NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
| Interpretations | Date |
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ID: aiam2238OpenMr. W. G. Milby, Staff Engineer, Blue Bird Body Company, P. O. Box 937, Fort Valley, GA, 31030; Mr. W. G. Milby Staff Engineer Blue Bird Body Company P. O. Box 937 Fort Valley GA 31030; Dear Mr. Milby: This responds to several questions raised by Blue Bird Body Compan concerning the applicability of school bus safety standards to certain bus types under the newly-issued redefinition of school bus (40 FR 60033, December 31, 1975). The new definition (effective October 27, 1976) reads:; >>>'School bus' means a bus that is sold, or introduced in interstat commerce, for purposes that include carrying students to and from school or related events, but does not include a bus designed and sold for operation as a common carrier in urban transportation.>>>; In your February 24, 1976, letter you ask whether buses utilized t transport athletic teams and school bands to and from athletic events qualify as school buses under the definition that becomes effective October 27, 1976, and, if so, whether they must therefore comply with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards.; From your description of the use of an 'activity bus' to transpor students to and from athletic events related to the students' school, it would be included as a school bus under the new definition if it were sold for this use. It appears clear that the manufacturer and dealer in these cases would both be aware that the purchasing school intended to use the bus to transport students to events related to their school, such as athletic events involving school teams. In close cases, the knowledge of parties to the sales transaction would be determinative of whether the bus was 'sold. . . for purposes that include carrying students to and from school or related events. . . .' Any bus determined to be a school bus under the new definition would be required to meet all applicable standards in effect on the date of its manufacture.; Your December 16, 1975, letter asks whether transit buses that ar based on a basic school bus design must meet the requirements of Standard No. 217, *Emergency Exits*, that apply to buses other than school buses. Since receipt of your letter, the redefinition of school bus has been issued and Standard No. 217 has been amended by the addition of requirements for school buses. In answer to your question, only a bus that is sold for purposes that include carrying students to and from school qualifies as a school bus. A bus designed and sold for operation as a common carrier in urban transportation would be required to meet the requirements of Standard 217 for buses other than school buses.; Your separate question regarding the configuration of emergency exit has been answered in an earlier interpretation of the provision you question. A copy of that interpretation is enclosed.; Your March 4, 1976, letter asked whether the new definition of schoo bus includes buses that are sold for transportation of college-age students. You argued that an intent to include buses other than those for the transportation of preprimary-, primary-, and secondary-school students would go beyond the statutory definition added to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act by the Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus (sic) Safety Amendments of 1974 (15 U.S.C. S1391(14)), and apply the standards to a broader variety of vehicles than those for which they were developed. The NHTSA finds this argument to have merit. It therefore withdraws its discussion of the breadth of the regulatory definition of school bus that appeared in the December 31, 1975, preamble. The agency will not consider buses sold for the transportation of college-age students to be school buses.; You also asked if any motor vehicle safety standard requires tha school buses be painted yellow. No motor vehicle safety standard requires yellow paint. At this time, however, Standard No. 108, *Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment*, requires installation of warning lights, and this would entail the use of yellow paint by the operator under Pupil Transportation Standard No. 17.; In an area unrelated to school bus definition, you asked in a Februar 20, 1976, letter whether the description of vehicle roof appearing in S5.2(b) of Standard No. 220, *School Bus Rollover Protection*, applies to determination of roof size under S5.2(a) and S5.2(b). The description is intended to apply to roof measurement under both S5.2(a) and S5.2(b).; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam2240OpenMr. W. G. Milby, Staff Engineer, Blue Bird Body Company, P. O. Box 937, Fort Valley, GA 31030; Mr. W. G. Milby Staff Engineer Blue Bird Body Company P. O. Box 937 Fort Valley GA 31030; Dear Mr. Milby: This responds to several questions raised by Blue Bird Body Compan concerning the applicability of school bus safety standards to certain bus types under the newly-issued redefinition of school bus (40 FR 60033, December 31, 1975). The new definition (effective October 27, 1976) reads:; >>>'School bus' means a bus that is sold, or introduced in interstat commerce, for purposes that include carrying students to and from school or related events, but does not include a bus designed and sold for operation as a common carrier in urban transportation.<<<; In your February 24, 1976, letter you ask whether buses utilized t transport athletic teams and school bands to and from athletic events qualify as school buses under the definition that becomes effective October 27, 1976, and, if so, whether they must therefore comply with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards.; From your description of the use of an 'activity bus' to transpor students to and from athletic events related to the students' school, it would be included as a school bus under the new definition if it were sold for this use. It appears clear that the manufacturer and dealer in these cases would both be aware that the purchasing school intended to use the bus to transport students to events related to their school, such as athletic events involving school teams. In close cases, the knowledge of parties to the sales transaction would be determinative of whether the bus was 'sold. . . for purposes that include carrying students to and from school or related events. . . .' Any bus determined to be a school bus under the new definition would be required to meet all applicable standards in effect on the date of its manufacture.; Your December 16, 1975, letter asks whether transit buses that ar based on a basic school bus design must meet the requirements of Standard No. 217, *Emergency Exits*, that apply to buses other than school buses. Since receipt of your letter, the redefinition of school bus has been issued and Standard No. 217 has been amended by the addition of requirements for school buses. In answer to your question, only a bus that is sold for purposes that include carrying students to and from school qualifies as a school bus. A bus designed and sold for operation as a common carrier in urban transportation would be required to meet the requirements of Standard 217 for buses other than school buses.; Your separate question regarding the configuration of emergency exit has been answered in an earlier interpretation of the provision you question. A copy of that interpretation is enclosed.; Your March 4, 1976, letter asked whether the new definition of schoo bus includes buses that are sold for transportation of college-age students. You argued that an intent to include buses other than those for the transportation of preprimary-, primary-, and secondary-school students would go beyond the statutory definition added to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act by the Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974 (15 U.S.C. S 1391(14)), and apply the standards to a broader variety of vehicles than those for which they were developed. The NHTSA finds this argument to have merit. It therefore withdraws its discussion of the breadth of the regulatory definition of school bus that appeared in the December 31, 1975, preamble. The agency will not consider buses sold for the transportation of college-age students to be school buses.; You also asked if any motor vehicle safety standard requires tha school buses by painted yellow. No motor vehicle safety standard requires yellow paint. At this time, however, Standard No. 108, *Lamps, Reflective devices, and Associated Equipment*, requires installation of warning lights, and this would entail the use of yellow paint by the operator under Pupil Transportation Standard No. 17.; In an area unrelated to school bus definition, you asked in a Februar 20, 1976, letter whether the description of vehicle roof appearing in S5.2(b) of Standard No. 220, *School Bus Rollover Protection*, applies to determination of roof size under both S5.2(a) and S5.2(b). The description is intended to apply to roof measurement under both S5.2(a) and S5.2(b).; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam4388OpenJ. Douglas Hand, Esq., Legal Staff, General Motors Corporation, P.O. Box 33122, Detroit, MI 48232; J. Douglas Hand Esq. Legal Staff General Motors Corporation P.O. Box 33122 Detroit MI 48232; Dear Mr. Hand: This responds to your letter seeking an interpretation of Standard No 208, *Occupant Crash Protection* (49 CFR S571.208). Specifically, you asked whether General Motors Corporation (GM) can be deemed the manufacturer of passenger cars produced by Lotus Cars Limited (LCL) for the purposes of S4.1.3.5, the manufacturer attribution provisions of Standard No. 208. After we received your letter, you made us aware of certain changed circumstances. In your letter, you stated that GM did not own the entity that was the exclusive importer of Lotus vehicles, and that GM owned 96 percent of LCL. Subsequently, you have told us that GM wholly owns the companies that import and market Lotus vehicles in the United States and that GM wholly owns LCL. This letter of interpretation is based on the GM - Lotus corporate relationship described in this letter. To the extent that the description in this letter differs from the description set forth in your August, 1986 letter, it reflects our understanding of the changed circumstances. Our conclusion is that, since GM sponsors the importation, distribution, and marketing of these cars, GM may be considered the manufacturer of cars produced by LCL for the purposes of Standard No. 208.; You explained that LCL is a part of Group Lotus, a United Kingdo company that provides engineering services to various motor vehicle manufacturers and produces fewer than a thousand passenger cars a year. Group Lotus is a wholly-owned subsidiary of GM, although LCL designs, builds, and certifies its cars without GM's advice. Approximately 200 Lotus passenger cars are imported into the United States each year by Lotus Performance Cars, Limited Partnership (LPC), a wholly-owned subsidiary of GM. Lotus cars are marketed and distributed in the United States by Lotus Cars USA, Inc., another wholly-owned subsidiary of GM. Hence, GM owns the company that designs and assembles these cars, and GM owns the companies that import and market the vehicles.; Section 102(5) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (1 U.S.C. 1391(5)) defines 'manufacturer' as 'any person engaged in the manufacturing or assembling of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, including any person importing motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment for resale.' Under this definition, *both* LCL and LPC are statutory manufacturers of Lotus passenger cars. LCL designs and assembles the cars, and has filed a designation of agent for service of process with this agency, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1399(e). By filing a designation of agent, LCL has acknowledged that it is offering its cars for importation into the United States. LPC imports those cars into the United States.; Section S4.1.3.5 of Standard No. 208 sets forth provisions fo instances in which passenger cars have more than one statutory 'manufacturer.' That section provides that the manufacturers may execute an express written contract to specify the manufacturer to which the cars shall be attributed. In the absence of such a contract, S4.1.3.5.1(a) provides that imported passenger cars will be attributed to the importer. Since there is no such contract in this instance, application of this provision means that the Lotus passenger cars, which are produced in the United Kingdom, would be attributed to LPC, the GM subsidiary which imports the cars into the United States.; In the April 12, 1985, proposal to establish attribution requirement in the case of vehicles that have more than one statutory 'manufacturer' (50 FR 14589), NHTSA stated that it considers the statutory definition of 'manufacturer' to be sufficiently broad to include sponsors, depending on the circumstances. See 50 FR 14596. The agency stated that if a sponsor contracts for another manufacturer to produce a design exclusively for the sponsor, the sponsor may be considered the manufacturer of those vehicles, applying basic principles of agency law. On the other hand, the agency stated that the mere purchase of vehicles for resale by a company which also is a manufacturer of motor vehicles does *not* make the purchaser the manufacturer of those vehicles.; Applying these principles to your case, we conclude that GM sponsor the importation of the Lotus vehicles. Both LCL, the actual assembler, and LPC, the actual importer, are wholly-owned subsidiaries of GM. By itself, GM's ownership of both the producer and importer of these cars might not be sufficient to establish that GM was the sponsor of these vehicles for the purposes of Standard No. 208. In addition, however, another wholly-owned subsidiary distributes and markets the vehicles in the United States. GM coordinates the activities of all these subsidiaries. Since GM wholly owns the actual producer of these vehicles and is actively involved in the importation, distribution, and marketing of these vehicles, we believe that GM should be considered to sponsor the importation of the Lotus vehicles. Accordingly, GM rather than LPC, may be considered the importer and manufacturer of these vehicles.; If you have any further questions, please let me know. Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam0180OpenMr. John Thomas, Staff Engineer, Motor Vehicle Safety, International Harvester Company, Motor Truck Division, P. O. Box 1109,Fort Wayne, IN 46801; Mr. John Thomas Staff Engineer Motor Vehicle Safety International Harvester Company Motor Truck Division P. O. Box 1109 Fort Wayne IN 46801; Dear Mr. Thomas: This is in reply to your letter dated June 19, 1969, in which yo request approval of an alternative to the specified certification label location in accordance with Part 367.4(c) of the regulations. Due to an oversight, your letter has not reached me until now, and I apologize for the delay in responding.; Your proposed label location for models MA-1200 and MA-1500 Metro, o the panel below the wing glass, as shown in your enclosed sketch, is approved.; Sincerely, Robert Brenner, Acting Director |
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ID: aiam2673OpenMr. Eric E. Gough, Staff Assistant (Technical), Lucas Industries North America, Inc., Two Northfield Plaza, Troy, MI 48084; Mr. Eric E. Gough Staff Assistant (Technical) Lucas Industries North America Inc. Two Northfield Plaza Troy MI 48084; Dear Mr. Gough: In response to your letter of August 19, 1977, we advise you that you mistake in referencing S4.5.2 of Standard No. 108 instead of S4.5.1 in your earlier letter of May 13, 1977, does not alter our previous interpretation of June 16, 1977.; Your design appears to meet the specifications of J564a allowin compliance of the headlamp beam switching system with S4.5.1 when installed in a motor vehicle.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Deputy Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam2372OpenMr. Don Dekker, Attwood Corporation, Lowell, MI, 49331; Mr. Don Dekker Attwood Corporation Lowell MI 49331; Dear Mr. Dekker: This is in response to your letter of June 23, 1976, in which you as whether Standard No. 302, *Flammability of Interior Materials*, applies to portable toilets.; Standard 302 applies to the motor vehicles listed in Section S3 including the equipment installed in them at the time of sale. Section S4 lists those parts of a motor vehicle that must comply with burn resistance requirements, and a portable toilet is not included. Therefore, it is not subject to the standard. I have enclosed a copy of the standard for your information.; Sincerely, Frank A. Berndt, Acting Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam1413OpenMr. S. A. Spretnjak, Excel Industries, 1003 Industrial Parkway, Elkhart, IN 46514; Mr. S. A. Spretnjak Excel Industries 1003 Industrial Parkway Elkhart IN 46514; Dear Mr. Spretnjak: This is in reply to your letter of January 14, 1974, inquiring whethe Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 217, Bus Window Retention and Release' (49 CFR 571,217), prohibits the use of sliding windows as emergency exits in buses. You refer to language in S5.3.1 and S5.4 of the standard which refers specifically to the use of push-out windows as emergency exits.; Standard No. 217 is not intended to prohibit the use of sliding window as bus emergency exits, but such windows must comply with all of the standard's requirements for emergency exits.; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam3188OpenR. H. Brushwood, The Hartford, Hartford Plaza, Hartford, CT 06115; R. H. Brushwood The Hartford Hartford Plaza Hartford CT 06115; Dear Mr. Brushwood: This is in response to your letter of December 27, 1979, wherein yo asked whether the Hawaii Interim Certificate of Accurace complies with the Federal odometer disclosure regulations. You are correct in believing that it does not. In order to comply it must include a statement that the odometer reading contained therein reflects the actual mileage, the mileage over 100,000, or does not reflect the actual mileage. If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to write.; Sincerely, John Womack, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam2009OpenMr. Hironori Tanaka, Toyoda Gosei Co., Ltd., 9, 1-chome, Nishiyabushitacho, Nishiku, Nagoya, Japan; Mr. Hironori Tanaka Toyoda Gosei Co. Ltd. 9 1-chome Nishiyabushitacho Nishiku Nagoya Japan; Dear Mr. Tanaka: #Please forgive the delay in responding to your lette of April 25, 1975, which questioned our interpretation of March 13, 1975, of the adhesion requirement of S7.3.7 of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 106-74, *Brake Hoses*. #Our interpretation was that the requirement applies to each pair of adjacent layers of a brake hose. Multilayer hose manufacturing in the United States and Europe is in fact made with bonding between all pairs of adjacent layers. There is no change in our interpretation. #Sincerely, Frank A. Berndt, Acting Chief Counsel; |
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ID: aiam0389OpenMr. K. Nakajima, General Manager, Toyota Motor Company, Ltd., Lyndhurst Office Park, 1099 Wall Street, West, Lyndhurst, New Jersey 07071; Mr. K. Nakajima General Manager Toyota Motor Company Ltd. Lyndhurst Office Park 1099 Wall Street West Lyndhurst New Jersey 07071; Dear Mr. Nakajima: This is in reply to your letter of June 9, 1971, regarding th definition of 'curb weight' in Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 110.; The air conditioner and the additional weight optional engine are to b included in 'curb weight' if the motor vehicle is equipped with these items. If the motor vehicle is not so equipped, then the items are not to be included in the 'curb weight' or the 'accessory weight'.; Sincerely, Lawrence R. Schneider, Acting Chief Counsel |
Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.