ID: nht95-1.24

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: January 12, 1995

FROM: Jeffrey Echt -- President, Saline Electronics, Inc.

TO: Chief Counsel -- NHTSA

TITLE: In Re: Saline Electronics

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 3/2/95 LETTER FROM PHILIP R. RECHT TO JEFFREY ECHT (REDBOOK(4)); STD. 108 AND 30122 (6)

TEXT: Saline Electronics, Inc., has developed and applied for a United States patent on a new type of automotive stop lamp system. During normal braking, this new system permits the stop lamps, which are original equipment, to operate in a steady burning mode . However, during and after episodes of high, braking-induced deceleration, the system flashes the stop lamps it controls on and off. The flashing stop lamps could be the original equipment stop lamps required by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard ( FMVSS) No. 108 (49CFR571.108), or one or more lamps in addition to those required by FMVSS No. 108.

The purpose of this letter is to obtain clarification of the position of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) with respect to our new system. We realize that individual states may regulate such devices, causing non-Federal limitati ons upon its use.

Apparently, deceleration warning systems, such as ours, are not specifically mentioned in FMVSS No. 108. Yet, in an interpretative letter, dated July 30, 1993, to the Virginia Transportation Research Council, the NHTSA stated:

Virginia could permit the use of a red or amber original equipment deceleration warning system operating in a steady burning mode through either original equipment lamps or supplementary ones.

In the same interpretative letter, you also indicated that "unless otherwise provided by Section 5.5.10 [of FMVSS 108], all original motor vehicle lighting equipment, whether or not required by Standard No. 108, must be steady burning in use."

These interpretations suggest room for experimentation by governmental agencies with our new system, and also the possibility of aftermarket products designed for installation by the individual motor vehicle owners. Hence, we seek your opinion on the fo llowing questions, based solely upon Federal law:

1. May states specifically permit (by statute or regulation) the use of deceleration warning systems which are neither original equipment nor replacements for original equipment? For example, may states specifically permit the use of an aftermarket dec eleration warning system which a) permits all original equipment stop lamps required by FMVSS No. 108 to operate in a normal steady burning mode, and b) flashes one aftermarket center-mounted stop lamp or two side-mounted stop lamps, on vehicles not requ ired to be so equipped?

2. In the absence of state regulation of flashing deceleration warning systems, is it lawful for individuals, states or municipalities to install such systems on their vehicles, provided they do not alter the steady burning operation of the original equ ipment stop lamps required by FMVSS No. 108? For example, may mass transist districts operate busses with flashing deceleration warning lamps, if the systems are installed by their own mechanics and the steady burning operation of the original equipment stop lamps is not altered? May individuals install such equipment on their own vehicles?

3. May individuals, states or municipalities, who are not manufacturers, distributors or motor vehicle repairs businesses, lawfully install flashing deceleration warning systems which would prevent the original equipment stop lamps from steadily burning during and after episodes of high, braking-induced deceleration? For example, may a mass transit district install a deceleration warning system which would flash some or all of the original equipment stop lamps during and after rapid deceleration due t o hard braking, if the system were installed by its own mechanics?

We know that the NHTSA receives many requests for interpretation and petitions for rule making with regard to vehicle lighting. We appreciate your consideration of our request and thank you for your prompt action. Saline Electronics, Inc., has no objec tion to this letter and your response becoming a part of the public record.

ID: nht95-1.25

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: January 13, 1995 EST

FROM: Philip R. Recht -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Melinda Dresser -- Manager Contracts/Transportation, Carlin Manufacturing, Inc.

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached to 11/28/94 letter from Melinda Dresser to Mary Versailles

TEXT: Dear Ms. Dresser:

This responds to your letter of November 28, 1994, concerning seats with swivel bases. You noted that, in a November 25, 1992 letter to Ms. Frances Parton, we stated that there is no express prohibition in Federal law against installing a seat with a sw ivel base. You asked for a "current written determination" of that issue. This letter confirms that there is still no express prohibition in Federal law against installing a seat with a swivel base.

As explained in our November 1992 letter, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration is authorized to issue Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards for new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment (49 U.S.C. @ 30101 et seq.). Manuf acturers are required to certify that their products meet all applicable safety standards.

A manufacturer must consider three safety standards if a seat with a swivel base is installed in a vehicle: Standard No. 207, Seating Systems, Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection, and Standard No. 210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages. Standard No. 207 establishes strength and other performance requirements for vehicle seats. Standard No. 208 sets forth requirements for occupant protection at the various seating positions in vehicles. Standard No. 210 establishes strength and location requirement s for seat belt anchorages. Nothing in these standards expressly prohibits a seat with a swivel base. Instead, a seat with a swivel base must comply with the same standards as other seats.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht95-1.26

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: January 16, 1995

FROM: Ken Liebscher -- President/Director, Electric Car Company

TO: Administrator, NHTSA

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 2/13/95 LETTER FROM PHILIP R. RECHT TO KEN LIEBSCHER (A43; PART 555)

TEXT: The Electric Car Company Inc. is situated at 401 Lincoln St., Box 618, Everson WA 98247. It was incorporated in the State of Nevada.

This is a petition to be exempted from six Federal motor vehicle safety standards for passenger cars that we manufacture using electric power, the MI Series Electric Car. The basis of the petition is that compliance with the standards will cause substan tial economic hardship. The standards for which the exemptions are requested are:

1. Standard # 201, Occupant protection in interior impact. 2. Standard # 203, Impact protection for the driver from the steering control system. 3. Standard # 204, Steering control rearward displacement. 4. Standard # 208, Occupant crash protection. 5. Standard # 214, Side door strength. 6. Standard # 216, Roof crush resistance.

The MI-6 (pictured) is constructed from Dupont Kevlar composite fiberglass material and according to the manufacturer, is four times the strength as conventional fiberglass and we feel confident that it will conform to all applicable Federal motor vehicl e safety standards. However, thirty-mile per hour barrier crash testing is needed to determine the actual energy absorbing characteristics. All component parts of the MI-6 are Original Equipment Manufacturer products and, as such, in compliance of Nati onal Safety Standards. The restraint systems were also purchased from OEM and are installed as per standards.

We request an exemption of two years after which we expect to certify compliance with these standards. To require immediate compliance would create substantial economic hardship. I have enclosed the last audited year end financial statement as well as the last unaudited quarterly statement. The cost for "one set" of testing for the standards on one vehicle is approximately $ 30,000, exclusive of the costs of delivering the vehicle to the test facility. An exemption would permit vehicle sales and the generation of cash permitting testing while the exemptions are in effect. The Company expects to produce six vehicles for demonstration purposes and 100 limited edition vehicles in the first year. A denial of the petition would delay the Company's pro duction while we attempt to test for conformance, but the costs of testing would require a retail price of $ 50,000 for an MI-6. We doubt that we could sell a car at this price, and that, accordingly, we would be forced out of business in the year follo wing a denial of this petition.

Granting of the exemption would be in the public interest and consistent with the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety act by helping to relieve environmental problems associated with automotive transportation. The Company believes that we can make a very positive contribution to the country's clean transportation needs quickly and effectively.

(FOLLOWING ATTACHMENTS OMITTED: 1. MI-6 ELECTRIC AUTOMOBILE SPECIFICATIONS AND TECHNICAL DATA; 2. E.T.C. INDUSTRIES QUARTERLY REPORT AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS)

ID: nht95-1.27

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: January 17, 1995

FROM: Philip R. Recht -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: The Honorable Connie Mack -- United States Senate

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached to 12/12/94 letter from Connie Mack to DOT Intergovernmental and Consumer Affairs; Also related to 1/17/95 letter from Philip Recht to Bob Graham (A43; Std. 109); Also related to 12/15/94 letter from Bob Graham to John Womack

TEXT: Dear Senator Mack:

Thank you for your letter of December 12, 1994, addressed to the Intergovernmental & Consumer Affairs office of this Department. You forwarded to us a letter from your constituent, Mr. Howard J. Levy, Vice-President, Used Tire International, of Deerfiel d Beach, Florida.

Mr. Levy expressed concern in his letters to you and this agency, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), about a proposed bill in the Puerto Rico Senate which would require that used tires imported into Puerto Rico have not less than 5/32 inch tread depth and which would impose a tax of $ 10 per tire on such imports. Mr. Levy is concerned that the proposed bill would mean the end of the used tire industry on the island. In his letter to this agency, he asked, "Does NHTSA have juri sdiction over these laws in Puerto Rico or does the Puerto Rican Senate control the regulations over highway safety," and requested our help in this matter.

We have carefully evaluated Mr. Levy's concerns. As discussed in our enclosed response to Mr. Levy, however, we have concluded that the laws and regulations that we administer will not be of help to him. Since our opinion is limited to consideration of the laws and regulations that we administer, we have suggested to Mr. Levy that he may wish to consult a private attorney concerning whether the proposed Puerto Rico bill raises other legal issues that are relevant to his concerns.

Sincerely,

Philip R. Recht

Enclosure

JAN 17 1995

Mr. Howard J. Levy Used Tire International 837 S.E. 8th Avenue, Suite 202 Deerfield Beach, FL 33441

Dear Mr. Levy: This responds to your letter to Dr. Ricardo Martinez, Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), referring to a bill before the Puerto Rico Senate. The bill would require all used tires imported into Puerto Rico to have a minimum of 5/32 inch tread depth and would impose a tax of $ 10 per tire.

You stated that the proposed requirement is 3/32 inch more than is "required by U.S. law," and that if the proposal became law it "would mean the end of the Used Tire industry on the island." You asked, "Does the NHTSA have jurisdiction over these laws i n Puerto Rico or does the Puerto Rican Senate control the regulations over highway safety," and requested this agency's help in this matter.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain the laws and regulations that we administer. As discussed below, however, those laws and regulations will not be of help to you with respect to your concerns about the proposed Puerto Rico law.

By way of background information, NHTSA is authorized by Federal law (Chapter 301 of Title 49, U.S. Code (hereinafter referred to as the Safety Act)) to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards for new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle eq uipment. The Safety Act prohibits any person from manufacturing, selling or importing any new motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment unless the vehicle or equipment item is in conformity with all applicable safety standards. It also prohibits commercial businesses from rendering inoperative the compliance of a vehicle or item of equipment with a safety standard.

NHTSA's safety standards do not, however, apply to used vehicles or equipment. (I note that if a used tire is imported as motor vehicle equipment, the tire must have complied with the safety standards at the time of its manufacture.) Instead, the individ ual states have the authority to regulate used vehicles and equipment. Also, the Office of Motor Carriers within the Federal Highway Administration has the authority to regulate commercial vehicles and equipment operated in interstate commerce. (Your s tatement that the proposed Puerto Rico tread depth requirement is 3/32 inch more than is "required by U.S. law" appears to be referring to a requirement specified by the Office of Motor Carriers, Federal Highway Administration, for commercial vehicles. See 49 CFR @ 393.75(c)).

I will now turn to your question concerning whether NHTSA has jurisdiction over the laws being considered by the Puerto Rican Senate. The Safety Act includes one provision which addresses Federal preemption of state laws. That provision (49 U.S.C. @ 30 103(b)) specifies that when a Federal motor vehicle safety standard is in effect, a state (including Puerto Rico) may maintain a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is i dentical to the Federal standard. (States may, however, specify higher standards for vehicles or equipment obtained for their own use.) Therefore, if a state specified a particular requirement for new tires that was different from one specified for the same aspect of performance as a Federal motor vehicle safety standard, the state law would be preempted. Moreover, a state law could be impliedly preempted if it frustrated the purposes of the Safety Act.

While we have not reviewed the specific text of the Puerto Rico bill, we do not believe the Safety Act is relevant to the particular concerns you raise in your letter. In order for a state law to be preempted under 49 U.S.C. @ 30103(b), it would have to apply to new vehicles or equipment. However, you are concerned about state requirements for used tires, not new tires. A state law which applied to used vehicles or equipment could be impliedly preempted if it had the same practical effect as a state law for new vehicles/equipment that would be preempted under 49 U.S.C. @ 30103(b), i.e., the law in question had the practical effect of requiring vehicles/equipment to be designed in a certain manner. However, neither a general tax on imported used tir es nor a tread depth requirement that applied only to imported used tires would have any practical effect on the design of new tires.

Based on consideration of the laws and regulations that we administer, we have therefore concluded that the proposed bill that you describe would not raise any preemption issues relevant to the importation of used tires. Since this opinion is limited to consideration of the laws and regulations that we administer, you may wish to consult a private attorney concerning whether the proposed Puerto Rico bill raises other legal issues that are relevant to your concerns.

I hope this information is helpful to you. Should you have any further questions or need additional information, please feel free to contact Walter Myers of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Philip R. Recht Chief Counsel

ID: nht95-1.28

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: January 17, 1995

FROM: Philip R. Recht -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: The Honorable Bob Graham -- United States Senate

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached to 12/15/94 letter from Bob Graham to John Womack; Also related to 1/17/95 letter from Philip Recht to Connie Mack (A43; Std. 109); Also related to 12/12/94 letter from Connie Mack to the DOT

TEXT: Dear Senator Graham:

Thank you for your letter of December 15, 1994, addressed to John Womack of this office. You forwarded to us a letter from your constituent, Mr. Howard Levy, Vice-President, Used Tire International, of Deerfield Beach, Florida.

Mr. Levy expressed concern in his letters to you and this agency, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) about a proposed bill in the Puerto Rico Senate which would require that used tires imported into Puerto Rico have not less than 5/32 inch tread depth and which would impose a tax of $ 10 per tire on such imports. Mr. Levy is concerned that the proposed bill would mean the end of the used tire industry on the island. In his letter to this agency, he asked "Does NHTSA have jurisd iction over these laws in Puerto Rico or does the Puerto Rican Senate control the regulations over highway safety," and requested our help in this matter.

We have carefully evaluated Mr. Levy's concerns. As discussed in our enclosed response to Mr. Levy, however, we have concluded that the laws and regulations that we administer will not be of help to him. Since our opinion is limited to consideration of the laws and regulations that we administer, we have suggested to Mr. Levy that he may wish to consult a private attorney concerning whether the proposed Puerto Rico bill raises other legal issues that are relevant to his concerns.

Sincerely, Philip R. Recht

Enclosure:

JAN 17 1995

Mr. Howard J. Levy Used Tire International 837 S.E. 8th Avenue, Suite 202 Deerfield Beach, FL 33441

Dear Mr. Levy:

This responds to your letter to Dr. Ricardo Martinez, Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), referring to a bill before the Puerto Rico Senate. The bill would require all used tires imported into Puerto Rico to have a minimum of 5/32 inch tread depth and would impose a tax of $ 10 per tire.

You stated that the proposed requirement is 3/32 inch more than is "required by U.S. law," and that if the proposal became law it "would mean the end of the Used Tire industry on the island." You asked, "Does the NHTSA have jurisdiction over these laws i n Puerto Rico or does the Puerto Rican Senate control the regulations over highway safety," and requested this agency's help in this matter.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain the laws and regulations that we administer. As discussed below, however, those laws and regulations will not be of help to you with respect to your concerns about the proposed Puerto Rico law.

By way of background information, NHTSA is authorized by Federal law (Chapter 301 of Title 49, U.S. Code (hereinafter referred to as the Safety Act)) to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards for new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle eq uipment. The Safety Act prohibits any person from manufacturing, selling or importing any new motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment unless the vehicle or equipment item is in conformity with all applicable safety standards. It also prohibits commercial businesses from rendering inoperative the compliance of a vehicle or item of equipment with a safety standard.

NHTSA's safety standards do not, however, apply to used vehicles or equipment. (I note that if a used tire is imported as motor vehicle equipment, the tire must have complied with the safety standards at the time of its manufacture.) Instead, the individ ual states have the authority to regulate used vehicles and equipment. Also, the Office of Motor Carriers within the Federal Highway Administration has the authority to regulate commercial vehicles and equipment operated in interstate commerce. (Your s tatement that the proposed Puerto Rico tread depth requirement is 3/32 inch more than is "required by U.S. law" appears to be referring to a requirement specified by the Office of Motor Carriers, Federal Highway Administration, for commercial vehicles. See 49 CFR @ 393.75(c)).

I will now turn to your question concerning whether NHTSA has jurisdiction over the laws being considered by the Puerto Rican Senate. The Safety Act includes one provision which addresses Federal preemption of state laws. That provision (49 U.S.C. @ 30 103(b)) specifies that when a Federal motor vehicle safety standard is in effect, a state (including Puerto Rico) may maintain a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is i dentical to the Federal standard. (States may, however, specify higher standards for vehicles or equipment obtained for their own use.) Therefore, if a state specified a particular requirement for new tires that was different from one specified for the same aspect of performance as a Federal motor vehicle safety standard, the state law would be preempted. Moreover, a state law could be impliedly preempted if it frustrated the purposes of the Safety Act.

While we have not reviewed the specific text of the Puerto Rico bill, we do not believe the Safety Act is relevant to the particular concerns you raise in your letter. In order for a state law to be preempted under 49 U.S.C. @ 30103(b), it would have to apply to new vehicles or equipment. However, you are concerned about state requirements for used tires, not new tires. A state law which applied to used vehicles or equipment could be impliedly preempted if it had the same practical effect as a state law for new vehicles/equipment that would be preempted under 49 U.S.C. @ 30103(b), i.e., the law in question had the practical effect of requiring vehicles/equipment to be designed in a certain manner. However, neither a general tax on imported used tir es nor a tread depth requirement that applied only to imported used tires would have any practical effect on the design of new tires.

Based on consideration of the laws and regulations that we administer, we have therefore concluded that the proposed bill that you describe would not raise any preemption issues relevant to the importation of used tires. Since this opinion is limited to consideration of the laws and regulations that we administer, you may wish to consult a private attorney concerning whether the proposed Puerto Rico bill raises other legal issues that are relevant to your concerns.

I hope this information is helpful to you. Should you have any further questions or need additional information, please feel free to contact Walter Myers of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Philip R. Recht Chief Counsel

ID: nht95-1.29

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: January 17, 1995

FROM: Philip R. Recht -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Mariano Garcia, Esq. -- Ricca & Whitmire, P.A.

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached to 10/24/94 letter from Mariano Garcia to NHTSA Chief Council (OCC 10463); Also attached to 12/3/91 letter from Paul Jackson Rice to Matthew Plache (VSA 102(3)); Also attached to 10/31/88 letter from Stephen Wood/Erika Jones to Hiroshi Kato

TEXT: Dear Mr. Garcia:

This responds to your request for an interpretation whether the Kawasaki Mule KAF 450-B1, with a top speed of 25 miles per hour, is a motor vehicle. You describe the Mule as an "off-road" light utility vehicle, and enclose a photocopy of what appears to be a Kawasaki brochure describing the Mule.

The Mule is similar to two on and off-road capable vehicles, reviewed by NHTSA for a determination whether the vehicles are motor vehicles. Enclosed are two interpretation letters, one to Mr. Matthew J. Plache, dated December 3, 1991, and one to Mr. Hir oshi Kato dated October 31, 1988. Both letters addressed vehicles which could attain a top speed of 25 miles per hour and were not intended by their manufacturers to be used on the public roads.

Both letters describe five criteria which NHTSA applies when determining whether a vehicle with on and off-road capability is a motor vehicle. We do not have sufficient information to apply the five criteria to the Mule. However, we believe that if the facts are known, the criteria are easily applied, and a determination whether the Mule is a motor vehicle may be made.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

ID: nht95-1.3

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: January 3, 1995

FROM: Philip R. Recht -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: James D. Murphy, Jr.

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached to 11/1/94 letter from James D. Murphy, Jr. to Mr. Recht (Occ 10478); Also attached to 6/11/86 letter from Erika Jones to Terry W. Wager

TEXT: Dear Mr. Murphy:

This responds to your request for an interpretation whether a vehicle with two main wheels and two auxiliary wheels may be considered a "motorcycle." As explained below, the answer is yes.

Your letter describes your vehicle's design as having two main wheels, and left and right side auxiliary wheels that are elevated off the ground. You informed Dorothy Nakama of my staff that the auxiliary wheels are to facilitate vehicle turning, when n o more than three wheels would touch the ground.

NHTSA defines "motorcycle" at 49 CFR Section 571.5(b) as:

a motor vehicle with motive power having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel on not more than three wheels in contact with the ground.

In a previous letter, NHTSA stated that a two wheeled vehicle whose auxiliary wheels are used only for stabilization in turns is considered a "motorcycle" since the vehicle is designed to travel on not more than three wheels in contact with the ground. (See enclosed letter of June 11, 1986 to the NY State Department of Motor Vehicles.) Since your vehicle is also designed to travel with at most three wheels in contact with the ground, we would consider your vehicle a "motorcycle" for purposes of complia nce with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions please contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992

Sincerely,

Philip R. Recht

ID: nht95-1.30

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: January 17, 1995

FROM: Nick Smith -- Member of Congress, U.S. House Of Representatives

TO: Regina Sulliven -- Director, Congressional Affairs, U.S. Department of Transportation

TITLE: Federal Regulations for public schools and home schools transporting students by van

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 2/27/95 LETTER FROM PHILIP R. RECHT TO NICK SMITH (REDBOOK (2)); PART 571.3)

TEXT: Dave Globig from Spring Arbor College in my district contacted my office regarding his concerns with regulations affecting the transportation of students in vans as opposed to buses.

It is his understanding that federal law will not allow certification of any vans made after 1995 and after, 1997, will not allow any vans to be certified. I would appreciate it if you could advise me as to what federal regulations pertain to this iss ue.

Obviously, Mr. Globig is concerned with the prospect of schools purchasing expensive vehicles and then, later, finding out that they can not be certified.

Thank you for your attention to this matter. Please direct any questions or correspondence to my Charlotte district office at the address and phone number listed below.

ID: nht95-1.31

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: January 17, 1995

FROM: Randall B. Clark -- A Concerned Citizen

TO: Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 2/16/95 LETTER FROM PHILIP R. RECHT TO RANDALL B. CLARK (A43; STD. 108; VSA 30122(6)

TEXT: I respectfully request clarification on the following paragraphs S5.1.1.27(a), Table III & Table IV, located in the "Code of Federal Regulations".

I contend the required Motor Vehicle Lighting Equipment requirements are the minimum requirements ONLY and do not state that this is the maximum stop lamps allowed on the back of any automobile.

In other words, my automobile has the normal two stop lamps and has a spoiler with a stop lamp built into it. The car also has a stop lamp mounted inside the back window which is not currently hooked up due to the fact that "Subaru of America" thinks the procedure is against the law. They have cited the above paragraphs & Tables as their authority.

I would appreciate a specific explanation from the "EXPERTS" stating that an automobile with four stop lamps is perfectly legal in the United States.

Thank you for your dedicated efforts on my behalf to clarify the correct point of view on Motor Vehicle Lighting Equipment.

P. S. I have enclosed the specific paragraphs & Tables discussed in my letter.

(ENCLOSURE OMITTED)

ID: nht95-1.32

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: January 19, 1995

FROM: Jiro Doi -- Vice President, MITSUBISHI MOTORS AMERICA, INC.

TO: Philip Recht -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 5/5/95 LETTER FROM JOHN WOMACK TO JIRO DOI (A43; PART 541)

TEXT: Dear Mr. Recht:

On behalf of Mitsubishi Motors America, Inc., a U.S. subsidiary of Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, I request a legal interpretation concerning Part 541 Federal Motor Vehicle Theft Prevention Standard, particularly our question regards Part 541.5(a)(2) whi ch requires that the transmission be marked with either the VIN or a VIN derivative.

The clutch housing, for vehicles with manual transmissions (or converter housings for vehicles with automatic transmissions), is attached to the transmission (See Attachment) via bolts that may be removed allowing the clutch housing (or converter housing ) to separate from the transmission. Nevertheless, we believe the clutch housing may be considered a part of the transmission. Therefore, we believe marking the clutch housing (or converter housing) complies with Part 541.5(a)(2).

Please provide us with your interpretation regarding this issue. If you have any questions, please contact me at (202) 223-5730.

Drawing omitted.