ID: nht93-9.9

DATE: December 10, 1993

FROM: Thomas Luckemeyer -- ITT Automotive Europe

TO: Taylor Vinson -- Office of the Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: Rear Fog Lamp

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 12/23/93 from John Womack to Thomas Luckemeyer (A42; Std. 108; VSA 103(d))

TEXT:

In the field of a new development for a German customer who intends to certificate a rear lamp in the U.S. there are some questions regarding the permissibility of rear fog lamps on U.S. cars. I hope you will answer the questions below.

- Is the rear fog lamp in a combined rear lamp unit permissible in all the states of the U.S.? There is no statement in the MVSS 108.

- Which photometric requirements do we have to fulfill for the rear fog lamp?

- Is the certification of the combined rear lamp unit binding upon the whole states of the U.S.?

- Do you have a list of lighting equipment for cars and the necessary requirements in the different states of the U.S.?

Please send your answer by FAX.

Thank you in advance for your help.

ID: nht69-2.21

DATE: 06/05/69

FROM: H.A. HEFFRON -- CHIEF COUNSEL, NHTSA; CONCURRENCE OF TENNEY JOHNSON -- MVSPS

TO: G. M. Hilgendorf, Esq.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: Mr. Frank Coy, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Transportation, has asked that I respond to your letter of April 16, 1969, in which you ask whether a station wagon purchased in March of 1968, equipped with two ply tires, violates Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 109.

The vehicle you purchased was apparently manufactured prior to April 1, 1968, and therefore, it was not required to be equipped with tires conforming to Standard No. 109. However, even if the standards were applicable, because a tire is labeled "2-ply" it is not necessarily a non-conforming tire. Standard No. 109 does not specifically require tires to have a given number of plies. It does require that irrespective of any ply rating tires pass minimum performance tests. As to passenger cars, Standard No. 110 requires that passenger cars manufactured after April 1, 1968, (1) must be equipped with tires that comply with Standard No. 109; and (2) the vehicle must not place a load on any of the tires greater than the load capacity of the tire specified in Standard No. 109.

ID: 1985-01.45

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 03/07/85

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Jeffrey R. Miller; NHTSA

TO: Stephen T. Waimey, Esq; Dean Hansell, Esq., Donovan, Leisure, Newton and Irvine

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

ATTACHMT: 8/30/79 letter from F. Berndt to Alfa Romeo

TEXT:

Stephen T. Waimey, Esq. Dean Hansell, Esq. Donovan Leisure Newton & Irvine 333 South Grand Avenue Los Angeles, California 90071

Dear Messrs. Waimey and Hansell:

I am responding to your correspondence regarding the definitions of "convertible" and "open body type vehicle" under National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) safety regulations.

Your first question concerns the definition of "open body type vehicle." Our regulations provide a definition at 49 CFR S571.3: "...a vehicle having no occupant compartment top or an occupant compartment top that can be installed or removed by the user at his convenience." The common usage of that term in our interpretations is that this term is intended to apply to multipurpose passenger vehicles, such as Jeep-type vehicles. Thus, neither of the automobiles in the pictures that you included with your letter (Porsche 911 Carrera Cabriolet and Porsche 911 Carrera Targa) are considered to be open-body vehicles.

You also ask whether the Porsche 911 Targa is considered a convertible. You state that there is no fixed, rigid structural member joining the "A" pillar with the "B" pillar. Despite this absence, the Targa roof, beginning behind the "B" pillar, apparently is a fixed, rigid structural member that meets Federal roof-crush standards.

You are correct in stating that our regulations do not expressly define "convertible." NHTSA interpretations, however, have consistently defined "convertible" as a vehicle whose "A" pillar or windshield peripheral support is not joined with the "B" pillar (or rear roof support rearward of the "B" pillar position) by a fixed, rigid structural member. Thus, the Porsche 911 Targa is considered a convertible because it meets this definition. While the vehicle is therefore not required to meet the roof-crush standards, it is commendable that Porsche has designed it to do so.

If you have any further questions, please let me know.

Sincerely,

Jeffrey R. Miller Chief Counsel

January 4, 1985

Frank Berndt, Esq. Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 7th Street S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Mr. Berndt:

We represent Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG ("Porsche") and on behalf of Porsche we seek your comments about apparent ambiguities in the regulations. These regulations are relevant to certain research and development work being done by Porsche.

Specifically, the definition of "open-body type vehicle" and the usage of that phrase and of the undefined term "convertible" in the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards are unclear. This leaves open questions as to (1) whether the Porsche 911 Cabriolet and the Porsche 911 Targa are "open body-type vehicles" and (2) whether the Porsche 911 Targa is a "convertible." (Pictures of both vehicles are attached to this letter). The following is our understanding of the applicable law and identifies the ambiguities as we see them.

(1) Open-body Type Vehicle. Section 571.3 of the NHTSA regulations, 49 C.F.R. S 571.3, defines an "open-body type vehicle" as "a vehicle having no occupant compartment top or an occupant compartment top that can be installed or removed by the user at his convenience." One interpretation of this definition is that the concept of a "removable" top includes a convertible top that can be folded down. However, the use of the term in NHTSA regulations suggests that the term is limited to vehicles that are usually manufactured with no doors and/or windshield or removable doors and/or windshield, such as four-wheel drive utility vehicles, and other specialty vehicles, and is this not intended to include convertible passenger cars such as the Porsche Cabriolet.

For example, in at least 3 cases, open-body type vehicles are treated separately from convertibles. Section 571.114 of the regulations exempts from the requirements of paragraph S4.5 of Safety Standard Number 114 (theft protection) only "open-body type vehicles that are manufactured for operation without doors and that either have no doors or have doors that are designed to be easily attached to and removed from the vehicle by the vehicles owner." Section 571.212 exempts "open body type vehicles with fold-down or removable windshields" from Safety Standard Number 212 (windshield mounting). Section 571.219 exempts "open-body type vehicles with "fold down" or removable windshields" from Safety Standard Number 219 (windshield zone intrusion). Conversely, Section 571.208 of the regulations exempts both "convertibles and open-body vehicles" from the requirements of paragraph S4.1.1.3.1 of Safety Standard Number 208 (occupant crash protection).* Similarly, the test conditions set forth in Section 571.208 provide (at paragraph S8.1.6) that for the frontal, lateral and roll-over tests "convertibles and open-body type vehicles have the top, if any, in place in the closed passenger compartment configuration." Finally, Section 571.205, as recently amended (at paragraph S5.1.2.4), prohibits glass and plastic glazing materials from being used in "convertibles, in vehicles that have no roof or in vehicles whose roofs are completely removable.***

Similarly, NHTSA Federal Register notices suggest that an open-body type vehicle is different than a convertible. In granting Anden Holdings Ltd. a temporary exemption from Safety Standard Numbers 104 and 201

* Section 571.208 provides (at paragraphs S4.1.1.3.2 and S4.1.2.3.2) that "convertibles and open-body type vehicles shall utilize either a Type l or a Type 2 seatbelt assembly.

** This second half of this reference appears to be a paraphrase of the definition of "open-body type vehicle."

(windshield wiping and washing systems and occupant protection in interior impact), because it is an open-body type vehicle, acting NHTSA Administrator Steed stated "the Auburn replica, as is true of many open-body vehicles, has no header and the windshield frame is too narrow to support a sun visor mounting." See 47 Fed. Reg. 34, 071 (1982). Further, discussion appears at both 46 Fed. Reg. 32,251 (1981) and 45 Fed. Reg. 85,450 (1980) about whether to exempt open-body type vehicles with readily removable or no doors from the key-in-ignition warning requirements of safety Standard Number 114 (theft protection).

Finally, use of the term "convertible" in Sections 571.210, 571.216, and 571.302 of the Regulations without the term "open-body type vehicle" suggests that a convertible is not an open-body type vehicle.

In view of the context in which the term "open-body type vehicles" has been used in NHTSA regulations, it thus appears that neither the Porshce 911 convertible nor the Porsche 911 Targa are intended to be considered "open-body type vehicles." It may be that this result is achieved because a convertible top is not completely removable (i.e., it is only folded down) and the Targa top actually leaves most of the roof in place (in the same way that a "T-top" roof does). however, because this matter is not clear, Porsche would appreciate your comments on the regulatory intent of these terms.

(2) The Porsche 911 Targa as a Convertible. You wrote a letter on August 30, 1979, to Alfa Romeo concluding that the term "convertible" is not defined in NHTSA regulations though it is apparently described or defined elsewhere. (For your convenience I attach a copy of the August 30, 1979 letter). The letter concludes:

"While our regulations do not include a formal definition of "convertible," the agency has stated that it considers a convertible to be a vehicle whose "A" pillar or windshield peripheral support is not joined with the "B" pillar (or rearward support rearward of the "B" pillar position) or by a fixed, rigid structural member."

In our research, we could not locate the source for that definition.

Also, as far as we could determine, the regulations still do not define the term "convertible." The term is, however, used four times in Section 571.208 (at paragraphs S4.1.1.3.1, S4.1.1.3.2, S4.1.2.3.2. and S8.1.6), and once each in Section 571.108 (paragraph S4.3. 1.8), in Section 571.205 (paragraph S5.1.2.4), in Section 571.216 (paragraph S3), and in Section 571.302 (paragraph S4.1). In each instance, no information about the meaning of "convertible" is given. Since the Porsche 911 Targa's "A" pillar is not joined with its "B" pillar, it thus appears that it might meet the definition of a "convertible." On the other hand, since the Targa roof (which begins at the B pillar position and continues by means of the rear glass window to the rear body deck) is a fixed, rigid structural member that provides the Targa with a roof from that point to the rear (which roof meets regulatory roof-crush standards), where the entire roof is non-structural, thus does not necessarily apply.*

* We note that there may be another undefined class of vehicles evolving, a class consisting of partially covered vehicles such as the "T"-top, cars with sun roofs and the Targa. Perhaps our focus in distinguishing between only convertibles, open-top vehicles and coupes is too narrow. For example, Section 571.205 (at paragraph S5.1.2.4) provides that glass-plastic glazing materials may not be used in convertibles. This prohibition does not apply to vehicles with sun roofs or "T"-tops, 48 Fed. Reg. 52,062 (1983), because "the probability that the plastic side of the glazing in those vehicles would be directly exposed to the sun over a prolonged period is particularly small due to the installation angle of the windshield and restricted path of the sunlight through the opening in the top of the vehicle." Id. However, because of the presence in the Targa of a fixed structural roof from the B-pillar areas rearwards, the plastic side of the glazing would not be directly exposed to the sun. Thus, in at least in this area, the Targa might more reasonably be considered as a member of a "T"-top/Targa class of vehicles.

Thank you for your courtesy and assistance.

Yours truly,

Stephen T. Waimey

Dean Hansell Enc: August 30, 1979 letter from NHTSA to Alfa Romeo. Omitted Here

ID: FERBLTR.CRS

Gabriel J. Ferber, Esquire
Nesper, Ferber & DiGiacomo, LLP
501 James Audubon Drive, Suite 300
Amherst, NY 14228

Re: Superior Auto Sales, Inc.

NSA-32 RSH; RII-10/R93-017

Dear Mr. Ferber:

This is in response to your letter of August 27, 1996, to Marilynne E. Jacobs, Director of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA's) Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance (OVSC), regarding 117 vehicles that were imported from Canada by your client, Superior Auto Sales, Inc. (Superior). As described in your letter, and in prior correspondence with OVSC, these vehicles, which consisted of 1994 and 1995 Model Year Plymouth Acclaims, Dodge Spirits, and Mazda Protégés, were not equipped with automatic restraints in the front outboard passenger seating position, as required by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection. You nevertheless contend that all of these vehicles should be deemed in compliance with that standard, with the exception of seven Mazda Protégés that are the subject of separate correspondence.

To support this contention you cite paragraph S4.1.4.1 of the standard, which provides, in relevant part:

A vehicle shall not be deemed to be in non-compliance with this standard if its manufacturer establishes that it did not know in the exercise of due care that such vehicle is not in conformity with this standard.

Your letter contends that Superior is a manufacturer within the meaning of this provision by virtue of the fact that it is a vehicle importer. Moreover, you claim that even though Superior exercised due care, it did not know that the vehicles in question did not comply with FMVSS No. 208. In support of this claim, you note that OVSC released the vehicles in question even though the conformity packages that Superior submitted for them included a vehicle identification number (VIN) deciphering chart that provided the means for the agency to ascertain that each of those vehicles was equipped with a driver side air bag and a passenger side manual seat belt.

To further support your claim that Superior did not have knowledge of the noncompliance in issue, you describe the standard as containing language "so obtuse (sic) as to defy understanding." You characterize "the complexity of the language" found in FMVSS No. 208 as "the very reason that NHTSA incorporated the 'due care' provisions of the Safety Act into the regulation." To support this contention, you cite language from the preamble of a notice of proposed rulemaking to amend the standard that was issued by NHTSA in 1985. That language states

The agency recognizes that because of the complexity of the requirements of Standard No. 208, manufacturers are concerned that the rule state that the due care provision of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act . . . applies to compliance with [this] standard.

50 FR 14589, 14592 (April 12, 1985). You interpret this statement as representing NHTSA's "recogni[tion] at the outset that the language of Standard 208 was so complex that mistakes in interpretation were likely to occur" and that "it would be unfair to penalize affected parties who made such mistakes notwithstanding due care." Accordingly, you assert that the vehicles that Superior "imported in the exercise of due care and without knowledge of their nonconformity must . . . be deemed to be in compliance with Standard 208."

Contrary to your interpretation, NHTSA did not incorporate the due care provision of the Safety Act into FMVSS No. 208 to relieve manufacturers from liability for noncompliances resulting from mistaken interpretations of the standard's language. The agency instead added the due care provision to address a concern expressed by manufacturers, grounded on the belief (disputed by NHTSA) that there was excessive variability in FMVSS No. 208 crash test results, that a noncompliance might be determined to exist on the basis of a single test failure, even though the vast majority of similar vehicles actually complied. NHTSA stated its intention to amend the standard to incorporate the due care provision in the final rule reinstituting the automatic restraint requirements published at 49 FR 28962 on July 17, 1984. As reflected in the enclosed excerpt from that document (at 49 FR 29006), NHTSA was motivated to add the due care language to assure manufacturers

that the agency would exercise appropriate discretion in compliance cases based on apparent failures to satisfy the performance requirements of the standard in OVSC crash tests.

We agree that Superior is a "manufacturer" within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(5) because it imports motor vehicles for resale. However, the due care language in FMVSS No. 208 cannot be relied upon by registered importers (RIs) to insulate themselves from liability for importing vehicles from Canada that do not comply with the standard. To properly exercise its responsibilities, an RI must be aware of the standards that apply to each of the vehicles that it imports and conform the vehicle to those standards when necessary. The principal difference between vehicles manufactured for the U.S. and the Canadian markets is that Canadian vehicles are not required to comply with the automatic restraint requirements of FMVSS No. 208. For that reason, the only passenger cars manufactured for the Canadian market that NHTSA has determined to be eligible for importation into the United States are those manufactured before September 1, 1989, the date on which the automatic restraint requirements were extended to a manufacturer's entire passenger car production, or those manufactured after that date that are equipped with an automatic restraint system that complies with FMVSS No. 208. Before importing a vehicle from Canada manufactured on or after September 1, 1989, the RI must therefore ensure that it complies with the automatic restraint requirements in the same manner as FMVSS No. 208 allows for vehicles produced for the U.S. market on the vehicle's date of manufacture.

As a factual matter, we dispute your assertion that the operative language of FMVSS No. 208 is "complex" or "obtuse." It is clear from S4.1.4.1 of FMVSS No. 208 that the authority to manufacture vehicles with a driver's side air bag and no automatic protection on the passenger side expired as of September 1, 1993 (i.e., it did not apply to model year 1994 or newer vehicles). Even if it could not discern those requirements from the language of the standard, Superior could have made appropriate inquiry with the vehicle's manufacturer or with NHTSA. Finally, if an RI is in fact confused as to the automatic restraint requirements that pertain to any given vehicle, it could not demonstrate that it exercised due care by importing the vehicle despite that confusion.

Your letter implies that Superior was misled by OVSC's "approval" of compliance packages that it submitted for vehicles that were not equipped with required passenger side automatic restraints. The conformity statements included in those packages contained Superior's certification that those vehicles were manufactured in compliance with FMVSS No. 208. OVSC's approval of the compliance packages was predicated on that certification by Superior. OVSC cannot be charged with knowledge that the vehicles it approved for release were not equipped with required automatic restraints simply because a VIN deciphering chart that would have revealed that information was included in the compliance packages. Given the thousands of compliance packages that it must process each month, OVSC cannot be expected to decipher every VIN to ensure that the RI's certification contains no inaccuracies. It is perverse to assert that merely because OVSC did not catch Superior's false statements, Superior is excused from having made them. Moreover, in each case, Superior's false certification preceded OVSC's release of the vehicle, so that release cannot have provided any basis for Superior's actions.

Your letter further cites NHTSA and Center for Auto Safety research reports for the proposition that automatic seat belts, the devices that Superior apparently would install in the vehicles in question in the event of a recall, are less safe than the manual seat belts with which those vehicles are now equipped. In light of these reports, you contend that it would be arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion for NHTSA to order a recall. On the contrary, it would be improper for the agency not to require compliance with the existing requirements of a standard in its administration of the vehicle importation program. FMVSS No. 208 requires that passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1993 be equipped with passenger side automatic restraints regardless of whether they have a driver's side air bag. This requirement was adopted in a protracted rulemaking proceeding in which the agency solicited and addressed numerous comments from the public. The requirement for automatic restraints in both front outboard seating positions is buttressed by the action of Congress in enacting the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, section 2508(a)(1), which mandated that FMVSS No. 208 be amended to require air bags in those locations. (See 49 U.S.C. 30127.)

Your letter requests a hearing if NHTSA believes that Superior has not established that in the exercise of due care it did not have reason to know that the vehicles it imported were not in conformity with FMVSS No. 208. We have provided you with our analysis of this issue, as presented in your letter. Based on that analysis, it is unlikely that any further discussion would alter our opinion that the due care defense is unavailable to Superior and similarly situated RIs in this circumstance. Therefore, we decline to hold the hearing you have requested.

If you have any further questions regarding this matter, please contact Coleman Sachs of my staff at 202-366-5238.

Sincerely,

John Womack

Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosure

ref:208

d:10/25/96

ID: nht75-4.34

DATE: 06/23/75

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE: R. L. Carter; NHTSA

TO: Volkswagen of America, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to Volkswagen of America's March 25, 1975, petition for rulemaking to amend S4.5.3.3 of Standard No. 208, Occupant crash protection, to allow, at the manufacturer's option, visual warning lamps which remain activated whenever front outboard safety belts are not in use. Your petition states that it supersedes Volkswagen's February 20, 1975 petition for rulemaking.

Your petition explains that Volkswagen, in offering a passive belt system in its Rabbit model on an optional basis, provides an ignition interlock system and a passenger-side warning system to encourage passive belt usage, although such systems are not required by the standard. You correctly note that a January 16, 1975, letter to Volkswagen from the NHTSA Office of Chief Counsel indicates that additional safety devices such as these are not prohibited by our minimum safety standards, as long as their installation does not have the effect of causing required systems not to comply.

Your petition requests an amendment of Standard No. 208's warning provisions to permit a visual warning longer than the 4- to 8-second reminder light presently required by S4.5.3.3. You apparently have concluded that language in our January 16 letter prohibits the provision of any additional visual warning with a duration different than 4-8 seconds.

Our January 16 letter states "additional [safety] devices could not be installed if that installation has the effect of causing the required systems not to comply." This does not prevent the installation of a second visual warning which operates continuously when seat belts are not in use at either front designated seating position. The manufacturer who provides such additional warning would only have to ensure that the required 4- to 8-second visual reminder required under S4.5.3.3 operates independently of the additional warning.

For this reason, we conclude that Volkswagen may provide the additional warning it desires without amendment of Standard No. 208. Accordingly, Volkswagen's petition is denied as unnecessary. Please advise the NHTSA if this interpretation does not permit Volkswagen to provide the degree of additional warning for which it petitioned.

SINCERELY,

March 25, 1975

James B. Gregory Administrator National Highway Traffic Safety Adminstration U. S. Department of Transportation

SUBJECT: Petition for Rulemaking

The enclosed Petition for Rulemaking of FMVSS 208 supercedes and replaces Volkswagen's Petition for Rulemaking of FMVSS 208 dated February 20, 1975.

VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC.

J. W. Kennebeck, Manager

Emissions, Safety & Development

Petition for Rulemaking

of

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208

Volkswagenwork Aktiengesellschaft Volkswagen of America, Inc.

Petitioners

TO

Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration U. S. Department of Transportation

Petition for Rulemaking

Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208

Request to allow S4.5.3.3 to allow, at manufacturer's option, visual warning lamps which remain activated whenever front outboard safety belts are not in use.

Background:

In October, 1973, Volkswagen petitioned NHTSA to amend MVSS 208 to specify emergency release interlock and warning systems for vehicles equipped with passive belt restraint systems. Based on NHTSA's response to this petition (Docket 74-4; Notice 2), VW laid firm production plans for its diagonal belt/energy absorbing knee panel passive restraint system for incorporation in a new model, the Rabbit.

In October, 1974, President Ford signed into law the Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, which stipulated that new regulations be written by NHTSA to effectively eliminate requirements for starter interlocks and long duration warning buzzers.

NHTSA responded quickly by eliminating all requirements in MVSS 208 for the starter interlock, and with a proposal for a new warning system (in S4.5.3.3) which, for passive belts, represented a change from continuous lights and buzzers, activated when either front outboard belt was disconnected, to four- to eight-second light warnings activated after ignition is turned on, with concurrent buzzers activated if the driver's belt was disconnected.

Between November 1974 and February 25, 1975, the effective date for the new warning systems, VW produced Rabbits for sale in the U.S. with optional passive restraints, equipped with the "old" warning system permitted under MVSS 208 until February 25. These vehicles were also fitted with starter interlocks for the emergency release. Excellent sales volume of early Rabbits largely depleted supplies of vehicles fitted with the passive restraint, and Volkswagen saw a need to produce more passive restraint cars after February 25 so that we could continue to offer our customers the passive restraint on an optional basis.

A letter from Mr. R. Dyson, Esq. (copy attached), confirmed that since starter interlocks were not regulated in any NHTSA regulation, they were not prohibited and could be installed at the manufacturer's option. Based on this interpretation, VW continued to fit its passive restraint cars with starter interlock. However, Volkswagen feels that the emergency release starter interlock must be supplemented by an effective warning system to inform the driver why he cannot start the car and to discourage occupants from unbuckling the belt while driving, although it is much easier to wear the belt properly than to defeat it. Therefore, we petitioned NHTSA with our letter of February 20, 1975, to allow manufacturers to continue to produce a more effective warning system, i.e. the "old" system.

While this petition was under consideration, our engineers have been able to develop on short notice, a warning system which meets the new S4.5.3.3, and, in addition, provides that release of the passenger's belt, as well as the driver's belt, as stipulated in the rule, activates the buzzer system during the specified four- to eight-second period. In a telephone conversation with NHTSA Legal Counsel, it was decided that this feature is allowed under MVSS 208 because the driver's side requirement is only a minimum standard.

However, we feel this warning system is not adequately effective, as it does not warn the occupants when a belt becomes disconnected after the four- to eight-second warning period. Therefore, by making a simple change to the visual warning, we developed a more effective system which satisfies the letter and the intent of Section 109 of the "Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Amendments of 1974" and, we believe, satisfies the intent of MVSS 208 in meeting the basic provisions of S4.5.3.3. The substantive request of this petition is merely to allow a system in which the visual warning can remain activated indefinitely if belts are not in use, at the manufacturer's option. Although we still feel that the most effective warning system available (the "old" system specified formerly under MVSS 208) offers the greatest safety benefits, we submit the following proposal with the hope that it will meet more favorable response from NHTSA.

DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED NEW WARNING SYSTEM

1. The warning light activates for a period of four to eight seconds after the ignition switch is moved to the "on" position, when both passive belts are in use, as determined by emergency release being buckled.

2. The audible signal activates for a four- to eight-second period after the ignition is switched to the "on" position if one or both front outboard belts are not in use, as determined by the emergency release belt latch mechanism not being fastened.

3. In addition to the above, the warning light activates continuously whenever the ignition switch is in the "on" position and either front outboard belt is not in use, as determined by the emergency release being unbuckled, regardless of the elapsed time after the ignition has been switched "on".

Since Section 109 of the Public Law 93-492, the "Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974," does not address the time duration of visual warning systems, we believe our proposed system satisfies the wording and intent of the law.

Therefore, Volkswagen petitions NHTSA to amend MVSS 208, S4.5.3.3 to allow, at the manufacturer's option, passive belt systems to retain the warning lamps with indefinite activation when belts are not in use. We suggest that the following words might be used:

Subparagraph S4.5.3.3 (b) (1) is amended to read:

(1) At the left front designated seating position (driver's position), and, at the manufacturer's option, at the right front designated seating position, be equipped with a warning system that activates, for a period of not less than four seconds and not more than eight seconds (beginning when the vehicle ignition switch is moved to the "on" or the "start" position), a continuous or flashing warning light, visible to the driver, displaying the words "Fasten Seat Belts" or "Fasten Belts" when condition (A) exists, and a continuous or intermittent audible signal when condition (A) exists simultaneously with condition (B), and, at the manufacturer's option, activates a continuous or flashing warning light, visible to the driver displaying the words "Fasten Seat Belts" or "Fasten Belts" when condition (A) exists simultaneously with condition (B).

(A) The vehicle's ignition switch is moved to the "on" position or to the "start" position.

(B) The driver's lap belt, or, at the manufacturer's option, either the driver's or the right front passenger's belt, is not in use, as determined by the belt latch mechanism not being fastened.

VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC.

July 11, 1975

Tad Herlihy, Esq. Chief Counsel Office of the Administrator NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION Subject: Letter from Robert L. Carter Dated June 23, 1975

This will confirm our recent telephone conversation advising that our engineers are not entirely happy with the suggestion that we install a continuous warning light in addition to the 4-8 second lamp.

It is our intention to reaffirm our Petition for Rulemaking previously submitted to your office and plan to submit additional supporting data as soon as the annual factory recess in Germany has ended. We hope to be able to have this information on file in Washington no later than the last week in August or the first week in September.

Gerhard P. Riechel

Attorney

ID: PORSCH3.wpd

Michael Love, Manager, Compliance
Porsche Cars North America, Inc.
100 West Liberty Street
P.O. Box 30911
Reno, Nevada 89520-3911

Dear Mr. Love:

On April 25, 1996, I issued an interpretation to Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (Porsche), concerning the readiness indicator requirement in S4.5.2 of Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection. In that letter, I interpreted that National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) standard to mean that a readiness indicator was not required for either voluntarily-installed inflatable restraints (air bags), i.e., those installed in addition to required safety systems, or for air bags installed for compliance with a standard other than Standard No. 208. The interpretation also stated:

[I]f you voluntarily provide a readiness indicator, and decide to combine it with the required readiness indicator, the information provided by the former must not confuse or obscure the information provided by the latter about the required air bag. The indicator must distinguish between the different air bag systems, such as by having dissimilar signals for the different systems.

We have received substantial feedback from you and other motor vehicle manufacturers disagreeing with the conclusion prohibiting a combined indicator that gives nondistinguishing messages. We also received a written request from the Association of International Automobile Manufacturers (AIAM), dated June 25, 1996, asking that we reconsider the interpretation.

Upon reconsideration, this letter replaces and supersedes my interpretation of April 25, 1996 to Porsche. In addition, as part of the reconsideration process, we have reconsidered that portion of a November 27, 1991 interpretation which concludes that an indicator for pretensioners may not be combined with the S4.5.2 indicator unless a distinguishable message is provided. That portion of the November 27, 1991 interpretation is also superseded by this letter.

Porsche asked whether the S4.5.2 indicator requirement applies (1) to a voluntarily-installed inflatable restraint (not needed to comply with Standard No. 208), or (2) to an inflatable restraint installed to meet the requirements of another standard (such as Standard No. 214, Side Impact Protection). You stated that Porsche believed that in both of these situations the manufacturer could install:

• no readiness indicator, or
• a separate readiness indicator from that required by Standard No. 208, or
• a readiness indicator combined with that required by Standard No. 208.

As explained below, we agree. Moreover, we also conclude that a voluntarily-provided indicator for pretensioners may be combined with the required Standard No. 208 indicator without providing a distinguishable message.

S4.5.2 of Standard No. 208 states:

An occupant protection system that deploys in the event of a crash shall have a monitoring system with a readiness indicator. The indicator shall monitor its own readiness and shall be clearly visible from the driver's designated seating position.

We believe that this provision, in the overall context of Standard No. 208, could be interpreted in more than one way. In particular, the requirement could be interpreted as applying to all occupant protection systems that deploy in the event of a crash, or just to those provided to comply with Standard No. 208.

On the one hand, one might conclude that an indicator is required for all air bags because the language of S4.5.2 does not limit its application to systems provided to comply with Standard No. 208, and because Standard No. 208 has historically addressed occupant protection broadly, i.e., its requirements are not limited to frontal protection.

Conversely, one could reach the opposite result, i.e., that an indicator is required only for air bags used to comply with Standard No. 208, because the standard's dynamic test requirements have, over time and as a practical matter, become limited to frontal protection. After all, an indicator's purpose is to ensure that an air bag or other crash deployed system will provide benefits for the life of the vehicle by warning the driver when repairs are needed. So it would be logical to conclude from the overall context of Standard No. 208 that the indicator requirements are there to ensure that the air bags provided to comply with the standard will provide benefits for the life of the vehicle. Viewed from that context, the indicator requirements do not address air bags installed for other purposes.

Under the first interpretation, i.e. that an indicator is required for all air bags, a single indicator could clearly be used for all air bags, without providing distinguishing messages, because nothing in Standard No. 208 suggests that separate indicators or messages are required.

The second interpretation, i.e. that an indicator is required only for air bags used to comply with Standard No. 208 raises the issue whether a single indicator without distinguishing messages could be used for required and non-required air bags. As suggested in my April 25 letter, it is arguable that the requirement in S4.5.2 would not be satisfied by an indicator providing non-distinguishable messages which may relate either to air bags required by Standard No. 208 or to other systems.

After considering the language of Standard No. 208 and its purposes, we conclude that it is appropriate to interpret Standard No. 208, S4.5.2, not to require an indicator for air bags other than those required to comply with that standard. While the agency is stopping short of interpreting the standard as requiring an indicator for such voluntarily-installed air bags, however, we nonetheless encourage such indicators. Consistent with that encouragement, and considering the ambiguity of S4.5.2, we believe it is appropriate to interpret the standard as permitting a single indicator, without distinguishing messages, for all air bags.

The reason for this conclusion is that the message of the readiness indicator is that a component of an air bag system (or other occupant protection system which deploys in the event of a crash) needs the attention of an automotive expert such as a dealer. Regardless of which system is causing the indicator to signal the existence of a malfunction, we believe that when vehicle owners see the indicator provide a warning, they will understand that there is a problem with an air bag (or other occupant protection system which deploys in the event of a crash) and will take the vehicle to a dealer or repair business. Since the dealer or repair business can inform the owner which system is malfunctioning, it does not matter that the indicator does not make that distinction. This result is, as noted above, consistent with the view that S4.5.2 applies to non-required air bags.

As indicated above, NHTSA has also reconsidered that portion of a November 27, 1991 interpretation which concludes that an indicator for pretensioners may not be combined with the S4.5.2 indicator unless a distinguishable message is provided. The rationale for that interpretation had some similarities to the April 25, 1996 interpretation to Porsche about air bags other than those used to comply with Standard No. 208. First, NHTSA concluded that S4.5.2 does not require an indicator for pretensioners. Second, the agency concluded that a voluntarily provided indicator for pretensioners may not be combined with the S4.5.2 indicator unless a distinguishable message is provided.

In concluding that S4.5.2 does not require an indicator for pretensioners, the agency considered whether pretensioners are "an occupant protection system that deploys in the event of a crash." The agency noted that even though pretensioners are designed to activate in the event of a crash, they will not "deploy" the belts if the belts have not been manually fastened. NHTSA stated that it does not view the pretensioners as "deploying" the belts but instead providing a final, albeit important, adjustment to belts which have already been deployed.

Just as there is some ambiguity with respect to whether S4.5.2 covers air bags other than those used to comply with Standard No. 208, there is ambiguity with respect to whether it covers pretensioners. The word "deploy" is defined in the dictionary and in common usage as "to arrange, place, or move strategically or appropriately." While it is certainly true that pretensioners will not "deploy" unfastened safety belts, pretensioners can be seen as "deploying" fastened safety belts in the event of a crash, i.e., moving them into position to provide better occupant protection.

NHTSA believes that this ambiguity should be resolved in the same manner as for air bags other than those used to comply with Standard No. 208. That is, the agency will not interpret the standard as requiring an indicator for pretensioners, but nonetheless encourages such indicators. As part of that encouragement, and given the ambiguity of S4.5.2, we interpret the standard as permitting a single indicator, without distinguishing messages, for all air bags and pretensioners.

I note that we are not interpreting S4.5.2 as permitting indicators for devices other than deploying occupant crash protection systems to be combined with the required indicator without distinguishing messages. I also note that, should the agency in the future receive information demonstrating that indicators for multiple air bag systems without distinguishing messages are creating confusion for drivers, we may revisit this subject in rulemaking. Finally, because this interpretation reflects consideration of the unique history of Standard No. 208, I caution against using it for precedent concerning how the agency might interpret other standards.

If you have any other questions or need some additional information, please contact Edward Glancy of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Samuel J. Dubbin

Chief Counsel

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Philip A. Hutchinson, Jr.
President
Association of International Automobile Manufacturers, Inc.
1001 19th St. North
Suite 1200
Arlington, VA 22209

ref:208#214

d:7/30/96

ID: 3276yy

Edward F. Conway, Jr., Esq.
Assistant General Counsel
Recreation Vehicle Industry Association
P.O. Box 2999
1896 Preston White Drive
Reston, VA 22090

Dear Mr. Conway:

I have been asked to respond to your letter to Administrator Curry, in which you asked about the application of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 216, Roof Crush Resistance, to van conversions and motor homes with raised roofs. In your letter, you suggested that the currently specified roof crush resistance test procedure is inappropriate for such vehicles because of their unique physical characteristics. Additionally, referring to the greater floor to roof height of a van conversion or motor home as compared to a typical passenger car, you questioned whether the five inch roof displacement pass/fail criteria are appropriate for these vehicles. I am pleased to have the opportunity to address these issues.

As you know, on April 17, 1991, NHTSA published a final rule extending the application of Standard No. 216 to multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPVs), trucks and buses with a GVWR of 6,000 pounds or less, manufactured on or after September 1, 1993 (56 FR 15510). That rule requires that the roof of any such vehicles be moved not more than five inches when a force of one and a half times the vehicle's unloaded weight is applied to either side of the forward edge of the vehicle's roof. This is the same test procedure specified for passenger cars, with one exception. For passenger cars, the standard specifies applying a force of one and a half times the vehicle's unloaded weight or 5,000 pounds, whichever is less. As indicated above, the alternative 5,000 pound crush force limit that applies for passenger cars was not adopted for light trucks, buses, and MPVs.

During the rulemaking process that led to this extension of Standard No. 216, NHTSA received comments requesting that the agency consider modifying the roof crush resistance test procedure to accommodate the particular physical characteristics of some motor homes, vans and van conversions, including those with raised roofs. More specifically, some commenters including RVIA suggested that the specified test procedures could not be used to position the test device on some vehicles with raised roofs. Other commenters, especially Ford, questioned the need for a five-inch roof crush limitation for vehicles with full standing headroom and suggested that NHTSA consider relating the maximum roof crush requirement to the available occupant headroom.

After carefully evaluating these comments, NHTSA concluded that, based upon the available information, the roof crush resistance test procedure was practicable, met the need for motor vehicle safety, and was appropriate for MPVs, trucks, and buses, if those vehicles had a GVWR of 6,000 pounds or less. The issues identified by the commenters were significant primarily for such vehicles with a GVWR of more than 6,000 pounds. NHTSA acknowledged that it was possible that there could be some light trucks with a GVWR of 6,000 pounds or less that would experience the same problems with the specified roof crush resistance test procedure as larger vehicles would. However, the agency had no information showing that those difficulties would actually be experienced by particular light trucks with a GVWR of 6,000 pounds or less. See 56 FR 15514; April 17, 1991.

In your letter, you raised the same issues that had previously been raised in these comments; that is, you suggested that the test device could not be positioned properly on vehicles with a raised roof and that the five inch crush displacement limit was inappropriate for vehicles with a raised roof. As was the case with those comments, your letter did not provide any specific information identifying particular vehicles with a GVWR of 6,000 pounds or less whose physical characteristics would cause it to experience some particular compliance difficulties or testing difficulties.

If you have some information showing compliance or testing difficulties for actual light truck models with a GVWR of 6,000 pounds or less, we would appreciate it if you would forward that information to the agency. At this time, NHTSA is not aware of any compliance or testing difficulties for light trucks subject to the extended requirements of Standard No. 216. Absent such information, NHTSA has no basis for changing its previous conclusion about the specified test procedures and requirements.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel

/ref:216 d:1/17/92

ID: nht80-3.18

DATE: 07/11/80

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: George D. Lordi

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your recent letter asking whether there are any Federal requirements applicable to the manufacture of center arm rests that are to be installed between bucket seats in passenger cars, as aftermarket equipment.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration issues safety standards and regulations governing the manufacture of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment, pursuant to authority of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.). Currently, Safety Standard No. 201, Occupant Protection in Interior Impact (49 CFR 571.201), specifies requirements for arm rests that are installed on new passenger cars. Although this standard does not apply directly to arm rests sold only as aftermarket does not apply directly to arm rests sold only as aftermarket equipment, installation of arm rests on both new and used cars may give rise to certain responsibilities on the part of the person making the installation.

Any person who alters a completed vehicle prior to its first purchase for purposes other than resale, i.e., the first sale of the vehicle to a consumer, must place an additional label or tag on the vehicle specifying that, as altered, the vehicle continues to be in compliance with all Federal motor vehicle safety standards (49 CFR 567.7). A person who installs a center arm rest on a vehicle prior to the vehicle's first purchase would be considered an alterer under this provision, and would have to certify that the passenger car was in compliance with Standard No. 201.

Section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Vehicle Safety Act specifies that no manufacturer, dealer, distributor or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative in whole or part any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle in compliance with Federal motor vehicle safety standards. This means that none of the persons mentioned could install a center arm rest in a passenger car if the installation would destroy the vehicle's compliance with the Federal safety Standards. For example, if it were necessary to permanently remove the vehicle's seat belts in order to install the arm rest, the installation would be prohibited since seat belts are required by Safety Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection. It is up to the person making the installation to determine if any safety standards would be affected, and you should so advise your client.

Finally, in addition to the Federal safety standards, manufacturers of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment are responsible for any defects in their products which affect motor vehicle safety. Under 49, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 579.5, each manufacturer of an item of aftermarket equipment is responsible for safety-related defects in that equipment. This means that a manufacturer of aftermarket arm rests would have to recall the equipment and remedy free of charge any defect that is determined to exist (15 U.S.C. 1414). For example, arm rests constructed of highly flammable material could be determined to be defective.

I hope this has been responsive to your inquiry. Please contact Hugh Oates of my staff if you require any further information (202-426-2992).

SINCERELY,

LORDI & IMPERIAL

COUNSELLORS AT LAW

June 18, 1980

Frank A. Berndt, Esq. Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic & Safety Administration

Dear Mr. Berndt:

Please be advised that I represent a company which is about to commence production of a center arm rest which will be installed in automobiles with bucket seats which do not offer this type of option.

In reviewing the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, I have been unable to find any standard relating to the manufacture and installation of arm rests. In fact, I am of the opinion that there are not any such standards.

My opinion was confirmed by a telephone call to your office and a conversation with one of the attorneys at your office.

Would you kindly provide me with the position of the National Highway Traffic & Safety Administration in regards to the manufacture and installation of center arm rests in automobiles containing bucket seats and advise whether there are any applicable safety standards.

Your immediate attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated as my clients are a small company who are totally dependent upon a steady cash flow in order to remain competitive.

GEORGE D. LORDI

ID: nht92-9.47

DATE: January 17, 1992

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Edward F. Conway, Jr., Esq. -- Assistant General Counsel, Recreation Vehicle Industry Association

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 11/14/91 from Edward F. Conway, Jr., Esq. to Jerry R. Curry

TEXT:

I have been asked to respond to your letter to Administrator Curry, in which you asked about the application of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 216, Roof Crush Resistance, to van conversions and motor homes with raised roofs. In your letter, you suggested that the currently specified roof crush resistance test procedure is inappropriate for such vehicles because of their unique physical characteristics. Additionally, referring to the greater floor to roof height of a van conversion or motor home as compared to a typical passenger car, you questioned whether the five inch roof displacement pass/fail criteria are appropriate for these vehicles. I am pleased to have the opportunity to address these issues.

As you know, on April 17, 1991, NHTSA published a final rule extending the application of Standard No. 216 to multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPVs), trucks and buses with a GVWR of 6,000 pounds or less, manufactured on or after September 1, 1993 (56 FR 15510). That rule requires that the roof of any such vehicles be moved not more than five inches when a force of one and a half times the vehicle's unloaded weight is applied to either side of the forward edge of the vehicle's roof. This is the same test procedure specified for passenger cars, with one exception. For passenger cars, the standard specifies applying a force of one and a half times the vehicle's unloaded weight or 5,000 pounds, whichever is less. As indicated above, the alternative 5,000 pound crush force limit that applies for passenger cars was not adopted for light trucks, buses, and MPVS.

During the rulemaking process that led to this extension of Standard No. 216, NHTSA received comments requesting that the agency consider modifying the roof crush resistance test procedure to accommodate the particular physical characteristics of some motor homes, vans and van conversions, including those with raised roofs. More specifically, some commenters including RVIA suggested that the specified test procedures could not be used to position the test device on some vehicles with raised roofs. Other commenters, especially Ford, questioned the need for a five-inch roof crush limitation for vehicles with full standing headroom and suggested that NHTSA consider relating the maximum roof crush requirement to the available occupant headroom.

After carefully evaluating these comments, NHTSA concluded that, based upon the available information, the roof crush resistance test procedure was practicable, met the need for motor vehicle safety, and was appropriate for MPVs, trucks, and buses, if those vehicles had a GVWR of 6,000 pounds or less. The issues identified by the commenters were

significant primarily for such vehicles with a GVWR of more than 6,000 pounds. NHTSA acknowledged that it was possible that there could be some light trucks with a GVWR of 6,000 pounds or less that would experience the same problems with the specified roof crush resistance test procedure as larger vehicles would. However, the agency had no information showing that those difficulties would actually be experienced by particular light trucks with a GVWR of 6,000 pounds or less. See 56 FR 15514; April 17, 1991.

In your letter, you raised the same issues that had previously been raised in these comments; that is, you suggested that the test device could not be positioned properly on vehicles with a raised roof and that the five inch crush displacement limit was inappropriate for vehicles with a raised roof. As was the case with those comments, your letter did not provide any specific information identifying particular vehicles with a GVWR of 6,000 pounds or less whose physical characteristics would cause it to experience some particular compliance difficulties or testing difficulties.

If you have some information showing compliance or testing difficulties for actual light truck models with a GVWR of 6,000 pounds or less, we would appreciate it if you would forward that information to the agency. At this time, NHTSA is not aware of any compliance or testing difficulties for light trucks subject to the extended requirements of Standard No. 216. Absent such information, NHTSA has no basis for changing its previous conclusion about the specified test procedures and requirements.

ID: nht95-4.70

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: November 8, 1995

FROM: Jane Thornton Mastrucci -- Thornton, Mastrucci and Sinclair

TO: John Womack -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: 12/26/95 letter from Samuel J. Dubbin (signed by John Womack) to Jane Thornton Mastrucci (A43; Part 571.3; VSA 102)

TEXT: We represent the Dade County School Board with respect to its vehicular litigation.

The Florida Legislature has just passed a new law, F.S. 234.02 (1)(a) which allows a School Board to use, in addition to passenger cars not exceeding eight students, any other motor vehicle designed to transport ten on fewer persons which meets all fe deral motor vehicle safety standards for passenger cars. Similarly, the Department of Education Rule 6A-3.017 (10)(c) allows the transportation of students, when necessary or practical, in multipurpose vehicles, providing the MPV meets all of the applica ble passenger car federal motor vehicle safety standards, except the standard pertaining to window tinting. Copies of both of these statutes are attached.

Would you please advise which passenger vehicles which multipurpose vehicles meet all federal motor safety standards.

Thanking you for your courtesy and cooperation in advance, I remain,

Florida statutes are omitted.