ID: 1083

Mr. Robert J. Ponticelli
President
American International
1040 Avenida Acaso
Camarillo, CA 93012

Dear Mr. Ponticelli:

This replies to your letter of July 25, 1995, asking for an opinion "on the use of Electro-Luminescent Strip Lighting on motor vehicles." The device in question "is an ornamental light which produces less than .05 candela/sq. inch." You have enclosed a brochure which shows the strip in use as a license plate frame and to mark the sides or perimeter of a vehicle. We assume that you are not asking about the license plate frame but only the "Lighted Pin Striping". The "Lighted Pin Striping" comes in "basic white" but once applied, seven colors of overlay tape are available to change the color. The brochure shows it in shades of blue and pink. You would like our views "on the installation of this product by regulated parties such as new car dealers and non-regulated entities such as aftermarket specialty shops and vehicle owners."

We are pleased to provide you with the interpretation you seek. The basic obligation of a new-car dealer is to deliver a new car that remains in compliance with all the applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards for which its manufacturer has certified compliance. In other words, the dealer must ensure that none of its actions before the sale of a new vehicle create a noncompliance with a safety standard. Further, if a dealer alters a vehicle before sale other than by the addition, substitution, or removal of readily attachable components, or minor finishing operations such as painting, is required to certify that the altered vehicle continues to meet the standards.

The Federal new vehicle standard that relates to your product is Standard No. 108 Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment. This standard permits a new car dealer to add supplementary lighting equipment such as the luminescent strip if the supplementary equipment does not impair the effectiveness of the lighting equipment required by Standard No. 108. The most common cause of impairment is lighting equipment that creates confusion with, or distraction from, the purpose of any item of required lighting equipment. Under Standard No. 108's lighting scheme, the color of lamps on the front of a vehicle are restricted to white and amber. On the side of the vehicle, side marker lamps and reflectors must be only amber to the front and red to the rear. Rear lighting is red or amber, with the color white permitted for the backup lamp only. The Lighted Pin Striping comes in a variety of colors. Your brochure shows one that is pink or red in color mounted on the front of a vehicle. We believe it possible that a motorist seeing a color of light on the front of the vehicle generally used on the rear or on the side at the rear could be distracted from the driving task. There is also the possibility that the strip would be bright enough to mask and thereby reduce the effectiveness of an adjacent front or rear turn signal, or stop lamp. In general, the agency tries to discourage the use of novelty lighting devices because of the uncertain reaction an unfamiliar light or reflection may cause in other drivers on the roadway. However, the determination as to whether installation of the lighting strip would impair the efficiency of required lighting equipment is initially that of the new car dealer who must determine whether his modifications to a new vehicle might take it out of compliance. Unless that determination is clearly erroneous, NHTSA will not contest it.

With respect to sales in the aftermarket, installation by a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business of the lighting strip would be prohibited if the use of the strip would, in the words of the statute, "make inoperative" any of the required lighting equipment. We tend to equate "make inoperative" and "impair effectiveness" so that the same considerations would have to be taken into account in installing the lighting equipment on a used as well as a new car. However, this prohibition does not extend to the vehicle owner who, under Federal law, may install the lighting strip regardless of its effect upon compliance.

Nevertheless, even if novelty lighting equipment does not violate Federal law, the ultimate decision of its acceptability is that of the State in which the lighting strip is to be used. It is our understanding that, for example, that California requires any emitted or reflected light from the front of vehicles to be white or yellow in color, which would appear to preclude installation of the lighting strip in colors other than these. For an opinion on the treatment of

the lighting strip under State laws, we suggest that you write for an opinion to the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, 4600 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22203.

If you have any further questions, you may refer them to Taylor Vinson of this Office (202-366-5263).

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

ref:108 d:8/18/95

ID: 10839

Mr. C. Rufus Pennington, III
Margol & Pennington, P.A.
Suite 1702 American Heritage Tower
76 South Laura Street
Jacksonville, FL 32202

Dear Mr. Pennington:

This responds to your letter concerning the rear seats of a 1979 Porsche 911 SC, which were not equipped with any type of seat belt. You asked two questions relating to whether these seats should have been equipped with seat belts. Your questions are addressed below.

1. Did the manufacturer's designation of "two front" passenger seats eliminate any obligation on the part of the manufacturer to provide seat belts in the rear seats under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208?

As explained below, a manufacturer's designation that a vehicle has two front seats does not eliminate the obligation to provide seat belts at rear seats, if those positions are "designated seating positions."

By way of background information, The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA has exercised this authority to establish Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208), which specifies performance requirements for the protection of vehicle occupants in crashes. Standard No. 208 required passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1973 and before September 1, 1986, to have either a Type 1 (lap) or Type 2 (lap/shoulder) seat belt assembly at each rear "designated seating position."

The term "designated seating position" is defined at 49 CFR 571.3. For vehicles manufactured before September 1, 1980, the term "designated seating position" was defined as:

any plan view location intended by the manufacturer to provide seating accommodation while the vehicle is in

motion, for a person at least as large as a fifth percentile adult female, except auxiliary seating accommodations such as temporary or folding jump seats.

In a May 22, 1978, notification to vehicle manufacturers, the agency stated that manufacturers are responsible for determining the number of seating positions that are in the vehicle. The agency also stated:

This does not mean, however, that the manufacturer's designation will be accepted by the agency if there are additional, obvious seating positions that are likely to be used by occupants while the vehicle is in motion. The agency unquestionably intends to require protection for all vehicle occupants.

Thus, a manufacturer's specification that a vehicle has two front seats did not eliminate Standard No. 208's requirement for a seat belt assembly at each rear seat, if those locations met the above definition.

2. Did the Porsche 911 SC comply with, or did it violate, the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208?

NHTSA cannot make a determination as to whether a vehicle complied with applicable safety standards outside a compliance proceeding. However, I can advise you of the factors the agency would look at to determine if the rear locations are designated seating positions. If those locations are designated seating positions, they should have been equipped with a seat belt assembly when originally manufactured.

The May 22, 1978, notice provides a good summary of the agency's position. That notice states:

the agency will consider any position ... capable of accommodating a person at least as large as a fifth percentile adult female to be a "designated seating position", if the overall seat configuration and design is such that the manufacturer knows the position is likely to be used as a seating position while the vehicle is in motion.

I note that the hip breadth of a sitting fifth percentile female is approximately 13 inches, and the sitting height is approximately 31 inches. These are the measurements NHTSA would consider in determining whether a position is capable of accommodating a fifth percentile female.

I hope this information has been helpful. If you have other questions or need some additional information, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosures

ref:571#208 d:6/6/95 The definition was amended effective September 1, 1980. Copies of the September 28, 1978 notice of proposed rulemaking and April 19, 1979 final rule are enclosed. 43 FR 21893. A copy of this notice is enclosed. While that notice was focused on front seats, the rationale would apply to any seat.

ID: 1083a

Mr. Robert J. Ponticelli
President
American International
1040 Avenida Acaso
Camarillo, CA 93012

Dear Mr. Ponticelli:

This replies to your letter of July 25, 1995, asking for an opinion "on the use of Electro-Luminescent Strip Lighting on motor vehicles." The device in question "is an ornamental light which produces less than .05 candela/sq. inch." You have enclosed a brochure which shows the strip in use as a license plate frame and to mark the sides or perimeter of a vehicle. We assume that you are not asking about the license plate frame but only the "Lighted Pin Striping". The "Lighted Pin Striping" comes in "basic white" but once applied, seven colors of overlay tape are available to change the color. The brochure shows it in shades of blue and pink. You would like our views "on the installation of this product by regulated parties such as new car dealers and non-regulated entities such as aftermarket specialty shops and vehicle owners."

We are pleased to provide you with the interpretation you seek. The basic obligation of a new-car dealer is to deliver a new car that remains in compliance with all the applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards for which its manufacturer has certified compliance. In other words, the dealer must ensure that none of its actions before the sale of a new vehicle create a noncompliance with a safety standard. Further, if a dealer alters a vehicle before sale other than by the addition, substitution, or removal of readily attachable components, or minor finishing operations such as painting, is required to certify that the altered vehicle continues to meet the standards.

The Federal new vehicle standard that relates to your product is Standard No. 108 Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment. This standard permits a new car dealer to add supplementary lighting equipment such as the luminescent strip if the supplementary equipment does not impair the effectiveness of the lighting equipment required by Standard No. 108. The most common cause of impairment is lighting equipment that creates confusion with, or distraction from, the purpose of any item of required lighting equipment. Under Standard No. 108's lighting scheme, the color of lamps on the front of a vehicle are restricted to white and amber. On the side of the vehicle, side marker lamps and reflectors must be only amber to the front and red to the rear. Rear lighting is red or amber, with the color white permitted for the backup lamp only. The Lighted Pin Striping comes in a variety of colors. Your brochure shows one that is pink or red in color mounted on the front of a vehicle. We believe it possible that a motorist seeing a color of light on the front of the vehicle generally used on the rear or on the side at the rear could be distracted from the driving task. There is also the possibility that the strip would be bright enough to mask and thereby reduce the effectiveness of an adjacent front or rear turn signal, or stop lamp. In general, the agency tries to discourage the use of novelty lighting devices because of the uncertain reaction an unfamiliar light or reflection may cause in other drivers on the roadway. However, the determination as to whether installation of the lighting strip would impair the efficiency of required lighting equipment is initially that of the new car dealer who must determine whether his modifications to a new vehicle might take it out of compliance. Unless that determination is clearly erroneous, NHTSA will not contest it.

With respect to sales in the aftermarket, installation by a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business of the lighting strip would be prohibited if the use of the strip would, in the words of the statute, "make inoperative" any of the required lighting equipment. We tend to equate "make inoperative" and "impair effectiveness" so that the same considerations would have to be taken into account in installing the lighting equipment on a used as well as a new car. However, this prohibition does not extend to the vehicle owner who, under Federal law, may install the lighting strip regardless of its effect upon compliance.

Nevertheless, even if novelty lighting equipment does not violate Federal law, the ultimate decision of its acceptability is that of the State in which the lighting strip is to be used. It is our understanding that, for example, that California requires any emitted or reflected light from the front of vehicles to be white or yellow in color, which would appear to preclude installation of the lighting strip in colors other than these. For an opinion on the treatment of

the lighting strip under State laws, we suggest that you write for an opinion to the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, 4600 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22203.

If you have any further questions, you may refer them to Taylor Vinson of this Office (202-366-5263).

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel ref:108 d:8/18/95

ID: 10855-2

Terrence S. Lockman, Investigator
Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie,
Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A.
Attorneys-at-Law
P.O. Box 12308
226 South Palafox Place
Pensacola, FL 32581

Dear Mr. Lockman:

This responds to your request for an interpretation whether a Model Year (MY) 1981 Versa Sweeper road sweeper is a "motor vehicle" and therefore subject to the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSSs) that were in effect when the vehicle was manufactured. Further, you ask whether the Versa Sweeper had to comply with requirements for an occupant restraint system or for rollover protection. You explained that you are conducting an investigation, and that "At the time in question, the vehicle was being used in a construction zone, to sweep debris off the roadway."

I note, before beginning, that your letter had asked for certain information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). NHTSA separately answered your FOIA request by letter dated May 22, 1995, from Ms. Heidi Coleman of my staff, Assistant Chief Counsel for General Law.

Yours is an unusual interpretation request. Typically, questions concerning whether a vehicle is a motor vehicle are raised around the time of manufacture of a vehicle or its importation into the country, and by a person knowledgeable about the intended use of the vehicle, such as the vehicle's manufacturer. In contrast, your question asks about another entity's vehicle 14 years after the vehicle's manufacture, which makes our response more difficult. We cannot say for certain what principles would have applied in 1981 concerning the Versa Sweeper, and our knowledge of the vehicle is limited to the information you provided. Thus, a conclusive answer is beyond our reach.

We can make the following observations, however. NHTSA applies several principles when making a determination of whether a vehicle is a motor vehicle. Section 102(3) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act defined a motor vehicle as "a vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power and manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways . . . ." We are not certain, based on the information you provided, that the Versa Sweeper was manufactured for use on public highways. The literature you sent indicates that the Versa Sweeper is intended for "road maintenance sweeping and highway preparation cleaning." It appears that the vehicle might be a construction vehicle. Moreover, you indicated that the vehicle was being used in a construction zone "at the time in question." Construction-related vehicles generally are "motor vehicles" for purposes of our statute if they frequently use the highway going to and from job sites and stay at a job site for only a limited time. With regard to the 1981 Versa Sweeper, its use of the highway is unclear.

Assuming the Versa Sweeper had regularly used the highway, NHTSA's longstanding position has been that vehicles of unusual configuration that are incapable of obtaining speeds greater than 20 miles per hour (mph) are not required to comply with the FMVSSs. It is unclear how this principle applies to a 1981 Versa Sweeper. The material you enclosed indicates that the Versa Sweeper has "Infinitely variable speeds from 0-30 miles per hour...." It is unclear whether this means each Versa Sweeper can attain a speed of 30 mph or whether some, but not all, can. A Versa Sweeper that had a maximum speed of less than 20 mph is excluded. One that went over 20 mph might not have been.

You ask about requirements for occupant restraints and rollover protection. The agency has stated that "street sweepers"--that are motor vehicles--are trucks. In 1981, FMVSS No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR '571.208), required open-bodied light trucks to have a lap belt system. There was no rollover requirement.

If you have any further questions, please contact Ms. Dorothy Nakama of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

ref:VSA102(3) d:8/2/95 In 1994, the Safety Act was recodified, without substantial change, at 49 U.S.C. 30101 et seq. The motor vehicle" definition is set forth in section 30102(a).

ID: 10858

Mr. Lance Tunick
Vehicle Science Corporation
P.O. Box 1015
Golden, CO 80402-1015

Dear Mr. Tunick:

This responds to your FAX of April 19, 1995, requesting clarification of an April 3, 1995, letter from this office. You asked for verification that the "seat belt anchorages in the following scenario are exempt from the location requirement of Standard No. 210:

A vehicle with 2 front seating positions that is fitted with an air bag and manual three- point seat belt at each position, and such restraint meets the frontal crash protection requirements of S5.1 of Standard No. 208 with the air bags alone and with the belts and air bags together, but the belts alone are not crash tested under FMVSS 208."

Your understanding is correct.

I hope this information has been helpful. If you have other questions or need some additional information, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel ref:208 d:5/9/95

ID: 10868-2

Mr. John N. Quinata
Customs and Quarantine Agency
Government of Guam
Suite 225, 2nd Floor, GITC Bldg.
Tamuning, Guam 96911

Dear Mr. Quinata:

This responds to your letter asking whether used Nissan Truck Crane Lorries from Japan are subject to the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS). I apologize for the delay in our response, but we had difficulty contacting Nissan for some information we needed to answer your question. From your letter, I assume that Sanko Bussan Guam has imported this vehicle for use in the dock area, and that your agency is holding the vehicle pending this interpretation because the vehicle is not certified as complying with the FMVSS.

The short answer to your question is that the truck crane is a motor vehicle, subject to the FMVSS. I will outline the applicable law and point out some of our regulations that you should consider.

The issue you raise is whether the truck crane is a "motor vehicle," since the regulations you ask about apply only to motor vehicles. Title 49 of the U.S. Code, section 30102(a)(6), defines a motor vehicle as "a vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power and manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways . . . ." Work-related vehicles generally are "motor vehicles" for purposes of our statute if they frequently use the highway going to and from job sites and stay at a job site for only a limited time.

We believe the truck crane is a motor vehicle. Nissan Diesel North America informs us that this truck crane is a general purpose medium-duty crane that can be used for short-duty jobs and driven from site to site on the public roads. The photographs you enclosed show the crane mounted on what appears to be a conventional truck chassis. The vehicle appears to be manufactured for use on the highways, and is thus a motor vehicle. The vehicle is a "truck" under our regulations, and must meet the FMVSSs for trucks that were in effect on the vehicle's date of manufacture.

As you know, NHTSA has regulations related to the importation of vehicles. They appear in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), at parts 591 to 593. In particular, note the declarations in 49 CFR 591.5 that are required for importation. Since your letter says that you enforce the FMVSSs in 49 CFR Part 571, I assume you have a copy of Parts 591-593. If you do not, we can send one to you.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions about NHTSA's safety standards, please contact Paul Atelsek of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

NCC-20:PAtelsek:62992:OCC 10868:5/22/95:revised 7/3/95 ref:VSA d:7/25/95

ID: 10878

Mr. Musa K. Farmand
Gonz555-B Blanding Boulevard
Orange Park, FL 32073

Dear Mr. Farmand:

This responds to your letter of April 27, 1995. Your letter concerns a law suit in which you represent plaintiffs injured in an automobile accident. In this law suit, the counsel for the defendant has moved to amend his answer to assert that 49 CFR 571.208, paragraph S4.1.5.2(c)(2) requires each state to allow for mitigation of damages in any seat belt use law and that paragraph preempts the Florida mandatory seat belt law. According to your letter, the Florida law "does not allow a mitigation of damages defense with respect to an alleged failure to wear a seat belt." As explained below, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration agrees with you that the Florida safety belt use law is neither expressly nor impliedly preempted by Federal law.

Purpose of Paragraph S4.1.5.2(c)(2)

Before discussing the issue of preemption, I want to discuss the background and purpose of Paragraph S4.1.5.2(c)(2). That paragraph was added to Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208) as part of a final rule issued July 17, 1984 concerning automatic restraints (49 FR 28962). That final rule required all new cars to have automatic protection (air bags or automatic belts) starting in the 1990 model year. The final rule included a provision that the automatic restraint requirement would be rescinded if the Secretary of Transportation determined, not later than April 1, 1989, that a sufficient number of States had enacted belt use laws meeting certain minimum criteria to cover at least two-thirds of the U.S. population (paragraph S4.1.5). Under S4.1.5, the Secretary was not required to make any determination about any State safety belt laws. In fact, the Secretary never did so, in part because not enough States adopted mandatory seat belt use laws of any

sort prior to April 1, 1989. Because no determination was made under S4.1.5, the automatic restraint requirements are now in effect for all passenger cars.

The minimum criteria were set forth in S4.1.5.2 of Standard No. 208 . One of the criteria was "a provision specifying that the violation of the belt usage requirement may be used to mitigate damages..." (S4.1.5.2(c)(2)). However, S4.1.5 neither purported to require nor was intended to require States to enact safety belt use laws. In addition, S4.1.5 did not require that any State safety belt use laws had to incorporate the minimum criteria of S4.1.5.2. Paragraph S4.1.5 merely provided that the Secretary would rescind the automatic restraint requirement if he or she determined that a sufficient number of States enacted laws which met the criteria of S4.1.5.2 by April 1, 1989.

Preemption

The Florida safety belt use law is not and never has been either expressly or impliedly preempted by Federal law.

Standard No. 208 was issued under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 which expressly preempts state laws only to the extent provided by section 30103. That section provides for the express preemption of State motor vehicle safety standards that are not identical to Federal standards. However, the Florida seat belt law is not a motor vehicle safety standard within the meaning of Chapter 301, since it does not regulate motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment performance. Accordingly, the Florida law is not expressly preempted.

The Florida law is not impliedly preempted because (1) Congress has not occupied the field of regulation of the behavior of motor vehicle occupants; and (2) the Florida seat belt law does not conflict with any Federal law or interfere with the objectives of Federal law.

I hope this information has been helpful. If you have other questions or need some additional information, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

ref:208 d:5/9/95 Your letter correctly notes that this provision was deleted from Standard No. 208 by a final rule issued on September 2, 1993 (58 FR 46551).

ID: 10878r

Mr. Musa K. Farmand
Gonz555-B Blanding Boulevard
Orange Park, FL 32073

Dear Mr. Farmand:

This responds to your letter of April 27, 1995. Your letter concerns a law suit in which you represent plaintiffs injured in an automobile accident. In this law suit, the counsel for the defendant has moved to amend his answer to assert that 49 CFR 571.208, paragraph S4.1.5.2(c)(2) requires each state to allow for mitigation of damages in any seat belt use law and that paragraph preempts the Florida mandatory seat belt law. According to your letter, the Florida law "does not allow a mitigation of damages defense with respect to an alleged failure to wear a seat belt." As explained below, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration agrees with you that the Florida safety belt use law is neither expressly nor impliedly preempted by Federal law.

Purpose of Paragraph S4.1.5.2(c)(2)

Before discussing the issue of preemption, I want to discuss the background and purpose of Paragraph S4.1.5.2(c)(2). That paragraph was added to Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208) as part of a final rule issued July 17, 1984 concerning automatic restraints (49 FR 28962). That final rule required all new cars to have automatic protection (air bags or automatic belts) starting in the 1990 model year. The final rule included a provision that the automatic restraint requirement would be rescinded if the Secretary of Transportation determined, not later than April 1, 1989, that a sufficient number of States had enacted belt use laws meeting certain minimum criteria to cover at least two-thirds of the U.S. population (paragraph S4.1.5). Under S4.1.5, the Secretary was not required to make any determination about any State safety belt laws. In fact, the Secretary never did so, in part because not enough States adopted mandatory seat belt use laws of any

sort prior to April 1, 1989. Because no determination was made under S4.1.5, the automatic restraint requirements are now in effect for all passenger cars.

The minimum criteria were set forth in S4.1.5.2 of Standard No. 208 . One of the criteria was "a provision specifying that the violation of the belt usage requirement may be used to mitigate damages..." (S4.1.5.2(c)(2)). However, S4.1.5 neither purported to require nor was intended to require States to enact safety belt use laws. In addition, S4.1.5 did not require that any State safety belt use laws had to incorporate the minimum criteria of S4.1.5.2. Paragraph S4.1.5 merely provided that the Secretary would rescind the automatic restraint requirement if he or she determined that a sufficient number of States enacted laws which met the criteria of S4.1.5.2 by April 1, 1989.

Preemption

The Florida safety belt use law is not and never has been either expressly or impliedly preempted by Federal law.

Standard No. 208 was issued under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 which expressly preempts state laws only to the extent provided by section 30103. That section provides for the express preemption of State motor vehicle safety standards that are not identical to Federal standards. However, the Florida seat belt law is not a motor vehicle safety standard within the meaning of Chapter 301, since it does not regulate motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment performance. Accordingly, the Florida law is not expressly preempted.

The Florida law is not impliedly preempted because (1) Congress has not occupied the field of regulation of the behavior of motor vehicle occupants; and (2) the Florida seat belt law does not conflict with any Federal law or interfere with the objectives of Federal law.

I hope this information has been helpful. If you have other questions or need some additional information, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

ref: 208 d:6/14/95 Your letter correctly notes that this provision was deleted from Standard No. 208 by a final rule issued on September 2, 1993 (58 FR 46551).

ID: 10888

Mr. Doug Russel
Design Engineer
Advance Engineered Products
144 Henderson Drive
Regina, Saskatchewan S4V 2B2

Dear Mr. Russel:

This responds to your letter asking about the brake power requirements in section S5.4.2 of Federal motor vehicle safety standard No. 121, Air Brake Systems (49 CFR 571.121). You asked whether there are any limitations on the pressure which can be used to achieve the required deceleration rate specified in S5.4.2.2. As explained below, the same limitation on the pressure which can be used to achieve the deceleration rate specified in S5.4.2.1 applies to the deceleration in S5.4.2.2. You also asked whether brakes must be capable of meeting the specific deceleration rate specified in S5.4.2.2. The answer to that question is yes.

Some background information on Federal motor vehicle safety laws and regulations may be helpful. Congress has authorized this agency the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA has used this authority to establish Standard No. 121, which applies to braking systems on vehicles equipped with air brakes. The agency, however, does not approve motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment, nor does it endorse any commercial products. Instead, Congress has established a "self-certification" process under which each manufacturer is responsible for certifying that its products meet all applicable safety standards.

Standard No. 121's brake power requirements are set forth in section S5.4.2. The purpose of these requirements is to help ensure that brakes retain adequate stopping capability during and after exposure to prolonged or severe use, such as long, downhill driving. The brake power procedure specified by that section is conducted on a dynamometer and is intended to replicate real world brake performance. The specified decelerations are designed to heat the brakes to simulate severe driving conditions.

Section S5.4.2 requires that each brake

shall be capable of making 10 consecutive decelerations at an average rate of 9 f.p.s.p.s from 50 m.p.h. to 15 m.p.h., at equal intervals of 72 seconds, and shall be capable of decelerating to a stop from 20 m.p.h. at an average deceleration rate of 14 f.p.s.p.s. 1 minute after the 10th deceleration.

For the first ten decelerations, section S5.4.2.1 specifies the conditions under which the decelerations must be performed, including that "The service line air pressure shall not exceed 100 p.s.i. during any deceleration." For the eleventh deceleration, S5.4.2.2 specifies that "one minute after the end of the last deceleration required by S5.4.2.1 and with the drum or disc rotating at a speed of 20 m.p.h., decelerate to a stop at an average deceleration rate of 14 f.p.s.p.s."

In asking whether there are any limitations on the pressure which can be used to achieve this eleventh deceleration, you noted that S5.4.2.2, unlike S5.4.2.1, does not explicitly specify a pressure limitation. However, reading section S5.4.2 (including S5.4.2.1 and S5.4.2.2) as a whole, the brake line pressure limitation set forth in S5.4.2.1 applies to the eleventh deceleration as well. Section S5.4.2 specifies a test procedure consisting of a series of events, i.e., preparing the dynamometer for the test including a 100 p.s.i. pressure limit, then making 10 decelerations on the dynamometer under the conditions set forth in S5.4.2.1, then making the eleventh deceleration. Section S5.4.2.2 does not specify any change in the dynamometer pressure limit for the eleventh deceleration. The dynamometer pressure limit specified for the brake power test simply reflects the fact that tractor trailer brakes are typically configured to operate at a maximum nominal brake pressure of approximately 100 psi. Use of a higher brake pressure that differed from a vehicle's actual maximum brake pressure would result in the brake power test not being representative of real world brake performance.

In response to your second question, section S5.4.2 specifies that a brake must be capable of decelerating to a stop from 20 m.p.h. at an average deceleration rate of 14 f.p.s.p.s. 1 minute after the 10th deceleration. See also S5.4.2.2. A brake which could not achieve this specified deceleration rate for the eleventh deceleration would not comply with the Standard's requirements.

I hope this information has been helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Marvin Shaw of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel ref:121 d:6/29/95

ID: 10890

Thomas L. Wright, Acting Manager
MVS Customer Services
State of New Jersey
Department of Law and Public Safety
Division of Motor Vehicles
Trenton, NJ 08666

Dear Mr. Wright:

This responds to your request for information about responsibilities of motorcycle manufacturers. As you discussed with Dorothy Nakama, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) does not "regulate" how an enterprise becomes a "recognized manufacturer."

Enclosed is NHTSA's information sheet for new manufacturers of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment, which discusses the main requirements of 49 U.S.C. section 30101 et seq. (formerly the Vehicle Safety Act). A copy of the Act is enclosed. Under section 30112(a) of the Act, a motorcycle manufacturer may not manufacture a motorcycle for sale unless the vehicle complies with all applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) and is covered by a certification issued under 49 U.S.C. section 30115. One safety standard is Standard No. 115 Vehicle Identification Number - Basic Requirements. (See 49 CFR 571.115.) In our regulations, at 49 CFR part 567 Certification, NHTSA has promulgated the requirement that a manufacturer certify compliance of its motorcycle with all applicable safety standards. Under part 566, NHTSA requires manufacturers to submit certain identifying information and a description of the items they produce.

Also enclosed is a copy of a July 13, 1992 interpretation letter to Mr. Jeffrey Puentes, discussing serial numbers on motorcycle frames versus motorcycle VINs.

As you may be aware, "certificates of origin" are matters relating to vehicle titling, which the State regulates, rather than NHTSA.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please contact Ms. Nakama at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosures ref:115#567 d:6/27/95