Interpretation ID: nht92-4.36

DATE: August 16, 1992

FROM: Robert N. Moore -- No. 203048, Iowa State Penitentiary

TO: Mr. Curry

TITLE: Re: Safety Act; 15 U.S.C., Section 1381 et seq.; F.M.V.S.S. #208

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 9/28/92 from Paul Jackson Rice to Robert N. Moore (A39; Std. 208)

TEXT:

I'm pleased to make your acquaintance.

This is a request for information, in the form of an official statement from your agency, concerning an interpretation of the above-caption statute and Safety Standard.

Before going further I should inform you that my prison I.D. No., given above, must follow my name on the face of your reply envelope.

The circumstances surrounding this request is a lawsuit I am prosecuting in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. That court is in Peoria, and the suit is captioned as MOORE V. GREEN, CV89-4129.

The factual basis of this action concerns my transportation in a law enforcement vehicle which was a regular, passenger van, with modifications to change it into a "paddy wagon" type of vehicle. The defendants admit that the device did not contain any type of occupant restraint system for my safety. I did sustain injury in the vehicle.

I have based one cause of action upon an alleged violation of the Safety Act and F.M.V.S.S. #208. The suit is presently at the discovery stage; and upon my receipt of answers to Interrogatory questions, both parties have informed the Magistrate of the intention to file motions for summary judgment. I am assuming that the defendants will rely as heavily upon the Interrogatory answers as I plan to do.

It thus appears that our first battle will focus upon the question of whether or not I have been bestowed the equivalent of a right or privilege under the Act to have been provided with a seat belt. And following that question, is that right enforceable under the remedial authority of 42 U.S.C., Section 1983, which is the statute I am using to obtain compensation.

Of course I have no idea of the research capabilities of the Asst. State's Attorney who is defending, but I do know that I can find no legal authority, at least in the cases, which addresses the specific question of whether the Act does in fact create a right to have a restraint system; and the related question of whether or not Congress has either allowed, or foreclosed a remedy under Section 1983 to enforce that right.

It is at this point where I think everyone involved would benefit from an expert opinion.

I'm sure you are probably aware of the policy of the federal judiciary to defer to, or to at least consult a government agency's own interpretation of the relevant statutes and regulations in these types of cases.

During my research I've discovered several recent opinions where one of the parties wrote an agency, exactly as I am doing here, for opinions or interpretations of the law bearing upon the issues of those particular actions. The written replies were submitted to those courts and were well received by them. I believe your written opinion could also guide our court when I will be required to conduct an agency interpretation analysis in this case.

In case you are disposed towards providing something to clarify the issue in this case, I can offer the following examples as reference points.

The opinion of GOLDEN STATE TRANSIT CORP. V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, 110 S.CT. 444, probably frames the entire problem much better than I can explain it.

From the viewpoint of that case, I suppose I could just ask two specific questions to make this an easier task for you:

1. Does the Safety Act, and F.M.V.S.S. #208, create a "binding obligation", as opposed to merely expressing a "congressional preference" as to the inclusion of seat belts in motor vehicles?

2. Do any provisions of the Act, or any regulations show that Congress specifically foreclosed a remedy under Section 1983?

I await your reply.