ID: nht88-1.26

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 02/05/88

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: The Honorable Leon E. Panetta

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

The Honorable Leon E. Panetta Member, U.S. House of Representatives 380 Alvarado Street Monterey, CA 93940

Dear Mr. Panetta:

This responds to your inquiry on behalf of Dr. Courtney F. Morgan, a constituent of yours. Dr. Morgan has purchased a 1987 model year Saab. The particular version of the model he saw at the dealership was equipped with manual lap/shoulder safety belts. H owever, the actual car that was delivered to Dr. Morgan was equipped with automatic safety belts. Dr. Morgan feels that the automatic belts are "hazardous and cumbersome," and asked what he must do in order to remove the automatic belts and have manual s afety belts installed in place of the automatic belts. I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our law and regulations to you.

Pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act in 1966 (the Safety Act: 15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.), a Federal safety standard on occupant crash protection was issued in 1967 requiring the installation of manual safety belts in all new passeng er vehicles. Although these manual safety belts have shown their effectiveness as safety devices, only a relatively small number of motorists used their manual belts. As recently as 1984, only 12.5 percent of front seat occupants wore their manual belts. Because so few people used their manual safety belts, the Department issued the first requirement for automatic restraints in passenger cars in 1970, and it was scheduled to take effect in 1973. That implementation date was delayed for a variety of reas ons. On June 24, 1983, the Supreme Court of the United States found our decision to repeal the requirement for automatic restraints was "arbitrary and capricious," and ordered us to reconsider the decision (Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. Stat e Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29). Against this background, former Secretary of Transportation Dole issued a final rule amending the Federal safety standard on occupant crash protection on July 17, 1984.

That decision, which promotes both automatic restraints and State safety belt use laws, provides a comprehensive approach designed to save as many lives as possible as quickly as possible. We believe that effectively enforced State laws requiring the pro per use of the manual safety belts reflects our belief in the value of automatic occupant protection systems, such as air bags and automatic belts, by requiring all new cars to have automatic protection starting with the 1990 model year. The automatic pr otection requirements are phased in during the preceding three model years, beginning with 10 percent of each manufacturer's 1987 model year cars. Each manufacturer must equip 25 percent of its 1988 model year cars with automatic occupant protection syst ems, and 4 percent of its 1989 model year cars with automatic occupant protection systems. However, if the Secretary determines not later than April 1, 1989, that State belt use laws have been enacted that meet certain criteria and that are applicable to two-thirds of the U.S. population, then the automatic restraint requirements will be rescinded.

The following prohibition appears in section 108 of the Safety Act: "No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative ... any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle ... in c ompliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard ..." In this case, the automatic safety belts in Dr. Morgan's Saab are a "device or element of design installed in a motor vehicle in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle s afety standard." Removal of the automatic belts would render them inoperative. Therefore, Federal law prohibits Saab, any other manufacturer, and any distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business from removing the automatic safety belts from Dr. Morgan's car.

Please note that this Federal prohibition does not prevent Dr. Morgan himself from removing the automatic belts from his car. However, we encourage vehicle owners not to tamper with the occupant crash protection systems installed in their vehicles. If Dr . Morgan were to remove the automatic belts himself and improperly install manual safety belts, he would be putting himself and other vehicle occupants at substantially greater risk of injury in a crash.

Please thank Dr. Morgan for informing us of his views on this subject. We welcome the interest of all concerned citizens on this important subject and I appreciate this opportunity advise you of our efforts to improve occupant crash protection for all Am ericans.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

December 18,1987

To: Ms. Nancy F. Miller, Director Office of Congressional Affairs U.S. Department of Transportation 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Room 10406 Washington, D.C. 20590

ENCLOSURES FROM:

Courtney F. Morgan, Ph.D.

RE: Dr. Morgan has contracted my office regarding his wish to have passive restraining system presently installed in his car replaced with a 3-point seatbelt system.

Would you please review the attached and reply to the concerns/questions which this constituent has brought to my attention? This matter has also been referred to the California Department of Motor Vehicles.

Thank you for your assistance.

I would appreciate your attention to the attached correspondence. Please direct your reply to the address to the address below.

Thank you very much for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

LEON E. PANETTA Member of Congress

PLEASE RESPOND TO ME AT: 380 Alvarado Street Montrey, California 93940 (408) 649-3555

Attention: Ken Christopher; (408) 429-1976

DATE: Dec. 8, 1987

STAFF MEMBER: KWC

CONSTITUENT'S NAME: Courtney F. Morgan, Ph.D.

ADDRESS: 351-D Western Dr. Santa Cruz, CA 95060

PHONE: 408 / 429-4382 area code

INFORMATION REQUESTED: (be specific)

Dr. Morgan purchased a new car, and would like information on how he can get the passive seatbelt restraints replaced with the 3-point seatbelt system that was formerly used in pre-1988 cars.

Dr. Morgan states that he bought a 1987 1/2 Saab 900-S coupe. When he viewed the car, it had the 3-point seatbelt system. Dr. Morgan ordered the car, and by the time his car arrived, the new models with passive seatbelt restraints were being manufactured . Dr. Morgan has learned

that these new type of restraints are being ordered by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), a branch of the U.S. Department of Transportation. Dr. Morgan feels that these passive restraints are hazardous and cumbersome. He wrote to the President of Saab, and was told that the company was only complying with a Federal order.

Therefore, Dr. Morgan would like to know what he must do in order to legally remove the passive restraints and have the 3-point seatbelt system he prefers installed.

ID: nht88-1.33

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 02/11/88

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Roderick A. Boutin

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: Roderick A. Boutin, Esq. 960 One Main Place 101 S.W. Main Street Portland, Oregon 97204

Dear Mr. Boutin:

This responds to your letter to Steve Kratzke, of my staff, asking for a statement of the legal requirements that would apply to a new product one of your clients plans to introduce. You provided no description of this product in your letter, other than to state that it "alters the alignment of an upper torso restraint to the increased comfort of the wearer." You also stated in the letter that the product would initially be sold as an aftermarket accessory to be installed by consumers, but that it might eventually be sold to manufacturers to be installed in new vehicles. In a telephone conversation with Mr. Kratzke on November 20, 1987, you stated that this product would clip the shoulder belt to the lap belt near the middle of wearer's abdomen.

Although we understand your concern that safety belts be comfortable for the wearer, we have significant reservations about this product. I hope the following discussion explains those reservations and the effect of our regulations on the product.

The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Safety Act; 15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.) gives this agency the authority to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and certain new items of motor vehicle equipment. We have exercised this authority to establish Standards No. 208 s Occupant Crash Protection, and No. 210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages (49 CFR 5571.208 and 5571.210, respectively), applicable to new vehicles, and to establish Standard No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies (49 CFR @5 7l. 209), applicable to new seat belt assemblies. It does not appear that any of these regulations would apply to your client's product, however.

Additionally, you are not required to get some "approval" from this agency before selling the product. NHTSA has no authority to approve or endorse motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Instead, the Safety Act establishes a "self-certification" proc ess under which each manufacturer is responsible for certifying that its products meet all applicable safety standards. The agency periodically tests vehicles and items of equipment to ensure their compliance with the safety standards, and also investiga tes other alleged safety-related defects.

While none of our safety standards appear to apply directly to your client's product, there are several statutory responsibilities your client must assume when it manufactures the product. All manufacturers of motor vehicle equipment are subject to the r equirements in sections 151-159 of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1411-1419) concerning the recall and remedy of products with defects related to motor vehicle safety. The agency does not determine the existence of defects except in the context of a defect pr oceeding, so we are unable to say at this time whether this product might or might not contain such a defect.

However, this product raises a host of safety concerns that we would advise your client to carefully consider. Section @7.1.2 of Standard No. 208 specifies that the intersection of the shoulder belt with the lap belt shall be at least 6 inches from the f ront vertical centerline of a 50th percentile adult male occupant with the seat in its rearmost and lowest adjustable position. Attaching the shoulder belt to the lap belt in the middle of the abdomen, instead of joining the belts at the latchplate off t o the side of the occupant, would cause the belts to no longer comply with this requirement of Standard No. 208 and would significantly alter the distribution of crash forces on the occupant. The lap and shoulder belts as currently installed distribute t he crash forces over the skeletal structure of the occupant. The proposed device to attach the shoulder belt to the lap belt near the middle of the abdomen would significantly increase the loading on the occupant's abdomen, a part of the body that cannot withstand the same loading levels as the skeletal structure. This increase in abdominal loading could have serious safety implications for the wearer of the belt. Additionally, by realigning the shoulder belt, the device would seem to increase the likel ihood that a wearer of the belt would twist toward the middle of the vehicle, so that the person could be partially or completely unrestrained by the shoulder belt. Further it is possible that the device attaching the shoulder belt to the lap belt near the middle of the wearer's abdomen could not withstand the forces of the crash, and would allow the shoulder belt to detach. Since the shoulder belt could have an exc essive amount of slack in it, the occupant's head would be likely to contact the vehicle interior. All of these possibilities raise serious safety concerns with respect to this proposed device.

In addition, use of this product could be affected by section 108 (a) (2) (A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a) (2) (A)) . That section prohibits commercial businesses from knowingly tampering with devices or elements of design installed in a motor ve hicle in compliance with a Federal motor vehicle safety standard. Shoulder belts are installed in the front seating positions of most vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less in compliance with Standard No. 208. If the install ation of this product causes the shoulder belts to offer less effective occupant protection, commercial establishments could not legally install the product on customers' vehicles.

The prohibition in section 108(a) (2)(A) does not apply to individual vehicle owners who may install or remove any items on safety belt systems regardless of the effect on compliance with Standard No. 208. However, our policy is to encourage consumers no t to tamper with the safety belts installed in their vehicles. Installation of this product by any person would be inconsistent with that policy.

If you have any further questions, please contact Mr. Kratzke at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

October 9, 1987

Mr. Steve Kratzke Office of Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Admin. 400 Seventh St. S.W., Room 5219 Washington, D.C. 20590

Re: Automobile Seatbelt Standards

Dear Mr. Kratzke:

I represent an Oregon company involved in the development of a device which alters the alignment of an upper torso restraint to the increased comfort of the wearer. Initially, the product would be sold as an after-market accessory to be installed by the consumer. However, if favorably received, there is the potential for licensed sales to automotive manufacturers for use in new vehicles. Would you please be so kind as to provide an opinion addressing which, if any, federal standards (either statutory or regulatory) guide, govern or control the design standards, testing, sale or use of such devices. It is hoped that you will be able to pr ovide such an opinion without the necessary of detailed descriptions or drawings disclosing confidential business information. However, should you require information about the device more detailed than is set forth herein, I would be pleased to answer y our request, pursuant to 49 CFR Part 512. Please let me know what additional information you need, if any.

Thank you for your assistance and courtesies. I await your reply. Sincerely,

Roderick A. Boutin Attorney at Law

ID: nht90-1.11

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 01/09/90

FROM: STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL

TO: ALLEN R. ANDRLIK -- AUSTRALIAN TRADE COMMISSION AUSTRALIAN CONSULATE GENERAL

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 08/28/89 FROM ALLEN R. ANDRLIK -- AUSTRALIAN TRADE COMMISSION TO DEE FUJITA -- NHTSA; OCC 3896

TEXT: Dear Mr. Andrlik:

This responds to your letter asking about Federal regulations that would apply to the "Milford Cargo Barrier" that Milford Industries, an Australian company, manufactures. Your enclosure indicates that the barrier is a type of wire screen that is genera lly anchored to the sides and floor of a vehicle directly behind the front seat(s). The barrier is intended to protect occupants in a crash from impact with objects carried in the rear of cars, trucks and vans.

By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards that set performance requirements for new moto r vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA is not authorized to certify or approve motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment for compliance with our Federal motor vehicle safety standards. Instead, under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicl e Safety Act (copy enclosed), each manufacturer of a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment is responsible for certifying that its products meet all applicable safety standards. The following represents our opinion based on the information pro vided in your letter.

There is currently no Federal motor vehicle safety standard that is directly applicable to the product you describe. Our standard for glazing materials (Standard No. 205) applies only to interior barries or partitions that contain glazing, and not to wi re screens.

However, there are other Federal laws that indirectly affect the manufacture and sale of Milford's barriers. If the barrier were installed as original equipment on a new motor vehicle, the vehicle manufacturer would be required to certify that, with the device installed, the vehicle satisfies the requirements of all applicable safety standards. Installation of the barrier could affect a vehicle's compliance with various safety standards. For example, installation of the barrier could affect complianc e with Standard No. 201, Occupant

2 Protection in Interior Impact, which sets energy-absorption requirements for the back of the front seat, to protect occupants in the rear seat who may be thrown forward in a crash. The barrier could also affect compliance with Standard No. 208, Occupa nt Crash Protection, (safety belts and other restraint systems), and Standard No. 111, Rearview Mirrors (driver field of view). Copies of each of these standards are enclosed.

If the barrier were added to a previously certified new motor vehicle (e.g., a completed van) prior to the vehicle's first sale, the person who modifies the vehicle may have certification responsibilities as an "alterer" under 49 CFR @ 567.7. This would occur if the installation of the barrier constituted something other than a "readily attachable" component (such as tires or rim assemblies). To determine whether installation of the barrier involves a readily attachable component, the agency considers factors such as the intricacy of installation, and the need for special expertise in installing the barrier.

The advertising brochure you enclosed states: "Expert installation available Australia wide." It also indicates that the barriers are "designed . . . to the individual dimensions" of the consumer's motor vehicle and are "load rated" (which we understand to mean that the barrier and its attachment are capable of withstanding a rated load). These factors appear to indicate that a degree of special expertise and analysis are needed to install the barrier so that it will perform in the manner intended. In light of these considerations, the barrier appears to be something other than a readily attachable component under @ 567.7. (If Milford would like to send us information indicating otherwise, we would be happy to review it.)

If the cargo barrier were installed in a new or used vehicle by a commercial business such as a motor vehicle dealer or repair shop, the installer would be subject to Safety Act considerations affecting the installation. Section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Act states: "No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative . . . any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicabl e Federal motor vehicle safety standard . . . ." Thus, the commercial installer would have to make sure that the addition of the apparatus would not negatively affect the compliance of any component or design on a vehicle with applicable Federal safety s tandards (such as Standards 111, 201 and 208). Section 109 of the Act specifies a civil penalty of up to $ 1,000 for each violation of @ 108.

In addition to the FMVSS considerations, manufacturers of motor vehicle equipment should also be aware that they are subject to the requirements in sections 151-159 of the Safety Act concerning the recall and remedy of products with defects relating to m otor vehicle safety. I have enclosed a copy of our regulation for defect responsibility of motor vehicle equipment manufacturers (49 CFR Part 579) for your information. Any manufacturer which fails to provide notification of or remedy for a defect may be subject to a civil penalty of up to $ 1,000 per violation.

3

In addition to the regulations described above, we also bring to your attention a procedural rule which applies to all manufacturers subject to the regulations of this agency. Subpart D of 49 CFR Part 551, Procedural Rules, requires all manufacturers he adquartered outside of the United States to designate a permanent resident of the United States as the manufacturer's agent for service of all process, notices, orders and decisions. This designation should be mailed to the Chief Counsel, National Highw ay Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590, and must include the following information:

1. A certification that the designation of agent is valid in form and binding on the manufacturer under the laws, corporate-by-laws, or other requirements governing the making of the designation at the time and place where it is made;

2. The full name, principal place of business and mailing address of the manufacturer;

3. Marks, trade names, or other designations of origin of any of the manufacturer's products which do not bear its name;

4. A statement that the designation shall remain in effect until withdrawn or replaced by the manufacturer;

5. A declaration of acceptance duly signed by the agent appointed, which may be an individual, a firm or a United States Corporation; and,

6. The full legal name and address of the designated agent.

In addition, the designation must be signed by a person with authority to appoint the agent. The signer's name and title should be clearly indicated beneath his or her signature.

I hope this information is helpful. Please feel free to contact us if you have further questions.

Sincerely,

ENCLOSURES

ID: nht74-3.7

DATE: 12/11/74

FROM: GERHARD P. RIECHEL -- ATTORNEY VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA INC

TO: TAYLOR VINSON -- OFFICE OF THE CHEIF COUNSEL NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

TITLE: STANDARD 105 - FAILURE INDICATOR LAMP

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 02/28/75 FROM RICHARD B. DYSON -- NHTSA TO GERHARD P. RIECHEL, RED BOOK (-); STANDARD 105-75

TEXT: Dear Mr. Vinson:

This is in reference to our meeting of Friday, November 22, and previous telephone conversations concerning the permissibility of Volkswagen's brake failure indicator configuration for use in connection with 1976 model vehicles.

We have understood Paragraph S5.3.3 of FMVSS 105-75 read in conjunction with S5.3.1(a)(1) to permit deactivation of the failure indicator lamp whenever the brake system is not under pressure, that is whenever brake activation terminates. Mr. Bloom informed us that this understanding did not accurately reflect the intent of the language of the Standard nor the purpose that its authors sought to achieve.

While we appreciate the difficulty of drafting regulations dealing with complex technical subjects, we believe that the language of the rule should be accorded priority where a contrary intent and purpose are not readily apparent. We have closely examined each notice issued by the NHTSA in the course of the lengthy rulemaking process relating to Standard 105 and find nothing that would have aided us in ascertaining the claimed intent of the rule.

It should also be noted that unlike certification, recall and record keeping regulations promulgated by the NHTSA, its safety standards are addressed to design engineers, who are accustomed to working with measurable and ascertainable values and conditions. A "gross loss of pressure," an engineer would justly maintain, simply cannot exist in the absence of any pressure in the brake system. One could argue that had the rule's authors intended the indicator lamp to remain activated as long as the brake system was so grossly defective that it was incapable of building up pressure, terms similar to "inability to build up pressure" or other such language would have been chosen. There is little doubt that our engineers chose that meaning, which most closley conforms to the letter of the standard, and totally unaware of the subsequently disclosed "intent" of the rule, acted responsibly in designing and developing a brake failure warning and indicator lamp configuration, which now is ready for production and use in connection with 1976 model cars.

Description of the Volkswagen Brake Failure Warning System and its Advantages Over Other Systems

Volkswagen uses a dual chamber master cylinder, which provides operating pressure to both brake circuits. The system is so designed that leaks in one circuit will not affect the performance of the other circuit. An electrical warning system, which is actuated by a pressure switch in each of the two brake circuits, which is located in the master cylinder, causes a red indicator lamp on the instrument panel to light up whenever a gross loss of pressure occurs in one of the two circuits upon application of the brake pedal with a control force of not more than fifty (50) pounds. The two pressure switches perform dual functions. Under normal operating conditions, they operate the tail brake lights. Both pressure switches are actuated simultaneously as the result of pressure built up in each circuit. In the case of a gross loss of pressure in one of the circuits, the pressure switch for the other circuit is actuated and in turn illuminates the tail brake lights and the warning indicator lamp upon application of the brake pedal. When the brake pedal is released, the warning and tail lights are deactuated.

This type of pressure failure warning system has certain advantages and, we believe, is superior to warning systems incorporating latching relay components, which allow the warning lamp to remain activated even if the brake pedal is released. Latching relay components have the disadvantage that they operate only in the event that a failure occurs. Unused, they may become increasingly unreliable as the vehicle ages. There is no way of checking, short of dis-assembly, whether or not they are operative. With the increasing age of the vehicle, possible malfunctions due to corrosion and other causes remain undetected until such time as the actual pressure loss occurs. Volkswagen's warning system offers a means of checking and assuring continuous operation throughout the life of the vehicle.

Additionally, since the Volkswagen pressure switch does not only sense a pressure loss but also any malfunction in the switch itself, which, if it occurs, would activate the indicator lamp, the driver is made aware of any deficiency in his braking system.

The Volkswagen warning system also enables the vehicle operator to distinguish between a pressure failure signaled by the warning light being deactivated upon release of the brake pedal, and a loss of brake fluid. In the latter instance, the warning light will remain activated independent of any brake pedal activation.

Notwithstanding the unpublished intent of the rule, which was unknown to us until recently, we believe there is ample support for our claim that the Volkswagen design falls squarely within the interpretive parameters of the Standard's language. We therefore believe that our design is permissible under the law without further rulemaking.

In the event that the NHTSA should disagree with this view, we respectfully request that the effectiveness date of Paragraph S5.3.3 to the extent that it makes reference to Paragraph S5.3.1(a)(1) be postponed until September 1, 1976.

Volkswagen is currently committed to produce the system described above and in more detail in Attachments 1, 2, and 3.

In order to meet the alleged intent of the rule, it will be necessary to redesign our current warning system in several respects. Attachment 4 shows the circuit diagram of the new system, and Attachment 3, the changes that are necessary in the lamp housing in order to accommodate the additional components. The changes are marked in red pencil.

Enclosed as Attachment 5 is an estimate of the cost that we anticipate in acquiring new tooling and in tool modifications for the purpose of incorporating latching relay components into the warning system of each of the models offered for sale in the United States. Note in particular the high costs that will be incurred for our two new models, the Rabbit and Scirocco. The single largest cost factor in this case involves major changes on the dashboard support structures on these models to receive the larger components of the new lamp assembly. The dashboard changes as well as the modifications of the instrument panel insert are marked in red pencil in the drawing enclosed as Attachment 6. The total cost for new tooling is estimated to be approximately $400,000. The cost to the manufacturer of the additional components that must be installed in 1977 vehicles is approximately $4 per car.

Redesign and preparation for production including development of the additional tooling is estimated to require approximately 20 months.

Your favorable consideration of our request is appreciated.

Sincerely,

ENCS

ID: nht73-1.7

DATE: 09/14/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; R. B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: U.S. Technical Research Corp.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of July 24, 1973, asking for an interpretation of several aspects of Standard No. 105a.

You have asked the following questions

"1. Paragraph S.5.1.2. 'Partial failure.'

It is required that '. . . the remaining portion(s) of the service brake system shall continue to operate . . .' What is the exact meaning of 'continue to operate'? Does it mean that the remaining portion of the brake system must be permanently fed or does it mean that it is required to have temporary braking with the operative portion reserve capability? In this latter case, how many brake applications are required?"

"Continue to operate" means that the portion of the brake system that has not failed continues to operate indefinitely, i.e., to the point that it wears out or until a second failure occurs in the brake system. It requires a permanent feed and does not depend upon the reserve capability of operative portion of system.

"2. Paragraph S.5.1.3.3 'Brake power units':

What exactly constitutes the power source? On the Citroen D and S models, the front brake circuit is fed by the pressure prevailing in the rear suspension. The brake accumulator and the rear suspension are fed from the high pressure source (which includes an HP pump, a pressure regulator and a main accumulator) . . . What is meant by 'inoperative brake power unit'? Does that mean that the high pressure pump only is inoperative or also the other components of the power source (main accumulator and regulator)?. . . What is meant by 'when the inoperative unit is depleted of all reserve capability' (paragraph S.5.1.3.3.(ii))? Are we correct in assuming that it means that only the main accumulator is depleted of reserve capability? (It is obvious that if one considers that not only the main accumulator, but also the brake accumulator and the rear suspension are depleted, no braking is possible)."

The power source consists of pumps, accumulators and/or back up systems such as a separate electric or hydraulic pumps, etc. A primary power source would be the pump, while the accumulators would constitute a secondary source and would be the portions used in optional test. A high pressure source would include the pump, regulator and, in Citroen's case, the main accumulator.

"Inoperative brake power unit" could mean that the (1) main pump is out, but the accumulators are functioning, (2) the main pump is operating, but only one brake accumulator is operating, (3) the pump and brake accumulator are operating, but the suspension accumulator is out, (4) the pump or accumulator is out, and the system is operating on reserve or backup pump. This list is meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive.

"When the inoperative unit is depleted of all reserve capability" means that one of the units (pump, accumulator, etc.) is completely non-functional, e.g., the pump has failed, the accumulator has failed, the check valve has failed, etc.

"3. Paragraph S.7.10.2 'Optional procedures'

We believe that subparagraph 'b' (vehicles with brake power unit) applies to our vehicles.

The test procedure mentioned in paragraph S.7.10.2(a) cannot be applied to our vehicles since, if the system is depleted of 'any residual brake power reserve capability', it is obvious that no braking is possible. We believe that the power source only should be depleted of any residual reserve (HP pump inoperative, main accumulator depleted), but not the entire brake system. Since, by definition, a 'brake power unit' is a unit where the operator action consists 'only of modulating the energy application level,' but not of supplying energy to the system, it is obvious that no braking is possible if all internal residual energy left in the brake system is depleted (since, in this case, there would be no energy available for braking from either the HP source, the driver or the system).

S7.10.2(b) does apply to Citroen. Your comments on S7.10.2(a) are correct.

Yours truly,

July 24, 1973

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Attention: Chief Counsel

Gentlemen:

In relation to Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 105a "Hydraulic Brake System", as published in the Federal Register vol. 38 No. 96 of May 18, 1973, we would like clarification of the following points.

1. Paragraph S.5.1.2 "Partial failure."

It is required that ". . . the remaining portion(s) of the service brake system shall continue to operate . . ." What is the exact meaning of "continue to operate"? Does it mean that the remaining portion of the brake system must be permanently fed or does it mean that it is required to have temporary braking with the operative portion reserve capability? In this latter case, how many brake applications are required?

2. Paragraph S.5.1.3.3 "Brake power units":

- What exactly constitutes the power source? On the Citroen D and S models, the front brake circuit is fed by a brake accumulator while the rear brake circuit is fed by the pressure prevailing in the rear suspension. The brake accumulator and the rear suspension are fed from the high pressure source (which includes an HP pump, a pressure regulator and a main accumulator). (see enclosed sketches)

We understand that the high pressure source is constituted by the HP pump, the pressure regulator and the main accumulator only. Are we correct?

- What is it meant by "inoperative brake power unit"? Does that mean that the high pressure pump only is inoperative or also the other components of the power source (main accumulator and regulator)?

We believe it should be considered that several failures cannot simultaneously happen to the same system. (as it is considered in equivalent European regulations).

- What is it meant by "when the inoperative unit is depleted of all reserve capability" (paragraph S.5.1.3.3.(ii))? Are we correct in assuming that it means that only the main accumulator is depleted of reserve capability? (It is obvious that if one considers that not only the main accumulator, but also the brake accumulator and the rear suspension are depleted, no braking is possible).

3. Paragraph S.7.10.2 "Optional procedures"

We believe that subparagraph "b" (vehicles with brake power unit) applies to our vehicles.

The test procedure mentioned in paragraph S.7.10.2(a) cannot be applied to our vehicles since, if the system is depleted of "any residual brake power reserve capability", it is obvious that no braking is possible. We believe that the power source only should be depleted of any residual reserve (HP pump inoperative, main accumulator depleted), but not the entire brake system. Since, by definition, a "brake power unit" is a unit where the operator action consists "only of modulating the energy application level," but not of supplying energy to the system, it is obvious that no braking is possible if all internal residual energy left in the brake system is depleted (since, in this case, there would be no energy available for braking from either the HP source, the driver or the system.)

We remain, of course, at your disposal should you need more information on the operation of our braking system, and, awaiting your answer, we are,

Very truly yours,

By Bernard Belier -- U.S. Resident Engineer for CITROEN S.A.

Enclosures: 1 print "Citroen SM braking"; 1 sketch "Citroen high pressure source"; 1 sketch "Citroen brake system"; 1 sketch "Suspension"; 1 plate No. 21 "Citroen brake accumulator"

ID: nht75-3.10

DATE: 06/02/75

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Robert L. Carter; NHTSA

TO: Tiger Tanks; Division of Faull Enterprises, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: Thank you for your letter of April 28, 1975, concerning the manufacture and installation of replacement tanks for Dodge, Ford, and Chevrolet vans.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has promulgated no motor vehicle safety standard relating to replacement fuel tanks. There is, however, a safety standard which imposes performance requirements upon motor vehicles with regard to their fuel systems (Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity). Thus, if installation of your replacement tank is accomplished prior to the first purchase of the vehicle for purposes other than resale causing the vehicle's fuel system not to be in compliance with the applicable safety standard, the person installing the tank or offering the vehicle for sale would be in violation of @ 108(a)(1) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Pub. L. 89-563). That would make the installer or seller subject to civil penalties of up to $ 1,000 for each violation.

Recent amendments to the Traffic Safety Act (Pub. L. 93-492) prohibit any manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business from knowingly rendering inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable motor vehicle safety standard (@ 108(a)(2)(A)). Therefore, even if installation of your replacement tank occurred after the first purchase of the vehicle, the vehicle's compliance with the fuel system integrity standard would still be mandatory where one of the above named persons performed the installation. If the replacement tank caused the fuel system to no longer comply with the safety standard, the installer would have rendered inoperative a system installed in compliance with Standard 301.

The Traffic Safety Act authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to make determinations as to whether items of motor vehicle equipment contain defects which relate to motor vehicle safety. If he finds that a safety-related defect exists, he may compel the manufacturer to remedy the defect and notify purchasers of the hazard. Therefore, even though replacement fuel tanks are not the subject of a standard, they still must be designed for safety.

In addition, the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety regulates interstate carriers, including fuel systems for operational and auxiliary equipment. These regulations might be of interest to you and are enclosed. Your attention is directed to the section concerning fuel systems, pages 51 through 54.

SINCERELY,

April 28, 1975

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Department of Transportation

We wish to be informed as to what information is required of us to obtain your approval on our replacement fuel tank for Dodge, Ford and Chevy vans.

We are currently approved by the State of California Air Resources Board for the manufacturing installation and distribution of our fuel tank. (enclosure)

Our replacement fuel tank does not alter or change any standard fuel system or structual entities of the vehicle.

We are only adding an additional fuel capacity.

We are currently negotiating a contract with a company who is placing quite a large order and they are requesting that we have your approval.

We have checked with Ford Motor Company, Chrysler Corporation and General Motors Corporation and they have informed us that we do not need any approvals from them.

Thanking you in advance.

Alfred H. Faull President

Tiger Tanks Division of Faull Enterprises, Inc.

A Division of Faull Enterprises, Inc.

REPLACEMENT FUEL TANKS FOR DODGE, FORD, CHEVY VANS AND MINI MOTOR HOMES

* Construction of long ternes steel-lead coated inside and out.

* Made of the same metal as the Ford Motor Company. The Chrysler Corporation and General Motors Corporation use on all original fuel tanks.

* Construction of heavy duty 16 guage steel.

* Seam welded.

* New sending unit and mounting hardware included.

* Connects back to original equipment.

* Pressure tested.

* No inside oil coating to dissolve.

* No plastic lining to peel and clog fuel lines and carburetors.

* No rusting to clog carburetors.

* No exterior paint to peel and cause rusting.

* Approved by the California Air Resourse Board. MODEL WHEELBASE YEAR APPROX. CAPACITY - DODGE ALL WHEELBASE 70-75 48 gallons net FORD ALL WHEELBASE 68-75 46 gallons net CHEVY/GMC ALL WHEELBASE 71-75 45 gallons nets

O.E.M. SUGGESTED RETAIL $ 79.00 not installed $ 125.00 not installed $ 105.00 installed $ 150.00 installed

F.O.B. Carson, Calif. Terms are C.O.D.

Prices subject to change without notice.

Orders of 10 or more units - $ 69.95 per unit.

State of California AIR RESOURCES BOARD

EXECUTIVE ORDER F-39 Relating to the Accreditation of Auxiliary Gasoline Fuel Tank Evaporative Loss Control System

TIGER TANKS DIVISION OF FAULL ENTERPRISES INC.

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Air Resources Board by Sections 39106.5 and 39175 of the Health and Safety Code; and

Pursuant to the authority vested in the undersigned by Section 39023 of the Health and Safety Code;

IT IS ORDERED AND RESOLVED: That Tiger Tanks auxiliary gasoline fuel tank evaporative loss control system is accredited for installation on vehicles subject to evaporative emission control requirements and originally equipped with activated carbon canister type control systems.

This accreditation is for systems serving up to 100 gallons of total fuel storage. For each 50 gallons of fuel storage capacity the vapors shall be vented to a 500 to 625 gram capacity activated carbon vapor storage canister.

This Executive Order shall, without further action by the Executive Officer, cease to be of effect if fuel evaporative loss emission standards more stringent than those in effect on the date of this Order are established and made applicable to any vehicle for which the manufacturer's system is hereby accredited, unless prior thereto the manufacturer applies for and obtains from the Executive Officer, based upon a showing that its system complies with such more stringent standards, an appropriate amendment to this Order or a new Executive Order.

The manufacturer must obtain prior approval from the Air Resources Board before any production changes are made on the gasoline fuel evaporative loss control system that would affect evaporative emissions, or before the system is sold, offered for sale, or advertised under a different name, whether by the manufacturer or any other person.

The Department of Motor Vehicles, the California Highway Patrol, and the Bureau of Automotive Repair will be notified by copy of this order and attachment.

Executed at Sacramento, California, this 10th day of December, 1974.

GEORGE J. TAYLOR

WILLIAM SIMMONS FOR Executive Officer

NET GALLONS 48

(Graphics omitted)

NET GALLONS 46

LONG WHEEL BASE ONLY

NET GALLONS 45

ID: nht71-1.24

DATE: 08/16/71 EST

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Lawrence R. Schneider; NHTSA

TO: Recreational Vehicle Institute, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of July 27, 1971, in which you raised a question concerning the application of Standard 206 to doors on recreational vehicles.

Standard 206, Door Locks and Door Retention Components, states that "Side door components referred to herein shall conform to this standard if any portion of a 90-percentile two-dimensional manikin as described in SAE Practice J826, when positioned at any seating reference point, projects into the door opening area on the side elevation or profile view." The term "seating reference point" corresponds to a "designated seating position," which is defined as "any plan view location intended by the manufacturer to provide seating accommodations while the vehicle is in motion, for a person at least as large as a fifth percentile adult female, except auxiliary seating accommodations such as temporary or folding jump seats." The question you asked is whether a seating accommodation that the manufacturer labels as "not for use while the vehicle is in motion" may be disregarded in determining which vehicle doors must comply under the Standard 206 provision quoted above.

The relevant question is whether the seating position in question is "intended by the manufacturer to provide seating accommodation while the vehicle is in motion." While Standard 207 will require all seats intended by the manufacturer not to be used while the vehicle is in motion to be so labeled, it does not necessarily follow that the label will be accepted in all cases as conclusive evidence of the manufacturer's intent. The design of the seat and its location in the vehicle must also be considered. As an example, if it were found that a manufacturer had previously intended that a particular seat be used while the vehicle is in motion, and that he now attached the label merely to evade the Standard 206 requirement without changing his design, the application of Standard 206 to the vehicle would not be barred. The ultimate question in such cases is whether the label clearly is in accord with the manufacturer's intent, in light of all the facts.

The above statement is our general position on the application of Standard 206, in answer to your question. It is not intended to change the interim agreements that we made with respect to the current Standard 206 compliance problems of some of your member manufacturers.

Sincerely,

ATTACH.

RECREATIONAL VEHICLE INSTITUTE, INC.

July 27, 1971

Lawrence R. Schneider -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

Dear Larry:

We appreciate very much the time you, Dave Schmeltzer and Dick Dyson spent with us the morning of July 26th on the door lock problem.

In addition to the possible courses of action proposed in those discussions to resolve the current problem, we have reexamined the specific language of Standard No. 206 to see if an appropriate interpretation of the standard would be helpful. We have reached the conclusion as to proper interpretation of the standard set forth below and would appreciate your confirmation of this conclusion if you are in agreement with it.

Paragraph S4. Requirements, requires that side door components conform to the standard "if any portion of a 90 - percentile two - dimensional manikin . . . when positioned at any seating reference point, projects into the door opening area on the side elevation or profile view . . ." (underscoring supplied). "Seating reference point", as defined in Part 571 - Section 571.3, seems clearly to be locatable only with reference to a "designated seating position". "Designated seating position", in turn, is defined as "any plan view location intended by the manufacturer to provide seating accommodations while a vehicle is in motion . . ." (underscoring supplied). Standard No. 208 (as published September 30, 1970 - 35 F.R. 190, p.15222) prescribes this amended definition and in the preamble states that "the amended definition of designated seating position in Section 571.3 does not include seats that are not intended for use while the vehicle is in motion" (underscoring supplied). Standard No. 207, effective January 1, 1972, prescribes that seats not designated for occupancy while the vehicle is in motion shall be conspicuously labeled to that effect.

These cited provisions, and the specific requirements of Standards Nos. 207, 208, and 210, seem clearly to contemplate that in some vehicles subject to these standards there will be seating accommodations but which are not intended by the manufacturer for use while the vehicle is in motion. This is particularly true of motor homes since manufacturers provide seating for dining and for other uses while the vehicle is not in motion.

We have concluded, therefore, that current Standard No. 206 is not applicable in either of the following situations:

(1) Where there is no seating accommodation at all projecting into the door opening area on the side elevation or profile view.

(2) Where there is a seating accommodation but the manufacturer of the vehicle has specifically designated as not for use while the vehicle is in motion any portion of such seating accommodation which would fall within the specific language of paragraph S4. of Standard No. 206.

It necessarily follows that, if the foregoing interpretations of the standard are correct, then a manufacturer, dealer or distributor, may manufacture, sell, offer for sale, or introduce into interstate commerce a motor vehicle, without violation of the Safety Act, which either does not have any seating accommodation at all or does not have designated seating positions falling within the specific language of paragraph S4. of Standard No. 206. A similar conclusion applies to certification labeling as to conformity with applicable Federal safety standards. Although the labeling requirements of Standard No. 207 are not effective until January 1, 1972, we presume that any labeling by the manufacturer of each seating position which might otherwise make the vehicle subject to Standard No. 206 as "not for use while the vehicle" would make the standard inapplicable to such vehicle. We, of course, would recommend to manufacturers at the time these conclusions are communicated to them that such labeling be conspicuous and designed to attract the attention of the vehicle occupants. We would recommend also to the manufacturers, as an added safety feature, that they provide dead bolt locks where feasible for each such motor home where there are seating accommodations which, while designated as not for use while the vehicle is in motion, would otherwise fall within the language of paragraph S4. of Standard No. 206.

Your expeditious consideration of these conclusions and their confirmation would be appreciated. We would like to be able to incorporate them in the contemplated general memorandum from RVI to the industry which will provide information regarding the Bargman Company part replacement program. These interpretations of the standard will aid the situation to some degree, hopefully, and together with your favorable action on the other ideas for resolution of the matter which we discussed may well alleviate much of the worst of the considerable adverse economic impact on the RV industry.

Very truly yours,

David J. Humphreys

cc: F. M. Radigan; Philip N. Shrake

ID: nht72-1.14

DATE: 06/15/72

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; R. L. Carter; NHTSA

TO: Frank and Frank

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: Thank you for your most recent inquiry regarding hood latch systems, dated May 26, 1972.

Examination of the 1964 Chevrolet hood latch system reveals that this system does meet the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 113, which was effective on January 1, 1969. While, as stated in our correspondence of February 16, 1972, we favor a system in which two complete operations are necessary, a system which employs two latches having a single operation will meet the requirements of the standard.

A current review of our Office of Defects Investigation files reveals that no information relative to 1964 Chevrolet hood latching systems has been added since our last communication.

Thank you for your inquiry.

Sincerely,

ATTACH.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORATION NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

01/01/72 EST.

Irving Frank -- Frank and Frank

Dear Mr. Frank:

Thank you for your letter of December 22, 1971, in which you requested safety information pertaining to 1964 Chevrolet hood latching mechansims.

Our Offices of Defects Investigation and Accident Investigation and Data Analysis have made a search of their files, and have found no specific information relating to defects in 1964 Chevrolet hood latching. I should like to point out that, inasmuch as Federal motor vehicle safety standards first became effective on January 1, 1968, we have not in all cases received information pertaining to defects which may have affected earlier vehicles. We have, however, monitored a recall campaign affecting potentially defective hood latch mechanisms on 1969 Mercury Cougars, wherein the possibility of binding components could cause the hood to open while the vehicle is in motion. In this connection, we are enclosing a copy of a report, Motor Vehicle Safety Defect Recall Campaigns, covering calendar year 1969. Your attention is invited to page 13 of the report for a brief summary of the action, and to page 1 for instructions for obtaining further detailed information relative to this campaign. We are, of course, continuing to be alert for further problems in this area.

Regarding designs of hood latch systems, we favor the type system you describe in which two complete operations are necessary before the hood can be opened completely. I am enclosing a copy of Federal

Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 113, entitled Hood Latch Systems, which has required secondary latch positions or secondary hood latch systems on most vehicles since January 1, 1969.

Thank you for your inquiry. Do not hesitate to contact me if I can be of further assistance.

Sincerely, J. E. FORESTER FOR Robert L. Carter -- Acting Associate Administrator Motor Vehicle Programs

Enclosures

ATTACH.

FRANK AND FRANK

December 22, 1971

Office of Compliance, National Safety Bureau

Re: Pettiford v. Hassell and Rhodes Our File No. 70-45

Gentlemen:

We represent a Mr. Dennle Pettiford of Brooklyn, New York who was seriously injured in an automobile accident in October, 1970.

On his behalf we are writing to you to determine whether or not there is any information available concerning the design, construction and maintenance of a hood or hood mechanism used in the 1964 Chevrolet station wagon. We would also be interested in knowing whether there are any statistics or other reports available concerning prior accidents arising in the same manner as the one in which our client was involved.

In September 1970, my client was driving a 1964 Chevrolet station wagon. While the car was in motion, after it had been traveling for some time, with no sign of any impending danger, the hood suddenly opened. Because his vision was completely obstructed, the driver immediately applied his brakes. At this time, there was traveling behind him a large trailer truck. Apparently, it was unable to stop. The truck collided with the rear of the station wagon ramming the station wagon against the side of the bridge and dragging it for a considerable distance. A serious fire ensued. Four people were killed and two others severely burned.

We understand that both vehicles were traveling on a very narrow bridge. A fast-moving vehicle traveling in the opposite direction may have created a vacumm-like effect as it passed our driver's vehicle. The vacuum-like effect in some fashion created pressure on

the hood causing it to fly upward and open.

We understand that at this time other vehicles had not only a latch to control the hood but also an additional safety catch. Thus the 1964 Ford automobile was equipped with a hood-release mechanism and also a secondary safety catch. Two complete operations were necessary before the hood could be opened completely.

The first device was released by compressing a lever located below the grillwork. This allowed for a partial opening of the hood; then a second device above the grillwork and below the hood was compressed to release a "hook" or "safety catch". Thus, assuming that a Ford vehicle was involved and mechanism was operating properly, the passing truck creating a vacuum-like effect, might have allowed the hood-release mechanism to become disengaged. However, the safety hook or catch would still have caught the hood before it could obstruct the driver's vision.

Any information that you may have concerning the hood release mechanism and/or safety catch on vehicles manufactured by General Motors in 1964, or for any other manufacturers that might have a bearing on this particular kind of accident would be greatly appreciated. If there's any additional information you require from us, please do not hesitate to ask.

Thank you for your courtesy and cooperation.

Very truly yours, IRVING FRANK

FRANK AND FRANK

May 26, 1972

Robert L. Carter -- Acting Associate Administrator, Motor Vehicle Programs, U.S. Dept. of Transportation

Re: Pettiford vs. Hassell and Rhodes Our File No. 70-45

Your reference: 41-42

Dear Mr. Carter:

You were good enough to write to us on February 16, 1972. This was in reply to our inquiry concerning the hood-latch systems on the 1964 Chevrolet.

We have recently been able to obtain a diagram from a publication known as "Gleen Mitchell Collision Estimator Inc." which is prepared for automotive mechanics. I am enclosing a copy of the same. You will notice that in the lower right-hand corner of this page 2-7, there is a small diagram of the hood and the locking mechanism.

As near as I can make out, it would appear that there is but one latch, consisting of an upper and lower assembly.

Would you be good enough to have your office indicate to us whether or not this assembly for the hood-latch system complies with the regulations which came into effect through your office on January 1, 1969.

We would also like to know whether or not since our last inquiry, there has been any further information obtained by your office with respect to the 1964 Chevrolet hood-latching mechanism.

Thank you for your courtesy and cooperation.

Very truly yours, IRVING FRANK

Enclosure

ID: nht72-1.45

DATE: 03/10/72

FROM: JAMES E. WILSON FOR CHARLES H. HARTMAN--NHTSA

TO: Rose Manufacturing Co.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: Thank you for your letter of February 1, 1972, concerning the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) pamphlet, "What to Buy in Child Restraint Systems."

While you approve generally of the pamphlet, you state that you consider certain statements in it to be incorrect. Particularly, you disagree with two statements appearing on the page of the pamphlet discussing child harnesses. Those statements were: "Give preference to those which attach under the seat back, not over it."; and, "Give preference to those which either attach directly to the vehicle floor, or to the vehicle seat belt, not to the seat back." We do not agree that either of these statements is incorrect.

The NHTSA position is that child harnesses that attach over or directly to the vehicle seat back increase the chance of seat back failure, a hazard which you recognize in your letter. Our dynamic test data have shown that affixing a child harness in either of these ways can cause the inertial load of the child to be applied to the seat back excessively deforming or failing the seat back, thereby allowing excesive occupant excursion and increasing the chance of injury to the child. In short, these configurations increase rather than, as you seem to argue, decrease the chance of seat back failure.

With regard to the statements concerning compressive forces being applied to the child during a crash, while we agree in principle that such forces are undersirable, it is not clear from your letter how their application is prevented by having the child harness attach over the top of the vehicle seat. In any event, it is preferable, in our view, for some force to be applied to the child's torso, as long as it is evenly distributed, than to have the child flung into hostile surfaces within the vehicle.

We also do not agree with the statement on page 2 of your letter that harnesses can safely be attached to a vehicle seat back, as the seat back is ". . . in turn securely attached to the car floor." Our experience has been quite the opposite; vehicle seat backs are merely attached to the seat frame and are quite susceptible to collapse in crash situations.

Finally, we do believe the pamphlet, in its recommendation that a child should not stand on the front seat of the vehicle when the harness is attached, is consistent with the design of your harness in that both seek to reduce the danger of whiplash injury,

I hope this clarifies our position for you.

SINCERELY,

rose manufacturing co.

February 1, 1972

Douglas W. Toms Administrator National Highway Traffic Safety Administration U.S. Department of Transportation

Dear Mr. Toms:

Please permit us to congratulate you on the excellent pamphlet, entitled "What to buy in Child Restraint Systems".

Also, however, please permit us to question some statements in this pamphlet which we consider to be, in effect, erroneous and dangerous.

We refer to the next-to-the-last page regarding child restraint harnesses. The first drawing on this page illustrates a restraint harness essentially similar to the one we manufacture, and market under the "Sears" and other trade names. Your first statement in red ink states: "Give preference to those which attach under the seat back, not over it". We submit that any such harness which is attached solely under the seat back, and not also over it, is subject to two vicious hazards. First, it would in case of a crash permit the seat back to move forward to crush the child against the seat cushion. This might result from the folding forward of a hinged seat back or the breaking loose of a fixed one.

The second hazard is more prevalent and just as vicious. An adult lap belt is normally attached under the seat back, and is safe when thus attached. In a crash it puts the impact loading on the hips and pelvic region--the strongest parts of the body with no vital organs to be affected. This is positively not true of any belt or harness which places any restraint on the shoulders or upper torso. All adult 3-point belts are required to have the upper torso restraint attached at some point above the shoulder. Some such safety should also be required in the child harness. It must not be permitted to apply any compressive pressure to the shoulders and downward along the spine, in case of a crash.

Your second statement in red reads: "Give preference to those which either attach directly to the vehicle floor, or to the vehicle seat belt, not to the seat back". This, again provides the same two hazards, the crushing, forward-moving seat back, and the linear forces compressing the spine.

We wish to emphasize that these two hazards are definitely and completely eliminated in the belt which we make, and which is partially indicated in your drawing, but without explanation or comment.

Our harness is not attached directly to the car floor. It is attached directly to the seat back, which in turn is securely attached to the car floor. This holds the seat back securely in its place in a crash, and it also eliminates the linear spinal pressure. The child harness is free to slide up and down along the anchor strap which extends vertically at the front of the seat back. This provides two important safety features. First, it assures that the impact force will always be restrained from a point horizontal to the position of the body at the instant of impact, whether this position is standing, sitting or lying down. Not only will this restraining force be applied directly linear to the impact force but the construction and attachments of our harness assures that such restraint force will be applied to the front of the child and never at the side or rear which might cause neck or spinal injury.

The other, and very important safety feature of our harness is the complete and instantaneous freedom of movement of the child. A child of 2 or 3 years cannot be forcibly restricted to a single sitting position during a long ride without venement and justifiable protest, and consequent distraction of the driver's attention.

This brings us to the last of your statements on that page, viz. "Caution: Parents are warned not to allow a child to stand on the front seat of the vehicle when utilizing a harness restraint, or this may happen". The accompanying drawing indicates a typical whiplash injury situation. To eliminate this hazard, and still provide the maximum safe freedom of movement, our harness includes a positive but adult-adjustible stop on the vertical anchorage strap, and our instructions include a positive warning to keep this stop adjusted to a point which will not permit the child to stand in any seat, front or rear, under any conditions which permits his head to extend to a point higher than the top of the seat back.

We very strongly feel that, in your sincere efforts to educate the public and save the lives of children, you should see to it that these erroneous implications are promptly corrected and that such corrections be given as wide publicity as the original pamphlet.

We shall be awaiting your reply with interest.

C. W. Rose Chairman of the Board

ID: nht88-2.13

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 05/02/88

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Durham & Associates, P.C.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Robert R. Keatinge, Esq. Durham & Associates, P.C. Suite 1750 950 17th Street Denver, CO 80202

Dear Mr. Keatinge:

This is a response to your letter of December 1, 1987, making this agency to clarify your understanding of 49 CFR S571.7(e). That section reads in part as follows:

Combining new and used components. When a new cab is used in the assembly of a truck, the truck will be considered newly manufactured ...unless the engine, transmission, and drive axle(s) (as a minimum) of the assembled vehicle are not new, and at least two of these components were taken from the same vehicle.

You referred to my August 11, 1987 letter to Mr. Ernest Parmer, and expressed concern that my having discussed only one aspect of S571.7(e) in that letter has led to some confusion. My letter to Mr. Parmer states that 'a modified school bus or truck is n ot considered a 'new' vehicle if, at a minimum, the engine, transmission, and drive axle(s) are not new and at least two of these three listed components are taken from the same used vehicle.' You stated that while my statement is 'correct,' my response did not address the first clause of this provision: 'When a new cab is used In the assembly of a truck...' you asserted that, a bus should not be considered 'new' unless a new body is attached to the chassis.' Your assertion is correct with respect to S5 71.7(e), but there is another regulation that specifies a vehicle is 'new' if an old body is combined with a new chassis.

By its own terms, S571.7(e) applies only in situations where a new body is combined with either (1) mixed new and used chassis components, or (2) used components from different vehicles. You were correct, then, in asserting that 5571.7(e) applied only to situations involving a new body. For the purposes of the Parmer letter, it Has understood between Mr. Parmer and a member of my staff that the bus bodies in question were new, so that letter did not purport to address the question of combining an old bu s body with new and or/used chassis Components.

Many of our prior interpretations have stated that a person who adds a new or used body to a new chassis to produce a school bus is considered the manufacturer of a new school bus, and must certify that the new bus conforms with all applicable safety sta ndards, just as every other school bus manufacturer must. In this case, the new chassis is an incomplete vehicle. 'Incomplete vehicle' is defined in 19 CFR 5568.3 as:

an assemblies consisting, as a minimum, of a frame and chassis structure, power train, steering system, suspension system, and braking system, to the extent that those systems are to be part of the completed vehicle, that requires further manufacturing o perations, other than the addition of readily attachable components, such as mirrors or tire and rim assemblies, or minor finishing operations such as painting, to become a completed vehicle.

When a new bus chassis is used to produce a vehicle, the person who adds a body - even an old body - is a final-stage manufacturer, within the meaning of 49 CFR 5568.3. Final-Stage manufacturers are required to certify that the completed vehicle conforms with all applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards in effect on the date of manufacture. The date of manufacture for these buses cannot be earlier than the date on which the chassis manufacturer completed its work on the chassis and cannot be la ter than the date the final-stage manufacturer completed its manufacturing operations. See 49 CFR S567.5, Requirements for Manufacturers of Vehicles Manufactured in Two or More Stages.

Note that neither S571.7(e) nor Part 568 would require a person to certify that a school bus complies with all applicable safety standards, if that person merely rebuilds or replaces an engine, drive axle, or transmission in a bus, or if that person plac es a used bus body on a used chassis.

I hope you find this information helpful.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel December 4, 1987

Erika Z. Jones, Esq. Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration United States Department of Transportation 700 Seventh Street Washington, D.C. 20890

Re: Your letter of August 11, 1987 to Ernest Farmer

Dear Ms. Jones:

This letter is to confirm my understanding of 49 CFR S571.7(e) as interpreted by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ('NHTSA'). In your letter of August 11, 1987 to Mr. Ernest Farmer, the Director of Pupil Transportation for the Tennessee Department of Education, you twice (at the top of page 2 and in the first paragraph of section 3 on page 3) make reference to the portion of 5571.7(e) which says that a bus will not be considered 'new' if the engine, transmission and drive train are not new and at least two of these components are from the same vehicle.

While this statement is a correct statement of part of the test under 5571.7(e) it does not address the part of the regulation which states that a truck (or, here, a bus) will be considered new only if the cab (or, here, a body? is replaced. The descrip tion of the regulation contained in your letter may have been in response to an Inquiry which assumed the replacement of the bus body (as did FR Docket No. 85-22646).

On Friday, December 4, 1987 I discussed this point with Joan Tilghman of your office. She confirmed what appears to be the clear reading of S571.7(e) to the effect that the replacement of the engine, transmission and/or rear axle only becomes an issue 'W hen a new cab (here, body) is used in the assembly of a truck (here, bus)...". In other words, a bus should not be considered 'new' unless a new body is attached to the chassis.

Unfortunately, there has been some confusion as a result of the letter indicates that the NHTSA is changing the regulation to provide in effect that whenever a new or rebuilt engine, transmission or rear axle is put in a bus the bus must be brought into conformity with current standards regardless of whether the body has been replaced. As discussed above, and as confirmed by Ms. Tilghman, I don't think that was your intention.

If the foregoing accurately describes the NHTSA's position, I would appreciate your confirming this to me so that we can correct the misunderstanding. Until this ambiguity is resolved, my client is in a difficult position inasmuch as the governmental age ncies are unsure how to proceed. Your prompt response would therefore be greatly appreciated.

If there are any questions in this regard or If I am incorrect in my understanding, I would appreciate your contacting me as soon as possible. Thank you for your consideration in this regard.

Sincerely,

Robert R. Keatinge