle." Service brakes are those brakes normally used to stop the vehicle and which will stop the vehicle under normal and emergency situations. The combined brakes on both vehicles meet this standard and the "primary mechanism" standard. It is difficult and dangerous to stop both vehicles using the brakes of the towing vehicle alone and virtually impossible and extremely dangerous to stop both vehicles using the brakes of the towed vehicle alone.

Your November 22, 1991 letter seriously misquotes Tekonsha's product literature and leads us to believe that your opinion is based on a misunderstanding with respect to how the Voyager, Commander and other electronic brake controls operate. Your quote, in the second paragraph on page 2 is "The Voyager will not apply the trailer brakes unless the manual override slidebar is applied." That statement is not true. The brochure you cited actually states "IN A

STATIONARY STATE, the Voyager will not apply the trailer brakes unless the manual override slidebar is applied" (emphasis added). The fact is that this is true in almost all electronic brake controls including those made and sold by Kelsey-Hayes.

Your letter does not comment on important safety features provided by Tekonsha's Commander and Voyager electronic brake controls which are superior to both existing Kelsey-Hayes products and Tekonsha's older style brake controls (herein the "2030 style"). Tekonsha spent large amounts of its own money developing superior and safer products for consumers while Kelsey-Hayes has not invested a nickel. Rather than compete fairly in the marketplace, it turns to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), which effectively protects Kelsey-Hayes from competition.

The first question one should ask is "Why do the Commander and Voyager brake controls have a manual override?" First and foremost, it permits the driver to properly set the brakes of the trailer to provide optimum braking performance for the towing and towed vehicles. The vehicles start together, stay together and stop together and, for all practical purposes, are a single vehicle.

Second, the brakes on the trailer serve as emergency brakes. If the service brakes fail when the driver applies the foot pedal, then the driver could activate the towing vehicle's emergency (parking) brake and activate the manual override to operate the trailer brakes. The emergency (parking) brakes on the towing vehicle do not activate the stoplamps on the towing vehicle. This is permitted by Federal law. See 49 CFR Section 393.25 (f). Notwithstanding that the law does not require that the activation of the emergency brakes on the towed vehicle activate the stoplamps on the towed vehicle, you want the activation of the emergency brakes on the towed vehicle to activate the stoplamps on the towed vehicle.

Third, the manual override is used in conjunction with the towing vehicle accelerator to control sway, although this use is inconsequential and not encouraged by Tekonsha. Because some drivers are aware of the laws of physics, they figure out that they can use the manual override in conjunction with the accelerator on the towing vehicle to control sway. To be able to control sway is a safety feature. In the "sway control" mode the intent of the driver is to control sway and not to stop or diminish the speed of the combined vehicle and, in this mode, the advanced Tekonsha brake controls do not activate the stoplamps which avoids sending false braking signals to trailing vehicles.

Only in the mind's eye is there "a differential in speeds between towing and towed vehicles." To the extent such a differential does exist, it exists only momentarily and cannot be observed by the human eye. Not only is a "differential in speeds" not mentioned in the regulations, but no one explains why a differential in speeds resulting from the towing vehicle accelerating (not physically possible because both parts of the combination accelerate together) is lawful but a differential resulting from applying the manual override (it does not work this way in practice) is unlawful. It is a distinction without a difference. In the sway control mode, an experienced driver will simultaneously accelerate the towing vehicle and manually apply the trailer brakes to stop the sway and the combination continues without any differential in speeds.

There are a number of situations where an operator intends to and does reduce speed without activating the stoplamps. For example, a driver using cruise control can reset the cruise control to a lower speed by merely pushing a button that reduces the speed of the vehicle until the driver releases the button. Downshifting is another example and, the most frequently used, removing the foot from the accelerator.

It might be helpful to recall that the purpose of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (the "Act") is to "reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents" (See Section 1 of the Act, 15 USC Section 1381), not to bar the development of new and safer products such as the Commander and Voyager electronic brake controls.

If you are not persuaded that the Commander and Voyager electronic brake controls comply with Section S4.5.4 of Standard No. 108, then the language should be amended to make them legal. Your agency has the power to establish "appropriate Federal motor vehicle safety standards" and that same power permits the amendment of existing standards to recognize technological advances.

There have been significant changes in the design and equipment of towing vehicles that called for advances in brake controls. Many towing vehicles are now equipped with such desireable features as cruise control, electronic engine controls and rear-wheel anti-lock brakes. These are desireable particularly when one is towing a 5,000 pound trailer down the road. These features do present a real challenge to brake control manufacturers because they are all susceptible to interference from brake controls. For safety purposes, the new towing vehicle features called for state of the art brake controls that:

1. DON'T put electrical noise on the 12 volt power system; 2. DON'T put signals on the stoplight circuit;and 3. DON'T invade the hydraulic brake system.

Tekonsha designed at great expense its Commander and Voyager electronic brake controls within the constraints set forth above. With respect to the dangers created by connecting to the stoplamp circuit see, for example, Ford Motor Company Bulletin Number 10 (copy attached).

We ask that you reconsider your position and, if you still feel constrained by the existing wording of Section S4.5.4, then the wording should be changed to read:

"The stoplamps on each vehicle shall be activated upon application of the service (foot) brakes."

We turn now to your May 23, 1991 letter which was written after the September 10, 1990 letter to Lawrence F. Henneberger, Esq. The September 10, 1990 interpretive letter concluded that Section S4.5.4 preempts in part Section 24603 (f) of the California Vehicle Code. The September 10, 1990 letter was written after a thorough evaluation of the Tekonsha Commander electronic brake control by engineering and legal representatives of NHTSA.

How could NHTSA issue its May 23, 1991 letter which reverses in part its September 10 1990 letter without notifying and giving Tekonsha an opportunity to comment. While we appreciate that both your May 23, 1991 and November 22, 1991 letter qualified your interpretation by stating "appear", you have placed a powerful anti-competitive tool in the hands of a competitor.

We suggest one way to clear up the havoc is to rule that all three of your letters i.e., the November 22 and May 23, 1991 letters to Mr. Lewandoski and your letter of September 10, 1990 to Mr. Henneberger are all void from the beginning. If you did this, you could then make a proper technical evaluation of the Commander and Voyager electronic brake controls. If a fair and objective evaluation concluded that not connecting to the stoplamp circuit advanced motor vehicle safety, then you could proceed accordingly. If a fair and objective evaluation resulted in a different conclusion, Tekonsha is prepared to live with the results on a prospective basis.

ID: nht89-1.46

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 03/22/89

FROM: ERIKA Z. JONES -- CHIEF COUNSEL NHTSA

TO: JUNITA P. DAVISON

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 04/22/88 FROM JUANITA P. DAVISON TO NHTSA, OCC 2041

TEXT: Dear Ms. Davison:

Thank you for your letter describing your impressions of the automatic safety belts on your 1987 Toyota. I apologize for the delay in this reply. You said that this motorized automatic belt system "takes away the roominess of the front," because it is in the way when getting in the car with a handbag or package and that it is cumbersome to get out of the belt system. I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our law and regulations to you.

Before I respond to your specific concerns, I would like to give you some background information on our requirement for automatic occupant protection systems in new cars. Pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act in 1966 (the Safety Act; 15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.), a Federal safety standard on occupant crash protection was issued in 1967 requiring the installation of manual safety belts in all new passenger vehicles. Although these manual safety belts showed their effectiveness as saf ety devices, only a relatively small number of motorists used their manual belts. As recently as 1984, only 12.5 percent of front seat occupants wore their manual belts. Because so few people used their manual safety belts, the Department issued the fi rst requirement for automatic restraints in passenger cars in 1970, and it was scheduled to take effect in 1973. That implementation date was delayed for a variety of reasons. On June 24, 1983, the Supreme Court of the United States found our decision t o repeal the requirement for automatic restraints was "arbitrary and capricious," and ordered us to reconsider the decision (Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29). Against this background, for mer Secretary of Transportation Dole issued a final rule amending the Federal safety standard on occupant crash protection on July 17, 1984.

That decision, which promotes both automatic restraints and State safety belt use laws, provides a comprehensive approach designed to save as many lives as possible as quickly as possible. We believe that effectively enforced State laws requiring the pr oper use of the manual safety belts that are in most cars on the road today offer our best opportunity to

save lives at virtually no cost to the customer. The decision also reflects our belief in the value of automatic occupant protection systems, such as air bags and automatic belts, by requiring all new cars to have automatic protection starting with the 1990 model year. The decision requiring further that automatic protection be phased in during the three years preceding that model year. Each manufacturer was required to equip 10 percent of its model year 1987 cars with automatic restraints. That per centage rose to 25 percent for model year 1988, and 40 percent for model year 1989. However, if the Secretary determines not later than April 1, 989, that State belt use laws have been enacted that meet certain criteria and that are applicable to two-th irds of the U.S. population, then the automatic restraint requirements will be rescinded.

You have three specific concerns with your automatic belt system. First, you asked if the motorized automatic belt system in your car was installed to meet some safety regulation. The answer is yes. As explained above, our Standard No. 208, Occupant C rash Protection request all 1990 model year cars to be equipped with automatic occupant crash protection. Please note that this requirement permits manufacturers to install any automatic occupant protection technology that meets the occupant protection requirements set forth in Standard No. 208. Thus, manufacturers may choose to install motorized, or nonmotorized, automatic safety belts, air bags, other technologies such as "passive interiors," or any combination of these technologies.

Your second question was whether you can legally disengage the motorized mechanism on the automatic belts in your car. Section 108 of the Safety Act provides that: "No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly r ender inoperative . . . any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle . . . in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard . . ." In this case, the automatic belts in your car are a "device or element of desig n installed in a motor vehicle in compliance with a Federal motor vehicle safety standard." Disengaging the motorized mechanism would render the automatic belts inoperative. Therefore, Federal law prohibits Toyota, any other manufacturer, and any distri butor, dealer, or repair shop from disengaging the motorized mechanism on your automatic belts.

Please note that this Federal prohibition does not prevent you, yourself, from disengaging the motorized mechanism on your automatic belts. However, each of the individual States has the authority to regulate the modifications that may be made to vehicl es by their owners and to establish requirements for vehicles to be registered or operated in that State. You may wish to contact the State of Florida to learn if they have exercised their authority to prohibit the disabling of automatic belts. Even if neither Federal nor State law prohibits you from disabling your automatic belt, we encourage vehicle owners not to tamper with the occupant crash protection systems installed in their vehicles. If you were to improperly disengage the motorized mechanism , you would put yourself, other occupants of your car and subsequent owners and users of the car at substantially greater risk of injury in a crash.

Third and finally, you said that you have been told it is not safe to wear your automatic belts without also fastening the manual lap belt,

because of the possibility of choking. The manual lap belt was voluntarily provided by the manufacturer of your car to provide an even higher level of crash protection for those occupants who choose to use the lap belt. However, the manufacturer of you r car has certified that, in a 30 mph frontal crash into a concrete barrier, a test dummy restrained only by the automatic belt in your car would not experience injury-producing forces in excess of the levels specified in Standard No. 208. Hence, the su ggestion that the automatic belt by itself is somehow unsafe is simply not true.

I would like to thank you for taking the time to express your views on this subject. We welcome the interest of all concerned citizens on this important question and appreciate this opportunity to advise you of our efforts to improve occupant crash prot ection for all Americans.

Sincerely,

ID: 1737y

Ms. Juanita P. Davison
1516 E. Hernandez Street
Pensacola, FL 32503

Dear Ms. Davison:

Thank you for your letter describing your impressions of the automatic safety belts on your 1987 Toyota. I apologize for the delay in this reply. You said that this motorized automatic belt system "takes away the roominess of the front," because it is in the way when getting in the car with a handbag or package and that it is cumbersome to get out of the belt system. I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our law and regulations to you.

Before I respond to your specific concerns, I would like to give you some background information on our requirement for automatic occupant protection systems in new cars. Pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act in 1966 (the Safety Act; 15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.), a Federal safety standard on occupant crash protection was issued in 1967 requiring the installation of manual safety belts in all new passenger vehicles. Although these manual safety belts showed their effectiveness as safety devices, only a relatively small number of motorists used their manual belts. As recently as 1984, only 12.5 percent of front seat occupants wore their manual belts. Because so few people used their manual safety belts, the Department issued the first requirement for automatic restraints in passenger cars in 1970, and it was scheduled to take effect in 1973. That implementation date was delayed for a variety of reasons. On June 24, 1983, the Supreme Court of the United States found our decision to repeal the requirement for automatic restraints was "arbitrary and capricious," and ordered us to reconsider the decision (Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29). Against this background, former Secretary of Transportation Dole issued a final rule amending the Federal safety standard on occupant crash protection on July 17, 1984.

That decision, which promotes both automatic restraints and State safety belt use laws, provides a comprehensive approach designed to save as many lives as possible as quickly as possible. We believe that effectively enforced State laws requiring the proper use of the manual safety belts that are in most cars on the road today offer our best opportunity to save lives at virtually no cost to the consumer. The decision also reflects our belief in the value of automatic occupant protection systems, such as air bags and automatic belts, by requiring all new cars to have automatic protection starting with the 1990 model year. The decision required further that automatic protection be phased in during the three years preceding that model year. Each manufacturer was required to equip 10 percent of its model year 1987 cars with automatic restraints. That percentage rose to 25 percent for model year 1988, and 40 percent for model year 1989. However, if the Secretary determines not later than April 1, l989, that State belt use laws have been enacted that meet certain criteria and that are applicable to two-thirds of the U.S. population, then the automatic restraint requirements will be rescinded.

You had three specific concerns with your automatic belt system. First, you asked if the motorized automatic belt system in your car was installed to meet some safety regulation. The answer is yes. As explained above, our Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection requires all 1990 model year cars to be equipped with automatic occupant crash protection. Please note that this requirement permits manufacturers to install any automatic occupant protection technology that meets the occupant protection requirements set forth in Standard No. 208. Thus, manufacturers may choose to install motorized, or nonmotorized, automatic safety belts, air bags, other technologies such as "passive interiors," or any combination of these technologies.

Your second question was whether you can legally disengage the motorized mechanism on the automatic belts in your car. Section 108 of the Safety Act provides that: "No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative ... any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle ... in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard ..." In this case, the automatic belts in your car are a "device or element of design installed in a motor vehicle in compliance with a Federal motor vehicle safety standard." Disengaging the motorized mechanism would render the automatic belts inoperative. Therefore, Federal law prohibits Toyota, any other manufacturer, and any distributor, dealer, or repair shop from disengaging the motorized mechanism on your automatic belts.

Please note that this Federal prohibition does not prevent you, yourself, from disengaging the motorized mechanism on your automatic belts. However, each of the individual States has the authority to regulate the modifications that may be made to vehicles by their owners and to establish requirements for vehicles to be registered or operated in that State. You may wish to contact the State of Florida to learn if they have exercised their authority to prohibit the disabling of automatic belts. Even if neither Federal nor State law prohibits you from disabling your automatic belt, we encourage vehicle owners not to tamper with the occupant crash protection systems installed in their vehicles. If you were to improperly disengage the motorized mechanism, you would put yourself, other occupants of your car and subsequent owners and users of the car at substantially greater risk of injury in a crash.

Third and finally, you said that you have been told it is not safe to wear your automatic belts without also fastening the manual lap belt, because of the possibility of choking. The manual lap belt was voluntarily provided by the manufacturer of your car to provide an even higher level of crash protection for those occupants who choose to use the lap belt. However, the manufacturer of your car has certified that, in a 30 mph frontal crash into a concrete barrier, a test dummy restrained only by the automatic belt in your car would not experience injury-producing forces in excess of the levels specified in Standard No. 208. Hence, the suggestion that the automatic belt by itself is somehow unsafe is simply not true.

I would like to thank you for taking the time to express your views on this subject. We welcome the interest of all concerned citizens on this important question and appreciate this opportunity to advise you of our efforts to improve occupant crash protection for all Americans.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel ref:208 d:3/22/89

ID: nht89-1.68

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 04/05/89

FROM: ERIKA Z. JONES -- CHIEF COUNSEL NHTSA

TO: MILTON GURNY -- HEIN, SMITH, BEREZIN, MALOOF & SPINELLA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 12/16/88 FROM MILTON GURNEY TO JOAN CLAYBROOK -- NHTSA, RE SCHWANEWEDE VS MARBELL INC. ET AL, FILE NO 34577, OCC 2936

TEXT: Dear Mr. Gurny:

This responds to your letter asking whether a 1975 Chevrolet Impala was required to have lap and shoulder belts installed in it. I regret the delay in responding.

The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.; the Safety Act) authorizes this agency to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. We have exercised this authority to es tablish Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR @ 571.208). Standard No. 208 required all 1975 model year cars to either be equipped with:

a. an automatic occupant protection system, such as air bags or automatic safety belts, or

b. lap and shoulder belts at both front outboard seating positions and either lap belts or lap and shoulder belts at all other seating positions.

Section 108(a)(1)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A)) provides that no person shall "manufacture for sale, sell, offer for sale, or introduce or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce, or import into the United States, any motor vehic le . . . manufactured on or after the date any Federal motor vehicle safety standard takes effect under this title unless it is in conformity with with such standard except as provided in subsection (b) of this section." This language prohibited any pers on from manufacturing, delivering, selling or importing any 1975 Chevrolet Impala that did not have lap and shoulder belts or an automatic occupant protection system installed at both front outboard seating positions.

However, section 108(b)(1) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(b)(1)) provides that the prohibitions in section 108(a)(1)(A) "shall not apply to the sale, offer for sale, or the introduction or delivery for introduction in interstate commerce of any motor vehicle after the first purchase of it is in good faith for purposes other than resale." In other

words, once the 1975 Impala was sold and delivered to its first retail purchaser, the vehicle was no longer required by Federal law to comply with Standard No. 208.

After the first purchase of a vehicle in good faith for purposes other than resale, the only provision in Federal law that refers to a vehicle's continuing compliance with an applicable safety standard is set forth in section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety A ct (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(A)). That section provides that:

No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle . . . in compliance with an applicable Federal motor veh icle safety standard, . . .

This section would prohibit any manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business from removing a lap and shoulder belt that was originally installed in the motor vehicle, unless the business replaced the safety belt with another lap and shoulder bel t. Please note that this statutory language does not impose any obligations on individual vehicle owners to avoid "rendering inoperative" their vehicle's compliance with a safety standard. Thus, any person may remove the safety belts from his or her ow n vehicle without violating Federal law.

Further, the "render inoperative" provision does not impose an affirmative duty on the listed commercial entities to replace equipment that was previously removed by someone else. Thus, if a car dealer purchases, as a used car, a 1975 Chevrolet Impala t hat was originally equipped with lap and shoulder belts and if those belts are not present at the time of such purchase, Federal law does not require the dealer to install safety belts in the care before reselling it.

The individual States have authority to regulate the modifications that can be made to vehicles by individual owners and to require that used cars have certain equipment installed when they are sold. You may wish to contact the appropriate State Departm ent of Motor Vehicles to learn if any applicable laws or regulations were violated in this instance.

I hope this information is useful. Please feel free to contact this office if you have any further questions on this topic.

Sincerely,

ID: nht90-1.33

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: FEBRUARY 1, 1990

FROM: HERBERT E. STOEL

TO: JOHN WOMACK -- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 4-8-90 TO HERBERT E. STOEL FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD; (A35; STD. 108). ALSO ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 12-30-87 TO KEN SIKKEMA FROM HERBERT E. STOEL. TEXT:

For quite some time, I have been deeply concerned about the need for greater safety on our highways. Back in August 1971, I gave a letter to former President Gerald R. Ford who was then a United States Congressman, stating the need for a change in the t aillights on all cars and trucks. The change would be green taillights and red stoplights. RED should mean only one thing, STOP.

Then on December 30, 1987, I gave a letter to Michigan State Representative Mr. Ken Sikkema (see letter enclosed), and now I feel inclined to bring this matter to your attention, because you have the authority to act on it. We have a law demanding the u se of seat belts or air bags on all cars, but it is more important to go even further and get to the origin of the problem. (A better warning of impending danger up front.)

So if we had Green taillights and Red stoplights, it would carry out the same system as our traffic lights, thus the idea would be received without confusion.

May it be found in your good pleasure and authority to enact this change before Japan or some other foreign nation forces us into it.

Enclosure