ID: nht95-4.83

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: November 21, 1995

FROM: Samuel J. Dubbin -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Eric D. Swanger -- Engineering Manager, Specialty Manufacturing Co.

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 8/8/95 LETTER FROM Eric D. Swanger to John Womack

TEXT: Dear Mr. Swanger:

This responds to your request for an interpretation of the conspicuity requirements in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 131, School Bus Pedestrain Safety Devices. According to your letter, a State has requested that you use light-emitting diodes (LEDs) to outline the word "STOP" on the stop arm blade. That State believes such lighting would increase the sign's conspicuity in certain weather conditions. In your letter and in an October 2, 1995, telephone conversation with Mr. Paul Atelsek of m y staff, you expressed your concerns that using LEDs on stop signal arms may cause confusion and asked whether they are permitted. You raised three specific issues relating to viewing angles, legibility from certain distances, and inconsistencies among various jurisdictions.

The short answer to your question is that the LEDs could comply with out standard, but only under certain conditions. As you are aware, S5.3 Conspicuity states that "The stop signal arm shall comply with either S5.3.1 or S5.3.2, or both." Either method of providing conspicuity is by itself sufficient. I will discuss how the presence of LEDs relates to each of these options and then address your specific questions below.

Section S5.3.1 sets forth the requirements of the reflectorization option, stating that "[t]he entire surface of both sides of the stop signal arm shall be reflectorized with type III retroreflectorized material . . . ." LEDs would appear on the surface of the arm but could not, as far as we know, qualify as type III retroreflectorized material. Therefore, LEDs are not permissible when compliance depends upon the reflectorization option.

Section S5.3.2, which references S6.2, sets forth requirements addressing flashing lamps. Section S6.2, sets forth requirements addressing flashing lamps. Section S6.2 specifies the lamp's color, flash rate, and on-off time. These rather specific requi rements reflect the importance of consistency in any signage or labeling requirement. However, we do not see

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anything intrinsic about LEDs that would preclude their use in stop signal arms with flashing lamps. As long as the familiar flashing lamps are used, we do not believe that interstate confusion would result from the addition of LEDs. Note that we do no t consider the use of LEDs as an "optional" method of compliance with S5.3.2, because the LEDs would not be centered on the vertical centerline at the top and bottom of the stop arm.

You expressed concerns in your letter about the narrow viewing angle of LEDs compared to incandescent lights, and about the legibility of the LEDs at a distance. Since the LEDs would be used as a supplement to a standard method of compliance (i.e., flas hing lamps), a diminished viewing angle is not important. We assume manufacturer's quality control practices would prevent uneven viewing angles from LED to LED within a given stop arm. While your concerns about the legibility of the word "STOP" at a di stance are important, they do not seem to relate to the presence or absence of the LEDs unless the LEDs reduce the legibility of the word. If you have data indicating that the size or spacing of the letters need to be increased to achieve greater legibi lity at a distance, you may petition NHTSA to revise the standard.

I want to raise one potential safety issue, in case you receive a request to design an LED-equipped stop signal with flashing lamps. Certain arrangements of LEDs might affect compliance by impairing the effectiveness fo the stop signal arm's flashing la mp. Very closely spaced red LEDs could enhance the readability fo the letters in poor visibility conditions. On the other hand, red LEDs spaced every few centimeters around the outline of the 15 cm high letters could appear as a random field of lights (like a Christmas tree), distracting the observer and resulting in diminished readability. Similarly, different flash rates or on-off speeds from installed incandescent lamps might detract from readability by creating a distracting double-flash effect, as you suggest. Whether a particular LED-equipped stop signal arm complies with Standard No. 131 as a matter that can be determined only in the context of an enforcement proceeding.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Paul Atelsek at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

ID: nht95-4.84

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: November 21, 1995

FROM: Samuel J. Dubbin -- Chief Counsel; NHTSA

TO: Rita Cola Carroll -- Chairperson, Bus Safety Committee, Great Valley School District, Paoli, PA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 10/9/95 LETTER FROM Rita Cola Carroll to NHTSA

TEXT: Dear Ms. Carroll:

This responds to your question whether a child sitting on a school bus seat with part of his body extending into the aisle, is afforded the compartmentalization protection of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 222, School bus passenger seating and crash protection.

We have addressed this issue in an October 26, 1994; letter to Ms. Debra Platt of Stuart, Florida, and have enclosed a copy of our response for your information. In the Platt letter, NHTSA agrees that it is far less safe for children to sit on the edge of school bus seats, rather than face forward. We are enclosing a copy of Highway Safety Program Guideline No. 17, Pupil Transportation Safety, which is referenced in the Platt letter. Guideline 17 uses specific wording with regard to seating of school children. It says: "Seating should be provided that will permit each occupant to sit in a seat intended by the vehicle's manufacturer to provide accommodation for a person at least as large as a 5th percentile adult female, as defined in 49 CFR 571.208 ."

We are also enclosing a copy of a report prepared by this agency entitled School Bus Safety Report, and a copy of a Report Summary prepared by the Transportation Research Board in May 1989. The latter two reports give a good overview of school bus safet y issues, and they and Guideline 17 contain recommendations to the various states in developing their own pupil transportation safety programs.

As noted in the Platt letter, since the States regulate school bus use, we recommend that you contact your State and/or local pupil transportation or school officials to inform them of your concerns. The Pennsylvania Governor's highway safety representa tive is:

Mr. Michael Ryan governor's Highway Safety Representative Deputy Secretary Highway Safety Administration Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 1220 Transportation & Safety Building Harrisburg, PA 17120 Telephone: (717) 787- 6815

I hope the enclosed information is helpful to you. Should you have any other questions or need additional information, please feel free to contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or at (202) 366- 2992.

Sincerely

ID: nht95-4.85

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: November 27, 1995

FROM: Erika Z. Jones -- Mayer, Brown and Platt

TO: Samuel Dubbin, Esq. -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: FMVSS 207/Request for Interpretation

ATTACHMT: 1/4/96 letter from Samuel J. Dubbin to Erika Z. Jones (A44; Redbook 2; Std. 207)

TEXT: I am writing to request an interpretation of FMVSS 207 S4.4, pertaining to labelling of certain motor vehicle seats.

S4.4 provides that:

"Seats not designated for occupancy while the vehicle is in motion shall be conspicuously labeled to that effect."

It is my understanding that S4.4 does not require designated seating positions to be labeled, even if those seating positions are equipped with a folding seat back that enables that seat to be converted to a bed.

This conclusion is consistent with a letter from your office to Mr. Richard Moss, dated June 30, 1971, in which the Acting Chief Counsel advised that FMVSS 207 does not require designated seating positions to be labeled.

The vehicle seat at issue in my question is generally intended for occupancy while the vehicle is in motion, while it is configured as a bench seat. The bench seat contains several "designated seating positions" equipped with safety belts, and the se at is otherwise certified to FMVSS 207 requirements in the seat configuration. When the seat is converted to a bed by folding down the seat back, however, it is no longer "an occupant seat," as that term is defined in FMVSS 207.

Under these circumstances, it is my understanding that the labeling requirement in S4.4 does not apply, and I respectfully seek your concurrence in this conclusion.

Please let me know if I can obtain any additional information for you. I look forward to your response.

ID: nht95-4.86

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: November 28, 1995

FROM: Samuel J. Dubbin -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Phyllis Armstrong -- General Sales Manager, Saturn of Puyallup, Inc., Washington

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 5/17/95 LETTER FROM Phyllis Armstrong to Phillip Reckt; Also attached to 7/20/89 letter from Kathleen DeMeter to B.L. Swank

TEXT: Dear Ms. Armstrong:

This is in response to the letter in which you requested this office to confirm in writing that the information you received from Mr. Richard Morse, Chief of the Odometer Fraud Staff of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), concerni ng the proper completion of odometer disclosure statements for Saturn vehicles that have been towed. The question arises because the odometer on the Saturn is designed not to register miles when the vehicle is being towed.

NHTSA's interpretation of the Truth in Mileage Act of 1986 ("TIMA," 49 U.S.C. Chapter 327) and the regulations implementing TIMA (49 CFR Part 580) is that when a vehicle has been towed, but its odometer is not capable of registering towed mileage, the pr oper way to complete the odometer disclosure statement is to record the number of miles showing on the odometer. It is permissible in such a situation for the transferor to certify that this number is the actual mileage on the vehicle, assuming there ar e no other reasons to believe that the reading on the odometer does not reflect actual miles driven.

The situation you describe is comparable to that in which the odometer is disconnected and the drive wheels of the vehicle are off the pavement while it is being towed. In a 1989 interpretation letter, the Chief Counsel of NHTSA stated that when the veh icle is being towed with its drive wheels off the pavement and the odometer disconnected, the mileage driven while being towed does not count, and need not be added to the mileage showing on the odometer. That letter also stated that the transferor may c ertify in this circumstance that the mileage on the odometer, exclusive of the towed mileage, is the actual mileage. I have enclosed a copy of that letter for your information.

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I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any further questions on Federal odometer disclosure requirements, you may contact Mr. Morse or Ms. Eileen Leahy, an attorney on my staff, at the above address. You may reach Ms. Leahy at (202) 366- 5263, and Mr. Morse at (202) 366-4761.

Sincerely,

ID: nht95-4.87

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: November 28, 1995

FROM: Samuel J. Dubbin -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Ben Ray

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 9/18/95 LETTER FROM Ben Ray to John Womack (OCC 11244)

TEXT: Dear Mr. Ray:

This responds to your letter asking about Federal requirements for automatic brake adjusters on log trailers. According to your letter, you manufacture log trailers, using used axles that already have what you call "regular" (i.e., manual) brake adjuste rs on them. In an October 13, 1995 telephone conversation with Mr. Marvin Shaw of my staff, you further stated that the wheels, brakes, and suspension are typically used, but that occasionally you use new brake systems. You also clarified that these tr ailers are used on the public roads as well as in the woods for transporting logs to the mills. You asked whether it is permissible to use manual brake adjusters instead of automatic adjusters. The answer depends it is permissible to use manual brake ad justers instead of automatic adjusters. The answer depends on whether your log trailers are equipped with new or used components and the trailer continues to use the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) and to be owned by the user of the reassembled vehi cle.

By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issues safety standards for new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle equipment. The agency does not provide approvals of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipme nt. Instead, manufacturers are required to certify that their vehicles or equipment meet all applicable standards. Once such standard is Standard No. 121, Air brake system, which requires new trailers to be equipped with automatic brake adjusters. The following represents our opinion based on the facts provided in your letter.

NHTSA's regulations specifically address the question of when trailers produced by combining new components and used materials are considered to be new trailers. Section 49 CFT 571.7(f) states that when new and used components are used in trailer manufa cture, the trailer will be considered "newly manufactured" unless each of the following three conditions is true with respect to the trailer. First, the trailer running gear assembly, which includes the axle(s), wheels, braking and suspension, is not ne w and was taken from an existing trailer. Second, the existing trailer's identity is continued in the reassembled vehicle with respect to the VIN. Third, the existing trailer is owned or leased by the user of the reassembled vehicle.

In other words, a log trailer will generally be considered newly manufactured, unless all these conditions are met. If a trailer is considered newly manufactured, then it must comply with the

P2 current requirements applicable to trailers. Among other things, this means that the trailer must be equipped with automatic adjusters. If a trailer meets these three conditions, then it is considered not newly manufactured and may be equipped with man ual adjusters.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any questions about NHTSA's safety standards, please feel free to contact Marvin Sahw at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

ID: nht95-4.88

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: November 28, 1995

FROM: Samuel J. Dubbin -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Paul Danner, Esq. -- General Claim Counsel, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 8/31/95 LETTER FROM Paul Danner to John Womack; Also attached to 8/9/89 letter from Kathleen DeMeter to Madeline Flanagan

TEXT: Dear Mr. Danner:

This is in response to your letter of August 31, 1995, to John Womack, then Acting Chief Counsel of this office, in which you asked for an interpretation of the proper application of Federal odometer disclosure requirements in a situation where an insure r is settling with a vehicle owner on a Claim for theft of the vehicle. Specifically, your letter requests confirmation that the information given to you over the telephone by Mr. Richard Morse, Chief of the Odometer Fraud Staff of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) accurately reflects the agency's interpretation of these requirements. For the sake of clarity, I will address the proper procedures to be followed, rather than your letter's rendition of Mr. Morse's advice.

After a vehicle has been stolen, it is of course unavailable to the insured-transferor at the time of title transfer to the insurer. Therefore, when completing the odometer disclosure needed to transfer ownership to the insurance company, the insured-tr ansferor may enter a figure that is his or her "best guess estimate" of the mileage on the odometer at the time the vehicle was stolen, not at the time of transfer to the insurer-transferee. In addition, the odometer disclosure must be dated as of the d ate of the theft, not as of the date of the transfer to the insurance company. The insured must certify on the odometer disclosure as to whether the odometer reading at the limits of the odometer, as appropriate.

In 1989, the agency issued an interpretation letter stating that this was the proper procedure for a lessee to follow when completing a disclosure to the lessor under 49 CFR @580.7 for a vehicle that had been stolen. That interpretation is equally appli cable to the situation in which the owner, rather than the lessee, is making an odometer disclosure for a stolen vehicle. I have enclosed a copy of that interpretation letter fro your information.

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As for the other issues raised in your letter, the following interpretation applies. Once the insured-transferor has completed the odometer disclosure and otherwise complied with requirements of state law for title transfer, the insurer-transferee shoul d then follow the procedures required by the appropriate state law to obtain title to the vehicle. If the vehicle is subsequently recovered and the insurer sells it for salvage, the insurer (which in this transaction will be the transferor) must inspect the vehicle and record the mileage that appears on the odometer at that time. If the insurer has no reason to believe that the mileage on the odometer is not the actual mileage on the vehicle, it must certify on the odometer disclosure that the mileage is the actual mileage on the vehicle. However, if the insurer does have reason to believe that the mileage shown on the odometer is not actual (e.g., if it is less than the mileage shown on the odometer disclosure statement provided to the insurer by t he insured when title was transferred to the insurance company), it must so certify on the odometer disclosure statement given to its transferee (the salvage company in your example), and indicate on the statement that there is an odometer discrepancy.

I hope this letter answers your questions about the procedures to be followed by the parties to the transactions you describe. If you have any further questions regarding legal interpretations of the Federal odometer statute and regulations, please cont act Eileen Leahy, an attorney on my staff, at the above address or at 202-366-5263.

Sincerely,

ID: nht95-4.89

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: November 28, 1995

FROM: Clifford C. Sharpe

TO: Legal Division, U.S. DOT

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: 2/2/96 letter from Samuel J. Dubbin to Clifford C. Sharpe (A44; Std. 109)

TEXT: I represent a client who purchased a Turbo Plus Radial GT steel belted radial tire bearing Dept of Transportation Serial No.: ADHY28M166 manufactured by General Tire, Inc. between April 20-26, 1986 at its Mayfield, KY plant. My client purchased the tire as "new" on November 12, 1991. The tire unraveled in March of 1993 after about 14,000 miles of travel causing injury.

Are there any regulations that address the selling as new of a tire that was manufactured 5 years hence?

Are you aware of any studies or information on the affects of age/time on an unused tire?

I will be responsible for all costs associated with this request.

ID: nht95-4.9

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: August 31, 1995

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Karen Coffey, Esq. -- Chief Counsel, Texas Automobile Dealers Association

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 8/22/95 LETTER FROM KAREN COFFEY TO JOHN WOMACK (OCC 11154)

TEXT: Dear Ms. Coffey:

This responds to your letter asking whether a dealer would violate Federal law by disconnecting a malfunctioning motor in an automatic seat belt system of a 1990 model vehicle. You state,

"a consumer has brought their vehicle to a dealership with an automatic seat belt in which the motor on the automatic seat belt continues to run. This continuous running of the seat belt motor causes the battery on the vehicle to run down, rendering the vehicle inoperable."

In a telephone conversation with Edward Glancy of this office, you indicated that the automatic seat belt is stuck in one position. The consumer has requested that the dealership disconnect the motor in lieu of repairing it. You also stated that, in th e event of such disconnection, the seat belt may still be connected manually.

As discussed below, it is our opinion that, under the facts stated above, a dealer would not violate Federal law by disconnecting the malfunctioning motor.

By way of background information, Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection, required 1990 model cars to be equipped with automatic crash protection at the front outboard seating positions. Automatic seat belts were one means of complying with that re quirement.

Federal law (49 U.S.C. 30122, formerly section 108(a)(2)(A) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act) provides that:

A manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business may not knowingly make inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable motor vehicl e safety standard . . .

It is our opinion that this requirement does not prohibit a dealer from disconnecting a malfunctioning seat belt motor in the factual situation described above. Since the seat belt motor would already be inoperative when the vehicle was brought to the d ealer, we would not consider the subsequent disconnection of the motor as making it inoperative. I note, however, that in servicing the vehicle, the dealer must not make another part of the vehicle or element of design inoperative with respect to the Fe deral motor vehicle safety standards.

While Federal law does not require dealers or owners to repair a malfunctioning seat belt motor, NHTSA strongly urges such repair, so that the vehicle continues to provide maximum safety protection. We also note that dealers and owners may be affected b y State laws in this area, including ones for vehicle inspection and tort law.

In closing, we suggest that the dealer urge the consumer to contact NHTSA's toll-free Auto Safety Hotline about this problem, at 800-424-9393. The agency uses this type of information in performing its safety mission.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please contact Mr. Glancy of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht95-4.90

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: December 1, 1995

FROM: Samuel J. Dubbin -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Edward Mansell -- Chief Engineer, Polar Tank Trailer, Inc.

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 10/10/95 LETTER FROM Edward Mansell to Philip R. Recht (OCC 11305)

TEXT: Dear Mr. Mansell:

This is in reply to your letter of October 10, 1995, to Philip R.Recht, former Chief Counsel of this agency. You seek an interpretation of the conspicuity requirements of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 as they apply to some Food Grade Tank Traile rs (FGTTs).

Paragraph S5.7.1.4.1(a) requires conspicuity sheeting to be placed "across the full width of the trailer" and "as close as practicable to not less than 375 mm and not more than 1525 mm above the road surface." You indicate that for many trailers the rear bumper is the closest practicable location (approximately 500 mm), but that, on some FGTTs, the load/unload ports are directly above the center portion of the rear bumper. The hot water to which the bumper is exposed degrades the conspicuity sheeting. "Since installation of sheeting subject to frequent hot water run off is not sheeting to be "applied from the extreme ends of the bumper to points no more than 6 inches (150 mm) to the left or right of the area directly below the load/unload area." You also state that "otherwise, the center section of the sheeting should be located on the tank, above the load/unload area."

We believe that this interpretation meets the intent of the standard. Under paragraph S5.7.1.4.1(a), the mounting height of the conspicuity material is based upon practicability, but the application "across the full width of the trailer" is absolute. W e interpret "across the full width" to mean that the sheeting must cover the entire width of the vehicle, though not necessarily on the same plane or continuously. Thus, mounting above the load/unload area would be acceptable as a practicable location. Generally, the agency defers to a manufacturer's determination of practicability and will not question it if it is not clearly erroneous. It is not the intent of the standard that manufacturers "redesign trailers to redirect the flow of wash water."

You also believe that, for FGTTs which use a cabinet to enclose the load/unload area, "conspicuity sheeting should be

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mounted on the cabinet doors to augment the sheeting on the bumper." Although you did not enclose a drawing of this configuration, it appears acceptable. We assume that, when viewed from the rear, the sheeting has the appearance of extending across the full width of the vehicle, even if the section on the cabinet doors is not on the same plane as that on the bumpers. This, too, is acceptable as a manufacturer's determination of practicability.

Sincerely,

ID: nht95-4.91

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: December 4, 1995

FROM: K.J. Sato -- President & CEO, Tekno - Info Corporation

TO: Kenneth O. Hardie -- Office of Rulemaking, NHTSA

TITLE: Request of Clarification for FMVSS No. 108 Requirements, S. 5.1.2

ATTACHMT: 2/1/96 letter from Samvel J. Dubbin to K.J. Sato (A44; Std. 108)

TEXT: This is to request you to clarify the interpretation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 108; Lamps, Reflective Devices, and associated equipment, paragraph S5.1.2.

Federal Register, September 5, 1995 Vol. 60, No. 171, page 46064 - 46067, announced the final rule to amend S5.1.2, effective from March 1, 1996. We would like to have your comments to clarify the requirement of S5.1.2(b).

Question on S5.1.2(b):

1) When plastics materials tested per SAE J576 JUL 91, and passed every criteria including the haze (and loss of surface luster) less than 30% (e.g. 10%) but failed to one of the appearance requirements (e.g. delamination) per J576 JUL 91, paragraph 4.2. 4 which says". . . shall not show physical changes affecting performance such as color bleeding, delamination, crazing, or cracking.", we need clarification whether or not the plastics materials are considered in compliance with S5.1.2(b) and can be used for lenses (other than those incorporating reflex reflectors). (We understand from S5.1.2(c) that the materials mentioned above cannot be used for reflex reflectors or lenses used in front of reflex reflectors since the materials failed to comply with the haze that exceeded 7%, and failed to comply with one of the the appearance requirements mentioned in S5.1.2(c)(("delamination")). But our question is asking if the materials can be used for lenses other than reflex reflectors or lenses used in front of, or incorporating, reflex reflectors). The reason for this question is that S5.1.2(b) does not mention those appearance requirements specifically but only mentions J576 JUL 91, although S5.1.2(c) specifically mentions those appearance requirements.

2) Since the final rule's S5.1.2(b) basically the same as the current S5.1.2(b), are we correct in assuming that your clarification of the above question 1) also applies to the current S5.1.2(b)?

I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience.