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NHTSA Interpretation File Search

Overview

NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies. 

Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage. 

An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.

  • Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
  • Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
  • The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
  • Some combination of the above, or other, factors.

Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.

Single word search

 Example: car
 Result: Any document containing that word.

Multiple word search

 Example: car seat requirements
 Result: Any document containing any of these words.

Connector word search

 Example: car AND seat AND requirements
 Result: Any document containing all of these words.

 Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.

Phrase in double quotes

 Example: "headlamp function"
 Result: Any document with that phrase.

Conjunctive search

Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.

Wildcard

Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).

Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).

Not

Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”

Complex searches

You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.

Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”). 

Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”

Search Tool

NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search



Displaying 5591 - 5600 of 16490
Interpretations Date

ID: aiam3763

Open
Mr. Richard P. Keim, Manager of Automotive Glass, Replacement Services, Libby=Owens-Ford Company, 811 Madison Avenue, P.O. Box 799, Toledo, OH 43695; Mr. Richard P. Keim
Manager of Automotive Glass
Replacement Services
Libby=Owens-Ford Company
811 Madison Avenue
P.O. Box 799
Toledo
OH 43695;

Dear Mr. Keim: This responds to your letter of September 26, 1983, regarding th certification and marking requirements for glazing under S6 of Safety Standard No. 205, *Glazing Materials*. You stated that you are interested in 'out-sourcing some of your replacement auto glass requirements' to other manufacturers and sought clarification on four points concerning glazing identification.; Section 6 of Standard No. 205 deals specifically with the certificatio and marking requirements for glazing materials. The standard incorporates by reference the American National Standard 'Safety Code for Safety Glazing Materials for Glazing Motor Vehicles Operating on Land Highways,' Z26.6-1966 (ANS Z26). You ask whether it is permissible under National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) regulations to allow another manufacturer, using its own DOT code mark, to put an LOF trademark and logo on its glass.; Section 6 of ANS Z26 states that a manufacturer shall mark safet glazing materials with its own 'distinctive designation or trademark.' The purpose behind these markings was to aid in the tracing of glazing materials and the enforcement of applicable standards. Your letter states that the other manufacturer will place their DOT code mark on the safety glass. Since the other manufacturer is using its own DOT code mark, the tracing and enforcement policies will not be circumvented. Therefore, under these circumstances, the use of LOF's logo and trademark is not violative of Standard No. 205.; Further, you ask whether another glass manufacturer can use LOF's 'M number on his glass with LOF's permission. As long as the model number is an accurate description of the specific glazing material being produced, the other manufacturer may use it.; Lastly, you ask if the name of the country of manufacture must appea on the safety glass if not manufactured in the United States. The standard does not mandate that the country of manufacturer be marked on the safety glazing materials.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel

ID: 15100.ztv

Open

Mr. Lawrence Rucker
3924 O'Bannon Drive, Apt. A
Jackson, Mississippi 39213

Dear Mr. Rucker:

This is in reply to your recent undated letter that arrived in this office on May 5. You write requesting a manufacturer identification number for your "new style of high-mounted brake lights." You have been told "that everything seems to be within the federal code of 108."

This refers to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 Lamps, Reflective Devices and Associated Equipment.

My letter is based on the assumption that you intend these lamps to replace the center high-mounted stop lamp rather than to be mounted as pairs to supplement a vehicle's two lower-mounted stop lamps. As you say, your stop lamps are unique because of their design and shape, to judge by the dollar sign and cocktail glass drawings that you enclosed. As replacement equipment, your lamps would have to meet the appropriate requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 and be certified as meeting them.

Standard No. 108 does not specify permissible shapes for the center stop lamp but it does require the lamp to comply with minimum and maximum photometric (light output) values measured at certain identified test points, as set out in Table 10 of the standard. The test points are, in essence, a grid and control to some extent the design of the lamp. For example, it appears to us unlikely that stylized lamps such as yours can meet the requirements of Table 10, or the requirement that the effective projected luminous area not be less than 4 square inches. If you intend the lamp to be located on the parcel shelf, it will have to conform when photometered through the rear glass and at the orientation in which it is installed, and minimize reflections from the light on the rear window that might be visible in the rear view mirror to the driver.

You may obtain a copy of Standard No. 108 and the agency's other regulations by placing an order with the U.S. Government Printing Office, whose telephone number is (202) 512-0133. The volume is "Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 400-999." You will find Standard No. 108 at Section 571.108. The portions that apply to center high-mounted stop lamps are paragraphs S3, S5.1.1.27, S5.3.1.8, and S5.4, Tables III and IV, and Figure 10 (photometrics).

If any lamp design does not conform, it cannot be manufactured and sold as replacement equipment without violating Title 49, United States Code, Section 30112(a). A civil penalty of up to $1,100 may be imposed for each lamp sold, up to a maximum of $880,000.

However, Standard No. 108 does not apply to center stop lamps sold for use on vehicles that were never required by Standard No. 108 to have them in the first place. The center lamp has been required on passenger cars manufactured beginning September 1, 1985, and on light trucks and vans manufactured beginning September 1, 1993. Thus you would not be in violation of Federal law by selling your lamps as presently designed, for use on vehicles produced before these dates. However, they might not be allowed under the laws of Mississippi or other states where you may want to sell them. We aren't conversant with local laws and suggest you ask the Department of Motor Vehicles in your state for advice.

We have no "manufacturer identification number" for producers of lighting equipment, but we do require manufacturers of replacement lighting equipment to file a simple identification statement with us not later than 30 days after beginning manufacture of their products. This regulation is known as 49 CFR Part 566, and can be found in the same volume as Standard No. 108, reference above..

If you have further questions, you may call Taylor Vinson of this Office (202-366-5263).

Sincerely,
John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel
ref:108
d:6/11/97

1997

ID: lynch.df

Open

B. Daniel Lynch, Esq.
B. Daniel Lynch Law Offices
CalFed Building, Suite 709
301 E. Colorado Boulevard
Pasadena, California 91101-1911

Dear Mr. Lynch:

This responds to your letter and telephone calls asking whether 49 U.S.C. 30101 et seq. would preempt legislation that you would like to have introduced in the California Assembly. I apologize for the delay in responding. Based on our understanding of your letter, we believe that the answer is a qualified no.

You explain that the California law you wish to see introduced would require a mirror on the passenger side of the hood of conventional "big rig" trucks (i.e., trucks with hoods that extend forward from the driver, as opposed to flat-faced "cab-over" trucks"). The law would be to correct a "blind spot" on the passenger side of the hood. Your inquiry arose out of a desire to prevent the kind of crash that a former client of yours had experienced. That person's car was in the right lane of a highway and was struck when a big rig truck moved into that lane without seeing the car. The truck was equipped with side-mounted rearview mirrors, but the passenger side mirror did not provide a view of the area to the right side of the hood, forward of the mirror. You would like California to enact a law to require big rig trucks to have a passenger-side mirror that would enable the driver to see small cars and other vehicles that could be obscured by the truck's large hood.

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 111, Rearview mirrors (49 CFR 571.111), requires side rear view mirrors on trucks with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 4,563 kilograms (kg) or more. The standard at S7.1 (for trucks with GVWRs of between 4,536 kg and 11,340 kg) and at S8.1 (for trucks with GVWRs of 11,340 kg or more) requires mirrors on both sides of the vehicle. The mirrors must be "located so as to provide the driver a view to the rear along both sides of the vehicle and shall be adjustable both in the horizontal and vertical directions to view the rearward scene." The use of the words "a view to the rear" and "rearward scene" indicates that the specified field of view does not extend forward of some point. That point, logically, is the driver. Our review of the rulemaking history of the standard indicates that there is no Federal intent to regulate the view of the driver and passenger side of a truck forward of the driver. California would thus be regulating a different aspect of performance (i.e., a different field of view) than that regulated by Standard No. 111.

Section 30103(b) of our statute, 49 U.S.C. 30103(b) (formerly 103(d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act), states in part:

when a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State . . . may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter.

If the State regulation would address only the area forward of the driver, it would not be preempted by 30103(b). (1) However, it is difficult to respond categorically that the State regulation would not be preempted because you have provided little information on what the State would require. The State regulation could still be preempted if it conflicts with Federal law, either by creating a situation in which manufacturers cannot comply with both the State and Federal laws, or by interfering in some way with another Federal motor vehicle safety standard (such as the field-of-view requirements for the lighting standard, 49 CFR 571.108).

The Department's Office of Motor Carrier Safety has jurisdiction over interstate motor carriers operating in the U.S. You should contact that office at (202) 366-4012, for information about that agency's requirements.

In closing, we want to make clear that we are not providing any views with respect to the merits of the State mirror requirement which you briefly described and which you would like to see enacted in California. This letter only addresses the preemption issue you raised.

If you have any further questions, please contact us.

Sincerely,
Frank Seales, Jr.
Chief Counsel
ref: 111#VSA
d.12/6/99

1. If NHTSA were to issue a standard in this area, inconsistent State laws of general applicability would be preempted to the extent that they are not identical with the Federal standard. Of course, we would consider any relevant State laws when adopting a Federal standard.

1999

ID: nht95-3.16

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: June 15, 1995

FROM: Shih-Chiang Chen -- President, Top World Traffic Equipments Co. Ltd.

TO: Minister, DOT.

TITLE: Re our product: Brake Condition Warning Sensor

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 7/10/95 LETTER FROM RICARDO MARTINEZ TO SHIH - CHIANG CHEN (A43; REDBOOK 2; STD. 108)

TEXT:

Dear Sirs,

I invented the "Brake Condition Warning Sensor" and applied for the patent right of 17 countries, including my country and your country. (For instance, the patent registration number in your country is 5059947)

The special properties of this patented product distinguishes itself from the similar products available on the market. It helps the third brake lamp to generate flashes of various levels due to the different speeds of stepping the brake when drivers me et various situations happened during the automobile travel in order to warn the drivers behind. Thus the drivers behind could make proper preparations and responses to prevent accident.

It has to been emphasized that the period of flashing from the third brake lamp by using this product is very short. Besides, it will act only when the driver must step down the brake. When the automobile completely stops, the light will automatically stops flashing, but still remain lit. This feature provides drivers with great convenience and safety. Therefore, this product is very popular with automobile industries since it became available on the market.

Although many people from your country take great interests in this product, they question about the "Flashing from the Third brake lamp". They think this product is not applicable and is arguable to the relevant communication codes in your countries.

The questions presented by people in your country are not unreasonable when they are first heard. However, after strict analysis, it is a total misunderstanding to the application range of flashing action. This product only generates the flashing actio n only on the third brake lamp, not relevant to the two tail lamps.

In other words, only the third brake lamp will flash by this device when drivers step the brake to respond to the road situation. The two tail lamps remain their normal function, lit but not flashing. It will not cause confusion to drivers' judgment. Instead, it warn the drivers behind to take proper approaches.

With regard to this point, the automobile industries in my country also questioned about the legal applicability at the very beginning. I requested the ministry of Communications for a proper explanation. The result showed that it is not in contraventi on of the regulation that "The Brake Lamp is Forbidden to Flash After Automobile Stops Completely." (See the attachment for a copy of letter from the Ministry of Communications.) The argument is ceased accordingly. Therefore, this product is legally appr oved and has gained a lot of good reputations.

Because I do not completely understand the relevant communication codes in your country, I will need your assistance to have a better understanding. Your reply will be highly appreciated.

Best regards!

P.S. An instruction is enclosed.

THE MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS

LETTER

[Illegible Words] Received By: Mr. CHEN, SHIH-CHIANG [Illegible Word] To: Mr. CHEN, SHIH-CHIANG

Insurance Date: November 10, 1993 File No.: Lu-Tai-(1983)-Chien-Tzu No. 10182

1. Thanks for your letter dated November 14, 1993.

2. Regarding you pointed out our improper regulation: "The third brake light cannot shine when the car stays still." We have checked the regulation of inspecting the third brake light. The regulation requests new small cars should have the third light device and other items necessary for inspecting when the current highway registration & inspection offices proceed all light inspection.

3. Please bring your attention.

Department of Land Administration Ministry of Communication

(Affixed with the official seal)

(Brochure and patent information omitted.)

ID: aiam4234

Open
Dennis H. Oyakawa, Esq., Graham & James, 725 South Figueroa Street, Los Angeles, CA 90017-5434; Dennis H. Oyakawa
Esq.
Graham & James
725 South Figueroa Street
Los Angeles
CA 90017-5434;

Dear Mr. Oyakawa: Thank you for your letter of September 16, 1986, to Stephen Oesch of m staff concerning how the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act and our regulations affect the proposed manufacture and sale of aftermarket safety belts by your client. As discussed below, your proposed plan would not violate either the Vehicle Safety Act or our regulations.; You explained that your client has supplied safety belts to a vehicl manufacturer for use both as an item of original equipment in a new vehicle and as item of replacement equipment for sale in the aftermarket. You said your client has recently been requested by the vehicle manufacturer to supply safety belts to be used as a replacement part for an older model vehicle which was exported to and marketed in the United States over 10 years age. You further explained that your client manufactured the original safety belts used in this older model vehicle, but is no longer equipped to readily manufacture the original safety belts.; Your client wishes to supply the vehicle manufacturer with a newe model safety belt. This newer safety belt has been designed to be installed as a replacement part in the older model vehicle and will fully comply with all of the requirements of Standard No. 209, *Seat Belt Assemblies*. In addition, the safety belt is also designed so that when it is installed in a vehicle, the vehicle will continue to comply with all of the applicable requirements of Standard Nos. 208, *Occupant Crash Protection*, and 210, *Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages*. Finally, you said that the newer model safety belt will not render inoperative any other features of the vehicle necessary to meet any other applicable safety standards.; As you are already aware, your client's proposed safety belt would b required to comply with Standard No. 209. As you are also aware, installation of your client's safety belt by a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair shop would be affected by the render inoperative provision of section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Vehicle Safety Act. However, as stated in your letter, your client has determined that installation of the belt will not render inoperative any other safety features of the vehicle. There is another 108(a)(2)(A) related issue raised by your letter. This concerns whether an item of equipment installed in accordance with one version of a Federal motor vehicle safety standard can be replaced with an item of equipment that complies with a later version of that standard. The agency addressed this issue in a letter of July 7, 1975 to Toyo Kogyo Co., Ltd. In that letter, the agency explained that it would not be a violation of section 108 as long as the vehicle or equipment complies with the safety standards in effect at the time of its manufacture or with the standards in effect at the time a particular system is replaced or altered, even if the new standards set less stringent performance requirements.; If you have any further questions, please let me know. Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones, Chief Counsel

ID: aiam3594

Open
File, Interpretation--S 571.7(f); File
Interpretation--S 571.7(f);

Telephone Interpretation On August 4, 1982, Mike Segraves of Trailmobile presented th hypothetical to me of whether a remanufactured trailer could be purchased by the remanufacturer before modification and leased to its former owner after modification without it being considered newly manufactured for purpose of compliance with the Federal motor vehicle safety standards.; He found a contradiction between 49 CFR S571.7(f) and the preambl establishing it. Subsection (f)(2) imposes the restriction that the remanufactured trailer is 'an existing trailer' which 'is owned or leased by the user of the reassembled vehicle.' Yet the preamble (41 FR 27073, July 1, 1976) states that the restriction 'would require that the owner or lessor of the existing trailer also be the owner or lessor of the rebuilt trailer'. I found no interpretation letters on the point.; Subsection (f)(2) was adopted verbatim from the proposal (40 FR 58154 December 15, 1975). It appears to have originated from a petition by Monon Trailer Company suggesting, in the words of the preamble 'that the rebuilt trailer be sold only to the owner of the trailer from which it was rebuilt'. NHTSA agreed, believing that 'the requirement that the trailer be sold to the original owner under its original identity would be included to prevent large-scale evasion of the standard by parties who might attempt to recycle old, unreliable equipment that would normally be junked'.; Upon close examination, I see no conflict. I believe that 571.7(f)(2 and the preamble language mean simply that in order for the trailer to qualify for the exclusion, it must be either owned by or leased by the same person both before and after manufacture. A 'lessor' is an 'owner' but a 'lessor' cannot be the 'user', thus, the word 'leased' refers to a lessee rather than a lessor. The preamble clarifies that the 'owner or lessor' of the existing trailer must be the owner or lessor of the rebuilt trailer. But 'owner' as 'vendor' is outside the exclusion, and sale of the trailer *after* remanufacture is prohibited. But sale *before* remanufacture is not precluded. Trailmobile as 'owner', independent of its status as remanufacturer, remains the 'owner' after its property is reconstructed, and as 'lessor' may enter into a lease with the former owner or any other party without bringing the trailer under the umbrella of the new vehicle standards.; After consulting with Roger Tilton I so advised Mr. Segraves. Z. Taylor Vinson, Senior Staff Attorney

ID: aiam5109

Open
Mr. Rodney T. Nash, P. E. Vice President Engineering Collins Industries, Inc. 421 East 30th Avenue Hutchinson, KS 67502-2493; Mr. Rodney T. Nash
P. E. Vice President Engineering Collins Industries
Inc. 421 East 30th Avenue Hutchinson
KS 67502-2493;

"Dear Mr. Nash: This responds to your letter to the Administrator National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), received in this office on November 18, 1992, and your telephone conversation of November 30, 1992 with Walter Myers of this office, regarding the proper classification of an ambulance. You indicated that Wheeled Coach Industries of Orlando, Florida, a subsidiary of Collins Industries, produces ambulances that are built on truck chassis. You stated that in the past those vehicles have been classified as trucks, but that Ford Motor Company auditors told you that they should be classified as multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPV). You said that you needed to know how to classify ambulances, observing that it appeared to you that the final stage manufacturer was free to choose between the two classifications, truck or MPV. NHTSA has long considered ambulances to be multipurpose passenger vehicles, which are defined in 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 571.3 as 'a motor vehicle with motive power, except a trailer, designed to carry 10 persons or less which is constructed either on a truck chassis or with special features for occasional off-road operation.' Your company's ambulances fit this definition very well: they are mounted on a truck chassis and are designed to carry ten persons or less. As you pointed out in your letter, it is true that an ambulance may carry more weight in special equipment than it carries in patients, and it may operate half its life with no patient on board. Nevertheless, NHTSA believes that whether or not a patient is on board or how much equipment is carried, the vehicle is primarily designed for the transportation and/or care of ill or injured persons, as well as the transportation of paramedic personnel to wherever they are needed. This is in contrast to a truck which is defined also in 49 CFR 571.3 as 'a motor vehicle with motive power, except a trailer, designed primarily for the transportation of property or special purpose equipment'. Thus, although an ambulance carries special purpose equipment, NHTSA believes that the equipment is only ancillary to the primary function of an ambulance which is the transportation of persons. Accordingly, an ambulance falls within the definition of MPV rather than truck. I hope this will help clarify this issue for you. Should you have any further questions in this regard, please feel free to contact Mr. Myers at this address or at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Stephen P. Wood Assistant Chief Counsel for Rulemaking";

ID: aiam1033

Open
Mr. David J. Humphreys, Recreational Vehicle Institute, Inc., Suite 406, 1140 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, DC 20006; Mr. David J. Humphreys
Recreational Vehicle Institute
Inc.
Suite 406
1140 Connecticut Avenue
Washington
DC 20006;

Dear Mr. Humphreys: This is in reply to your letter of January 31, 1973, requesting severa interpretations of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205, 'Glazing Materials', as it applies to motor homes and campers.; We find the interpretations as to the use of item 3 glazing containe in your letter to be correct. Your interpretation of 'levels not requisite for driving visibility' as meaning that other windows are available and more suited for driving visibility is reasonable, and acceptable for purposes of Standard No. 205.; We also find your interpretations on the use of items 4, 5, 8, and glazing materials to be correct. We do not agree, however, with your suggestion of allowing items 5 and 9 glazing to be used in camper windows adjacent to the truck cab rear window without regard to driving visibility. We agree it is unlikely with respect to most vehicles that such windows will be requisite for driving visibility, and will accept a good-faith, reasonable judgment decision on the question by a camper manufacturer. Consequently we do not believe that the remaining 'degree of uncertainty' will result in compliance problems for camper manufacturers.; Your conclusions regarding the application of items 6 and 7 glazing ar correct. We do not agree, however, that it is necessary or desirable to use such materials in any forward-facing windows, including those adjacent to the rear window of the truck cab. We believe the possibility of impact into these windows precludes the safe use in them of these glazing items, and item 13 glazing as well.; Your conclusions regarding the application of item 12 and item 1 glazing are correct. We appreciate your pointing out the lack of continuity in subparagraph designations for items 6, 7, 8, and 9. This was unintentional on our part, and your conclusion that the added subparagraphs should be read as following immediately those existing, regardless of letter designation, is correct. Finally, you are correct in your conclusion that the amendments to Standard No. 205 should be seen as overriding the headings for the various glazing items in the ANS Z26 standard.; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel

ID: aiam3820

Open
Herbert T. Thrower, Jr., P.E., President, Dotech, Inc., 306 Clanton Road, Charlotte, NC 28210; Herbert T. Thrower
Jr.
P.E.
President
Dotech
Inc.
306 Clanton Road
Charlotte
NC 28210;

Dear Mr. Thrower: This is in response to your letter of February 14, 1984, to Mr. Vinso of my staff asking 'is there any reluctance on the part of NHTSA to make a patented device a legal option under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108?'; At present, Standard No. 108 mandates specific items of lightin equipment not optional ones (though 'options' as to matters such as size and shape exist among headlamps which are required items). Instead, NHTSA points out that, pursuant to S4.1.3 optional lighting devices (proprietary or not) are allowable, provided that they do not impair the effectiveness of the lighting equipment the standard requires. When proprietary rights are involved in mandated lighting equipment, manufacturers have been willing to waive their rights.; You have also said that you 'presume that other patented automotiv devices also must have DOT approval before their optional public use is permissible.' I don't know what you have in mind, but under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, no 'approval' by DOT is necessary to market 'optional' motor vehicle equipment of any sort. Such equipment is subject only to the general requirement that its installation must not affect the compliance of the vehicle with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard.; If you have further questions, please let us know. Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel

ID: aiam5328

Open
Mr. Perry McGlothan Quality Assurance Test Specialist Century Products Company 9600 Valley View Road Macedonia, OH 44056; Mr. Perry McGlothan Quality Assurance Test Specialist Century Products Company 9600 Valley View Road Macedonia
OH 44056;

Dear Mr. McGlothan: This responds to your letter to me about the hea impact protection and protrusion limitation requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 213, Child Restraint Systems. We received under separate cover the three child seats you sent for illustration purposes, samples of Models 4560, 4590 and the STE 1000. You discuss in your letter a new method you would like to use to attach the head impact protection foam to the child restraint shell. The foam would be attached to the shell by means of two push-in pins, each 1/2 inch in length and with a 3/4 inch diameter head, as distinguished from the padding being glued to the shell as in the past. You stated that this change would better secure the foam padding to the shell and help your manufacturing process. You asked us whether the new method would meet the head impact protection requirement of S5.2.3 (for restraints recommended for children weighing less than 20 pounds) and the protrusion limitations of S5.2.4. As you know, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act establishes a self-certification system under which manufacturers are responsible for ensuring that their products comply with all applicable FMVSSs. We do not approve, endorse, or give assurances of compliance of any product. NHTSA may examine the manufacturer's certification in the course of any enforcement action. In response to manufacturers' requests for interpretations of the FMVSS's, we try, to the extent possible, to provide information that will help them make their determinations of compliance. However, these responses are based on information provided by the manufacturer, and is subject to the findings of actual compliance testing by the agency. Should the agency, in the future, examine production units of these models and detect an apparent noncompliance or defect, those results will control. You first inquire, 'Please advise as to compression deflection,' which we understand as asking whether S5.2.3.2 would permit you to secure the foam with the pins. S5.2.3.2 states that each system surface, except for protrusions that comply with S5.2.4, which is contactable by a dummy head must be covered with slow recovery, energy absorbing material with specified characteristics. As explained in the next paragraph, the pins we examined appear to satisfy S5.2.4. Further, the pins might not be contactable by the dummy head in Standard 213's dynamic test. However, whether they are contactable can only be determined in the standard's dynamic test. S5.2.4 requires that any portion of a rigid structural component within or underlying a contactable surface, or any portion of a child restraint system surface that is subject to S5.2.3 shall meet specified limits on height and radius of exposed edge. Based on our visual inspection, the pins we saw appear to be within those limits. Again, however, the Vehicle Safety Act places the responsibility for determining compliance in the first instance on you, the manufacturer of the child restraint. We still have the three seats that you sent us. We plan to dispose of them unless we hear from you. I hope this information is helpful to you. Should you have any further questions or need further information, please feel free to contact Walter Myers of this office at this address or at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel;

Request an Interpretation

You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:

The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590

If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.

Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.

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