ID: aiam4735

"Dear Ms. Avis: This responds to your letter to this agency askin about Federal regulations that apply to 'an accessory seat pad' for booster seats and child restraint systems. I regret the delay in responding. Your letter describes your product as a fabric seat cushion which is intended to provide comfort and head support to a child when the child is sleeping in the restraint system. You state that the cushion would be 'held in place' on the seat with 'the strap system inherent to the booster seat along with the weight of the child on the seat.' There is currently no Federal motor vehicle safety standard that is directly applicable to the product you wish to manufacture and sell. Our standard for child restraint systems (Standard No. 213) applies only to new systems and not to aftermarket components of a child restraint system, such as an aftermarket seat-pad. However, there are other Federal laws that indirectly affect your manufacture and sale of the seat-pad. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, your product is considered to be an item of motor vehicle equipment. As a manufacturer of motor vehicle equipment, you are subject to the requirements in sections 151-159 of the Safety Act concerning the recall and remedy of products with defects relating to motor vehicle safety. I have enclosed an information sheet that briefly describes those responsibilities. In the event that you or NHTSA determines that your seat-pads contain a safety related defect, you would be responsible for notifying purchasers of the defective equipment and remedying the problem free of charge. If your product would be installed by commercial businesses instead of child seat owners, those businesses would have to do so in a manner consistent with section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Act. The provision states: 'No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative ... any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard ...' Thus, this provision prohibits manufacturers, distributors, dealers or motor vehicle repair businesses (i.e., any person holding him or herself out to the public as in the business of repairing motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment for compensation) from installing your seat-pad if the addition of your product would negatively affect the compliance of a child restraint with Standard 213 and if the installing business were aware of that effect. There are elements of design incorporated in a child restraint system pursuant to Standard 213 that may be affected by installation of a seat-pad. For example, Standard 213 sets flame-retardant performance requirements for materials used in a child restraint system. (See paragraph S5.7 of Standard 213, referencing Standard 302, Flammability of Interior Materials (copy enclosed).) Installation of rapidly burning materials could vitiate the compliance of the child restraint with FMVSS No. 213. Section 109 of the Act specifies a civil penalty of up to $1,000 for each violation of 108. In addition, Standard 213 sets crash protection requirements for all new child restraint systems. It is unclear from your letter whether the seat-pad has provision for passing the belt systems of a child restraint around or through the pad and cushion. If the installation of your seat-pad would impair the function of a belt installed to restrain the child, then any manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business installing the seat-pad would likely be regarded as having knowingly rendered inoperative a Federally required element of design in child restraint systems, in violation of 108(a)(2)(A). The prohibitions of 108(a)(2)(A) do not apply to the actions of a vehicle owner in adding to or otherwise modifying his or her vehicle or motor vehicle equipment. Nevertheless, this agency urges you to voluntarily ensure that your seat-pad would not render inoperative the crash protection and flammability resistance of any child restraint. I hope this information is helpful. Please contact us if you have further questions. Sincerely, Stephen P. Wood Acting Chief Counsel Enclosure";

ID: 20663geninfokim.df

Mr. Hoon Young Kim
c/o Fullerton Restaurant
2400 W. Fullerton
Chicago, IL 60647

Dear Mr. Kim:

This responds to your recent letter to us generally describing a child restraint system that you wish to manufacture. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) administers Federal requirements for the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles and certain items of new motor vehicle equipment, including child restraint systems.

We are authorized to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards to reduce highway crashes and deaths and injuries resulting from crashes. Under that authority, we issued Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 213, Child Restraint Systems (49 CFR 571.213), which sets forth requirements which must be met by all devices designed for use in a motor vehicle to restrain, seat or position children who weigh not more that 50 pounds. Standard No. 213 requires, among other things, that the restraint protect a test dummy during a 30 miles-per-hour (mph) crash while the restraint is secured to a test seat assembly with just a lap belt, that the restraint meet the flammability resistance requirements of Standard No. 302 and that the manufacturer provide detailed instructions on the proper use of the restraint. I have enclosed an information sheet that describes how you can obtain copies of these standards.

The United States does not use a certification process similar to that of the European community in which a manufacturer of motor vehicle equipment is required to deliver the equipment to be certified to a governmental agency for testing and approval. Instead, in the United States, the individual manufacturer must certify that its product complies with all applicable safety standards. It is up to the individual manufacturer to determine what data, test results, or other information it needs to enable it to certify that its child restraint complies with the requirements of Standard No. 213. We would certainly recommend that a manufacturer producing child restraints for the first time conduct some testing of the restraint prior to certifying compliance with Standard No. 213, especially for the protection requirements in a 30 mph crash. Once the manufacturer determines that its child restraint meets the requirements of Standard No. 213, it certifies that compliance by putting the appropriate language on the label permanently attached to the restraint.

For purposes of enforcement, this agency conducts spot checks of child restraints after they have been certified as complying with Standard No. 213, by purchasing and testing the child restraints according to the procedures specified in the standard. If the restraints pass the tests, no further steps are taken. If the child restraints fail the test and are determined not to comply with Standard No. 213, the manufacturer of the child restraint is subject to the recall responsibilities of our statute. Manufacturers must also ensure that their products are free of safety-related defects. Our statute specifies that, in the case of a child restraint which fails to comply with Standard No. 213 or contains a safety-related defect, the manufacturer must notify purchasers and either:

1. repair the child restraint, so that the defect or noncompliance is removed; or
2. replace the child restraint with an identical or reasonably equivalent child restraint which does not have the defect or noncompliance.

Whichever of these options is chosen, the child restraint manufacturer must bear the expense and cannot charge the child restraint owner for the remedy.

I have enclosed an information sheet that briefly describes the responsibilities of manufacturers of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment. Included among those responsibilities is a procedural requirement for manufacturer identification (49 CFR Part 566). Our regulation requires a manufacturer of equipment to which a standard applies (e.g., child restraint systems) to submit its name, address, and a brief description of the items of equipment it manufacturers to NHTSA within 30 days after it begins manufacture.

Please note two recent amendments to Standard No. 213 made by a March 5, 1999 final rule (copy enclosed). The first requires forward-facing child restraints to meet a new 28-inch head excursion requirement in addition to an existing 32-inch head excursion requirement. Another amendment requires child restraint systems manufactured on or after September 1, 2002 to be equipped with connectors that attach to an independent child restraint anchorage system in vehicles. We are in the process of completing our response to petitions for reconsideration of the March 1999 final rule. (The first part of our response was published on August 31, 1999, 64 FR 47566, copy enclosed.) As part of your responsibility as a manufacturer, you must keep current on the requirements affecting your manufacture and sale of child restraint systems.

Should you have any further questions or need more information on this subject, please contact Ms. Deirdre Fujita of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,
Frank Seales, Jr.
Chief Counsel
Enclosures
ref:213
d.11/5/99

ID: aiam0740

Dear Mr. Jones: In reply to your letter of June 5, 1972, Motor Vehicle Safety Standar No. 302 applies only to new vehicles manufactured after September 1, 1972, and does not apply to replacement or aftermarket components.; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel

ID: aiam1009

Dear Mr. Caine: This is to confirm your conversation with Dave Schmeltzer of thi office in which he informed you that a spare tire that is installed in a new vehicle within the occupant compartment would not have to meet the requirements of Standard No. 302 if it is not designed to absorb energy on contact by occupants in the event of a crash. However, this ruling is limited to the actual tire and would not apply to the wheel housing cover of a spare tire since that would be a component specified in S4.1 of the standard.; Sincerely, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel

ID: 86-5.28

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 10/01/86

TITLE: TEXT OF THE RULING BY THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT UPHOLDING THE STATE'S LAW REQUIRING SEAT BELT USE BY DRIVERS AND FRONT SEAT PASSENGERS IN AUTOMOBILES

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 07/32/89 FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA TO BUTLER DERRICK -- CONGRESS; REDBOOK A31; STANDARD 208 LETTER DATED 07/11/89 FROM BUTLER DERRICK -- CONGRESS TO STEVE WOOD -- NHTSA

TEXT: Docket Nos. 62719, 62799, 63705, 63224 cons -- Agenda 40 -- May 1986.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS et al., Appellants, v. ELIZABETH J. KOHRIG et al., Appellees.

PER CURIAM: The defendants in these four consolidated cases were issued traffic citations for failure to wear seat safety belts while operating their motor vehicles on a street or highway in violation of section 12-603.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1 (hereinafter the section).) In each case, the trial court concluded that the section was unconstitutional and dismissed the charge. The State appealed each case directly to this court pursuant to our Rule 302(a) (94 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)), and the cases were consolidated for purposes of appeal. Only two of the four defendants -- Elizabeth J. Kohrig and Regina L. Greene -- have filed briefs in this court; however, various parties have been permitted to file briefs as amicus curiae.

At issue is whether the section, which requires drivers of motor vehicles and their front-seat passengers to wear safety belts when driving on a public highway or street, violates the due process guarantees of the State and Federal constitutions. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 2; U.S. Const., amend. XIV, sec. 1.

The section, which became effective on July 1, 1985, provides in part:

"(a) Each driver and front seat passenger of a motor vehicle operated on a street or highway in this State shall wear a properly adjusted and fastened seat safety belt; except that, a child less than 6 years of age shall be protected as required pursuant to the Child Passenger Protection Act. Each driver of a motor vehicle transporting a child 6 years of age or more, but less than 16 years of age, in the front seat of a motor vehicle shall secure the child in a properly adjusted and fastened seat safety belt." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1(a).)

The statute also provides that certain persons are exempt from complying with the seat-belt-use requirement, including persons with a written medical waiver from a physician or government agency; those persons frequently stopping and leaving the vehicle or delivering property from the vehicle if its speed between stops does not exceed 15 miles per hour; and drivers operating a vehicle in reverse. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1(b)(1),

(b)(4).) Certain vehicles also are exempt from the statute's requirements, including motorcycles, motorized pedalcycles, and vehicles manufactured prior to 1965. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1(b)(5), (b)(9).) Violators of the section are guilty of a "petty offense and subject to a fine not to exceed $ 25." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.I(d).

At the outset we note that, in reviewing the constitutionality of Illinois' mandatory-seat-belt law, this court does not join in the debate over whether the law is desirable or necessary. Our nation was founded in large part on the democratic principle that the powers of government are to be exercised by the people through their elected representatives in the legislature, subject only to certain constitutional limitations. Although this court has never hesitated to invalidate laws that it believes to be unconstitutional, we emphasize that our role is a limited one. The issue here in "not what the legislature should do but what the legislature can do." City of Wichita v. While (1970), 205 Kan. 408, 409, 469 P.2d 287, 288.

Defendant Greene contends that the section violates her fundamental right to privacy protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. (U.S. Const., amend XIV, sec. 2.) Additionally, both defendants argue that the section is beyond the police powers of the legislature and thus violates the due process clauses of the State and Federal constitutions. We first turn to the issue of whether the section violates defendants' fundamental right to privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment.

Regulations that limit a person's constitutional right to privacy may be justified only by a "'compelling state interest,'" and the legislation "must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake." (Roe v. Wade (1973), 410 U.S. 113, 155, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 178, 93 S. Ct. 705, 728. See also Carey v. Population Services International (1977), 431 U.S. 678, 686, 52 L.Ed. 2d 675, 685, 97 S. Ct. 2010, 2016.) However, "'only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" [citation]'" (Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 65, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 462, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2639, quoting Roe v. Wade (1973), 410 U.S. 113, 152, 35 L. Ed.2d 147, 176, 93 S. Ct. 705, 726), or those liberties "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition'" (Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , , 92 L.Ed. 2d 140, 146, 106 S.

Ct. 2841, 2844; see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland (1977), 431 U.S. 494, 503, 52 L. Ed.2d 531, 540, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1938) are included in the right of privacy guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court has selected only a few rights for such an esteemed status: the "privacy right encompasses and protects the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing." Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 65, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 462, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2639. See Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , , 92 L. Ed. 2d 140, 148, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2346; Paul v. Davis (1976), 424 U.S. 693, 712-13, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, 420-21, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1166.

Moreover, recognizing that a court is "most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution," the Supreme Court has emphasized that there should be "great resistance" to further expanding the substantive due process right of privacy. (Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , , 92 L. Ed.2d 140, 148, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846.) Thus, attempts by litigants to expand the privacy right beyond matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relations, abortion, child rearing and education have largely been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , 92 L. Ed. 2d 140, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (right to privacy does not encompass right to engage in homosexual sodomy); Kelley v. Johnson (1977), 425 U.S. 231, 244, 47 L. Ed. 2d 708, 714, 96 S. Ct. 1440, 1444 (police officer does not have privacy right to choose hairstyle); Paul v. Davis (1976), 424 U.S. 693, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (no privacy protection of reputation); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 93 S. Ct. 2628 (privacy right does not encompass right of adults to watch obscene movies in places of public accommodation).

In the present case it cannot be said that defendant Greene's claimed right to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt on a public highway resembles those liberties identified by the Supreme Court as being included in the right of privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment. Although the section in question implicates a person's interest in "liberty" in the sense that it restricts his freedom of choice, the law here does not regulate those intimate

decisions relating to marriage, procreation, child rearing, education or family that have heretofore been recognized as deserving of heightened constitutional protection. (See Wells v. State (1985), A.D.2d , 495 N.Y.S. 2d 591 (mandatory-seat-belt-use law does not violate right of privacy). Cf. People v. Thomas (1984), 159 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 18, 206 Cal. Rptr. 84 (statute requiring the securing of a child passenger in a seat-restraint system does not infringe on defendant's fundamental right of privacy); State v. Fetterly (1969), 254 Or. 47, 456 P.2d 996 (motorcycle helmet law does not violate defendant's right of privacy).) Nor do we think that the right to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed" (Palko v. Connecticut (1937), 302 U.S. 319, 325-26, 82 L. Ed. 288, 292, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152), or a liberty "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" (Moore v. East Cleveland (1977), 431 U.S. 494, 503, 52 L. Ed. 2d 531, 540, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1938). The States historically have been given a wide latitude to regulate the use of motor vehicles (Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. (1959), 359 U.S. 520, 530, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1003, 1010, 79 S. Ct. 962, 968), and the individual driver's autonomy on the road has, out of necessity for the public safety and welfare, been significantly curtailed by State regulation. Like the court in Bisenius v. Karns (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 42, 165 N.W.2d 377, appeal dismissed (1969), 395 U.S. 709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 655, 89 S. Ct. 2033, we reject any notion that the right of privacy includes the right to "do one's thing" on an expressway:

"There is no place where any such right to be let alone would be less assertable than on a modern highway with cars, trucks, busses and cycles whizzing by at sixty or seventy miles an hour. When one ventures onto such a highway, he must be expected and required to conform to public safety regulations and controls, including some that would neither have been necessary nor reasonable in the era of horse-drawn vehicles." (42 Wis. 2d 42, 55, 165 N.W.2d 377, 384.)

We are unwilling to graft onto the Constitution a right of privacy to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt where there is no textual basis or a clear historical precedent for such a right in the language of the Constitution or the opinions of the Supreme Court. To do so woul be to place the court in a position of acting as a super legislature,

nullifying laws it does not like. That is not our proper role in a democratic society. Therefore, we hold that the section does not infringe upon defendant's fundamental right of privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment. Neither does it infringe upon any right to privacy arising under the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 6).

Defendants also argue that the section does not further the health, safety or welfare of the general public, asserting that the statute only protects the safety of the individual driver and passenger. They contend that since the section interferes with their right to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt, and has no corresponding public benefit, the statute exceeds the State's police power and violates the due process guarantees of the State and Federal constitutions.

It is well established that the legislatures, not the courts, have the primary role in our democratic society in deciding what the interests of the public require and in selecting the measures necessary to secure those interests. (City of Carbondale v. Brewster (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 111, 115; Memorial Gardens Association, Inc. v. Smith (1959), 16 Ill. 2d 116, 127.) Recognizing the legislature's broad power to provide for the public health, welfare and safety, the courts are hesitant to second-guess a legislative determination that a law is desirable or necessary. Only when the statute in question affects a fundamental constitutional right will the courts subject the legislation to strict or exacting scrutiny. In such cases, the State must have a "compelling" purpose for the law and show that it's goals cannot be accomplished by less restrictive means. (Carey v. Population Services International (1977), 431 U.S. 678, 686, 52 L. Ed. 2d 675, 685, 97 S. Ct. 2010, 2016.) Few rights, however, have been identified as "fundamental," since only those rights "that lie at the heart of the relationship between the individual and a republican form of nationally integrated government" are deemed deserving of heightened judicial scrutiny. (People ex rel. Tucker v. Kotsos (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 88, 97.) Thus, in most cases involving substantive due process challenges to statutes, the courts give substantial deference to the legislative enactments.

In the present case we already have determined that the section here involved does not infringe upon the defendants' right of privacy protected by the fourteenth

amendment, and defendants do not argue that the statute implicates any other fundamental constitutional right or liberty. As such, the State need not show a "compelling interest" for the law. It is sufficient that there is a rational basis for the statute. That is, the law will be upheld if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. (Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. (1955), 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 99 L. Ed. 563, 572, 75 S. Ct. 461, 464; Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368; Hayen v. County of Ogle (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 413, 419; Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association v. Block (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 443, 453.) Under the rational-basis test, a statute is presumed to be valid, and the party challenging the statute has the burden of proving that the statute is irrational. (Hayen v. County of Ogle (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 413, 419; Pozner v. Mauck (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 250, 255.) As long as there is a conceivable basis for finding a rational relationship, the law will be upheld. McGowan v. Maryland (1961), 366 U.S. 420, 426, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393, 399, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 1105; Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368.

In challenging the section as exceeding the scope of the State's police power, the defendants principally rely on the case of People v. Fries (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 446. In Fries the court held that a statute requiring the operator or passenger of a motorcycle to wear protective headgear was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the purpose of the headgear requirement was to "safeguard the person wearing it" and was unrelated to the safety of the public at large. (42 Ill. 2d 446, 450.) It concluded that the statute constituted a "regulation of what is essentially a matter of personal safety" and exceeded the scope of the State's police power. (42 Ill. 2d 446, 450.) Here, too, defendants argue that the decision of whether or not to wear a safety belt is "essentially a matter of personal safety" and that any regulation restricting the individual's right to make such a decision exceeds the State's police power.

The State, on the other hand, maintains that Fries was wrongly decided, and it urges us to overrule that decision. It correctly notes that at present Fries stands alone in holding that a motorcycle helmet law is unconstitutional. The overwhelming weight of authority is that motorcycle-helmet laws are a valid exercise of the State's police

power. (See Kingery v. Chapple (Alaska 1972), 504 P.2d 831; State v. Beeman (1975), 25 Ariz. App. 83, 541 P.2d 409; Penney v. City of North Little Rock (1970), 248 Ark. 1158, 455 S.W.2d 132; Love v. Bell (1970), 171 Colo. 27, 465 P.2d 118;State v. Brady (Del. Super. 1972), 290 A.2d 322; Hamm v. State (Fla. 1980), 387 So. 2d 946; State v. Cotton (1973), 55 Hawaii 138, 516 P.2d 709; State v. Albertson (1970), 93 Idaho 640, 470 P.2d 300; City of Wichita v. White (1970), 205 Kan. 408, 469 P.2d 287; Everhardt v. City of New Orleans (1968) 253 La. 285, 217 So. 2d 400, appeal dismissed and cert. denied (1969), 395 U.S. 212, 23 L. Ed. 2d 214, 89 S. Ct. 1775; State v. Quinnam (Me. 1977), 367 A.2d 1032; Simon v. Sargent (D. Mass. 1972), 346 F. Supp. 277, aff'd (1972), 409 U.S. 1020, 34 L. Ed. 2d 312, 93 S. Ct. 463; Commonwealth v. Howie (1968), 354 Mass. 769, 238 N.E.2d 373, cert. denied (1968), 393 U.S. 999, 21 L. Ed. 2d 464, 89 S. Ct. 485; City of Adrian v. Poucher (1976) 398 Mich. 316, 247 N.W.2d 798; State v. Edwards (1970), 287 Minn. 83, 177 N.W.2d 40; State v. Cushman (Mo. 1970), 451 S.W.2d 17; State v. Eight Judicial District Court (1985), 101 Nev. 658, 708 P.2d 1022; State v. Merski (1973), 113 N.H. 323, 307 A.2d 825; State v. Krammes (1969), 105 N.J. Super. 345, 252 A.2d 223; City of Albuquerque v.Jones (1975), 87 N.M. 486, 535 P.2d 1337; People v. Bennett (1977), 89 Misc. 2d 382, 391 N.Y.S.2d 506; State v. Anderson (1969), 275 N.C. 168, 166 S.E.2d 49; State v. Odegaard (N.D. 1969), 165 N.W.2d 677; State v. Stouffer (1971), 28 Ohio App. 2d 229, 276 N.E.2d 651; Elliott v. City of Oklahoma City (Okla. Crim. App. 1970), 471 P.2d 944; State v. Fetterly (1969), 254 Or. 47, 456 P.2d 996; Commonwealth v. Kautz (1985), 341 Pa. Super. 374, 491 A.2d 864; State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi (1968), 104 R.I. 28, 241 A.2d 625; Arutanoff v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County (1969), 223 Tenn. 535, 448 S.W.2d 408; Ex Parte Smith (Tex. Crim. App. 1969), 441 S.W.2d 544; State v. Acker (1971), 26 Utah 2d 104, 485 P.2d 1038; State v. Solomon (1969), 128 Vt. 197, 260 A.2d 377; State v. Laitinen (1969), 77 Wash. 2d 130, 459 P.2d 789; State v. Zektzer (1975), 13 Wash. App. 24, 533 P.2d 399, cert. denied (1975), 423 U.S. 1020, 46 L. Ed. 2d 392, 96 S. Ct. 457; Bisenius v. Karns (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 42, 165 N.W.2d 377, appeal dismissed (1969), 395 U.S. 709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 655, 89 S. Ct. 2033.) Alternatively, the State contends that the statute being challenged here promotes valid public

interests and thus is distinguishable from the motorcycle helmet law found to be unconstitutional in Fries.

Defendants are correct in asserting that the primary goal of the section is to protect the individual driver and front-seat passenger from death or serious injury. As such, the statute interfers with the individuals' choice concerning his or her personal safety. However, arriving at those conclusions does not ipso facto mean that the law is devoid of any public benefit and is unconstitutional. Regardless of a law's primary objective, it will be upheld if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose. (Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368-69; Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association v. Block (1979), 75 I11. 2d 443, 453.) In that regard, the defendants have not persuaded us that the legislature could not have found that the law bears a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. The legislative debates clearly indicate that the legislators believed that safety-belt use would protect persons other than the belt wearers by helping drivers to maintain control of their vehicles, and that the law would promote that economic welfare of the State by reducing the public and private costs associated with serious injuries and deaths caused by automobile accidents.

During debates in the House of Representatives, a principal sponsor of the safety-belt legislation remarked:

"The Bill would not only protect drivers and passengers in the front seat, the Bill would also protect other people. It would protect other drivers. It would protect pedestrains on our highways and on our sidewalks. The reason for that, of course, is that even a minor * * * accident, can if * * * a car is driven by a person who doesn't have a seat belt, * * * result in that person losing control of the car and injuring other people on or about the car." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 212 (statement of Representative John Cullerton).)

Another legislator argues that if she were to drive an automobile without her safety belt fastened "and I lose control of my car, I am endangering others." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 223 (statement of Representative Josephine Oblinger).) The Governor, in signing the seat-belt law, also agreed that the law would help drivers to maintain control of their vehicles and avoid accidents with other motorists and pedestrians:

"Unbelted passengers in a motor vehicle literally become human projectiles in the event of a crash. Unbelted passengers

can interfere with the ability of an operator to respond to the collision, and unbelted drivers may lose control of a vehicle and thus cause death and injury to others." Letter of Governor James R. Thompson to the General Assembly indicating his intent to sign House Bill 2800 (Jan. 8, 1985).

The State can enact laws aimed at reducting traffic accidents, since such laws are clearly related to the health, welfare and safety of the public. We also believe that the legislature could rationally conclude that unbelted drivers and passengers endanger the safety of others. In upholding a law similar to the one here under review, the court in People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, 494 N.Y.S.2d 960, stated:

"A driver who is injured or who is jolted away from his vehicle's controls during a skid or by an initial impact, may well be less able to prevent or minimize injuries caused by an accident. Also, an unrestrained occupant of a vehicle may injure others inside or out of the vehicle during an accident. The preventing or reduction of such an injury seems to the Court to be a valid State interest." (129 Misc. 2d 993, , 494 N.Y.S.2d 960, 963.)

It also is conceivable that drivers who wear safety belts are less likely to fall asleep at the wheel, or to lose control of their vehicles in situations where the driver must apply the brakes suddenly, or in cases where a vehicle begins to skid or swerve. Safety belts can also prevent passengers from being thrown against the driver. And, as the State observes, children and other occupants who are wearing safety belts are less likely to distract the driver. See People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, , 494 N.Y.S.2d 960, 963; Druhot, The Constitutionality of the Illinois Mandatory Seat Belt Use Legislation, 74 Ill. B.J. 290, 296 (1986); Werber, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach To Seat Belt Issues, 29 Cleve. St. L. Rev. 217, 244 (1980).

Defendants argue that there is no statistical evidence showing that seat-belt use helps the driver to maintain control of his vehicle and avoid accidents with other motorists or pedestrains. Even assuming this argument is correct, it is without merit. "The fact that a congressional directive reflects unprovable assumptions about what is good for the people * * * is not a sufficient reason to find that statute unconstitutional" (Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 62, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 460, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2638), and a court "will not disturb a police regulation merely where there is room for a difference of

opinion as to its wisdom, necessity and expendiency." (City of Carbondale v. Brewster (1979), 78 I11. 2d 111, 115. See also Schuringa v. City of Chicago (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 504, 515.) Moreover, "the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it." (Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. (1955), 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 99 L. Ed. 563, 572, 75 S. Ct. 461, 464.) Here, we think that the legislature could rationally determine that the seat-belt-use law would serve the public safety and welfare by reducing the likelihood that a driver would lose control of his vehicle and jeopardize other motorists or pedestrians.

Another reason advanced by the State for the section is that the law promotes the economic welfare of the State by reducing the public costs associated with serious injuries and deaths caused by automobile accidents. The legislative history of the section indicates that legislators were concerned about the financial costs associated with highway accidents. Representative Cullerton remarked that, the safety-belt legislation "would clearly save money," asserting that "it cost the State over 800,000 dollars for a 26 year old person who is made a paraplegic as a result of a car crash." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 212 (statement of Representative John Cullerton).) Another Representative stated: "The lives we were save and the injuries that we avoid are the injuries and lives that we, the taxpayers, are very likely to be responsible for in the long run. We're not talking about somebody's own individual decision to end up in a car crash and find him or herself in a hospital for 20 years with that individual paying the bill. It's the taxpayers that are going to be paying those bills." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 220 (statement of Barbara Currie).) Senator James Philip, in urging passage of the seat-belt law, observed that " in 1982 in Illinois some seventy-five people were killed in automobiles [while] performing their job * * *. This costs Illinois employers some twelve million dollars." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Debates, June 21, 1984, at 159 (statement of Senator James Philip).) Senator Dawn Netsch remarked: "We intrude because the consequences of the thousands of people * * * who are injured and whose affictions then are passed on

to their families, to all of us in society * * *." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Debates, June 21, 1984, at 162 (statement of Senator Dawn Netsch).) Governor Thompson, in explaining his reasons for signing the legislation, estimated that the seat belt law would "save more than 300 lives in Illinois in the first year, will avoid nearly 43,000 injuries and save more than $ 400 million in costs." Letter of Governor James R. Thompson to the General Assembly indicating his intent to sign House Bill 2800 (Jan. 8, 1985).

It cannot be seriously questioned that the police power may be used to promote the economic welfare of the State, its communities and its citizens. "[I]n the interest of general welfare, the police power may be exercised to protect citizens and their businesses in financial and economic matters, [and] it may be exercised to protect the governments itself against potential financial loss." (Sherman-Reynolds, Inc. v. Mahin (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 323, 326.) A law whose aim is to reduce the private and public costs resulting from injuries and deaths caused by motor vehicle accidents is therefore within the police power of the State. In finding that a motorcycle helmet law was rationally related to the public welfare, the court in Simon v. Sargent (D. Mass. 1972), 346 F. Supp. 277, aff'd (1972), 409 U.S. 1020, 34 L. Ed. 2d 312, 93 S. Ct. 463, stated:

"From the moment of the injury, society picks the person up off the highway; delivers him to a municipal hospital and municipal doctors; provides him with unemployment compensation if, after recovery, he cannot replace his lost job, and, if the injury causes permanent disability, may assume the responsibility for his and his family's continued subsistence. We do not understand a state of mind that permits plaintiff to think that only he himself is concerned." (346 F. Supp. 277, 279, aff'd (1972), 409 U.S. 1020, 34 L. Ed. 2d 312, 93 S. Ct. 463.)

Because of the drain on private and public financial resources caused by highway accidents, society has a legitimate interest in minimizing injuries which result from such accidents. See Wells v. State (1985), A.D.2d 495 N.Y.S.2d 591; People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, 494 N.Y.S.2d 960; State v. Eighth Judicial District Court (1985), 101 Nev. 658, 708 P.2d 1022; State v. Beeman (1975), 25 Ariz. App. 83, 541 P.2d 409; Love v. Bell (1970), 171 Colo. 27, 465 P.2d 118; See also Druhot, The Constitutionality of the Illinois Mandatory Seat belt Use Legislation, 74 Ill. B.J. 290 (1986); Note, The Illinois Seat Belt Law: Should those Who Ride Decide?, 19 John

Marshall L. Rev. 193 (1985); Werber, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to Seat Belt Issues, 29 Cleve, St. L. Rev. 217, 222 (1980).

Defendants make several arguments concerning the effectiveness of safety belts in reducing injuries and arguments regarding the merits of alternative safety devices such as air bags. Defendants also contend that in some instances safety belts may cause injuries instead of preventing them. We need not consider these arguments, however, since they are proper subjects of discussion for the legislature, not the courts. (Hayden v. County of Ogle (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 413, 421; City of Carbondale v. Brewster (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 111, 115; Pozner v. Mauck (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 250, 255.) We believe that the General Assembly could reasonably assume that a law requiring drivers and front-seat passengers to wear safety belts will reduce traffic-related injuries and fatalities. (Wells v. State (1985), A.D.2d , 495 N.Y.S.2d 591; People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, 494 N.Y.S.2d 960.) Therefore, we hold that section 12.603.1 does not violate the due process clauses of the State and Federal constitutions. To the extent that People v. Fries (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 446, is inconsistent with our opinion, it is overruled.

Defendant Greene also filed a motion to strike certain portions of the briefs and appendices filed by the State and certain parties amicus curiae. This motion was taken with the case. Our review of the record shows that certain safety statistics relied on by the State and the amicus were not presented in the trial courts. Accordingly, defendant Greene's motion to strike this information is allowed.

For the reasons stated the judgments of the circuit courts of Marion, Effingham, Fayette and Champaign counties in cause Nos. 62719, 62799, 63705 and 63224 are reversed, and said causes are remanded to those respective courts for further proceedings.

Motion allowed;

judgments reversed;

causes remanded.

CLARK, C.J., and SIMON, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

ID: aiam0757

Dear Mr. Nishibori: This is in reply to your letter of June 9, 1972, concerning th proposed amendment to paragraph S4.2 of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 302 (36 F.R. 9565, May 26, 1971). As we understand your question it is, when surface, underlying, or padding and cushioning materials are glued together in particular vehicle components, should you test with the glue applied to the contact points between the materials.; The proposed revision of paragraph S4.2 together with paragraph S5. o the standard contemplates the testing of composites with the individual materials joined together, as they appear in the vehicle. Materials glued together would be tested in that configuration during NHTSA compliance tests, and the glue would be tested as part of the composite.; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel

ID: nht92-6.34

DATE: May 27, 1992

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Gerald A. Guertin

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 3/30/92 from Gerald A. Guertin to Samuel Skinner (OCC 7234)

TEXT:

Your letter of March 30, 1992 to former Secretary Skinner was referred to this agency for reply. You expressed concern that you had not received a response to an earlier letter, addressed to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), concerning the use of vans to transport school children. I regret that you did not receive a response to your previous letter.

You indicated that you are a school teacher in Florida and asked us to verify your understanding of why you cannot use nine- to 15- passenger vans to transport school children. You stated that, at the present time, seven-person rifle teams, eight-person cheerleader squads, 11-person science clubs, and the like are prohibited from being transported in vans and must instead use "gas-guzzling, 37-passenger school buses." Since these clubs must raise their own gas money, you stated that they could get "more trips for the buck" if they could use vans. You indicated that you were permitted to use vans prior to a crash about seven years ago in which a cheerleader was killed. You understand that van roof standards were apparently not what they should be and that NHTSA then "came forward with the need for 'acceptability of crash-worthy tests' for vans," placing the cost of developing and performing such tests on manufacturers. You suggested that van manufacturers opted out of the school van business because they were reluctant to fund the new tests.

Your understanding is not quite correct, and I am pleased to have this opportunity to clarify Federal law as it relates to school buses. By way of background information, NHTSA has the authority under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act to issue motor vehicle safety standards that apply to the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles, in order to reduce the number of fatalities and injuries that result from motor vehicle crashes.

Under NHTSA's regulations, vans are generally classified as either multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPV's) or buses. The MPV category includes vans which carry 10 persons or less; vans which carry more than 10 persons are buses. Under the agency's definitions, a "school bus" is a type of bus sold for transporting students to and from school or school-related events.

All MPV's and buses are required to meet Federal motor vehicle safety standards. However, in the legislative history of the School Bus Safety Amendments of 1974, Congress stated that school transportation should be held to the highest level of safety. Accordingly, NHTSA has issued special Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to all new school buses.

Like all safety standards, NHTSA's school bus standards impose obligations on the manufacturers and sellers of new motor vehicles, not upon the subsequent

users of these vehicles. It is a violation of Federal law for any person to sell any new vehicle that does not comply with all school bus safety standards if the vehicle capacity is more than 10 persons, and if the seller is aware that the purchaser intends to use the vehicle as a school bus. On the other hand, without violating any provision of Federal law, a school may USE a vehicle which does not comply with Federal school bus regulations to transport school children. This is so because the individual States, not the Federal government, have authority over the use of vehicles.

However, I would like to call your attention to a guideline that NHTSA has issued under the authority of the Highway Safety Act of 1966. That Act authorizes the agency to issue guidelines for states to use in developing their highway safety programs. NHTSA issued Highway Safety Program Guideline 17, Pupil Transportation Safety, to provide recommendations to the states on various operational aspects of their school bus and pupil transportation safety programs. Guideline 17 recommends that any vehicle designed for carrying more than 10 persons which is used as a school bus comply with all safety standards applicable to school buses at the time the vehicle was manufactured.

In conclusion, it is not a violation of Federal law for your school to use vans for transportation of school children; however, use of these vehicles may be restricted by Florida law. I must emphasize NHTSA's position that a vehicle meeting Federal school bus regulations is the safest way to transport students. I strongly recommend that you give your most careful consideration to the possible consequences of transporting school children in vehicles that do not comply with those standards.

I hope this information will be helpful to you. If you have any further questions regarding this matter, please feel free to contact Walter Myers of this office at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Attachment

The following is a list of federal motor vehicle safety standards that include requirements for school buses:

Standard Nos. 101 through 104 Standard No. 105 (school buses with hydraulic serivce brake systems) Standard Nos. 106 through 108 Standard Nos. 111 through 113 Standard No. 115 Standard No. 116 (school buses with hydraulic service brake systems) Standard Nos. 119 and 120 Standard No. 121 (school buses with air brake systems) Standard No. 124 Standard No. 131 (effective September 1, 1992) Standard Nos. 201 through 204 (school buses with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 10,000 pounds or less) Standard No. 205 Standard Nos. 207 through 210 Standard No. 212 (school busses with a GVWR or 10,000 pounds or less) Standard No. 217 Standard No. 219 (school busses with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less)

Standard No. 220 Standard No. 221 (school buses with a GVWR greater than 10,000 pounds) Standard No. 222 Standard Nos. 301 and 302

Of the above-listed standards, only Standard numbers 131 and 220 through 222 apply exclusively to school buses.

All federal motor vehicle safety standards may be found in Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 571. The CFRs may be found in your local bar association library, the main public library, or a copy of Title 49, CFR, may be purchased from the United States Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D.C. 20402, (202) 783-3238.

ID: aiam0440

Dear Mr. Wuddel: This is in reply to your letter of August 20, 1970, concerning Moto Vehicle Safety Standard No. 302 (Docket 3-3, Notice 4) 'Flammability of Interior Materials.' You ask whether 'plastic materials such as those covering control lamps, for the control lamps themselves, for the control knobs and for the interior lights must also meet the same requirements.' The components you list are not specifically enumerated in S4.1 of the standard, and are not required to meet the standard's burn- rate requirements unless they are 'any other interior materials. . . that are designed to absorb energy on contact by occupants in the event of a crash.' (See the last sentence of S4.1, copy enclosed) This will depend on the particular configuration of the vehicle in question, and the manufacturer must determine, based on the design of his vehicle, whether the components you describe fall within the quoted language.; In answer to your second question, the NHTSA neither requires no provides prior approvals for motor vehicles or motor vehicle components. Questions concerning these approvals should be directed to the jurisdiction, such as the State of California, which you mention, that is involved.; Sincerely, Lawrence R. Schneider, Chief Counsel

ID: nht95-2.16

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: March 31, 1995

FROM: Philip R. Recht -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Truman J. Lothen

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 2/6/95 LETTER FROM TRUMAN J. LOTHEN TO NHTSA (OCC 10754)

TEXT: Dear Mr. Lothen:

This responds to your letter of February 6, 1995, requesting information on requirements applicable to a "van seat/bed for aftermarket installation." Your questions and our response to each follows.

Does your department have safety standards that must (should) be designed into aftermarket vehicles seats?

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. Federal law prohibits any person from manufacturing, intr oducing into commerce, selling, or importing any new motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment unless the vehicle or equipment item is in conformity with all applicable safety standards. NHTSA, however, does not approve motor vehicles or motor ve hicle equipment, nor do we endorse any commercial products. Instead, each manufacturer is required to "self-certify" that its products meet all applicable safety standards.

There are five safety standards that are relevant to your inquiry: Standard No. 207, Seating Systems, Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection, Standard No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies, Standard No. 210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages, and Standard No. 3 02, Flammability of Interior Materials.

Standard No. 209 sets forth strength, elongation, webbing width, durability, and other requirements for seat belt assemblies. This standard applies to all seat belt assemblies for use in motor vehicles, regardless of whether the belts are installed as o riginal equipment in a motor vehicle or sold as replacements. Hence, any seat belts installed on the aftermarket seat have to be certified as complying with Standard No. 209.

The remaining four standards apply only to new vehicles. If the aftermarket seat were installed before the vehicle's first purchase for purposes other than resale, the vehicle would have to be certified as complying with all applicable standards, includ ing these four, with the aftermarket seat installed. Standard No. 207 establishes strength and other performance requirements for vehicle seats. Standard No. 208 sets forth requirements for occupant protection at the various seating positions in vehicl es. Standard No. 210 establishes strength and location requirements for seat belt anchorages. Finally, Standard No. 302 specifies burn resistance requirements for materials used in motor vehicles, specifically including seat cushions, seat backs, and s eat belts. While aftermarket seats, as items of equipment, are not required to meet these requirements, you may wish to use these standards as design guidelines.

After a vehicle's first purchase for purposes other than resale; i.e., the first retail sale of the vehicle, the only provision in Federal law that affects a vehicle's continuing compliance with an applicable safety standard is set forth in 49 U.S.C. 301 22(b). That section provides that:

A manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business may not knowingly make inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle . . . . in compliance with an applicable motor vehicle safety standard.

Any violation of this "make inoperative" prohibition would subject the violator to a potential civil penalty of up to $ 1,000 for each violation. Please note that the "make inoperative" provision prohibits those entities from performing aftermarket modi fications that they know or should know will degrade the safety of the vehicle as it was before the modification.

Please note also that the "make inoperative" prohibition does not apply to modifications vehicle owners make to their own vehicles. Thus, Federal law would not apply in situations where vehicle owners install your seat in their own vehicles, even if the installation were to result in the vehicle no longer complying with the safety standards. However, individual States have the authority to regulate modifications that individual vehicle owners may make to their own vehicles.

Finally, as a manufacturer, you would be subject to federal requirements concerning the recall and remedy of products with defects related to motor vehicle safety (49 U.S.C. 30118-30121). I have enclosed a sheet for new manufacturers that discusses the basic requirements of our standards and regulations, including the provisions relating to manufacturers' responsibilities to ensure that their products are free of safety-related defects.

This seat would be provided with a lap seat belt and shoulder belt with one end attached to the seat frame and the other to the vehicle structure similar to what's currently used in automobiles. What safety design standards must be incorporated into thi s restraint system?

As explained above, the seat belt would have to comply with Standard No. 209. If you install seat belts manufactured by another company, that company should have certified compliance with that standard.

Would this seat require compliance testing to meet safety requirements?

As noted above, if these seats are installed in a vehicle prior to the vehicle's first sale for purposes other than resale, the vehicle must be certified as complying with all applicable safety standards with the seat installed. NHTSA's position on what steps manufacturers must take before certifying that their vehicles or equipment comply with applicable safety standards has been often stated and applies with equal force in your situation.

Our position is as follows. The compliance test procedures set forth in the safety standards must be followed by this agency during our compliance testing. With respect to your company's seats, this means that NHTSA's compliance testing for the vehicle would be conducted using the test procedures set forth in the relevant safety standard or standards. Manufacturers certifying compliance with the safety standards are not required to follow exactly the compliance test procedures set forth in the applica ble standard. In fact, manufacturers are not required to conduct any actual testing before certifying that their products comply with applicable safety standards. However, to avoid liability for civil penalties if the vehicle were determined not to com ply with a safety standard, the certifying manufacturer is required to exercise "reasonable care" to assure compliance and in making its certification. It may be simplest for the manufacturer to establish that it exercised "reasonable care" if the manuf acturer has conducted testing that strictly followed the compliance test procedures set forth in the standard. However, "reasonable care" might also be shown by using modified test procedures, engineering analyses, computer simulations, and the like. T hus, the entity that installs your seat in a vehicle prior to the vehicle's first sale will have to decide for itself, in the first instance, what information it needs to make its certification in the exercise of "reasonable care."

As noted above, if the seat were installed after the first purchase of the vehicle in good faith for purposes other than resale, any manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair shop that performed the installation would have to ensure that the installat ion did not "make inoperative" compliance with any applicable safety standard. Your company should carefully examine your product and the proposed installation instructions and compare those with the requirements of the safety standards, to determine if installing your product in accordance with your instructions would result in the vehicle no longer complying with the standards.

I hope you find this information helpful. I have enclosed information on how to get copies of those standards and regulations. If you have any other questions, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht90-2.38

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: May 1, 1990

FROM: Jerry Laderberg -- Acting Director, Commercial Rulings Division

TO: John H. Heinrich -- District Director

TITLE: Re Country of origin marking of imported automotive glass

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 9-14-90 from P.J. Rice to J. Durant (A36; Std. 205); Also attached to letter dated June 26, 1989 from S.P. Wood to M. Turner; Also attached to letter dated 6-28-90 from J. Durant to P.J. Rice (OCC 4965)

TEXT:

This is in response to your memorandum of July 21, 1988, (MAR-2-05-LA:CO:TTB-1 DLM), requesting internal advice on the country of origin marking of imported replacement automotive glass. We regret the delay in responding to your inquiry.

FACTS:

Mitsubishi International Corporation imports automotive glass from Japan for the replacement automotive market. The automotive glass is packaged in two ways. Deep bent automotive glass such as windshields and rear windows are individually packaged in p lastic containers. Side window automotive glass are individually packaged in cardboard containers. All the containers are marked with the country of origin of the glass.

The car manufacturer's name, the trademark of the glass, the material code, the Department of Transportation ("DOT") number and other markings required by the European Community are sandblasted on the glass. It is common commercial practice to mark the glass with the trademark, DOT number and other certification marks. The part numbers are placed on labels on the individual container.

In HQ 726169 (September 20, 1984), Customs denied an importer's request for an exemption from individual country of origin marking of glass windshields and windows for buses and automobiles. Customs cited examples of who might be considered the ultimate purchaser of imported glass in different circumstances, but did not rule on who the ultimate purchaser was in that case.

In HQ 729257 (March 30, 1988), Customs clarified its position that the examples cited in HQ 726169 were not necessary to the ruling and were not binding on Customs.

In your memorandum, you asked that we determine who is the ultimate purchaser of imported replacement automotive glass and how the imported glass ought to be marked for country of origin marking purposes.

ISSUE:

Whether the installer of imported replacement automotive glass is the ultimate purchaser for country of origin marking purposes.

LAW AND ANALYSIS:

Section 304 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1304), provides that, unless expected, every article of foreign origin imported into the U.S. shall be marked in a conspicuous place as legibly, indelibly, and permanently as the nature of the article (or container) will permit, in such a manner as to indicate to the ultimate purchaser in the U.S. the English name of the country of origin of the article. The Court of International Trade stated in Ford North America v. United States, 701 F.Sup p. 229, 12 CIT (CIT 1988), that: "In ascertaining what constitutes the country of origin under the marking statute, a court must look at the sense in which the term is used in the statute, giving reference to the purpose of the particular legislation inv olved. The purpose of the marking statute is outlined in United States v. Friedlaender & Co., 27 CCPA 297 at 302 C.A.D. 104 (1940), where the court stated that: "Congress intended that the ultimate purchaser should be able to know by an inspection of th e marking on the imported goods the country of which the goods is the product. The evident purpose is to mark the goods so that at the time of purchase the ultimate purchaser may, by knowing where the goods were produced, be able to buy or refuse to buy them, if such marking should influence his will."

Part 124, Customs Regulations (19 CFR Part 134), implements the country of origin marking requirements and exceptions of 19 U.S.C. 1304. Section 134.1(d), Customs Regulations (19 CFR 134.1(d)), defines the ultimate purchaser as generally the last person in the U.S. who will receive the article in the form in which it was imported. The definition then gives examples of who might be the ultimate purchaser if the imported article is used in manufacture, if the imported article is sold at retail in its im ported form and if an imported article is distributed as a gift.

The standard for determining the ultimate purchaser of an article used in manufacture is set forth in section 134.35, Customs Regulations (19 CFR 134.35), which provides that the manufacturer or processor who converts or combines the imported article int o an article having a name, character or use differing from that of the imported article is considered the ultimate purchaser. Under such circumstances, the imported article is substantially transformed and the article itself need not be individually ma rked. Only the outermost container in which the article is imported must be marked.

A substantial transformation occurs when articles lose their identity and become new articles having a new name, character or use. United States v. Gibson-Thomsen Co., 27 C.C.P.A. 267 at 270 (1940), National Juice Products Association v. United States, 10 CIT 48, 628 F.Supp. 978 (CIT 1986), Koru North America v. United States, 12 CIT , 701 F.Supp. 229 (CIT 1988).

In the instant case, the automotive glass is imported already cut to size and is merely installed into the automobile. Further, the glass is imported already cut to shape and dedicated to use as either a windshield, rear window, or side window, and made to fit a particular automobile type and model. In addition, the automotive glass is imported in a finished condition and merely requires installation. No evidence was submitted that the installation is particularly complex or requires a great deal of

skill. For all the above reasons, the installation of replacement automotive glass into an automobile is not a substantial transformation.

Since the replacement automotive glass is not substantially transformed, pursuant to 19 CFR 134.35, the automobile owner who purchases the glass is the ultimate purchaser. The marking statute requires that the ultimate purchaser, who in this case is the automobile owner purchasing replacement glass, be made aware of the country of origin of the imported article.

Section 134.41(a), Customs Regulations (19 CFR 134.41(a)), states that as a general rule, marking requirements are best met by marking worked into the article at the time of manufacture. For example, it is suggested that the country of origin on metal a rticles be die sunk, molded in or etched; on earthenware or chinaware be glazed on in the process of firing; and on paper articles be imprinted. The marking requirements of 19 CFR 134.41 are best met by marking worked into the glass at the time of manuf acture which would be visible to the automobile owner purchasing the glass. In any case, the marking must be sufficient to insure that in any reasonably foreseeable circumstance, the marking shall remain on the article until it reaches the ultimate purch aser unless it is deliberately removed.

HOLDING:

Imported replacement automotive glass is not substantially transformed when it is installed in an automobile. Therefore, pursuant to 19 CFR 134.1(d), the automobile owner who purchases the replacement glass is the last person in the U.S. to receive it i n its imported form and is the ultimate purchaser of the imported automotive glass. Pursuant to 19 CFR 134.41, the marking requirement is best met with a marking worked into the glass at the time of manufacture which would be visible to the automobile o wner purchasing the glass.