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NHTSA Interpretation File Search

Overview

NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies. 

Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage. 

An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.

  • Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
  • Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
  • The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
  • Some combination of the above, or other, factors.

Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.

Single word search

 Example: car
 Result: Any document containing that word.

Multiple word search

 Example: car seat requirements
 Result: Any document containing any of these words.

Connector word search

 Example: car AND seat AND requirements
 Result: Any document containing all of these words.

 Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.

Phrase in double quotes

 Example: "headlamp function"
 Result: Any document with that phrase.

Conjunctive search

Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.

Wildcard

Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).

Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).

Not

Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”

Complex searches

You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.

Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”). 

Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”

Search Tool

NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search



Displaying 6041 - 6047 of 6047
Interpretations Date

ID: 13241-2.pja

Open

Mr. Frank Smidler
Director of Engineering
Wabash National Corporation
P.O. Box 6129
Lafayette, IN 47903

Dear Mr. Smidler:

This letter responds to your December 11, 1996, letter asking several questions about the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's January 24, 1996, (61 FR 2004) rear impact protection (underride guard) standards. You asked about using an elastomeric bumper facade to meet the energy absorption requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 223, Rear impact protection. The short answer to your questions is that the elastomeric material, by itself, cannot be used to meet the energy absorption requirements because the requirements call for plastic, not elastic, deformation of the guard. Your specific questions are answered below, in the order that you posed them.

Question 1: S5.2.2 Guard energy absorption states ". . . shall absorb by plastic deformation within the first 125 mm of deflection at least 5,650 J of energy . . .". Is energy absorption through elastic deformation acceptable? (Emphasis in original).

You urge us to interpret the standard to allow for elastic deformation for two reasons. First, you believe that a guard designed to absorb energy by "simple plastic deformation of steel" is more likely to be damaged by repetitive normal impacts of a vehicle with a Gross Vehicle Weight Rating of 80,000 lb with loading docks, thus rendering it useless for the intended purpose of protecting colliding vehicles. Second, you state that elastomeric material would be easier to apply to trailers with low floor heights and other special applications where it is not possible to mount a bumper that hangs down and can pivot back on a long arm during impact.

The standard's required energy absorption cannot be met by elastic deformation of the guard. We interpret the language "by plastic deformation" in S5.2.2 to mean that the required energy absorption will be provided exclusively by plastic deformation. In other words, any energy that the guard returns to the force application device when the load is removed (i.e., the elastic component of the deformation) is subtracted from the total energy absorption for purposes of meeting the requirement. The typical energy absorption curve in Figure 2 (61 FR 2034) shows that the area under the force-deflection curve where the guard rebounds elastically from 125 mm of deflection to about 90 mm of deflection is not included in the shaded area (the shaded area represents the amount of energy absorption counted against the requirement in the standard). There is a discussion in the preamble to the final rule (61 FR 2011) of NHTSA's reasons for requiring plastic deformation.

Please note that the standard does not prohibit the use of elastomeric material as supplemental shock absorbers. The material might be useful in preventing shock-induced metal fatigue for certain guard designs. However, NHTSA believes that the strength requirements of the standard are sufficiently high that most guard designs would stand up to the stresses of normal use without significant degradation in performance.

Please also note that the standard is not prescriptive about guard design, as your letter implied. There is no requirement that "[s]imple plastic deformation of steel" provide the energy absorption. Other materials may provide the deformation, and the deformation may be as complex as desired. There is also no requirement that trailers with low floor heights or any other trailers have a "bumper that hangs down and can pivot back on a long arm during impact to absorb energy." The final rule specifically mentioned that vertical supports were not required (61 FR 2013). Even if the conventional vertical strut guard design would not work well for certain vehicles, other designs could be engineered for these vehicles without resorting to elastic materials.

Question 2: S6.6(c) states that when testing for energy absorption ". . . apply the force to the guard until displacement of the force application device has reached 125 mm." S5.2.2 states ". . . shall absorb by plastic deformation within the first 125 mm of deflection . . .". If our test bumper absorbs the required amount of energy at less than 125 mm of deflection (i.e., ". . . within the first 125 mm . . .") do we have to continue to test load to the full 125 mm of deflection? (Emphasis in original)

No. The test procedures in the standard describe how NHTSA will test guards for compliance with the standard's requirements, and are not binding upon guard manufacturers. They may certify their guards based on other kinds of testing or even engineering analysis, if these provide a reasonable basis for certification. If a guard can pass NHTSA's test after less than 125 mm of displacement, it would be reasonable to assume that it will pass the test if displacement was continued to the full 125 mm, because more displacement will only result in more energy absorption, up to a certain point.

Even if the guard appears to have absorbed the required amount of energy before the displacement has reached 125 mm, NHTSA will continue the test because S6.6(c) states "[i]f conducting a test . . . for . . . energy absorption . . . apply the force . . . until displacement . . . has reached 125 mm." NHTSA does this because it does not know how much elastic rebound the guard will exhibit once the load is removed, and the energy returned during the rebound will have to be subtracted when calculating the total energy absorbed.

Question 3: S6.6(b) states that "If conducting a strength test . . . the force is applied until the forces specified . . . has been exceeded, or until the displacement of the force application device has reached at least 125 mm, whichever occurs first." Is it correct to take this to mean that the strength requirements must be met at or before 125 mm of deflection? The ". . . at least. . . " is slightly confusing.

Your assumption is correct. The words "at least" do not imply that NHTSA will continue to displace the guards beyond 125 mm. If the required level of strength has not been achieved by 125 mm, the guards will have failed the test. The test procedures are based on demonstrating compliance with the requirements, and the relevant requirement, S5.2.1, states "[t]he guard must resist the force levels specified . . . without deflecting by more than 125 mm."

Question 4: Hydraulic guards that are velocity sensitive have been excluded from the energy absorption test with the statement in the January 24, 1996 Federal Register that the NHTSA is unaware of any nonhydraulic guards that are velocity sensitive. We are looking at the contribution of energy absorption of air escaping from an elastomeric bumper facade as it is compressed under load and at high velocity. What must be done to allow the energy absorption of a pneumatic chamber deflating?

Hydraulic guards are defined in S4 as ". . . a guard designed to use fluid properties to provide resistance force to deformation." (emphasis added). Pneumatic guards use the fluid properties of air to provide resistance to deformation. However, the word "hydraulic" is defined as "operated by, moved by, or employing water or other liquids in motion."(1) Therefore, the word "hydraulic" limits the meaning of the word "fluid" to liquids. This is also the common sense meaning of the word "hydraulic."

Like hydraulic guards, guards based on pneumatic resistance of escaping air might not provide sufficient resistance to the slow application of force in Standard No. 223's quasi-static test. Therefore, the quasi-static test is inappropriate for testing guard designs based on the principle of pneumatic resistance of escaping air. Only a change in the standard will allow relying on such a chamber to provide energy absorption.

Question 5: Will we be allowed to use a full width elastomeric bumper facade that does not meet the quasi-static test using an 8" x 8" input plate but that in total provides more energy absorbing potential that a structure utilizing plastic deformation of steel supports that does meet the quasi-static test using an 8" x 8" plate?

No. The requirements are not based on the total energy absorbing potential of the entire structure, but on the energy absorbing potential at the P3 test points using an 8" by 8" plate. Writing a standard based on calculating the "total energy absorbing potential" would be impractical due to the many possible guard designs. In addition, that is not an appropriate measure for guard performance, because the force of an underriding vehicle will normally be concentrated in a certain area, rather than distributed along the entire surface of a bumper facade.

We note that NHTSA has received petitions for reconsideration on certain aspects of the energy absorption requirements, although their resolution probably will not affect our answers to your questions. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Paul Atelsek of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack

Acting Chief Counsel

ref:223

d:4/29/97

1. Random House Dictionary of the English Language, unabridged edition, 1966.

1997

ID: 2405y

Open

His Excellency
D. H. Burney
Ambassador of Canada
501 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Thank you for your letter of March 16, 1990, expressing the concern of your country about this agency's new regulations on importation of motor vehicles and equipment.

Canada is concerned that, under P.L. l00-562, the Imported Vehicle Safety Compliance Act of l988, Canadian vehicle brokers, dealers, and private citizens will not, for all practical purposes, be able to export new or used Canadian market vehicles to the United States. It is concerned further that Canadian individuals and firms will be precluded from providing conformance goods and services for vehicles exported to the United States. Canada therefore requests that this agency modify its regulations with respect to Canadian market vehicles, recognizing their near-compliance with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, and accommodating their entry in the least costly and burdensome manner. You have five specific requests, and I shall address each.

Preliminarily, I want to note several things. First, my assurance that this agency gave very careful consideration to the concerns of Transport Canada in adopting final regulations under the 1988 Act, as well as those expressed by Canadian companies that commented on the proposed regulations. As we noted in the notices proposing and adopting those regulations, our discretion to make changes in the regulations was narrowly circumscribed in many instances by the detailed language of that Act. On a more technical level, I want to note that your understanding of our new regulations expressed in paragraphs (a) through (g) on page 2 of your letter is essentially correct. However, with respect to your paragraph (d), please note that determinations of vehicle eligibility for importation may also be made by me as Administrator on my own initiative, and need not be pursuant to a petition. Also, as to paragraph (e), I would like to point out that the bond processing fee, proposed to be $125, is only $4.35 (however, under paragraph (f) the bond is not less than l50% of the dutiable value of the vehicle).

Your first request is that the agency "recognize Canadian market vehicles as a special class of non-complying vehicles requiring only minor changes to meet the FMVSS." The l988 Act was enacted on October 31, l988, and became effective January 31, l990. I regret to say that none of its provisions authorize the agency to directly distinguish between non-complying vehicles of Canadian manufacture and those originating in other countries.

However, the eligibility provisions that you reference in paragraph (d) do permit a basis for minimizing some of the burden that the l988 Act imposes. We begin with the premise that if a Canadian vehicle has not been certified by its manufacturer as in conformance with U.S. standards, then it cannot be presumed to conform in all respects to the U.S. standards. Canadian and U.S. safety standards do differ in some ways (e.g., mandatory automatic crash protection for U.S. market passenger cars manufactured on and after September 1, l989). Nevertheless, we believe that enough similarity may exist to support a finding that a Canadian passenger car is "substantially similar" to a U.S. passenger car, justifying a determination that it is eligible for importation into the United States, and capable of conversion to meet U.S. safety standards. Further, such a finding may be made on our own initiative. I am pleased to inform you that NHTSA is publishing a notice of tentative determination that would cover all passenger cars certified as meeting the Canadian Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, and that were manufactured up to September 1, l989. A copy of the notice is enclosed for your reference. After receiving and considering public comment, we will make a final decision on this matter. If we decide to adopt our tentative determination as a final determination, your first request would, in effect, be granted.

Your second request is that we "exempt such vehicles from the fees." These fees are the ones mentioned in paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) of your letter, the registered importer annual registration fee, the vehicle eligibility petition fee, and the bond processing fee. Each fee is specifically required by the l988 Act, and must be established in advance of the fiscal year in which it is effective. The registered importer fee is required to cover agency costs for administration of the registration program. The vehicle eligibility fee is required to cover the agency's costs in making and publishing eligibility determinations. The bond processing fee is required to reimburse the U.S. Customs Service for its costs in processing the agency's conformance bond that accompanies each nonconforming vehicle. Congress provided no authority to waive these fees, or to modify them during the fiscal year that they are in effect. Thus, the fees that have been established must remain in effect until October 1, l990. When we begin the review that will lead to next year's fees, we shall be happy to consider whether some provision may be made for Canadian market vehicles. In the meantime, I would like to point out that under our notice of tentative determination on eligibility of Canadian vehicles, the fee of $l,560 would cover the blanket determination of all passenger cars, and would not be applied to each individual model and model year of passenger car. This action would effectively moot Canada's second request that Canadian market passenger cars be exempted from the determination fee.

Canada's third request is to "exempt them from the bonding requirement." The l988 Act requires the importer of a non-conforming vehicle to furnish an appropriate bond to ensure that the vehicle will be brought into compliance, or will be exported or abandoned to the United States. This is not a new requirement; ever since January 1, l968, each nonconforming vehicle, Canadian or otherwise, has been required to be accompanied by a conformance bond upon its entry into the United States. The l988 Act provides us with no authority to exempt Canadian vehicles, and does not distinguish degrees of nonconformity. Therefore, we believe that we are unable to grant Canada's request, absent specific authorization by the U.S. Congress.

The fourth request is to "exempt them from the requirement that they be imported by registered importers, who must be U.S. citizens." This request raises two issues: whether Canadian market cars may be imported by persons other than registered importers, and whether registered importers must be U.S. citizens. As to the first issue, the l988 Act does allow one alternative to direct importation by a registered importer. That is, a person other than a registered importer may import a nonconforming vehicle if he has a contract with a registered importer to perform conformance work. This would allow a Canadian citizen to import a Canadian market car, without himself becoming a registered importer.

The second issue is whether a Canadian company is permitted to be a registered importer. We believe that a registered importer is a person who is physically present in the territory in which importation occurs, as opposed to an exporter, who is outside that territory. While we are not conversant with the laws of the individual States, we believe that a Canadian company could qualify to do business within an individual State, and become a registered importer. Thus, it is not necessary to be a U.S. "citizen", but it is necessary to be subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The l988 Act requires the registered importer regulation to contain requirements for recordkeeping, and inspection of records and facilities. Since the jurisdiction of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act does not extend beyond the boundaries of the United States, we believe that it would be difficult to enforce our provisions on inspection of premises, documents, etc. in the territory of another country.

This brings us to your fifth and final request, that we "allow modifications to be done in either the United States or Canada." Under current regulations, conformance work is permitted to be performed outside the United States. However, vehicles modified in this fashion must be admitted under the same procedures as if they had not been modified. This allows the agency to review the documents on pre-importation conversion work, to ensure that it has been satisfactorily accomplished, before the conformance bond is released. Accordingly, we believe that the concern underlying this request has already been accommodated.

If, after reviewing this letter, you have further suggestions for reducing the burdens that the new law may have imposed on importations of Canadian-manufactured vehicles, I would be happy to consider them.

Sincerely,

Jerry Ralph Curry

Enclosure ref:59l#592#593#594 d:4/24/90

1990

ID: 2794o

Open

Mr. Koji Tokunaga
Manager, Engineering
Isuzu Motors America, Inc.
21415 Civic Center Drive
Southfield, MI 48076-3969

Dear Mr. Tokunaga:

This letter responds to your inquiry in which you ask a number of questions concerning Federal motor vehicle safety standard (FMVSS) 124, Accelerator Control Systems. I apologize for the delay in this response. In your letter, you describe a new accelerator control system that operates through electrical rather than mechanical signals.

You state that the moving components of this system are the accelerator pedal, stepping motor arm, linkage, and the throttle lever. When a driver depresses the accelerator pedal, a pedal sensor converts the displacement into a proportional electric signal. The signal goes through a control unit to a position switch, and then to a stepping motor. This stepping motor works to move the motor's arm and linkage, and they in turn work the throttle lever. Therefore, you say, the engine speed is controlled in proportion to the amount of accelerator pedal displacement.

You further inform us that Isuzu already has distributed vehicles equipped with this system in Japan, and that the company would like to market this kind of vehicle in the United States. You present three questions and a diagram of the system components, and request an agency response.

First, please be aware that in issuing this interpretation, NHTSA is neither approving, certifying, nor endorsing your new accelerator control system. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, each manufacturer must certify that its product meets agency safety standards, or other applicable standards. However, based on the information you supplied in your letter, I have the following responses.

Question I: In this vehicle, Isuzu considers the battery that drives the stepping motor to be one of the energy sources under S5.1, and the return springs (accelerator pedal and throttle lever return springs) the other sources. Is this interpretation correct? We do not have enough information to state whether the battery that drives the stepping motor, or the return springs would be considered energy sources under S5.1. Section S5.1 of Standard 124 requires, among other things, that there be a minimum of two energy sources capable of returning the throttle to idle whenever the driver removes the opposing actuating force, or if there is a single severance or disconnection in the accelerator control system.

With respect to the battery, if all system elements are operating properly, then it would appear that removing the actuating force will cause the electrical circuit from accelerator pedal sensor to stepping motor to return the throttle to idle. On the other hand, if there is a failure caused by a severance or disconnection in the accelerator control system between the pedal and the stepping motor, it is not clear to me whether the stepping motor will return to zero, and bring the throttle springs back to idle; or lock the arm and linkage in an "open-throttle" position.

Similarly, it is not clear to me that the accelerator pedal and throttle return springs are capable of returning the throttle to idle in the event of a failure caused by an ACS severance or disconnection. (While you include the throttle lever in your description of the accelerator control system, the agency considers it as part of the fuel metering device. However, as NHTSA explained in the preamble to 124, an energy source under the Standard may be attached to the fuel metering device. [37 FR 20033, September 23, 1972.]) Ordinarily, the agency would have no difficulty in finding that either of the throttle return springs is an energy source capable of returning the throttle to idle. But I cannot tell from your description and diagram whether a severance or disconnection in the electrical system would cause the throttle to lock in a position other than idle.

I would make the same observation with respect to the accelerator pedal. I can not tell from the information you supplied what impact a severance or disconnection failure would have on the pedal. For example, it is not apparent whether some element in the electrical system senses a severance or disconnection in the accelerator control system, so that a sensor transmits a signal to the appropriate energy sources that the throttle should return to idle. If the pedal and return springs can operate mechanically and in concert to return the throttle to idle in the event of a failure in the accelerator control system caused by a severance or disconnection, then together they may be an energy source under the Standard.

Question 2a: Is a severance in electric wires in this system a severance or disconnection within the meaning of S5.2? Isuzu considers negative because electric wires are not a moving part.

A severance or disconnection of the electric wires in this system would be a severance or disconnection within the meaning of S5.2 of Standard 124.

Section S4.1 of Standard 124 defines a "driver-operated accelerator control system" as "all vehicle components, except the fuel metering device, that regulate engine speed in direct response to movement of the driver-operated control and that return the throttle to the idle position upon release of the actuating force."

You stated in your letter that, in this new system, when the driver depresses the accelerator pedal, the mechanical displacement is converted into electrical signals. These electrical signals are transmitted by wires to a control unit that regulates engine speed in direct response to pressure on the accelerator pedal, again by means of wires that connect the control unit's electrical signal to the appropriate components. Thus, the control unit, all of the components to which it is connected, and the wires that make those connections are "vehicle components ... that regulate engine speed in direct response to movement of the driver-operated control and that return the throttle to the idle position upon release of the actuating force." Under S4.1, then, the control unit, the components to which it is connected, and the wires that make the connection are components of the driver-operated accelerator control system.

Section S5.2 of Standard 124 requires that the throttle return to idle "from any accelerator position or any speed...whenever any one component of the accelerator control system is disconnected or severed at a single point." Please note that this language does not limit the requirement to disconnections or severances of components that are moving parts. Thus, all severances or disconnections of any component of the accelerator control system are within the ambit of the standard. In this case, since the wires are a component of the accelerator control system, the throttle must return to idle whenever a wire is disconnected or severed.

Question 2b: If a severance in electric wires were a severance or disconnection under S5.2, what about a short-circuiting that may result from such a severance? Does the Standard require that the throttle returns to the idle position even in such a condition?

Yes. Section S5.2 of Standard 124 requires the throttle to return to the idle position whenever any component of the accelerator control system is disconnected or severed at a single point, regardless of the other consequences of the disconnection or severance. In the case of this system, this language requires the throttle to return to idle when any wire is severed, even if the severance results in a short circuit.

Question 2c: Our understanding is that a failure (other than severance or disconnection) of a system component itself (i.e. a failure in the accelerator pedal sensor with pedal position switches, control unit, throttle valve position switch, or stepping motor) is not subject to the throttle return requirement under the Standard. Is this correct?

Your understanding is partially correct. Standard 124 addresses those circumstances where (1) the driver removes the opposing actuating force; and (2) a severance or disconnection in the ACS causes a failure. Therefore, you are correct that Standard 124 addresses only those failures resulting from a severance or disconnection within the system. However, for electrical systems, shorted or open circuits are the consequence of a change in one or more of the electrical components in the system. The agency would consider such a change a disconnection or severance in the context of this Standard.

Question 3: It is our interpretation that the battery and the electric wires from the battery to the control unit are not a part of the accelerator control system under this definition. (That is, the definition of "driver-operated accelerator control system.") Is this interpretation correct?

No, your interpretation is incorrect. We have set out the definition of "driver-operated accelerator control system" in section S4.1 above, in response to your Question 2a. With respect to your electrical accelerator control system, the electrical impulse that travels between the vehicle battery and the control unit is a direct consequence of the driver's applying an actuating force to the accelerator pedal. Given this aspect of your system's design, both the vehicle battery and the electric wires from the battery to the control unit fall within the definition of "driver-operated accelerator control system."

I hope you find this information helpful.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

ref:124 d:8/8/88

1988

ID: nht90-2.21

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: APRIL 24, 1990

FROM: JERRY RALPH CURRY

TO: D. H. BURNEY -- AMBASSADOR OF CANADA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 3-16-90 TO JERRY R. CURRY, NHTSA, FROM D. H. BURNEY, AMBASSADOR OF CANADA TEXT:

Thank you for your letter of March 16, 1990, expressing the concern of your country about this agency's new regulations on importation of motor vehicles and equipment.

Canada is concerned that, under P.L. 100-562, the Imported Vehicle Safety Compliance Act of 1988, Canadian vehicle brokers, dealers, and private citizens will not, for all practical purposes, be able to export new or used Canadian market vehicles to the United States. It is concerned further that Canadian individuals and firms will be precluded from providing conformance goods and services for vehicles exported to the United States. Canada therefore requests that this agency modify its regulations wit h respect to Canadian market vehicles, recognizing their near-compliance with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, and accommodating their entry in the least costly and burdensome manner. You have five specific requests, and I shall address each.

Preliminarily, I want to note several things. First, my assurance that this agency gave very careful consideration to the concerns of Transport Canada in adopting final regulations under the 1988 Act, as well as those expressed by Canadian companies tha t commented on the proposed regulations. As we noted in the notices proposing and adopting those regulations, our discretion to make changes in the regulations was narrowly circumscribed in many instances by the detailed language of that Act. On a more technical level, I want to note that your understanding of our new regulations expressed in paragraphs (a) through (g) on page 2 of your letter is essentially correct. However, with respect to your paragraph (d), please note that determinations of vehi cle eligibility for importation may also be made by me as Administrator on my own initiative, and need not be pursuant to a petition. Also, as to paragraph (e), I would like to point out that the bond processing fee, proposed to be *$125, is only $4.35 (however, under paragraph (f) the bond is not less than 150 percent of the dutiable value of the vehicle).

Your first request is that the agency "recognize Canadian market vehicles as a special class of non-complying vehicles requiring only minor changes to meet the FMVSS." The 1988 Act was enacted on October 31, 1988, and became effective January 31, 1990. I regret to say that none of its provisions authorize the agency to directly distinguish between non-complying vehicles of Canadian manufacture and those originating in other countries.

However, the eligibility provisions that you reference in paragraph (d) do permit a basis for minimizing some of the burden that the 1988 Act imposes. We begin with the premise that if a Canadian vehicle has not been certified by its manufacturer as in conformance with U.S. standards, then it cannot be presumed to conform in all respects to the U.S. standards. Canadian and U.S. safety standards do differ in some ways (e.g., mandatory automatic crash protection for U.S. market passenger cars manufactur ed on and after September 1, 1989). Nevertheless, we believe that enough similarity may exist to support a finding that a Canadian passenger car is "substantially similar" to a U.S. passenger car, justifying a determination that it is eligible for impor tation into the United States, and capable of conversion to meet U.S. safety standards. Further, such a finding may be made on our own initiative. I am pleased to inform you that NHTSA is publishing a notice of tentative determination that would cover a ll passenger cars certified as meeting the Canadian Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, and that were manufactured up to September 1, 1989. A copy of the notice is enclosed for your reference. After receiving and considering public comment, we will make a final decision on this matter. If we decide to adopt our tentative determination as a final determination, your first request would, in effect, be granted.

Your second request is that we "exempt such vehicles from the fees." These fees are the ones mentioned in paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) of your letter, the registered importer annual registration fee, the vehicle eligibility petition fee, and the bond pro cessing fee. Each fee is specifically required by the 1988 Act, and must be established in advance of the fiscal year in which it is effective. The registered importer fee is required to cover agency costs for administration of the registration program . The vehicle eligibility fee is required to cover the agency's costs in making and publishing eligibility determinations. The bond processing fee is required to reimburse the U.S. Customs Service for its costs in processing the agency's conformance bo nd that accompanies each nonconforming vehicle. Congress provided no authority to waive these fees, or to modify them during the fiscal year that they are in effect. Thus, the fees that have been established must remain in effect until October 1, 1990.

When we begin the review that will lead to next year's fees, we shall be happy to consider whether some provision may be made for Canadian market vehicles. In the meantime, I would like to point out that under our notice of tentative determination on el igibility of Canadian vehicles, the fee of $1,560 would cover the blanket determination of all passenger cars, and would not be applied to each individual model and model year of passenger car. This action would effectively moot Canada's second request that Canadian market passenger cars be exempted from the determination fee.

Canada's third request is to "exempt them from the bonding requirement." The 1988 Act requires the importer of a non-conforming vehicle to furnish an appropriate bond to ensure that the vehicle will be brought into compliance, or will be exported or aban doned to the United States. This is not a new requirement; ever since January 1, 1968, each nonconforming vehicle, Canadian or otherwise, has been required to be accompanied by a conformance bond upon its entry into the United States. The 1988 Act prov ides us with no authority to exempt Canadian vehicles, and does not distinguish degrees of nonconformity. Therefore, we believe that we are unable to grant Canada's request, absent specific authorization by the U.S. Congress.

The fourth request is to "exempt them from the requirement that they be imported by registered importers, who must be U.S. citizens." This request raises two issues: whether Canadian market cars may be imported by persons other than registered importers , and whether registered importers must be U.S. citizens. As to the first issue, the 1988 Act does allow one alternative to direct importation by a registered importer. That is, a person other than a registered importer may import a nonconforming vehicl e if he has a contract with a registered importer to perform conformance work. This would allow a Canadian citizen to import a Canadian market car, without himself becoming a registered importer.

The second issue is whether a Canadian company is permitted to be a registered importer. We believe that a registered importer is a person who is physically present in the territory in which importation occurs, as opposed to an exporter, who is outside t hat territory. While we are not conversant with the laws of the individual States, we believe that a Canadian company could qualify to do business within an individual State, and become a registered importer. Thus, it is not necessary to be a U.S. "citiz en", but it is necessary to be subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The 1988 Act requires the registered importer regulation to contain requirements for recordkeeping, and inspection of records and facilities. Since the jurisdiction of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act does not extend beyond the boundaries of the United States, we believe that it would be difficult to enforce our provisions on inspection of premises, documents, etc. in the territory of another country.

This brings us to your fifth and final request, that we "allow modifications to be done in either the United States or Canada." Under current regulations, conformance work is permitted to be performed outside the united States. However, vehicles modifi ed in this fashion must be admitted under the same procedures as if they had not been modified. This allows the agency to review the documents on pre-importation conversion work, to ensure that it has been satis- factorily accomplished, before the confo rmance bond is released. Accordingly, we believe that the concern underlying this request has already been accommodated.

If, after reviewing this letter, you have further suggestions for reducing the burdens that the new law may have imposed on importations of Canadian-manufactured vehicles, I would be happy to consider them.

Enclosure

ID: nht92-7.31

Open

DATE: April 23, 1992

FROM: John J. Duncan, Jr. -- Member of Congress, House of Representatives, Washington, DC

TO: Jerry R. Curry -- Administrator, NHTSA

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 5/29/92 from Jerry Ralph Curry to John J. Duncan, Jr. (A39; Part 571.3)

TEXT:

I am writing in regard to a problem which has been brought to my attention by Clarence Lowe of the Campbell County Comprehensive High School.

Attached is correspondence received from Mr. Lowe in which he outlines the difficulties being experienced in using vans for the Campbell County School System.

As you may know, Campbell County made the national news recently when they simply ran out of funds for bus transportation to get children to school. Campbell County is a very rural area. Furthermore, because of economic hardships, the average income per capita is very low making it even more difficult for parents to get their children to school if transportation is not provided by the school system.

Even though bus transportation was restored recently, another problem has arisen with regard to using vans to transport students for such things as off-campus curriculum experiences or extra-curricular activities. In the instance of extra-curricular activities, many times, because of this restriction, this means splitting the students up and transporting them in automobiles so they will be able to get to the event.

Although none of us want to put our children at risk, I wonder what the logic of this restriction is if, in fact, it only results in either restricting a child's education, such as off-campus curriculum, or transporting children in an even less safe manner by reverting to individual cars filled to capacity.

Unfortunately, with the financial restraints we are all witnessing at the federal, state and local government levels the added costs of trying to convert these vans to meet the standards set forth by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) appear to have put an unrealistic and unsurmountable burden on our schools.

Attached is a copy of a letter from Mr. Ernest Farmer, Director of Pupil Transportation for the State of Tennessee. Mr. Farmer appears to agree that there may be reason to investigate this matter. At present, Mr. Farmer feels that he has no alternative but to comply with these federal mandates unless directed otherwise by NHTSA. In telephone discussions with your Chief Counsel, Ken Weinstein, there was some question as to whether these restrictions were on the manufacturers of these vans or on the school systems that were using older, previously purchased vans for transportation of students.

Your response specifically outlining what federal requirements must be complied with would be sincerely appreciated. Also, it would be appreciated if you would advise me as to whether or not any changes in regard to the use of older, previously purchased vans were done through specific legislative changes or through regulations.

Your assistance in this matter would be greatly appreciated. With best wishes and personal regards, I am your truly.

Attachments

Letter dated 2/2/192

To: Congressman John J. Duncan, Jr.

House of Representatives Attention Judy Whitbred Washington, DC

Dear Congressman Duncan:

The purpose of this letter is to clarify our conversation last week concerning the problem of vans held for use in our vocational programs in the Campbell County (Tennessee) School System.

As you are aware, the Campbell County Board of Education elected to end all bus transportation for its students in late October due to severe budget deficits. This caused a great hardship for our schools, students, parents, and the county in general. Last week the County Commission approved budget transfers within the school budget to allow the restart of bus transportation on February 12, for 37 school days. We still face a possibility of no bus transportation at the end of those 37 days.

The next day after buses stopped running in our county, Tennessee State Department of Education officials within the Pupil Transportation Division informed our county education department that all school vans must be pulled off the road. They cited regulations of the U.S. Department of Transportation based on congressional legislation concerning the use of vans to transport students. I forwarded to you, after our conversation, copies that I obtained from our vocational director that related to this matter and seemed to be the basis for which the state department made its decision.

Our county vocational department had assisted our two high schools with the purchase of four vans for the purpose of transporting general building trades students from the school to the job site and back to school each day. This hands-on work experience is vital to teaching students the building trade skill. In addition, the county vocational department purchased another van for use by all vocational programs to transports students to off-campus curriculum experiences (such as clinical training for our health occupations students), meetings, conferences, conventions, and other school related functions. The building trades program has always had some types of vans for transportation purposes. Also, our athletic department has their own vans for transporting student athletes to the game sites. They too were pulled off the road. In a

time of no bus transportation and critical budget cuts, another hardship was imposed upon our educational programs.

Thus, the purpose of my contacting your office is to see if the regulations mandated concerning school van usage is still applicable and if so, might there be some relief at the federal level to allow us to use the vans or bring them into compliance without placing our school system in danger of tort liability. We would hope that the cost to comply would not prohibit our using the vans. Due to limited funds and lack of budgeted monies this may not even be an option.

The vans purchased by our vocational department are 15 passenger type. Vans are classified as either multi-purpose passenger vehicles or van conversions. Vans containing more than ten seating accommodations must meet Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. All vans in questions were purchased prior to the November 14, 1990 memo from the Tennessee Department of Education addressing the use of vans. Thus, it appears that our school officials had no knowledge that such regulations applied. Further, a state inspection was held on May 3, 1988, of all buses and vans in our county. All of our vans and the athletic vans passed this inspection. The only requests made of us was to number the vans, install a fire extinguisher and a first-aid kit. Only one of the vocational vans in question was in service at that time. This van, a 1987 Dodge, is held for use by all vocational programs was inspected and passed. Following that time, four new vans were purchased to replace older vans in the general building trades program. Purchased on December 8, 1988, were two 89 Ford vans, on March 21, 1989, one 89 Ford van, and on January 12, 1991, one 90 Ford Van. I am enclosing supporting memos of this inspection and related van purchase transactions.

Upon order from state officials, our vocational director, Miss Sharon Mills, stopped all vocational instructors from using the vans to transport students. Since that time our building trade students have not been to a job site for training. There is no way to transport them. Using school buses is much too expensive as those buses are privately owned. An off-campus building project had to be canceled due to the transportation problem. Their vans sit parked on the campus. An option might be to sell all the vans and use the money received from the sale toward purchase of "approved" vans. That might sound good, but there is no way to replace like numbers and the cost of new vehicles would not be something affordable in our already strapped school budget.

The van which I am most familiar with is the 1987 Dodge. I have used this van to take students to leadership conferences, conventions, competitive events, and other related programs that concern the area which I teach. This van has a tag attached which classifies it as a bus and states that this vehicle conforms to all applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety standards on the date of manufacture.

To cite an example of our dilemma, on February 6, 1992, I had to use private automobiles to transport 12 students to a competitive event in Knoxville (some 40 miles) while the van could only be used to carry our computer equipment. No students were allowed to ride in the van. This is the same problem that our athletic teams face on a regular basis while their vans sit parked or carry their equipment. The burden of getting transportation has

placed many restrictions upon our curricula and extra-curricula activities. Our students stand again to be the losers in the whole matter. I am already faced with finding suitable transportation for my students to their state competition in Nashville on March 12-14, and the national competition in Cincinnati in late April. This is a similar problem faced by Several of my colleagues in our county and apparently across the state.

I would greatly appreciate your assistance in investigating this matter. Please let me know if I can supply additional information. You may reach me at (615) 562-9118 (school) or (615) 562-1303 (home). You can reach the vocational director Sharon Mills, at (615) 562-8377.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence Lowe, Instructor Office Education/Computer Technology

Letter dated 3/20/92

To: Congressman John Duncan House of Representatives 115 Cannon Building Washington, D.C. 20515

Attention: Ms. Judy Whitbred

Dear Congressman Duncan:

In 1975 the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) amended its definition of a school bus to include vehicles that are "likely to be significantly used" for pupil transportation. The memo, in an effort to further clarify the agency's action, noted that "VAN TYPE VEHICLES, USED FOR MANY PURPOSES, WILL BE PARTICULARLY AFFECTED BY THE NEW AMENDMENT --- SINCE THEY ARE NOT DESIGNED FOR, OR INTENDED TO BE USED AS, A PRIMARY SOURCE OF TRANSPORTATION FOR SCHOOL CHILDREN. THE AMENDMENT MAKES THE VANS SUBJECT TO FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS (FMVSS) if they are SOLD FOR USE AS A SCHOOL BUS". (The effective date of this amendment to the Motor vehicle and School Bus Safety Act, AS AMENDED IN 1974, is OCTOBER 27, 1976). (See Attachment #1)

The FORD RENT-A-CAR SYSTEM, a division of the FORD MOTOR COMPANY, issued a bulletin (FRCS Bulletin #923) to its members instructing them not to rent their CLUB WAGONS and SUPER WAGONS for the transportation of PRE PRIMARY, PRIMARY OR SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS to and from school or school related events since they fall, by virtue of their seating capacity, within the definition of a bus. (Ten (10) capacity or greater) (49 Code of Federal Regulations S 571.3). (See Attachment #2)

In November 1990, we issued a follow-up memo on the subject to all Superintendents/Directors of schools with programs of pupil transportation service in an effort to bring them into total compliance with the provisions of this NHTSA Amendment. (See Attachment #3)

The memo, perhaps, understandably became one of the most, if not the most, controversial memos ever issued from this office for several reasons. In the first place, the use of van type vehicles for school transportation purposes dates from the years of World War II when it was virtually impossible to purchase newly manufactured, or even factory reconditioned, buses. In the next place, these units (VANS) are much more "economical" to purchase than the specially constructed "VAN CONVERSIONS" hence the basis of their growing popularity among school officials as "extracurricular vehicles". Finally, school officials are hard pressed to find accidental data that conclusively supports this highly questionable action on the part of the NHTSA. Few, if any, can document, from personal experience in their own school systems, multifatality accidents involving their useage. They have no problem, however, detailing accidents, though fortunately not multi-fatal at this time, involving the operation of passenger cars, station wagons and other type vehicles placed in service to compensate for their loss.

As the State Director of Pupil Transportation, I have no alternative, as I see it, but to comply with such Federal Regulations unless directed to do otherwise which is something that I do not see forthcoming. I must, therefore, continue my enforcement efforts until the amendment is withdrawn by the NHTSA, which is something else that I do forsee as happening.

Again, thank you for your interest in pupil transportation and for your efforts to assist our school officials in maintaining an "acceptable" level of service for their public school children.

Sincerely yours,

Ernest Farmer, Director of Pupil Transportation

cc: Wayne Qualls Captain Ralph Swift

NHTSA 12/30/75 press release

Concerns the definition of school bus. (Text omitted)

ID: ntea2.ztv

Open

    Mr. Michael Kastner
    Director of Government Relations
    National Truck Equipment Association
    1300 19th Street, Fifth Floor
    Washington, DC 20036-1609

    Dear Mr. Kastner:

    This is in reply to your letter of April 22, 2003, asking 20 questions relating to the early warning reporting (EWR) regulations issued by this agency (Subpart C, 49 CFR Part 579). By letter dated April 11, 2003, we previously answered several other questions you asked about these regulations. Your questions, and our responses, are as follows:

      "1) For manufacturers of fewer than 500 vehicles per year, is NHTSA requiring a report for each quarter when there are no fatalities?"

      No.

        "A) If not, are low volume and equipment manufacturers still required to submit a request for an m [User] ID and password when they have no fatalities to report?"

        No.

        "B) Is it true that low volume and equipment manufacturers can submit reports for fatalities in writing to NHTSA?"

        No. "Low volume" and equipment manufacturers eligible to report under Section 579.27 must submit reports of claims and notices involving deaths in one of the two ways specified under Section 579.29(a)(2), either by submitting them to the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) early warning repository through the use of templates available through NHTSAs internet home page, or by filling out an interactive form on ODIs early warning website.

      "2) Is there another method for requesting and receiving a [User] ID and password, and also the designation of manufacturer's contacts, besides writing to the Director or [sic] ODI, as required under Part 579.29?"

      No.

        "A) If [a request for] an ID and password is submitted in writing within the required period, and it is not received prior to the due date for the reports, what should a manufacturer do?"

        ODI will attempt to provide user IDs and passwords well before the due dates for reporting. If a manufacturer does not receive that information by the due date, it should notify ODI which will take appropriate action. We would then expect reports to be submitted within 10 working days after the manufacturer receives the User ID and password.

        "B) Also, if a low volume or equipment manufacturer has no fatalities to report, are they still required to submit a request for an ID and password and the designation of the manufacturer's contacts?"

        No.

      "3) Part 579.29 - Manner of Reporting, indicates that the required reports must be submitted to NHTSA's early warning data repository identified on NHTSA's Internet home page (www.nhtsa.dot.gov). As of April 21, 2003, there does not appear to be any reference to the repository or to early warning reporting in general, including the Excel templates on the home page. When will the repository, Excel templates and any other information be listed on the home page?"

      The NHTSA home page contains a link to "Early Warning Reporting (EWR) Requirements" under the list of "Popular Information."That link will take the viewer to templates and other information which are available now for downloading. Templates may be updated, as necessary. Manufacturers are encouraged to check the website periodically for any such updates.

        "A) Also, Part 579.29 indicates that manufacturers of fewer than 500 vehicles per year and equipment manufacturers can either submit reports to the data repository "or by manually filling out an interactive form on NHTSA's early warning web site." Where is this located, and are there instructions/examples for using this interactive form? (See question 1 regarding low volume/equipment mfg.)"

        There will be a link from the NHTSA website. We will also provide an information manual on how manufacturers are to report to ODI.

      4) [Answered by the Final Rule published April 15, 2003, 68 FR 18136]

      "5) For manufacturers that have production of 500 or more vehicles for the first time in the 2003 calendar year or after, but not in any prior year, what would be their reporting obligations?"

        "A) If such a manufacturer reaches a production level of 500 for the very first time in the 4th quarter of a given calendar year, are they then responsible for submitting reports for the 4th quarter and each of the prior 3 quarters of that calendar year?"

        In this situation, a manufacturer would submit reports under Section 579.27 for the first three calendar quarters, and, for the fourth quarter, reports under Sections 579.21-24, according to the type of vehicle manufactured.

        "B) If so, would such a manufacturer also be required to submit a one-time historical report?"

        The one-time historical report is due only on the date specified in Section 579.28(c), and would not be required from a manufacturer that begins to submit reports under sections 579.21-.24 at a subsequent date.

        C) [Moot]

        "D) How are the reporting obligations for the quarterly reporting and one-time historic report determined for manufacturers whose production fluctuates above and below 500 vehicles per year for the previous 2 or more years?"

        The EWR regulations provide that if a manufacturers aggregate production of a vehicle type "during the calendar year of the reporting period or during each of the prior two calendar years is 500 or more," the manufacturer is not eligible to report under Section 579.27 for that type, and must provide quarterly reports and a one-time historical report in accordance with Section 579.28(c). See, e.g. the introductory text of Section 579.22.

      "6) When acting as an intermediate stage manufacturer, how are vehicles that are modified treated? Are they counted for production?"

      As we explained in our letter of April 11, 2003 to you, for vehicles manufactured in two or more stages, only the manufacturer of the completed vehicle is required to report as a vehicle manufacturer. Incomplete vehicles, including vehicles produced by intermediate manufacturers, are deemed to be equipment, and information about them need not be reported under Sections 579.21-.24. However, we recognize that some light vehicle manufacturers may choose to include information about their incomplete chassis along with their other vehicles for which they report under Section 579.21. The final rules definition of "type" includes "incomplete vehicle" as a category of "light vehicle." Therefore, such a manufacturer would report production numbers and other data for incomplete vehicles that will be light vehicles when completed.

        "A) Are intermediate stage manufacturers considered to be equipment manufacturers, since they are not completing the incomplete vehicle?"

        See prior answer.

      "7) Production Number reporting - do manufacturers of vehicles built in 2 or more stages count both the vehicles that they complete from incomplete chassis and the number of vehicles that they alter? The OEM of the completed vehicles that are altered, such as a pickup truck with the box removed and a new body added, would already have counted the completed pickup in their production numbers, so would the alterer need to count it as well after their manufacturing operations?"

      Yes. A manufacturer must include in its production numbers any vehicle to which it attaches, or should attach, a certification under Part 567, either as its original manufacturer or as its alterer.

        "A) Are used vehicles that are modified counted toward production, warranty claims, etc. since the company performing this is technically not a "manufacturer" at this point, but a repair facility? Ex. a used chassis that has a new body installed on it."

        As a general rule, a used chassis with a new body installed is not considered a new vehicle, and no reporting is required under the EWR regulations. In addition, modifications of used vehicles, with two exceptions, are insufficient to create a new vehicle subject to NHSTA regulations that apply to new vehicles. Those two exceptions are based upon the extent of the modifications. See Sections 571.7(e), Combining new and used components, and 571.7(f), Combining new and used components in trailer manufacture. These provisions may be relevant to the operations of some NTEA members.

        "If so, what model year is used for reporting, the original model year of the vehicle or the year in which it was modified?"

        If a truck or trailer is considered newly manufactured under Sections 571.7(e) or (f), the model year would be that of the year of the vehicles modification, and reporting would be required under the EWR regulations in the same manner as other new motor vehicles. If a truck or trailer is not considered newly manufactured under these sections, no reporting is required. This moots your remaining questions under "A."

        "B) Along the same lines, under Part 571.7(e) and (f), since certain vehicles are excluded from Subpart B, does it make a difference whether a vehicle that is modified after the first retail sale is considered newly manufactured or not with regard to being counted toward production. For example, if it is not newly manufactured is it

        accounted for, and if so how? If it is considered newly manufactured is it accounted for, and if so, how? If not, what about when a new VIN is issued? If so, for a vehicle with a new VIN, what model year would be used to designate it?"

        See our answers to questions 7 and 7 A) above.

        "C) Also under Part 571.7(c), since military vehicles are excluded from Subpart B, are vehicles and/or equipment produced and sold to the US Armed Forces counted toward production and included in reporting of warranty claims, consumer complaints, field reports, etc.?"

        The exclusion of Section 571.7(c) is limited to compliance with the Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS) and does not extend to other NHTSA regulations applicable to motor vehicles. We would expect manufacturers of vehicles that they would otherwise be required to certify, such as staff (passenger) cars and some trucks, to submit reports under the EWR regulations in the same manner as manufacturers of non-military motor vehicles certified by their manufacturers.

        "D) Vehicles modified for mobility of the disabled are allowed to use the exemption from the make inoperative prohibition under which the first purchase of a vehicle in good faith for purposes other than retail is defined as the point at which the seller and the end user enter into a sales contract that identifies a specific vehicle to be delivered in the Final Rule of February 27, 2001. Are vehicles that are modified under this provision counted for production purposes?"

        Part 595 only applies to modifications made after first sale. Therefore, they will be counted for EWR purposes by their original manufacturers, and not by the modifier.

      "8) What are the model years of production volumes that need to be reported for the one-time historic and on-going quarterly reports? The July 10, 2002 (sic) indicates that production volumes from 1994 to the present must be reported for each year of the one-time report and then a moving window of the current model year plus the past 9 model years for the quarterly reports (i.e. is it provided for every year starting with 1994 and carries forward so there are always 9 years plus the current year shown on the quarterly reports?)."

      For the quarterly reports, the reports must cover all vehicles "manufactured during the reporting period and the nine model years prior to the earliest model year in the reporting period." See, e.g., the introductory text of Section 579.22. For the one-time historic report, each of the twelve reports must cover claims and field reports applicable to vehicles back to model year 1994.

        "A) Can you please give examples of what production information should be submitted for both the one-time historical report and the quarterly reports?"

        The production information that is required for quarterly reports and the one-time historical report by manufacturers is described in the introductory text of Sections 579.21- 579.24, and subsection (a) of each of these sections. See the production template at NHTSAs EWR website for an example of the information that is to be submitted.

        "B) Also, are the one-time historical reports to be produced utilizing the quarterly spreadsheet templates?"

        Manufacturers should use the templates for the production numbers and the number of warranty claims and field reports for their one-time historical report.

        "If so, what would be the file name strategy vs. the quarterly reports?"

        ODI is developing a "naming convention" which will be covered in an early warning reporting manual that will be issued in the near future.

      "9) Can the one-time historical report for warranty claims, warranty adjustments and field reports be submitted electronically?"

      The one-time historical report should be filed electronically in the same manner as quarterly reports under Section 579.29(a).

      "10) The Final Rule published on January 28, 2003 indicates that NHTSA would allow electronic submission of foreign defect reports under Part 579.11, so that they may be transferred by email or fax. Does this apply to other documents required under Part 579.11, specifically the annual list of substantially similar vehicles?"

      Yes. Moreover, NHTSA is developing a template for these submissions.

      "11) Clarification - are manufacturers responsible for reporting warranty claims, consumer complaints, etc. for equipment that was installed after the first retail sale by someone or themselves?"

      We assume that the last phrase of this question meant to say "by someone other than themselves." Vehicle manufacturers need not report warranty claims, etc. under those circumstances. However, they would have to report a claim or notice about a death or injury regarding their product, even if they believe the claim arose out of the performance of an aftermarket addition.

      "12) Are manufacturers responsible for reporting warranty claims, consumer complaints, etc. for altered vehicles? If they don't count toward the alterer's production count, it would seem then that they should be excluded from reporting in any of the other categories not involving deaths or injuries."

      Alterers are responsible for reporting on the vehicles they alter. If an alterer has certified, or was required to certify, 500 or more vehicles per year within a specific vehicle category, it is required to submit production numbers, the number of warranty claims, consumer reports, etc.

      "13) What are the rules for forwarding information that is received from other manufacturers in regards to external communications? Do engineering bulletins that are produced by another manufacturer and sent to more than one other manufacturer, dealer, customer, etc. and then redistributed by one of the recipients who also happens to be a manufacturer, have to be sent to NHTSA by the manufacturer recipient who re-distributes the bulletin/communication?"

      Yes, they must do so under Section 579.5, even though the information may also be submitted by the original issuer of the document.

      "14) Is there a hierarchy of reporting categories for incidents that fit more than one reporting category? E.g. how would an incident that starts as a consumer complaint that turns into a warranty claim be logged? Both as a consumer complaint and warranty claim or just one of them?"

      The incident would be reported both as a consumer complaint and as a warranty claim.

      "15) Make - Is it acceptable to use the chassis manufacturer's designation for the make and model?"

      No. Our system will not accept submissions that attempt to specify multiple, unrelated manufacturers producing the same make, model, and model year vehicle. For EWR purposes, a final stage manufacturer can create a pseudo make by combining the final stage manufacturers name with the chassis make, such as Widget Ford, Widget Dodge, Widget Volvo, etc., used in conjunction with the appropriate model application. If a single body is installed on various chassis of a single manufacturer, the model designation would be modified to reflect the chassis. From the example above, Widget Ford becomes Widget Ford 150, Widget Ford 250, etc.

      Whichever way a final stage manufacturer identifies a product in its production data, that product identification must be applied throughout each quarterly report (i.e., Death, Injury, Warranty, Consumer Complaints, etc.) as well as in all future quarterly reports.

      "16) What constitutes structure"?

      For purposes of the EWR regulations, "Structure" is defined in Section 579.4(b).

        "A) If truck bodies are considered structures, are all components of the truck body considered to be part of the structure for warranty claims, consumer complaints, etc.?"

        Yes.

        "B) If yes, what about latch mechanisms on the body compartments-would they be categorized under latch-17?"

        Yes. "Latch," as defined in Section 579.4(b), applies to latching devices on "doors" of all exterior body compartments.

        "C) Further, are there any components of truck body that would not be reportable for warranty claims, consumer complaints, etc.?"

        A manufacturer that has certified a completed truck is not required to report the number of property damage claims, consumer complaints, warranty claims, and field reports, involving a body component that is not considered "structure." However, the manufacturer would be required to report incidents involving death or injury with respect to such a component, using Code 98.

          "i Clarification - are paint runs or dents or scratches reportable as warranty claims, consumer complaints, etc.?"

          No. These do not relate to any systems or components of a vehicle specified in the regulations.

          "ii What about equipment that is attached to or stored within a body? How would they be classified? Examples: ladder racks, generators, welding equipment, cranes, tool boxes, liquid storage tanks, sprayers, etc."

          Equipment attached to the exterior of a body could create a safety problem if it detaches from the body while the trailer is in motion should be classified as "structure." Please note that the definition of "structure" includes mounting elements such as brackets and fasteners. On the other hand, equipment stored within a trailer is normally related to the structure of the vehicle. However, an incident that occurs that is due in whole or in part to the equipment, such as a fire or an incident involving a death, would be reportable.

          "(a) And, would it make a difference if the vehicle to which the equipment is attached was completed from an incomplete vehicle vs. an altered vehicle with the same equipment?"

          No.

      "17) Would the definition of latch include locking/latching mechanisms that are located internally to a vehicle, such as on the inside of a second unit body of a truck or the interior of a trailer?"

      No. The definition of "latch" relates only to a vehicles exterior doors.

      "18) Would power take-off (PTO) issues be classified?"

        "A) If so, how?"

        "B) What about transmission mounted vs. engine mounted PTO's? Would the mounting location change the classification?"

        Claims and other items involving PTOs would be reportable in the context of how they affect the vehicle or roadway safety; e.g., if a PTO failure causes the engine to seize, then it would be reported in the "Engine and Engine Cooling" category; if a hydraulic line to a PTO ruptures causing a fire, it would be reported under "Fire;" if there is an electrical problem as a result of a failure or problem with a PTO, then it would be reported under "Electrical System."

      "19) In regards to the one-time historical report, the Production Information of Part 579.22 indicates that "[i]f the service brake system in a vehicle is not readily characterized as either hydraulic or air, the vehicle shall be considered to have hydraulic service brakes." Brake system information is not readily accessible in the records of many final-stage manufacturers, however, GVWR information typically is available. Given this, could manufacturers base their brake system designations on GVWR for the lack of any records to indicate otherwise? Some companies manufacture vehicles that are primarily under 20,000 Lbs. GVWR while others primarily manufacture Class 8 (over 33,000 Lbs. GVWR) vehicles. The guidance provided would be proper for assuming a hydraulic brake system for vehicles that are under 20,000 Lbs. GVWR, but not for vehicles that are over 33,000 Lbs. as they are predominately equipped with air brakes."

      With respect to the service brake issues in the one-time historic report, the manufacturer should provide the warranty claim counts, as they are available. If the counts are not divided by type of service brake system, the approach suggested by NTEA is acceptable except that to prevent any gaps, vehicles with a gross vehicle weight less than 30,000 lbs. GVWR should be filed in Service Brake System, Hydraulic, and all others in Service Brake System Air.

      "20) Part 573.5(a) states that [e]ach manufacturer of a motor vehicle shall be responsible for any safety-related defect or any noncompliance determined to exist in the vehicle or in any item of original equipment. Does this mean that a final-stage manufacturer would be required to perform a recall on vehicles that it completes where the defect or noncompliance lies within the incomplete chassis upon which the completed vehicle is based?"

      Recall responsibility rests primarily with the manufacturer that certified the completed vehicle. See Sections 568.7, 571.3, 573.5. If the final stage manufacturer certified the vehicle, then it is primarily responsible for remedying any safety-related defect or noncompliance in the vehicle, including the portion of the vehicle manufactured by the incomplete vehicle manufacturer. If an incomplete vehicle manufacturer or intermediate manufacturer certified the vehicle, then it is responsible for remedying the safety defect or noncompliance regardless of the manufacturer of the part or system that is the subject of the recall. Of course, the final stage manufacturer could seek indemnification or other redress from the incomplete vehicle manufacturer.

        "A) Further, are incomplete vehicles considered to be "original equipment" for reporting purposes?"

        See answer to Question 6.

      If you have further questions, you may call Taylor Vinson of this Office (366-5263).

      Sincerely,

      Jacqueline Glassman
      Chief Counsel

      ref:579
      d.5/14/03

2003

ID: 12-00245._ITA_Defective_Tire_Exportation

Open

Sarah L. Wilson

Covington & Burling LLP

1201 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004-2401

 

Re: TREAD Act Provisions involving Defective Tires

 

Dear Ms. Wilson:

 

This letter responds to your January 19, 2012 letter on behalf of ITR USA, Inc. requesting an interpretation of certain provisions of the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation Act, Pub. L. No. 106-414, 114 Stat. 1800 et. seq. (2000) (TREAD Act). You ask for clarification regarding two requirements under the TREAD Act: the requirement in Section 7 that directs tire manufacturers, which includes importers, conducting recalls to include in their remedy program plans addressing how to prevent replaced tires from being resold for installation on a motor vehicle and the prohibition in Section 8 that forbids the sale or lease of motor vehicle equipment (including tires), for installation on a motor vehicle, that is the subject of a recall. Sections 7 and 8 have been codified in 49 U.S.C. 30120(d) and (j), respectively.

 

You ask three questions: (1) Do 49 U.S.C. 30120(d) and (j) and 49 CFR 573.12 prohibit the export of recalled, defective or noncompliant tires for resale in foreign countries for use on a motor vehicle? (2) Must recalled tires be incapacitated pursuant to 49 U.S.C.

30120(d) and 49 CFR 573.6(c)(9)(ii)(A) by means of permanent physical alteration (e.g., by cutting a hole in their sidewalls) or would cosmetic alteration (e.g., removal of Department of Transportation identification numbers) be sufficient? And (3) May a manufacturer dispose of recalled tires pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 30120(d) and 49 CFR 573.6(c)(9)(iii) by exporting them for either vehicular or non-vehicular use?

 

A brief background on the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, as amended including by the TREAD Act (as amended, the Safety Act) will be helpful in understanding these TREAD Act requirements.

 

The TREAD Act and Regulation of Tire Recalls.

 

The Safety Act requires manufacturers to recall motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment that do not comply with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard (FMVSS) or contain a defect related to motor vehicle safety. See 49 U.S.C. 30118(c).



 

One part of a recall is the remedy program. See 49 U.S.C. 30120. Under the Safety Act, both the fabricating manufacturer and the importer of vehicles and equipment are responsible for implementing a recall. See 49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(5), 49 CFR 573.5.

 

Congress passed the TREAD Act in 2000, in part, as a reaction to congressional concerns related to tire recalls conducted by Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. See 66 Fed. Reg. 65165 (Dec. 18, 2001). As reflected in your letter, the TREAD Act addresses the sale of recalled tires that are noncompliant or contain a safety-related defect. 49 U.S.C. 30120(j) prohibits the sale or lease of any motor vehicle equipment (including a tire) for installation on a motor vehicle, that is subject to a recall under 49 U.S.C. 30118(b) or (c) in a condition that the equipment may be reasonably used for its original purpose. There are two limited exceptions to this prohibition: (1) the defect or noncompliance is remedied as required by

30120 before delivery under the sale or lease, or (2) notification of the defect or noncompliance is required under 30118(b) but enforcement of the order is set aside in a civil action. 49 U.S.C. 30120(j)(1) and (2). In addition, 49 U.S.C. 30120(d) addresses remedies. It provides, in part: In the case of a remedy program involving the replacement of tires, the manufacturer shall include a plan addressing how to prevent, to the extent reasonably within the control of the manufacturer, replaced tires from being resold for installation on motor vehicles . . . .

 

The regulations implementing 49 U.S.C. 30120(d) address the sale of defective tires more particularly. 49 CFR 573.6(c)(9) specifies a number of requirements on a manufacturers remedy program for replacement of defective or noncompliant tires. To begin, the manufacturers plan must address how the manufacturer will assure that the entities replacing tires are aware of legal requirements. A manufacturer must notify its owned stores and distributors, as well as independent outlets that are authorized to replace the tires that are subject to the recall, about the ban on sales of new defective or noncompliant tires (49 CFR 573.11), the prohibition on the sale of new and used defective and noncompliant tires (49 CFR 573.12), and the duty to notify NHTSA of any sale of a new or used recalled tire for use on a motor vehicle (49 CFR 573.10). 49 CFR 573.6(c)(9)(i). In addition, the manufacturers remedy program must address how it will prevent, to the extent reasonably within its control, the recalled tires from being resold for installation on a motor vehicle. 573.6(c)(9)(ii). The plan must include written directions to alter the recalled tires permanently so that they cannot be used on a motor vehicle. See 573.6(c)(9)(ii)(A), (B) and (C).

 

In addition to preventing recalled tires from being installed on motor vehicles, the TREAD Act also sought to limit, to the extent reasonably within the control of the manufacturer, the disposal of recalled tires in landfills, particularly through shredding, crumbling, recycling, recovery, and other alternative-beneficial non-vehicular uses. See

49 U.S.C. 30120(d); 49 CFR 573.6(c)(9) (implementing regulations).

A.    Exporting recalled tires for use on a motor vehicle.

Your first question asks: Do 49 U.S.C. 30120(d) and (j) and 49 CFR 573.12 prohibit the export of recalled, defective or noncompliant tires for resale in foreign countries for use on a motor vehicle? As noted above, 49 U.S.C. 30120(j) explicitly prohibits the sale or lease of any motor vehicle equipment, including a tire, for installation on a motor vehicle that is subject to a recall. There are only two narrow exceptions, which arise if the defect or noncompliance is remedied or enforcement of the recall notice has been set aside in a civil action. 49 U.S.C. 30120(j)(1) and (2). Section 30120(j) clearly prohibits any sale or lease of a recalled tire, including an export that involves a sale, in a condition in which it can be used on a vehicle. In as much as this is a remedial provision, the term sale would be construed broadly.

 

NHTSAs multifaceted approach to implementing Section 30120(d) reflects the broad thrust of this program including the imperative of insuring that recalled tires do not end up being installed on vehicles. The manufacturers recall remedy plan must provide for incapacitation of the recalled tire. The plan must address how the manufacturer will prevent, to the extent reasonably within its control, replaced tires from being resold for installation on a motor vehicle. This includes written directions to manufacturer owned and controlled outlets to alter the recalled tires permanently so that they cannot be used on vehicles, including incapacitation of each recalled tire within 24 hours of receipt of the recalled tire at the outlet. In addition, written guidance is to be given to other outlets on how to alter the recalled tires promptly and permanently so that they cannot be used on vehicles. In the course of the rulemaking, NHTSA considered a petition for reconsideration to delete the requirement for prompt incapacitation of recalled tires. As the agency stated: For safety reasons, we have decided to retain a requirement for prompt incapacitation of returned recalled tires by retail outlets and others under the manufacturers control that receive such tires. 69 Fed. Reg. 50077, 50079 (Aug. 13, 2004). NHTSA explained: [w]e agree with [a commenter] that the best mechanism for ensuring that recalled tires are not reinstalled on vehicles (inadvertently or otherwise) is for prompt destruction of those tires. Id. at 50081.

 

Allowing a manufacturer to export recalled tires for resale in a foreign country would circumvent and undermine NHTSAs program, which implements 49 U.S.C. 30120(d) and (j). It would not ensure that recalled tires are not installed on vehicles. Unaltered defective tires exported by the manufacturer could be diverted to re-enter the stream of commerce or, if exported, could re-enter this country. Recalled tires would be resold for installation on a motor vehicle. Accordingly, the export of recalled defective or noncompliant tires for resale in foreign countries for use on a motor vehicle is prohibited by 49 U.S.C. 30120(d) and (j).

B.     Incapacitating tires by physical alteration.

Second, you ask whether recalled tires must be incapacitated pursuant to 49 U.S.C.

30120(d) and 49 CFR 573.6(c)(9)(ii)(A) by means of permanent physical alteration, or instead, whether cosmetic alteration is sufficient. As explained above, the TREAD Act requires manufacturers to develop a plan that addresses how they will prevent, within the extent reasonably within their control, recalled tires from being resold for installation on a motor vehicle. NHTSAs regulations require tire manufacturers to direct their owned and controlled outlets, and to provide written guidance to all other outlets, to alter or incapacitate the recalled tires promptly and permanently so that they cannot be used on vehicles. See 573.6(c)(9)(ii)(A)-B. Incapacitation in this context refers to the



 

destruction of those tires. 69 Fed. Reg. 50077, 50081 (Aug. 13, 2004). See also 66 Fed. Reg. at 65169 (alteration includes drilling substantial holes in the sidewalls, cutting the tire beads, or sawing the tires in half).

 

Cosmetic alterations, such as removing the DOT identification number, do not satisfy the agencys regulations. Cosmetic changes leave the tire functionally unchanged, allowing a recalled tire to be installed on a motor vehicle, whether inadvertently or otherwise. In addition, without identification numbers, potential dealers or purchasers may be unable to determine whether the tires were recalled. Accordingly, only functional incapacitation of unremedied recalled tires meets the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 30120(d) and 49 CFR 573.6(c)(9)(ii)(A).

C.    Disposal of recalled tires by exporting for either vehicular or non-vehicular use.

Last, you ask whether a manufacturer may dispose of recalled tires pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 30120(d) and 49 CFR 573.6(c)(9)(iii) by exporting them for either vehicular or non-vehicular use. As explained above, exporting unremedied recalled defective or noncompliant tires for resale in foreign countries for use on a motor vehicle in a condition that the tire may be reasonably used for its original purpose is prohibited by 49 U.S.C. 30120(d) and (j) and 49 CFR 573.6(c)(9)(iii). Similarly, this prohibition may not be circumvented by labeling such exportation of recalled tires that have not been incapacitated as disposal.

This prohibition on exporting tires that have not been incapacitated does not foreclose the disposal of incapacitated tires for non-vehicular use. For example, the incapacitated tires might be shredded and used in various ways. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 50082 ([T]he market conditions for recycling may change from time to time, and it would be inadvisable for us to advocate particular uses over others when those uses might become commercially infeasible, or when additional uses might subsequently be developed . . . . For these reasons, we are leaving the choice of beneficial non-vehicular reuse applications to manufacturers.). See also 66 Fed. Reg. at 65167 (discussing possible uses for scrap tires).

If you have questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Nicholas Englund, Litigation and Enforcement Attorney, the Office of Chief Counsel, at (202) 366-5263.

 

Sincerely,

 

 

 

 

O. Kevin Vincent

Chief Counsel

 

d: 10/3/12

Request an Interpretation

You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:

The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590

If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.

Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.

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