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NHTSA Interpretation File Search

Overview

NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies. 

Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage. 

An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.

  • Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
  • Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
  • The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
  • Some combination of the above, or other, factors.

Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.

Single word search

 Example: car
 Result: Any document containing that word.

Multiple word search

 Example: car seat requirements
 Result: Any document containing any of these words.

Connector word search

 Example: car AND seat AND requirements
 Result: Any document containing all of these words.

 Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.

Phrase in double quotes

 Example: "headlamp function"
 Result: Any document with that phrase.

Conjunctive search

Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.

Wildcard

Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).

Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).

Not

Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”

Complex searches

You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.

Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”). 

Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”

Search Tool

NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search



Displaying 13511 - 13520 of 16517
Interpretations Date

ID: nht94-5.37

Open

DATE: May 12, 1994

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Nicholas S. Copass -- Sales Manager, Titeflex Industrial Americas

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 9/29/93 from Nicholas S. Copass to David Elias (OCC-9161), letter dated 3/6/91 from Anthony J. Laliko to Vernon G. Bloom, and letter dated 3/18/91 from Arthur H. Neill, Jr. to Anthony J. Lalikos

TEXT:

This responds to your letter to Mr. David Elias, formerly of this office, concerning the manufacture of hydraulic brake hose assemblies by Titeflex and Russell Performance Products. I regret the delay in responding.

We recently responded to a letter from Mr. Jim Davis of Russell about the labeling of the hose assemblies. I have enclosed a copy of that letter for your information. In that letter, we explain that both Titeflex's and Russell's designations need not be marked on the assembly. Instead, since Russell is manufacturing the assemblies and will market the assemblies, Russell's designation must be marked. The designation will identify Russell as the manufacturer of the assembly in the event of a possible noncompliance or defect with the assembly.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call Ms. Deirdre Fujita of my staff at (202)-366-2992.

ID: nht94-5.38

Open

DATE: MAY 12, 1994

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Jim Davis -- President, Russell Performance Products

COPYEE: Nicholas S. Copass

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 10/22/93 from Jim Davis to David Elias (OCC-9249), letter dated 10/22/93 from Jim Davis to NHTSA Office of Vehicle Safety Standards, Crash Avoidance Division, and letter dated 11/16/93 from Jim Davis to David Elias

TEXT:

This responds to your letters to Mr. David Elias, formerly of this office, about the requirements of Standard 106, "Brake Hoses," for labeling hydraulic brake hose assemblies. I apologize for the delay in responding.

You explain in your letters that Russell holds a license to manufacture brake hose assemblies from Titeflex Corporation, a manufacturer of brake hoses, end fittings and assemblies. Titeflex supplies Russell with braided hose, and Russell manufactures the end fittings that Titeflex designed, using Titeflex's engineering drawings. Russell assembles the Titeflex hose with the end fittings, and "markets these hose assemblies (in) the marketplace."

You ask about marking the hose assemblies with a designation that identifies the manufacturer of the assembly, pursuant to S5.2.4 of Standard 106. You ask whether both Russell's and Titeflex's designations are required to be labeled, or only the designation of Russell.

The answer is only Russell's designation is required to be marked. Russell is manufacturing the assemblies and will market the assemblies. Russell's designation will identify Russell as the manufacturer of the assembly in the event of a possible noncompliance or defect with the assembly.

You also ask whether Titeflex's hose must be labeled with the information specified in *S5.2.1 and S5.2.2 of Standard 106. The first part of your question asks whether the labeling requirements apply to bulk brake hose "with a stainless braided outer covering." The answer is yes. The standard does not exclude braided brake hoses from the labeling requirements.

The second part of this question asks about the required labeling for hoses that are part of brake hose assemblies. You ask for confirmation that Standard 106 does not require the hose to be labeled once the hose is part of a brake hose assembly. Your understanding is correct with regard to S5.2.2. The last sentence of that paragraph states: "The information (specified in S5.2.2) need not be present on hose that is sold as part of a brake hose assembly or a motor vehicle." (The quoted sentence was adopted at 56 FR 50520, October 7, 1991, to replace the sentence you referred to.) Accordingly, the hose need not bear the labeling of S5.2.2 when the hose is part of an assembly. However, the hose must still bear the stripes required by S5.2.1 unless, to quote from S5.2.1, the hose is

"manufactured for use only in an assembly whose end fittings prevent its installation in a twisted orientation in either side of the vehicle."

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please contact Deirdre Fujita of my staff at the above address, or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht94-5.39

Open

DATE: May 12, 1994

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Jerry Schwebel -- Executive Vice President, Travel Safety Children's Products, Inc.

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached To Letter Dated 11/9/93 From Jerry Schwebel To Walter Myers (OCC-9316)

TEXT: Dear Mr. Schwebel:

This responds to your letter to Mr. Walter Myers of my staff asking about a particular feature of your "air-filled car seat" and how Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 213, "Child Restraint Systems," would apply. I apologize for the delay in responding.

Your letter and the promotional literature you enclosed describe the car seat as having a 5-point belt system to provide upper and lower torso restraint. The seat also has a strap that crosses in front of the child's chest, that attaches to each side of the child seat "to offer additional side impact protection by keeping the leading side of the seat attached to the opposite side so as to prevent the child from rolling out." You state that the strap is not part of the primary restraint system and is non-load bearing in a frontal impact. You ask if there is any problem with the strap feature.

By way of background information, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. @ 1381, et seq. (Safety Act), authorizes the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards for new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA, however, does not approve motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, nor do we endorse any commercial products. Instead, the Safety Act establishes a "self-certification" process under which each manufacturer is responsible for certifying that its products meet all applicable safety standards. The following represents our opinion based on the facts set forth in your letter.

Standard 213 specifies requirements for child restraint systems used in motor vehicles and aircraft, to reduce the number of children killed or injured in motor vehicle crashes and in aircraft. S5.2.2, "Torso impact protection," states in part that each add-on, forward-facing child restraint system

shall have no fixed or movable surface . . . [d]irectly forward of the dummy and intersected by a horizontal

2

line . . . parallel to the SORL [seat orientation reference line illustrated in Figure 1A of the standard] . . . and passing through any portion of the dummy, except for surfaces which restrain the dummy when the system is tested in accordance with S6.1.2.1.2, so that the child restraint system shall conform to the requirements of S5.1.2 and S5.1.3.1.

The purpose of S5.2.2 is to prohibit child seats from having any surface or component that can be mistaken by motorists to be a means of adequately restraining the child occupant in a crash. 43 FR 21470, 21475 (May 18, 1978). A strap in front of the dummy would be prohibited by S5.2.2, unless it is provided to restrain the dummy in S6.1.2.1.2's dynamic test so that the system conforms to Standard 213's injury criteria for head and chest accelerations and occupant excursion. Since you indicate the strap is not meant to be load bearing in a frontal impact, it does not appear that the strap would perform adequately. n1 Accordingly, it appears the strap is prohibited.

n1 The strap may be installed if it provides adequate protection. To measure the adequacy of the performance of a child seat with such a strap, the child seat will be tested at 20 mph with the strap placed in front of the child, but without the dummy strapped into the restraint system. The child seat must pass the occupant excursion and other dynamic performance requirements without use of the primary restraint system. See, test procedures for 20 mph test, S6.1.2.1.2, S6.1.2.3.1(c)(ii).

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions or need additional information, please call Ms. Deirdre Fujita of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

ID: nht94-5.4

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: December 8, 1994

FROM: Kenneth Sghia-Hughes -- Research Engineer, Solectria Corporation

TO: Chief Counsel -- NHTSA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached to 2/2/95 from Philip R. Recht to Kenneth Sghia-Hughes (A43; Part 301; Std. 102)

TEXT: Dear Sir/Madam:

Solectria Corporation produces electric vehicles (EV's) on the chassis of existing new vehicles and is currently developing a ground-up electric vehicle. In the course of reviewing NHTSA's regulations covering vehicle manufacturers, we have identified qu estions regarding the application of specific standards and regulations to our electric vehicles. Solectria Corporation requests a formal interpretation of these regulations with regard to the following issues:

1. 49 CFR 571.301, FMVSS #301 -- Fuel system integrity

Opinions vary as to the applicability of this standard to electric vehicles with no petroleum-based fuel source. The stated purpose of the standard is "to reduce deaths and injuries occurring from fires that result from fuel spillage. . . . and resul ting from ingestion of fuels during siphoning." The standard states that it applies to "passenger cars, and to multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses that have a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less and use fuel with a boiling point above 32 degrees F. . . . .", implying that it applies to all passenger vehicles, but to only those trucks with GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less and that use fuel with a boiling point above 32 degrees F. On the face of it, this standard appears not to apply to electric veh icles with no liquid fuel, but enough doubt as to NHTSA's interpretation of this standard with respect to EV's exists that Solectria requests an official interpretation from NHTSA.

2. 49 CFR 571.102. FMVSS #102 -- Transmission shift lever sequence, starter interlock, and transmission braking effect

This standard is written so that it literally only applies to vehicles with manual or automatic transmission. Most of our vehicles delivered to date and all of the models currently in production have a single speed transmission which requires no shif ting, either manual or automatic. Solectria vehicles nevertheless meet the requirements of this standard for automatic transmission vehicles, in keeping with what Solectra believes is the intent, if not the letter, of the regulation. Solectria requests a clarification of this standard with regard to single speed transmissions, as commonly encountered in electric vehicles. If deemed applicable to single speed transmission vehicles. Solectria requests that S3.1.3 Starter interlock, be rewritten or inte rpreted to include the initial activation of EV motor controllers as well as engine starters.

Please feel free to contact me for any additional information.

Sincerely,

ID: nht94-5.40

Open

DATE: May 12, 1994

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: David Fabrycky

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached To Letter Dated 12/4/93 From David Fabrycky To NHTSA Chief Counsel (OCC-9433)

TEXT: Dear Mr. Fabrycky:

This responds to your letter about an aftermarket product you wish to manufacture. The product is a child safety seat buckle shield, which is intended to prevent a child from opening the buckle on a child restraint system. You state that your device would cover the buckle and prevent the child from gaining access to the pushbutton of a child seat buckle. To depress the pushbutton, the device requires that a latch be actuated and the cover pivoted away from the buckle. You indicated that the device requires "manual dexterity to exert the forces in many directions simultaneously."

Although we understand your concern that young children not be able to easily unbuckle a child safety seat, we have reservations about devices that interfere with the unbuckling of the seats. I hope the following discussion explains those reservations and answers the questions in your letter about the effect of our regulations on your product.

Our agency has the authority to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. We have exercised this authority to establish Safety Standard No. 213, "Child Restraint Systems," which applies to all new child restraint systems sold in this country. However, Standard 213 does not apply to aftermarket items for child restraint systems, such as your buckle shield. Hence, you are not required to certify that this product complies with Standard 213 before selling the product.

Additionally, you are not required to get "approval" from this agency before selling the buckle shield. NHTSA has no authority to "approve" motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, nor do we endorse any commercial product. Instead, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act establishes a "self-certification" process under which each manufacturer is responsible for certifying that its products meet our safety standards. The agency periodically tests vehicles and equipment items for compliance with the standards, and also investigates alleged safety-related defects.

2

Although we do not have any standards that directly apply to your product, there are several statutory provisions that could affect it. Manufacturers of motor vehicle equipment such as your buckle shield are subject to the requirements in sections 151-159 of the Safety Act concerning the recall of products with defects related to motor vehicle safety. The agency does not determine the existence of safety defects except in the context of a defect proceeding, and thus is unable to say whether your product might or might not contain such a defect. However, the agency is concerned that people be able to easily and quickly operate a child safety seat buckle in an emergency. As the agency said in a rule on the force level necessary to operate child restraint buckles:

The agency's safety concerns over child restraint buckle force release and size stem from the need for convenient buckling and unbuckling of a child and, in emergencies, to quickly remove the child from the restraint. This latter situation can occur in instances of post-crash fires, immersions, etc. A restraint that is difficult to disengage, due to the need for excessive buckle pressure or difficulty in operating the release mechanism because of a very small release button, can unnecessarily endanger the child in the restraint and the adult attempting to release the child. (50 FR 33722; August 21, 1985)

It appears that your product could significantly increase the difficulty of using the buckle release and thus hinder a person attempting to release the belt in an emergency.

In addition, use of your product could be affected by section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act. That section prohibits commercial businesses from knowingly tampering with devices or elements of design installed in an item of motor vehicle equipment, such as a child safety seat, in compliance with the Federal motor vehicle safety standards. In determining the effect of a buckle shield on a child seat's compliance with Standard 213, NHTSA would evaluate the performance of the seat with the buckle shield installed. Standard 213 specifies several elements of design with which a child restraint system is unlikely to comply if your buckle shield were installed. Section S5.4.3.5 of Standard 213 requires the pushbutton release for any buckle on a child restraint to have a minimum area for applying the release force. Since your device will completely cover the buckle when installed, the buckle shield would cause the child restraint to no longer comply with this requirement. That section also requires the buckle to release when a specified maximum force is applied. Your device will not allow the buckle to release when the force is applied because it will cover the buckle and require force to be applied "in many directions simultaneously." Your device would thus cause the child restraint to no longer comply with that requirement. Therefore, commercial establishments cannot

3

legally install your device on customers' child safety seats. In addition, section S5.7 of Standard 213 requires each material used in a child restraint system to comply with the flammability resistance requirements of Standard 302, "Flammability of Interior Materials." If your buckle shield does not comply with the requirements of Standard 302, commercial establishments cannot legally install your device.

The prohibition of section 108(a)(2)(A) does not apply to individual vehicle owners who may install or remove any items on child restraint systems regardless of the effect on compliance with Standard 213. However, our policy is to encourage child restraint owners not to tamper with or otherwise degrade the safety of their child restraints.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please contact Ms. Deirdre Fujita of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

ID: nht94-5.41

Open

DATE: May 12, 1994

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Martin M. Sackoff -- Executive Director Of Laboratories, International Testing Laboratories

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 2/7/94 FROM MARTIN M. SACKOFF TO NHTSA OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNCIL (OCC - 9646)

TEXT: Dear Dr. Sackoff:

This responds to your letter to this agency with reference to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 109, New Pneumatic Tires.

Your specific question addressed S 4.2.2.4, Tire strength, which states: "Each tire shall meet the requirements for minimum breaking energy specified in Table I when tested in accordance with S 5.3." You asked for an interpretation of the term "breaking," whether it means a blowout of the tire or the breaking of the tire caused by the plunger used in the test specified in the standard.

The breaking energy test is a measure of the resistance of the tire to bruise or damage due to impact of the tire with road hazards. This agency tests such resistance in accordance with the procedures of S5.3, Tire strength, of the standard. In that test, a cylindrical steel plunger is forced perpendicularly into the tire rib at the rate of 2 inches per minute at five test points equally spaced around the circumference of the tire. The inch-pounds of force required to push the plunger into the tire is continuously monitored. As the plunger pushes into the tire, the resistance to the plunger force increases. That resistance requires ever-increasing force applied to the plunger to continue pushing it into the tire. Ultimately, one of two things will happen:

1. The plunger will push all the way to the rim; or

2. The tire cords, plies, innerliner, or other components of the tire will stretch, separate, crack or break so that the resistance pressure of the tire diminishes. The "breaking" of the tire at that point does not require an actual blow-out although, obviously, a blow-out would constitute a "breaking."

The plunger force is measured just prior to contact with the rim as in 1 above or just prior to the force reduction

2

described in 2 above. The measured force is then combined with the penetration of the plunger into the tire as specified in S5.3.2.3 and S5.3.2.4 of the standard. The breaking energy value of the tire is then determined by computing the average of the values obtained at the five test locations on the tire. Table I, Appendix A of the standard specifies the minimum breaking energy of tires based on tire type, size, composition, and inflation pressure.

I hope this information is helpful to you. Should you have any further questions or need any additional information, please feel free to contact Walter Myers of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht94-5.42

Open

DATE: May 11, 1994

FROM: William L. Blake

TO: United States Department of Transportation

COPYEE: Lloyd Barker

TITLE: Re: 1985 Mercedes Benz, Model 280SL, A "Gray Model" Car

ATTACHMT: Attached to Letter Dated 6/9/94 From John Womack to William L. Blake (A42; Part 581; 591; CSA S106 And Letter Dated 4/29/94 From William Blake To U.S. DOT

TEXT: Gentlemen:

Enclosed please find a copy of mine of April 29, 1994 to which I received no reply whatsoever.

Please give me a call upon receipt of this letter and send me a reply in writing at your earliest convenience.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Yours very truly,

Enclosure

ID: nht94-5.43

Open

DATE: May 10, 1994

FROM: Christopher A. Hart -- Acting Administrator, NHTSA; Signature by Stephen P. Wood

TO: The Honorable Doug Bereuter -- U.S. House of Representatives

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached To Letter Dated 4/20/94 From Doug Bereuter To Christopher Hart (OCC-9916) And 1/1/94 (EST) Letter From Christopher A. Hart To Doug Bereuter

TEXT: Dear Mr. Bereuter:

Thank you for your recent letter concerning our rulemaking on compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicle fuel systems and fuel containers. Please be assured that I will keep you fully apprised of the rulemaking's status. I share your concern that the rulemaking be completed expeditiously as possible and appreciate your interest in this matter.

Thank you for your patience.

Sincerely,

ID: nht94-5.44

Open

DATE: May 9, 1994

FROM: Womack, John -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Bloomfield, John -- Manager, Engine Management, Legislation and Certification, Lotus Cars, Ltd. (ENGLAND)

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached To a Letter Dated 10/28/93 From Rachel Jelly To John Womack

TEXT: This responds to the letter from Ms. Rachel Jelly, formerly of your company, concerning low volume CAFE exemptions. I apologize for the delay in our response. Ms. Jelly asked whether Bugatti Automobili S.p.A. (Bugatti) and Lotus Cars, Ltd. (Lotus), both of which are controlled by the same holding company, may submit separate low volume CAFE exemption petitions requesting two alternative standards. The answer to this question is no. Since any alternative CAFE standard would apply to Bugatti and Lotus together, a single combined petition must be submitted for a single alternative standard.

The reasons for the above response are discussed in the attached letter from NHTSA to Mr. Lance Tunick, of Bugatti. Mr. Tunick's letter to NHTSA raised issues that are of concern to both Bugatti and Lotus. Thus, NHTSA's response to Mr. Tunick should address Lotus' concerns about filing for alternative CAFE standards.

I hope this information is helpful. If there are any questions, please contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht94-5.45

Open

DATE: May 09, 1994

FROM: Womack, John -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Tunick, Lance -- Bugatti

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached To A Letter Dated 11/8/93 From Federico Trombi To John Womack (OCC 9318)

TEXT: This responds to your letter n1 concerning low volume CAFE exemptions. I apologize for the delay in our response. You asked whether Bugatti Automobili S.p.A. (Bugatti) and Lotus Cars, Ltd. (Lotus), both of which are controlled by the same holding company, may submit separate low volume CAFE exemption petitions requesting two separate alternative standards. As discussed below, the answer to this question is no. Since any alternative CAFE standard would apply to Bugatti and Lotus together, a single combined petition must be submitted for a single alternative standard.

n1 The letter was signed by Federico Trombi of Bugatti Automobili S.p.A. but requested that the response be directed to you.

According to your letter and a separate one received from Lotus, General Motors sold Lotus to Bugatti International Holding, SA, in August 1993. That holding company also controls Bugatti, which is planning to enter the U.S. market in the near future. Lotus and Bugatti intend to submit petitions for low volume CAFE exemptions. Moreover, the joint annual production of Bugatti and Lotus is far below the 10,000 vehicles per year eligibility threshold for low volume CAFE exemptions.

In a telephone conversation with Edward Glancy of my staff, you indicated that Lotus cars are imported by Lotus USA. You also indicated that Bugatti cars could be imported by Lotus USA, or could be imported by a new company that would be established by Bugatti, e.g., "Bugatti USA." Finally, you indicated that Lotus USA is not in a control relationship with any other auto manufacturers.

In addressing whether Bugatti and Lotus would be eligible for two separate standards, I will begin by identifying the statutory provisions which are relevant to determining who manufactures the vehicles at issue. Under section 501(8) of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, "(t)he term 'manufacturer' means any person engaged in the business of manufacturing automobiles." Under section 501(9), "(t)he term 'manufacture' (except for purposes of section 502(c)) means to produce in the customs territory of the United States, or to import." Under section 501(10), "(t)he term 'import' means to import into the customs territory of the United States."

Under these sections, the company which imports foreign-built cars into the United States is the manufacturer of those automobiles. Thus, if Lotus USA imported Lotus cars and Bugatti cars, Lotus USA, rather than Bugatti Automobili S.p.A. and Lotus Cars, Ltd., would be considered the manufacturer of those vehicles for CAFE purposes.

Since Lotus USA would be the manufacturer of all the vehicles under this scenario, and CAFE standards apply to all passenger automobiles manufactured by a manufacturer, there would be no basis for Bugatti and Lotus to request two separate standards. Instead, a single alternative standard would need to be requested for Lotus USA, which would cover all automobiles imported by that company.

This result would not change if Bugatti established a new company, Bugatti USA, for importing cars into the U.S. This is because of the operation of the operation of section 503(c), which provides that any reference to "automobiles manufactured by a manufacturer" is deemed to include all automobiles manufactured by persons who control, are controlled by, or are under common control with, such manufacturer. Since Lotus USA and Bugatti USA would presumably be under common control (traced back to Bugatti International Holding, SA), their fleets would be combined for CAFE purposes. Since many of the arguments you raise in your letter are relevant to this type of scenario, i.e., one in which Lotus and Bugatti cars would be considered to be manufactured by manufacturers within a control relationship, I will assume it for the rest of this letter.

As you noted in your letter, NHTSA addressed the issue of how alternative CAFE standards apply to manufacturers within a control relationship in a July 1991 decision concerning low volume exemption petitions submitted by Ferrari. Ferrari and Alfa Romeo were under the common control of Fiat. We stated the following:

Because of the operation of section 503(c), Ferrari and Alfa Romeo are in essence the same manufacturer for purposes of CAFE standards. As discussed below, under section 502, the same CAFE standard should apply to both manufacturers together. This is true for both generally applicable standards and alternative standards.

Section 502(a), in setting forth the generally applicable standard, specifies a standard for "passenger automobiles manufactured by any manufacturer." Section 502(c)(1), in setting forth requirements relating to low volume exemptions, specifies that such exemptions may not be granted unless the Secretary establishes, by rule, alternative average fuel economy standards for "passenger automobiles manufactured by manufacturers" which receive exemptions under this subsection. Under 503(c)(1), any reference to "automobiles manufactured by a manufacturer" is deemed to include all automobiles manufactured by persons who control, are controlled by, or are under common control with, such manufacturer. Thus, any CAFE standard which applies to Ferrari should apply to Ferrari and Alfa Romeo together. Therefore, granting Ferrari a low volume exemption in MY 1988 would create a paradox, since Alfa Romeo is indisputably not eligible (given its own worldwide production) for an exemption.

A similar paradox would arise in the context of determining compliance with the statute. Under section 503(a), neither manufacturer may have an independent CAFE value. Instead, by operation of section 503(c), they share a CAFE value that is based on the total volume of cars imported by both companies.

Thus, a decision to grant an exemption to Ferrari while applying the generally applicable standard to Alfa Romeo would cause compliance enforcement difficulties by compelling the agency to try to compare a combined CAFE value to separate CAFE standards. 56 FR 31461, July 10, 1991.

You argued in your letter that, because of factual differences, the Ferrari/Alfa analysis should not be applied to the Bugatti/Lotus situation, and Bugatti and Lotus should be permitted to submit separate low volume CAFE exemption petitions requesting two separate alternative standards.

While we agree that there are factual differences, e.g., Ferrari and Alfa Romeo together produced too many vehicles to meet the eligibility threshold while Bugatti and Lotus do not, the situations are identical with respect to the issue of how CAFE standards apply to manufacturers within a control relationship. In particular, since Lotus USA and Bugatti USA would be under common control and because of the operation of section 503(c), the two companies would in essence be the same manufacturer for purposes of CAFE standards. Any alternative standard issued under section 502 would apply to the two companies together. Moreover, neither manufacturer would have an independent CAFE value under section 503(a). Instead, by operation of section 503(c), they would share a CAFE value that is based on the total volume of cars imported by both companies. Therefore, the same CAFE standard would necessarily apply to the two companies together.

You raised several other objections in your letter. First, you stated that the CAFE statute provides that "a manufacturer" may submit a petition for a CAFE exemption, and a joint petition would not fall within this provision. In fact, any one of the related companies (Lotus, Lotus USA, Bugatti, the Bugatti U.S. subsidiary, or the holding company) could submit a petition on behalf of the combined companies. However, any such petition would apply to the combined fleet of both Bugatti USA and Lotus USA.

You also stated that combining two small companies together would muddy the question of the best fuel economy that each company is capable of achieving. However, NHTSA would simply assess the "maximum feasible average fuel economy level" that could be achieved by the combined Bugatti/Lotus fleet. We recognize that this level would be dependent on assumptions about the relative volumes of Bugatti USA and Lotus USA. However, the agency needs to take this factor into account in assessing the capability of any manufacturer which produces vehicles with varying fuel economy values.

Finally, you stated that if a joint alternative standard was established, NHTSA would face a difficult enforcement situation in the event of a failure to comply with the standard. You asked how the agency would divide the civil penalties. It is our opinion that Lotus USA and Bugatti USA would be jointly and severally liable for the full amount of the civil penalty, although we would permit the two companies to divide the penalty between themselves.

I would like to address two other issues that are raised by the factual situation described in your letter: (1) the immediate eligibility of Bugatti/Lotus given that Lotus was owned by General Motors until August 1993, and (2) the timing of petitions for low volume exemptions.

As you know, section 502(c)(1) specifies that low volume exemptions are only available for manufacturers "who manufactured . . . fewer than 10,000 passenger automobiles in the second model year preceding the model year for which the application is made. . . ." (Emphasis added.) During the time that Lotus was owned by General Motors, the combined companies manufactured far more than 10,000 vehicles. It is our opinion that Lotus does not have to wait two years from the date it ceased being in a control relationship with General Motors to be eligible, given the circumstances described above. In particular, we believe that the requirement that a manufacturer have manufactured fewer than 10,000 passenger automobiles in the second model year preceding the model year for which the application is made was intended to address varying production levels (above and below 10,000) and not a situation where a small manufacturer such as Lotus is sold by a large manufacturer.

With respect to the timing of petitions, NHTSA's regulations at 49 CFR @ 525.6, Requirements for petition, state that petitions from low volume manufacturers for alternative fuel economy standards must be "submitted not later than 24 months before the beginning of the affected model year, unless good cause for later submission is shown." Clearly, the deadline for a timely submission for model years 1994-96 has passed. On the issue of "good cause" for a later submission, we note that Lotus was not sold by General Motors until August 1993, and both Lotus and Bugatti requested our opinion concerning submitting a petition within three months of that sale.

Under the circumstances, we conclude that, Lotus/Bugatti have, to date, taken reasonable measures to submit a petition in as timely a manner as possible. Therefore, if a petition that meets the requirements of 49 CFR Part 525 is submitted promptly after receipt of this letter, we will consider there to be good cause shown for submitting a late petition for model years 1994-96. I also note that a petition for model year 1997 would be due later this year.

I hope this information is helpful. If there are any questions, please contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Request an Interpretation

You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:

The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590

If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.

Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.

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