ID: GPScrashsensor

Mr. Ralph Longton
Application Engineer
LoJack Corp.
15 Commercial Circle
Dedham, MA 02026





Dear Mr. Longton:

This responds to your letter of June 1, 2001. In that letter, you inquire about a system that LoJack is currently developing. This system will be located in the passenger compartment of a vehicle. In the event the vehicle is in a crash, the system will rate the crash as minor or major, alert a G.P.S. locator, and contact a clearinghouse. The clearinghouse will attempt to contact the driver or send assistance. You would like to know whether there are any regulatory obligations you may need to meet in the deployment and operation of such a device.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) cannot speak to all of your regulatory obligations, but only to Federal requirements in the area of automotive safety. We do not have any Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS) for this type of device. However, the FMVSS could be relevant to your device if the device affects a vehicle's compliance with any of the standards. We do not have sufficient information about your system to comment on whether it would likely affect a vehicle's compliance with the FMVSS.

I have enclosed a copy of a paper titled "Information for New Manufacturers of Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Equipment" which identifies relevant Federal statutes and NHTSA standards and regulations affecting motor vehicle and motor vehicle equipment manufacturers.

I hope this answers your question. Should you have any more questions, please contact Edward Glancy of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosure
Ref:571
d.7/20/01

ID: GPScrashsensor.rtf

Mr. Ralph Longton
Application Engineer
LoJack Corp.
15 Commercial Circle
Dedham, MA 02026





Dear Mr. Longton:

This responds to your letter of June 1, 2001. In that letter, you inquire about a system that LoJack is currently developing. This system will be located in the passenger compartment of a vehicle. In the event the vehicle is in a crash, the system will rate the crash as minor or major, alert a G.P.S. locator, and contact a clearinghouse. The clearinghouse will attempt to contact the driver or send assistance. You would like to know whether there are any regulatory obligations you may need to meet in the deployment and operation of such a device.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) cannot speak to all of your regulatory obligations, but only to Federal requirements in the area of automotive safety. We do not have any Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS) for this type of device. However, the FMVSS could be relevant to your device if the device affects a vehicle's compliance with any of the standards. We do not have sufficient information about your system to comment on whether it would likely affect a vehicle's compliance with the FMVSS.

I have enclosed a copy of a paper titled "Information for New Manufacturers of Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Equipment" which identifies relevant Federal statutes and NHTSA standards and regulations affecting motor vehicle and motor vehicle equipment manufacturers.

I hope this answers your question. Should you have any more questions, please contact Edward Glancy of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosure

NCC-20:Eglancy:mar:6/26/01:62992:OCC23204
Cc: NCC-01 Subj./Chron
Redbook (2), interp. Part 571
U:\ncc20\interp\gpscrashsensor.doc

ID: GRACIA.2

Wayne F. Plaza, Esq.
Rooks, Pitts and Poust
10 South Wacker Drive
Suite 2300
Chicago, IL 60606

Re: Gracia v. Volvo Europa Truck, N.V.,

N.D. Ill., Civ. No. 87-C-10005

Dear Mr. Plaza:

This is in response to your letter dated September 6, 1996, which objected to my letter of August 27, 1996 to Arthur Bryant of Trial Lawyers for Public Justice. My letter included my interpretation, as Acting Chief Counsel of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), of certain provisions of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 as they relate to the above-referenced litigation.

One of my functions as Acting Chief Counsel is to issue interpretations of the statutes administered by NHTSA and the regulations adopted by the agency pursuant to those statutes. See 49 CFR 501.8(d); 61 Fed. Reg. 26468 (May 28, 1996). Thus, your assertion that my response to Mr. Bryant's request for an interpretation of the preemptive effect of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 212 under a particular set of facts was "beyond the scope of [my] office" is incorrect. Similarly, while the adoption of Federal motor vehicle safety standards pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 30111 can be analogized to a "legislative" process accompanied by public participation (as required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. Part 553), the issuance of interpretations by an agency is not governed by the APA. Rarely if ever does NHTSA or another Federal agency seek public comment on a request for an interpretation like the one that led to my August 27 letter to Mr. Bryant.

The fact that Mr. Bryant's request was related to pending litigation does not affect NHTSA's handling of the request, and certainly imposes no duty upon the agency to seek the views of all parties in that litigation. Many interpretation requests seek the views of the agency on matters being litigated. While it is the policy of the agency not to express any view on the ultimate questions raised in such litigation, we do not refrain from interpreting our statutes and regulations merely because the interpretation could affect a pending lawsuit.

In this case, we promptly sent you, as well as counsel for the plaintiff, a copy of the interpretation, even though that is not required. (I am puzzled by your statement that your copy of the letter was postmarked August 30, 1996; to the best of my knowledge, it was placed in the outgoing mail tray in this office on August 27, the day it was signed.)

Consistent with the policy described above, my letter explicitly declined to take a position on the ultimate questions at issue in this litigation, and noted that the interpretation was necessarily based on the facts presented by Mr. Bryant. Please note, however, that Mr. Bryant enclosed with his request copies of the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by your client, Volvo Europa Truck, N.V.; the plaintiff's memorandum in response to your motion; the Report and Recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge Pallmeyer; Volvo's objections to Magistrate Pallmeyer's Report; and the Memorandum Opinion and Order issued by Judge Plunkett of the Northern District of Illinois. Thus, I believed at the time, and still believe, that I had sufficient awareness of the relevant facts to issue the interpretation.

Of course, to the extent that the interpretation is based upon an incorrect understanding of the relevant facts, such a misunderstanding would decrease the relevance of the interpretation to the pending litigation. However, it would not undermine the validity of the interpretation under the facts as I understood them. If you believe the relevant facts are not accurately or completely set forth in the documents provided by Mr. Bryant, I will be happy to consider whether any such new facts would change my interpretation.

In conclusion, while it is perfectly legitimate for you to disagree with the interpretation set forth in my August 27 letter, that letter was an appropriate exercise of my authority as Acting Chief Counsel. I therefore decline to adopt your request that I "formally withdraw" that letter.

Sincerely,

John Womack

Acting Chief Counsel

cc: Arthur H. Bryant, Esq.

Bruce R. Pfaff, Esq.

ref:VSA

d:10/10/96

ID: GRACIA.LTR

Arthur H. Bryant, Esq.
Executive Director
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice
Suite 800
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20036

Re: Gracia v. Volvo Europa Truck, N.V.,

N.D. Ill., Civ. No. 87-C-10005

Dear Mr. Bryant:

This is in response to your letter requesting that the United States file an amicus curiae brief with the Seventh Circuit in the above-referenced case, in which the District Court ruled that the plaintiff's claims are preempted by Federal law.

Although the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) disagrees with both the result and the rationale adopted by the District Court, we have decided not to request the Department of Justice to file an amicus brief. A brief discussion of our views on this legal issue and the basis for our decision not to participate is set forth below.

As you are aware, NHTSA has consistently taken the view that, as a general matter, Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS) issued under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 preempt state common law actions only in very limited situations, which do not appear to apply here. Our views on this issue were most recently stated in the amicus curiae brief filed by the United States in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 115 S. Ct. 1483 (1995).

To summarize, judgments under the common law can effectively create "standards" that would be expressly preempted by the "preemption clause" of Chapter 301, 49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1),⁽¹⁾ if that clause stood alone. However, the "savings clause," 49 U.S.C. 30103(e),⁽²⁾ precludes a finding that suits seeking to recover damages on the basis of a manufacturer's failure to go beyond the requirements of a standard are expressly preempted. Moreover, such suits are impliedly preempted only in those relatively rare cases where the common law duty sought to be imposed on an auto manufacturer would create an actual conflict with a NHTSA safety standard, either because it would be impossible to comply with both state and Federal requirements or because the judgment would "stand as an obstacle to" or "frustrate the purpose of" federal law.

As we understand the facts in the Gracia case, the plaintiff was injured when she was "thrown through the windshield" of a model year 1986 Volvo truck that had a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of more than 10,000 pounds and which was a "forward control vehicle." One of NHTSA's safety standards, FMVSS No. 212, "Windshield mounting," 49 CFR 571.212, imposes performance requirements for windshields of certain vehicles. The standard applies to passenger cars and to trucks with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less. It does not apply to certain types of trucks, including "forward control vehicles," even if they have a GVWR of less than 10,000 pounds.

The District Court concluded that NHTSA's decision to exclude forward control vehicles from the reach of the standard preempted plaintiff's product liability action. In our view, this conclusion is both factually and legally incorrect.

First, the focus by the parties and the court on the agency's rationale for excluding "forward control" trucks with a GVWR of less than 10,000 pounds from the reach of FMVSS No. 212 is misguided, since the GVWR of the vehicle involved in this crash was greater than 10,000 pounds. As with almost all of its safety standards, NHTSA did not explicitly consider applying FMVSS No. 212 to heavy trucks, regardless of whether they were forward control vehicles.

More generally, although we agree that a NHTSA decision not to regulate can preempt state common law actions, see Arkansas Elec. Co-op Corp. v. Arkansas Public Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 384 (1983), it will do so only where the intent to preempt is "clear and manifest." See Toy Mfrs. Of America, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 986 F.2d 615, 622-623 (2d Cir. 1992), citing Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc.,

471 U.S. 707, 718 (1985). Here, there was no such intent, and none was indicated in any of the documents issued by the agency during its consideration of this standard.⁽³⁾

The regulatory materials quoted in the District Court's opinion indicate that the primary basis for NHTSA's exclusion of forward control vehicles (with a GVWR of less than 10,000 pounds) was a concern that it would not be "practicable" for such vehicles to comply with the existing standard.⁽⁴⁾ In no way did this reflect a NHTSA conclusion that efforts by maufacturers of forward control vehicles to reduce the possibility of ejections through the windshield (either by satisfying the performance requirements of the standard or through other means) would have an adverse impact on safety. Rather, it reflected a NHTSA determination that applying FMVSS No. 212 to such vehicles would not be appropriate in light of the statutory criteria for FMVSSs set out in Chapter 301.

A decision not to regulate on this basis does not in itself "preempt the field." In other words, while the exclusion of certain vehicles from the reach of FMVSS No. 212 relieves the manufacturers of those vehicles from any duties with respect to windshield retention under Chapter 301, it does not immunize those manufacturers from a duty of care that might be imposed under state law.⁽⁵⁾

Thus, as noted above, we believe that the District Court's opinion is incorrect. However, to our knowledge, this is the first case in which a court has improperly concluded that a NHTSA decision not to regulate an aspect of performance of certain vehicles preempts a state common law action seeking damages based on an alleged failure with respect to that aspect of performance. Therefore, in keeping with NHTSA's long-standing policy of minimizing its involvement in private tort litigation, we believe that it would not be appropriate to participate formally in this case. In the unlikely event that this erroneous view of the scope of "negative" Federal preemption proliferates in the future, the agency may decide to participate in a subsequent case.

Thank you for bringing this matter to our attention.

Sincerely,

John Womack

Acting Chief Counsel

cc: Wayne F. Plaza, Esq.

Bruce R. Pfaff, Esq.

ref: 103(d)#108(k)

NCC-10:KWeinstein:August 9, 1996; revised:August 16, 1996

Printed: August 26, 1996 (cyb)

1. "When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State . . . may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle . . . only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter. . . ."

2. "Compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law."

3. Although we cannot anticipate all possibilities, it is likely that NHTSA would "negatively" preempt state law only if it concluded that a specific item or design feature would have an adverse effect on motor vehicle safety. For example, if NHTSA had decided that headrests above a certain size should not be required because they would interfere with driver visibility, a claim by a plaintiff that a manufacurer's failure to equip a vehicle with a larger headrest led to neck injuries would be preempted, even in the absence of an explicit ban on such headrests.

4. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 30111(a), each FMVSS "shall be practicable, meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and be stated in objective terms."

5. NHTSA takes no position on whether the windshield retention system in this particular vehicle was "unreasonably dangerous" or what duty of care a state might reasonably impose through its common law. (Presumably, NHTSA's views on the technological options avilable to manufacturers of forward control vehicles would be considered by courts and juries considering those issues.) Similarly, NHTSA takes no position on whether this crash led to a "foreseeable impact," as alleged by plaintiff, or on the relevance, if any, of the facts that the plaintiff apparently was not seated in a designated seating position and apparently was not wearing a safety belt.

ID: GRAMMLT.ogm

The Honorable Phil Gramm
United States Senator
2323 Bryan Street, #1500
Dallas, Texas 75201

Dear Senator Gramm:

Thank you for your letter of June 21, 1996, on behalf of your constituent, Mr. Milton C. Beveridge. Mr. Beveridge apparently wishes to modify the rear seats of a 1996 Chrysler 15 passenger van to create better access for elderly passengers who, in order to reach seats in the rear of the van, must pass through the limited space between the edges of the seats and the rear wheel housing. In order to provide better access, Mr. Beveridge wishes to have these seats made narrower so that they would seat two passengers rather than three and create a wider opening between the seats and the wheel housing. However, Mr. Beveridge is unable to find a facility that will perform this work because of an existing state requirement that any work on the van, which was purchased through a state grant, be performed by a "certified" repair facility. In addition, in speaking with the dealer who sold the van and representatives of Chrysler, Mr. Beveridge has been told that the seats in the van cannot be modified without violating federal law.

As discussed below, there is no blanket Federal prohibition against modifying seats. However, Federal law does specify that dealers and repair businesses making such modifications must do so in a way that does not compromise the occupant protection provided by the vehicle manufacturer in accordance with Federal standards.

Some background information about our agency may be helpful. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has the authority to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motorvehicle equipment. Federal law prohibits the manufacture or sale of any new motor vehicle or new item of motor vehicle equipment which does not conform to all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards.

After the first retail sale, there is a limit on the modifications that can be made by certain businesses to vehicles. Manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and repair businesses may not "knowingly make inoperative" any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or equipment in compliance with an applicable safety standard.

Since the seats and their safety belts are devices or elements of design that were installed in your constituent's van in compliance with applicable standards, none of these businesses may modify the vehicle in such a manner that it no longer complies with a safety standard. Accordingly, such a business should examine the relevant Federal motor vehicle safety standards in these areas, e.g., Standards Nos. 207, Seating Systems, 208, Occupant Crash Protection, 209, Seat Belt Assemblies, 210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages, and 302, Flammability of Interior Materials, to determine how modifications can be made in a manner that does not adversely affect compliance.

The foregoing standards may be found in Sections 571.207, 571.208, 571.209, 571.210 and 571.302 of Volume 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations ,(49 CFR 571.207 et.seq.). We are providing Mr. Beveridge with copies of these standards under seperate cover.

As noted above, Mr. Beveridge's letter indicates that he is having difficulty finding a "certified" repair facility to modify his vehicle. NHTSA does not "certify" repair shops or approve modifications to privately owned vehicles. As Mr. Beveridge indicates that the requirement that any modification be performed by a "certified" facility is imposed by the state, I suggest that he contact an appropriate state government official for assistance in how to find such a facility.

I hope this information is helpful. Should you have any further questions or need additional information, feel free to contact me or Mr. Otto Matheke of the Office of Chief Counsel at (202) 366-5253.

Sincerely

John Womack

Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosure

Constituent's Correspondence

ref:208

d:9/20/96

ID: GRUMMANOLSON.CRS

Mr. David White
Manager of Reliability
Gruman Olson Industries Inc.
1801 S. Nottawa Street
Sturgis, MI 49091





Dear Mr. White:

This responds to your letter of May 7, 2001, requesting the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to approve an alternate location for placement of the certification label on delivery trucks that Grumman Olson Industries is manufacturing for the U.S. Postal Service.

NHTSA's regulations at 49 CFR 567.4(c) prescribe specific locations for the installation of vehicle certification labels, and provide that if none of those locations are practicable, the manufacturer may suggest an alternate location for the agency's approval. Your letter states that during the first article inspection, the Postal Service requested that Grumman Olson Industries relocate the certification label to the dash shelf extension to the right of the instrument panel so that the driver can see the label from a seated position. Your letter further notes that because these vehicles are walk-in vans with removable sliding doors, placement of the label on the inward-facing surface of the door next to the driver's seating position would not be practicable. Your letter observes that the "[t]he proposed location is visible from almost all locations in the cab," and that the certification label can be easily found at this position in the event that any information that it contains is needed.

In specifying locations for the placement of vehicle certification labels, NHTSA's objective is to ensure that those labels may be easily read. The location that you have proposed for the delivery trucks that Grumman Olson Industries is manufacturing for the U.S. Postal Service would meet this objective. NHTSA therefore approves your request.

If you have any further questions regarding vehicle certification requirements, feel free to contact Coleman Sachs of my staff at 202-366-5238.

Sincerely,

John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel

ref:567
d.6/26/01

ID: guam.ztv

Lt. James W. Cruz
Supervisor, FFF Section
Guam Customs & Quarantine Agency
1501 Central Avenue
Tiyan, Guam 96913





FAX (671) 475-6219





Dear Lt. Cruz:

This is in reply to your fax of September 5, 2001, asking whether fog lamps made in Taiwan must comply with" Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment, in order to be imported into Guam.

A fog lamp is a "lamp" and not an item of "associated equipment." However, Standard No. 108 does not prescribe any requirements for fog, driving, and other aftermarket accessory lamps. Therefore, there are no requirements of this agency that they must meet in order to be imported into Guam.

I hope that this answers your question.

Sincerely,

John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel

Ref:591
d.9/24/01

ID: gustback_doorlatch

Dr. Peter Gust
Kirchhoff GmbH & Co. KG
Oststrasse 1
58553 Halver
Germany

Dear Dr. Gust:

This letter responds to your e-mail and fax inquiries into the application of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 206, Door locks and door retention components. You asked a question about how a specific back door latch configuration is tested under the procedures specified in the standard. We have addressed your question below.

Your letter describes a back door that opens upward, with a single latch at the bottom of the door with a single striker on the back door sill. According to the diagrams sent with your letter, the latch is comprised of two sections. When the latch is engaged, (1) the portion of the latch that is attached to the door is oriented perpendicular to the vehicle floor plane (the "upper section"), and (2) the portion of the latch face that interacts with the striker is oriented along a plane that is roughly 45 degrees to the vehicle floor plane (the "lower section"). The diagrams also show that the striker plate is parallel to the lower section, with the striker oriented perpendicular to the striker plate. You asked how the test procedures in Load Test One and Load Test Two of FMVSS No. 206 apply to your latch assembly.

FMVSS No. 206 specifies requirements for door locks and door retention components including latches, to minimize the likelihood of occupants being thrown from their vehicle as a result of an impact. Under FMVSS No. 206, hinged back doors must comply with several load requirements, including:

S4.4.1.1  Load Test One. The primary door latch and striker assembly, when in the fully latched position, shall not separate when a load of 11,000 Newtons (2,500 pounds) is applied in the direction perpendicular to the face of the latch (corresponding to the longitudinal load test for side door latches) such that the latch and the striker anchorage are not compressed against each other. When in the secondary latched position, the primary latch and striker assembly shall not separate when a load of 4,450 Newtons (1,000 pounds) is applied in the same direction.

S4.4.1.2  Load Test Two. The primary door latch and striker assembly, when in the fully latched position, shall not separate when a load of 8,900 Newtons (2,000 pounds) is applied in the direction of the fork-bolt opening and parallel to the face of the latch (corresponding to the transverse load test). Figure 1 depicts the loading direction for this test. When in the secondary latched position, the primary latch and striker assembly shall not separate when a load of 4,450 Newtons (1,000 pounds) is applied in the same direction.

As indicated in S4.4.1.1 and S4.4.1.2, the orientation of the latch face dictates the direction of the loads. FMVSS No. 206 does not define latch face, but we have stated that SAE J839, Passenger car side door latch systems (JUN91), provides guidance on its meaning (see 60 FR 50124, 50128; September 28, 1995). While SAE J839 does not define latch face, it defines "latch plate" as "the main body or frame for supporting working components, appendages and transmitting or distributing loads to the door structure" (S3.1.1).

Based on the specifications in S4.4.1.1, Load Test One would be oriented with the lower section of the latch face in question. While S4.4.1.1 does not specifically address testing a latch face that aligns with more than one plane, the section does specify that the latch and striker anchorage should not compress upon application of the load. The intent of Load Test One is to apply the load such that there is no engagement of the latch face by the striker. This is accomplished with your latch assembly by applying the test load in a direction perpendicular to the lower portion of the latch face. By contrast, application of the test load perpendicular to the upper portion of the test face would result in some compression; i.e. , the striker would engage the latch face to some extent, and would thus not test the latch as specified by the standard.

Regarding the application of Load Test Two to your latch system, again the standard indicates that the direction of force should be oriented with the lower section of the latch face. Load Test Two specifies application of the load in the direction of the fork-bolt opening, parallel to the face of the latch. Figure 1 of FMVSS No. 206 illustrates that Load Test Two is applied in a direction that is parallel to the portion of the latch face that interacts with the striker. On the latch face in question, this corresponds to the lower section. Testing in this manner is consistent with the intent of the standard to test the latch in a manner representative of opening the door.

Further, applying Load Test One and Two as described would test your latch in a manner consistent with the longitudinal and transverse testing specified for side door latches, respectively. Additionally, orienting the test loads to the lower portion of the latch face would permit testing in accordance with SAE J934, as intended by the agency (see 60 FR 50128).

I hope that you find this information helpful. If you have any further questions, please contact Mr. Chris Calamita of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:206
d.11/19/04

ID: HARMER.ZTV

John L. Harmer, Esq.
P.O. Box 721
Bountiful, Utah 84011

FAX 801-299-0523

Dear Mr. Harmer:

This is in reply to your letter of June 4, 1996, asking the following question:

"Whether or not certification of an automobile for sale in Puerto Rico as being in compliance with Federal safety standards would allow that automobile to be imported into the fifty states insofar as compliance with applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards is concerned?"

The answer is yes, as you have represented to Daewoo.

49 U.S.C. 30112(a) prohibits the importation into the "United States" of a motor vehicle manufactured on or after the date an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard takes effect unless the vehicle complies with the standard and is covered by the manufacturer's certification of compliance with the standard. Although the term "United States" is not defined, we view it as comprising all States, and "State" is a defined term. Under 49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(10), a "State" means "a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Virgin Islands." This means that a motor vehicle that Daewoo manufactures to conform, and that it certifies as conforming, with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards, may be freely imported into Puerto Rico or into any other "State" as defined above as in compliance with DOT safety regulations.

I hope that this is responsive to your request. If you have further questions, you may refer them to Taylor Vinson of this Office (202-366-5263).

Sincerely,

Samuel J. Dubbin Chief Counsel ref:591 d:6/6/96

ID: Harness_and_LATCH

Mr. Terry Emerson
Product Standards Manager
Cosco
2525 State Street,
Columbus, IN 47201





Dear Mr. Emerson:

This responds to your letter of July 12, 2001, asking "Is the Cosco Travel Vest required to be LATCH compatible by September 1, 2002?" Stated differently, you ask whether child restraint vest systems are required by Standard No. 213 to have attachments that enable the restraint to connect to a child restraint anchorage system on a vehicle (49 CFR 571.225). ⁽¹⁾ The answer to your question is no.

According to the marketing literature you enclosed with your letter, the Travel Vest is a 5-point harness restraint. Section 5.9(a) of Standard No. 213 (49 CFR 571.213) excludes harnesses from the requirement in the standard that child restraints must have components that attach to the lower anchorages of a LATCH system. We excluded harnesses out of practicability concerns. We did not know whether harnesses had a structural member that was strong enough to withstand the forces that would be imposed on it by the LATCH connectors. (See LATCH final rule, 64 FR 10786, 10808; March 5, 1999.)

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Deirdre Fujita at this address or at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel

ref:213
d.8/31/01





---

1. ¹ "LATCH" is a term used by industry and retail groups referring to the child restraint anchorage system required by Standard No. 225. LATCH stands for "lower anchorages and tethers for children." For convenience, we will use the term in this letter.