NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
| Interpretations | Date |
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ID: 1985-01.39OpenTYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA DATE: 03/01/85 FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA TO: Mr. Hiroshi Shimizu TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION TEXT: This responds to your letter of December 19, 1984, concerning the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies. You noted that section S4.1(e) of the standard provides that "A Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly shall be provided with a buckle or buckles readily accessible to the occupant. . . ." [Emphasis added]. You asked whether the standard would permit a seat belt assembly with two buckles as shown in the schematic attached to your letter. The answer is that while Standard No. 209 would permit such an assembly, whether such an assembly can be installed in a particular vehicle is determined by Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection. Standard No. 208 specifies performance requirements for the protection of occupants in a crash. Section S4.1.2.3.1 provides that Type 2 lap and shoulder belt systems used in passenger cars must have a nondetachable shoulder belt. Likewise, S4.2.2 provides that certain trucks and buses with Type 2 belts must have a nondetachable shoulder belt. The belt system you illustrated in your diagram consists of one continuous loop of webbing which serves as both the lap and shoulder belt. However, your design provides a separate buckle for the shoulder anchorage and thus an occupant could release the shoulder buckle and use the belt solely as a lap belt. Thus, we would not consider your design to have a nondetachable shoulder belt. In addition, section S7.2 of the standard sets requirements for the latch mechanism of non-automatic seat belt assemblies used in passenger cars and certain trucks and buses. Section S7.2(c) requires that the latch mechanism used in those vehicles must release at a single point. Therefore, a two buckle system could not be used in those vehicles. I hope this answers your question. Sincerely, ATTACH. December 19, 1984 Diane Steed -- Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Dear Sirs: This is to ask for your confirmation that a design of seat belt assembly having two buckles is allowed by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 209.
Section S4.1(e) of the standard sets forth "A Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly shall be provided with a buckle or buckles readily accessible to the occupant . . . . .". Based on that provision, we believe that FMVSS 209 permits such a seat belt design as shown in the schematic enclosed as long as they meet all the applicable provisions in the regulation. We should appreciate your confirmation letter. Very truly yours, TOKAI RIKA CO., LTD.; Hiroshi Shimizu, Asst. Manager -- Overseas Operations Dept. Encl. (Graphics omitted) Schematic of Seat Belt Assembly having Two Buckles |
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ID: 86-1.19OpenTYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA DATE: 02/03/86 FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA TO: Robert C. Shaver -- Mohawk Customs Service TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION TEXT:
Mr. Robert C. Shaver Mohawk Customs Service Air Cargo Building Hancock International Airport North Syracuse, NY 13212 This responds to your letter to this office, asking whether there was some procedure whereby you could import new truck tires into this country, if those tires do not have the name of the manufacturer on the sidewall. You enclosed an invoice with a note written by a Customs Service officer stating that much tires do not conform with the requirements of our tire standards, because the "tires bear no brand name." Our tire standards do not require that new truck tires have the manufacturer's name or a brand name on the sidewall. For your information, I have enclosed a copy of Standard No. 119, New Pneumatic Tires for Vehicles Other Than Passenger Cars (49 CFR 571.119). This is the standard applicable to new truck tires. Section S6.5 of this standard lists all of the information that must appear on the sidewalls of all new tires subject to Standard No. 119. As you see, there is no requirement that either the manufacturer's or a brand name appear on the sidewall of these tires. The tire is required to have a tire identification number which identifies the manufacturer. It is possible that the Customs Service was confusing the requirements for truck tires with those for passenger car tires. New passenger car tires are subject to the requirements of Standard No. 119. As you see, there is no requirement that either the manufacturer's name or a brand name appear on the sidewall of these tires. The tire is required to have a tire identification number which identifies the manufacturer. It is possible that the Customs Service was confusing the requirements for truck tires those for passenger car tires. New passenger car tires are subject to the requirements of Standard No. 109, New Pneumatic Tires - Passenger Cars (49 CFR 571.109; copy enclosed). Section S4.3.2 does require that new passenger car tires be "labeled with the name of the manufacturer, or brand name and number assigned to the manufacturer." However, the tires you are seeking to import are not subject to this requirement, because they are not passenger car tires. I suggest that you show this letter to the appropriate officers of the Customs Service, and ask then to reconsider their determination that the tires you seek to import do not comply with Standard No. 119. If you have any further questions in this area, please feel free to contact Steve Kratzke of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 426-2992. Sincerely, Original Signed By Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel Enclosure |
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ID: 86-2.46OpenTYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA DATE: 04/28/86 FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA TO: Bill Taylor TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION TEXT:
Mr. Bill Taylor General Manager Airport Honda P.O. Box 297 Alcoa, Tenn. 377
Dear Mr. Taylor:
This is in reply to your letter of February 24, 1986 to Ms. DeMeter of this office with reference to the installation of a luggage rack on a vehicle equipped with a center high-mounted atop lamp, and the liability of a dealer for such installation if in accident occurred while the rack was in use.
Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, a dealer of new passenger cars must not perform such modifications as will create a noncompliance with the Federal motor vehicle safety standards before initial sale of the car. This means that a deck mounted luggage rack must be mounted in such a way that the center high-mounted stop lamp continues to meet the visibility and photometric requirements that it did when originally installed. However, compliance with these requirements is judged with the rack in place, and not with the rack in use. There is no liability of a dealer under the Vehicle Safety Act for any accidents that might occur while the rack is in use.
We are not aware of any suits in State courts seeking recovery against dealers who have installed luggage racks on cars equipped with center high-mounted stop lamps.
Sincerely,
Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel
February 24, 1986
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Chief Counsel's Office 400 7th St. Washington, DC 20590
Dear Ms DeMeter:
I am writing in reference to a telephone conversation I had with Ms. Walsh of Consumer Affairs on February 25. I was inquiring as to whether or not federal laws would be violated by installing a luggage rack on the trunk of a 1986 Honda. By doing so, if the driver was to put luggage on the rack, it would block the high-mount stop light. My concern is not only if the customer would be in violation of federal law, but also, what would the dealership's liabilities be if there was an accident while the luggage rack was in use.
Ms. Walsh's reply, after talking with you, was that there is no liability to the dealership. In either case, please send me a letter stating what liability if any, the dealership may have. Sincerely,
Bill Taylor General Manager
rjc |
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ID: 2855yyOpen William J. Bethurum, Esq. Dear Mr. Bethurum: Your letter of December 14, 1990, to the "U.S. National Highway Safety Commission" for reply. Our agency, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, is the Federal agency responsible for establishing and enforcing the Federal motor vehicle safety standards. Your client, Mr. E.D. Farnsworth, has asked about "when and how side lights adjacent to the main head lights came to be first used with head lights on automobiles." You have, in turn, asked to be apprised of the regulations which govern new headlamp designs for automobiles and other motor vehicles. The Federal regulations that apply to motor vehicle headlamps are found in 49 C.F.R. 571.108, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. l08, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment. The current version of the CFR volume (Parts 400 to 999) containing that standard is updated to October 1, l990. We are uncertain as to what you mean by "side lights adjacent to the main head lights". Standard No. l08 requires amber or white parking lamps on the front of passenger cars and other types of motor vehicles whose overall width is less than 80 inches, amber turn signal lamps, and amber front side marker lamps. Other types of lamps that are sometimes found on the front, and on the side at the front, are fog lamps and cornering lamps. They are not required by Standard No. l08, and are permissible as long as they do not impair the effectiveness of the lighting equipment required by the standard. Standard No. l08, which has been in effect for passenger cars since January l, l969 (the mandatory requirement for a side marker lamp replaced the earlier provision giving manufacturers a choice of lamp or reflector effective January 1, l970), has always prescribed lamp location in general terms. Thus, parking lamps and headlamps are to be installed "at the front" and "as far apart as practicable" (Table IV of Standard No. l08). Similarly, turn signals are to be located "at or near the front" and "as far apart as practicable." Amber side marker lamps are to be on the side but placed "as far to the front as practicable." Because Standard No. l08 does not otherwise specify lamp location, we surmise that the head lamp and adjacent side lamp relationship to which you refer resulted from the choice of the vehicle manufacturer within the overall general parameters of the Federal specifications. If you have further questions, we shall be pleased to answer them. Sincerely,
Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel ref:l08 d:2/26/9l |
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ID: nht87-1.2OpenTYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA DATE: 01/01/87 EST FROM: PETER MCINTOSH -- PRESIDENT. STARDOR INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LTD TO: TAYLOR VINSON -- NHTSA TITLE: REAR ENDER STOP LAMP ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 09/29/87 FROM ERIKA Z. JONES -- NHTSA TO PETER MCINTOSH, REDBOOK A31, STANDARD 108; LETTER DATED 02/24/87 (EST) FROM ERIKA Z. JONES TO HAL MCNAMARA TEXT: Dear Mr Vinson, Mr Kumbar of the A.A.M.V.A. suggested I write to you & inform you of our wishes to obtain approval for the marketing of our Rear Ender brake light. This product was introduced into Australia in 1986 with great success and is now used by many corporations, government bodies & sporting groups to promote their product and incorporate a great safety device into their vehicles. With the statistics fr om the U.S.A. illustrating the reduction in rear end accidents by over 50% with the installation of a mid mounted brake light, acceptance of this concept was incredible with our promotional factor assisting to promote their use. Due to the acceptance and the interest shown we decided to try and export the product to the U.S.A. where the market is so much larger and where so many millions of cars still lack this safety system. On showing the product to a number of interested parties in the U.S.A. it is evident that this concept should receive much the same acceptance. Apart from the promotional angle main selling feature to most end users is the big advantages offered in safety. Our aim is mainly to introduce them to corporations for use in their own vehicles, used car sales for their stock and sporting groups for fund raising (support their team with endorsement on lights). Eventually we hope to introduce them onto the reta il market. With all new cars being factory fitted we do not see a market in this area, with the exception of 2wd vehicles and vans. The size of the lens is 10" x 2 1/2" offers excellent visibility and the most important feature of the lens is the fact that the message dissapears when the brake light is illuminated, thus not interfering with the initial design characteristic requir ement of the light. This factor has gained acceptance by the police departments in Australia and has encouraged a number of insurance companies to offer bonuses to their clients utilizing the mid mounted lights, e.g. no loss of no claim in the event of a rear end collision. The light has also been used by police and county vehicles to promote community messages such as "BUCKLE UP!", "SAY NOT TO DRUGS!" etc. Please find enclosed a copy of our brochure and I trust this information will be of assistance to you in evaluating our product. Should you require any further information please do not hesitate to call me on (305) 3616908. |
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ID: nht91-2.2OpenDATE: February 26, 1991 FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA TO: William J. Bethurum -- Patent Attorney TITLE: None ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 12-14-90 from William J. Bethurum to Legal Counsel, U.S. National Highway Safety Commission TEXT: Your letter of December 14, 1990, to the "U.S. National Highway Safety Commission" for reply. Our agency, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, is the Federal agency responsible for establishing and enforcing the Federal motor vehicle safety standards. Your client, Mr. E.D. Farnsworth, has asked about "when and how side lights adjacent to the main head lights came to be first used with head lights on automobiles." You have, in turn, asked to be apprised of the regulations which govern new headlamp designs for automobiles and other motor vehicles. The Federal regulations that apply to motor vehicle headlamps are found in 49 C.F.R. 571.108, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment. The current version of the CFR volume (Parts 400 to 999) containing that standard is updated to October 1, 1990. We are uncertain as to what you mean by "side lights adjacent to the main head lights". Standard No. 108 requires amber or white parking lamps on the front of passenger cars and other types of motor vehicles whose overall width is less than 80 inches, amber turn signal lamps, and amber front side marker lamps. Other types of lamps that are sometimes found on the front, and on the side at the front, are fog lamps and cornering lamps. They are not required by Standard No. 108, and are permissible as long as they do not impair the effectiveness of the lighting equipment required by the standard. Standard No. 108, which has been in effect for passenger cars since January 1, 1969 (the mandatory requirement for a side marker lamp replaced the earlier provision giving manufacturers a choice of lamp or reflector effective January 1, 1970), has always prescribed lamp location in general terms. Thus, parking lamps and headlamps are to be installed "at the front" and "as far apart as practicable" (Table IV of Standard No. 108). Similarly, turn signals are to be located "at or near the front and "as far apart as practicable." Amber side marker lamps are to be on the side but placed "as far to the front as practicable." Because Standard No. 108 does not otherwise specify lamp location, we surmise that the head lamp and adjacent side lamp relationship to which you refer resulted from the choice of the vehicle manufacturer within the overall general parameters of the Federal specifications. If you have further questions, we shall be pleased to answer them. |
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ID: aiam5564OpenMr. Musa K. Farmand Gonz lez & Farmand, P.A. 555-B Blanding Boulevard Orange Park, FL 32073; Mr. Musa K. Farmand Gonz lez & Farmand P.A. 555-B Blanding Boulevard Orange Park FL 32073; "Dear Mr. Farmand: This responds to your letter of April 27, 1995. You letter concerns a law suit in which you represent plaintiffs injured in an automobile accident. In this law suit, the counsel for the defendant has moved to amend his answer to assert that 49 CFR 571.208, paragraph S4.1.5.2(c)(2) requires each state to allow for mitigation of damages in any seat belt use law and that paragraph preempts the Florida mandatory seat belt law. According to your letter, the Florida law 'does not allow a mitigation of damages defense with respect to an alleged failure to wear a seat belt.' As explained below, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration agrees with you that the Florida safety belt use law is neither expressly nor impliedly preempted by Federal law. Purpose of Paragraph S4.1.5.2(c)(2) Before discussing the issue of preemption, I want to discuss the background and purpose of Paragraph S4.1.5.2(c)(2). That paragraph was added to Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208) as part of a final rule issued July 17, 1984 concerning automatic restraints (49 FR 28962). That final rule required all new cars to have automatic protection (air bags or automatic belts) starting in the 1990 model year. The final rule included a provision that the automatic restraint requirement would be rescinded if the Secretary of Transportation determined, not later than April 1, 1989, that a sufficient number of States had enacted belt use laws meeting certain minimum criteria to cover at least two-thirds of the U.S. population (paragraph S4.1.5). Under S4.1.5, the Secretary was not required to make any determination about any State safety belt laws. In fact, the Secretary never did so, in part because not enough States adopted mandatory seat belt use laws of any sort prior to April 1, 1989. Because no determination was made under S4.1.5, the automatic restraint requirements are now in effect for all passenger cars. The minimum criteria were set forth in S4.1.5.2 of Standard No. 208. One of the criteria was 'a provision specifying that the violation of the belt usage requirement may be used to mitigate damages...' (S4.1.5.2(c)(2)). However, S4.1.5 neither purported to require nor was intended to require States to enact safety belt use laws. In addition, S4.1.5 did not require that any State safety belt use laws had to incorporate the minimum criteria of S4.1.5.2. Paragraph S4.1.5 merely provided that the Secretary would rescind the automatic restraint requirement if he or she determined that a sufficient number of States enacted laws which met the criteria of S4.1.5.2 by April 1, 1989. Preemption The Florida safety belt use law is not and never has been either expressly or impliedly preempted by Federal law. Standard No. 208 was issued under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 which expressly preempts state laws only to the extent provided by section 30103. That section provides for the express preemption of State motor vehicle safety standards that are not identical to Federal standards. However, the Florida seat belt law is not a motor vehicle safety standard within the meaning of Chapter 301, since it does not regulate motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment performance. Accordingly, the Florida law is not expressly preempted. The Florida law is not impliedly preempted because (1) Congress has not occupied the field of regulation of the behavior of motor vehicle occupants, and (2) the Florida seat belt law does not conflict with any Federal law or interfere with the objectives of Federal law. I hope this information has been helpful. If you have other questions or need some additional information, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel"; |
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ID: aiam3432OpenMr. C. L. Biddle, Supervisor of Claims, General Transportation Department, Firestone Tire Company, 1200 Firestone Parkway, Akron, OH 44317; Mr. C. L. Biddle Supervisor of Claims General Transportation Department Firestone Tire Company 1200 Firestone Parkway Akron OH 44317; Dear Mr. Biddle: This responds to your recent letter to Mr. Kratzke of my staff describing a situation in which a railroad car full of new tires caught on fire. As a result of the damage caused to the tires by the fire, Firestone's quality control staff determined that the tires could no longer be certified as safe for highway use. The railroad company has refused to pay your claim for damage to the tires unless Firestone releases the damaged tires to the railroad company. You stated that the railroad company will either sell the tires through its salvage outlets or use the tires on company vehicles. You ask whether you can rightfully withhold these tires from the railroad company.; If Firestone releases the tires and the railroad company sells th tires or uses them on the public roads, both Firestone and the railroad company would violate an express provision of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as amended (15 U.S.C. 1381 *et seq*.) ('the Safety Act'). Therefore, you can rightfully withhold the tires from the railroad company.; Your letter did not indicate whether the damaged tires were tires fo passenger cars or tires for motor vehicles other than passenger cars. In either case, the tire manufacturer is required to certify that each tire fully complies with certain marking requirements and with specified performance requirements (resistance to bead unseating, strength, endurance, and high speed performance) of Safety Standard No. 109 in the case of passenger car tires (49 CFR S571.109) or of Safety Standard No. 119 for tires other than passenger car tires (49 CFR S571.119). This certification is made by the manufacturer by molding the letters 'DOT' into the sidewall of the tire.; As a result of the damage to this particular shipment of tires, you company has determined that his certification is no longer valid. This determination obligates Firestone to remove the 'DOT' symbol from the sidewall of the tires.; Without the 'DOT' symbol, these tires would clearly not comply with th requirements of either Standard No. 109 or Standard No. 119. Section 108(a)(1)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A)) provides:; >>>No person shall manufacture for sale, sell, or offer for sale, o introduce or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce, or import into the United States, any ... item of motor vehicle equipment manufactured on or after the date any applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard takes effect under this title unless it is in conformity with such standard ....<<<; Firestone would violate this prohibition if it were to deliver tires t the railroad company which were not certified as complying with the appropriate safety standard. The railroad company would violate this prohibition if it sold or offered to sell uncertified tires, or if uncertified tires were used by the company on the public roads (introduction in interstate commerce). Section 109 of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1398) specifies penalties of up to $1000 for each violation of section 108, and each tire delivered by Firestone or sold or used by the railroad company would constitute a separate violation of section 108. Section 109 specifies that the maximum civil penalty which can be imposed for a series of related violations, which this would be, is $800,000 for each violator.; You indicated that Firestone would not release the damaged tires fo use in any case, because of the potential safety hazard. I hope that this response reinforces that position. Should you need any further information on this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me. Please show this letter to the interested railroad company so that it will realize the serious nature of its contemplated actions.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam5540OpenMr. Musa K. Farmand Gonz lez & Farmand, P.A. 555-B Blanding Boulevard Orange Park, FL 32073; Mr. Musa K. Farmand Gonz lez & Farmand P.A. 555-B Blanding Boulevard Orange Park FL 32073; "Dear Mr. Farmand: This responds to your letter of April 27, 1995. You letter concerns a law suit in which you represent plaintiffs injured in an automobile accident. In this law suit, the counsel for the defendant has moved to amend his answer to assert that 49 CFR 571.208, paragraph S4.1.5.2(c)(2) requires each state to allow for mitigation of damages in any seat belt use law and that paragraph preempts the Florida mandatory seat belt law. According to your letter, the Florida law 'does not allow a mitigation of damages defense with respect to an alleged failure to wear a seat belt.' As explained below, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration agrees with you that the Florida safety belt use law is neither expressly nor impliedly preempted by Federal law. Purpose of Paragraph S4.1.5.2(c)(2) Before discussing the issue of preemption, I want to discuss the background and purpose of Paragraph S4.1.5.2(c)(2). That paragraph was added to Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208) as part of a final rule issued July 17, 1984 concerning automatic restraints (49 FR 28962). That final rule required all new cars to have automatic protection (air bags or automatic belts) starting in the 1990 model year. The final rule included a provision that the automatic restraint requirement would be rescinded if the Secretary of Transportation determined, not later than April 1, 1989, that a sufficient number of States had enacted belt use laws meeting certain minimum criteria to cover at least two-thirds of the U.S. population (paragraph S4.1.5). Under S4.1.5, the Secretary was not required to make any determination about any State safety belt laws. In fact, the Secretary never did so, in part because not enough States adopted mandatory seat belt use laws of any sort prior to April 1, 1989. Because no determination was made under S4.1.5, the automatic restraint requirements are now in effect for all passenger cars. The minimum criteria were set forth in S4.1.5.2 of Standard No. 208. One of the criteria was 'a provision specifying that the violation of the belt usage requirement may be used to mitigate damages...' (S4.1.5.2(c)(2)). However, S4.1.5 neither purported to require nor was intended to require States to enact safety belt use laws. In addition, S4.1.5 did not require that any State safety belt use laws had to incorporate the minimum criteria of S4.1.5.2. Paragraph S4.1.5 merely provided that the Secretary would rescind the automatic restraint requirement if he or she determined that a sufficient number of States enacted laws which met the criteria of S4.1.5.2 by April 1, 1989. Preemption The Florida safety belt use law is not and never has been either expressly or impliedly preempted by Federal law. Standard No. 208 was issued under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 which expressly preempts state laws only to the extent provided by section 30103. That section provides for the express preemption of State motor vehicle safety standards that are not identical to Federal standards. However, the Florida seat belt law is not a motor vehicle safety standard within the meaning of Chapter 301, since it does not regulate motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment performance. Accordingly, the Florida law is not expressly preempted. The Florida law is not impliedly preempted because (1) Congress has not occupied the field of regulation of the behavior of motor vehicle occupants, and (2) the Florida seat belt law does not conflict with any Federal law or interfere with the objectives of Federal law. I hope this information has been helpful. If you have other questions or need some additional information, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel"; |
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ID: 11615JEGOpen Mr. Larry Clarke Dear Mr. Clarke: Senator Kohl asked me to respond to your question asking whether there is a law that stipulates that cars with air bags must have the air bags put back in after an accident. As discussed below, Federal law does not require replacement of a deployed air bag in a used vehicle. However, this subject area could be covered by State law. By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards that apply to the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle equipment. One of the standards we have issued is Standard No. 208, AOccupant Crash Protection@ (49 CFR 571.208). Manufacturers install air bags in passenger cars and light trucks as one method of complying with the occupant protection requirements of Standard No. 208. While the Federal motor vehicle safety standards apply only to new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle equipment, Federal law does limit the modifications that can be made by certain businesses to used vehicles. Manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and repair businesses are prohibited from "knowingly making inoperative" any device or element of a design installed on or in a motor vehicle in compliance with an applicable safety standard (49 U.S.C. ' 30122). While the "make inoperative" provision would prohibit a dealer or repair business from knowingly disabling safety equipment, such as an air bag, installed in compliance with an applicable safety standard, the provision does not impose an affirmative duty on dealers or other persons to repair equipment on a used vehicle that was damaged in a crash. Therefore, Federal law does not require replacement of a deployed air bag in a used vehicle. Despite the absence of any requirement in Federal law, State law may require replacement of deployed air bags. You may wish to contact the State of Wisconsin to learn if there are any applicable laws or regulations. Additionally, you may wish to consult a private attorney with respect to potential liability of an owner or repair facility for failure to replace an air bag after a crash. In addition to the legal considerations, I note that, for vehicles being repaired for road-use, NHTSA has long recommended the repair, restoration, or replacement of all safety systems that may have been damaged in a crash. These systems include the safety belts, air bag systems (including sensors), built-in child restraints, and other vehicle systems such as brakes, accelerator controls, transmission gear and "park" function, etc. If you or a repair facility need guidance as to which vehicle systems may require inspection or repair after a crash, we suggest that you contact the selling dealer, zone representative, and/or manufacturer of the vehicle in question. I hope this information is helpful. If you have further questions, please feel free to contact Stephen P. Wood, NHTSA's Assistant Chief Counsel for Rulemaking, at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely,
Ricardo Martinez, M.D. cc: The Honorable Herb Kohl ref:208
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Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.