ID: nht89-2.42

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 07/24/89

FROM: STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL

TO: ROBERT KNAUFF -- APPLIED RESEARCH & DESIGN, INC.

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 06/08/89 FROM ROBERT J. KNAUFF -- APPLIED RESEARCH AND DESIGN INC TO; KATHLEEN DEMETER -- DOT; LETTER DATED 08/16/88 FROM RICHARD H. SCHULTZ -- AMERICAN PULSE LIGHTS INC TO ROBERT KNAUFF; LETTER DATED 12/07/87 FROM RICHARD H. SCHUL TZ -- AMERICAN PULSE LIGHTS TO ROBERT J. KNAUFF

TEXT: Dear Mr. Knauff:

On April 21, 1989, you wrote the agency with respect to the acceptability of your collision avoidance lighting system, as both original and aftermarket lighting equipment, under Federal laws and regulations.

Because the patent application you enclosed was stamped "Confidential", Ms Kathy DeMeter, the Assistant Chief Counsel for General Law, wrote you on May 26 for a clarification of your intent regarding confidential treatment of the material you submitted. We have received your letter of June 8 to Ms DeMeter containing your "permission to use" the confidential information in responding to you. As Ms DeMeter explained, the issue is not whether we may "use" the information, but whether it may be made avail able to the public, for the agency cannot provide non-public interpretations. Your statement is not a clear waiver of a claim of confidentiality; however, Ms DeMeter states that you told her that you were no longer requesting confidential treatment as t he patent application has been filed, and we regard that as a sufficient oral waiver of your request.

Your invention is intended as an advance warning of braking, and consists of "a single pulse of light [lasting] approximately 40 millionths of a second." You wish to know of the acceptability of this device as both original and aftermarket lighting equip ment in six different configurations.

First, let me observe that the agency has not performed research with respect to a device such as yours. However, it is concerned with the effects of glare, whether disabling or discomforting in nature. It would be concerned if the after-image left by the pulse of light from your device created a momentary distraction in drivers from their immediate driving task, in this instance, causing them to hesitate rather than to apply the brake pedal. We note the concern expressed by the State of Minnesota in its 1987 and 1988 letters to you. Under the assumption that a pulse of 40 millionths of a second does not produce this effect, I

shall proceed to a discussion of your device with respect to the situations you envision.

The first configuration is as "a high-mount stop light system." A center high-mounted stop lamp has been required for all passenger cars manufactured on and after September 1, 1985, by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 Lamps, Reflective Devic es, and Associated Equipment. Paragraph S5.4 of Standard No. 108 states that the center stop lamp "shall not be combined with any other lamp or reflective device." This is the only flat prohibition in Standard No. 108 against physical combinations of li ghting equipment, and as such, we read it as forbidding use of the collision avoidance pulse. Thus, your device would not be acceptable as original equipment for passenger cars. As for its suitability as original equipment on other types of motor vehic les, it is permissible as long as it does not impair the effectiveness of other lamps that Standard No. 108 requires (paragraph S5.1.3).

With respect to the aftermarket, the pulse could not be incorporated in a center high-mounted stop lamp intended to replace original equipment high-mounted stop lamps, because replacement equipment must conform with original equipment requirements. Howe ver, the lamp would be permissible for installation on passenger cars manufactured before September 1, 1985, and on any other vehicle as well.

Whether or not subject to a standard, all aftermarket equipment is subject to the Federal requirement that its installation not lead to a rendering inoperative (wholly or partially) of equipment installed in accordance with any Federal safety standard. For example, if your light utilized the wiring of stop lamps and somehow diminished the light output, we would regard its installation as rendering the stop lamps partially inoperative within the meaning of the prohibition. This prohibition applies to m otor vehicle manufacturers, distributors, dealers and repair shops. It does not, however, apply to changes made by a person to his or her own vehicle.

Because the agency has no standards for your device, a State may set its own standard for it, or even prohibit it altogether even though it is not prohibited under Federal Law. This is implied by the State of Minnesota to you in its letter of August 16, 1988. We are unable to advise you on State law, and suggest that you consult the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, 4600 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22203.

Your second configuration is as "an enhancement for existing vehicular brake lights." We interpret this as meaning a combination of the pulse lamp with a stop lamp. This is not a forbidden equipment combination for original equipment, but it is subject to the same restriction (paragraph S5.1.3) as all supplementary lighting equipment: that it not impair the effectiveness of required lighting equipment. Similarly, its installation as an aftermarket device is permissible if it does not violate the rende ring inoperative prohibition mentioned above.

Your third configuration involves "use in motorcycle taillights". Taillamps are steady burning in nature, activated when the headlamps are on. Today, most motorcycle headlamps are activated when the ignition is

turned on, meaning that the taillamp operates at all times that the motorcycle is in motion. Your letter does not indicate the frequency of the pulse, but we must raise the possibility that a pulse from the taillamp might impair the effectiveness of sig nals from the stop lamp, or from the turn signal lamps.

If this possibility occurs, the device could not be incorporated into original equipment or replacement motorcycle taillamps for the reasons discussed in the preceding paragraph.

The fourth configuration you envision involves "use for 8-way lights in school bus systems." This would appear to mean incorporation in the red warning lamps of the red and amber warning lamp system. This system operates automatically when the bus door is opened (paragraph S5.1.4). This appears to enhance the warning purpose of the lamps, and not impair their effectiveness. Nor does it appear to "render inoperative", within the meaning of the aftermarket prohibition. We must advise you, however, tha t States are particularly sensitive to issues of school bus safety and lighting.

"Ambulance lighting" is your fifth concern. The agency has no specific requirements for warning light systems on ambulances. Such systems, of course, must not impair the effectiveness of original equipment lighting installed in accordance with Standard No. 108. Strobe-type warning lamps on the vehicle top, at front and rear, have been considered permissible.

Finally, you ask about "off-road type vehicles, i.e., snowmobiles, boats, etc." The agency has no jurisdiction over vehicles that are not manufactured primarily for use on the public roads, and thus we cannot answer this question.

Sincerely,

ID: nht89-2.43

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 07/24/89

FROM: STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL

TO: WAYNE KRAUSE -- ENGINEERING SUPERVISOR WALTCO TRUCK EQUIPMENT COMPANY

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 06/21/89 FROM WAYNE KRAUSE -- WALTCO TO STEVEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA; OCC 3668

TEXT: Dear Mr. Krause:

This is in reply to your letter of June 21, 1989, asking for an interpretation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108.

You have enclosed drawings of a rear lighting configuration (tail, stop, and turn signal lamps) intended for installation of your "RGL-Series tail gate lift with the platform stored below floor level of a truck or trailer for transit". You state that the platform in this position would block from view any normal taillamp arrangement, and that in order to comply with the 45 degree visibility requirement of Standard No. 108, you propose to use two sets of lamps. "Light Set 1 is installed above floor leve l (not to exceed 72" for ground) and inside of tail gate rails." The other, "Light Set 2 will be installed under the vehicle body. . . ." Light Set 1 would be visible "from the rear of the vehicle and would act as the primary tail lights." The other arra ngement, Light Set 2, "would act as auxiliary tail lights that would be visible from the side of the vehicle. . . ." You believe that such a configuration is acceptable under paragraph S4.3.1.1.1 (now S5.3.1.1.1) of Standard No. 108, and ask for our comm ents.

Paragraph S5.3.1.1.1 states in pertinent part:

[E]ach lamp shall . . . shall be located so that it meets the visibility requirements specified in any applicable SAE Standard or Recommended Practice. . . . . However, if motor vehicle equipment . . . prevents compliance with this paragraph by any r equired lamp . . . an auxiliary lamp . . . meeting the requirements of this paragraph shall be provided.

While you have developed a novel concept to address the lighting problem posed by the RGL Series, it is not one that is permitted by paragraph S5.3.1.1.1, or by the SAE Standards incorporated by reference in Standard No. 108. The paragraph clearly st ates that "each" lamp shall meet the visibility requirements, and if the vehicle configuration prohibits that, then an auxiliary lamp "meeting the requirements of this paragraph" shall be provided. The basic SAE visibility requirement applicable to lamp s in the array is that they be visible through a horizontal angle from 45 degrees to the left to 45 degrees to the right. This means that if the primary lamp does not meet the visibility requirements, the auxiliary lamp must, and the requirements cannot be met through partial compliance of each lamp. Neither appears to meet the total visibility requirements of Standard No. 108 applicable to each lamp, and thus such a configuration would not meet Federal lighting requirements.

Sincerely,

ID: nht89-2.44

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 07/26/89

FROM: STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA

TO: FREDERICK H. DAMBACH -- EXECULINE

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 07/10/89 FROM FREDERICK H. DAMBACH TO NHTSA

TEXT: Dear Mr. Dambach:

This is in response to your July 10, 1989 letter, and your July 12, 1989 telephone conversation with David Greenburg of my staff. Your letter requested an interpretation concerning transit bus (as distinguished from school bus) emergency exits. You ask ed whether emergency exits located on the roof of a transit bus could be considered side exits for purposes of complying with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 217, Bus Window Retention and Release. As is explained below, the answer is " no".

Your concern has arisen because of difficulties you have encountered in obtaining approval from the New Jersey Department of Transportation to operate two used 1985 Van Hool buses. You indicated to Mr. Greenburg that the original importer had certified that the buses were in compliance with the applicable FMVSS. Nonetheless, NJDOT claims that the buses lack adequate side emergency exit space and are therefore not in compliance with Standard 217. Your letter indicated that if the roof mounted exists w ere counted as side exits, your buses would be in compliance with Standard 217.

Manufacturers (including importers) of motor vehicles sold in the U.S. are required to certify that those vehicles comply with the applicable FMVSS's. NHTSA does not require states to adopt or enforce the FMVSS's; states are, however, free to do so. You have indicated that New Jersey has incorporated FMVSS 217 by reference as a matter of State law. Of course NHTSA may not interpret state law; the agency may only interpret federal requirements. The following discussion therefore represents only an int erpretation of Federal law, and specifically FMVSS 217.

As is set out in S5.2 of Standard No. 217, transit buses must provide unobstructed emergency exit openings that total, in square inches, 67 times the number of seating positions on the bus. At least 40% of the total area required must be on the left sid e of the bus, and at least another 40% must be on the right side. To provide further assurance that there are multiple exits, no single exit may be credited with more than 336 square inches.

A roof exit may not be counted toward the amount of unobstructed opening required to be on a side of the bus since such an exit is not located on the side. The term "side," as used in Standard 217, refers to that part of the bus which is approximately p erpendicular to the floor and the front and rear ends of the bus. It does not include the ends or the roof of the bus. The standard follows that definition in clearly drawing distinctions between the sides, the rear and the roof of a bus. See S5.2.1 a nd S5.3.3(a). Further, if a rear or roof exit could be considered as a side exit for purposes of Standard 217, it would be unnecessary for the standard to provide detailed requirements relating to rear and roof exits.

I hope you have found this discussion informative. Please contact David Greenburg of this office at (202) 366-2992 if you have any further questions.

Sincerely,

3. IMPLICATIONS TO CANADIANS

[PARAGRAPHS ILLEGIBLE]

3.1 MANUFACTURERD

[PARAGRAPHS ILLEGIBLE]

3.2 EXPORTERS OF CANADIAN SPECIFICATION VEHICLES

[PARAGRAPHS ILLEGIBLE]

3.3 TOURISTS AND COMMERCIAL TRUCKING

[PARAGRAPHS ILLEGIBLE]

ID: nht89-2.45

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 07/27/89

FROM: STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL

TO: ROBERT V. POTTER -- SPALDING & EVENFLO COMPANIES, INC.

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 07/31/86 FROM ERIKA Z. JONES -- NHTSA TO K.A. ZIOMEK -- TRW; LETTER DATED 03/17/89 FROM ROBERT V. POTTER TO NHTSA; OCC ILLEGIBLE

TEXT: Dear Mr. Potter:

This responds to your March 17, 1989, letter asking whether the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) requires child restraint manufacturers to make spare parts available for their products for a specified amount of time. I regret the d elay in responding.

NHTSA has addressed the availability issue you raise in a July 31, 1986, letter to Ms. Ziomek of Washington, Michigan, a copy of which is enclosed. As explained in that letter, NHTSA does not specifically require child restraint manufacturers to make re placement parts available for any child restraint. However, manufacturers must be prepared to meet their recall obligations under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. That law requires that, in the event of a safety-related defect or non-c ompliance with a safety standard, manufacturers provide a remedy without charge to consumers for eight years after purchase.

With regard to your statement about an existing Federal regulation requiring automobile manufacturers to make replacement parts available for 10 years, NHTSA does not have such a requirement. However, automobile manufacturers have the same recall respon sibilities described above for safety-related defects and non-compliances. Further, we understand manufacturers commonly follow a voluntary practice of making replacement parts available for vehicle parts likely to become worn or damaged for a 10-year p eriod, which to the best of our knowledge has usually proven adequate to meet general consumer demand.

I hope this information is helpful.

ENCLOSURE

Sincerely,

ID: nht89-2.46

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 07/27/89

FROM: STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA

TO: MARTIN M. GINSBURG -- PROLINE DESIGNS

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 05/08/88 FROM MARTIN M. GINSBURG TO ERIKA JONES -- NHTSA; OCC 2027; LETTER DATED 11/24/88 FROM MARTIN M. GINSBURG TO ERIKA Z. JONES -- NHTSA

TEXT: Dear Mr. Ginsburg:

This responds to your letters asking whether Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 302, Flammability of Interior Materials (49 CFR @ 571.302), applies to the "interior window coverings" that you manufacture for "pick up truck shells." In your letters, you briefly explain that the "shell," which is sold as an aftermarket product, "is placed directly over the bed of a truck." The answer to your question is no, Standard No. 302 does not apply to your product. I regret the delay in responding t o your letter.

By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) does not grant approval of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, it is the responsibility of the m anufacturer to ensure that its vehicles or equipment comply with applicable requirements. The following represents our opinion based on our understanding of the facts provided in your letter.

There are two factors which lead us to conclude that Standard No. 302 does not apply to your window coverings. First, you manufacture an aftermarket item of equipment -- i.e., an accessory or addition to a motor vehicle sold to owners of used vehicles. Standard No. 302 regulates the flammability resistance of curtains and shades in new completed vehicles only.

Second, even if the shell and its window coverings were installed on a new vehicle prior to the vehicle's first sale to a consumer, Standard No. 302 applies only to components in the "occupant compartment air space" (S4), which the agency has indicated i s the area in which persons are likely to use to ride. Assuming that we are correct in believing that people do not typically ride in the enclosed bed of the truck, we conclude that the area enclosed by the shell would not be an occupant compartment. Th is accords with the agency's February 15, 1983 letter to Mr. Nakaya in which NHTSA stated that, with regard to vans, the space to

the rear of the rearmost seat was not part of the occupant compartment. Accordingly, since the window coverings in question are not located in the occupant compartment, we conclude that they are not subject to Standard No. 302.

Nevertheless, there are two matters that you ought to consider when manufacturing your window coverings. First is the possibility of liability under State and common law if the coverings were to catch fire in a situation where a window covering meeting Standard No. 302's flammability resistance requirements would not have caught fire, or if the coverings burn much more rapidly than coverings meeting those requirements.

Second is the possibility of a finding of a safety-related defect in your products. While Standard No. 302 does not directly apply to your product, you should be aware that the window coverings you manufacture are considered to be items of motor vehicle equipment. As the manufacturer of motor vehicle equipment, you are thereby subject to the provisions set forth in sections 151-159 of the Vehicle Safety Act concerning the recall and remedy of equipment with defects relating to motor vehicle safety. I f you or this agency determined that your product had a defect relating to motor vehicle safety, you would have to notify all known purchasers of the defect and either repair your product so that the defect is removed, or replace the window coverings wit h an identical or reasonably equivalent product that does not contain a defect.

Your letter did not indicate whether you also manufacture the truck shell to which you refer. If you are the shell manufacturer, and if your product contains glazing material, Standard No. 205 (49 CFR @ 571.205, Glazing Materials) directly applies to yo ur product. Standard No. 205 is an equipment standard which sets performance requirements for glazing materials used in new and used motor vehicles and glazing materials sold as items of motor vehicle equipment, including glazing used in truck shells. The standard establishes both performance requirements, including those regulating the light transmittance and abrasion resistance of glazing, and labeling requirements applicable to the glazing used in your product.

We note also that, since your description of the "shell" was very brief, we were not certain whether the term "shell" as you use it includes what our regulations refer to as a "slide-in camper." Under Standard No. 126, Truck-Camper Loading (49 CFR @ 571. 126), a "slide-in camper" is a structure having a roof, floor, and sides, designed for the purpose of providing shelter for persons and to be mounted on and removed from the cargo area of a truck by the user. (See, also, 49 CFR @ 575.103 for NHTSA's con sumer information requirements for trucks that are capable of accommodating slide-in campers.) In light of the possibility that the structures to which you refer are slide-in campers, and that you might be the manufacturer of the campers, we would like t o mention our regulations that apply to slide-in campers.

Briefly, each slide-in camper must meet Standard No. 205 for any glazing materials used in the camper. In addition, Standard No. 126 requires each slide-in camper to be permanently labeled with information including its maximum loaded weight. This stan dard also requires each camper to be furnished with an owner's manual that includes information on total camper weight, proper matching of a truck and slide-in camper, appropriate methods of camper loading, and how to determine the camper's center of gra vity (cg) and where the cg should be placed in the truck cargo area. All campers must also be certified in accordance with section 114 of the Vehicle Safety Act as conforming to all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards. Each camper manufac turer must submit certain information concerning its company pursuant to Part 566 of our regulations, Manufacturer Identification. However, Standard No. 302 does not apply to slide-in campers, even if the slide-in camper is installed on a new pickup tru ck.

Finally, we must decline your request that we review "California Health and Safety Code Standard No. 19" to inform you whether window coverings that meet the California standard can meet Standard No. 302. NHTSA determines whether a vehicle or item of mo tor vehicle equipment complies with an applicable safety standard by purchasing vehicles and equipment and testing them under strict conditions according to the procedures specified in the standards. Thus, we determine whether a product subject to our s tandards complies with those standards by assessing the actual performance of the product in our tests. Since your window coverings are not subject to Standard No. 302, they will not be part of our compliance testing. Further, even if the coverings were subject to Standard No. 302, we have already noted that it is the responsibility of the manufacturer of the motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment -- and not NHTSA -- to ensure that its vehicles or equipment comply with applicable FMVSS's.

I have enclosed copies of all of the safety standards and regulations mentioned above, and an information sheet explaining how you can obtain copies of NHTSA regulations for your future reference. I hope this information is helpful.

Sincerely,

Enclosures

ID: nht89-2.47

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: JULY 27, 1989

FROM: LARRY S. SNOWHITE -- MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS, GLOVSKY AND POPEO

TO: STEPHEN P. WOOD, ESQ. -- ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED JANUARY 25, 1990 TO LARRY S. SNOWHITE, MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS, GLOVSKY AND POPEO, FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD, NHTSA; REDBOOK A35; VSA 1397 (A)(2)(A); STD. 108

TEXT: On behalf of our clients, ATAT Technology Ltd. ("ATAT") and CTS Corporation, we respectfully request that you determine that the sale into the aftermarket as well as aftermarket installation of the Advanced Brake Light Device ("ABLD") manufactured by ATAT (or of any other device performing as does the ABLD) would not violate the statutes administered by, or regulations of, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

Specifically, we are requesting this determination for a device, the ABLD or a similar device demonstrating comparable performance, that consists of a sensor attached to the accelerator pedal that senses the rate at which the foot releases the acceler ator pedal. This signal is transmitted to a processor unit, which determines whether the brake lights should be turned on, and the duration of the illumination until the brake is applied. The ABLD is set so that the brake light will go off unless the b rake is applied within one second of the ABLD's activation, which based on experimentation and observation provides sufficient time for the brake pedal activation of the stop lights while avoiding misleading signals (if NHTSA considers that a different i nterval is consistent with applicable law and regulations, ATAT is prepared to modify the interval to meet an alternative NHTSA performance standard.)

It is our belief that the ABLD, and any similar device, holds out the promise of avoiding significant numbers of rear-end accidents and of reducing the seriousness of rear-end accidents that do occur. As the ABLD does not compromise,

render inoperative, in whole or in part, or impair the effectiveness of the mandated brake light system, we believe that on neither legal nor public policy grounds should NHTSA object to aftermarket sales of the ABLD.

This question was previously considered in a Memorandum dated March 7, 1988 addressed by Erika Jones to the Associate Administrator for Research and Development. In our view, that Memorandum was based on inadequate information concerning the mandated brake and brake light systems, the ABLD's performance and ABLD's potential contribution to safety -- inadequacies for which ATAT was responsible and which it now seeks to correct. In the intervening months, additional studies have been conducted and AT AT has marshaled relevant research materials. This new information is presented in the enclosed submissions.

The March Memorandum expressed concern that installation of the ABLD could create a noncompliance with Standard 108 and thereby presumptively run afoul of the anti-tampering provisions of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 1397. In this regard, w e understand that the threshold question is, does the ABLD render inoperative, in whole or in part, a device or element of design installed in compliance with Standard 108. A related determination is whether, under S4.1.3, it "impairs the effectiveness of lighting equipment required" by Standard 108.

This is a factual determination. And we believe that as a matter of fact the ABLD does not render the brake light system inoperative or impair its effectiveness.

First, the ABLD does not prevent the brake light system (the stoplamp and the CHMSL) from being activated and operating when the brake is applied. The ABLD is consistent with the operation of the brake light system, and arguably enhances it. The ABL D clearly and unambiguously indicates "the intention of the operator of a vehicle to stop or diminish speed by braking." SAE Standard J586d,2.1. Stop Lamps. The brake light is illuminated if the driver releases the accelerator at a rate greater than a predetermined minimum -- a minimum which reflects a very high probability that the release will be followed by an "emergency" brake application. If the brake is applied within one second, the brake light remains illuminated. Certainly this is consisten t with the definition of a Stop Lamp and with the operation of the brake light system.

There will be circumstances in which the brake will not be engaged after the ABLD is activated. In this case, the brake light will remain illuminated only for one second. As the enclosed material documents, this is not a phenomenon unique to, or agg ravated by, the ABLD. Illuminations of the brake lights for one second or less occur frequently during

normal driving without the ABLD. As is described in the enclosed submissions, in everyday driving it is not uncommon for the brake lights to be illuminated briefly even though the service brakes are not activated. The performance of the ABLD adds margi nally to the total number of illuminations of the brake lights for less than one second. Thus, ABLD-caused short-duration illuminations do not convey an intent or signal that is inconsistent or contradictory of the signal sent by the standard brake ligh t system. And they do signal an at least momentary "intention of the operator to stop or diminish speed by braking"

Activation of the ABLD does illuminate the stoplamps by means other than the application of the service brakes. While S4.5.4 prohibits the CHMSL being activated by means other than the application of the service brake, there is no comparable prohibit ion on the stoplamps themselves being activated by means other than the application of the service brakes. The ABLD would activate the stoplamp and CHMSL simultaneously. And it is our understanding that the CHMSL provision is an inadvertent hold-over f rom a rule, S4.5.11(b), that allowed the CHMSL to be activated by the hazard warning system for passenger cars manufactured on or after August 1, 1984 until September 1, 1986. Accordingly, while the installation of the ABLD as OEM technically would be i nconsistent with a literal reading of S4.5.4, this should not be considered an "impairment" such as to bar aftermarket sales and installation of the ABLD.

As previously noted, both the trigger point for the activation of the ABLD and the interval during which the ABLD illuminates the brake lights are subject to adjustment. The trigger and interval chosen reflect ATAT's studied judgment as to what will succeed in order to send a signal in those cases in which a signal is appropriate and minimize the incidence of misleading signals. Part of the basis for this judgment is set out in the attached submissions.

ATAT would appreciate an opportunity to meet with appropriate NHTSA staff in order to discuss this request so as to assure that you are in a position to respond to the request based on the fullest available information. As you will immediately see, t he enclosed submissions are the result of considerable work and ATAT would also welcome the opportunity to respond to questions about them.

As you know, ATAT is an Israeli company. This creates special logistical difficulties in communicating with NHTSA. A representative of ATAT will be in the United States on

August 1-4. We believe that it would be in the mutual interest of ATAT and NHTSA to meet during these dates.

Thank you for your consideration.

Enclosure

ID: nht89-2.48

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: July 28, 1989

FROM: Anne M. Kennedy -- Customer Relations Representative, Volkswagen United States, Inc.

TO: Emory L. Lariscy -- President, Lariscy Enterprises, Inc.

TITLE: Re #89026684

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 9-4-90 from P.J. Rice to E.J. Lariscy (A36; Std. 108; Std. 124; Std. 301); Also attached to letter dated 8-28-89 from E.L. Lariscy to G. Shifflett (OCC 3910) with Patent Application for Vehicle Safety Light Assembly (gr aphics omitted); Also attached to letter dated 7-14-89 from J.M. Mundy to E. Lariscy; Also attached to letter dated 7-14-89 from J.M. Staples to E.L. Lariscy; Also attached to letter dated 8-8-89 from L. Baer to E.L. Lariscy

TEXT:

Thank you for your recent letter, concerning Vehicle Safety Light Assembly. Please be assured we appreciate the information in your letter, since it is through communications of this nature that changes and/or improvements can be brought about where it appears they are needed most. Your commentary will be called to the attention of all concerned parties.

We have taken the liberty of forwarding the information contained in your letter to our Product Planning Department. You should be hearing directly from them.

Thank you once again for taking the time to write and for giving us the opportunity to review and comment.

ID: nht89-2.49

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 07/31/89

FROM: STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL

TO: RICHARD J. STROHM

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 11/09/87 FROM RICHARD J. STROHM TO EDWARD JETTNER -- NHTSA; FMVSS 207; OCC 1362; LETTER DATED 10/07/87 FROM RICHARD J. STROHM TO CHEVROLET DIVISION; 1987 CHEVROLET CAPRICE, 1G1BL51H0HX163146, 9000 MILES

TEXT: Dear Mr. Strohm:

This responds to your letter, referred to me by Mr. Edward Jettner of this agency, which asked the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to authorize the adjustment of the front seat in your Chevrolet Caprice by your automobile dealer. I regret the delay in responding.

Your letter and enclosure explained that you would like your dealer to move back the front bench seat in your newly-purchased vehicle to give you more leg room. You stated that the front seat in your new vehicle is mounted closer to the front of the vehi cle than the seat in your former car had been, and that you were more comfortable with the latter seat placement. You said that you contacted a customer service representative and that he told you Chevrolet is prohibited by law from moving the seat. Yo u asked how Chevrolet can obtain authorization to make the desired adjustments. Federal law does not directly prohibit your dealer from adjusting the seat; it does, however, indirectly set limits on the modifications.

By way of background, NHTSA is authorized by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. Manufacturers m ust certify that their new vehicles and equipment conform to all of our safety standards applying to their product. If a new vehicle is modified before its first sale to a consumer, the person making the modification would have to certify that the vehic le, as altered, continues to comply with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards. Moving back a seat on a new vehicle could affect compliance with Standard No. 207, Seating System, Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection, and No. 210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages. A dealer is not prohibited from making changes in the seat position as long as the modified seat and related safety components continue to perform in the manner required by the applicable standards.

Your situation involves the modification of a vehicle after its first sale to a consumer. While our safety standards apply only to new vehicles, there are some statutory restrictions on modifications of

this type. If a vehicle is modified after its first sale, then @ 108(a)(2)(A) of the Vehicle Safety Act would apply. That section provides, in pertinent part:

No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an ap plicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard . . .

Your dealer is not prohibited by @ 108(a)(2)(A) from making the seat adjustment if the adjustment can be made without rendering inoperative your vehile's compliance with any applicable Federal safety standard. It may be that the dealer you contacted has determined that it cannot move the seat rearwards without rendering inoperative a component or element of design now in compliance with the Federal safety standards.

The prohibition of @ 108(a)(2)(A) only applies to commercial businesses, not to individuals. Thus, under Federal law, vehicle owners may themselves make any modifications to their vehicles. They must, however, comply with any applicable State laws limi ting modifications.

If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact us.

Sincerely,

ID: nht89-2.5

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 06/16/89

FROM: TAKAYOSHI CHIKADA -- MANAGER OF AUTOMOTIVE LIGHTING ENGINEERING CONTROL DEPT. STANLEY ELECTRIC

TO: RICHARD L. VAN IDERSTINE -- SAFETY STANDARDS ENGINEER

TITLE: REVISION OF FMVSS NO.108 (DOCKET NO.85-15 NOTICE 8)

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER 08/23/89 FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA TO TAKAYOSHI CHIKADA; REDBOOK A34[3]; STANDARD 108

TEXT: Dear Mr. Van Iderstine,

We thank you very much for your kind cooperation during our stay in the U.S. for SAE Lighting Committee Meeting.

We would like have your advice concerning interpretation of new FMVSS No. 108 (Docket No.85-15 Notice 8).

1. The requirement of S7.7.5.1.a) was not applied to replaceable type headlamp by previous FMVSS No.108. Please give us your advice whether this requirement will also be applied to the replaceable bulb type headlamps which are already manufactured accor ding to the previous FMVSS No.108.

2. The requirement of S7.7.5.1.b) need to quote SAE J580 b "Sealed Beam Headlamp Assembly" by previous FMVSS No. 108 and the expression seem to be slightly different from new S7.7.5.1.b). Please advice us whether the requirement of "0.1 in. max." is cond itioned when headlamp is being pushed or after said force is removed.

3. How should we prove the confirmation to the requirement of S7.7.2.2? We think the combinations of Horizontal and Vertical angle within the aim range will be so huge and it is not practicable to test for all combinations.

4. It is acceptable to set up initial "0" point of S7.7.5.2.a).2) not mechanically but photometrically?

Please give us your advice by return facsimile.

We thank you very much in advance.

Yours faithfully,

ID: nht89-2.50

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 07/31/89

FROM: STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL

TO: BUTLER DERRICK -- UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: TEXT OF THE RULING BY THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT UPHOLDING THE STATE'S LAW REQUIRING SEAT BELT USE BY DRIVERS AND FRONT SEAT PASSENGERS IN AUTOMOBILES; DATED 10/01/86; LETTER DATED 07/11/89 FROM BUTLER DERRICK -- CONGRESS TO STEVE WOOD -- NHTSA

TEXT: Dear Mr. Derrick:

Thank you for your July 11, 1989 letter on behalf of one of your constituents in South Carolina, asking whether mandatory safety belt use laws are constitutional. I am pleased to have this chance to provide you with the following information.

Before addressing your specific question, I would like to emphasize that effectively enforced State laws requiring the proper use of safety belts offer our best opportunity to save lives today at virtually no cost to the consumer. We recognize that a saf ety belt use law requires an action that many people do not take voluntarily. However, all traffic laws involve some restraint on individual behavior. Most are accepted without a second thought: we drive on the right side of the road, instead of the le ft, we stop for red lights, and we obey speed limits. In many cases, the failure of motorists to obey these traffic laws will have an impact on motorists besides the violator.

The same is true when motorists fail to wear safety belts. Automobile accidents have many victims -- family, friends, employers, and taxpayers -- all of whom bear some measure of the human and economic cost. During the past decade, 470,000 persons have died on American highways. Each year, an estimated 300,000 are injured seriously enough to require hospital treatment. These traffic injuries and deaths have resulted in an annual cost to society of $ 57 billion, including such costs as workman's comp ensation, welfare payments and lost tax revenues. Because of the substantial societal burden imposed by vehicle-related deaths and injuries, we believe that State legislatures have more than adequate justification to impose the relatively small intrusio n on individual liberties that results from mandatory safety belt use laws.

The constitutionality of State mandatory use laws has been upheld by the courts of three different States, Illinois, Nebraska, and New York. I have enclosed a copy of the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion on this issue (Illinois v. Kohrig, decided Octobe r 1, 1986). The Supreme Court of the United States dismissed an appeal from the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Kohrig, on the grounds that it did not present a substantial Federal question. This dismissal suggests that the[Illegible Words]

You also stated that your constituent believes that the Supreme Court has declared laws requiring the use of motorcycle helmets to be unconstitutional.

This belief is inaccurate. Page 7 of the enclosed Kohrig decision lists 35 different State and Federal cases that have held that State laws requiring the use of motorcycle helmets are a valid exercise of a State's powers and not unconstitutional. That list shows that the Supreme Court has affirmed a lower court decision that the Massachusetts motorcycle helmet use law was a constitutional exercise of a State's power (Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277, aff'd, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972)). Additionally, the Supreme Court has refused to review decisions by State Courts in Lousiana, Massachusetts, Washington, and Wisconsin upholding the constitutionality of State motorcycle helmet use laws. There are no Supreme Court decisions suggesting that State motorcycle helmet use laws are unconstitutional exercises of the State's power.

I hope this information is helpful. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any further questions or need some additional information on this subject.

Sincerely,

ENCLOSURE