ID: 86-5.2

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 08/22/86

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Stephen P. Wood for Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Mr. Charles J. Newman

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. Charles J. Newman Vice-President, Engineering The Grote Manufacturing Company 2600 Lanier Drive Madison, Indiana 47250

Dear Mr. Newman:

This is in reply to your letter of December 10, 1985, asking for an interpretation regarding two proposed locations for clearance lamps. As you know, our response has been delayed because the original letter lacked one of the the drawings necessary for us to reply to your questions.

You have paraphrased S4.3.1.1.1 of Standard No. 108 as stating "in part that clearance lamps need not be mounted on the front or rear and at such a location need not be visible at 45 degrees inboard." That is not exactly what that section permits. It states that "Clearance lamps may be mounted at a location other than on the front and rear if necessary to indicate the overall width of a vehicle, or for protection from damage during normal operation of the vehicle, and at such a location they need not be visible at 45 degrees inboard." Your first request for an interpretation concerns a "fixed body with additional equipment mounted on the box," and depicts clearance lamps that are mounted on the front of a structure behind the cab, and yet are not visible at 45 degrees inboard. You have asked whether this meets the intent of S4.3.1.1.1. The plan view diagram in your letter indicates that the clearance lamps, if mounted on the front (i.e., the cab) would not be located to indicate the overall width of the vehicle. But when mounted on the structure behind the cab, they appear located so as to indicate the overall width of the vehicle. You have not mentioned mounting height, but we assume that they are "as close to the top as practicable" In accordance with the requirements of Table II of Standard No. 108. Therefore the exception permitted by S4.3.1.1.1 would apply.

Your second request covers a "side mounted clearance lamp," and states that "Because of box construction and box size, a side mounted clearance lamp is a better location." In this location, the inboard visibility requirements would not be met. You asked whether this would meet the intent of S4.3.1.1.1.

The intent of S4.3.1.1.1 is that the alternate location indicate the overall width of the vehicle. If we judge compliance by the plan view of the diagram, then the location on the second diagram is acceptable. But in this location the inboard angle of visibility would be even less than in the first diagram, and the overall width of the vehicle would be less apparent to an incoming driver. Given the fact that you have presented us with alternative means by which you may meet S4. 3.1.1. 1 we cannot conclude that the location shown in the second diagram complies with Standard No. 108.

Sincerely

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

December 10, 1985

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 Seventh St., S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

Attn: Vincent Taylor

Re: Front mounted clearance lamps

Dear Mr. Vincent:

Due to a recent interpretation of FMVSS 108 and the construction of some truck bodies several of our customers have asked for recommendations on the mounting location of the front clearance lamps.

The vehicle manufacturer has in the past mounted five lamps on the top of the cab - three (3) indentification and two (2) clearance lamps-

Section "S4.3.1.1.1" of FMVSS 108 states in part that clearance lamps need not be mounted on the front or rear and at such a location need not be visible at 45o inboard.

This brings up several questionable mountings-

1. Fixed body with additional equipment mounted on the box.

(Please insert graphics)

We have outboard visibility and straight on visibility but do not have inboard visibility.

We would consider this mounting to meet the intent of S.4.3.1.1.1 of FMVSS 108.

Do you agree?

2. Side mounted clearance lamp-

(Please insert graphics)

Because of box construction and box size, a side mounted clearance lamp is a better location. We have outboard visibility and straight on visibility but do not have inboard visibility.

We would consider this mounting to meet the intent of S.4.3.1.1.1 of FMVSS 108.

Do you agree?

Sincerely,

THE GROTE MANUFACTURING COMPANY

Charles J. Newman Vice-President, Engineering

kp

ID: 86-5.20

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 09/16/86

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Mr. Skip Maraney

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. Skip Maraney National Star Route Mail Contractor Association 324 East Capitol Street Washington, DC 20003

Dear Mr. Maraney:

This responds to your telephone inquiry about whether our regulations would prohibit the installation of a right hand drive steering system in a motor vehicle. We do not have any standards that prohibit the use of a right hand drive steering system. We have, however, issued two safety standards (Standard Nos. 203 and 204) that set performance requirements which apply to any steering system, whether left or right hand drive, installed in new passenger cars and light trucks, buses, and multipurpose passenger vehicles. A copy of each of these standards is enclosed.

You also asked about the agency's regulations on the importation of motor vehicles. I have enclosed a copy of a publication, "Instructions Handbook for Complying with Regulations on Imported Vehicles," which will provide you with information about our importation regulations.

If you have any further questions, please let me know.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

Enclosures

ID: 86-5.21

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 09/16/86

FROM: JEROME A. CZARNOWSKI

TO: CARL CLARK -- INVENTOR CONTACT NHTSA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 06/04/87, TO JEROME A CZARNOWSKI FROM ERIKA Z. JONES, REDBOOK A30 (2), STANDARD 121

TEXT: Dear Dr. Clark,

Enclosed are copies of the un-edited and published versions of the article on the Emergency Air Reserve System (EARS) of which we spoke this morning. I retained copyright, while granting FIRE COMMAND one-time publication rights, which is our usual arrangement.

Basically, EARS is a separate high-pressure system intended to provide an emergency vehicle with enough air volume and pressure to charge the vehicle's integral system to operating pressure. Depending upon the volume of the integral system, this can be accomplished in four to ten seconds versus two to five minutes using the vehicle's air compressor from O PSI. In our business, cutting the response time in any emergency can mean life or death for the victim.

This system does not violate the integrity of the vehicle's system, since check-valves, a relief valve and one-way regulator are present. The components of the system are proven under the most demanding and abusive conditions.

The article points out other advantages to the system, and how some apparatus manufacturers are providing to solve the initial air-pressure problem. I doubt if some of the solutions I've seen (i.e., on-board diaphram compressors tied to the "wet tank") solve more problems than they create. I have also seen electrical air-selenoids on the discharge ports of air tanks to shut the tanks off when not in use (parked). Can you imagine the result if the electrical system fails while a fire engine is responding to a scene?

Thank you for your time in evaluating this device. As I stated over the phone, the Patent prospect looks favorable. However, I am more concerned with the safety for both the firefighter and the public.

Sincerely,

ID: 86-5.22

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 09/22/86

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Steven R. Taylor -- President and Owner, Team Visions, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Sep 22 1986

Mr. Steven R. Taylor President and Owner Team Visions, Inc. P.O. Box 85 Tujunga, CA 91042-0085

Dear Mr. Taylor:

This responds to your letter asking about regulations that apply to the manufacturer of reconditioned brake drums. According to your letter, you intend to put worn or damaged brake drums through a cleaning process and then fuse new material to the drums, enlarging them enough so that they can be re-machined to meet new drum specifications.

By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) does not provide approvals of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the "Vehicle Safety Act"), it is the responsibility of the manufacturer to ensure that its vehicles or equipment comply with applicable safety standards. The following represents our opinion based on the facts provided in your letter and is limited to the regulations administered by this agency. You may wish to contact a local attorney concerning applicability of other Federal or state requirements to your business.

NHTSA has issued safety standards for both hydraulic-braked vehicles (Standard No. 105, Hydraulic Brake Systems) and air-braked vehicles (Standard No. 121, Air Brake Systems). In the case of a brake drum, whether sold new, used, or reconditioned, there is no applicable standard for it as a separate item of motor vehicle equipment. However, if the item is installed as original equipment on new vehicles, the vehicle manufacturer would be required to certify that the entire brake system satisfies the requirements of Standard No. 105 or Standard No. 121, as applicable. Also, if the item is added to a new motor vehicle prior to its first sale, the person who modifies the vehicle would be an alterer of a previously certified motor vehicle and would be required to certify that, as altered, the vehicle continues to comply with all of the safety standards affected by the alteration.

If the brake drum is installed on a used vehicle by a business such as a garage, the installer would not be required to attach a certification label. However, it would have to make sure that it did not knowingly render inoperative the compliance of the vehicle with any safety standard. This is required by section 108(a)(2)(a) of the Vehicle Safety Act.

In all of the instances discussed so far, the legal responsibilities under the Vehicle Safety Act would not be on you as the manufacturer of reconditioned brake drums but instead on your customer, i.e., the vehicle manufacturer, alterer, or repairer. However, your customers might provide particular specifications for brake drums or request information from you in order to fulfill their responsibilities under the Act.

You should also be aware that the Vehicle Safety Act places certain responsibilities on all manufacturers of motor vehicle equipment, regardless of whether a Federal motor vehicle safety standard applies to the equipment being produced. In particular, as discussed by an enclosed information sheet, the Act requires manufacturers to notify purchasers of safety-related defects and to remedy such defects without charge.

We note that since you would be a manufacturer of reconditioned brake drums rather than a manufacturer of entirely new brake drums, there is an issue of whether you are a manufacturer for purposes of the Vehicle Safety Act or instead a person who repairs used motor vehicle equipment. While a manufacturer of brake drums is subject to the Act's defect provisions as a manufacturer of motor vehicle equipment, a person who repairs used brake drums is not. As discussed below, it is our opinion that the nature of your planned operations would make you a manufacturer under the Act.

Section 102(5) of the Vehicle Safety Act provides that the term "manufacturer" means "any person engaged in the manufacturing or assembling of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, including any person importing motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment for resale.. The dictionary defines "manufacture" as "the making of goods or wares by manual labor or by machinery, esp. on a large scale . . ." Random House Dictionary of the English Language (unabridged edition).

NHTSA has in the past considered the issue of what types of operations make a person a manufacturer with respect to retreaded tires and remanufactured wheels. A person who retreads tires is considered to be a manufacturer under the Vehicle Safety Act. The retreading process involves significant manufacturing operations, which do not differ substantially from those of manufacturing new tires. By contrast, a person who remanufactures wheels is not considered to be a manufacturer under the Vehicle Safety Act. The process of remanufacturing wheels consists of such things as straightening, re-welding parts, and repairing cracks by welding. These types of actions are not significant manufacturing operations, but instead are the type of operations commonly performed in repair shops.

It is our opinion that the combined operation of fusing new material to brake drums and then re-machining the drums to meet new drum specifications constitutes a significant manufacturing operation rather than the type of operation performed in repair shops. Accordingly, we have concluded that you would be considered a manufacturer under the Vehicle Safety Act.

I hope this information is helpful.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

Enclosure

June 16,1986

National Highway Transportation Safety Administration Chief Council 400 7th S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590 Attn : Officer Engineering Dwaine Perrin

Dear Mr. Perrin:

This letter is a follow-up to the telephone conversation that you had with my secretary, Anita Puckett, a few weeks ago concerning any regulations that may govern us as a reconditioned brake drum manufacturer.

Team Visions, Inc., i s a new corporation that has intentions of doing business as a brake drum reconditioning service, whereby, we put a worn or damaged brake drum through a cleaning process and then fuse new material to the drum enlarging it enough so that it can be re-machined to meet new drum specifications.

Our anticipated date of opening is September 1, 1986. In light of this, please send a letter stating your findings of any regulations that may govern us to the undersigned at the letterhead address.

Thank you for your time and assistance.

Steven R. Taylor President and Owner SRT:Sz

ID: 86-5.23

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 09/22/86

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Mr. T.E. McConnell

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. T. E. McConnell Prince Lionheart 2301 Cape Cod Way Santa Ana, CA 92703

Dear Mr. McConnell:

Thank you for your letter of July 31, 1986, inquiring about the Federal safety standards that apply to roll-up window shades designed to be attached to a vehicle's window by suction cups. The following discussion explains how our safety standards apply to your products.

Some background information on how Federal Motor Vehicle Safety laws and regulations affect your product may be helpful. Our agency is authorized, under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and certain items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA, however, does not approve motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, nor do we endorse any commercial products. Instead the Vehicle Safety Act establishes a "self-certification" process under which each manufacturer is responsible for certifying that its products meet all applicable safety standards The agency periodically tests vehicles and equipment items for compliance with the standards, and also investigates other alleged safety-related defects. As explained below, installation of products in new and used vehicles would be affected by our regulations. In addition, any manufacturer of motor vehicle equipment is subject to the requirements of the Vehicle Safety Act concerning the recall and remedy of products with noncompliances or defects related to motor vehicle safety.

We have issued Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205, Glazing Materials, which specifies performance and location requirements for glazing used in vehicles. These requirements include specifications for minimum levels of light transmittance (70% in areas requisite for driving visibility, which includes all windows in passenger cars).

No manufacturer or dealer is permitted to install solar films and other sun screen devices, such as the ones described in your letter, in new vehicles without certifying that the vehicle continues to be in compliance with the light transmittance and other requirements of the standard.

After a vehicle is first sold to a consumer, modifications to a vehicle are affected by section 108(a) (2) (n) of the Vehicle Safety Act. That section prohibits commercial businesses from tampering with safety equipment installed on a vehicle in compliance with our standards. Thus, no dealer, manufacturer, repair business or distributor can install a sun screen device for the owner of the vehicle, if the device would cause the window not to meet the requirements of Standard No. 205. Violation of section 108(h) (2) (A) can result in Federal civil penalties of up to $1,000 for each violation.

Section 108 (6)( 2) (A) does not affect vehicle owners who may themselves alter their vehicles as they please, so long as they adhere to all State requirements. Under Federal law, the owner may install sun screening devices regardless of whether the installation adversely affects the light transmittance. The agency, however, urges vehicle owners not to take actions that would degrade the performance of required safety features. Individual States govern the operational use of vehicles by their owners and therefore it is within the authority of the States top preclude owners from using sun screens in their vehicles.

I am returning, under separate cover, the two samples of your product you provided the agency. If you need further information, please let me know.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

July 31, 1986

Office of Chief Counsel NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION U.S. Department of Transportation 400 Seventh Street S.W. Washington. D.C. 20590

Dear Sir:

Mr. Ralph Hitchcock of the NHTSA Rule Making Office referred me to the Office of Chief Counsel in my effort to obtain a determination that PRINCE LIONHEART'S BABYBRELLAtm and sUNBRELLAtm roll-up automobile window shades are in compliance with all State and Federal laws regarding window coverings.

I am enclosing a sample BABYBRELLAtm and a packaged sUNBRELLA for your reference. The package for the BABYBRELLAtm is identical to that of the sUNBRELLAtm except for the name and logo.

Please note that the shade, itself, does not come in contact with the window's surface and it's roll-up feature allows it to be easily raised for driving at night or on cloudy days. We have found these items to be extremely useful in protecting a car's occupants from sun, heat and glare while providing a safe alternative to sheets and towels which many people use to protect themselves and their children from the sun.

I will appreciate your prompt response to this request and please feel free to call the undersigned should any questions arise.

Very truly yours,

T.E. McConnell PRINCE LIONHEART

TEM/pd encl.

ID: 86-5.24

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 09/25/86

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Doug Bereuter

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

The Honorable Doug Bereuter Member, U.S. House of Representatives P.O. Box 82887 Lincoln, NE 68501

Dear Mr Bereuter:

Thank you for your July 18, 1986, correspondence enclosing a letter from your constituent, Ms. Dianna L. Prosser of Beatrice, who asked about Federal regulations for safety belts on school buses. Your letter has been referred to my office for reply, since the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is responsible for administering Federal programs relating to school bus safety. I regret the delay in our response.

Ms. Prosser believes that the Federal government should encourage States to enact laws requiring passengers to use safety belts on school buses. She suggests that such a requirement would be consistent with State laws requiring the driver of a passenger car or school bus to use his or her safety belt. She asks also whether any states have enacted requirements for safety belt use in school buses.

I appreciate this opportunity to respond to your constituent's concerns. I would like to begin by clarifying that safety belts are not required by Federal law to be installed for passengers on large school buses. We have been carefully examining the issue of safety belts on large school buses. While NHTSA has often explained that States are free to order safety belts on their large school buses if they wish to do so, we believe that large school buses are very safe and that safety belts for passengers are not needed for safety.

Some background information on our school bus regulations might be helpful. NHTSA is responsible for developing safety standards applicable to all new motor vehicles, including school buses. In 1977, we issued a set of motor vehicle safety standards for various aspects of school bus safety. Included in that set is Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 222, School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash Protection. Standard No. 222 requires large school buses--i.e., those with gross vehicle weight ratings over 10,000 pounds--to provide passenger crash protection through a concept called "compartmentalization." Compartmentalization requires that the interior of large buses be improved so that children are protected regardless of whether they have fastened a safety belt. The seating improvements include higher and stronger seat backs, additional seat padding, and better seat spacing and performance. Our safety standards require a safety belt for the school bus driver since the driver's position is not compartmentalized. We also require safety belts for passengers in smaller school buses because those buses experience greater crash forces than do larger buses and the additional restraint system is needed to provide adequate crash protection for passengers.

However, large school buses already offer substantial protection to passengers and a Federal endorsement for safety belts in those vehicles is unnecessary. In addition to meeting Federal school bus safety standards, large school buses are very safe vehicles because of their size and height, the training and experience of their drivers and the extra care that other road users employ in the vicinity of school buses. As stated earlier, NHTSA does not prevent States and local jurisdictions that wish to order safety belts on their own large school buses from doing so. Such a decision is a matter for the officials of the particular State or local jurisdiction, who are best able to assess their own pupil transportation needs.

Issues relating to safety belts in large school buses are discussed in a June, 1985 NHTSA publication entitled "Safety Belts in School Buses." I have enclosed a copy of the report for Ms. Prosser's information.

Ms. Prosser also asked whether any State mandates the installation and use of safety belts in buses. New York has recently required installation of safety belts for passengers in large school buses. Requirements for the use of the belts would be set by the local board of education or board of trustees.

I would like to reiterate that the agency does not endorse installation of safety belts for passengers on large school buses because we believe belts are not necessary to provide adequate crash protection. This contrasts with the data we have with regard to the use of safety belts by persons driving passenger cars. The Department's decision to promote effective State laws requiring the proper use of safety belts in passenger cars reflects our finding that safety belts substantially reduce deaths and serious injuries in a crash. If comparable data were available for school buses, our agency would not hesitate to take necessary and expeditious action.

I hope this information is helpful. Please contact my office if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel Enclosure

Congress of the United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C.

July 18, 1986

Sir:

The attached communication is sent for your consideration. Please investigate the statements contained therein and forward me the necessary information for reply, returning the enclosed correspondence with your answer.

Yours truly,

DOUG BEREUTER, M.C.

Please respond to: Pat Wergin District Staff P.O. Box 82887 Lincoln, NE 68501

June 27, 1986

Mr. Doug Bereuter Nebraska Representative U. S. House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Bereuter:

After much consideration, I have decided this issue should be addressed at the national level and not the state level.

Many states now have lawamaking it mandatory to wear seat belts when riding in the front seats of cars. Do any states mandate the provision of and use of seat belts on school buses? I have riden school buses and know that children don't always remain seated as they should. This has to be a source of great distraction for the driver. It it my understanding that school bus drivers must wear seat belts, maybe the children should too.

There was a school bus accident involving one of our city school buses this spring. Several of the students were injured and treated at the hospital, some school days were missed. The bus overturned and students were thrown as it turned. Some of these injuries surely could have been prevented if seat belts had been in use. Constantly, during the school year, we hear of accidents involving school buses that turned out worse.

Your consideration of this matter would be appreciated.

Sincerely, Dianna L. Prosser 705 Elk St. Beatrice, NE 68310

ID: 86-5.25

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 09/29/86

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Mr. Rohit Vaidya

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your April 30, 1986 letter concerning Safety Standard No. 213, Child Restraint Systems, and your planned built-in child seat. You asked for information concerning all safety standards that would be applicable to the seat and concerning a pending petition for amending Standard No. 213 to permit the installation of built-in child seats in new motor vehicles. I regret the delay in our response.

Standard No. 213 is the only standard which this agency has issued concerning child restraint systems. It was drafted at a time when add-on or portable systems were the only type of child restraint systems. Accordingly, the requirements of the standard are oriented toward that type of system. However, the agency has granted a petition to broaden the standard to permit the installation of built-in child restraint systems. We expect to issue a proposal regarding this matter later this year. Copies of the standard and the petition are enclosed.

As a new manufacturer of motor vehicle equipment, you should know that a manufacturer has a variety of responsibilities in addition to certifying compliance with all applicable safety standards. Manufacturers have the responsibility to conduct notification and remedy campaigns for safety-related defects or noncompliances with standards in their products. If a child restraint system fails to comply with Standard No. 213 or contains a safety-related defect, the manufacturer may elect to either (1) repair the child restraint so that the defect or noncompliance is removed; or (2) replace the child restraint with an identical or reasonably equivalent restraint which does not have the defect or noncompliance. Whichever of these options is chosen, the child restraint manufacturer must bear the expense for the remedy.

Installation of your product in a used vehicle would also be affected by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. Section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act prohibits any manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business from "rendering inoperative" in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed in a motor vehicle in compliance with an applicable safety standard. Such a rendering inoperative could occur, for example, if the installer of a built-in child safety seat removed the original vehicle seat, installed a replacement vehicle seat containing the built-in child safety seat, but did not ensure that the seat belt anchorages for adult seating positions in the replacement rear seat continued to meet the location and strength requirements of Standard No. 210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages. A rendering inoperative could also occur if the installer did not ensure that a replacement vehicle seat continued to meet the strength requirements of Standard No. 207, Seating Systems, to minimize the possibility of failure by forces acting on that seat as a result of vehicle impact.

Section 108(a)(2)(A) does not establish any limitations on an individual vehicle owner's ability to alter his or her own vehicle. Under Federal law, individual vehicle owners can themselves install any product they want on their vehicles, regardless of whether that product would render inoperative the compliance of the vehicle's seats or seat belt assembly anchorages with the requirements of Standards Nos. 207 or 210. However, the agency encourages vehicle owners not to install products which could lessen the occupant protection afforded by the original seats or safety belt assembly anchorages and thus adversely affect safety.

For further information concerning these responsibilities, please consult the enclosed information sheet for new manufacturers.

ENCLS(3)

OCC 0617

Erika Jones Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

April 30, 1986

Dear Madam,

This letter is in reference to the Federal Regulations regarding automobile child safety-seats - the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard # 213.

I am an inventor and I expect to be receiving a Letters Patent from the US Patent & Trademark Office for a child safety seat that is designed to be an integral part of a vehicle. I would be very grateful if you could send me a list of all current applicable test standards for automobile child safety-seats (including FMVSS #213, above).

Furthermore, I understand the above referenced standard #213 is under review because of a petition that has been submitted to your office to broaden the scope of the regulation. I also would like to request: (1) information on the status of this review; and (2) a copy of the petition.

Thank you very much.

Rohit Vaidya

cc: DR. C. CLARK, NHTSA MR. W. FONTAINE

ID: 86-5.26

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 09/29/86

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Mr. William C. Fisher

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. William C. Fisher Product Engineer Parker Hannifin Corporation Parflex Division 1300 North Freedom Street Ravenna, OH 44266

Dear Mr. Fisher:

Thank you for your letter and enclosure regarding the labeling requirements for air brake hose assemblies set forth in Standard No. 106, Brake Hoses. I regret the delay in our response. We have referred the matter to our enforcement division to obtain more information about the assemblies you enclosed. We will return the samples of brake hose assemblies you sent, as you requested, when our examination is completed.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

National Highway Traffic Safety Admin. Department of Transportation Office of Chief Council, NOA32 Room 5219 400 Seventh Street, S.W. Washington,D.C. 20590

Attention : Ms. Deirdre Hom, Attorney Advisor

Subject: D.O.T. Safety Standard 106 Section 7.2.3, Parts a and b - Identification of brake tubing assemblies by banding; Section 7.2.3.1 - End fitting marking to D.O.T. regulations.

Dear Deirdre:

Per our recent conversation, I have enclosed samples of the air brake end fittings which we contend are not in compliance with DOT 106 regulations. These assemblies were permanently ". . attached by crimping or swaging. ." a brass collar to the nylon tubing. This would, in our opinion, constitute a permanently attached fitting which is not reusable. In addition, no identification band was found on the coil assembly, and all end fittings lack D.O.T. identification markings.

I request that you review these samples and render a decision on the following questions:

1) Do these samples constitute permanently attached fittings under Section 7.2.3?

2) Is the attachment of a D.O.T. identification band required on brake hose assemblies made with this type of end fitting?

3) Is the end fitting identification marking in compliance with DOT 106 regulations?

I have enclosed for review, a current production sample of a Parker brake coil assembly that complies with DOT 106 regulations.

I request that these samples be returned to me at the Parker Parflex Division upon completion of your study.

Ms. Deirdre Hom Page 2

Your swift attention to this matter will be appreciated. If you have any additional questions, please contact me at (216) 296-2871, ext. 259.

Very truly yours,

William C. Fisher Product Engineer

WCF:dm

Enclosures

1) Unidentified brake hose end fitting (Section Out) 2) Unidentified brake hose end fitting 3) Parker brake coil assembly

cc: William Hertel, Corporate Staff Engineer, Parker Hannifin Corp. Mark Kugelman, General Marketing Mgr., Parker Hannifin Corp. Robert Wiseman, Plant Mgr., Parker Hannifin Corp.

ID: 86-5.27

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 09/29/86

FROM: DALE T. FANZO

TO: DIANE STEED -- NHTSA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 09/02/88 FROM ERIKA Z JONES TO GERALD PETERSON; REDBOOK A32, STANDARD 202; LETTER DATED 05/17/88 FROM GERALD PETERSON TO ERIKA JONES, OCC - 2052; LETTER DATED 08/28/87 FROM CARL C CLARK TO JERRY PETERSON

TEXT: Dear Ms. Steed,

"I hereby petition the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to change the requirements of Standard #202 to include head restraints on vehicles other than passenger cars. I feel that the listing of these mini vans as multi purpose evades the issue of safety. I am enclosing this copy of my letter to Lee Iacocca and Chrysler's response. A brief summary of my accident follows:

"On February 11, 1986 I was sitting at a red light on Route 22. A welding truck was in back of me and was struck by a milk tanker. The driver of the tanker dozed off at 50 mph, pusing the welding truck into me with me ending up 211 ft. from point of contact.

"The result from the accident was I had 0 degree head movement for 9 weeks and a A/C separation of the left shoulder. After seeing 4 doctors and 6 therapists I am able to move my head to the left, however, only 60 degree to the right. It is 7 months now and I may have permanent damage to my ligaments in my neck. I have been told that a normal whiplash is caused when your head goes back and it bounces off the head restraint. However, my 3 seated Voyager SE had no head rest which caused my head to snap over the seat causing my injury.

"Ms. Steed, my van is listed with the State as a station wagon and also with my insurance company. If you check to see how many SE Voyager and Caravans were purchased since 1984 you would find, I'm sure, 80%-90% with families. My purpose for this petition is to make sure that no other innocent party will have to go through what I have been going through. To make matters worse, I am a self employed individual who relys on sales by way of 40,000 miles a year to support my family."

In summary, I would appreciate your time and consideration towards this petition. I can be reached at the above address, or by calling (412) 831-8514.

ENCLS

ID: 86-5.28

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 10/01/86

TITLE: TEXT OF THE RULING BY THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT UPHOLDING THE STATE'S LAW REQUIRING SEAT BELT USE BY DRIVERS AND FRONT SEAT PASSENGERS IN AUTOMOBILES

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 07/32/89 FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA TO BUTLER DERRICK -- CONGRESS; REDBOOK A31; STANDARD 208 LETTER DATED 07/11/89 FROM BUTLER DERRICK -- CONGRESS TO STEVE WOOD -- NHTSA

TEXT: Docket Nos. 62719, 62799, 63705, 63224 cons -- Agenda 40 -- May 1986.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS et al., Appellants, v. ELIZABETH J. KOHRIG et al., Appellees.

PER CURIAM: The defendants in these four consolidated cases were issued traffic citations for failure to wear seat safety belts while operating their motor vehicles on a street or highway in violation of section 12-603.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1 (hereinafter the section).) In each case, the trial court concluded that the section was unconstitutional and dismissed the charge. The State appealed each case directly to this court pursuant to our Rule 302(a) (94 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)), and the cases were consolidated for purposes of appeal. Only two of the four defendants -- Elizabeth J. Kohrig and Regina L. Greene -- have filed briefs in this court; however, various parties have been permitted to file briefs as amicus curiae.

At issue is whether the section, which requires drivers of motor vehicles and their front-seat passengers to wear safety belts when driving on a public highway or street, violates the due process guarantees of the State and Federal constitutions. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 2; U.S. Const., amend. XIV, sec. 1.

The section, which became effective on July 1, 1985, provides in part:

"(a) Each driver and front seat passenger of a motor vehicle operated on a street or highway in this State shall wear a properly adjusted and fastened seat safety belt; except that, a child less than 6 years of age shall be protected as required pursuant to the Child Passenger Protection Act. Each driver of a motor vehicle transporting a child 6 years of age or more, but less than 16 years of age, in the front seat of a motor vehicle shall secure the child in a properly adjusted and fastened seat safety belt." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1(a).)

The statute also provides that certain persons are exempt from complying with the seat-belt-use requirement, including persons with a written medical waiver from a physician or government agency; those persons frequently stopping and leaving the vehicle or delivering property from the vehicle if its speed between stops does not exceed 15 miles per hour; and drivers operating a vehicle in reverse. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1(b)(1),

(b)(4).) Certain vehicles also are exempt from the statute's requirements, including motorcycles, motorized pedalcycles, and vehicles manufactured prior to 1965. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1(b)(5), (b)(9).) Violators of the section are guilty of a "petty offense and subject to a fine not to exceed $ 25." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.I(d).

At the outset we note that, in reviewing the constitutionality of Illinois' mandatory-seat-belt law, this court does not join in the debate over whether the law is desirable or necessary. Our nation was founded in large part on the democratic principle that the powers of government are to be exercised by the people through their elected representatives in the legislature, subject only to certain constitutional limitations. Although this court has never hesitated to invalidate laws that it believes to be unconstitutional, we emphasize that our role is a limited one. The issue here in "not what the legislature should do but what the legislature can do." City of Wichita v. While (1970), 205 Kan. 408, 409, 469 P.2d 287, 288.

Defendant Greene contends that the section violates her fundamental right to privacy protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. (U.S. Const., amend XIV, sec. 2.) Additionally, both defendants argue that the section is beyond the police powers of the legislature and thus violates the due process clauses of the State and Federal constitutions. We first turn to the issue of whether the section violates defendants' fundamental right to privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment.

Regulations that limit a person's constitutional right to privacy may be justified only by a "'compelling state interest,'" and the legislation "must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake." (Roe v. Wade (1973), 410 U.S. 113, 155, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 178, 93 S. Ct. 705, 728. See also Carey v. Population Services International (1977), 431 U.S. 678, 686, 52 L.Ed. 2d 675, 685, 97 S. Ct. 2010, 2016.) However, "'only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" [citation]'" (Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 65, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 462, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2639, quoting Roe v. Wade (1973), 410 U.S. 113, 152, 35 L. Ed.2d 147, 176, 93 S. Ct. 705, 726), or those liberties "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition'" (Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , , 92 L.Ed. 2d 140, 146, 106 S.

Ct. 2841, 2844; see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland (1977), 431 U.S. 494, 503, 52 L. Ed.2d 531, 540, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1938) are included in the right of privacy guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court has selected only a few rights for such an esteemed status: the "privacy right encompasses and protects the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing." Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 65, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 462, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2639. See Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , , 92 L. Ed. 2d 140, 148, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2346; Paul v. Davis (1976), 424 U.S. 693, 712-13, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, 420-21, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1166.

Moreover, recognizing that a court is "most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution," the Supreme Court has emphasized that there should be "great resistance" to further expanding the substantive due process right of privacy. (Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , , 92 L. Ed.2d 140, 148, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846.) Thus, attempts by litigants to expand the privacy right beyond matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relations, abortion, child rearing and education have largely been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , 92 L. Ed. 2d 140, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (right to privacy does not encompass right to engage in homosexual sodomy); Kelley v. Johnson (1977), 425 U.S. 231, 244, 47 L. Ed. 2d 708, 714, 96 S. Ct. 1440, 1444 (police officer does not have privacy right to choose hairstyle); Paul v. Davis (1976), 424 U.S. 693, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (no privacy protection of reputation); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 93 S. Ct. 2628 (privacy right does not encompass right of adults to watch obscene movies in places of public accommodation).

In the present case it cannot be said that defendant Greene's claimed right to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt on a public highway resembles those liberties identified by the Supreme Court as being included in the right of privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment. Although the section in question implicates a person's interest in "liberty" in the sense that it restricts his freedom of choice, the law here does not regulate those intimate

decisions relating to marriage, procreation, child rearing, education or family that have heretofore been recognized as deserving of heightened constitutional protection. (See Wells v. State (1985), A.D.2d , 495 N.Y.S. 2d 591 (mandatory-seat-belt-use law does not violate right of privacy). Cf. People v. Thomas (1984), 159 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 18, 206 Cal. Rptr. 84 (statute requiring the securing of a child passenger in a seat-restraint system does not infringe on defendant's fundamental right of privacy); State v. Fetterly (1969), 254 Or. 47, 456 P.2d 996 (motorcycle helmet law does not violate defendant's right of privacy).) Nor do we think that the right to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed" (Palko v. Connecticut (1937), 302 U.S. 319, 325-26, 82 L. Ed. 288, 292, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152), or a liberty "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" (Moore v. East Cleveland (1977), 431 U.S. 494, 503, 52 L. Ed. 2d 531, 540, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1938). The States historically have been given a wide latitude to regulate the use of motor vehicles (Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. (1959), 359 U.S. 520, 530, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1003, 1010, 79 S. Ct. 962, 968), and the individual driver's autonomy on the road has, out of necessity for the public safety and welfare, been significantly curtailed by State regulation. Like the court in Bisenius v. Karns (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 42, 165 N.W.2d 377, appeal dismissed (1969), 395 U.S. 709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 655, 89 S. Ct. 2033, we reject any notion that the right of privacy includes the right to "do one's thing" on an expressway:

"There is no place where any such right to be let alone would be less assertable than on a modern highway with cars, trucks, busses and cycles whizzing by at sixty or seventy miles an hour. When one ventures onto such a highway, he must be expected and required to conform to public safety regulations and controls, including some that would neither have been necessary nor reasonable in the era of horse-drawn vehicles." (42 Wis. 2d 42, 55, 165 N.W.2d 377, 384.)

We are unwilling to graft onto the Constitution a right of privacy to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt where there is no textual basis or a clear historical precedent for such a right in the language of the Constitution or the opinions of the Supreme Court. To do so woul be to place the court in a position of acting as a super legislature,

nullifying laws it does not like. That is not our proper role in a democratic society. Therefore, we hold that the section does not infringe upon defendant's fundamental right of privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment. Neither does it infringe upon any right to privacy arising under the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 6).

Defendants also argue that the section does not further the health, safety or welfare of the general public, asserting that the statute only protects the safety of the individual driver and passenger. They contend that since the section interferes with their right to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt, and has no corresponding public benefit, the statute exceeds the State's police power and violates the due process guarantees of the State and Federal constitutions.

It is well established that the legislatures, not the courts, have the primary role in our democratic society in deciding what the interests of the public require and in selecting the measures necessary to secure those interests. (City of Carbondale v. Brewster (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 111, 115; Memorial Gardens Association, Inc. v. Smith (1959), 16 Ill. 2d 116, 127.) Recognizing the legislature's broad power to provide for the public health, welfare and safety, the courts are hesitant to second-guess a legislative determination that a law is desirable or necessary. Only when the statute in question affects a fundamental constitutional right will the courts subject the legislation to strict or exacting scrutiny. In such cases, the State must have a "compelling" purpose for the law and show that it's goals cannot be accomplished by less restrictive means. (Carey v. Population Services International (1977), 431 U.S. 678, 686, 52 L. Ed. 2d 675, 685, 97 S. Ct. 2010, 2016.) Few rights, however, have been identified as "fundamental," since only those rights "that lie at the heart of the relationship between the individual and a republican form of nationally integrated government" are deemed deserving of heightened judicial scrutiny. (People ex rel. Tucker v. Kotsos (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 88, 97.) Thus, in most cases involving substantive due process challenges to statutes, the courts give substantial deference to the legislative enactments.

In the present case we already have determined that the section here involved does not infringe upon the defendants' right of privacy protected by the fourteenth

amendment, and defendants do not argue that the statute implicates any other fundamental constitutional right or liberty. As such, the State need not show a "compelling interest" for the law. It is sufficient that there is a rational basis for the statute. That is, the law will be upheld if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. (Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. (1955), 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 99 L. Ed. 563, 572, 75 S. Ct. 461, 464; Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368; Hayen v. County of Ogle (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 413, 419; Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association v. Block (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 443, 453.) Under the rational-basis test, a statute is presumed to be valid, and the party challenging the statute has the burden of proving that the statute is irrational. (Hayen v. County of Ogle (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 413, 419; Pozner v. Mauck (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 250, 255.) As long as there is a conceivable basis for finding a rational relationship, the law will be upheld. McGowan v. Maryland (1961), 366 U.S. 420, 426, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393, 399, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 1105; Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368.

In challenging the section as exceeding the scope of the State's police power, the defendants principally rely on the case of People v. Fries (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 446. In Fries the court held that a statute requiring the operator or passenger of a motorcycle to wear protective headgear was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the purpose of the headgear requirement was to "safeguard the person wearing it" and was unrelated to the safety of the public at large. (42 Ill. 2d 446, 450.) It concluded that the statute constituted a "regulation of what is essentially a matter of personal safety" and exceeded the scope of the State's police power. (42 Ill. 2d 446, 450.) Here, too, defendants argue that the decision of whether or not to wear a safety belt is "essentially a matter of personal safety" and that any regulation restricting the individual's right to make such a decision exceeds the State's police power.

The State, on the other hand, maintains that Fries was wrongly decided, and it urges us to overrule that decision. It correctly notes that at present Fries stands alone in holding that a motorcycle helmet law is unconstitutional. The overwhelming weight of authority is that motorcycle-helmet laws are a valid exercise of the State's police

power. (See Kingery v. Chapple (Alaska 1972), 504 P.2d 831; State v. Beeman (1975), 25 Ariz. App. 83, 541 P.2d 409; Penney v. City of North Little Rock (1970), 248 Ark. 1158, 455 S.W.2d 132; Love v. Bell (1970), 171 Colo. 27, 465 P.2d 118;State v. Brady (Del. Super. 1972), 290 A.2d 322; Hamm v. State (Fla. 1980), 387 So. 2d 946; State v. Cotton (1973), 55 Hawaii 138, 516 P.2d 709; State v. Albertson (1970), 93 Idaho 640, 470 P.2d 300; City of Wichita v. White (1970), 205 Kan. 408, 469 P.2d 287; Everhardt v. City of New Orleans (1968) 253 La. 285, 217 So. 2d 400, appeal dismissed and cert. denied (1969), 395 U.S. 212, 23 L. Ed. 2d 214, 89 S. Ct. 1775; State v. Quinnam (Me. 1977), 367 A.2d 1032; Simon v. Sargent (D. Mass. 1972), 346 F. Supp. 277, aff'd (1972), 409 U.S. 1020, 34 L. Ed. 2d 312, 93 S. Ct. 463; Commonwealth v. Howie (1968), 354 Mass. 769, 238 N.E.2d 373, cert. denied (1968), 393 U.S. 999, 21 L. Ed. 2d 464, 89 S. Ct. 485; City of Adrian v. Poucher (1976) 398 Mich. 316, 247 N.W.2d 798; State v. Edwards (1970), 287 Minn. 83, 177 N.W.2d 40; State v. Cushman (Mo. 1970), 451 S.W.2d 17; State v. Eight Judicial District Court (1985), 101 Nev. 658, 708 P.2d 1022; State v. Merski (1973), 113 N.H. 323, 307 A.2d 825; State v. Krammes (1969), 105 N.J. Super. 345, 252 A.2d 223; City of Albuquerque v.Jones (1975), 87 N.M. 486, 535 P.2d 1337; People v. Bennett (1977), 89 Misc. 2d 382, 391 N.Y.S.2d 506; State v. Anderson (1969), 275 N.C. 168, 166 S.E.2d 49; State v. Odegaard (N.D. 1969), 165 N.W.2d 677; State v. Stouffer (1971), 28 Ohio App. 2d 229, 276 N.E.2d 651; Elliott v. City of Oklahoma City (Okla. Crim. App. 1970), 471 P.2d 944; State v. Fetterly (1969), 254 Or. 47, 456 P.2d 996; Commonwealth v. Kautz (1985), 341 Pa. Super. 374, 491 A.2d 864; State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi (1968), 104 R.I. 28, 241 A.2d 625; Arutanoff v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County (1969), 223 Tenn. 535, 448 S.W.2d 408; Ex Parte Smith (Tex. Crim. App. 1969), 441 S.W.2d 544; State v. Acker (1971), 26 Utah 2d 104, 485 P.2d 1038; State v. Solomon (1969), 128 Vt. 197, 260 A.2d 377; State v. Laitinen (1969), 77 Wash. 2d 130, 459 P.2d 789; State v. Zektzer (1975), 13 Wash. App. 24, 533 P.2d 399, cert. denied (1975), 423 U.S. 1020, 46 L. Ed. 2d 392, 96 S. Ct. 457; Bisenius v. Karns (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 42, 165 N.W.2d 377, appeal dismissed (1969), 395 U.S. 709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 655, 89 S. Ct. 2033.) Alternatively, the State contends that the statute being challenged here promotes valid public

interests and thus is distinguishable from the motorcycle helmet law found to be unconstitutional in Fries.

Defendants are correct in asserting that the primary goal of the section is to protect the individual driver and front-seat passenger from death or serious injury. As such, the statute interfers with the individuals' choice concerning his or her personal safety. However, arriving at those conclusions does not ipso facto mean that the law is devoid of any public benefit and is unconstitutional. Regardless of a law's primary objective, it will be upheld if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose. (Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368-69; Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association v. Block (1979), 75 I11. 2d 443, 453.) In that regard, the defendants have not persuaded us that the legislature could not have found that the law bears a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. The legislative debates clearly indicate that the legislators believed that safety-belt use would protect persons other than the belt wearers by helping drivers to maintain control of their vehicles, and that the law would promote that economic welfare of the State by reducing the public and private costs associated with serious injuries and deaths caused by automobile accidents.

During debates in the House of Representatives, a principal sponsor of the safety-belt legislation remarked:

"The Bill would not only protect drivers and passengers in the front seat, the Bill would also protect other people. It would protect other drivers. It would protect pedestrains on our highways and on our sidewalks. The reason for that, of course, is that even a minor * * * accident, can if * * * a car is driven by a person who doesn't have a seat belt, * * * result in that person losing control of the car and injuring other people on or about the car." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 212 (statement of Representative John Cullerton).)

Another legislator argues that if she were to drive an automobile without her safety belt fastened "and I lose control of my car, I am endangering others." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 223 (statement of Representative Josephine Oblinger).) The Governor, in signing the seat-belt law, also agreed that the law would help drivers to maintain control of their vehicles and avoid accidents with other motorists and pedestrians:

"Unbelted passengers in a motor vehicle literally become human projectiles in the event of a crash. Unbelted passengers

can interfere with the ability of an operator to respond to the collision, and unbelted drivers may lose control of a vehicle and thus cause death and injury to others." Letter of Governor James R. Thompson to the General Assembly indicating his intent to sign House Bill 2800 (Jan. 8, 1985).

The State can enact laws aimed at reducting traffic accidents, since such laws are clearly related to the health, welfare and safety of the public. We also believe that the legislature could rationally conclude that unbelted drivers and passengers endanger the safety of others. In upholding a law similar to the one here under review, the court in People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, 494 N.Y.S.2d 960, stated:

"A driver who is injured or who is jolted away from his vehicle's controls during a skid or by an initial impact, may well be less able to prevent or minimize injuries caused by an accident. Also, an unrestrained occupant of a vehicle may injure others inside or out of the vehicle during an accident. The preventing or reduction of such an injury seems to the Court to be a valid State interest." (129 Misc. 2d 993, , 494 N.Y.S.2d 960, 963.)

It also is conceivable that drivers who wear safety belts are less likely to fall asleep at the wheel, or to lose control of their vehicles in situations where the driver must apply the brakes suddenly, or in cases where a vehicle begins to skid or swerve. Safety belts can also prevent passengers from being thrown against the driver. And, as the State observes, children and other occupants who are wearing safety belts are less likely to distract the driver. See People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, , 494 N.Y.S.2d 960, 963; Druhot, The Constitutionality of the Illinois Mandatory Seat Belt Use Legislation, 74 Ill. B.J. 290, 296 (1986); Werber, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach To Seat Belt Issues, 29 Cleve. St. L. Rev. 217, 244 (1980).

Defendants argue that there is no statistical evidence showing that seat-belt use helps the driver to maintain control of his vehicle and avoid accidents with other motorists or pedestrains. Even assuming this argument is correct, it is without merit. "The fact that a congressional directive reflects unprovable assumptions about what is good for the people * * * is not a sufficient reason to find that statute unconstitutional" (Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 62, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 460, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2638), and a court "will not disturb a police regulation merely where there is room for a difference of

opinion as to its wisdom, necessity and expendiency." (City of Carbondale v. Brewster (1979), 78 I11. 2d 111, 115. See also Schuringa v. City of Chicago (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 504, 515.) Moreover, "the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it." (Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. (1955), 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 99 L. Ed. 563, 572, 75 S. Ct. 461, 464.) Here, we think that the legislature could rationally determine that the seat-belt-use law would serve the public safety and welfare by reducing the likelihood that a driver would lose control of his vehicle and jeopardize other motorists or pedestrians.

Another reason advanced by the State for the section is that the law promotes the economic welfare of the State by reducing the public costs associated with serious injuries and deaths caused by automobile accidents. The legislative history of the section indicates that legislators were concerned about the financial costs associated with highway accidents. Representative Cullerton remarked that, the safety-belt legislation "would clearly save money," asserting that "it cost the State over 800,000 dollars for a 26 year old person who is made a paraplegic as a result of a car crash." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 212 (statement of Representative John Cullerton).) Another Representative stated: "The lives we were save and the injuries that we avoid are the injuries and lives that we, the taxpayers, are very likely to be responsible for in the long run. We're not talking about somebody's own individual decision to end up in a car crash and find him or herself in a hospital for 20 years with that individual paying the bill. It's the taxpayers that are going to be paying those bills." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 220 (statement of Barbara Currie).) Senator James Philip, in urging passage of the seat-belt law, observed that " in 1982 in Illinois some seventy-five people were killed in automobiles [while] performing their job * * *. This costs Illinois employers some twelve million dollars." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Debates, June 21, 1984, at 159 (statement of Senator James Philip).) Senator Dawn Netsch remarked: "We intrude because the consequences of the thousands of people * * * who are injured and whose affictions then are passed on

to their families, to all of us in society * * *." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Debates, June 21, 1984, at 162 (statement of Senator Dawn Netsch).) Governor Thompson, in explaining his reasons for signing the legislation, estimated that the seat belt law would "save more than 300 lives in Illinois in the first year, will avoid nearly 43,000 injuries and save more than $ 400 million in costs." Letter of Governor James R. Thompson to the General Assembly indicating his intent to sign House Bill 2800 (Jan. 8, 1985).

It cannot be seriously questioned that the police power may be used to promote the economic welfare of the State, its communities and its citizens. "[I]n the interest of general welfare, the police power may be exercised to protect citizens and their businesses in financial and economic matters, [and] it may be exercised to protect the governments itself against potential financial loss." (Sherman-Reynolds, Inc. v. Mahin (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 323, 326.) A law whose aim is to reduce the private and public costs resulting from injuries and deaths caused by motor vehicle accidents is therefore within the police power of the State. In finding that a motorcycle helmet law was rationally related to the public welfare, the court in Simon v. Sargent (D. Mass. 1972), 346 F. Supp. 277, aff'd (1972), 409 U.S. 1020, 34 L. Ed. 2d 312, 93 S. Ct. 463, stated:

"From the moment of the injury, society picks the person up off the highway; delivers him to a municipal hospital and municipal doctors; provides him with unemployment compensation if, after recovery, he cannot replace his lost job, and, if the injury causes permanent disability, may assume the responsibility for his and his family's continued subsistence. We do not understand a state of mind that permits plaintiff to think that only he himself is concerned." (346 F. Supp. 277, 279, aff'd (1972), 409 U.S. 1020, 34 L. Ed. 2d 312, 93 S. Ct. 463.)

Because of the drain on private and public financial resources caused by highway accidents, society has a legitimate interest in minimizing injuries which result from such accidents. See Wells v. State (1985), A.D.2d 495 N.Y.S.2d 591; People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, 494 N.Y.S.2d 960; State v. Eighth Judicial District Court (1985), 101 Nev. 658, 708 P.2d 1022; State v. Beeman (1975), 25 Ariz. App. 83, 541 P.2d 409; Love v. Bell (1970), 171 Colo. 27, 465 P.2d 118; See also Druhot, The Constitutionality of the Illinois Mandatory Seat belt Use Legislation, 74 Ill. B.J. 290 (1986); Note, The Illinois Seat Belt Law: Should those Who Ride Decide?, 19 John

Marshall L. Rev. 193 (1985); Werber, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to Seat Belt Issues, 29 Cleve, St. L. Rev. 217, 222 (1980).

Defendants make several arguments concerning the effectiveness of safety belts in reducing injuries and arguments regarding the merits of alternative safety devices such as air bags. Defendants also contend that in some instances safety belts may cause injuries instead of preventing them. We need not consider these arguments, however, since they are proper subjects of discussion for the legislature, not the courts. (Hayden v. County of Ogle (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 413, 421; City of Carbondale v. Brewster (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 111, 115; Pozner v. Mauck (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 250, 255.) We believe that the General Assembly could reasonably assume that a law requiring drivers and front-seat passengers to wear safety belts will reduce traffic-related injuries and fatalities. (Wells v. State (1985), A.D.2d , 495 N.Y.S.2d 591; People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, 494 N.Y.S.2d 960.) Therefore, we hold that section 12.603.1 does not violate the due process clauses of the State and Federal constitutions. To the extent that People v. Fries (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 446, is inconsistent with our opinion, it is overruled.

Defendant Greene also filed a motion to strike certain portions of the briefs and appendices filed by the State and certain parties amicus curiae. This motion was taken with the case. Our review of the record shows that certain safety statistics relied on by the State and the amicus were not presented in the trial courts. Accordingly, defendant Greene's motion to strike this information is allowed.

For the reasons stated the judgments of the circuit courts of Marion, Effingham, Fayette and Champaign counties in cause Nos. 62719, 62799, 63705 and 63224 are reversed, and said causes are remanded to those respective courts for further proceedings.

Motion allowed;

judgments reversed;

causes remanded.

CLARK, C.J., and SIMON, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.