ID: nht95-1.19

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: January 9, 1995

FROM: Philip R. Recht -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Barbara Kise

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached to 11/11/94 letter from Barbara Kise to Chief Consul (OCC 10499)

TEXT: Dear Ms. Kise:

This responds to your letter of November 11, 1994 asking whether the air bag in your 1994 Oldsmobile can be disconnected. You explained that you use oxygen for emphysema and chronic bronchitis and are concerned that your lungs might not be able to toler ate the powder ejected if the air bag deploys in a crash.

Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection, requires that cars be equipped with automatic crash protection at the front outboard seating positions. The air bags in your car were installed as one means of complying with that requirement. The removal or deactivation of one of those air bags by a vehicle dealer is prohibited by a provision of Federal law, 49 U.S.C. @ 30122. The provision provides that:

A manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business may not knowingly make inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable motor veh icle safety standard.

However, in limited situations in which a vehicle must be modified to accommodate the needs of a person with a particular disability or a person's special medical needs, NHTSA has in the past stated that it would consider violations of the "make inoperat ive" prohibition as purely technical ones justified by public need, and that it would not institute enforcement proceedings.

NHTSA has previously stated that chemical and medical tests indicate that an air bag inflation poses no respiratory system hazard, even for persons who are highly susceptible to airborne particles. However, one recent test series of persons with an asth matic condition revealed that prolonged exposure (20 minutes with the windows rolled up) to the atmosphere inside a vehicle after both the driver and passenger air bags have deployed can induce significant asthmatic reactions in some persons. Please not e that these were worst case test conditions unlikely to be found in a real world crash situation.

However, given this test, we would recommend that you consult your doctor to determine whether any significant hazard could result if you were exposed to air bag deployment by-products. I have enclosed a report on this test for you to share with your do ctor to assist in this determination. If you and your doctor decide that the risk to you offsets the potentially life-saving benefits of your air bag, and you wished to have your air bag deactivated, we would regard the deactivation a purely technical v iolation of the "make inoperative" prohibition justified by public need. Accordingly, we would not institute enforcement proceedings against the person who deactivated the air bag. I would recommend that the manufacturer of the vehicle and/or air bag b e consulted on the safest way to disconnect the air bag.

I want to add a caution. The purpose of the "make inoperative" prohibition is to ensure, to the degree possible, current and subsequent owners and users of your vehicle are not deprived of the maximum protection afforded by the vehicle as newly manufact ured. Accordingly, we urge that the air bag be reactivated prior to selling the vehicle. In addition, I strongly encourage you to ensure that every person in your vehicle always uses his or her safety belt.

I hope that this letter resolves your problem. If you have any other questions, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Philip R. Recht

ID: 10499

Ms. Barbara Kise
124 Dormar Drive
North Syracuse, NY 13212-2708

Dear Ms. Kise:

This responds to your letter of November 11, 1994 asking whether the air bag in your 1994 Oldsmobile can be disconnected. You explained that you use oxygen for emphysema and chronic bronchitis and are concerned that your lungs might not be able to tolerate the powder ejected if the air bag deploys in a crash.

Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection, requires that cars be equipped with automatic crash protection at the front outboard seating positions. The air bags in your car were installed as one means of complying with that requirement. The removal or deactivation of one of those air bags by a vehicle dealer is prohibited by a provision of Federal law, 49 U.S.C. '30122. The provision provides that:

A manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business may not knowingly make inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable motor vehicle safety standard.

However, in limited situations in which a vehicle must be modified to accommodate the needs of a person with a particular disability or a person's special medical needs, NHTSA has in the past stated that it would consider violations of the "make inoperative" prohibition as purely technical ones justified by public need, and that it would not institute enforcement proceedings.

NHTSA has previously stated that chemical and medical tests indicate that an air bag inflation poses no respiratory system hazard, even for persons who are highly susceptible to airborne particles. However, one recent test series of persons with an asthmatic condition revealed that prolonged exposure (20 minutes with the windows rolled up) to the atmosphere inside a vehicle after both the driver and passenger air bags have deployed can induce significant asthmatic reactions in some persons. Please note that these were worst case test conditions unlikely to be found in a real world crash situation.

However, given this test, we would recommend that you consult your doctor to determine whether any significant hazard could result if you were exposed to air bag deployment by-products. I have enclosed a report on this test for you to share with your doctor to assist in this determination. If you and your doctor decide that the risk to you offsets the potentially life-saving benefits of your air bag, and you wished to have your air bag deactivated, we would regard the deactivation a purely technical violation of the "make inoperative" prohibition justified by public need. Accordingly, we would not institute enforcement proceedings against the person who deactivated the air bag. I would recommend that the manufacturer of the vehicle and/or air bag be consulted on the safest way to disconnect the air bag.

I want to add a caution. The purpose of the "make inoperative" prohibition is to ensure, to the degree possible, current and subsequent owners and users of your vehicle are not deprived of the maximum protection afforded by the vehicle as newly manufactured. Accordingly, we urge that the air bag be reactivated prior to selling the vehicle. In addition, I strongly encourage you to ensure that every person in your vehicle always uses his or her safety belt.

I hope that this letter resolves your problem. If you have any other questions, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Philip R. Recht Chief Counsel

Enclosure d:1/9/95 ref:VSA#208

ID: nht89-2.44

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 07/26/89

FROM: STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA

TO: FREDERICK H. DAMBACH -- EXECULINE

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 07/10/89 FROM FREDERICK H. DAMBACH TO NHTSA

TEXT: Dear Mr. Dambach:

This is in response to your July 10, 1989 letter, and your July 12, 1989 telephone conversation with David Greenburg of my staff. Your letter requested an interpretation concerning transit bus (as distinguished from school bus) emergency exits. You ask ed whether emergency exits located on the roof of a transit bus could be considered side exits for purposes of complying with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 217, Bus Window Retention and Release. As is explained below, the answer is " no".

Your concern has arisen because of difficulties you have encountered in obtaining approval from the New Jersey Department of Transportation to operate two used 1985 Van Hool buses. You indicated to Mr. Greenburg that the original importer had certified that the buses were in compliance with the applicable FMVSS. Nonetheless, NJDOT claims that the buses lack adequate side emergency exit space and are therefore not in compliance with Standard 217. Your letter indicated that if the roof mounted exists w ere counted as side exits, your buses would be in compliance with Standard 217.

Manufacturers (including importers) of motor vehicles sold in the U.S. are required to certify that those vehicles comply with the applicable FMVSS's. NHTSA does not require states to adopt or enforce the FMVSS's; states are, however, free to do so. You have indicated that New Jersey has incorporated FMVSS 217 by reference as a matter of State law. Of course NHTSA may not interpret state law; the agency may only interpret federal requirements. The following discussion therefore represents only an int erpretation of Federal law, and specifically FMVSS 217.

As is set out in S5.2 of Standard No. 217, transit buses must provide unobstructed emergency exit openings that total, in square inches, 67 times the number of seating positions on the bus. At least 40% of the total area required must be on the left sid e of the bus, and at least another 40% must be on the right side. To provide further assurance that there are multiple exits, no single exit may be credited with more than 336 square inches.

A roof exit may not be counted toward the amount of unobstructed opening required to be on a side of the bus since such an exit is not located on the side. The term "side," as used in Standard 217, refers to that part of the bus which is approximately p erpendicular to the floor and the front and rear ends of the bus. It does not include the ends or the roof of the bus. The standard follows that definition in clearly drawing distinctions between the sides, the rear and the roof of a bus. See S5.2.1 a nd S5.3.3(a). Further, if a rear or roof exit could be considered as a side exit for purposes of Standard 217, it would be unnecessary for the standard to provide detailed requirements relating to rear and roof exits.

I hope you have found this discussion informative. Please contact David Greenburg of this office at (202) 366-2992 if you have any further questions.

Sincerely,

3. IMPLICATIONS TO CANADIANS

[PARAGRAPHS ILLEGIBLE]

3.1 MANUFACTURERD

[PARAGRAPHS ILLEGIBLE]

3.2 EXPORTERS OF CANADIAN SPECIFICATION VEHICLES

[PARAGRAPHS ILLEGIBLE]

3.3 TOURISTS AND COMMERCIAL TRUCKING

[PARAGRAPHS ILLEGIBLE]

ID: nht88-1.70

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: MARCH 15, 1988

FROM: CARL C. CLARK -- INVENTOR CONTACT, NHTSA

TO: CLAIRE HAVEN--QUADWEST, INC.

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 11-22-88 TO CLAIRE HAVEN, QUADWEST, FROM ERICKA Z. JONES, NHTSA; REDBOOK A33; STDS. 209, 208, 302; VSA108 (A)(2)

TEXT: Thank you for sending your "Joyride" Seatbelt Pad, which you propose to sell as a comfort rather than a safety feature. This nylon covered foam pad device fits inside of the shoulder belt and is attached to the shoulder belt by nylon babs running the le ngth of the pad (about 16 inches) with velcro along the entire length. You have asked for my comments on its design prior to your writing to Ms. Erika Jones, Chief Counsel of this agency, for a formal letter as to whether the device would be expected to take a shoulder belt out of compliance with any applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard.

The pad has a thickness of about one inch of moderately soft foam, sufficient to spread the load of the retractor force over its width of about 3.5 inches but not sufficient to spread the load under crash conditions, which would require a much stiffer pa d. In the model sent to me, the nylon tabs were closer together than the one and seven eights inches width of the belt, and so did not wrap around the belt to allow complete overlapping of the velcro. You advised me that this was an early model and lat er models had the proper clearance for the belt. Once the pad is in place from the shoulder across the chest, it does make the belt a little more comfortable, particularly if the retractor has a continuous pull, without the "windowshade" feature.

On getting out of the car, the pad must either be removed from the belt or slid toward the latch plate, or it prevents the retractor from reeling up the belt completely or in part, so that the belt may become tangled and less easy to use on the next entr y. We have tried the pad with an automatic motorized passive belt, which has a motor that moves the belt along a track around the door when the door is closed, automatically positioning the shoulder belt across the body; since the retractor is near the center of the car, the pad simply slid along the belt and caused no jamming.

When the pad is in place, it does introduce a slight amount of additional shoulder belt length, but within the one inch or so of acceptable slack, expectedly similar to wearing a coat under a belt.

We do not provide certification tests for showing compliance with standards, nor do we endorse products. A manufacturer, in selling an automotive product, is by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act "self-certifying" that the product meets a ll aplicable federal safety standards. Your product is used in association with the belts, covered under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards 208 and 209, but such a product is not specifically mentioned in these standards. Your device, if left on th e shoulder belt, retards or inhibits retraction, and so may inhibit subsequent belt use if the belt becomes tangled. But for those troubled by the slight retractor load on the shoulder (in some car models), the pad would expectedly increase the comfort o f using the belt. And for short people for whom the shoulder belt may rest flat on the neck, your pad may provide sufficient stiffness to hold the shoulder belt on the shoulder rather than on the neck, a potential safety benefit.

I see no technical safety objection to its use, but you should also request the formal review by the Chief Counsel as to whether there is any implication of interference of your device with an applicable standard.

ID: nht89-1.86

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 05/08/89

FROM: DAN TREXLER, -- THOMAS BUILT BUSES INC SPECIFICATIONS ENGINEER

TO: ERIKA Z. JONES -- OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNCIL NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 08/30/89 FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA TO DAN TREXLER; REDBOOK A34 [7]; STANDARD 105; STANDARD 108; STANDARD 121; STANDARD 217

TEXT: Dear Ms. Jones,

We, as well as other body companies, have received requests to install a master electrical disconnect switch on many buses. This switch disconnects the entire electrical system from the battery(ies) (i.e., battery cut-off switch).

The requests have been both in the form of state requirements (on school buses) and by individual customers. Additionally, it is a recommendation contained in the Baseline Advanced Design Transit Coach Specifications (UMTA "White Book") (Part II, page I I-75, section 3.6.5.3).

When this switch is turned to the "off" position, it renders inoperative the warning signals (to the driver) required by FMVSS 105, 121 and 217. It also inactivates the hazard warning flasher required by FMVSS 108.

Would the installation of such a switch constitute a safety related hazard or noncompliance if, a) it is accessible to the seated driver or, b) it is remotely located in the battery or engine compartment without ready access to the driver?

We would appreciate an interpretation of this matter at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

ID: nht79-2.47

DATE: 03/16/79

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Vespa of America Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: We have received your letter of January 22, 1979, petitioning for a determination that a possible noncompliance with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety.

This is to inform you that upon review of Mr. Levin's letter to you of March 14, 1978, and examination of the turn signal system employed on Vespa motor scooters, we have determined that there is no failure to comply with the standard and your petition is moot.

Vespa brought to our attention the fact that S4.5.6 of Standard No. 108 requires each vehicle equipped with a turn signal operating unit to have an illuminated pilot indicator but SAE Standard J588e, incorporated by reference, requires it only if turn signal lamps are not readily visible to the driver. Mr. Levin informed Vespa that, if all turn signal lamps were readily visible to the driver, no pilot indicator was necessary. Mr. Levin continued by saying:

"If the driver must turn his head to the rear to check the operation of turn signal lamps, then those lamps are not 'readily visible to the driver' and a turn signal indicator must be provided."

You have now informed us that you believe the turn signal system on Vespa motor scooter manufactured between March 1975 and the latter part of 1977 "are the functional equivalent of turn signal indicators", specifically

"The turn signal systems . . . are designed so that in the event of a failure of either rear turn signal lamp, the appropriate front turn signal lamp will flash at three times the normal rate. As the front turn signal lamps and their flash rates are readily visible at all times to the operator, any turn signal malfunction will be readily apparent to the operator."

We agree with your conclusion. The rapid flash rate will indicate the presence of a problem in either the front or rear turn signal system and the equivalent of a turn signal indicator appears to have been provided.

SINCERELY,

vespa of america corporation PIAGGIO GROUP

January 22, 1979

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Attn: Joan Claybrook, Administration Petition for Exemption

Gentlemen:

Vespa of America Corporation ("Vespa") respectfully submits its petition for exemption from the notification and remedy requirements of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the "Act") pursuant to 49 CFR S 556.4 with respect to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's November 14, 1977 notification of possible non-compliance with Section 4.5.6 of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108.

Vespa is incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware with its principal place of business at 355 Valley Drive, Brisbane, California 94005. The motor vehicles involved are Vespa motor scooters manufactured by Piaggioe & C. S.p.A. and imported into the United States by Vespa from March of 1975 through December of 1977.

On October 14, 1977, Vespa received notification from Mr. Francis Armstrong (letter ref. NMV-22 GSH CIr. 1627.2) that Vespa motor scooters with obtainable speeds of over 30 MPH were required to be equipped with a turn signal indicator under Section 4.5.6 of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108. On October 24, 1977, Vespa responded to the Administration pointing out the apparent inconsistency between Section 4.5.6 and SAE Standard J588e. On March 17, 1978, Vespa received a response from Joseph J. Levin, Jr., Esq., the Administration's Chief Counsel (letter ref. NOA-30) acknowledging this inconsistency and indicating that vehicles equipped with signal lamps readily visible to the driver in compliance with SAE Standard J588 (e) did not need to be equipped with an illuminated pilot indicator in order to comply with the Act. Mr. Levin interpreted the phrase "readily visible to the driver" to require that all turn signals (both front and rear) must be visible to a driver facing forward in the normal driving position.

For the reasons hereinafter set forth, Vespa believes that the turn signal lamps on the affected vehicles are in substantial compliance with Section 4.5.1 of SAE Standard J588 (e) and that, because of their location, visibility and operation, these turn signal lamps are the functional equivalent of the turn signal indicators required by SAE Standard J588 (e). Vespa accordingly believes that any non-compliance is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety.

Although the affected vehicles are not equipped with a separate illuminated turn signal indicator, Vespa motor scooters incorporate an alternate but equally effective method for operator notification of turn signal malfunction. The turn signal systems in the motor vehicles involved are designed so that in the event of a failure of either rear turn signal lamp, the appropriate front signal lamp will flash at three times the normal rate. As the front turn signal lamps and their flash rates are readily visible at all times to the operator, any turn signal malfunction will be readily apparent to the operator.

It is apparent that the purpose of both sections is to afford the driver with an immediate and readily visible indication that a failure in the turn signal system has occurred. Vespa believes that its present system completely satisfies this objective and that no modification of any sort would increase the safety of the vehicle or would increase the driver's ability to detect any failure in the turn signal system.

To require Vespa to modify and equip all vehicles which have been imported into the United States since its formation in March of 1975 with an additional turn signal pilot indicator lamp would impose an impossible financial burden on the corporation which could quite possibly result in the insolvency of the corporation. The modifications which would be required would entail a major modification of the existing headlight housing and a total revision of the existing electrical system. The estimated cost of bringing all vehicles into strict compliance with the Act's standards will exceed $ 493,000. A breakdown of the estimated cost is attached hereto as Attachment I.

The Vespa motor scooter was redesigned in the latter part of 1977 and the turn indicators on the new model are no longer readily visible to the operator. Accordingly, all new models are equipped with illuminated turn signal indicators which meet the Act's requirements.

In light of the foregoing, we respectfully request that Vespa be exempted from the requirements of Section 4.5.6 of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 and from the requirements of Section 4.5.1 of SAE Standard J588e with respect to all Vespa motor scooters imported from March of 1975 through December of 1977.

Bruno Porrati President

ATTACHMENT I

NOTIFICATION REPAIR COST BREAKDOWN

Approximate total of effected vehicles imported by Vespa of America Corporation since March 1975 - 4,500

Notification Costs:

(Customer & Dealer) $ 8,000.00

Repair Cost:

Time allotted for unit repair - 5 hrs. @ $ 20.00 per hour

(100.00 x 4,500) = $ 450,000.00

Special Tools needed - $ 20.00/tool

(20.00 x 425 dealers appx.) = $ 8,500.00

Cost of Replacement Parts - $ 6.00 per vehicle

($ 6.00 x 4,500) = $ 27,000.00

TOTAL $ 493,500.00

ID: 23132spwAug21

Dietmar K. Haenchen, Process Leader
Safety Affairs and Vehicle Testing
Volkswagen of America, Inc.
Mail Code 2A02
3800 Hamlin Road
Auburn Hills, MI 48326





Dear Mr. Haenchen:

This responds to your letter to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), concerning Standard No. 201, Head Impact Protection. You are particularly concerned about the applicability of the upper interior head impact requirements of Standard No. 201 as they apply to vehicles built in two or more stages.

You explain that Volkswagen plans to produce incomplete vehicles and supply them to final stage manufacturers. According to your letter, Volkswagen believes that these vehicles would be governed by the certification requirements of 49 CFR Part 568 - Vehicles manufactured in two or more stages. In particular, your company observes that Section 568.6(a) of Part 568 permits a final stage manufacturer to complete a vehicle such that it conforms to the Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS) in effect on the date of manufacture of the incomplete vehicle, or the date of final completion, or a date in between those dates. Your letter also notes that Section 568.6(a) further states that the foregoing requirements shall be superseded by any conflicting provisions of a standard that applies by its terms to vehicles manufactured in two or more stages.

Volkswagen believes that S6.14 of Standard No. 201, Occupant protection in interior impact, which sets out a separate "phase-in" compliance date for final stage manufacturers and alterers, does not "conflict" with the requirements of Section 568.6(a). Therefore, Volkswagen argues that final stage manufacturers who complete vehicles after the September 1, 2002 compliance date contained in S6.14 of Standard No. 201, may, if they choose to, comply with the standards in effect on the manufacturing date of the incomplete vehicle, the date it is finally completed or a date between these two dates. Your letter notes that Standard No. 201 contains a separate phase-in schedule establishing a distinct compliance date that applies directly to multi-stage vehicles. However, your company contends that nothing in Standard No. 201 indicates that NHTSA intended for this phase-in schedule to supersede the provisions of Section 568.6(a) of Part 568. Your letter points out that when the agency created a separate phase-in for multi-stage manufacturers in recent amendments to Standard No. 208, it clearly indicated in the preamble to the interim final rule that this phase-in did not permit the selection of alternate certification dates under Section 568.6(a). Volkswagen argues that the lack of similar language in the preamble to Standard No. 201 establishes that NHTSA intended that Standard No. 201 allow multi-stage manufacturers to choose a compliance date under paragraph 568.6(a).

The agency does not agree with your interpretation.

It is our view that the phase-in provisions of Standard No. 201, which explicitly provide that vehicles manufactured in two or more stages must meet the head protection requirements on September 1, 2002, control the applicable compliance requirements. Section 586.6(a) states:

(a) Each final-stage manufacturer shall complete the vehicle in such a manner that it conforms to the standards in effect on the date of manufacture of the incomplete vehicle, the date of final completion, or a date between those two dates. This requirement shall, however, be superseded by any conflicting provisions of a standard that applies by its terms to vehicles manufactured in two or more stages.

Section 568.6(a) provides final stage manufacturers with the choice of three dates for complying with applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards unless a particular standard provides otherwise. Under your interpretation of Standard No. 201 and Section 568.6(a), a final stage manufacturer could complete a vehicle on September 2, 2002 and avoid meeting the upper interior head protection requirements of Standard No. 201 by complying with the less stringent provisions of the Standard that were in effect when the incomplete vehicle was built or a date between the manufacture date of the incomplete vehicle and before September 1, 2002.

Standard No. 201 directly addresses the responsibilities of manufacturers of multi-stage vehicles in regard to compliance with the upper interior head protection requirements. S6.1.4 of Standard No. 201 states as follows:

S6.1.4 Phase-in Schedule #4 A final stage manufacturer or alterer may, at its option, comply with the requirements set forth in S6.1.4.1 and S6.1.4.2.

S6.1.4.1 Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 1998 and before September 1, 2002 are not required to comply with the requirements specified in S7.

S6.1.4.2 Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2002 shall comply with the requirements specified in S7.

This language indicates that S6.1.4 of Standard 201, by its terms, establishes a single compliance date for multi-stage vehicles. The existence of this single date directly conflicts with the options found in Section 568.6(a).

Your letter also contrasts the language contained in the preamble to the May 2000 interim final rule amending Standard No. 208 with the notices establishing the upper interior head protection requirements of Standard No. 201. Volkswagen notes that the preamble to the amendments to Standard No. 208 explains that Section 568.6(a) does not apply to those amendments while the preamble to the upper interior head protection final rule does not. This, in Volkswagen's view, indicates that Section 568.6(a) does not conflict with Standard No. 201.

The upper interior head protection requirements of Standard No. 201 were established by a final rule published in the Federal Register on August 18, 1995 (60 FR 43031). The preamble to this final rule addressed the issue of compliance by final stage manufacturers on page 43049:

NHTSA also has decided to allow manufacturers of vehicles manufactured in two or more stages to delay compliance until the final year of the phase-in. Since final stage manufacturers and alterers have no control over the year of the phase-in in which a particular vehicle will be certified as complying with the new requirements, NHTSA is allowing these manufacturers until the final year of the phase-in to certify that their vehicles meet the new requirement. NHTSA has taken this approach previously with the phase-ins for Standards Nos. 208. However, NHTSA is not allowing additional leadtime beyond the end of the phase-in, because individual components can be tested outside the vehicle. This will enable a final stage manufacturer or an alterer to verify that the changes it intends to make to a vehicle's compliant interior will not affect the vehicle's compliance.

This language indicates that the agency gave special consideration to the needs of multi-stage vehicle manufacturers, extended the phase-in to accommodate their needs, and established a single date by which these manufacturers must meet the new requirements. Although the preamble did not explicitly state that the agency's choice of single compliance date was intended to forestall application of Section 568.6(a), the decision to do so is implicit in the selection of a single compliance date - particularly when this date is at the conclusion of an extended phase-in.

In sum, the agency believes that Standard No. 201's provisions regarding multi-stage manufacturers establish a single compliance date that directly conflicts with Section 568.6(a). To the extent that such an examination is warranted, NHTSA also believes that the preamble to the final rule establishing the upper interior head protection requirements supports the agency's position.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to call Otto Matheke of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel

ref:201
d.10/11/01

ID: 22041.drn

The Honorable Todd Tiahrt
United States House of Representatives
155 North Market, Suite 400
Wichita, KS 67202






Dear Congressman Tiahrt:

Thank you for your letter to the Department of Transportation's Office of Congressional Affairs, on behalf of Mr. Maurice Linnens, of Kansas Truck Equipment Co., Inc. Because the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) administers Federal regulations for school buses, your letter has been referred to my office for reply.

Your constituent seeks clarification of the effect of Federal regulations on the sale of an "over-the-road activity bus" (motorcoach) to a Kansas school district. Mr. Linnens would like to sell a new motorcoach to a school district, but was told that Federal law would prohibit the sale, even though it would be permitted under Kansas law. You ask for our views on several letters from Kansas officials and from Mr. Roger Theis, Mr. Linnens' attorney, concerning Federal and state school bus regulations.

As explained below, under NHTSA's regulations, any new bus (including a motorcoach) that is sold for purposes that include carrying students to and from school or related events must comply with the standards for school buses issued by this agency under 49 U.S.C. 30101 et seq. (formerly referred to as the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act). While Kansas apparently permits schools to purchase motorcoaches as "activity buses," Federal law would not permit manufacturers and dealers to sell a new motorcoach for this purpose unless the vehicle is certified as meeting Federal school bus safety standards.

NHTSA is authorized to issue and enforce Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles. Each new vehicle must meet all applicable safety standards or it cannot be sold. In a 1974 amendment to the Safety Act (Public Law 93-492), Congress expressly directed us to issue standards on specific aspects of school bus safety, including school bus emergency exits, seating systems, window and windshields, and bus body structural integrity. The standards we issued became effective on April 1, 1977, and apply to each new "school bus" manufactured on or after that date.

Our statute defines a "school bus" as any vehicle that is designed for carrying a driver and more than 10 passengers and which, NHTSA decides, is likely to be "used significantly" to transport "preprimary, primary, and secondary" students to or from school or related events. ⁽¹⁾ 49 U.S.C. 30125. This definition was enacted in 1974, as part of the comprehensive effort by Congress to increase school bus safety. By regulation, the capacity threshold for school buses corresponds to that of buses -- vehicles designed for carrying more than ten (10) persons.

The great majority of vehicles used to transport students fall within the definition of "school bus." More specifically, any new "bus" (including a motorcoach) sold to a school district, or to a school bus contractor, is considered to be a "school bus" when sold for pupil transportation, and as such must comply with the school bus safety standards. A dealer or distributor who sells a new bus to a school district or school bus contractor that does not meet school bus standards is subject to penalties under the statute.

Because our laws generally apply only to manufacturers and dealers of new motor vehicles, we do not regulate a school district's use of a bus to transport school children, even when the bus does not meet Federal school bus safety standards. However, each state has the authority to set its own standards regarding the use of motor vehicles, including school buses.

The letters you enclosed from Kansas state officials reflect an opinion that a new motorcoach purchased and operated for transporting pupils to school-related activities is not a school bus ("route bus") under state law. A state's determination that a motorcoach is exempted from its school bus standards does not affect the Federal requirement that new buses sold by dealers for pupil transportation must meet the Federal motor vehicle safety standards for school buses. Thus, Federal law would not permit the sale of a new motorcoach to the school district unless the vehicle were certified as a school bus. The views of Mr. Theis on this issue are essentially correct.

As you have pointed out in your letter, a school district can be sold a used motorcoach, even when the bus could not be sold when new. This is because our requirement to sell vehicles that meet applicable safety standards does not apply to the sale of a motor vehicle "after the first purchase of the vehicle ... in good faith other than for resale," i.e., to sales of used vehicles. (See 49 U.S.C. 30112(b)(1).) Nonetheless, because school buses are one of the safest forms of transportation in this country, we strongly recommend that all buses that are used to transport school children be certified as meeting NHTSA's school bus safety standards. In addition, using buses that do not meet NHTSA's school bus standards to transport students could result in liability in the event of a crash.

I am enclosing NHTSA's publication: "School Bus Safety: Safe Passage for America's Children." This brochure explains the safety enhancements of a school bus that makes school buses safer than non-school buses.

Our belief that vehicles providing the safety of school buses should be used whenever transporting children in buses is shared by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). At a June 8, 1999, public meeting, the NTSB issued the enclosed abstract of a special investigative report on nonconforming buses. The NTSB issued the report after investigating four crashes in 1998 and 1999 in which 9 people were killed and 36 injured when riding in "nonconforming buses." NTSB defines "nonconforming bus" as a "bus that does not meet the FMVSSs specific to school buses." Most of the victims, including eight of the fatalities, were children.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please contact John Womack, Esq., NHTSA's Senior Assistant Chief Counsel, at (202) 366-9511.

Sincerely,

Frank Seales, Jr.
Chief Counsel

Enclosures

ref:VSA#571.3
d.9/26/00

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1. NHTSA has consistently interpreted "related events" to include school-sponsored field trips and athletic events.

ID: 14407.drn

[]

Dear [ ]

This responds to your request for an interpretation of S5.2.5, Footrests, in Standard No. 123 Motorcycle controls and displays. You ask whether the requirement that the footrest "fold rearward and upward when not in use" can be interpreted to require the passenger footrest to fold upward only. As explained below, the answer is no.

You requested confidential treatment for all information in your letter, and its attachment. Please note that when confidential treatment is claimed for material submitted to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), our confidentiality regulation, 49 CFR Part 512, requires the submission of a certification stating that the submitter has made a diligent inquiry to ascertain that the information submitted has not been disclosed, or otherwise made public, (49 CFR 512.4(e)) and other supporting information (49 CFR 512.4(b)). However, in order to expedite our response to you, I will waive the requirement of the certification contained in 49 CFR 512. In a telephone conversation with Dorothy Nakama of my staff, you stated that redacting your name, the name of your company, and the drawing of your motorcycle from publicly available copies of your letter and our response letter to you will satisfy your request for confidential treatment.

S5.2.5 Footrests in Standard No. 123 states in full:

Footrests shall be provided for each designated seating position. Each footrest for a passenger other than an operator shall fold rearward and upward when not in use.

In your letter, you state that in its current designs, your company uses passenger footboards for some of the larger motorcycles. Your footboards are hinged, and their basic design allows them to fold directly upward, rather than rearward and upward. Your company believes that the footboard location makes it impossible for the footboard to contact the road during turning maneuvers. You expressed the opinion that S5.2.5 is "design restrictive," and that safety will not be compromised by allowing passenger footboards that fold directly upward, as long the footboards "cannot possibly make contact with the road during normal driving conditions."

NHTSA has addressed S5.2.5 in past interpretation letters, but has never interpreted S5.2.5 to permit the passenger footrest to fold upward only. Because the provision plainly states "shall fold rearward and upward," we are unable to interpret S5.2.5 by disregarding the word "rearward," and to permit a passenger footrest to fold upward only. Please note that S5.2.5 states only that the passenger footrest "shall fold rearward" but does not specify the extent to which the footrest must fold rearward.

If you believe S5.2.5 should be amended, you may petition for rulemaking, as provided in our regulations at 49 CFR Part 552 - Petitions for Rulemaking, Defect, and Noncompliance Orders. Please note that even if your petition should be granted and a rulemaking proceeding is commenced, it does not signify that the rule in question will be issued. A decision as to the issuance of the rule is made on the basis of all available information developed in the course of the rulemaking proceeding, in accordance with statutory criteria.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack

Acting Chief Counsel

This interp contains confidential information in brackets [ ].

ref:123

d:5/20/97

ID: 11647MLV

Mr. Michael Love
Manager, Compliance
Porsche Cars North America, Inc.
100 West Liberty Street
P.O. Box 30911
Reno, Nevada 89520-3911

Dear Mr. Love:

This responds to your letter of December 19, 1995, requesting information concerning the readiness indicator requirement in S4.5.2 of Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection. I apologize for the delay in responding.

S4.5.2 of Standard No. 208 states:

An occupant protection system that deploys in the event of a crash shall have a monitoring system with a readiness indicator. The indicator shall monitor its own readiness and shall be clearly visible from the driver's designated seating position.

You ask whether this requirement applies (1) to a voluntarily-installed inflatable restraint (not needed to comply with Standard No. 208), or (2) to an inflatable restraint installed to meet the requirements of another standard (such as Standard No. 214, Side Impact Protection). You state that Porsche believed that in both of these situations the manufacturer could install:

- no readiness indicator, or - a separate readiness indicator from that required by Standard No. 208, or - a readiness indicator combined with that required by Standard No. 208.

As explained below, for both types of inflatable restraints, we agree with the first two of these statements, but not necessarily with the third.

Voluntarily-Installed Inflatable Restraints

A crash-deployed occupant protection system installed in addition to required safety systems would not be required to

comply with the provisions of the safety standards. Thus, a readiness indicator would not be required. However, in the interest of safety, we would urge you to consider voluntarily providing a readiness indicator for the system.

As explained below, if you voluntarily provide a readiness indicator, and decide to combine it with the required readiness indicator, the information provided by the former must not confuse or obscure the information provided by the latter about the required air bag. The indicator must distinguish between the different air bag systems, such as by having dissimilar signals for the different systems.

While systems or components installed in addition to required safety systems are not required to comply with the standards, they must not make inoperative the compliance of the required systems (49 U.S.C. '30122). We urge you to make sure that by combining a voluntarily-installed readiness indicator with the required indicator, you do not prevent the latter from complying with Standard No. 208. If the messages of the two indicators were not distinguishable, a driver would not know if the illuminated telltale showed a problem with the occupant protection system installed to comply with Standard No. 208, or a problem with another system being monitored.

NHTSA addressed a related issue in a rulemaking that allowed manufacturers to install a manual cut-off device for a passenger-side air bag in certain situations (60 FR 27233; May 23, 1995). The agency stated there that the readiness indicator must monitor only the driver's air bag when the passenger-side air bag was deactivated. In other words, the indicator must not be affected by the deactivated state of the passenger-side air bag.

Systems Installed for a Standard Other than Standard 208

The requirement for a readiness indicator (S4.5.2) applies only to systems that are installed to comply with the requirements of Standard No. 208, and not to systems installed to comply with another standard. Air bag systems installed pursuant to Standard No. 208 are generally installed to meet the frontal protection requirements of that standard. While a readiness indicator is not required for systems installed for other purposes, we would urge the manufacturer to provide a means of monitoring the readiness of the system, consistent with the cautions above.

I hope this information has been helpful. If you have other questions or need some additional information, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Samuel J. Dubbin Chief Counsel

ref:208#214 d:4/25/96