ID: nht76-5.69

DATE: 12/03/76

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; E.T. Driver; NHTSA

TO: Shughart; Thomson and Kilroy

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: Your October 20, 1976, letter to the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, has been referred to this office for reply.

You request data concerning the 10.00-02 "Inland Deep Drive 300," that was manufactured by the Mansfield Tire and Rubber Company, Mansfield, Ohio. Tire Identification Number WLZJAVN 503.

We have enclosed all the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards for:

* New Pneumatic Tires, Passenger Cars, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 109

* New Pneumatic Tires for Vehicles Other Than Passenger Cars, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 119

* Part 574 - Tire Identification and Recordkeeping

* Tire Code Numbers Assigned New Tire Manufacturers.

* Tire Size Codes

The tire identification number stated in your letter can be explained by the use of the above data.

"WL" - is the plant code for the Mansfield, Ohio plant.

"ZJ" - is the tire size code for the 10.00-20 tire size designation.

"AVN" - is an internal code for Mansfield.

"503" - means the tire was cured the 50th week of 1973.

You also request design and construction information. We do not have this type of information because it is proprietary. Also enclosed are copies of tire "Care and Service of Bias and Radial Ply Truck Tires."

We hope the above has been of some help to you.

SHUGHART, THOMSON & KUROY

October 20, 1976

U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration Re: Commercial Truck Tires

Our office is investigating an accident involving the blowout of a commercial truck tire known as the "Inland Deep Drive 300" size 10.00 x 20 tube type 13 ply rating with serial No. WL2JAVN503 manufactured by the Mansfield Tire and Rubber Company, Mansfield, Ohio. Please advise us if this particular tire or series of tires has been assigned a Department of Transportation number and if so, please advise us of the number.

We would also appreciate copies of any documents, standards, regulations, and procedures which you have on this tire including its design, construction, and manufacture. We would also appreciate copies of any documents, standards, and regulations or procedures pertaining to the design, construction, and manufacture of commercial truck tires in general.

Naturally, we are willing to pay a reasonable charge for providing the copies requested. If there is such a charge, please forward your statement for services along with the requested information and we will arrange for the appropriate payment of same.

REX R. REDHAIR

ID: nht76-5.7

DATE: 12/09/76

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Wayne Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of November 15, 1976, in which you ask whether emergency exits installed in school buses beyond those required in S5.2.3 of Standard No. 217, Bus Window Retention and Release, must meet the requirements of the standard.

The NHTSA has determined previously that only those exits required in S5.2.3 must meet the requirements specified for school bus emergency exits in Standard No. 217. All other emergency exits installed in school buses must comply with the requirements for emergency exits in buses other than school buses. These requirements are detailed in Standard No. 217.

In your letter, you ask specifically whether S5.2.3.1(b), S5.3.1, S5.3.2, S5.3.3, S5.4.1, S5.4.2.1(b), or S5.5.3 apply to a side emergency door in a school bus that already complies with S5.2.3.1(a) of the standard. The NHTSA concludes that this door would be required to comply with S5.3.1, S5.3.2, and S5.4.1 of the standard.

SINCERELY,

Wayne Corporation

November 15, 1976

Frank R. Berndt Office of Chief Counsel NHTSA

This inquiry is in reference to FMVSS 217, Bus Window Retention and Release, as applied to school buses with a GVWR of more than 10,000 pounds. In the case of a school bus equipped with a side emergency door, in addition to a rear emergency door furnished in compliance with the requirements of Sections S5.2.3.1(a), S5.3.3, S5.4.2.1(a) and S5.5.3, which if any of the following requirements must the side door comply with:

S5.2.3.1(b), S5.3.1, S5.3.2, S5.3.3, S5.4.1, S5.4.2.1(b) or S5.5.3?

Your prompt attention to this matter and an early reply will be greatly appreciated.

Robert B. Kurre Director of Engineering

ID: nht76-5.70

DATE: 07/01/76 EST

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Robert L. Carter; NHTSA

TO: Roy A. Taylor; House of Representatives

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of May 21, 1976, forwarding a plea from Mr. Ralph O. Howard, Executive Vice President of the North Carolina Tire Dealers and Retreaders Association, for help in changing Public Law 91-265, HR 10105, that would permit voluntary registration of tires. The law which became effective May 22, 1971, amended the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 to require tire manufacturers, including retreaders, to maintain records of the names and addresses of first purchasers. The law also authorized the Secretary of Transportation to prescribe procedures to be followed by distributors and dealers to assist manufacturers in securing the required information. In order to implement the law, our Regulation Part 574 (copy enclosed) specifies that tire dealers shall record the purchaser's name and address at time of sale.

The purpose of tire registration is to enable manufacturers to notify consumers in the event of defective or nonconforming tires. The Congress took steps in amending the Safety Act only after attempts by manufacturers and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to inform owners of defective tires proved ineffective. Congressional action would again be necessary to change the law as Mr. Howard's letter requests.

To provide additional orientation pertinent to this subject, we are enclosing a copy of Secretary Coleman's recent letter to the Honorable C. E. Wiggins.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S. WASHINGTON, D.C.

May 21, 1976

Mr. Ernest R. Warner, Jr. Acting Director, Office of Congressional Relations Department of Transportation 400 7th St., S. W. Washing, D. C. 20590

The attached communication is submitted for your consideration, and to ask that the request made therein be complied with, if possible.

If you will advise me of your action in this matter and have the letter returned to me with your reply, I will appreciate it. Very truly yours, Roy A. Taylor M.C.

11th North Carolina District.

Congress of the United States House of Representatives

May 21, 1976

Ralph O. Howard Excutive Vice President North Carolina Tire Dealers and Retreaders Association, Inc.

Dear Ralph:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter of May 14, 1976, containing the resolution passed by your Association in opposition to the Mandatory Tire Registration requirements. I am pleased to have the benefit of your views on this subject and in an effort to be of assistance I am today contacting the appropriate authorities of the Department of Transportation for any comments or information which could be supplied on this situation. As soon as any reply is received I will be back in contact with you.

Many thanks for sending us a copy of the 1975 Membership Directory of the Carolina Society of Association Executives. Also, both Evelyn and I and Mrs. Bobrowski and her husband enjoyed being with you for the congressional dinner.

With many good wishes.

Roy A. Taylor Member of Congress

Ralph O. Howard Executive Vice President

May 14, 1976

Dear Roy:

Because tire dealers are perplexed by a law (HR 10105, signed by the President May 25, 1970) which they do not feel is necessary the following resolution to relieve the burden of non-compliance is respectfully submitted to you for your assistance. Your efforts to change this law so that the customers can register tires if they so choose rather than requiring the tire dealer to make the registration will be greatly appreciated.

RESOLUTION OPPOSING MANDATORY TIRE REGISTRATION

"Whereas, the costs of recording, reporting, maintaining tire ales to the replacement tire market have compounded the economic problems of inflation, and been aggravating to tire customers and to tire dealers; and,

"Whereas, major relief has been proposed by the National Tire Dealers and Retreaders Association just by changing the law to make tire registration voluntary,

"Now, therefore, we commend our North Carolina Congressional delegation to inform the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration that the purpose of the law on Tire Registration and Record Keeping would be just as well served if mandatory provisions were changed to voluntary.

"This resolution approved by the membership of the North Carolina Tire Dealers and Retreaders Association at its annual convention on March 6, 1976."

Ralph O. Howard

ID: nht76-5.71

DATE: 01/12/76

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Robert J. Geurink

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of December 29, 1975, to the Department concerning "general policies on recalls and any rules you may have on them."

From September 9, 1966, when the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act was enacted, until December 27, 1974, a manufacturer was required to notify purchasers of the existence of a safety-related defect or a non-compliance with a Federal motor vehicle safety standard, but there was no legal requirement to recall and repair the product. To implement the notification requirement, this agency adopted a regulation, 49 CFR Part 577, Defect Notification. It also adopted 49 CFR Part 573, Defect Reports, which requires a manufacturer to report to us periodically on notification campaigns.

Effective December 27, 1974, the Act was amended (Section 151 and following sections) to require mandatory notification, and remedy. We have proposed a new Part 577 to implement the new requirements. The public comments on the proposal are still being evaluated and the final rule has not been issued. I enclose copies of the Act, Part 573, Part 577, and proposed Part 577 for your information, and will be happy to answer any questions you have concerning them.

To address your specific concerns: the fact that a product fails one of our tests does not per se establish a failure to comply with a Federal motor vehicle safety standard. In the usual case the manufacturer is afforded an informal opportunity to present its views regarding the test failure. Errors in testing or test machines may be brought to our attention which have the effect of negating the test results. Or the manufacturer may be convinced of its noncompliance and voluntarily announce a notification/recall campaign. Or the manufacturer may be directed by this agency to furnish notification after a public hearing on the matter. The agency in the latter circumstance will issue its own press release announcing the recall. Notification must be made "within a reasonable time" after a determination of noncompliance or safety-related defect (Sec. 153(b)). If that determination is made by the government, it may prescribe a time period that it regards as reasonable.

There is no "recent" Goodyear Tire recall of 12,500 tires as you state, though the company did recall 12,602 tires in January 1973. Without knowing the size and type of the tires you are concerned about I cannot comment further.

I am returning your stamps.

YOURS TRULY,

Dec. 29, 1975

DEAR SIR -- Have you made a formal statement or drawn up any regulations regarding recalls?

For instance, must a company announce a recall of a product that fails your tests? Or do you announce it? When are letters sent to buyers?

Goodyear Tire recalled 12,500 tires recently and I wondered about the circumstances. Mainly, though, I'm interested in your general policies on recalls and any rules you may have on them.

I am enclosing return postage for a prompt reply.

Robert J. Geurink

ID: nht76-5.72

DATE: 05/26/76

FROM: RONALD W. COOKE

TO: JAMES B. GREGORY -- U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 11/01/75 EST, FROM ROBERT L. CARTER -- NHTSA TO RONALD W. COOKE, N41-42, OPINION FILE, MVSS 301

TEXT: Dear Mr. Gregory:

I am writing to you for some clarification on Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301-75 (part 571; s 301-75). This standard spells out original equipment manufacture's responsibilities for designing automobiles against fuel spillage after crash tests. This implicitely means that manufactures of gas caps for OEM customers are required to provide gas caps which conform to the roll-over requirements.

My question is, do the Federal Motor Vehicle Standards in any way impose requirements on parts manufacturers who make gas caps for after-market retail outlets to market caps which meet the OEM roll-over specifications?

For any company to volentarily follow the practice of meeting the roll-over specifications when others do not, self-imposes a severe marketing penalty because of the additional large number of caps which are needed for complete market coverage. This poses warehouse customer inventory stocking problems. Since some companies are using one cap for the OEM which meets roll-over requirements, and a different cap for the after-market at a decided competative advantage, it is imperative to us that this question of applicability of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard be answered

I await your early reply.

Sincerely yours,

ID: nht76-5.73

DATE: 02/10/76

FROM: JAMES B. GREGORY -- NHTSA ADMINISTRATOR

TO: S. L. TERRY -- VICE PRESIDENT PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS CHRYSLER CORPORATION

TITLE: N40-30

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 1/22/76 FROM S. L. TERRY -- CHRYSLER CONSUMER AFFAIRS TO JAMES B. GREGORY -- NHTSA ADMINISTRATOR

TEXT: Dear Mr. Terry:

This is in response to your letter of January 22, 1976, in which you discussed Chrysler's position with respect to the recently proposed amendment of Standard No. 105-75 that would make a low brake fluid level indicator optional instead of mandatory. You asked that we provide assurance that if the proposal is not adopted, the existing requirement for the indicator will be delayed, in recognition of the fact that manufacturers have passed the latest point at which money must be committed for engineering and tooling the indicator for September production.

I will hereby provide that assurance. We recognize that if manufacturers do not delay their financial commitment past the usual period for preparation to meet a requirement, when the agency proposes to delete the requirement, the money is likely to be wasted even if the agency proceeds as proposed. We expect manufacturers to hold off their commitment of tooling and other expenses for a requirement that we have proposed to delete, and if we should decide not to go ahead with the proposal, we will take the required leadtime into account in resetting the effective date.

Sincerely,

ID: nht76-5.74

DATE: 01/22/76

FROM: S. L. TERRY -- CHRYSLER CORPORATION VICE PRESIDENT-PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS

TO: JAMES B. GREGORY -- ADMINISTRATOR NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

COPYEE: RICHARD B. DYSON -- NHTSA DOCKET SECTION

TITLE: DOCKET 70-27; NOTICE 17 NOTICE OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT MVSS 105-75, HYDRAULIC BRAKE SYSTEMS

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO A LETTER DATED 2/10/76 FROM JAMES B. GREGORY -- NHTSA TO S. L. TERRY PRESIDENT PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS CHRYSLER CORPORATION; N40-30; 70-27-N17-004-A

TEXT: Dear Dr. Gregory:

Chrysler Corporation is very pleased by the direction indicated in the recent notice to amend MVSS 105-75, Hydraulic Brake Systems, that would permit either a gross loss of pressure indicator (GLPI) or a low brake fluid level indicator (BFLI) in satisfaction of the hydraulic failure indicator requirements of 85 3.1. We strongly support that proposed amendment. In our opinion adoption of the amendment will serve the best interest of the motoring public and will not adversely affect motor vehicle safety.

As Mr. Robert Sornson of my office discussed with Mr. Richard Dyson, your Assistant Chief Counsel, we recognize that it may have been necessary for you to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act since a substantive change in the standard is being proposed. However, the procedural delay in finalizing the change in the standard because of the rulemaking process will create a substantial hardship for Chrysler Corporation and probably for the rest of the industry. Since the notice did not cancel or delay the current requirements in the standard, we now find it necessary to continue to engineer and tool a fluid level indicator device in order to be certain that we will be able to build and sell cars conforming to the present standard after 9-1-76 in the event this proposal is not adopted. To insure against this possibility Chrysler Corporation will be spending approximately $ 150,000 per month for engineering and tooling of a fluid level indicator with a total program cost in excess of $ 600,000. In the event this proposed rulemaking is adopted most of the cost and manpower that will be expended on this program could be saved. However, we are naturally reluctant to stop work on this program on the basis of the new rulemaking where the consequences of another reversal could prevent us from building(Illegible Word)

We appreciate that NHTSA understands our problem and is willing to consider an approach that will allow manufacturers to keep their options open during the rulemaking process without incurring unnecessary and wasteful spending of manpower and money. As discussed with Mr. Dyson an acceptable method to do this would be for NHTSA to provide written assurance that the requirements of the current standard for a fluid level indicator, effective 9-1-76, will be delayed in the event that the proposed amendment is not adopted. In such an event we estimate that we would require 8 months lead time after the decision is published in order for us to reinstitute our tooling and engineering program and to get the necessary volume production required to equip the vehicles we manufacture with low brake fluid indicators.

In view of the time constraints involved we would appreciate written confirmation as soon as possible indicating that NHTSA will follow the procedure outlined above in the event MVSS 105-75 is not amended as proposed.

Sincerely,

ID: nht76-5.75

DATE: JULY 14, 1976

FROM: WILLIAM K. ROSENBERRY -- ATTORNEY AT LAW

TO: GEORGE SHIFFLETT -- OFFICE OF STANDARDS, NHTSA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED AUGUST 19, 1978 FROM FRANK BERNDT, NHTSA, TO WILLIAM K. ROSENBERRY

TEXT: It is my understanding that you are responsible for enforcement of the standards promulgated by the Department of Transportation pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. The purpose in my writing is to request information concerning the standards promulgated by the Secretary of Transportation.

I have a client which is anticipating the formation of a business in which new pick-up trucks would be purchased from manufacturers and re-outfitted in the cab area by providing a different seat, new carpeting, and headliners, and then sold through dealers to the general public. It is my understanding that the provisions of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act apply to a company in the position of my client, and in particular, Standard #302 relating to flammability of materials and Standard #207 relating to seating requirements.

I would appreciate knowing if a company in the position of my client which is remodeling new automobiles may rely on the warranty of a fabric manufacturer that the fabric sold meets the requirements of Section #302. A fabric supplier has recently stated that they are required under Federal Regulations to test each lot of fabric for flammability purposes before certification can be given. Please advise whether in fact such certification per lot is necessary by a fabric supplier. I would also appreciate being placed on any mailing list which your Department may keep in order that I may be informed of any future standards or changes which relate to this Act and the standards promulgated by the Secretary of Transportation.

ID: nht76-5.76

DATE: 01/01/76 EST

FROM: Frank A. Berndt -- Acting Chief Counsel

TO: W.G. Milby -- Staff Engineer, Blue Bird Body Company

COPYEE: Truck Body and Equipment Association

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 3-18-77 from Frank Berndt to W.G. Milby; Also attached to letter dated 8-16-90 from Thomas D. Turner to Paul J. Rice (OCC 5110); Also attached to letter dated 1-14-91 from Paul J. Rice to Thomas D. Turner (A37; Std. 221)

TEXT:

This responds to Blue Bird Body Company's July 20, 1976, question whether the NHTSA's redefinition of "school bus" (illegible), December 31, illegible) includes buses designed for intercity transportation utilized in charter operation to transport school children to and from school or related events, and what constitutes "interstate commerce" as that term term is used in the redefinition. A second July 20, 1976, letter from Blue Bird Body requests reconsideration of two NHTSA interpretations of Standard No. 221, School Bus Body Joint Strength, that were issued in an April 26, 1976, letter.

The definition of school bus (affective April 1, 1977) states:

"School bus" means a bus that is sold, or introduced in interstate commerce, for purposes that include carrying students to and from school or related events, but does not include a bus designed and sold for operation as common carrier in urban transportation.

The definition is not intended to include intercity type buses on regular common-carrier routes, although they may be used in some circumstances to transport school students to and from school or related events. This bus type has never been considered a school bus under existing motor vehicle safe standards on Pupil Transportation Standard No. 17 (43 CFR 1204). In light of the major standardizing activity undertaken by Congress for school buses under the Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1970 (the Act) (15 U.S.C. S 1392(i), it is unlikely that such a broad change of regulatory direction would be contemplated by Congress without explicit discussion in the legislative history. The boundaries of coverage of the redefinition are explicitly left by the statute to agency determination, and the agency did not include the intercity buses you describe in the redefinition.

The meaning "interstate commerce" in the redefinition is the same as for that term in S (illegible)(1)(A) of the Act, which states that no person shall "manufacture for sale, sell, offer for sale, or introduce or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce, or import non-complying vehicles. While the legislative history of the Act does not directly address the meaning of the term, the House of Representatives Committee report stated: . . . the purpose of this section is to prohibit the manufacture, sale, or importation into this country of vehicles . . . that fail to meet the Federal safety standards . . . (H.R. Rep. No. 1776,

(illegible) Cong., 2d Secs 22 (1966))

The agency adopts the existing construction of the term set forth in Ratzenback v McClurg, 379 U.S. (illegible) (1974). To answer your specific question, however, it should be clarified that only the classification of the bus as a school bus is determined by the (illegible) of "interstate commerce" in those infrequent cases were a sale does not occur. Blue Bird Body's responsibilities to conform to the standards arise directly from its manufacturing activities under (illegible)(1)(A). For example, a bus built in Georgia must conform to the school bus standards if it is sold to a Georgia school for use in transportation of school students, even it never leaves the state.

Your second July (illegible) letter requests reconsideration of the NHTSA's April 26, 1976, decision that the area of contact between headlining panels and the "header" over the windows qualifies as a body joint subject to the requirements of the standard. You assert that the area of contact is not such a joint because it is covered by a molding and therefore does not "enclose occupant space" and cannot be considered a "surface component".

"Body panel joint" is defined in the standard to mean, with several exceptions, the area of contact or close proximity between the edges of a body panel and another body component. Whether or not the joint itself it covered is not relevant to its status. The separate definition of "body panel" does refer to the surface of the exterior or interior of the bus and to use of the panel in enclosing the bus occupant space. Thus, it is the body panel and not the joint which must form part of the exterior or interior surface of the bus. In the case you describe, the headlining panel does enclose the bus occupant space and constitutes a part of the interior surface of the bus. Thus it does form a "body panel joint" at the point of contact with the header (a separate body component).

You also suggest that the requirements do not apply to a joint where the edges of the body panel join a body component at a point other than at the edge of the body component. Your interpretation is incorrect. In the case you describe, the floor panel's edges form a right angle that is attached to a central portion of the tag panel at some distance from its edges. The definition of "body panel joint" refers to contact between the edges of the body panel and another body component, without regard to the proximity of the edges of the body component.

You also request confirmation that a statement on rubrails in our April (illegible) letter is fulfilled by ensuring that, in testing a complex joint to which rubrails are fastened, the rubrails are modified so that they are not held by the gripping fixture of the tensile strength test machine. Your interpretation is correct.

In a related matter, the NHTSA would like to advise you of failure in our April 26, 1976, letter to respond fully to Blue Bird Body Company's February 13, 1976, letter. You asked if the cove molding that is attached at the border of the bus body floor against the sidewall of the bus body would qualify as a surface component whose edges form a joint

subject to the standard's requirements. From your description of the cove molding and its use at the edge of the floor, the agency considers that it does not have a function in enclosing the occupant space and is therefore not considered a body component for purposes of the requirements. A copy of your illustration of these component is attached for the benefit of interested persons.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge receipt of your July 28, 1976, letter to the Administrator, asking that the new definition of "school bus" become effective on April 1, 1977, instead of October 27, 1976. Your request has been granted by a recent notice of rulemaking.

ID: nht76-5.77

DATE: December 9, 1976

FROM: Frank A. Berndt -- Acting Chief Counsel, U.S. Department of Transportation, NHTSA

TO: Leon W. Steenbock -- Engineering, FWD Corporation

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 5-6-93 from John Womack to Bob Brinton (A41; Std. 121); Also attached to letter dated 3-16-93 from Bob Brinton to NHTSA (OCC 8436)

TEXT: This responds to FWD Corporation's October 15, 1976, request to know whether a truck that complies with the requirements of Standard No. 121, AIR BRAKE SYSTEMS, would continue to comply after the addition or another parking brake system (hand-operated mechanical, operating on the driveline) or another service brake control (piped to either or both sides of a split system).

Standard No. 121's requirements for braking systems does not preclude the addition of an additional braking system. The agency would not consider the requirements of S5.6.4 to prohibit an additional parking brake control.

Standard No. 121 does not prohibit installation of more than one service brake control. The installation of a hand-operated control lever that your letter appears to describe would not of itself violate the standard's requirements. If the hand control were piped into both systems, however, a failure introduced into the control would probably result in violation of S5.7.1, which requires certain secondary braking performance following a single failure introduced into the service brake system.