ID: AIAM.ekmy

Mr. Michael X. Cammisa
Director, Safety
Association of International Automobile Manufacturers, Inc.
1001 19th Street North, Suite 1200
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Cammisa:

This is in response to your August 29, 2003 letter on behalf of the Technical Affairs Committee of the Association of International Automobile Manufacturers, Inc. (AIAM), requesting clarification and interpretation of the Early Warning Reporting (EWR) regulations, as set forth in 49 CFR Part 579, with respect to the submission of certain marketing survey information. In your letter, you described certain consumer survey forms that are provided by manufacturers to consumers that elicit consumer opinions of their vehicles' performance. As described, these forms are in a "bubble" format, are machine-read, often contain spaces for comment, and consumers sometimes attach separate pages in response. You raised four specific points with respect to the information gathered from these forms, that I repeat below, followed by NHTSA's interpretation.

1. "Machine-read 'bubble form' responses to consumer surveys, requesting scaled, qualitative evaluations or product performance." You request our confirmation that these not be counted in consumer complaint totals.

You explained that "[t]he purpose of the 'bubble form' surveys is to seek qualitative evaluations of consumer preferences, so that future vehicles may be designed to better meet consumer needs and desires." The forms request consumers' ratings of their vehicles' performance (e.g., on a scale of 1 to 5) in particular areas, with typical questions addressing engine sound, smoothness, acceleration, steering effort, and seat comfort, among others. Although you have not provided pro forma exemplars of the "bubble forms," you explained that they are completed in a manner analogous to a standardized test and the responses are machine-read.

You note that these surveys are submitted at the request of the manufacturer, but recognized our previously expressed view to the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers of March 25, 2003, that the manufacturer's initiation of a communication is not determinative as to whether a communication is a complaint. Based on your description of the information sought in the forms used by your constituent manufacturers, the responses are likely to be "qualitative and general in nature."

In our view, the bubble portions of these consumer surveys do not fall within the meaning of "consumer complaint" as defined in the EWR regulations, 49 CFR  579.4(c). As you note, it would be unclear as to when or if a low a rating rises to the level of a "complaint," which would be dependent on the definitions and views of the consumers, and which would not be communicated by the standardized part of the form. As such, it is NHTSA's interpretation that the bubble portions of the survey forms, as you have described them, do not fall within NHTSA's definition of "consumer complaint." This is consistent with our letter of March 25, 2003 cited above.

2. "Comments written by consumers in the space designated for comment in the bubble form and expressing a complaint about a vehicle system covered by the early warning rule." You believe that these should be counted as consumer complaints.

You noted that the survey forms utilized by your constituent manufacturers "may have spaces at the bottom of the forms for consumers to write more detailed comments," in addition to the bubble portion. NHTSA agrees with your understanding that the comments provided in these spaces need to be reviewed by the individual manufacturers, like other communications, to determine whether they are complaints. If so, any complaints documented in these spaces must be reported if required by 49 CFR 579.21(c).

3. "Separate pages attached by the consumer to a bubble form and expressing a cognizable complaint."Again, you believe that these must be counted as consumer complaints.

You reported that a consumer might attach separate pages to the survey form documenting specific problems or dissatisfaction with a vehicle's performance. NHTSA agrees with your understanding, that the manufacturer is required to count any complaints contained in these separate, attached pages as "consumer complaints," and report such complaints according to the coded categories set forth in the EWR regulations.

4. You believe that "marginal notes written in spaces on machine read bubble forms that were not designated for recording comments need not be reviewed by manufacturers for possible inclusion in the consumer complaint counts."

You stated that consumers occasionally write comments or notes in the bubble portion of the survey forms, rather than in (or in addition to) the space designated for additional commentary or in separate pages. You further explained that the marketing contractors that manufacturers hire to tabulate the responses to these surveys are unable to capture such notes contained in the margins of the forms in their calculus of the responses. Under these circumstances, we agree that such marginal notes would not need to be counted in the manufacturer's report.

Should you have any further questions, please contact Andrew J. DiMarsico of my staff at (202) 366-5263.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:579
11/6/03

ID: AIT.jeg

Mr. Daniel H. Fagerstrom
Station Manager - AIT Freight Systems, Inc.
3340-C Greens Road
Suite 350
Houston, TX 77032

Dear Mr. Fagerstrom:

This responds to your inquiry whether a "truck-mounted hydraulic crane 'bundle extractor'" you wish to import is considered a motor vehicle that would have to comply with the applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. You submitted your inquiry on behalf of your client, Hydro-Engineering, Inc.

According to your letter, the unit "comprises a used Peinemann Truck Mounted Bundle Extractor (TMBE) which consists of a hydraulic crane apparatus permanently mounted on a special-order Mercedes diesel truck chassis." The TMBE is used to remove, handle, and replace bundles of heat exchanger and cooling tubes from industrial heat exchangers and cooling towers. The work for which the TMBE is designed is performed in oil refineries, electric power and process chemical plants, or other similar heavy industrial settings. You stated that "(t)ypically the TMBE spends extended periods of time at a single jobsite." You also stated that the intended use of the TMBE is definitely that of off-road applications, and that there are numerous features of its design and construction that make it unsuitable for anything other than sporadic, short-term road travel.

By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) interprets and enforces the laws under which the Federal motor vehicle safety standards are promulgated. NHTSA's statute defines the term "motor vehicle" as follows:

"Any vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, except any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails."

Whether the agency considers a vehicle such as you describe to be to be a motor vehicle depends on its use. It is the agency's position, for example, that this statutory definition does not encompass mobile construction equipment, such as cranes and scrapers, which use the highway only to move between job sites and which typically spend extended periods of time at a single job site. In such cases, the on-highway use of the vehicle is merely incidental and is not the primary purpose for which the vehicle was manufactured. In contrast are instances where vehicles, such as dump trucks, frequently use the highway going to and from job sites, and stay at a job site for only a limited time. Such vehicles are considered motor vehicles, since the on-highway use is more than "incidental."

Based on the information you provided, it appears that the TMBE is not a "motor vehicle" within the meaning of the statutory definition.

I hope this information is helpful.

Sincerely,
Frank Seales, Jr.
Chief Counsel
ref:VSA
d.6/22/00

ID: Alani.1

Mr. Y. Alani
Deputy General Manager
Autoluxe Tires (Israel) Ltd.
25 Hamelacha Street, Park Afeq
Rosh Haayin 48091
Israel

Dear Mr. Alani:

This is in response to your letter and subsequent e-mail to Eric Stas in which you requested clarification as to the proper application of speed rating codes for replacement tires. Specifically, your letter asked whether it would be permissible to replace original equipment tires with an "H" speed rating with replacement tires with a "T" speed rating, whether it would be permissible to place "H"-rated tires on the front axle and "T"-rated tires on the rear axle of a vehicle, and whether a damaged "H"-rated tires would retain that designation after being repaired. For the reasons discussed below, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) cannot advise you as to the proper application of these codes.

Speed ratings are not required under our Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSSs). It is our understanding that the tire speed rating system was established by the European Tyre and Rim Technical Organization (ETRTO), so you may wish to consult with that organization about the proper application of such codes (see http://www.etrto.org/pub_gb.html for contact information.)

We assume that you wrote to us because some tires sold in the U.S. are labeled with speed rating codes. By way of explanation, NHTSA is authorized to issue FMVSSs that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment (e.g., tires) introduced into the U.S. market. NHTSA does not issue approvals of these products, but instead, a manufacturer of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment must self-certify that its products meet all applicable safety standards, prior to offering such products for sale in the United States. Under our FMVSSs related to tires, manufacturers are not required to label tires with speed ratings. However, tire manufacturers are permitted to label additional information on the sidewall of tires, including speed rating codes, provided that the additional information does not obscure or confuse the meaning of the required information, or otherwise defeat its purpose.

If you have further questions, you may contact Eric Stas of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:109 d.6/21/05

ID: Alliance 114

ID: Alliance Letter - Sale of Electronic Odometer Resetting Devices

ID: alliance(9-2-03).ajd

Mr. Robert S. Strassburger
Vice President
Vehicle Safety and Harmonization
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Inc.
1401 H Street, NW, Suite 900
Washington, D.C. 20005

Dear Mr. Strassburger:

This is in reply to your letter of September 2, 2003, regarding my July 21, 2003 letter to Mr. Cavallo of Halcore Group, Inc., which discussed the early warning reporting (EWR) responsibilities of small volume manufacturers.

I had advised Mr. Cavallo that "[f]or the purposes of determining whether the production of vehicles meets or exceeds the 500 vehicles per year threshold in Section 579.21 et seq., the production of the divisions, parent, subsidiaries and affiliates must be aggregated." This interpretation is consistent with other letters interpreting the EWR regulation.See Letter from Jacqueline Glassman to John D. Evans of April 11, 2003, at p. 3; Letter from Jacqueline Glassman to Rod Nash of August 20, 2003, at p. 2; and Letter from Jacqueline Glassman to Rod Nash of October 10, 2003.

You assert that the interpretation that I provided to Mr. Cavallo was inconsistent with statements made by a person other than the Chief Counsel at a public meeting. The September 24, 2002 public meeting you reference concerned technical issues, such as security and acknowledgement of submissions, regarding electronic EWR submissions to the agency. The Federal Register Notice announcing this meeting was clear that this was to be only a technical meeting. See 67 FR 55448. Moreover, at the time of the meeting, we expressly stated that the information presented was not binding upon the agency, and that nothing stated at the meeting should be construed as a final NHTSA interpretation. Transcript p. 8. [1] In addition, the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (Alliance) and its members are familiar with NHTSAs interpretive processes. As such, the Alliance is fully aware that the Chief Counsel is the only NHTSA official with authority to issue interpretations of agency regulations. See 49 CFR 501.8(d)(4).

Second, you state that the interpretation in the Cavallo letter is inconsistent with how the agency intends to use the information collected from EWR, as stated in the final rule. You also said that the value in the information provided by low volume manufacturers is very limited when conducting trend analysis because a single incident can look like a high "incident rate" relative to the performance of other vehicles manufactured in larger quantities. In addition, you concluded that "the agencys guidance from September 2002 public meeting regarding the limited reporting requirements for low volume subsidiaries makes sense in the overall context of the EWR rule and the uses to which NHTSA plans to put the EWR information."

We disagree with your conclusion. The statement was not "the agencys guidance." We determined that the 500 unit production threshold is the appropriate demarcation point in part based on small business concerns. We also determined that aggregate reporting is appropriate in order to capture all vehicles manufactured by an entity with affiliates or subsidiaries. Moreover, while a single incident may skew the "incident rate" relative to other vehicles, it is not the only factor that controls NHTSAs initiation of a defect investigation or the determining factor in deciding to issue an initial determination. Also, EWR information will not be the sole basis for opening a defect investigation. As we stated in the preamble to the final rule, "if we identify matters that might possibly suggest the existence of a defect, we plan to seek additional clarifying information from the manufacturer in question, and from other sources, to help us to decide whether to open a formal defect investigation." 45822 FR at 45865. We see no reason to vary from our current position.

Lastly, you stated that, in the context of FMVSS No. 208 phase-in requirements, the agency in an interpretation letter previously determined that low volume subsidiaries of larger parent companies retain their low volume status. As you recognize in your letter, a letter interpreting FMVSS No. 208 does not control the interpretation of the EWR regulation. We also noted in that letter that the interpretation provided therein only reflected consideration of factors underlying FMVSS No. 208, and did not provide guidance for interpreting any other regulatory provisions. See Letter from John Womack to Grant Nakayama of August 22, 2001. We do not believe that the concerns underlying that interpretation letter are the same as those underlying the EWR regulation. First, the exclusion of low volume subsidiaries from the phase-in requirements of FMVSS No. 208 reflected the technical challenges faced by smaller manufacturers given the complexity of the advanced air bag requirements. Second, that exclusion simply deferred compliance with the advanced air bag rule by low volume subsidiaries to the end of the phase-in period. In contrast, your suggestion would, in effect, totally exclude low volume subsidiaries from the comprehensive reporting requirements of the EWR regulation.

If you have any questions, you may call Andrew DiMarsico of this Office (202-366-5263).

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:579
d.11/4/03





---

[1] Docket NHTSA 2001-8677-530. Available at http://dms.dot.gov.

ID: Alliance.1

Robert Strassburger, Vice President
Vehicle Safety & Harmonization
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
1401 Eye Street, NW, Suite 900
Washington, DC20005-6562




Dear Mr. Strassburger:

This acknowledges receipt of your October 24, 2005, letter regarding our September 7, 2005, final rule responding to petitions for reconsideration under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 138, Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems (TPMS)(70 FR 53079). Specifically, your letter raised an issue with paragraph S4.4(c)(2) of the standard, which sets requirements for flashing a combined low tire pressure/TPMS malfunction telltale for a period of 60-90 seconds to indicate to the driver when one or more malfunctions in the TPMS have occurred. The Alliance believes that this provision of the standard, as explained in the final rule, is design restrictive to the extent that the flashing sequence for a combined TPMS telltale is permitted only once per ignition cycle, regardless of the number of TPMS malfunctions encountered. Your letter also, argued that there is not a safety need to restrict the combined TPMS telltale to a single flashing sequence in the rare event of multiple TPMS malfunctions.

According to the Alliance, many current TPMSs have design architectures that automatically send a TPMS malfunction alert each time a new malfunction is detected, and you suggested that for manufacturers using such systems, a redesign would not be practicable before the September 1, 2007, compliance date for the TPMS malfunction indicator requirement. Consequently, your letter requested that the agency permit, but not require, vehicle manufacturers to install TPMSs with combined telltales that reinitiate the prescribed flashing sequence upon detection of subsequent TPMS malfunctions. Your letter sought this result either through a letter of interpretation of S4.4(c)(2), or alternatively, you asked that your letter be treated as a petition for reconsideration of the September 7, 2005, final rule.

Given the language of the standard and the preambles generally clear explanation of the agencys expectations regarding the requirements of S4.4(c)(2), we do not believe that the issue you have raised is amenable to a response via a letter of interpretation. Accordingly, we have decided to treat your letter as a petition for reconsideration of the final rule, and after careful consideration of the issue you have raised, we will respond accordingly.

If you have further questions, please feel free to contact Mr. Eric Stas of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Wood
Acting Chief Counsel

cc: Docket No. NHTSA-2005-22251
ref:138
d.12/21/05

ID: Alliance.jeg

Robert S. Strassburger, Vice President
Vehicle Safety and Harmonization
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
1401 H Street, NW
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20005

Dear Mr. Strassburger:

This responds to your letter seeking our concurrence that "Alliance members are allowed to combine the fleets of motor vehicle manufacturing subsidiaries owned by Alliance members for purposes of determining the overall fleet compliance with the compliance percentages set forth in various safety standard phase-in requirements." As discussed below, we generally agree with your suggested interpretation.

In your letter, you note that, in our mid-1980s rulemaking establishing the phase-in requirements associated with automatic occupant protection requirements for passenger cars, we addressed the need to accommodate complex relationships among manufacturers. See NPRM proposing phase-in requirements for Standard No. 208, 50 FR 14589, 14595-97, April 12, 1985. In that rulemaking, we adopted an attribution rule that generally permits companies to agree among themselves which entity will be treated as the manufacturer for purposes of meeting the phase-in percentages when any of those companies could be considered the "manufacturer." We have adopted similar attribution rules in subsequent rulemakings involving phase-ins.

You state in your letter that "(a)s Alliance members have consistently interpreted these phase-in requirements, member companies with ownership interests in other motor vehicle manufacturers have been able to combine the fleets for reporting purposes to the agency."

You note, however, that in a recent interpretation to Mr. Nakayama of Kirkland & Ellis regarding the status of certain small volume manufacturers, we observed:

(T)he vehicles of related manufacturers are not ordinarily grouped together for purposes of determining compliance with phase-ins of new safety standards. We note that this is in contrast to determinations of compliance with fuel economy standards, where vehicles of related manufacturers are grouped together. However, the grouping of vehicles of related manufacturers for purposes of fuel economy standards is done pursuant to an explicit statutory provision.

You state that the Alliance "understands the above observation reaffirms that vehicles of related manufacturers are not ordinarily required to be grouped together by the Safety Act, unlike the contrasting situation for fuel economy." You state further, however, that because of the potential for the first sentence of the quoted paragraph to be misunderstood, particularly if it is taken out of context, the Alliance "seeks confirmation that a group of related vehicle manufacturers may continue to choose, if they so desire, to combine fleets for safety standard phase-in purposes."

In considering your letter, we note that, in interpreting the provision at issue, we have not taken the position that we would consider a particular vehicle to have been manufactured by two or more manufacturers solely based on the corporate relationships between those manufacturers.

We considered this issue to some degree in a September 18, 1987, interpretation to General Motors (GM), addressing whether it could be deemed the manufacturer of passenger cars produced by Lotus for purposes of the phase-in of the automatic occupant protection requirements.

In our interpretation, we noted that in the April 1985 NPRM proposing phase-in requirements for Standard No. 208, we had stated that we consider the statutory definition of "manufacturer" to be sufficiently broad to include "sponsors," depending on the circumstances. We stated in the NPRM that if a sponsor contracts for another manufacturer to produce a design exclusively for the sponsor, the sponsor may be considered the manufacturer of those vehicles, applying basic principles of agency law.

We presented the following analysis to support our conclusion that GM could be considered the manufacturer of Lotus passenger cars:

Both LCL, the actual assembler, and LPC, the actual importer, are wholly-owned subsidiaries of GM. By itself, GM's ownership of both the producer and importer of these cars might not be sufficient to establish that GM was the sponsor of these vehicles for the purposes of Standard No. 208. In addition, however, another GM wholly-owned subsidiary distributes and markets the vehicles in the United States. GM coordinates the activities of all these subsidiaries. Since GM wholly owns the actual producer of these vehicles and is actively involved in the importation, distribution, and marketing of these vehicles, we believe that GM should be considered to sponsor the importation of the Lotus vehicles. Accordingly, GM rather than LPC, may be considered the importer and manufacturer of these vehicles.

Thus, in considering whether GM could be considered a manufacturer of Lotus passenger cars, we looked to GM's overall involvement with those vehicles and not merely to the fact that it owned the producer and importer of those vehicles.

In now considering the Alliance's request for interpretation, we believe several factors are relevant.

First, we believe that the application of the manufacturer attribution provisions applicable to phase-in requirements needs to be clear, without the necessity of addressing each specific situation by interpretation.

Second, we believe that, as a practical matter, there is typically sufficient interaction among related manufacturers, and direct involvement by a "parent manufacturer" in the actions of its subsidiaries, that their fleets can reasonably be considered as a single fleet for purposes of complying with phase-in requirements.

Third, from a public policy perspective, there is little (if any) difference in the number of compliant vehicles introduced into the fleet during the phase-in years between the case in which commonly owned manufacturers are permitted to combine their fleets and the case in which commonly owned manufacturers are permitted to separate their fleets for compliance purposes.

Fourth, as a general matter, NHTSA does not have any interest under the Safety Act as to how companies choose to structure themselves, so long as Safety Act obligations are fully met. Thus, in a situation in which one manufacturer corporation buys another, NHTSA does not generally have any interest in whether the corporation that has been purchased becomes a division of the other manufacturer or is maintained as a subsidiary.

Given the above considerations, we have concluded that vehicle manufacturers may combine the fleets of motor vehicle manufacturing subsidiaries they own for purposes of determining overall fleet compliance with the compliance percentages set forth in the various safety standard phase-in requirements, subject to the agreement of those other manufacturers. Moreover, recognizing the different levels of ownership that exist in the industry and wishing to avoid further requests for interpretation in this area, we take the following further position: For purposes of complying with phase-in requirements under Federal motor vehicle safety standards, vehicle manufacturers may combine, with their fleet, the fleets of motor vehicle manufacturers that are considered to be within the same "control" relationship for purposes of the CAFE standards (and which are in fact included in the same fleets under the CAFE statute), subject to the agreement of the other manufacturers. To the extent that the fleets of more than one manufacturer are so combined, we would consider each manufacturer jointly and severally liable for any failure to meet a relevant percentage phase-in requirement.

Since this interpretation is based on specific factual determinations and policy concerns related to phase-ins of new safety requirements, it should not be considered as precedent for how we would interpret the term "manufacturer" in other contexts.

I also note that this interpretation does not overturn the one we sent to Mr. Nakayama. In that interpretation, we addressed the status of certain small volume manufacturers in the context of ownership relationships with other manufacturers. Our conclusion that the small volume manufacturers at issue qualified for the special small volume implementation schedule reflected a number of considerations, including the operational independence of the companies.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref: 208
d.10/24/02

ID: alliance.march20

Robert Strassburger, Vice President
Safety and Harmonization
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
1401 H Street, NW, Suite 900
Washington, DC 20005

Dear Mr. Strassburger:

This is in response to your letter of March 18, 2003, in which you asked questions regarding our interpretation of certain provisions of the early warning reporting rules promulgated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Subpart C of 49 CFR Part 579. You requested prompt turn around in view of the fact that the first reporting period will soon begin. This letter provides that response. I will first paraphrase your inquiries and then provide a brief statement of our interpretation.

1. Reporting Information on the Face of a Claim/Complaint. The Alliance inquired as to whether manufacturers must report complaints/claims based on the information contained on the face of the complaint or claim, rather than reporting on the basis of the manufacturers review or analysis of the complaint/claim.

The answer is yes. Reporting is to be based on the information in the complaint or claim, rather than on the manufacturers assessment. Even if the manufacturer disagrees with the assertions of the consumer/claimant after conducting its analysis, the manufacturer must still report the complaint or claim. Each of the five examples given in your letter would be reportable as a "consumer complaint" under the early warning reporting rules.

2. Marketing Survey Information. The Alliance sought NHTSAs concurrence that marketing information purchased from third-party vendors (such as J.D. Power) or supplied by third parties (such as Consumer Reports magazine), which might contain information reflecting a consumers dissatisfaction with a product, is not reportable in the early warning program as a "consumer complaint," or otherwise, even if the information contains "minimum specificity" about the make, model, and model year of a vehicle. You also asked about complaints that are included in "marketing information" solicited by a manufacturer directly from the purchasers of its products.

We concur with respect to third-party submissions, since they are not "addressed to the company . . . ." and therefore do not fall within the regulatory definition of "consumer complaint" in Section 579.4(c). However, if a manufacturer collects the information directly from its consumers, by itself or through a contractor, it would have to report any "complaints" included in that information, regardless of whether the primary purpose of the activity is marketing. As you note in your letter, consumers responding to such manufacturer surveys are "likely aware that they are communicating with the manufacturer." The fact that the comments are solicited by the manufacturer is not determinative, particularly since many consumers who make a complaint about a vehicle in this context will justifiably believe that they need not repeat that complaint to a different office within the company.

3.Dealer Repair Work Orders. The Alliance sought the agencys views on whether dealer repair work orders, if received in writing by a vehicle manufacturer, are reportable as " dealer field reports." These work orders are the dealers internal records of service performed at dealerships. As described in your letter, these work orders are not requested by, or provided to, manufacturers in the ordinary course of business, but might be submitted in the context of "lemon law" proceedings, product liability litigation, or similar proceedings, often many years after the service in question was performed. As such, we would not consider them to be "field reports" under the rule, and they would not have to be reported under that category. However, if the work had been performed under warranty, it would have to be reported as a warranty claim.

4.Vehicle Inspections Conducted to Determine Eligibility for Insurance and/or Extended Warranty Coverage. Finally, the Alliance asked whether written reports of vehicle inspections conducted solely to determine eligibility for insurance and/or extended warranty coverage are reportable as "field reports." As described in your letter, these reports are not prepared in response to an assertion that a specific problem exists in a particular vehicle, which is the normal genesis of field reports. Thus, although it is possible that an inspection report might identify a problem in a vehicle, it would not be a "communication . . . regarding the failure, malfunction, lack of durability, or other performance problem . . . ." As such, these inspection reports would not have to be reported to us as field reports.

If you have any questions, pleas call Taylor Vinson or Lloyd Guerci of this office at (202) 366-5263.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:579
d.33/25/03

ID: nht76-3.2

DATE: 07/16/76

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Robert L. Carter; NHTSA

TO: Jeep Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to Jeep Corporation's March 9, 1976, petition for rulemaking as supplemented by its letter of April 1, 1976. The petition requested an amendment of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301-75, Fuel System Integrity, that would add the following sentence at the end of S7.1.6(b):

For the purposes of this section, unloaded vehicle weight does not include the weight of work-performing accessories.

The supplement to the petition included a list of 15 examples of such work-performing accessories. The amendment would require the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to remove these accessories before performing compliance testing pursuant to the standard.

In Section 108 of the Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, (15 U.S.C. 1392 note), Congress directed that the fuel system integrity standard take effect in the form in which it had been most recently published. Conditions for amending the standard were specified in Section 108(b) as follows:

Amendment or Repeal of Standard. -- The Secretary may amend the standard described in subsection (a) in order to correct technical errors in the standard, and may amend or repeal such standard if he determines such amendment or repeal will not diminish the level of motor vehicle safety.

The practical result of the amendment requested by Jeep would be that certain vehicles would not, as is presently specified, be required to conform to the standard in the form in which they are actually delivered to purchasers and used on the highways. In fact, the presence of work-performing accessories could seriously degrade a vehicle's performance in the standard's barrier crash tests. We therefore cannot conclude that the requested amendment "will not diminish the level of motor vehicle safety." Furthermore, the amendment goes beyond the mere correction of technical errors in the standard. Consequently, Jeep's petition must be and is hereby denied.

Despite this denial, however, the NHTSA interprets the term "unloaded vehicle weight" in a manner that provides some of the relief that Jeep has requested. The term is defined in 49 CFR Part 571.3 as follows:

'Unloaded vehicle weight' means the weight of a vehicle with maximum capacity of all fluids necessary for operation of the vehicle, but without cargo or occupants.

The "weight of a vehicle" includes the weight of those accessories that are installed on a vehicle before delivery and are not ordinarily removed. Among such accessories are the following: air bag suspension systems

draw bars

headlamp and radiator protectors

helper-springs

hitches

pintle hooks

power take-offs

push bumpers

step bumpers and side steps

tire carriers

wreckers

The weight of those accessories that are ordinarily removed from a vehicle when they are not in use, however, is not included in the "weight of a vehicle". Consequently, accessories in this latter group would be removed by the NHTSA prior to testing for conformity to Standard No. 301-75. Among these are the following:

snow plows

spreaders

tow bars

Categorization of winches, the remaining accessory that you have listed, depends on the nature of the particular winch. One that is generally removed only when its presence interferes with other vehicle functions would be included in the evaluation of "unloaded vehicle weight". A portable winch that is ordinarily removed after use, however, would not be included in that evaluation.

SINCERELY,

Jeep Corporation

April 1, 1976

James B. Gregory Administrator National Highway Traffic Safety Administration U.S. Department of Transportation

On March 9, 1976 the Jeep Corporation petitioned the Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration for rulemaking to exempt work-performing accessories from the test requirements of FMVSS No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, as the standard applies to multi-purpose vehicles and light trucks. This letter transmits additional information to supplement our March 9 petition.

It has occurred to us that a summary of the types of available work-performing accessories referenced in our petition might be of benefit to you in your efforts to evaluate the merits of the Jeep petition. We, therefore, submit the following list of work-performing accessories, or work-related accessories, for your information and review:

Air bag suspension systems

Draw bars

Headlamp and radiator protectors

Helper springs

Hitches

Pintle hooks

Power take-offs

Push bumpers

Snow plows

Spreaders

Step bumpers and side steps

Tire carriers

Tow bars

Winches

Wreckers

In addition, we have attached copies of the booklet "Jeep Vehicle Special Equipment and Jeep Vehicle Accessories Catalog" which includes illustrations of the type of accessories and devices discussed above as well as descriptions of other factory-approved equipment and accessories that are available on these unique vehicles.

We request your prompt and favorable acceptance of this petition since less than five months remain before FMVSS No. 301 becomes effective as applied to MPV's and light trucks.

George E. Brown Executive Director - Vehicle Emissions & Safety

ATTACHMENTS Jeep Corporation

March 9, 1976

James B. Gregory Administrator National Highway Traffic Safety Administration U.S. Department of Transportation

RE: Petition For Rulemaking Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity

On October 16, 1975, Jeep Corporation submitted a petition to amend the definition of "unloaded vehicle weight" so that work-performing accessories would not be included. That petition was subsequently denied (your letter N40-30) on the grounds that the NHTSA has adopted a policy of evaluating potential dynamic testing problems with heavy or protruding accessories on a "standard-by-standard" basis.

In accord with that stated NHTSA policy, Jeep Corporation, herewith, submits the attached petition to amend Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, so that the test conditions specified by the standard do not include the work-performing accessories used on trucks and multi-purpose vehicles.

George E. Brown Executive Director Vehicle Emissions and Safety

March 9, 1976

PETITION TO AMEND FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD (49 CFR PART 301) FUEL SYSTEM INTEGRITY

Pursuant to Section 124 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, Jeep Corporation petitions the Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to undertake rulemaking to amend Motor Vehicle Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, so that the test conditions specified by the standard do not include work-performing accessories for trucks and multipurpose vehicles. Thus, the test conditions for Standard No. 301 would then be consistent in this respect with those for Standard No. 219, Windshield Zone Intrusion.

The Jeep Corporation requests the Administrator's consideration of this petition for the amendment to Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, for the following reasons:

Currently, the Test Conditions of Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, Are Not Consistent with Those of Standard No. 219, Windshield Zone Intrusion

In the preamble to the proposal for Standard No. 219, Windshield Zone Intrusion, Docket No. 74-21; Notice 2, the Administrator stated:

"Finally, the NHTSA is continuing to promote compatibility and economy in barrier crash testing by adopting vehicle loading and dummy restraint requirements in Standard No. 219 identical to those set out in proposed amendments to Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, 49 CFR 571.301 (40 FR 17036, April 16, 1975)."

Jeep Corporation fully supports the Administrator's efforts to promote compatibility and economy in barrier testing; however, the requirements for Standard No. 219 and 301 do not provide the desired compatibility or economy.

Section 7.7b of Standard No. 219 referring to the test loading and dummy requirements for multi-purpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses states:

"For the purposes of this section, unloaded vehicle weight does not include the weight of work performing accessories."

Standard No. 301 does not provide for the exemption of work-performing accessories and, therefore, is not compatible with Standard No. 219 and thus requires clarification regarding the loading conditions for barrier testing.

Barrier Tests Including Work-Performing Accessories Would Not Be Representative of Normal Production Vehicles

Multi-purpose vehicles, because of their nature, are used in many ways with equipment not typical of normal passenger car usage. Barrier tests involving work-performing accessories would not be representative of most production vehicles. For example, the barrier test results of a truck with a snow plow on its front and carrying a salt spreader on its rear should not be used to depict base vehicles because of the possible protection offered to the base vehicle by its work-performing devices.

Excessive Barrier Test Requirements May Cause Some Accessories Specifically Engineered for Jeep Vehicles to be Removed From the Marketplace

Jeep Corporation offers a full range of work-performing accessories ranging from snow plows and push plates to power winches and wrecker assemblies. Such accessories are highly desirable to customers who want to more fully utilize the multi-purpose features of their Jeep vehicles or who want to utilize the capabilities of any class of vehicle for recreational or work purposes.

These accessories, which are marketed as Jeep Special Equipment, are specifically designed to be compatible with Jeep vehicles, thereby requiring a minimum of vehicle modification, and are offered either as factory-installed or dealer add-on equipment. Aftermarket universal-type accessories may not be so readily adaptable to Jeep vehicles resulting in major vehicle modifications which may compromise the safety performance of the original vehicle.

Marketing of these engineered accessories may not be possible, however, if the dynamic testing procedures of Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, differ from the test procedures specified for other standard such as Standard No. 219, Windshield Zone Intrusion, and require multi-purpose vehicles to be tested with a myriad of special equipment accessories. Programs to assure compliance to any Federal Safety Standard specifying barrier testing with all possible equipment combinations would create a testing and financial burden which Jeep Corporation could not bear. The end result would be the withdrawal from the marketplace of certain original equipment, manufacturer-installed accessories or dealer-installed, manufacturer-approved accessories which may not be in the best interest of public safety.

Summary

In recognition of the above arguments, Jeep Corporation petitions the Administrator to amend Section 7.1.6(b) of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, by adding the sentence underlined here:

". . . same. Each dummy shall be restrained only by means that are installed in the vehicle for protection at its seating position. For the purposes of this section, unloaded vehicle weight does not include the weight of work-performing accessories."

Jeep Corporation submits that such rulemaking is both in the public interest and in the best interest of vehicle safety.