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NHTSA Interpretation File Search

Overview

NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies. 

Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage. 

An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.

  • Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
  • Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
  • The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
  • Some combination of the above, or other, factors.

Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.

Single word search

 Example: car
 Result: Any document containing that word.

Multiple word search

 Example: car seat requirements
 Result: Any document containing any of these words.

Connector word search

 Example: car AND seat AND requirements
 Result: Any document containing all of these words.

 Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.

Phrase in double quotes

 Example: "headlamp function"
 Result: Any document with that phrase.

Conjunctive search

Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.

Wildcard

Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).

Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).

Not

Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”

Complex searches

You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.

Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”). 

Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”

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Displaying 5481 - 5490 of 6047
Interpretations Date

ID: nht88-2.15

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 05/04/88

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Alberto Negro -- Director, Fiat Research & Development -- U.S.A. Branch

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. Alberto Negro Director Fiat Research & Development -- U.S.A. Branch Parklane Towers West Suite 1210 Dearborn, MI 48126

This responds both to your revised report, dated January 20, 1988, pursuant to 49 C.F.R. Part 585, on behalf of Alfa Lancia Industriale S.p.A. (Alfa Romeo), covering compliance with the automatic restraint "phase-in" requirements during the 1987 producti on year, and to your February 4, 1988, letter to Stephen Wood, our Assistant Chief Counsel for Rulemaking, seeking an interpretation of Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR S571. 208). Specifically, your question concerns whether Fiat may exclude automatic restraint-equipped convertibles from its determinations of annual production for the purpose of calculating the number of passenger cars that must comply with the automatic restraints requirements during the phase-in period.

Alfa Romeo, a subsidiary of Fiat, equipped some of its convertibles with automatic restraints during the 1987 model year, and Fiat counted those convertibles toward satisfying the requirement that 10 percent of 1987 production year cars be equipped with automatic restraints. You stated in your February 4 letter that you need clarification of whether Standard No. 208 permits you to exclude from your annual production calculations those convertibles that were equipped with automatic restraints and that we re counted in determining whether the requisite percentage of production complied with the automatic restraint requirements. In other words, you wish to know whether Fiat may "count" Alfa Romeo convertibles equipped with automatic seat belts for the purp ose of satisfying the 108 "phase-in" requirement for production year 1987, found at @4.1.3.1.2 of Standard No. 208, while excluding those same convertibles from the annual vehicle production calculations covering the 1987 production year.

The answer to your question is that Standard No. 208 does not allow Fiat to exclude from its annual production calculations any convertibles that comply with the automatic restraint requirements set forth in @4.1.2. 1 of the standard. Section @4.1.3.1.2 of Standard No. 208 specifies that the amount of passenger cars that comply with the automatic restraint production. Under these provisions, Fiat elected to use the average annual production from September 1, 1983, through August 31, 1986, for its 1987 m odel year report.

For the period of September 1, 1986, to August 31, 1987 section @4.1.3.3.3 of Standard No. 208 provides a single exception from the requirement to include all of a manufacturer's cars in determining annual production. Under that exception, a manufacturer has the following option in calculating annual production:

A manufacturer may exclude convertibles which do not comply with the requirements of @4.1.2.1, when it is calculating its average annual production under @4.1.3.1.2(a) or its annual production under @4.1.3.1.2(b). (Emphasis added.)

The same single exception is set forth in section @4.1.3.2.3 for the September 1, 1987, to August 31, 1988 reporting period, and in section @4.1.3.3.3 for the September 1, 1988, to August 31, 1989 reporting period. This exception expressly permits manufa cturers to exclude convertibles that do not comply with @4.1.2.1 from such calculations . However, this language does not permit manufacturers to exclude convertibles that are certified as complying with @4.1.2.1 from such calculations.

An old principle of legal interpretation is expressed in the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius": literally, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. Applying this principle to Standard No. 208, one would conclude that since the standard was drafted to provide one means of excluding convertibles from calculations of annual production, the standard does not allow any other means of excluding convertibles from those calculations. In other words, since the standard allows you to e xclude convertibles that do not comply with @4.1.2.1 when calculating annual production, the absence of a similar provision for convertibles that comply with @4.1.2.1 means that convertibles that are certified as complying cannot be excluded.

This interpretation does not raise any questions about the January 20 report's exclusion of all convertibles produced between September 1, 1983, and August 31, 1986, since your letter states that none of those convertibles complied with @4.1.2.1. However , this interpretation does mean that Fiat cannot exclude the 803 convertibles you reported as complying with @4.1.2.1 when making your 1988 model year calculations, as required by @4.1.3.2, if Fiat again elects to base its calculations on the average ann ual production of passenger cars during the preceding three years, as permitted by @4.1.3.2.2(a). Similarly, if Fiat elects to base its calculations on the actual production between September 1, 1987, and August 31, 1988, as permitted by @4.1.3.2.2(b), F iat cannot exclude convertibles that comply with the requirements of @4.1.2.1. September 1, 1987, and August 31, 1988, as permitted by @4.1.3.2.2(b) , Fiat cannot exclude convertibles that comply with the requirements of @4.1.2.1.

In this letter, we have assumed that the Alfa Romeo convertibles that are equipped with automatic seat belts are certified as complying with the automatic restraint provisions of @4.1.2.1 of Standard No. 208. If this is not the case, then fiat may not "c ount" those vehicles as complying with the automatic restraint phase-in requirements of @4.1.3.1.2 of Standard No. 208. See attached letter dated April 18, 1988 to Mr. Robert Munson of Ford Motor Company. Please notify Mr. George L. Parker, NHTSA's Assoc iate Administrator for Enforcement, within 10 business days of your receipt of this letter, whether the Alfa Romeo automatic seat belts are certified as complying with the automatic restraint requirements of @4.1.2.1 of Standard No. 208.

If you have any further questions or need more information on this subject, please feel free to contact Steve Kratzke of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

Mr. Stephen P. Wood Assistant Chief Counsel of Rulemaking National Highway Traffic Safety Administration NCC-20, Room 5219 4007th St., S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Mr. Wood:

We require clarification of the NHTSA regulation which allows certain vehicle types to be excluded from the set of vehicles which is used to determine passive restraint quotas.

In 49 CFR, Sections @4.l.3.l.3, @4.l.3.2.3, and @4.l.3.3.3 say that "convertibles which do not comply" with passive restraint requirements may be excluded from the set of vehicles which is used to determine the quota. We need to know whether convertibles which do comply with passive restraint requirements may also be excluded from the quota set.

On January 19, 1988 we presented this question by telephone to NHTSA and were told that convertibles which do comply could be excluded. Furthermore, we have reviewed the applicable Federal Register and found nothing within them that prohibited the exclus ion of convertibles which do comply.

Nevertheless, upon reviewing our passive restraint report (dated January 20, 1988) NHTSA expressed some doubt about whether convertibles which comply could be excluded. The doubt arose not because the report calculations were suspect, as all of the exclu ded convertibles in that report were without passive systems but rather because it was not clear whether we would be including complying convertibles in subsequent quota calculations.

We urgently need an official decision from NHTSA on this matter so that we may accurately forecast our future passive restraint liabilities. Hence, a prompt response will be most appropriate.

If you have any questions, please contact my office. Sincerely yours,

Alberto Negro Director

ID: 19376-1.pja

Open

The Honorable Tim Holden
Member, United States House of Representatives
Berks County Services Center
633 Court Street
Reading, PA 19601

Re: Mr. Gary Issod

Dear Representative Holden:

This responds to your letter on behalf of Mr. Gary Issod of Reading, regarding Federal regulations on window tinting and how they relate to the law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. You letter has been referred to my office for reply, because the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) administers the Federal requirements for window tinting.

Mr. Issod objects to a Pennsylvania law requiring automobile windows to transmit at least 70 percent of the incident light. Mr. Issod believes that the State law is based on an erroneous interpretation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205, which regulates automotive glazing materials (windows). As explained below, Pennsylvania correctly interprets Standard No. 205, and we have determined that the State law is not preempted.

By way of background, NHTSA has the authority, under 49 U.S.C. 30111, to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment. Pursuant to this statute, we issued Safety Standard No. 205, which specifies performance requirements for vehicle glazing. The standard includes a requirement that all windows "requisite for driving visibility" (including all windows in passenger cars) have a light transmittance of at least 70 percent. Although the standard does not apply to vehicles once the vehicle has been sold to a consumer, 49 U.S.C. 30122(b) of our statute prohibits a vehicle manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business from "mak[ing] inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable motor vehicle safety standard . . . ." Therefore, the act of tinting any car window to transmittance levels darker than 70 percent is a violation of section 30122(b), if it is performed by one of the regulated businesses listed above.

We do not regulate or limit owners tinting their vehicle windows, although NHTSA does not encourage tinting darker than that allowed by Standard No. 205 for new vehicles. Moreover, NHTSA does not regulate the use of vehicles. Instead, the operation or use of vehicles is under the jurisdiction of the States.

States have the authority to regulate how vehicles are operated or used, as long as the State law is not preempted by Federal law. State operational restrictions addressing an aspect of performance regulated by the Federal standard would be preempted by Federal law only to the extent that they prohibit the use of vehicles that comply with Federal regulations.

Examining Pennsylvania's law, as outlined in the letter you forwarded from Assistant Counsel Sanders, we find that the Pennsylvania law is not preempted by NHTSA's regulations. Pennsylvania's law does not prohibit the use of vehicles with windows allowing 70 percent light transmittance. It requires the identical level of light transmittance as the Federal standard. There appears to be no conflict between the State and Federal glazing standards, with regard to the light transmittance issue.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,
Frank Seales, Jr.
Chief Counsel
NCC-20:PAtelsek:6-2992:OCC# 19376:1/21/99

NHTSA # ES99010044, DOT # 984688

ref: FMVSS 205
I10, I20, NOA-01, NOA-02, NOA-03, NOA-04,NOA-10
cc: NCC-20 Subj/Chron,
NCC-20 PJA, NPS-01, NSA-01
Interp.: 205, Redbook (2)

Re: Mr. Gary Issod

Dear Representative Holden:

This responds to your letter on behalf of Mr. Gary Issod of Reading, regarding Federal regulations on window tinting and how they relate to the law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. You letter has been referred to my office for reply, because the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) administers the Federal requirements for window tinting.

Mr. Issod objects to a Pennsylvania law requiring automobile windows to transmit at least 70 percent of the incident light. Mr. Issod believes that the State law is based on an erroneous interpretation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205, which regulates automotive glazing materials (windows). As explained below, Pennsylvania correctly interprets Standard No. 205, and we have determined that the State law is not preempted.

By way of background, NHTSA has the authority, under 49 USC 30111, to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment. We issued Safety Standard No. 205, which specifies performance requirements for vehicle glazing. The standard includes a requirement that all windows "requisite for driving visibility" (including all windows in passenger cars) have a light transmittance of at least 70 percent. Although the standard does not apply to vehicles once the vehicle has been sold to a consumer, section 30122(b) of our statute prohibits a vehicle manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business from "mak[ing] inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable motor vehicle safety standard . . . ." Therefore, the act of tinting any car window to transmittance levels darker than 70 percent is a violation of 30122(b), if it is performed by one of the regulated businesses listed above.

NHTSA's regulations do not apply to the use of vehicles by their owners. We do not regulate or limit owners tinting their vehicle windows, although NHTSA does not encourage tinting darker than that allowed by Standard No. 205 for new vehicles. Instead, the operation or use of vehicles is under the jurisdiction of the States.

States have the authority to regulate how vehicles are operated or used, as long as the State law is not preempted by Federal law. Preemption of State motor vehicle safety standards is addressed by section 30103(b)(1) of our statute, which states, in pertinent part: "[w]hen a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect . . . a State . . . may prescribe . . . a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance . . . only if the standard is identical to the [Federal standard]." State laws would be preempted by Federal law to the extent that they regulate the same aspect of performance in a different way, or permit an action that is prohibited by the Federal regulations (such as permitting the sale of noncomplying vehicles, not allowing the sale of complying vehicles, or permitting businesses to tint windows darker than 70 percent transmittance).  As long as the State law restricts itself to regulating the operation or use (as opposed to the sale or modification) of vehicles, it would not be preempted by Federal law.

Examining Pennsylvania's law, as outlined in the letter you forwarded from Assistant Counsel Sanders, we find that the Pennsylvania law is not preempted by NHTSA's regulations. Pennsylvania's law does not permit businesses to tint vehicle windows darker than 70 percent light transmittance. It requires maintenance of the identical level of light transmittance as the Federal standard. There appears to be no conflict between the State and Federal glazing standards, with regard to the light transmittance issue.

Further, the relevant State provision, 75 Pa. C.S. 4524(e)(1), states "[n]o person shall drive any motor vehicle . . ." (emphasis added). No part of the law quoted by Mr. Sanders appears to regulate anything beyond the operation of vehicles or the criteria for inspection. It does not restrict the operation of vehicles that are manufactured in compliance with Federal regulations that concern the same aspect of performance addressed by the State standard. Finally, Pennsylvania's law does not permit businesses to tint vehicle windows darker than 70 percent light transmittance. Instead, it requires maintenance of the identical level of light transmittance as the Federal standard.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,
Frank Seales, Jr.
Chief Counsel
ref:205
d.2/11/99

1999

ID: 1984-3.13

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 08/23/84

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: P. Winkler-Doman -- Office of the General Counsel, Ford Motor Co.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Ms. P. Winkler-Doman Office of the General Counsel Ford Motor Company The American Rd. Dearborn, MI 48121

Dear Ms. Winkler-Doman: This responds to your July 19, l984, letter regarding the timing of petitions to amend average fuel economy standards. As you know, the agency has taken the position that Ford's petition to amend the l984 and l985 light truck average fuel economy standards was not timely filed with regard to the 1984 model year.

A model year is presumed to begin sometime in the autumn of the preceding calendar year (see Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 710 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. l983)). The Ford petition was filed on November 21, l983, and amended on January 20, l984. Since model year l984 began in the fall of l983, it is clear that the l984 light truck standards could not have been amended in response to the Ford petition prior to the start of that model year.

Section 502(b) of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act (15 U.S.C. 2002(b) requires the Secretary of Transportation to issue average fuel economy standards for light trucks for each model year beginning with l979. These standards must be set at the "maximum feasible average fuel economy level" and must be prescribed at least "18 months prior to the beginning of" the model year to which they apply. 1d.

Section 502(f)(1) of the Act provides that the "Secretary may, from time to time, amend" any light truck fuel economy standard "as long as such standard, as amended, meets the requirements" of section 502(b). An amendment which makes standards more stringent must be promulgated "at least l8 months prior to the beginning of the model year to which such amendment will apply." See section 502(f)(2), 15 U.S.C. 2002(f)(2). With regard to any timing requirements applicable to amendments which make standards less stringent, section 502(f) is not explicit but could be interpreted in two ways. The language in paragraph ( ) (1) authorizing amendments "from time to time" could be interpreted to permit amendments at any time. Alternatively, the language in that paragraph requiring that amendments to standards must comply with requirements applicable to their original enactment could be interpreted to impose the l8 month rule, one of the requirements of section 502(b), on amendments to reduce standards. Under the letter approach, all amendments would have to be issued at least l8 months prior to the start of the effected model year.

Where a statutory provision is ambiguous on its face, rules of statutory construction dictate that the legislative history of the provision must be considered. See Sutherland, "Statutory Construction," 4th Ed., section 48.01. An Act's Conference Report has been considered the "most persuasive evidence of congressional intent" in this regard. Denby v. Schwelker, 671 F.2d 507, 510 (D.C. Cir. l981). The Conference Report on th Energy Policy and Conservation Act (the statute which added the fuel economy provisions to the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act) contains the following discussion:

Average fuel economy standards prescribed by the ST (Secretary of Transportation) for passenger automobiles in model years after l980, for non-passenger automobiles, and for passenger automobiles manufactured by manufacturers of fewer than 10,000 passenger automobiles may be amended from time to time as long as each such amendment satisfies the l8 month rule-i.e., any amendment which has the effect of making an average fuel economy standard more stringent must be promulgated at least l8 months prior to the beginning of the model year to which such amendment will apply. An amendment which has the effect of making an average fuel economy standard less stringent can be promulgated at any time prior to the beginning of the model year in question.

See Sen. Rep. 94-516, 94th Cong., lst Sess. (1979) at 157. (Emphasis added.)

Although this discussion does not expressly prohibit amendments after the start of a model year, the last sentence certainly implies that result. If no limit on the timing of relaxatory amendments had been intended, The underlined sentence would have been ended after the words "...promulgated at any time.." The agency believes that Congress intended to provide certainty and finality for all parties concerned with regard to the levels of standards, to permit planning by the manufacturers and the agency through cutting off amendments once a model year has begun.

Ford has argued that a failure to permit amendments to fuel economy standards after the start of a model year places manufacturers in a difficult position, since unanticipated sales trends during the model year might impair its ability to comply. However, the agency is also concerned that amendments made after production has begun have some characteristics of ex postfacto law. We believe that Congress intended standards to be established before production begins, to encourage the achievement of particular fuel economy levels rather than simply rectifying past conduct. Chrysler Corporation has expressed similar concerns in its comments in our pending light truck rulemaking, noting that late changes in standards levels could adversely effect manufacturers who planned to meet the original levels. Therefore, we must reaffirm our previous position that petitions to amend fuel economy standards must be submitted in time to permit necessary rulemaking to be completed prior to the start of the model year.

Ford has also requested that the agency specify the precise data by which petitions to amend fuel economy standards must be filed. As noted above, the single court to address the issue has stated only that a given model year begins in the fall of the preceding calendar year (e.g., fall l984 is the beginning of the l985 model year). In its final rule establishing fuel economy reporting requirements, the agency took the position that, in the absence of my single "annual production period," the model year would be deemed to coincide with the calendar year, e.g., the l985 model year would begin January l, l985. See l9 U.S.C. 2001 (12) and 42 FR 62374 (December 12, l977). A further complicating issue is the time necessary to conduct a rulemaking proceeding. Since any amendments to standards must be promulgated prior to the start of the model year, petitions must be filed in time to permit the agency to complete a rulemaking proceeding on the petition prior to the start of the model year. The time necessary for such a proceeding will vary greatly depending on the complexity and controversiality of the issues involved. A proceeding would involve agency analysis of the petition, preparation and publication of the necessary analysis of comments, and preparation and publication of the documentation necessary to accompany the final decision. Such a proceeding could not in any case be completed in less than 6 months. The various uncertainties involved make it impossible for the agency to specify a precise date after which petitions will not be accepted. However, it is clear that the Ford petition, which was filed in November of the preceding calendar year, was not timely. Petitions regarding a particular model year's standards should be submitted no later than the early part of the preceding calendar year, and preferrably before that time.

If you have further questions on this matter, please contact us. Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel

ID: 1984-3.23

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 09/12/84

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: M.D. Carter -- International Legal Dept., Hope Computer Corporation AS

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. M. D. Carter International Legal Department Hope Computer Corporation As 1 Hobrovej DK-9560, Hadsund Denmark

This responds to your recent letter requesting clarification of certain of the agency's standards. The answers to your question are discussed below.

1. Standard No. 203, impact protection for the driver from the Steering Control System, does not require the use of a specific design for the steering column. It requires that when the steering column is tested, it must absorb a certain amount of energy. Manufacturers have thus far chosen to meet this requirement by using a steering wheel and column which incorporate an energy-absorbing unit in them so that the column collapses in a controlled manner in a crash. You are correct that an air cushion equipped vehicle complying with the occupant crash protection criterion of Standard No. 208 in a frontal barrier crash does not have to comply with Standard No. 203.

2. You pointed out an inconsistency between the description of Standard No. 216 in DOT pamphlet HS 805 674 and the text of Standard No. 216 codified in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The text in the CFR is correct. Compliance with Standard No. 216 was an alternative to the rollover test of Standard No. 208 prior to August 15, 1977. When the provision allowing compliance with Standard No. 216 as an alternative to the rollover test of Standard No. 208 was eliminated, the text of DOT pamphlet HS 805 674 was not corrected. Thank you for calling this matter to my attention.

3. Your third question asks, in effect, whether automatic or motorized belts are considered automatic restraints under Standard No. 208. You question whether they would qualify since "they still have to be latched." You are correct that if automatic or motorized blts have be latched by an occupant before they will provide protection, they would not be considered automatic restraints by this agency. However, Volkswagen currently sells in the United States an automatic belt system which does not require latching before each use and which is certified as complying with the automatic restraint requirements of Standard No. 208. Like wise, Toyota sells a motorized belt system which does not require latching and is certified as complying with Standard No. 208. I have enclosed for you information a copy of the Department's July 11, 1984, final rule on the automatic restraint requirements of Standard No. 208.

4. Neither Standard No. 301 nor the requirements of Section S9.2 of Standards No. 208 apply to batteries used in battery-powered vehicles. There are no other safety standards that set performance requirement for batteries.

5. Your final question asked whether S4.5.3.3(b) of Standard 208 should conclude with the words "or condition (C). You are correct that the words "or condition (c)" should appear at the end of S4.5.3.3(b). On January 8, 1981, the agency amended section S4.5.3.3(b). The amendment as published in the Federal Register include the words "or condition (c). Unfortunately, the the correct text was not adopted in the Code Federal Regulation. Thank you for bringing this matter to my attention.

Sincerely,

Original Signed by

Frank Berndt Chief Counsel

Enclosure

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 Seventh Street, S.W. Washington D.C. 20590

Att: Mr. Oesch, Office of the Chief Counsel

Dear Sir

I am writing to obtain clarification/interpretation of certain Motor Vehicle Safety Standards contained in 49 CFR 571, certain sections of 14 U.S.C.A., as well as a DOT pamphlet which, though not a statue or regulation, is an official publication providing guidance concerning NHTSA practice which the user cannot glean from the statutes and regulations. Our lack of clarity may be due to inability to promptly obtain the latest changes and materials; thus, I am enclosing photocopies of the sections to which I refer.

1. According to DOT pamphlet HS 805 674, revised November 1983, page 7, SN 203, it would appear that the forward yielding steering column is required ("by providing"), though this requirement nowhere appears in the test of SN 203; is the forward yielding steering column required by the SAE "Steering wheel Assembly Laboratory Test Procedure" or has the forward-yielding steering column proven to be the only way of meeting the requirement in practice in the absence of an air cushion ("by means other than seat belt assemblies",S2)?

2. According to the same DOT pamphlet, SN 216 "provides an alternative to conformity with the rollover tests of SN 208." This alternative is stated in general terms. However, SN 216, S3 expressly exempts convertibles from meeting the rollover standards of SN 208 if they meet the roof crush resistance standards of SN 216. Has this exemption been extended in practice to all passenger cars? Quite clearly, the wording of SN 216 exempts passenger cars meeting the requirements of SN 208's rollover test by means that require no action by vehicle occupants from the roof crush requirements of SN 216, but how is the contrary read form the wording of SN 216?

3. Note on page 312 of 49 CFR 571, 1.Oct.82, defines "no action by vehicle occupants" as used in 49 CFR 571. 208 as "a system that requires no action other than would be required if the protective system were not present in the vehicle. Under this interpretation, the concept does not include 'forced action' systems as described above". Thus, since automatic or motorized belts still have to be latched, they would not qualify as passive restraints, since passive belts are defined in 49 CFR 571. 208 S4.5.3 as requiring "no action by vehicle occupants". The note on page 312 concludes "This interpretation is not intended to rule out the possibility that further rulemaking action may be taken in the future to permit such systems in certain cases." Recent articles have led me to believe that subsequent to 1. October 1982, "passive restraints" have been interpreted to include automatic or motorized belt systems, as will as air cushions and energy-absorbing interiors. Please inform us on the current concepts of "passive restraint" and "no action by vehicle occupants".

4. It is not immediately clear that car batteries or battery-powered cars are covered by 49 CFR 571.301; neither does 49 CFR 571.208 (S9.2) seem to cover batteries. What standards are controlling for the battery power system in a motor vehicle?

5. Hope Motor Company A/S of Denmark has undertaken to import battery-powered motor cars into the United States. If we should need to apply for a 15 USCA 1410(a)(1)(c) exemption, the battery-powered vehicle may be required to quality as a "low-emission vehicle", as defined in 15 USCA 1410(g). Could you confirm that the battery-powered car does indeed qualify as a "low-emission" vehicle? The relevant data are enclosed in schematic form.

6. Should 49 CFR 571.208, S4.5.3.3 in fin (just prior to subsection A) conclude with the words "or condition (C)"?

I would appreciate your prompt assistance in this matter.

Sincerely, HOPE COMPUTER CORPORATION AS M.D. Carter International Legal Department

Encs.

ID: 1985-01.24

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 01/30/85

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Barry Merten, Senior Product Development Engineer, Fisher-Price Diversified Products

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. Barry Merten Senior Product Development Engineer Fisher-Price Diversified Products 636 Girard Avenue East Aurora, NY 14052-1885

This responds to your letter to Mr. Oesch of my staff and to Mr. Radovich of our Rulemaking division, seeking interpretations of the requirements of Standard No. 213, Child restraint systems (49 CFR S571.213). Specifically, you stated that your company plans to produce a new design of child restraint, which incorporates automatic belt retractors for the shoulder belts. These belts are permanently attached to a semi-rigid front restraining shield, which has a buckle built onto the bottom that attaches onto a tongue rigidly fixed within the seating surface. After connecting the buckle on the shield to the tongue,the parent must then push the shield toward the child so that it fits snugly. This automatically takes in the slack in the belts.

You asked two questions about the application of Standard No. 213 to this design of child restraint. The first concerned section S8.1.2.4, which specifies that, prior to testing, the belts on a child restraint shall be adjusted so that there is 1/4 inch of slack. The automatic belt retractors in your design may leave up to 3/4 inch of slack in the belts. You asked if the 1/4 inch slack requirement effectively prohibits the use of belts with an automatic retractor. It does not.

At the time Standard No. 213 took effect, all belts on child restraint systems then on the market were manually adjustable. Hence, they could be adjusted to introduce any amount of slack desired. To ensure that all child restraints would be tested under identical conditions, a provision was added to Standard No. 213 specifying the precise amount of slack which should be present. This specification of test conditions was not intended to establish a requirement that all belt systems on child restraints be manually adjustable, so that the specified amount of slack could be introduced. Instead, it was intended to function as an impartial specification for all belt systems, whether or not they were manually adjustable.

Section S6.1.2.4 sets forth the amount of slack to which all belt systems on child restraints should be adjusted before running the sled test. However, systems which are not manually adjustable may be tested with more slack present, since the greater slack would make the test more severe. No belt system, whether or not manually adjustable, can be tested with less than the specified 1/4 inch of slack, since that would make the test less severe for child restraints equipped with such a belt system. Section S6.1.2.4 is not intended to favor any particular type of belt system. Accordingly, you may test your child restraint with more than 1/4 inch of slack present in the belts.

The second question you asked was whether the language specified in section S5.5.2.(h) could be slightly modified for use on the labels to be affixed to your child restraints. That section requires that the following language appear on the label: "Snugly adjust the belts provided with this child restraint against your child." Since the belts on your child restraint will not be manually adjustable, you would like to modify the language to read: "Snugly adjust the shield provided with this restraint against your child and test that the belts are locked."

Your proposed modification would ensure that the directions, which again were written with manually adjustable belts in mind, contained the appropriate modifications for belts with automatic retractors. Your proposed modification does not make any substansive change in the meaning of the directions specified for the label. Since the proposed change is a minor variation intended to clarify the language of the instructions for child restraints where the belts themselves are not manually adjustable, it is permitted.

Should you have any further questions or need further information on this subject, please contact Mr. Steve Kratzke of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 426-2992.

Sincerely,

Frank Berndt Chief Counsel

NOA-30:SKratzke:426-2992:cyb:12/26/84 NOA-30:Subj/Chron NOA-30-:SKratzke NRM-01 NFF-01 Interps. Std. 213 Redbook OCC 1514 and 1534

Vladislav Radovich Office of Vehicle Safety Standards National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 Seventh Street S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Mr. Radovich,

A belated thank you for your time and help during our visit last August 15 to discuss the Fisher-Price Car Seat under development. Your comments were very helpful and we are now preparing for production of, we feel, the most convenient and one of the safest Car Seats available.

We do have several requests for you and your legal department. We would like a ruling on the application of Standard 213 Test Procedure S6.1.2.4 specifying snugly adjusted belts. Our means of restraining the child in the Car Seat consists of a semi-rigid T-shaped shield with a buckle built into the bottom that attaches onto a tongue rigidly fixed within the sitting surface. Two shoulder belts emerge from the top of the shield and run through slots in the seat back where they attach non-adjustably to a connector bar. This bar is sewn into a single belt running up the back from an automatic locking set belt retractor mounted under the sitting surface.

The retractor applies a constant spring tension to the belt at all times. A mechanical override, activated when the buckle is detached from the tongue, allows the belt to pay out. Thus, the user can pull an excess length of shoulder strap while installing or removing a child. With the buckle attached to the tongue, the retractor automatically locks so that no belt can be pulled out, only slack taken up.

At this point, the semi-rigid shield stands somewhat clear of the child, resisting the pull of the retractor winding spring. The instructions will direct the user to "push the shield toward th child for a snug but comfortable fit and the belt slack will be taken up." Because of the racheting mechanism in the retractor, slack is taken up in increments of one-half to three quarters of an inch. Therefore, there may be up to 3/4 of an inch of slack in the belt system that cannot be taken out. Although we expect this condition to meet Standard 213 requirements, it precludes the application of the procedure specifying snugly adjusted belts. Barbara Kelleher of Calspan Corporation has requested this ruling for the compliance tests they will be running.

Also, since the use of a retractor is not addressed in Standard 213, we would appreciate a ruling or statement regarding the acceptability of our approach. We have chosen the automatic locking approach because we believe it offers the highest degree of safety. Will you please refer these requests to your legal department for us?

Also, during Dave Campbell's and my visit with you last August to review the product, the acceptability of a recess in the upper back surface was questioned. We feel there was agreement during the meeting that the protrusion limitation (S5.2.4) does not apply. In a telephone conversation with you a few days later, it was agreed that the area is in compliance with S5.2.2.1 since the system has a continuous back support surface greater than 85 square inches below the recess in question. I believe these were the only points in question.

Sincerely,

FISHER-PRICE DIVERSIFIED PRODUCTS

Barry Merten Sr. Product Development Engineer /mam

ID: nht87-1.49

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 03/17/87

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; SIGNATURE UNAVAILABLE; NHTSA

TO: Mr. Floyd D. Spence

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Dear Mr. Spence:

Thank you for your letter enclosing correspondence from your constituent, Mr. George Seaborn or the South Carolina Association of School Superintendents, concerning Federal regulations for school buses. Your letter has been referred to my office for repl y, since the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration is responsible for administering Federal programs relating to school bus safety.

In his letter to you, Mr. Seaborn expresses his concern about a Federal regulation that "excludes the use of vans capable of transporting more than 10 persons from use by schools." Mr . Seaborn explains that it would be difficult for school districts to comply with a restriction on van use since large vans are extensively used for pupil transportation. He believes that schools should be permitted to use vans since those vehicles are safe for transporting passengers other than school children.

I appreciate this opportunity to clarify our school bus regulations. As explained below, there is no Federal prohibition directed against schools or school districts which prevents them from using vans carrying 11 or more persons. Federal law does, howev er, affect the sale of buses to schools. NHTSA has the authority, under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, to regulate the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles. In 1974, Congress enacted the Schoolbus and Motor Vehicle Safety Amendm ents to direct NHTSA to issue motor vehicle safety standards on specific aspects of school bus safety aid apply those standards to all "school buses." The school bus standards we issued became effective April 1, 1977, and apply to each school bus manufac tured on or after that date.

The parties subject to the Vehicle Safety Act are the manufacturers and sellers of new school buses. The Vehicle Safety Act requires each person selling a new "school bus" to ensure that the bus complies with our school bus safety standards. Under Federa l law, a van designed for 11 or more persons (driver included) is a "bus," and is a "school bus" if intended for transporting students to aid from school or related events.

A person way sell a new bus (including a van designed to carry 11 or more persons) to a school or school district provided that the vehicle meets our motor vehicle safety standards for school buses.

Because our regulations apply only to the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles, we do not prohibit school districts from using their large vans to transport school children even when the vehicles do not meet Federal school bus safety standards. Mat ters relating to motor vehicle use are determined by state law. However, in the event a South Carolina school district decides to buy a new school bus, we would like the district to keep in mind that the seller would be obligated under the Vehicle Safety not to sell complying school buses. The seller should know that he or she risks substantial penalties if a noncomplying bus is sold as a school bus.

Since Mr. Seaborn is interested in transporting students in vans, I would like to clarify a few additional matters concerning our school bus regulations. In his letter to you, your constituent expresses a belief that large vans (i.e., buses) should be sa fe for school children since they are safe for other passengers. The legislative history of the Schoolbus Amendments of 1974 indicate that Congress believed that special measures should be taken to protect school children who use school bus transportatio n. Fifteen-passenger vans (i.e., buses) meeting our school bus safety standards provide more safety features than other buses. School buses must meet stringent performance requirements, including those for interior protection, fuel systems, emergency exi ts, windows and windshields and seating systems.

New 15-passenger vans, conforming to our school bus standards, may be sold to school districts to transport their pupils to school related events. School districts may also purchase 9-passenger vans for school transportation, because such vans are consid ered "multipurpose passenger vehicles" (MPV's) and not "buses" or "school buses" under Federal law. We do not prohibit the sale of MPV's to carry school children nor do we require then to comply with Federal school bus safety standards. Instead, they mus t meet the performance requirements set by the safety standards for MPV's, which also provide high levels of passenger safety.

I hope this information is helpful. We have provided similar letters to Representatives Robin Tallon and Butler Derrick who contacted us on behalf of Mr. Seaborn. Please let us know if we can be of further assistance to you and your constituents.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

The Honorable Floyd Spence House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Spence:

Thank you for your letter forwarding correspondence from your constituent, Mr.

George W. Seaborn.

I have transmitted your inquiry to the appropriate Departmental officials who are familiar with this matter and they will respond to you directly.

I appreciate your contacting me and hope you will not hesitate to call if I can be of any further assistance.

Sincerely,

Edward J. Babbitt Director, Office of Congressional Affairs

February 2, 1987 Mr. Ed Babbitt

Director/Congressional Affairs Department of Transportation Room 10406 400 7th Street. S.W. Washington. D.C. 20590

Dear Mr. Babbitt:

Enclosed is the copy of a constituent letter I recently received. I would appreciate it if you could review this matter and let me know its current status. Thank you for your time.

With kindest regards. I am

Sincerely,

FLOYD D. SPENCE Member of Congress

FDS/bb Enclosure

Congressman Floyd Spence Room 2466 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, DC 20515 Dear Congressman Spence:

You will see from the enclosed material that in 1977, the Department of National Highway Safety adopted a standard which excludes the use of vans capable of transporting more than ten persons from use by schools. None of the administrators in South Carol ina were aware of this legislation until recently. I am sure that you know that there are hundreds of these vans being operated by South Carolina school districts and many thousands more by school districts across our land. We have three in our school di strict which belong to the state and are furnished to us for the purpose of transporting children to our child development program. We also have our own vans which are used to transport small groups such as golf team, cheerleaders, etc.

All of these vans were legally purchased on the open market in South Carolina. It seems to me that if these vehicles are unsafe to transport youngsters then they are unsafe to transport any citizens in our nation. On the other hand, if they are considere d safe to transport citizens in this country who are not school students, they should be safe to transport school students. This regulation implies that certain classes of our citizens are entitled to higher safety standards than other classes.

I have been asked by my colleagues throughout the state to urge your immediate attention to this matter as all it is doing at the present time is creating additional liability for our schools systems. There is no way I can tell the parents for instance i n our child development program that we can no longer transport their children to their child development classes. I respectfully await your prompt action concerning this matter.

Sincerely. George W. Seaborn, President South Carolina Association of School Superintendents

ID: nht87-2.50

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 07/13/87

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Lyon L. Brinsmade -- Porter and Clements

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Lyon L. Brinsmade, Esq. Porter & Clements 3500 Republicbank Center Houston, TX 77002

This responds for your request for information regarding Federal regulation of semi-trailer manufacturing. You asked about Federal standards applicable to "pneumatic aluminum tank type semi-trailers" which your client wishes to manufacture abroad and imp ort into the United States. You were particularly concerned about specifications for aspects of the vehicle which pneumatically load and discharge substances into and out of the tank unit.

I would like to take this opportunity to provide some background information concerning this agency's regulations. you are correct that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) administers Federal regulations for that manufacture and sa le of new motor vehicles, including semi-trailers. NHTSA is authorized, under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, nor do we endorse ant commercial produ cts. Instead, the Vehicle Safety Act establishes a "self-certification" process under which each manufacturer is responsible for certifying that the products meet all applicable safety standards. This process requires each manufacturer to determine in th e exercise of due care that its products meet all applicable requirements. (A general information sheet describing manufacturers' responsibilities under the Vehicle Safety Act is enclosed.)

We note that the term "manufacturer" is defined by section 102(5) of the Act to mean "any person engaged in the manufacturing or assembling of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, including any person importing motor vehicles or motor vehicle equip ment for resale." (Emphasis added.) Therefore your client, as a manufacturer of motor vehicles, is responsible for certifying compliance with all applicable motor vehicle safety standards. The procedure, specified in 49 CFR Part 567, requires also that the manufacturer provide safety information on the certification label, includ ing the vehicle's gross weight rating and gross axle weight rating.

At this time, the only safety standards applicable to all trailers are Safety Standard No. 108, Lamps, reflective devices, and associated equipment, Standard No. 120, Tire selection and rims for motor vehicles other than passenger cars, and Standard No. 115, Vehicle Identification Number - Basic Requirements. The content requirements for the vehicle identification number are found at Part 565. Your client's trailers also must meet Standard No. 106, Brake hoses, Standard No. 116, Motor Vehicle brake flui ds, and applicable requirements of Standard No. 121, Air brake systems. These standards are found in 49 CFR Part 571.

You were particularly concerned about Federal standards applicable to pneumatic tank of the semi-trailer. There are no Federal motor vehicle safety standards for pneumatic tank units. However, even in the absence of an applicable safety standard, the Vehicle Safety Act imposes general responsibilities on manufacturers of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment regarding safety defects. Manufacturers of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment are responsible generally for ensuring safety-related defects and can perform their intended function safely. If your client or the agency determines that a safety-related defect or noncompliance exists, your client is obligated under section 151 et seq. of the Act to notify purchasers of its product and remedy the problem without charge. Manufacturers who fail to provide notification of or remedy for a defect or noncompliance may be subject to a civil penalty of up to $1,000 per violation.

In addition to the regulations described above, your client should be aware of two procedural rules which apply to all manufacturers subject to the regulation of this agency. The first is 49 CFR Part ???, Manufacturer Identification. This rule requires y our client to submit its name, address, and a brief description of the items of equipment it manufacturers to this agency within 30 days after it imports its products in the Unite States.

The other rule is 49 CFR Part 551, Procedural Rules. Subpart D of this regulation requires all manufacturers headquartered outside of the United States to designate a permanent resident of the United States as the manufacturer's agent for service of all process, notices, orders and decisions. This designation should mailed to the Chief Counsel, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Ave., S. W., Washington D. C., 20590, and must include the following information:

1. A certification that the designation of agent in form and binding on the manufacturer under the laws, corporate by-laws, or other requirements governing the making of the designation at the time and place where it is made;

2. The full legal name, principal place of business and mailing address of the manufacturer;

3. Marks, trade names, or other designations of origin of any of the manufacturer's products which do not bear its name;

4. A statement that the designation shall remain in effect until withdrawn or replaced by the manufacturer; 5. A declaration of acceptance duly signed by the agent appointed, which may an individual, a firm or a United States Corporation; and

6. The full legal name of the designated agent.

In addition, the designation must be signed by a person with authority to appoint the agent. The signer's name and title should be clearly indicated beneath his or her signature.

You asked whether your client's semi-trailers would be affected by regulations administered by other Federal agencies. If the semi-trailer will be used to transport a material designated by the Secretary of Transportation as a "hazardous material" (see 4 9 CFR Part 172), then the transportation of that material is regulated by the Office of Hazardous Materials Transportation of the Research and Special Projects Administration (RSPA). You can contact the director of that office, Mr. Alan Roberts, at 366-0 656 for more information on RSPA's regulations in addition, you might be interested in information about regulations for interstate motor carriers issued by the Federal Highway Administration. Mr. Tim Kozlowski of the Office of Motor Carrier Standards, F ederal Highway Administration, can provide you with more information. He may be reached at this address, Room 3403, or by telephone at (202) 366-1790.

I hope this information has been helpful.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Department of Transportation Room 5219 - 400 7th Street S. W. Washington, D.C. 20590

Attention: Chief Counsel's Office

Gentlemen:

This letter is written by way of following up a telephone conference between the writer and your Ms. Didre Hom and is to respectfully request the issuance by your office of a written interpretation concerning compliance with applicable government regulat ions of certain semi-trailers which one of our clients manufactures abroad and proposes to import to the United States for sale and use in this country. Such semi-trailers are described below.

Thus, the subject semi-trailers are of the pneumatic aluminum tank type (see enclosed photocopy) and are used for the transportation in bulk of substances such as cement, flour, lime, sugar, powdered milk, powdered fertilizer and, in general, other subst ances in dry powdered form, which may be loaded and discharged into and out of the tank unit, pneumatically at a pressure of up to 15 pounds per square inch. Detailed specifications of these semi-trailers are attached hereto.

If you should need any additional information, please specify the additional information in as much detail as possible for us to be able to compile the same.

Also, if the characteristics of the subject semi-trailers, as described herein and in the attached, fail to meet applicable requirements, please specify any such failures in as much detail as possible to enable our client to correct the same.

Additionally, we would appreciate your letting us know if there is any other federal agency apart from yours that would need to be consulted to make sure that the specifications of the subject semi-trailers are in compliance with all existing requirement s that may be applicable under federal law.

Yours very truly,

Lyon L. Brinsmade

SPECIFICATIONS OF PNEUMATIC ALUMINUM TANK TYPE SEMI-TRAILERS MANUFACTURED ABROAD AND PROPOSED TO BE IMPORTED FOR SALE IN THE UNITED STATES

(Omitted)

ID: nht87-2.68

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 08/11/87

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Mr. Troy C. Martin

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. Troy C. Martin Specification/Inspections Chief Texas State Purchasing and General Services Commission P.O. BOX 13047 Capitol Building Austin, TX 78711-3047

Dear Mr. Martin:

This is in response to your letter of February 25, 1987, concerning the regulations applicable to buses used by State Schools to transport children to non-school related activities. You have asked us to address this question for each type of State School , some of which are not "schools" at all, and for public and private schools generally.

In beginning my answer, I want to stress the distinction between the State and Federal regulation of school buses. The question of what bus to use for a particular trip is a question of State regulation. Although there are federal guidelines for school b us use, these are not binding on the States and Hill not be discussed in this letter. The question of what bus nay be sold for transporting children is a matter of Federal regulation. It is this question that we can answer.

A "school bus" is defined by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act in terms of its anticipated use. A bus is thus a "school bus" if the Secretary of Transportation determines it is likely to be significantly used for the purpose of transporti ng primary, preprimary, or secondary school students to or from such schools or events related to such schools.

A person who sells a new bus that Hill be "significantly used" for the purposes listed in the school bus definition must ensure that the bus meets- the Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to school buses. Selling a nonconforming bus for sch ool bus use will subject the seller to a civil penalty of up to 000 for each vehicle and up to $800,000 for a related series of violations. The question of the bus's use is thus of considerable consequence both to the seller and to the buyer.

As you describe the State Schools in Texas, each type of School provides 24-hour residential care for children but offers a differing degree of educational service. One type is certified as a school district and provides instruction on campus, a second t ype is certified as a school district but offers no instruction, and a third is neither certified nor equipped for instruction. In purchasing a new bus for any of the three types of State School, you would need to ask the same question: Is the bus going to be "significantly used" to transport students to and from school or school-related events? If it will be used in this fashion, it will have to be certified as conforming to the school bus safety standards.

I can visualize circumstances under which a bus purchased for any of the three types of State School would have to be certified. The first type is a bona-fide school, so that any use of a bus to transport children to or from the School would be a trip "t o or from" school within the school bus definition of the Vehicle Safety Act. We expect that any new bus sold for use in this type of School would be certified as a school bus.

The second type of State School, though certified as a school district, offers no instruction. We would not consider either this type or the third type to be a "school," which we define as an institution for the instruction of children at the preprimary, primary, or secondary level. A new bus purchased for the use of one of these types of State School, and used for no other school transportation' would not have to be certified as a school bus. However, if the bus were to be purchased for the purpose of transporting children from the State School to local public or parochial schools on a regular basis, we would consider it to be "significantly used" for that purpose, even though it might also be used for other transportation unrelated to school.

A new bus sold for the use of a bona fide school, whether public or private, will almost invariably be required to be certified. Although a bus might conceivably be purchased by a school for the sole use of school employees, such a restriction would be r are. We would expect that virtually all buses purchased by a school would be required to be certified to the school bus standards.

Since the certified school bus has been shown to be the safest vehicle for children, we strongly endorse the use of a certified bus to transport children for any purpose, whether or not school-related. However, our regulatory authority extends only to th e manufacture and sale of new buses, not to their use for a particular trip. For those trips for which a school considers using a noncertified bus, we suggest that you review the Texas regulations on the use of school buses.

I hope this information is helpful. Please contact us if you have further questions.

Sincerely, Original Signed By Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

February 25, 1987 Ms. Erika Z. Jones, Chief Counsel Room 5219 National Highway traffic Safety Administration 400 7th Street NW Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Ms. Jones:

He have in the State or Texas certain Institutions called State Schools which may or may not educate students on their campuses (but these Institutions have, responsibility for 24-hr care of the children living there). There arises questions concerning whether or not the vehicles used to transport ten or more or these children to non-school related activities must be certified as school buses. I understand that the transporting or school children to and from school and to and from school related events such as activity trips require vehicles certified as school buses if the vehicle is equipped with ten or more passenger seats. What is unclear to me is what is considered school-related. I would appreciate your answering the following questions so that we can advise these institutions about transporting children:

1. Is an Institution such as a State School required to use a vehicle which is certified as a school bus to carry ten or more passengers to events not related to the public school activities (such as shopping trips downtown to purchase clothing, etc., tr ips to the local parks and playgrounds for entertaining the children, out-of-town trips such as a trip to the State Capital, etc.), if

a) the Institution is certified by the State or Texas as a school district, they teach children on their campus, and in all ways are considered as a school.

b) the Institution is certified by the State of Texas as a school district, however, they do not teach students on campus (their students go to the local public schools).

c) the Institution is not certified by the State or Texas as a school district, they do not teach students on campus, and the children living there attend the local public school, however, the Institution is called a State School.

2. Is a bona fide school, either public or private, required to use certified school buses to transport students to and from activities not related to school activities? For example, if the city government (or Institutional leaders) decided it would be a good idea to take all (or some) of the school children in one city (or an Institution) to a zoo in a nearby city; and this event was not coordinated with school officials; and the school officials were not involved in the project? or, another example, t he Superintendent of a private school decides to transport all of their students to a church activity in a nearby city.

I suppose, that the answers to the above questions and others that crop up from time to time about transporting children, really lies in the definitions of two terms: schools and school related. I would appreciate it, if in your reply you would give the federal definition of these two terms, and expand on them by giving some examples of what is and what is not a school, school related, etc. It would be very helpful to us.

Sincerely yours, Troy C. Martin Specification/Inspections Chief cc: Mr. Tommy Crowe

ID: nht87-3.26

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 11/13/87

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Rode & Qualey

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: William J. Maloney, Esq. Rode & Qualey 295 Madison Avenue New York, NY 10017

Dear Mr. Maloney:

This responds to your letter seeking an interpretation of Standard No. 211, Wheel Nuts, Wheel Discs, and Hub Caps (49 CFR @571.211). Section @3 of this standard states, "Wheel nuts, hub caps, and wheel discs for use on passenger cars and multipurpose pas senger vehicles shall not incorporate winged projections." You asked whether these components are permitted to incorporate winged projections if the winged projections do not extend beyond the wheel rim when mounted. As we have stated several times in th e past, winged projections are prohibited on wheel nuts, hub caps, and wheel discs, regardless of whether the winged projections are recessed below the level of the wheel rim.

This issue was first raised in response to the notice of proposed rulemaking for the initial Federal motor vehicle safety standards, published on December 3, 1966 (31 FR 15212). That notice proposed language for Standard No. 211 that was identical with t hat which was adopted. In response to this proposal, a manufacturer commented that it did not consider its winged wheel nuts a hazard to pedestrians or cyclists, because the winged wheel nuts did not extend beyond the outermost projection of the wheel ri m. The final rule published on February 3, 1967 (32 FR 2408) did not make any change to the proposed language in response to this comment.

In a report issued on March 17, 1967 on the development of the initial Federal motor vehicle safety standards, the agency summarized the comments on the proposed standards and its response to those comments. have enclosed a copy of the summary of Standar d No. 211 for your information. As you will see, this summary recited the manufacturer's comments on winged projections that were located inside the outermost projection of the wheel rim and tire. The summary goes on to say, "The Agency did not agree, an d retained the prohibition of even such recessed winged structures lest the clothes of child pedestrians and others be caught." Hence, arguments about the unobjectionability of recessed winged projections were considered and rejected by the agency more t han twenty years ago. We have repeated this position in our subsequent interpretations of Standard No. 211. I have enclosed copies of an August 26, 1970 letter to Mr. James S. Campbell ("...any winged projection is prohibited, even if recessed."), a November 25, 1975 letter t o Mr. James J. Schardt ("Our interpretation of Standard No. 211 is that @3 prohibits winged projections that do not extend beyond the outer edge of the tire or rim, as well as those that do."), and a January 31, 1980 letter to Mr. Doug Smith ("...the sta ndard prohibits the use of all winged projections regardless of the extent to which they extend from a rim.").

After examining the history of this requirement, we have concluded that the language of the standard itself draws no distinction between winged projections that do not extend beyond the outer edge of the rim and those that do. Instead, section @3 provide s that the identified components "shall not incorporate winged projections." We reaffirm our previous interpretations, which concluded that this language prohibits all winged projections on the identified components, not just those that extend beyond the outer edge of the rim.

You concluded by asking me to state that recessed winged projections may be imported, offered for sale, and sold in the United States. I cannot make such a statement. Since those winged projections are prohibited by Standard No. 211, section 108(a) (1) ( A) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, as amended (15 U.S.C. 1397(a) (1) (A)) makes it illegal to "manufacture for sale, sell, offer for sale, or introduce or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce, or import into the United St ates" any wheel discs, wheel nuts, or hub caps that incorporate winged projections. Section 109 of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1398) specifies a civil penalty of up to $1000 for each violation of section 108(a), and we would consider each sale of wheel dis cs, wheel nuts, or hub caps with winged projections to be a separate violation of section 108(a).

If you have any further questions on this matter, please feel free to contact Mr. Kratzke at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

Enclosures

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Room 5219 400 Seventh Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590 Attention: Ms. Erika Jones, Office of Chief Counsel Dear Ms. Jones:

This letter is submitted to request a letter ruling from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration concerning any prohibition which may exist with respect to the use of the enclosed articles which are referred to in the automobile accessory trad e as "spinners." On Monday, September 21, 1987, we spoke with Mr. Stephen Kratzke, Senior Attorney for Rule Making, concerning regulations, particularly standard number 211, which may apply to certain wheel accessories. Th rule prohibits the use on passe nger cars and multi-purpose passenger vehicles of certain wheel nuts, hubcaps, and wheel disks which incorporate winged projections.

We respectfully submit that the sample articles enclosed herewith are not subject to the prohibition of rule 211 since they do not project beyond the wheel rim when mounted. Consequently, they do not project beyond the tire or the wheel well of the vehic le. Enclosed are pictures which show a spinner mounted on a correct wheel which is 9 1/2 inches in width. As can be seen from the pictures, the spinner does not project beyond the wheel rim. In light of the fact that the enclosed spinners will not projec t beyond the wheel rim and wheel well, we do not believe that they are the type of article prohibited pursuant to rule number 211. That rule is clearly intended to prohibit certain articles which project beyond the wheel well, or at least beyond the whee l rim, thereby creating a potential hazard to pedestrians. The instant articles, since they do not project beyond the wheel well, could not rationally be considered such a hazard. In order for the pedestrian to come into contact with the spinner, that pe destrian would certainly have to be in an extremely precarious position vis-a-vis certain lethal and dangerous parts of the vehicle. Indeed, it is difficult to perceive how the spinner in the pictures enclosed could be considered a greater "hazard" than the slotted portions of the wheel which clearly is not prohibited.

Furthermore, it is noted that spinners such as those enclosed herewith are readily available at this time in the United States. Enclosed is a brochure of an automobile accessory company which clearly depicts spinners similar to those which we have enclos ed. As with the sample spinners which we have enclosed, the "spinners" depicted in the brochure do not appear to extend beyond the wheel rim when mounted.

For the reasons set forth above, we do not believe that the enclosed spinners pose a hazard when used in passenger vehicles Furthermore, we do not believe that the enclosed spinners fall within the prohibition of rule number 211 since they do not project beyond the wheel rim; therefore, we submit that they may be imported, offered for sale, sold and used in the United States and your ruling to that effect is requested.

If you require additional information, please do not hesitate to call me. We request that the enclosed spinners be returned to us after your review.

Very truly yours,

William J. Maloney

WJM:sr

Enclosures

ID: 86-6.16

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 12/19/86

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Ted Stevens

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

The Honorable Ted Stevens United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Stevens:

Thank you for your letter on behalf of your constituent, Ms. Bridget Ernst, regarding our regulations for safety belts on school buses. Your letter has been referred to my office for reply, since the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is responsible for administering Federal programs relating to school bus safety.

In her letter to you, Ms. Ernst enclosed materials issued by the National Coalition for Seat Belts on School Buses which explained why the Coalition believes safety belts should be required by Federal law on all school buses. You asked us to discuss the main counter-arguments against such a requirement, and asked also whether any Federal legislation has been introduced recently to increase the safety requirement on school buses. I am pleased to respond.

I would like to begin with some background information on our school bus regulations. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 authorizes NHTSA to issue motor vehicle safety standards for new motor vehicles, including school buses. Pursuant to that authority, NHTSA issued a comprehensive set of motor vehicle safety standards to improve school bus safety. Our school bus safety standards apply to various aspects of vehicle performance, including school bus windows and windshields, emergency exits, fuel systems and passenger seating and crash protection.

The safety belt issue your constituent raises involves the safety standard we issued for school bus passenger crash protection, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 222. Standard No. 222 requires that large school buses provide passenger crash protection through a concept called "compartmentalization." Compartmentalization requires that the interior of the school bus be improved with protective seat backs, additional seat padding, and better seat spacing and performance. These interior features are intended to keep occupants in their seating area during an accident. They ensure that a system of crash protection is provided to passengers independent of their actions to use safety belts. Standard No. 222 requires safety belts for passengers in smaller school buses since belts are needed on those vehicles to provide adequate crash protection.

The information from the Coalition that Ms. Ernst enclosed in her letter to you states that safety belts are needed on all school buses to protect children and keep them within their seating compartment in the event of a collision or rollover. We believe that effective passenger crash protection and containment is already provided by compartmentalization and that it would be inappropriate to issue a Federal mandate for safety belts on all school buses. While the effects of compartmentalization are expected to be greater in crashes involving front or rear impacts, the standard also has potential in side impacts and rollovers by minimizing the "hostility" of the crash environment and by limiting the range of movement of an occupant in those two types of crashes.

For your information, I have enclosed a DOT report, "Seat Belts in School Buses" (June 1985),"which provides a thorough discussion of the safety belt issues raised by your constituent. As explained in the report, school buses in this country have compiled an excellent safety record. In addition to meeting compartmentalization requirements, large school buses incorporate more safety by virtue of their greater mass, higher seating height and high visibility to other motorists. Thus, the need for safety belts to mitigate against injuries and fatalities is not the same as that for other vehicles, such as passenger cars. Because the safety record of large school buses is very good, we must conclude that a Federal requirement for the installation of safety belts is not justified at this time.

The Coalition's material enclosed by Ms. Ernst included a statement indicating that NHTSA "supports local district seat belt programs." NHTSA permits the voluntary installation of safety belts for passengers on large school buses if the purchaser wishes to have belts installed. We believe that such a decision should be made by individual schools and school districts that have made a reasoned assessment of their particular pupil transportation needs. However, because there are many effective ways to improve pupil transportation safety, such as improving driver training and school bus maintenance programs, it would be inappropriate for us to endorse local district programs for safety belts on school buses. Therefore, for purposes of clarification, we neither support nor discourage school districts' decisions to install safety belts on their large school buses.

You asked about any Federal legislation that had been recently introduced to increase the safety of school buses. The Administration has not proposed any legislation affecting school buses. However, two bills were introduced in the 99th Congress concerning school buses. H.R. 3129 contained a provision calling for a school bus safety study to determine the measures most effective in protecting the safety of school children. H.R. 719 proposed incentive grants to the States encouraging the adoption and enforcement of laws requiring the use of safety belts in school buses. Neither H.R. 3129 nor H.R. 749 was enacted.

In addition, NHTSA has issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to amend Standard No. 222 by setting performance requirements for safety belts voluntarily installed in large school buses. If adopted, this rule would require safety belts voluntarily installed on mew large school buses to meet Federal safety belt standards for strength and proper installation. We are evaluating the comments submitted on our proposal and a final decision on the rulemaking action is expected in the near future.

I hope this information is helpful. Please contact my office if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel Enclosure

September 24, 1986

David P. Sloane, Director Office of Congressional Relations Department of Transportation 400 Seventh Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Mr. Sloane:

One of my constituents, Ms. Bridget Ernst, has recently informed me of her support for seatbelt requirements on school buses. I have enclosed some information from the National Coalition for Seatbelts on School Buses which she has brought to my attention. I would appreciate your comments on the safety issues they raise.

Has any legislation been introduced recently on the federal level to increase the safety requirement on school buses? What are the main counter-arguments?

Thanks for your assistance in this matter of concern.

With best wishes,

Cordially,

TED STEVENS

Enclosure

Oct 22, 1986

The Honorable Ted Stevens United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Stevens:

Thank you for your letter forwarding correspondence from your constituent, Ms. Bridget Ernst.

I have transmitted your inquiry to the appropriate Departmental officials who are familiar with this matter and they will respond to you directly.

I appreciate you contacting me and hope you will not hesitate to call if I can be of any further assistance.,

Sincerely,

Edward J. Babbit Director, Office of Congressional Affairs

Request an Interpretation

You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:

The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590

If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.

Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.

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