ID: nht73-2.17

DATE: 11/08/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; James B. Gregory; NHTSA

TO: Department of California Highway Patrol

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of October 1, 1973, in which you asked that we review an enclosed opinion by the California Attorney General on the question of preemption of California motor vehicle regulations by Federal standards. The opinion concluded that the California requirement that motorcycles be wired so that their headlamps are lit whenever their engines are running was not preempted. This conclusion was contrary to the position taken in an NHTSA letter of November 14, 1972, to Mr. Edward Kearney.

We adhere to the position stated in the November 14, 1972, letter that the California requirement is preempted, and consider the legal opinion by the California Attorney General to be an erroneous view of the Federal law.

The opinion properly viewed the question as turning on the application of the phrase in @ 103(d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 1392(d), "applicable to the same aspect of performance." If the Federal standard (Standard No. 108, 49 CFR 571.108) covers a given aspect of performance, any State requirement must be identical to it. The California opinion relied on the language in the main opinion of one of the Super Lite cases, Chrysler Corp. v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499 (1969), that preemption should be "narrowly construed", and went on to find that since Standard 108 does not specifically address the matter of wiring the headlamps when the engine is running, that aspect of performance is not covered by the standard and the California law is valid.

More important, however, than the nebulous concept of whether preemption is "narrowly" construed (a concept with which Judge Friendly, concurring in Chrysler, did not agree) is the point made at the end of the main opinion, that the administering Federal agency was supporting the State's position regarding the scope of the Federal regulation. The Court quoted the U.S. Supreme Court in Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 276 (1969):

[W]hen construing an administrative regulation,'a court must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the words used is in doubt. . . .[T]he ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.'

In this case the situation is the opposite of that in the Super Lite cases. The NHTSA's position is that the standard does cover the aspect of performance in question. As stated in the NHTSA letter of November 14, 1972, the standard "establishes requirements for motorcycle headlighting, along with special wiring requirements for motorcycles and other vehicles." It is the intent of the NHTSA that its requirements for headlamp performance, configuration, and wiring cover all aspects of performance directly involving headlamps, and thus preempt any non-identical State Standards relating to headlamps.

The implication of the California opinion is that any mode of design or performance that is not expressly dealt with in the Federal standard is open to regulation by the States. Such a position is impractical, where the agency's intent is to have a comprehensive, uniform regulation in a given area. In order to preempt the field it would be necessary for a Federal agency to anticipate the imaginative regulatory impulses of future State agencies or legislatures and include in a standard such provisions as, "It is not required that motorcycle headlamps be wired to operate when the engine is running." Congress clearly intended the NHTSA to establish a single set of uniform standards to which manufacturers must comply, and that intent would tend to be defeated by the position taken in the California opinion. Federal regulation has a negative as well as a positive aspect: in determining that there should be certain requirements in an area, we also are deciding against imposing others. The only way to effectuate such a decision is to declare, as we have done here, that our regulation is intended to be exclusive, and to describe as necessary its outer limits.

The California opinion's factual comparison with the Super Lite cases is also inapt. The Super Lite itself was a new type of lighting equipment, a supplementary lamp, for which Standard 108 contained no requirements. Headlamps, by contrast, are comprehensively regulated by the standard.

For these reasons, we conclude that the California requirement that motorcycle headlamps be wired to operate when the engine is running is preempted by Standard 108, and void.

While we feel constrained by law to so conclude, I want you to know that I have instructed my staff to consider the merit of amending the Federal lighting standard to include the California requirement in 108.

Sincerely,

October 1, 1973

James B. Gregory -- Administrator, U. S. Dept. of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Dear Dr. Gregory:

A copy of Mr. Douglas Toms' letter of November 14, 1972, to Mr. Edward Kearney expressing his opinion that a recently passed California law relative to motorcycle headlamps was preempted by Federal Standard 108, was received by this Department on November 20, 1972.

The opinion expressed by Mr. Toms prompted a request by this Department to the Office of the Attorney General of the State of California for an opinion on the question of federal preemption as related to this recently enacted statute. A copy of the Attorney General's Opinion on this matter is enclosed for your review.

You will notice that the Attorney General's Opinion is not in accord with that expressed by Mr. Toms; therefore, we are proceeding on the premise that all motorcycles first manufactured and registered in California after January 1, 1975, will be required to meet these headlamp requirements.

After your review of the enclosed material, I would appreciate your comments on this very important issue.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely,

W. PUDINSKI Commissioner--Dept. of California Highway Patrol

Enclosure

cc: Senator Donald L. Grunsky; Edward Kearney

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

SAN FRANCISCO

September 13, 1973

W. Pudinski, Commissioner-- Department of California Highway Patrol

Dear Commissioner Pudinski:

You have requested the opinion of this office on the question of whether California Vehicle Code sections 25650.5 and 24253 are pre-empted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.

We conclude that these Vehicle Code provisions are not pre-empted by that Federal Act.

Our conclusion is based upon the following analysis:

In 1966 the Federal Government assumed a paramount role in the field of motor vehicle safety with the passage of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. 15 U.S.C. @ 1381 et seq. (hereafter Federal Act). Basically this Act establishes a comprehensive system for the formulation and implementation of safety standards for the performance and equipment of new motor vehicles.

The enactment of such an extensive federal law naturally gave rise to the question of whether State legislation in the same field was pre-empted. n1E. g., see Chrysler Corporation v. Rhodes, 416 F.2d 319 (1969); Chrysler Corporation v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499 (1969).

n1 See U.S. Const. art. VI, @ 2, the so-called Supremacy Clause.

Congress anticipated the question in their enactment of a provision in the Federal Act expressly dealing with issue of pre-emption, 15 U.S.C. @ 1392(d). It provides: "(d) Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the Federal Government or the government of any State or political subdivision thereof from establishing a safety requirement applicable to motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment procured for its own use if such requirement imposes a higher standard of performance than that required to comply with the otherwise applicable Federal standard."

This pre-emption provision (15 U.S.C. @ 1392(d)) was succinctly summarized by the United States Court of Appeals in Chrysler Corporation v. Tofany, supra, 419 F.2d 499 (1969). In that case the Court declared:

"This provision indicates that state regulation of an item of motor vehicle equipment will be preempted only if the following factors appear in combination: (1) a federal standard in effect which covers that item of equipment; (2) a state safety standard . . . for the item which is not identical to the federal standard; and (3) application of the state and federal regulations to 'the same aspect of performance' of the item of equipment." 419 F.2d at 506.

In connection with the present inquiry, the question of federal pre-emption has arisen with respect to two provisions in the State Vehicle Code: Vehicle Code section 25650.5 (relating to the activation of motorcycle headlights) and Vehicle Code section 24253 (relating to the duration of tail lamp illumination). It is noted that there are federal standards issued pursuant to the Federal Act which are (1) applicable to the same "items of equipment" (viz., motor cycle headlights and tail lamps); and (2) which are "not identical" to the State regulations. Hence in determining whether or not the State regulations are preempted, the specific question here is whether the State and federal regulations apply to "the same aspect of performance" of these specified items of equipment. In making this determination, it would be appropriate to first ascertain whether the phrase "same aspect of performance" is to be given a narrow or broad construction; i.e., whether the pre-emptive effect of the Federal Act is to be narrowly or broadly applied.

This specific point was considered by the United States Court of Appeals in Chrysler Corporation v. Tofanv, supra, 419 F.2d 499. In evaluating Congressional intent with respect to the Federal Act's pre-emptive effect, the Court noted that "uniformity through national standards" was merely "a secondary objective." 419 F.2d at 511. On the other hand, the Court declared that "the clear expression of purpose in section 1381 and other evidence of legislative intent indicate that the reduction of traffic accidents was the overriding concern of Congress. We think that these expressions of legislative purpose should govern our assessment of the preemptive effect of the Act and the standards issued under it." 419 F.2d at 508. (See also Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Lowery, 452 F.2d 431, 438 (1971), where the Court reiterates this conclusion.) Accordingly, the Court determined that "the 'aspect of performance' language in the preemption section of the Act must be construed narrowly." 419 F.2d at 510. The Court further stated: "If traffic safety is furthered by a traditional type of state regulation under the police power, . . . a narrow construction of the preemptive effect of the federal Act and [the standards issued pursuant thereto] is required." 419 F.2d at 511. n2.

n2 See Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of New York, 340 F.Supp. 1120, 1124 (1972), which cites Chrysler Corporation v. Tofanv, supra, for the proposition that "[w]here exercise of the local police power serves the purpose of a federal Act, the preemptive effect of that Act should be narrowly construed." See also Chrysler Corporation v. Rhodes, supra, 416 F.2d 319, 324, n. 8 (1969).

Thus in view of the judicial constraint upon the scope of the Federal Act's pre-emption provisions, it is apparent that the states are still afforded substantial leeway in the enactment of vehicle equipment safety regulations.

In this light we now compare the State statutes in question with the pertinent federal standards issued pursuant to the Federal Act to determine if they cover the "same aspect of performance."

With respect to motorcycle headlamps:

(1) State Law

Vehicle Code section 25650.5 provides that after January 1, 1975, all motorcycle headlamps shall "automatically turn on when the engine of the motorcycle is started and which remain lighted as long as the engine is running."

(2) Federal Standards

The standard pertinent to motorcycle headlamps is found in 49 CFR section 571.108, Standard 108, subsection S4.5.7(b). This standard provides: "When the headlamps are activated in a steady-burning state, the taillamps, parking lamps, license plate lamps and side marker lamps shall also be activated."

In comparing these two provisions, it can be seen that the State law relates to the mechanism or event of activation and duration of activation of the headlamps. The federal standard, on the other hand, is unconcerned with these factors. It merely constitutes a designation of other lamps whose activation is to accompany the activation of headlights. It would appear reasonable to conclude that these two provisions apply to different aspects of performance of motorcycle headlamps and that, accordingly, the State provision is not pre-empted. As will be seen, our conclusion is the same as to State law regulating taillamps.

With respect to taillamps:

(1) State Law

Vehicle Code section 24253 provides in essence that all motor vehicles and motorcycles shall be equipped with taillamps that will remain lighted at least one-quarter hour if the engine stops.

(2) Federal Standards

49 CFR section 571.108, Standard 108, subsections S4.5.3 and S4.5.7(b) provide that the taillamps shall be activated upon the activation of the headlamps. Subsection S4.5.7(a) provides that the taillamps shall be activated upon the activation of the parking lamps.

Thus the State law is solely concerned with the duration of illumination, while the federal standards are directed to the event of activation. Again, it would appear that, just as in the case of headlamps, these State and federal regulations are each addressed to separate and distinct aspects of taillamps performance. Accordingly then, the State provision is not pre-empted by the Federal Act.

Our conclusion that the State headlamp and taillamp regulations relate to aspects of performance different from those covered by federal standards, is fortified by the analysis engaged in by the Court in Chrysler Corporation v. Tofanv, supra, as it compared the state and federal standards at issue in that case. There state law prohibited a type of auxiliary headlight because of its unacceptable glare and dazzle effect (419 F.2d at 502, n. 5, 503) and because it emitted a blue light, a color of light which the states had reserved for emergency vehicles (419 F.2d at 503). The pertinent federal standards prohibited such auxiliary headlights only if they impaired the effectiveness of the required lights (419 F.2d at 506). The Court concluded that the federal standard applied to the impairment of light emission from the required headlights to the extent that such impairment affected the visibility of the driver of the car (419 F.2d at 511). On the other hand, the Court determined that the state provisions purported to regulate the effects of the light upon drivers of oncoming cars. The Court concluded that this was "a different aspect of performance" and thus the states' "attempts at regulation are not preempted." (Ibid.)

Thus we have a case where even though the state and federal regulations both related to the quality of the illumination itself which was emitted by the headlight, the Court nonetheless found that these regulations were directed to "different aspects of performance," because of the distinction between the effect of the illumination upon the driver of the car in question, and the effect upon drivers of oncoming cars.

If such closely related factors are deemed to constitute "different aspects of performance," a fortiori, such manifestly distinct elements of operation as the event or mechanism of light activation on the one hand, and the duration of illumination on the other hand, must be deemed to constitute "different aspects of performance."

In view of the explicit quality of this difference, our conclusion that it constitutes a different "aspect of performance" would appear to be warranted whether the phrase "aspect of performance," as used in the pre-emptive provisions of the Federal Act (viz., 15 U.S.C. @ 1392(d)), is given a narrow or broad construction. n3 It is thus our opinion that Vehicle Code sections 25650.5 and 24253 are not pre-empted.

n3 The concurring opinion in Chrysler Corporation v. Tofanv, supra, 419 F.2d at 512-515, argued that the pre-emptive provisions of the Federal Act should be broadly construed (419 F.2d at 512-513). Yet it concluded that the state regulations were not pre-empted because one of the basis for restricting the auxiliary headlight was the fact that it emitted light of a blue color (a color reserved for emergency vehicles), and that this was an aspect of performance different from that encompassed by the federal standard; viz., impairment of the effectiveness of the required lights (419 F.2d at 515). It would appear that the aspects of performance under consideration here are at least as distinct as those aspects of performance found to be different under the concurring opinion's broad construction of the Federal Act's pre-emption provisions.

Very truly yours,

EVELLE J. YOUNGER --

Attorney General,

VICTOR D. SONENBERG --

Deputy Attorney General

ID: nht94-4.48

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: October 11, 1994

FROM: Robert L. Hart -- Manager - Legal & Engineering Services, Gerry Baby Products Company

TO: Dee Fujita -- NHTSA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached to 1/4/95 letter from Philip Recht to Robert L. Hart (A43; Std. 213)

TEXT: Dear Ms. Fujita:

Several weeks ago I discussed our new child restraint with you. It is our model #632 with a preliminary name of Gerry Belt Right II Booster/Toddler Car Seat. A copy of the proof from our 1995 catalog describing this product is enclosed.

Model #632 has a removable 5 point restraint system. When the restraint is removed, it is a booster seat according to the definition in FMVSS 213.

Gerry is developing the final name for the product from these nine choices and we want to make sure we are not in violation of the standard if we use any of these names.

Belt Right 20 to 60 Lb. Car Seat

Belt Right Booster Car Seat

Belt Right Convertible Car Seat

Belt Right Convertible/Booster

Belt Right Convertible Toddler Seat

Belt Right Toddler Car Seat

Belt Right Baby to Toddler Car Seat

Belt Right Baby to Booster Car Seat

Belt Right Beyond Baby Car Seat

Please review these names at your earliest convenience and let me know if there are any problems. Thank you very much for your help.

Enclosure (Brochure omitted.)

ID: aiam1423

Dear Mr. Volberding: This is in further reply to your letter of December 6, 1973, i response to your phone conversation with Mike Peskoe on February 25, 1974. You indicated then that our reply of February 6, 1974, failed to define 'lowest seating position' as that term is used with respect to motorcycles in Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205 (S5.1.2.1 and S5.1.2.2).; We interpret the phrase 'lowest seating position' to mean the lowes point on the uncompressed seating surface of the motorcycle operator's seat.; I regret that our earlier letter omitted this information. Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel

ID: 11601MLV

Mr. Donald B. Karner
President
Electric Transportation Applications
P.O. Box 10303
Glendale, AZ 85318

Dear Mr. Karner:

This responds to your letter of February 2, 1996, requesting additional information in response to a letter from this agency dated January 24, 1996. Your question relates to what steps a manufacturer must take to Apermanently obstruct seating positions@ if the number of designated seating positions was to be reduced. You asked for Aany findings, case law, or policy or position statements which may have been previously generated in this area.@

NHTSA does not have a general rule as to what is an acceptable Apermanent obstruction@ of a seating position. We can, however, provide you with a discussion of previous statements concerning this topic, which may provide some guidance. We will also discuss the examples you include in your letter.

Previous Statements An April 19, 1979, final rule amending the definition of Adesignated seating position@ offers some discussion of this issue (44 FR 23229, copy enclosed). In the preamble to the rule, NHTSA interpreted the portion of the Adesignated seating position@ definition concerning the presumption that a bench seat with more than 50 inches of hip room shall have not less than three designated seating positions. The agency stated: Athe space occupied by a rigid console or a fixed, stationary armrest, for example, would not be considered hip room and would not be included in the measurement of the 50-inch limitation.@ (44 FR 23229, 23232)

In an April 9, 1980, letter to Renault USA (copy enclosed), the agency discussed the use of seat belt assemblies to limit the number of seating positions on a bench seat. NHTSA stated:

The agency would give more credence to this factor if the inboard portions of the belt assemblies were on stiff, immovable cables (or similar design). With the current design, a person wishing to sit in the center position can easily move the belts out of the way, so that the belts are not real impediments to the use of the center position.

Your Examples Alteration of the floor plan: You ask if altering the floor plan such that a normal seated position cannot be achieved could constitute an Aacceptable obstruction@ of a seating position. It is unclear what actions this would entail. However, in the April 1979 notice the agency stated: AThe NHTSA agrees that shoulder room, leg room, and head clearance are factors which may influence the number of persons who will use a bench or split-bench seat.@ (44 FR 23229 at 23231). Thus, in theory, alteration of the floor plan could reduce the number of designated seating positions.

Filling the seat with an empty container bolted to the frame or seat skeleton: If the design of the container was such that a person could not sit in the container on the seat, this would constitute a permanent obstruction.

Removal of the seat: This is an obvious example of a means of reducing the number of designated seating positions in a vehicle.

I hope that this information has been helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Samuel J. Dubbin Chief Counsel

Enclosures ref:571.3 d:4/2/96

ID: nht94-2.73

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: May 6, 1994

FROM: David L. Ori -- Manager Vehicle Control Division, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Pennsylvania Dept. of Transportation

TO: Jim Gilkey -- NHTSA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 09/07/94 from John Womack to David Ori (A42; STD. 205; Part 567

TEXT: I would like to thank you for the assistance you gave to one of my staff members, Kris Singer, when she recently telephoned you regarding Federal glazing standards relating to limousines. Since the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation is addressing this issue at the present time, I would appreciate your assistance in confirming the information which Mrs. Singer received.

You explained that limousines which seat less than ten persons are categorized as passenger cars for the purpose of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 205 (FMVSS 205). As such, these vehicles may not be equipped with any sun screening or window tintin g product which does not meet FMVSS 205. This prohibition also applies to vehicle modifications completed during the second stage or alteration phase of the manufacturing process. Further, the company which alters the original vehicle is required to ce rtify that the finished product is still in compliance with FMVSS 205.

Limousines which seat ten or more persons are categorized as buses and, therefore, would not be restricted regarding the use of sun screening products on windows located behind the driver's area of the vehicle. These vehicles would also require certific ation from the second stage manufacturer of continued compliance with FMVSS 205.

I would appreciate receiving your confirmation of the above information, at your earliest convenience, at the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Vehicle Control Division, Room 104, T & S Building, Harrisburg, PA 17120. If there is any additional information whic h you feel may be pertinent to Pennsylvania's efforts to address this issue, please include it with your response, or contact me at (717) 787-3184.

ID: nht87-2.3

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 06/09/87

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Wil de Groot -- President, Exoticars of Hunterdon

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

ATTACHMT: 2/24/87 letter from Erika Z. Jones to Wil de Groot

TEXT:

Mr. Wil de Groot President Exoticars of Hunterdon 6 Washington Street Frenchtown, NJ 08825

This is in reply to your letter of April 12, 1987, with respect to your further questions on Federal regulation of kit cars.

You have presented the following facts: the engine, transmission, final drive, axles, suspension, steering, brakes, heating and defrosting equipment, windshield wiper motor and mechanisms, instruments, switches, controls, wiring harness, fuel tank, seat belts, door and ignition switch buzzer system, door handles, latches and locks, impact absorbing bumper supports, and other unnamed components, all previously used on a vehicle meeting Federal safety standards would be retained for use with a new body of your own manufacture.

Your first choice is to install these items upon a new chassis of your own manufacture, and to supply the vehicle to a purchaser fully assembled. This is what must be met under these circumstances: when a new body is mounted upon a new chassis, the resul ting vehicle must comply with all Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable upon the date of its assembly, even if the parts that you named are used. Further, the assembler must certify that the vehicle complies with safety standards. There is no legal obligation to use new parts in order to certify compliance with the standards. The assembler is regarded as a manufacturer of motor vehicles, and must notify owners and remedy noncompliances with the safety standards or safety related defects shou ld they occur, in accordance with Federal law and regulations.

If you supply all parts, but do not complete assembly of the vehicle, we should regard you nevertheless as its manufacturer and subject to the requirements stated above. However, if you do not supply all parts, the question of whether you would be regard ed as the manufacturer would necessarily depend upon the parts that the purchaser must supply in order to compete assembly.

You have also stated your second choice: that the new body would be mounted upon the original chassis, modified to accept it. In this circumstance, when a new body is mounted upon a used chassis, the resulting vehicle is not subject to Federal motor vehi cle standards that apply to new vehicles, and there is no certification obligation. Nevertheless, its assembler is a "manufacturer" under federal law and responsible for notification of owners and remedy of any safety related defects that may occur in th e product. Further, if the assembler is the person responsible for removing the old body, he must ensure that the reassembled vehicle continues to meet the standards that originally applied to the vehicle which might have been affected by removal of the old body. For example, if the body of a 1974 Jaguar XJ6 is removed, compliance with a number of standards such as those covering glazing, lighting, and windshield retention is affected and the reassembled vehicle must then meet the standards that were in effect in 1974. But, standards covering such things as accelerator control systems and brake hoses would not appear to be affected by the disassembly of the original vehicle, and the assembler is under no obligation to ensure that the reassembled vehicle continues to meet those standards.

If the used-chassis vehicle is supplied partially disassembled, but all parts are supplied, we would nevertheless regard the supplier as subject to all obligations discussed above, assuming that he was the person responsible for removal of the old body. If all parts are not supplied, the answer remains as before: whether the supplier is a "manufacturer" depends upon the parts that the purchase must provide.

Finally, you have asked, "if actual crash tests. . .have to be made what is the cost and where is this done?" There is no express legal requirement that a manufacturer of new motor vehicles conduct crash tests in order to certify compliance with those st andards where compliance can be demonstrated through barrier impacts. A manufacturer is required to exercise due care to ensure that his vehicle, if crashed, would meet the performance requirements of those standards incorporating barrier impact test pro cedures, but his certification may be based upon computer simulations, engineering studies, mathematical calculations, etc. We cannot advise you as to the cost of such tests, and suggest you write the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association (MVMA) for in formation on facilities that perform them. MVMA's address is 1620 I Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

I hope this answers your questions.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

MS. ERIKA Z. JONES U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION 400 SEVENTH STREET, S.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590

4.2.1987

Dear Ms. Jones,

Thank you for your reply of Feb. 24 1987 to my letter of January 12, 1987 regarding regulations for home built or car kits.

What we have in mind is to take, for example, a 1974 Jaguar XJ6 (federal version) remove the engine, transmission, final drive, suspension, steering, brakes, etc. and all safety and emission related items and after refurbishing these parts, install them on a new chassis with a new body of our own (U.S.) manufacture. We are familiar with the process of bringing a gray market car into compliance with Federal regulations, having gone through the process and wondering if this same process, complete with all applicable engineering data, photo's and paperwork could somehow be applied to a limited production rebodied and rechassied vehicle without the expense of crashing cars into a wall.

If actual crash tests have to be made what is the cost and where is this done?

The following are the specifics that I hope will allow you to give me the answers I am looking for,:

-Chassis- New made in U.S.A. (first choice) -Chassis- Used original chassis but modified to accept new body (second choice)

-Old parts used- Engine, transmission, final drive, axles, brakes, steering, heating and defrosting equipment, windshield wiper motor and mechanisms, instruments, switches, controls, wiring harnesses, seats, fuel tank, seat belts, door and ignition switc h buzzer system, door handles, latches and locks. Impact absorbing bumper supports, etc.

-Suppled to Consumer fully assembled- (first choice) -Supplied partially disassembled- all parts supplied (second choice) -Supplied partially disassembled- all parts not supplied (third choice)

-Parts- Used would come from federal version of imported cars or domestic cars. All parts including new would meet D.O.T. & E.P.A. specifications.

Thank you in advance, I hope you can help us.

Sincerely,

Wil de Groot, President

ID: 19548.ztv

Herr Tilman Spingler
Robert Bosch GmbH
Automotive Equipment Div. 2
Postfach 13 42
D-72703 Reutlingen
Germany

Dear Herr Spingler:

This is in reply to your fax of February 3, 1999, asking for an interpretation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108.

You state that Figures 15-1 and 15-2, Figures 17-1 and 17-2, and Figures 28-1 and 28-1 show a position 10U-90U for a lower beam headlamp with a maximum intensity of 125 cd. In your view, it is not clear whether, for compliance testing, that means a scan on the vertical line from 10U to 90U or a scan of an area from e.g., 45L to 45R and from 10U to 90U.

Each of the Figures you reference specify a maximum of 125 candela for test points 10U-90U. The Figures do not state where in space from left to right to locate the vertical line, and thus, they do not specify that a line is to be measured. It follows that the only description of a set of test points is that of the entire area from 90L to 90R and 10U to 90U, i.e., an area from the extreme left of the test point grid to the extreme right of the test point grid, with an elevation of from 10U to 90U.

Sincerely,
Frank Seales, Jr.
Chief Counsel
ref:108
d.7/2/99

ID: aiam2715

Dear Mr. Barlow: This responds to your letter of October 24, 1977, asking whethe Federal safety standards permit passive safety belts to be equipped with conventional buckles for emergency release.; In answer to your question, Standard No. 208, *Occupant Cras Protection*, not only permits buckles on passive belt systems, it requires them. Under paragraphs S4.5.3.3 and S7.2 of the standard, passive seat belt assemblies are required to have a latch mechanism that releases the restraints. The release is required to be at a single point by pushbutton action.; Please contact us if you have any further questions. Sincerely, Joseph J. Levin, Jr., Chief Counsel

ID: 77-4.5

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 09/28/77

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; J. J. Levin, Jr.; NHTSA

TO: The Coachette Company

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your August 18, 1977, letter asking whether the head protection zone requirements of Standard No. 222, School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash Protection, apply to a portion of your bus located directly above the side windows.

You enclosed a sketch which details the bus sidewall and roof structure. On that sketch, you have shaded a small area asking whether that portion of the bus constitutes part of the bus sidewall or part of the roof structure. The head protection zone requirements of the standard (S5.3.1.1) do not apply to the sidewalls of school buses.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) interprets your sketch to show the sidewall ending and the roof structure beginning at the point where the radius of curvature of the interior structure decreases sharply (see the point marked "A" on the sketch). Since the shaded portion of your sketch falls below that point, it is considered part of the sidewall and need not comply with the head protection zone requirements.

SINCERELY, (Illegible Words)

August 18, 1977

Joseph Levin, Chief Office of Chief Council N.H.T.S.A.

RE: FMVSS 222 Pora. S5.3.1.1.

A clarification of the above referenced standard is urgently needed. Due to the "tumble home" type of the side of some van-type school buses, there is no clear distinction where the side wall would end and the roof structure would start.

S5.3.1.1. of FMVSS 222 states that the head protection zones are the spaces in front of each school bus passenger seat which are not occupied by bus side wall, window or door structure . . . etc.

Please refer to the enclosed sketch and note that the outboard plane (S5.3.1.1. (c)) of the head protection zones intersects the wall at approximately the window header point. The wall extends upward and inward from that point. This leaves an area, indicated by the shaded portion of the sketch that would extend into the head protection zone. Is this configuration in compliance with the standard? There is no greater hazard to the occupant from the window header to well above the upper limits of the head protection (Illegible Word) than any where in the wall area.

It is very urgent that we get an opinion on this just as soon as possible. After you have reviewed this, we would like to phone or if necessary come to your office for the clarification.

Thanking you in advance for your consideration.

E.H. Ryan

ward

SCHOOL BUS MFG., Inc. P.O. BOX 311 HIGHWAY 65 CONWAY, ARKANSAS 72032 DATE - 8-18-77 CHK- DRAFT: DM ENGR: SCALE IN OR OUT PART ORDER NO REV CHANGE BY DATE

MATERIAL -

TOLERANCE

(Graphics omitted)

ID: 006817ogm

Dietmar K. Haenchen, Process Leader
Safety Affairs and Vehicle Testing
Volkswagen of America, Inc.
Mail Code 2A02
3800 Hamlin Road
Auburn Hills, MI 48326

Dear Mr. Haenchen:

This responds to your letter to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), concerning Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 201, Occupant Protection in Interior Impact. You are particularly concerned about the applicability of the upper interior head impact requirements of Standard No. 201 as they apply to sunroof systems and vehicles using roof panels made of glazing materials.

One of your concerns relates to sunroofs or fixed glass roof panels and trim panel covers that may cover these components. Your letter notes that S8.2 of Standard No. 201 directs that movable sunroofs must be placed in the fully open position for testing. Volkswagen also states that it believes it is reasonable to conclude that a single sliding trim cover for a movable sunroof should also be in the open position for testing under S8.2. In your view, if a movable sunroof is in the open position, the cover would be open as well. You then address the instance where a sunroof might be covered by multiple trim panels that may either be in a closed or open position when the sunroof is in use. In such an instance Volkswagen believes that the correct interpretation of Standard No. 201 is that the definition of sunroof would include any accompanying roof panel that can be opened.

NHTSA agrees with your interpretation. S8.2(c) of Standard No. 201 specifies that movable sunroofs are placed in the fully open position for vehicle testing. Provided that the trim or cover involved does not extend beyond the perimeter of the sunroof opening, we believe it is reasonable to include such covers or trim as being part of the sunroof for the purposes of Standard No. 201. We note that this interpretation is consistent with a previous interpretation contained in a February 19, 1999 letter to Mr. George L. Parker of the Association of International Automobile Manufacturers. In that letter, we stated that sunroofs should be open during both testing and the target location procedure. This position was based on our view that vehicles were likely to be operated with the sunroof in the open position. We further stated that sunroofs should be open during the target location procedure. As the trim or covers over the sunroof opening would impede in locating targets and testing if they remained in the closed position, we agree with your suggested interpretation.

Your letter also asks about roofs with fixed glass panels. You note that prior NHTSA interpretations state that impacts where the Head Injury Criterion (HIC) is affected by contact with glazing are invalid. In the case of a roof incorporating a fixed glass panel with a moveable shade or sun cover, you ask if testing should be conducted with the shade in an opened or closed position. Your letter further states that Volkswagen believes that the correct interpretation would be that the shade be open for testing and that impacts should be invalid when contact with a fixed glass roof panel are such that the HIC is affected. If NHTSA determines that such a shade or sun cover should remain in the closed position, you propose an alternate interpretation. Under this alternate interpretation, Volkswagen contends that impacts where the headform deforms the cover to the point where the cover contacts the glass panel should also be invalid.

You are correct in stating that prior NHTSA interpretations have indicated that impacts will be determined to be invalid when the anterior portion of the Full Motion Headform (FMH) strikes fixed glazing near or at the same time that the forehead impact zone strikes a nearby target. Standard No. 201 is not intended to prevent injuries resulting from impacts with glazing. If such an impact occurs, thereby affecting the HIC, the test is invalid.

We also agree that any shade or cover for a fixed glass roof panel be in the open position for testing (as well as target location). A sliding shade or cover for such a fixed glass panel is likely to be located in close proximity to the glass panel itself. Thus it could be impracticable to incorporate safety features into such a shade that would allow compliance with Standard No. 201.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to call Otto Matheke of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:201
d.2/12/04