NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
| Interpretations | Date |
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ID: aiam4501OpenMr. Terry E. Quinn Corporate Director of Quality Hehr International, Inc. PO Box 39160 Los Angeles, CA 90039-0160; Mr. Terry E. Quinn Corporate Director of Quality Hehr International Inc. PO Box 39160 Los Angeles CA 90039-0160; "Dear Mr. Quinn: This responds to your letter of last year concernin Standard No. 205, Glazing Materials. I regret the delay in our response. You explained that your company, Hehr International, is a prime glazing material manufacturer that tempers glazing material used in vehicular windows produced by your company and other companies. You stated that a prospective customer for your tempered glass does not wish to have your trademark appear on the glazing etch of its windows since it is a competitor of yours. You asked whether a prime manufacturer may sell its tempered glass without its distinctive designation or trademark. As explained below, Standard No. 205 requires that a manufacturer's distinctive designation appear on the glass. However, if the glass in question is marked with the prime manufacturer's DOT code mark, the designation marked on the glass may be the designation of the company that sells the glass, instead of the prime manufacturer. Section S6 of Standard No. 205 (49 CFR 571.205) sets forth the certification and marking requirements for glazing materials. Paragraphs S6.1 and S6.2 of the standard specify that each 'prime glazing material manufacturer' shall mark glazing materials manufactured by him in accordance with Section 6 of the American National Standard 'Safety Code for Glazing Materials for Glazing Motor Vehicles Operating on Land Highways,' Z-26.1 - 1977, January 26, 1977 as supplemented by Z26.1a July 3, 1980 (ANS Z-26). Paragraph S6.1 defines a 'prime glazing material manufacturer' as one who fabricates, laminates, or tempers the glazing material. Your company is therefore a 'prime glazing material manufacturer' of all glazing material that it tempers, and so you are subject to these marking requirements. One of the requirements of S6 of ANS Z-26 is that a manufacturer mark its glazing with its own 'distinctive designation or trademark.' In addition to the marking requirements of S6 of ANS Z-26, S6.1 of Standard No. 205 requires prime glazing material manufacturers to mark each piece of glazing they temper with an 'AS' number, indicating that the glazing meets all of the performance requirements set for that glazing item number. S6.2 of Standard No. 205 further requires a prime glazing manufacturer to mark each item of glazing material designed to be used in a specific vehicle with the symbol 'DOT' and a manufacturer's code mark assigned by this agency. Standard No. 205, through its incorporation of ANS Z-26, requires that all glazing be marked with a distinctive designation or trademark by the prime manufacturer. Therefore, your company cannot do what you asked to do in your letter, that is, sell glazing without any distinctive designation or trademark appearing on the glazing. However, NHTSA has previously concluded that the designation or trademark on the glazing need not be that of the prime glazing material manufacturer, if the glazing is marked with the prime manufacturer's DOT code mark. This is because NHTSA can easily and accurately identify the prime manufacturer from the DOT code mark, regardless of the distinctive designation or trademark that appears on the glazing. The agency needs to be able to identify the prime glazing material manufacturer, since that is the party responsible for any defect or noncompliance recall campaigns. When the agency can use the DOT code mark to identify the prime manufacturer, the agency does not need the distinctive designation or trademark appearing on the glazing to also identify the prime manufacturer. When a prime manufacturer sells glazing to another glazing company that sells the glazing to the public, the company selling the glazing to the public has a legitimate competitive interest in having its logo appear on that glazing. In recognition of these factors, we said in an October 16, 1986 letter to Mr. Edward T. Fennell, Jr. (copy enclosed) that Standard No. 205 permits a prime glazing material manufacturer to mark windshields with the logo of the company that was buying windshields from the prime manufacturer, with the permission of the purchasing company. Your company would be permitted to do the same for the glazing you are selling to a competitor, if your company's assigned DOT code mark appears on the glazing you are selling. If your company's assigned code mark does not appear on that glazing, or if the glazing company that is purchasing the glazing from you will not give you permission to use its logo, Standard No. 205 would require you to mark your company's distinctive designation or trademark on the glazing. Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel Enclosure"; |
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ID: aiam3287OpenMr. R. W. Hildebrandt, Group Director, Engineering, Heavy Vehicle Systems Group, The Bendix Corporation, 901 Cleveland Street, Elyria, OH 44035; Mr. R. W. Hildebrandt Group Director Engineering Heavy Vehicle Systems Group The Bendix Corporation 901 Cleveland Street Elyria OH 44035; Dear Mr. Hildebrandt: This responds to your April 8, 1980, letter asking for a interpretation of section 5.2.1.1 of Standard No. 121, *Air Brake Systems*. In particular, you ask whether your system complies with the provisions of that section which require that vehicles have a reservoir capable of releasing the parking brakes in the event of an emergency failure of the service brake system. You indicate that your system is in compliance with the intent of this section but may not be in technical compliance with the actual requirements. Nonetheless, you believe that your system complies based upon a letter of interpretation made by the agency to Berg Manufacturing Company dated August 27, 1979.; The August letter to Berg to which you refer in your letter wa conditioned upon our reading of the facts as stated by Berg in their letter. That letter as it applied to section 5.2.1.1 was not an interpretation of the standard, but rather an assessment by the agency as to whether we believed that the Berg system would comply with the requirements. At that time and based upon the given facts, we stated to Berg that we felt that their system would comply.; The agency has always been reluctant to issue such letters, because i is impossible to determine compliance based upon a manufacturer's description of its vehicles or from vehicle drawings. It is necessary for the agency to conduct tests to be certain whether a vehicle will comply. Accordingly, the agency always indicates in its letters that any assessment of compliance is contingent upon the description made in the manufacturer's letter, and that our opinions only reflect our engineering expertise and in no way bind the agency should we test the vehicle and find a noncompliance. In fact, we have frequently indicated to manufacturers that these letters are of little or no value to them.; Subsequent to the issuance of the Berg letter, the agency has receive a clearer picture of how the Berg system operates. We have notified that company that their system does not comply with the requirements of the standard. Berg has indicated to the agency that they consider their system to be as good as any that is in complete compliance with the standard and has petitioned the agency to amend the standard in a way that would permit their system. The agency is now looking into the Berg request. We suggest that you closely follow that rulemaking action.; With respect to your system, it appears that it too would not compl with the technical requirements of the standard, because your system does not have a reservoir capable of releasing the parking brakes in the event of service brake failure. Although the agency appreciates your argument that your system meets the intent of the standard for the release of parking brakes when the service brake system fails, nonetheless the standard is specific in its requirement that a reservoir be provided that is capable of releasing the parking brakes. We cannot by interpretation remove the reservoir requirement. Our rulemaking effort with respect to the Berg petition will address the question of whether the reservoir requirement remains necessary in the standard.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam4556OpenMr. Wayne Ivie Manager, Vehicle Support Service Section Oregon Department of Transportation 1905 Lana Avenue NE Salem, OR 97314; Mr. Wayne Ivie Manager Vehicle Support Service Section Oregon Department of Transportation 1905 Lana Avenue NE Salem OR 97314; "Dear Mr. Ivie: This responds to your letter seeking information abou the labeling requirements in Standard No. 218, Motorcycle Helmets (49 CFR 571.218). You noted that Oregon recently enacted a mandatory helmet use law which adopted Standard No. 218 as the minimum standard for helmets. You correctly noted that section S5.6.1 of Standard No. 218 requires subject motorcycle helmets to be permanently and legibly labeled with specified information, including the symbol 'DOT' as a certification that the helmet complies with Standard No. 218. However, you stated that you have received reports that the labeling required by Standard No. 218 is not present on many helmets, either because it has fallen off or been removed by someone. You said that there is often no other identification of the manufacturer or brand name on the helmet. Accordingly, it is not possible for the owner of a helmet without the Standard 218 label present to contact a dealer or manufacturer for information about the helmet. You then asked several questions about the labeling requirements set forth in Standard No. 218. Before answering your specific questions, I would like to provide some general background information on Standard No. 218. Prior to October 3, 1988, Standard No. 218 applied only to helmets that could be placed on the size C headform. The helmet manufacturers estimated that approximately 90 percent of all motorcycle helmets were subject to Standard No. 218, because they could be placed on the size C headform. However, helmets manufactured before October 3, 1988 that could not be placed on the size C headform (these were typically smaller sizes of helmets) were not subject to Standard No. 218. Hence, manufacturers of helmets that could not be placed on the size C headform were not required by Standard No. 218 or any of our other regulations to label any information on these helmets. In fact, manufacturers could not label the DOT certification symbol on those helmets that were not subject to Standard No. 218. See the enclosed December 4, 1987 letter to Mr. Hoppe for more information on this subject. We published a final rule on April 6, 1988 that extended the requirements of Standard No. 218 to all motorcycle helmet sizes (53 FR 11280). This rule became effective on October 3, 1988. Accordingly, all motorcycle helmets manufactured on or after October 3, 1988 are subject to Standard No. 218 and must be labeled in accordance with the requirements of S5.6 of that standard. With this background, your question can be answered as follows. For the approximately 10 percent of helmets manufactured before October 3, 1988 that could not be placed on the size C headform, Standard No. 218 did not apply to them, so there was no requirement for any information to be labeled on these helmets. Any such helmets would not display a 'DOT sticker' because they were not required or permitted to display such a sticker when they were new, not because the sticker 'fell off' or was removed. However, Standard No. 218 applied to approximately 90 percent of all helmets manufactured before October 3, 1988 and applies to every motorcycle helmet manufactured on or after that date. For those helmets, S5.6.1 of Standard No. 218 requires that: 'Each helmet shall be permanently and legibly labeled . . .' with the manufacturers name or identification, the precise model designation, the size, the month and year of manufacture, the DOT certification mark, and warning instructions. (emphasis added) In an October 16, 1973 letter to the Cycraft Co., NHTSA stated that the requirement that helmets be permanently labeled prohibits the use of labels that can be removed easily by hand without tools or chemicals. You stated that you have heard of two reasons why helmets that originally had a DOT certification label would no longer have such a label. One of the reasons was that the affixed label was a 'sticker' and it 'fell off.' Standard No. 218 permits manufacturers to label the required information on the helmet by means of a 'sticker,' provided that the label is permanent and legible and contains all the information required by S5.6. A 'sticker' that falls off the helmet would not appear to be permanent within the meaning of Standard No. 218, so this would be an apparent noncompliance with the standard. If you have any evidence that 'stickers' are falling off helmets, please forward that information to our Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance at this address, and we will take appropriate actions. The second reason that you have heard for helmets no longer having the labeling required by Standard No. 218 is that someone removed the label to paint the helmet and failed to put the label back on the helmet. Section 108(a)(2)(A) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C 1397(a)(2)(A)) prohibits any manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business from 'knowingly render ing inoperative any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard.' In this case, the label on motorcycle helmets is a device or element of design installed on the helmet in compliance with Standard No. 218. If a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business removed that label and failed to put it back on the helmet, then those entities would be rendering the label inoperative, in violation of Federal law. Again, if you have any evidence that violations of Federal law have occurred in your State, please forward that evidence to our Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance and we will take appropriate actions. Please note that Federal law does not prohibit the helmet's owner or any other person that is not a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business from removing the label from motorcycle helmets. Thus, the owner of a motorcycle helmet is permitted to remove the label from his or her helmet for any reason without violating any provision of Federal law. The individual States are free to establish requirements for motorcycle helmets used in their State, and could prohibit an owner from removing the label. You suggested that the problem of missing labels could be solved if this agency were to require that the DOT symbol be embossed on or in the helmet. NHTSA considered and rejected this suggestion 15 years ago when it established Standard No. 218. In the August 20, 1973 preamble to the final rule that established FMVSS 218, we said: With respect to providing important safety information in the form of labeling, one comment recommended that, due to possible label deterioration, both the manufacturer's identification and the helmet model designation should be permanently marked by etching, branding, stamping, embossing, or molding on the exterior of the helmet shell or on a permanently attached component so as to be visible when the helmet is in use. The NHTSA has determined that the practical effect of this recommendation is accomplished by requiring each helmet to be permanently and legibly labeled. The method to be used to permanently and legibly affix a label for each helmet is therefore left to the discretion of the manufacturer. (38 FR 22391) You finally asked if other jurisdictions have informed NHTSA of similar problems and sought suggestions on methods to resolve the situation where an apparently undamaged helmet would be in compliance with the standard except that it is not properly labeled. As noted above, approximately 10 percent of the motorcycle helmets manufactured before October 3, 1988 were not subject to Standard No. 218 and were not required to be labeled. To my knowledge, no other jurisdictions have informed this agency of problems akin to those raised in your letter aside from more general questions about labeling. I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions or need some more information on this subject, please do not hesitate to contact Mr. Marvin Shaw of my staff at this address, or by telephone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel Enclosure"; |
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ID: aiam2147OpenRobert S. Raymond, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Divison (sic), State of Maine, Department of the Attorney General, Augusta, ME 04333; Robert S. Raymond Esq. Assistant Attorney General Criminal Divison (sic) State of Maine Department of the Attorney General Augusta ME 04333; Dear Mr. Raymond: We have received copies of correspondence between you and Leonard A Fink, Washington counsel for Bombardier/Puch motorized bicycles, concerning requirements of the State of Maine for motor driven cycle headlamps. I understand that Mr. Fink as provided you with a copy of my letter of September 17, 1975 to him. Mr. Fink has asked that I write you directly concerning our views on Federal preemption of State motor vehicle safety standards.; At issue is whether the State of Maine may continue to requir motorcycles of 5 horsepower or less to be equipped with multiple beam headlamps. In my letter to Mr. Fink I stated:; >>>'Any motorcycle with 5 horsepower or less manufactured on or afte January 1, 1969, may be equipped with either a single or multiple beam headlamp (Table III, Standard No. 108, incorporating by reference SAE Standard J584, *Motorcycle and Motor Driven Cycle Headlamps*, April 1964. See Table I of J584. This means, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1392(d) that a State is preempted from requiring a motorcycle with 5 horsepower or less to be equipped with a multiple beam headlamp if its manufacturer has equipped it with a single beam one'.<<<; You replied to Mr. Fink on November 7, 1975 that >>>'Table I appears to be inconclusive . . . . The most reasonabl interpretation . . . is that motor driven cycles at high beam frequently utilize both the upper beam of the multiple beam light and a additional single beam light, whereas motor driven cycles at low beam may use the lower beam of the multiple lights (Table II of J584). At any rate, I have not found any clear preemptive language such as we find with regard to turn signal lamps in Standard No. 108 S 4.1.1.26.'<<<; There are actually four different permissible lighting configuration available for motor driven cycles. The 'multiple beam light and an additional single beam light' to which you refer is one of them, specifically the 'one 5 3/4 inch Type 1 and one 5 3/4 inch Type 2 sealed beam units' referred to in SAE J584's *General Requirement*. But the photometrics of Table I do not refer to this configuration, whose photometrics are those of J579. As a practical matter motor driven cycles will rarely if ever be equipped with more than one headlamp because of the severe drain on their low power reserve. In recognition of the limited generating capability of motor cycles with 5 horsepower or less, J584 does allow use of a single beam headlamp as the sole forward lighting source. The texts of the sections on *Beam Aim During Photometric Test* and *At-Focus Tests* refer specifically to test methods for single beam headlamps, and while the standard could be even more specific, its requirements appear to be generally understood by manufacturers and law enforcement officials. It is not a prerequisite for preemption that there be language in the body of Standard No. 108 specifying allowable headlamp systems for motor driven cycles. Where, as here, the area of motor driven cycles. Where, as here, the area of motor driven cycle headlighting is clearly covered by Standard No. 108, a State must allow all four headlighting systems and cannot require only one of them.; If Maine officials would like the NHTSA to consider changing thes existing Federal requirements for motor-driven cycles, they should submit a petition for rulemaking pursuant to 49 CFR Part 552 for an amendment to Standard No. 108.; If you have any further questions I would be pleased to answer them. Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Acting Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam4622OpenRobert Knauff, President Applied Research & Design, Inc. Markethouse Suite 405 289 E. 5th St St. Paul, MN 55l0l; Robert Knauff President Applied Research & Design Inc. Markethouse Suite 405 289 E. 5th St St. Paul MN 55l0l; "Dear Mr. Knauff: On April 21, l989, you wrote the agency with respec to the acceptability of your collision avoidance lighting system, as both original and aftermarket lighting equipment, under Federal laws and regulations. Because the patent application you enclosed was stamped 'Confidential', Ms Kathy DeMeter, the Assistant Chief Counsel for General Law, wrote you on May 26 for a clarification of your intent regarding confidential treatment of the material you submitted. We have received your letter of June 8 to Ms DeMeter containing your 'permission to use' the confidential information in responding to you. As Ms DeMeter explained, the issue is not whether we may 'use' the information, but whether it may be made available to the public, for the agency cannot provide non-public interpretations. Your statement is not a clear waiver of a claim of confidentiality, however, Ms DeMeter states that you told her that you were no longer requesting confidential treatment as the patent application has been filed, and we regard that as a sufficient oral waiver of your request. Your invention is intended as an advance warning of braking, and consists of 'a single pulse of light lasting approximately 40 millionths of a second.' You wish to know of the acceptability of this device as both original and aftermarket lighting equipment in six different configurations. First, let me observe that the agency has not performed research with respect to a device such as yours. However, it is concerned with the effects of glare, whether disabling or discomforting in nature. It would be concerned if the after-image left by the pulse of light from your device created a momentary distraction in drivers from their immediate driving task, in this instance, causing them to hesitate rather than to apply the brake pedal. We note the concern expressed by the State of Minnesota in its l987 and l988 letters to you. Under the assumption that a pulse of 40 millionths of a second does not produce this effect, I shall proceed to a discussion of your device with respect to the situations you envision. The first configuration is as 'a high-mount stop light system.' A center high-mounted stop lamp has been required for all passenger cars manufactured on and after September l, l985, by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. l08 Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment. Paragraph S5.4 of Standard No. l08 states that the center stop lamp 'shall not be combined with any other lamp or reflective device.' This is the only flat prohibition in Standard No. l08 against physical combinations of lighting equipment, and as such, we read it as forbidding use of the collision avoidance pulse. Thus, your device would not be acceptable as original equipment for passenger cars. As for its suitability as original equipment on other types of motor vehicles, it is permissible as long as it does not impair the effectiveness of other lamps that Standard No. l08 requires (paragraph S5.1.3). With respect to the aftermarket, the pulse could not be incorporated in a center high-mounted stop lamp intended to replace original equipment high-mounted stop lamps, because replacement equipment must conform with original equipment requirements. However, the lamp would be permissible for installation on passenger cars manufactured before September l, l985, and on any other vehicle as well. Whether or not subject to a standard, all aftermarket equipment is subject to the Federal requirement that its installation not lead to a rendering inoperative (wholly or partially) of equipment installed in accordance with any Federal safety standard. For example, if your light utilized the wiring of stop lamps and somehow diminished the light output, we would regard its installation as rendering the stop lamps partially inoperative within the meaning of the prohibition. This prohibition applies to motor vehicle manufacturers, distributors, dealers and repair shops. It does not, however, apply to changes made by a person to his or her own vehicle. Because the agency has no standards for your device, a State may set its own standard for it, or even prohibit it altogether even though it is not prohibited under Federal Law. This is implied by the State of Minnesota to you in its letter of August l6, l988. We are unable to advise you on State law, and suggest that you consult the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, 4600 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22203. Your second configuration is as 'an enhancement for existing vehicular brake lights.' We interpret this as meaning a combination of the pulse lamp with a stop lamp. This is not a forbidden equipment combination for original equipment, but it is subject to the same restriction (paragraph S5.1.3) as all supplementary lighting equipment: that it not impair the effectiveness of required lighting equipment. Similarly, its installation as an aftermarket device is permissible if it does not violate the rendering inoperative prohibition mentioned above. Your third configuration involves 'use in motorcycle taillights'. Taillamps are steady burning in nature, activated when the headlamps are on. Today, most motorcycle headlamps are activated when the ignition is turned on, meaning that the taillamp operates at all times that the motorcycle is in motion. Your letter does not indicate the frequency of the pulse, but we must raise the possibility that a pulse from the taillamp might impair the effectiveness of signals from the stop lamp, or from the turn signal lamps. If this possibility occurs, the device could not be incorporated into original equipment or replacement motorcycle taillamps for the reasons discussed in the preceding paragraph. The fourth configuration you envision involves 'use for 8-way lights in school bus systems.' This would appear to mean incorporation in the red warning lamps of the red and amber warning lamp system. This system operates automatically when the bus door is opened (paragraph S5.1.4). This appears to enhance the warning purpose of the lamps, and not impair their effectiveness. Nor does it appear to 'render inoperative', within the meaning of the aftermarket prohibition. We must advise you, however, that States are particularly sensitive to issues of school bus safety and lighting. 'Ambulance lighting' is your fifth concern. The agency has no specific requirements for warning light systems on ambulances. Such systems, of course, must not impair the effectiveness of original equipment lighting installed in accordance with Standard No. l08. Strobe-type warning lamps on the vehicle top, at front and rear, have been considered permissible. Finally, you ask about 'off-road type vehicles, i.e., snowmobiles, boats, etc.' The agency has no jurisdiction over vehicles that are not manufactured primarily for use on the public roads, and thus we cannot answer this question. Sincerely, Stephen P. Wood Acting Chief Counsel"; |
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ID: aiam5574OpenMr. Michael A. Norman 2820 Nine Mile Road Richmond, VA 23233; Mr. Michael A. Norman 2820 Nine Mile Road Richmond VA 23233; "Dear Mr. Norman: This responds to your letter of June 30, 1995, wit respect to the 'Auto Truckers Courtesy Light.' This is the device that you discussed with Taylor Vinson of this Office on June 29. You have applied to the Virginia Department of Transportation for evaluation of this product who will make a decision on July 13. We assume that you wish to know whether the product is permitted by Federal regulations. As we understand it from the description, photos, and drawings that you enclosed, the device consists of a large sign with a 'thank you' message that would be illuminated by two small amber lamps in the upper corners. The device could be mounted on the rear underride guard of a large truck or trailer, or on the rear cargo door. The purpose of the device is to enable the driver of the vehicle on which it is installed to show appreciation 'to a trailing motorist for blinking his lights to assist the truck operator in changing back to the right hand lane after passing.' In addition ' t he device operates with audio and visual indicators with three second automatic delay cut off.' You told Taylor Vinson that the intent is to sell this product in the aftermarket. As Mr. Vinson indicated, the Federal motor vehicle safety standard on motor vehicle lighting (Standard No. 108) contains no specifications applicable to the manufacture and sale in the aftermarket of supplementary motor vehicle lighting equipment such as this. This means that the device may be manufactured and sold without violating any Federal law administered by the Department of Transportation. There remains, however, the issue of whether its installation and use would violate a Federal proscription that forbids manufacturers, dealers, distributors, and motor vehicle repair businesses from 'making inoperative' motor vehicle lighting equipment installed in accordance with Standard No. 108 (or equipment installed that was necessary to comply with any other Federal motor vehicle safety standard). With respect to supplementary lighting equipment, we generally ask ourselves whether the 'message' sent by required lighting equipment is likely to be made less effective if it and the device are used simultaneously. The effectiveness of the required lighting equipment is especially important with respect to oversized vehicles such as large trucks and trailers. With respect to your device, we foresee the possibility that the driver of a large vehicle on which it is installed might have to apply the brakes at the moment that the two small amber lamps are activated that illuminate the 'thank you' sign, thus impairing the effectiveness of the stop lamps (we would probably reach a different conclusion if the message was related to the brake lamps, i.e., if it said 'Stop'). Therefore, the installation of your device by a manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or motor vehicle repair business would appear to violate the Federal proscription against making safety equipment inoperative. The proscription, however, does not apply to the owner of the vehicle which, if a company, could have the device installed in its own private repair facilities, or if the owner is a person, by the owner. This means that the individual States in which the device is to be used may accept or reject the device as they determine to be appropriate. We are unable to advise you how the laws of the individual States would apply to the device, and suggest that you write for an opinion to the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, 4600 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22203. If you have further questions, Taylor Vinson will be pleased to assist you (202-366-5263). Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel"; |
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ID: aiam4648OpenMr. Terry Hudyma Vice President, Engineering LAFORZA Automobiles, Inc. 3860 Bay Center Place Hayward, CA 94545; Mr. Terry Hudyma Vice President Engineering LAFORZA Automobiles Inc. 3860 Bay Center Place Hayward CA 94545; "Dear Mr. Hudyma: Thank you for your letter requesting a interpretation of 49 CFR Part 567, Certification. Specifically, you asked about certification requirements for multipurpose passenger vehicles that will be assembled in Italy and in Michigan. I apologize for the delay in this response. The vehicles in question will be assembled in Italy to the extent that they will be 'complete with everything except the engine (and associated equipment such as ignition and air conditioning, etc.), transmission and transfer case in Italy.' These assemblies will then be imported into the United States where the vehicles will be completed. You state that both the operations in Italy and in Michigan will be performed pursuant to a contract with LAFORZA, who will have 'complete control over the manufacturing process at all times.' It is your understanding that in the fact situation described above, LAFORZA is considered to be the manufacturer of the vehicle and therefore LAFORZA is responsible for affixing the certification label on the completed motor vehicle pursuant to 49 CFR Part 567. You asked us to confirm this interpretation. We cannot do so. Under our law and regulations, the company that completes the vehicles in Michigan is a 'manufacturer' of the vehicles in question. The information provided in your letter is inadequate to allow us to determine whether LAFORZA might also be considered a 'manufacturer' of these vehicles. The first issue to be addressed in our analysis is whether the products in question are 'incomplete vehicles' when they arrive in the United States. An 'incomplete vehicle' is defined at 49 CFR 568.3 as: ... an assemblage consisting, as a minimum, of frame and chassis structure, power train, steering system, suspension system, and braking system, to the extent that those systems are to be part of the completed vehicle, that requires further manufacturing operations, other than the addition of readily attachable components, such as mirrors or tire and rim assemblies, or minor finishing operations such as painting, to become a completed vehicle. Your letter states that the products that arrive in the United States will not have an engine or transmission, which means they will not have a power train. Accordingly, 568.3 makes clear that these products would not be 'incomplete vehicles' for the purposes of our regulations. In previous interpretations, we have referred to products that do not qualify as 'incomplete vehicles' as an 'assemblage of items of motor vehicle equipment'. In those previous letters, we have stated that the assemblage should be labeled as items of motor vehicle equipment for importation into the United States and that the importer of the assemblage must certify that each item of motor vehicle equipment that is covered by a Federal motor vehicle safety standard complies with such standard. See the enclosed May 6, 1985 letter to Mr. Hayley Alexander. This finding also means that the Italian company that produces these 'assemblages of items of motor vehicle equipment' is not a 'manufacturer' of motor vehicles with respect to the vehicles in question. Section 102(5) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1391(5), the Safety Act) defines a 'manufacturer' as 'any person engaged in the manufacturing or assembling of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, including any person importing motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment for resale.' In this case, the Italian company producing the assemblage of items of motor vehicle equipment has not manufactured or assembled any motor vehicles, nor has it imported any motor vehicles. Hence, it does not fit the statutory definition of a 'manufacturer' of the vehicles in question. After these assemblages are imported into the United States, the operations performed by the Michigan company will transform the items of motor vehicle equipment into a motor vehicle. Therefore, the Michigan company would be a 'manufacturer' of these vehicles for the purposes of the Safety Act and our regulations. Since 567.4(g)(1) requires the certification label to include the name of the manufacturer, the vehicles could comply if the name of the Michigan company were shown on the certification label. The information in your letter was inadequate to allow us to make even a tentative determination of whether LAFORZA may also be considered a manufacturer of these vehicles. The agency discussed the issue of vehicles with more than one 'manufacturer' at length in its proposal to establish rules of attribution for determining which of the manufacturers would be responsible for complying with the phase-in requirements in Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208). In that proposal, NHTSA said: Since the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act places the responsibility of compliance with safety standards on manufacturers, the agency does not have authority to attribute a vehicle to a party other than one of the vehicle's manufacturers. However, the agency considers the language in section 102(5) of the Vehicle Safety Act that a manufacturer is 'any person engaged in the manufacturing or assembling of motor vehicles . . .' to be sufficiently broad to include sponsors, depending on the circumstances. For example, if a sponsor contracts for another manufacturer to produce a design exclusively for the sponsor, the sponsor may be considered the manufacturer. This follows from application of basic principles of agency law. In this case, the sponsor is the principal. On the other hand, the mere purchase of vehicles for resale by a company which also is a manufacturer of motor vehicles does not make the purchaser the manufacturer of those vehicles. 50 FR 14589, at 14596, April 12, 1985. According to your letter, LAFORZA has a contractual relationship with the company in Italy that is producing the assemblage of items of motor vehicle equipment and a contractual relationship with the company in Michigan that is assembling the motor vehicle. These contractual relationships led you to assert that '... LAFORZA Automobiles will have complete control of the manufacturing process at all times.' If LAFORZA merely has contractual relationships under which it purchases products for resale from the companies in Italy and Michigan, LAFORZA would not be considered the manufacturer of those vehicles. If you can provide us with information about any role LAFORZA has in producing these vehicles besides contracting with other companies to assemble the vehicles, we will review that information and offer our interpretation of whether LAFORZA could be considered a 'manufacturer' of these vehicles for the purposes of the Safety Act and our regulations. Sincerely, Stephen P. Wood Acting Chief Counsel Enclosure cc: Mr. Hans W. Metzger LAFORZA Safety Consultant 6323 E. Turquoise Avenue Scottsdale, Arizona 85253"; |
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ID: aiam4601OpenThe Honorable Harry Reid United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510; The Honorable Harry Reid United States Senate Washington D.C. 20510; "Dear Senator Reid: Thank you for your letter to the Department o Transportation, on behalf of the City of Sparks, Nevada. That city's police department has received six new patrol cars equipped with air bags. According to the City Attorney for Sparks, the city police cars are often required to push disabled vehicles out of travel lanes of highways and the police officers are afraid that the air bags will be activated during these pushing operations. You asked if the Department of Transportation would authorize the Sparks police department to disconnect the air bags on its patrol cars. I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our law and regulations to you. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Safety Act) authorizes this agency to issue safety standards applicable to new vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. We have exercised this authority to issue Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR /571.208). Standard No. 208 requires all 1990 model year cars to be equipped with automatic crash protection, and specified percentages of each manufacturer's 1987, 1988, and 1989 model year cars to be so equipped. Chrysler, the manufacturer of the patrol cars in question, has chosen to comply with the requirement for automatic crash protection by installing air bags in these police cars. When a safety standard like Standard No. 208 is in effect and applicable to new passenger cars, the Safety Act prohibits any person from manufacturing, selling or offering for sale, importing, or introducing in interstate commerce any new car that does not comply with the safety standard. However, the Safety Act provides that these prohibitions do not apply after the first purchase of the car 'in good faith for purposes other than resale.' Hence, the Federal requirement that the cars comply with all applicable safety standards ceased to apply when the Sparks city police department purchased these cars, since the police department bought these cars in good faith to use them as police patrol cars, not to resell them. After the first purchase of a car in good faith for purposes other than resale, the Safety Act prohibits any manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business from 'rendering inoperative' any device or element of design installed in the car in compliance with an applicable safety standard. Obviously, disconnecting air bag systems would have that effect. Accordingly, Federal law prohibits any manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair shop from disconnecting the air bag systems on the Sparks police department cars. Please note that the Safety Act does not prohibit individual vehicle owners from rendering inoperative safety features on their own vehicles. Hence, the City of Sparks does not need any sort of 'authorization' from this agency to disconnect the air bag systems on the city's police cars. The City of Sparks is permitted to disconnect the air bags on its own vehicles without violating any Federal law, just as any resident of Sparks can remove any safety equipment they like from their own vehicles without violating Federal law. Such removals may, however, violate the laws of the State of Nevada. I recommend that the city carefully consider the effects of disconnecting the air bag systems in its police cars, even though Federal law does not prohibit the city from doing so. The air bags in those cars are an effective means of protecting vehicle occupants in frontal crashes. As to the possibility of inadvertent deployment of air bags in police cars, I note that the agency has entered into a contract under which police cars have been retrofitted with air bag systems, without a single reported instance of an air bag detonation while pushing a disabled vehicle. Enclosed is a report with some additional information on this contract. Particularly since the City of Sparks police officers face the possibility of becoming involved in high speed pursuit situations, we believe those police officers deserve the benefits of automatic crash protection in their police cars. I hope this information is helpful. Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have any further questions or need additional information on this subject. Sincerely, Stephen P. Wood Acting Chief Counsel Enclosure"; |
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ID: aiam4064OpenMs. Cynthia R. Syverson, Manufacturers Representative, P.O. Box 23314, Jacksonville, FL 32217; Ms. Cynthia R. Syverson Manufacturers Representative P.O. Box 23314 Jacksonville FL 32217; Dear Ms. Syverson: Thank you for your letter of January 7, 1986, inquiring about th Federal safety standards that apply to a sun shading product you enclosed with your letter and asking whether the product complies with our standards. The product is a rolldown sun shade, which when extended covers a 15 x 18 inch area of a vehicle window with a piece of perforated plastic. The product is designed to be attached to a vehicle's windows by suction cups. The following discussion explains how our safety standards apply to this product.; Some background information on how Federal motor vehicle safety law and regulations affect your product may be helpful. Our agency is authorized, under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and certain items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA, however, does not approve motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, nor do we endorse any commercial products. Instead the Vehicle Safety Act establishes a 'self-certification' process under which each manufacturer is responsible for certifying that its products meet all applicable safety standards. The agency periodically tests vehicles and equipment items for compliance with the standards, and also investigates other alleged safety-related defects. As explained below, installation of products in new and used vehicles would be affected by our regulations. In addition, any manufacturer of motor vehicle equipment is subject to the requirements of the Vehicle Safety Act concerning the recall and remedy of products with noncompliances or defects related to motor vehicle safety.; We have issued Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205, *Glazin Materials*, which specifies performance and location requirements for glazing used in vehicles. These requirements include specifications for minimum levels of light transmittance (70% in areas requisite for driving visibility, which includes all windows in passenger cars).; No manufacturer or dealer is permitted to install solar films and othe sun screen devices, such as the one described in your letter, in *new* vehicles without certifying that the vehicle continues to be in compliance with the light transmittance and other requirements of the standard.; After a vehicle is first sold to a consumer, modifications to a vehicl are affected by section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Vehicle Safety Act. That section prohibits commercial businesses from tampering with safety equipment installed on a vehicle in compliance with our standards. Thus, no dealer, manufacturer, repair business or distributor can install a sun screen device for the owner of the vehicle, if the device would cause the window not to meet the requirements of Standard No. 205. Violation of the 'render inoperative' provision can result in Federal civil penalties of up to $1,000 for each violation.; Section 108(a)(2)(A) does not affect vehicle owners, who may themselve alter their vehicles as they please, so long as they adhere to all State requirements. Under Federal law, the owner may install sun screening devices regardless of whether the installation adversely affects the light transmittance. Individual States govern the operational use of vehicles by their owners and therefore it is within the authority of the States to preclude owners from using sun screens in their vehicles.; If you need further information, please let me know. I am returning under separate cover, the sample you sent.; Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam4349OpenMr. Alberto Negro, Fiat Research & Development - USA Branch, Parklane Towers West, Suite 1210, Dearborn, MI 48216; Mr. Alberto Negro Fiat Research & Development - USA Branch Parklane Towers West Suite 1210 Dearborn MI 48216; Dear Mr. Negro: This is in response to Mr. Rossi's request for an interpretation of th Federal motor vehicle theft prevention standard (49 CFR Part 541), which he asked that I direct to you. That standard requires that certain parts of high-theft carlines, including the engine and transmission, be marked with the vehicle identification number, if the part is an original equipment part, or with the letter 'R' and the manufacturer's trademark, if the part is a replacement part. Mr. Rossi stated that it is occasionally necessary to remove the original equipment engine or transmission from one of these cars and install a replacement engine or transmission in the car. The original equipment engine and/or transmission is then sent to the factory to be repaired and reconditioned. Following such repair, the engine and/or transmission is then put into the replacement parts network.; Mr. Rossi stated his belief that the original equipment part shoul have the original equipment identification removed and a replacement marking put onto the part. He then asked whether Ferrari was required to remove the footprint left by the original equipment identification marking or if that should be left on the part. The answer is that Ferrari and all other reconditioners are *not* permitted to remove from any reconditioned part the original equipment identification marking inscribed or affixed to the part in compliance with Part 541. Further, reconditioners are not required to inscribe or affix any additional markings to parts they have reconditioned. Title II of the Motor Vehicle Theft Prevention Standard of 1984 (Pub. L. 98-547, the Theft Act) includes a provision that addresses this question. This section (18. U.S.C. 511) reads as follows:; S511. *Altering or removing motor vehicle identification numbers* >>>(a) Whoever knowingly removes, obliterates, tampers with, or alter an identification number for a motor vehicle, or motor vehicle part, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.; (b)(1) Subsection (a) of this section does not apply to a removal obliteration, tampering, or alteration by a person specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection (unless such person knows that the vehicle or part involved is stolen).; (2) The persons referred to in paragraph (1) of this subsection are - (A) a motor vehicle scrap processor or a motor vehicle demolisher who complies with applicable State law with respect to such vehicle or part, (B) a person who repairs such vehicle or part, if the removal, obliteration, tampering, or alteration is reasonably necessary for the repair, and (C) a person who restores or replaces an identification number for such vehicle or part in accordance with applicable State law.<<<; None of the exceptions set forth in 18 U.S.C. 511(b)(2) would permi Ferrari to routinely remove original equipment markings from reconditioned engines and transmissions. The first exception is not applicable, since Ferrari is clearly not a motor vehicle scrap processor or demolisher. The second exception would be applicable only in rare instances, since it is not usually necessary to remove the original equipment identification marking in order to recondition engines or transmissions. The third exception was explained as follows in the House Report on the Theft Act (H.R. Rep. No. 1087, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., at 24 (1984)): 'The exemption also applies to persons acting under the authority of the Secretary of Transportation or State law to restore or replace such markings.' For the policy reasons discussed below, we will not give reconditioners authority to routinely remove original equipment identification markings from engines and transmissions. Assuming Ferrari does not have authority under applicable State law to remove such markings, the third exception does not apply to Ferrari when it is reconditioning engines and transmissions.; If reconditioners of engines and transmissions were allowed t routinely remove the original equipment identification markings, the law enforcement purposes of the Theft Act would be seriously undermined. In response to some comments received on the proposed Part 541, a new S541.6(b) was added to the final rule. This section expressly prohibits covered major parts from being marked as both original equipment and replacement parts. The preamble to the final rule explained the reasons for prohibiting such 'dual markings' as follows:; >>>Dual markings would give thieves the opportunity to present stole original equipment parts as properly marked replacement parts. Once the original equipment identification (the VIN) had been obliterated from those stolen parts, a legitimate replacement part marking would remain. Assuming that the obliteration of the VIN were performed reasonably proficiently, repair shops and investigators would have little reason to suspect that this part was anything other than a properly identified replacement part. 50 FR 43178, October 24, 1985.<<<; These same law enforcement concerns would arise if Ferrari were t remove the VIN markings from its reconditioned engines and transmissions. If those parts were marked as both original equipment and replacement parts, the problems associated with dual markings would arise. If, on the other hand, Ferrari were to try to obliterate the footprint from the original equipment, law enforcement officials would have no means of distinguishing engines Ferrari had reconditioned from stolen engines on which thieves had obliterated the original equipment marking and added a counterfeit replacement marking. In either case, it would cause confusion and uncertainty for law enforcement officials if Ferrari and the large number of other reconditioners were legitimately and routinely to remove the original equipment identification from reconditioned parts and add a replacement part marking to those parts.; Indeed, such action by reconditioners would serve to defeat the purpos of the Theft Act, which was to 'decrease the ease with which stolen vehicles and their major parts can be fenced.' If reconditioners routinely removed the original equipment markings from the engines and transmissions they reconditioned, car thieves could also remove those original equipment markings with impunity. If the thieves were ever questioned by law enforcement officials about the obliterated original equipment marking, they could respond that the marking must have been obliterated during reconditioning. If obliterated original equipment markings on parts do not provide law enforcement officials with evidence of illegal activity, there would seem to be no reason to require the original equipment markings on the parts.; Further, a requirement that all persons reconditioning engines an transmissions obliterate the original equipment marking and add a replacement part marking would impose significant additional costs and burdens on those persons. This would be inconsistent with the Theft Act's stated purpose of minimizing regulation of the aftermarket motor vehicle industry.; All of these potential problems can be avoided if reconditioners simpl leave the original equipment marking on the parts after reconditioning. When those markings are left in place by reconditioners, thieves cannot claim that an engine or transmission that has a 'footprint' in the area where the original equipment identification is placed is just a reconditioned part. Instead, the 'footprint' would alert law enforcement officials to the likelihood that the original equipment marking had been unlawfully removed from the part. Further, no burdens are imposed on reconditioners if they must leave the original equipment markings in place and are not required to add any markings of their own. Therefore, we conclude that the Theft Act and Part 541 require that businesses that recondition any major parts required to be marked pursuant to Part 541 leave those markings in place on the reconditioned parts. Part 541 does not require reconditioners to add any further identification markings to these parts.; Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones, Chief Counsel |
Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.