NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
| Interpretations | Date |
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ID: nht88-2.28OpenTYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA DATE: 05/18/88 FROM: HIROSHI KATO -- ASSISTANT VICE-PRESIDENT MMC SERVICES INC TO: ERIKA JONES -- CHIEF COUNSEL NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION TITLE: NONE ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 09/21/88 TO HIROSHI KATO FROM ERIKA Z JONES, REDBOOK A32, STANDARD 201 TEXT: Dear Ms. Jones: This letter serves to request an interpretation of the requirements of 49 CFR Part 571.201; Occupant Protection in Interior Impact for the "one-piece" instrument panels and console assemblies in the passenger vehicle interiors shown in the enclosures. We request that these enclosures be treated confidentially under the provisions of 49 CFR Part 512; Confidential Business Information. An affidavit attesting to the confidentiality is also enclosed. Section S3.1 of FMVSS 201 requires that the deceleration of the head foam impacted into the instrument panel within the head impact area must not exceed 80g continuously for 3 ms. The console assembly is exempted from this head impact areas as described in S3.1.1. In your letter to Tsuyoshi Shimizu of our office dated October 27, 1986, you defined the instrument panel to be the vehicle structure below the windshield used to mount a vehicle's gauges. Gauge is described in 49 CFR 571.101; Definitions under S4. to m ean a display that is listed in S5.1 or in Table 2 and is not a telltale. Specifically, gauges are listed in S5.1 as the speedometer, turn signal, gear position, brake failure warning, fuel, engine coolant temperature, oil, high beam, and electrical cha rge. Table 2 adds the following gauges: malfunction in anti-lock or brake systems, odometer, and automatic gear position. Based on this definitions, we determine the instrument panel to be areas where gauges are mounted which communicate critical vehicle functions to the driver. In contrast, the console assembly is where less essential functions are located, heater control panel, radio, ashtray, etc., which aid in occupant comfort.
Based on this judgment, we have delineated the separation of the instrument panel and console assembly on the enclosed diagrams just above the heater control panel (highlighted by a solid-slashed line). View Z on the same attachments shows the "setback" area which makes this boundary line clearer. While 49 CFR 571.103, Windshield Defrosting and Defogging Systems specifies performance criteria for the defroster and although we consider the defroster a necessary safety function, it is not a gauge and, th erefore, is not included as part of the instrument panel. I ask for your confirmation of this interpretation and the acceptability of our indicated separation of the instrument panels and console assemblies on the enclosed diagrams. If you have any questions, please call me at (313) 353-5444. Sincerely, ENCLOSURES (6) |
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ID: nht91-5.43OpenDATE: September 10, 1991 FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA TO: Rosemary Dunlap -- President, Motor Voters TITLE: None ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 6-19-91 from Rosemary Dunlap to Paul Jackson Rice (OCC 6150) TEXT: This responds to your letter seeking clarification of statements made by NHTSA's Associate Administrator for Rulemaking, Barry Felrice, at the July 1990 Public/Industry Meeting regarding possible federal preemption of proposed state disclosure legislation. Specifically, you requested us to provide legal support for Mr. Felrice's general statement that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Safety Act) may preempt state laws requiring safety information disclosures to be affixed to vehicles. During a telephone conversation on July 1, 1991, Elizabeth Barbour of my staff informed you that in order to provide an opinion as to whether the Safety Act would preempt a specific state bill, we would need to review the provisions of that bill as a whole. Accordingly, you forwarded a copy of California Assembly Bill No. 71 to this office and asked whether the bill, if enacted into law, would be federally preempted. We have reviewed the California bill. Because the question of preemption could turn on how the State of California would interpret the language in the bill and how it would be enforced if adopted, we are declining to provide a specific opinion as to whether or not the bill would be preempted. However, our discussion identifies the principles under which the validity of such legislation can be determined. The bill would add a new section 24011.5 to the California Vehicle Code to read as follows: 24011.5 (a) Every dealer or lessor shall affix to the dashboard or a window of every new multipurpose passenger vehicle sold or leased, or offered for sale or lease, a notice which specifies whether or not the vehicle meets the following federal safety standards applicable to passenger cars: (1) Side door strength; (2) Roof crush resistance; (3) Passive restraint devices; (4) Raised brake light. (b) The notice required by subdivision (a) shall not be smaller than 8 inches by 10 inches, and shall be printed in at least 20-point type and shall be affixed in such a manner as to be readily removable by the purchaser or lessee. (c) As used in this section, "passenger car" and "multipurpose passenger vehicle" have the same meaning as defined in regulations adopted pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act . . . . According to the California Legislative Counsel's Digest, other provisions of existing California law would make violation of this requirement a crime. At the outset, I would like to note that NHTSA has recently extended its standards/requirements on side door strength (FMVSS 214, quasi-static requirements only), roof crush resistance (FMVSS 216), passive restraint devices (FMVSS 208), and raised brake light (FMVSS 108) to cover most multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPV's). The amendments will become effective over the next several years. Therefore, we believe that this bill will become largely superfluous during that timeframe, since most MPV's will be required to be certified as complying with the enumerated requirements. We note, however, that there may be some slight differences in the way these requirements are applied to MPV's and the way they currently apply to passenger cars. By way of background information, Federal law, including agency regulations, can expressly or impliedly preempt state law. Under section 103(d) of the Safety Act, whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard is in effect, a state may not adopt or maintain a safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance which is not identical to the Federal standard. A non-identical state standard preempted under section 103(d) would be an example of express preemption. A requirement for a label related to safety could in some cases constitute a safety standard. For example, several Federal motor vehicle safety standards include requirements for permanent labels. We do not, however, believe that the California bill would constitute a safety standard. Therefore, it would not be expressly preempted under section 103(d). While the bill would require an information sheet to be affixed to the vehicle, the information sheet would be readily removable by the purchaser or lessee. Thus, the information sheet is not intended to remain affixed to the vehicle after sale. The requirement that the information sheet be affixed to the vehicle appears to be solely for the purpose of ensuring that a prospective purchaser will see it, and is thus akin to a requirement that the information be prominently displayed in the dealer showroom. Federal law impliedly preempts state law when (1) it is impossible to comply with both; (2) the federal interest in the field is so dominant that federalism principles prevent enforcement of complementary or auxiliary state laws; (3) the federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive as to be exclusive; or (4) state law hinders the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of federal law. See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 108 S. Ct. 1145, 1150-51 (1988). We do not believe that the California bill would be preempted under any of the first three factors cited above for implied preemption. The California bill would not make it impossible to comply with federal law. Further, the federal interest in this area is not so dominant that complementary state laws may not be enforced, and the federal regulatory scheme is not so pervasive as to be exclusive. There remains the issue of whether the California bill would be preempted as a state law which hinders the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of federal law. One problem in analyzing this question relates to the fact that we have difficulty understanding how the drafters of the California bill contemplate that the dealers/lessors subject to the requirements would be capable of complying with them. Dealers/lessors would have no way of knowing whether an MPV met particular passenger car requirements unless the manufacturer advised them. For example, while dealers/lessors could visually determine whether an MPV had a passive restraint or raised brake light, they would not know whether those devices met Federal standards for passenger cars. Dealers/lessors obviously could not determine from inspection whether an MPV met the side door strength or roof crush resistance requirements applicable to passenger cars. The drafters of the California bill may have assumed that dealers/lessors could obtain information from manufacturers concerning whether MPV's met particular requirements. However, even if manufacturers wanted to help their dealers comply with this requirement by providing such information, the manufacturers might not be able to do so. A manufacturer would not know whether its MPV's met certain passenger car standards unless it had conducted substantial testing. And it may not be possible to test some MPV's to passenger car standards, because of different vehicle configurations or other factors. If this were the case, it is unclear how anyone, including a manufacturer, would be able to determine whether an MPV met such a standard. One of the purposes of the Safety Act that is emphasized in the legislative history is the need for uniform standards. If the bill were interpreted as going beyond requiring dealers/lessors to disclose what they or manufacturers know and instead to require manufacturers or others to undertake significant testing, it would impose burdens similar to the certification burdens of a safety standard. For some standards, such as those involving crash tests, these burdens are quite large. We believe that a state disclosure law that imposed significant testing burdens, in connection with an aspect of performance for which NHTSA has issued a safety standard or decided not to issue such standard, would hinder the objective of uniform standards and be preempted under federal law. I hope this information is helpful to you. |
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ID: aiam1373OpenLewis S. Hollins, Esq., Attorney at Law, One Chester Drive, Great Neck, NY 11021; Lewis S. Hollins Esq. Attorney at Law One Chester Drive Great Neck NY 11021; Dear Mr. Hollins: Dr. Gregory has asked me to respond to your client's request fo approval of the 'Hollins system' interlock device. In an earlier version, the system was the basis of a petition for an alternative to Standard 208's seatbelt interlock system. That petition was denied by the NHTSA (38 FR 9830, April 20, 1973, and 38 FR 16072, June 20, 1973) as was a petition for reconsideration of our decision (38 FR 33110, November 30, 1973).; Standard 208 establishes performance requirements, but the NHTSA doe not approve or disapprove specific equipment designs. Any design can be used to satisfy Standard 208 which fulfills the performance requirements. We have considered Mr. Hollins' proposal and, as set our (sic) in the *Federal Register*, have determined that his requested changes to the performance requirements are not justified. We feel that our consideration of Mr. Hollins' petition has been full and complete, and that further petitions on this subject will be repetitious within the meaning of 49 CFR S553.35(c).; Sincerely, Lawrence R. Schneider, Chief Counsel |
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ID: 19751.wkmOpenMr. Barry McManus Dear Mr. McManus: This responds to your letter of March 17, 1999, to Walter Myers of my staff and to your telephone conversation with Mr. George Soodoo of this agency on March 22, 1999. You asked whether one of the products your company produces, a trailer-mounted water tower called the Klein Porto-Tower® (KPT), is required to be equipped with an antilock brake system (ABS). The answer is no. You stated that the KPT is a trailer-mounted water tank that is utilized at construction sites where it is elevated into position, then filled with water to supply water trucks and wagons working at the site. The KPT is always transported empty when being moved over the highway, and filled only at the job site. You advised Mr. Soodoo that the empty weight of the KPT is its gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 20,000 pounds, that the vehicle is equipped with an axle system rated at 22,000 pounds, and that when filled with water, the KPT weighs approximately 120,000 pounds. Thus, it can only be transported while empty because the axle system is inadequate to support the KPT when filled with water, and the tires and brakes are not sized for such a load. You stated that you have been equipping your KPT with ABS, while your competitors have not, which puts you at a competitive disadvantage. Finally, you stated that in reviewing Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (Standard) No. 121, Air brake systems (49 Code of Federal Regulations 571.121), you believe that the KPT is exempt from the ABS requirements of Standard No. 121 by virtue of paragraph S3(f). Paragraph S3(f) of Standard No. 121 excludes from the requirements of the standard "any trailer that has an unloaded vehicle weight which is not less than 95 percent of its GVWR, . . ." Thus, since the GVWR and the empty weight of the KPT are the same, and since the KPT is filled only when being used at work sites and is always completely emptied before being transported, it is excluded from the requirements of Standard No. 121, including the ABS requirements, by virtue of paragraph S3(f). I hope this information is helpful to you. Should you have any further questions or need additional information, feel free to contact Mr. Myers at this address, by telephone at (202) 366-2992, or by fax at (202) 366-3820. Sincerely, |
1999 |
ID: nht94-6.34OpenDATE: April 13, 1994 FROM: Richard Kreutziger -- Executive Director, New York State Bus Distributors Ass'n. TO: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA TITLE: None ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 4/25/94 from John Womack to Richard Kreutziger (A42; Std. 108) TEXT: I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR RESPONSE TO MY QUESTIONS FAXED TO YOU ON 1/12/94 AND 2/14/94. THE "APPENDIX" PROVIDED HAS AND I AM SURE WILL PROVIDE MUCH MORE BENEFIT IN TIME. I AM FACED, NOW, WITH A NEW QUANDARY. I CERTAINLY DO NOT MEAN TO IMPOSE ADDED WORK LOAD, AND I ASSURE YOU THAT I HAVE READ AND REREAD FMVSS 571.108 - LAMPS, REFLECTIVE DEVICES, AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT, FOR MY ANSWER. IN 571.108 SECTION S5.5.7 - REFERENCE TO VEHICLES INCLUDING BUSES, OF LESS THAN 80 INCHES OVERALL WIDTH - HAVE VERY DEFINITE WIRING PROGRAMS INCLUDED, PART (a) AND (b) - IN BOTH SUB-SECTIONS THE "MAKER LIGHTS" ARE REFERRED TO - WHICH HAVE TO BE ACTIVATED WHEN THE PARKING OR HEADLIGHT SWITCH IS ACTIVATED. MY "QUANDARY" IS - I CAN FIND NO LIKE OR SIMILAR SECTION REQUIRING THE ACTIVATION OF SPECIFIC LIGHTS ON VEHICLES OF MORE THAN 80 INCHES IN OVERALL WIDTH. ANY HELP AND/OR KNOWLEDGE OF A SIMILAR POSITION/FACTOR ON VEHICLES OF MORE THAN 80 INCHES IN WIDTH AS THOSE OF 80 INCHES OR LESS WILL BE GREATLY APPRECIATED. |
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ID: nht93-9.12OpenDATE: December 14, 1993 FROM: J. Hulshof -- NEDAP N.V. TO: Patrick Boyd -- Office for Rulemaking, NHTSA TITLE: Standard FMVSS 118 ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 4/12/94 from John Womack to J. Hulshof (A42; Std. 118) TEXT: Referring to our recent telecons we wish to inform you about the following. We have designed a SCU (Sunroof Control Unit) for a power operated roof panel system where the roof panel can be closed only in the following circumstances: 1. Ignition key activated AND continuous activation of close button 2. Ignition key activated AND short touch of close button (one shot close, close button is released and roof panel moves to closed position) 3. Continuous operation of Central close mechanism, not capable closing the roof panel from a distance of more than 6 meters from the vehicle. 4. Ignition key activated AND continuous operation of a PANIC button Note: System has no reversal mechanism acc. to the FMVSS 118 Referring to the above mentioned: Does the sunroof comply with the rules as stated in FMVSS 118? Are there any amendments to the FMVSS 188 in progress? We look forward to your answer. Note: For any reactions, our fax nr. in the USA: 815 633 6089 Attn. Bob Cooper, LMS |
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ID: 3261oOpen Mr. William Shapiro Dear Mr. Shapiro: This responds to your letter concerning the testing of hydraulic brake hose assemblies to the whip resistance requirement (S5.3.3) of Standard No. 106, Brake Hoses. I regret the delay in responding. Your question relates to Table II of Standard No. 106, which specifies the amount of slack that should be introduced when mounting brake hose assemblies on the whip test apparatus. (The amount of the hose indicated as "slack" in Table II is the difference between the projected length of the hose assembly (when mounted in the whip test machine) and the free length of the hose while maintained in a straight position.) Slack must be present in the hose when mounted on the whip test machine to enable the proper "whipping" movement of a brake hose assembly. Without slack, an assembly would probably be incapable of withstanding any rotation of the movable header of the whip test apparatus described in Standard No. 106 without rupturing. Table II specifies the amount of slack for some sizes of assemblies, and not for others. You ask whether a hydraulic brake hose assembly of a size falling in the latter category--viz., an assembly comprised of a brake hose that is 19 to 24 inches in free length, and which is more than one-eighth inch or three millimeters (mm.) in diameter--"need not be tested to meet or exceed the whip resistance requirement" of the standard. With regard to NHTSA's Standard No. 106 compliance testing, your understanding is correct that Table II does not specify the amount of slack for testing assemblies of the size you describe. Due to the absence of the slack specification, NHTSA does not require testing of such assemblies to the whip resistance requirements of the standard. With regard to your certification that the brake hose assemblies you manufacture comply with all applicable requirements of Standard No. 106, you are correct that hydraulic brake hose assemblies of the size you describe are not subject to the whip resistance requirements. However, the agency urges manufacturers to ensure that these assemblies perform in a safe manner while subject to environmental conditions of vehicle operations which may result in flexing of the brake hose or brake hose assembly. Please contact my office if you have further questions. Sincerely,
Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel ref:106 d:l2/9/88 |
1988 |
ID: 005048crowellpolicebarrier-dfOpenMr. Steven Crowell Dear Mr. Crowell: This responds to your letter concerning the permissibility of installing partitions between the front and rear seats in police vehicles. You ask whether installing a steel safety cage would be considered a violation of the "make inoperative" provision of 30122 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (49 U.S.C. 30101 et seq.). From our records of interpretations we have issued in the past, we see that you are familiar with this agencys requirements and have inquired into this area before. (NHTSA wrote you about this subject on September 13, 1985. A copy of our previous letter to you is enclosed.) Our basic requirements have not significantly changed since our earlier letter to you. The "render inoperative" provision of 15 U.S.C. 108(a)(2)(A) was recodified as 49 U.S.C. 30122, but no substantive change was made to the provision. As explained in our earlier letter, the entities listed in 30122 must not knowingly make inoperative the compliance of vehicles with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard. The make inoperative provision does not apply to individual owners who modify their own vehicles. Thus, a police department may modify its own vehicles without regard to 30101. As a general matter, NHTSA encourages vehicle owners not to alter their vehicles in a manner that degrades the overall safety of the vehicle. I hope this information is helpful. If you have further questions, please contact us. Sincerely, Stephen P. Wood Enclosure |
2005 |
ID: nht89-2.35OpenTYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA DATE: July 14, 1989 FROM: James M. Staples -- Director of Safety and Health, Bassett- Walker, Inc. TO: Emory L. Lariscy -- President, Lariscy Enterprises, Inc. TITLE: None ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 9-4-90 from P.J. Rice to E.J. Lariscy (A36; Std. 108; Std. 124; Std. 301); Also attached to letter dated 8-28-89 from E.L. Lariscy to G. Shifflett (OCC 3910) with Patent Application for Vehicle Safety Lighty Assembly (g raphics omitted); Also attached to letter dated 7-14-89 from J.M. Mundy to E. Lariscy; Also attached to letter dated 8-8-89 from L. Baer to E.L. Lariscy; Also attached to letter dated 7-28-89 from A.M. Kennedy to E.L. Lariscy TEXT: Several days ago, I had the opportunity to observe a vehicle that had a safety caution light installed in the rear window over the third brake light. As I was following this vehicle, I noticed this caution light would operate independently of the brake lighting system which alerted me that something was occurring with the vehicle ahead of me. This raised my awareness and when the vehicle, ahead of me with the caution light installed, began to decelerate and stop, to my surprise, I was able to react and began to brake before the brake lights came on indicating that the vehicle ahead was attemp ting to stop. An inquiry into this device has led me to write you and express my feelings from this experience. I was employed as a Police Officer for the City of Martinsville for 10 years and worked as a Traffic Officer five of those ten years, and during that time, I investigated many automobile accidents. I am now employed by Bassett-Walker, Inc. as Director o f Safety and Health, and have been in this capacity for the past eight years. From both of these positions, I can clearly see that if this device had been installed on vehicles, a large amount of the accidents which involved rear-end collisions could have been prevented. I certainly hope you will consider manufacturing and marketing this safety caution light because it is my opinion that this small device is a giant step in accident prevention which will save lives, reduce over all cost for insurance, property damage and bodily injury. |
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ID: 9427Open Ms. Lisa A. Norris Dear Ms. Norris: This is in reply to your letter of December 1, 1993, to Robert Hellmuth of this agency. You have written us questioning the disconnection of your original equipment center highmounted stop lamp when an aftermarket spoiler with lamp was installed on your Honda. American Honda has referred you to us, referencing an interpretation by our former Chief Counsel, Paul Jackson Rice. I enclose a copy of Mr. Rice's letter of August 31, 1990, to David Holscher which sets forth the agency's views on this subject. These views remain our position. The disconnecting of your lamp appears permitted under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 according to this interpretation. Because Federal authorities do not interpret the laws of the individual States, we are unable to comment on the Louisiana provisions that you paraphrase, except to note that "tail lights", as you refer to them, are not "stop lamps" under Standard No. 108. Taillamps are another item of lighting equipment and have no relevance to the wiring of the center highmounted stop lamp. Sincerely,
John Womack Acting Chief Counsel Enclosure ref:108 d:12/27/93 |
1993 |
Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.