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NHTSA Interpretation File Search

Overview

NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies. 

Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage. 

An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.

  • Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
  • Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
  • The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
  • Some combination of the above, or other, factors.

Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.

Single word search

 Example: car
 Result: Any document containing that word.

Multiple word search

 Example: car seat requirements
 Result: Any document containing any of these words.

Connector word search

 Example: car AND seat AND requirements
 Result: Any document containing all of these words.

 Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.

Phrase in double quotes

 Example: "headlamp function"
 Result: Any document with that phrase.

Conjunctive search

Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.

Wildcard

Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).

Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).

Not

Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”

Complex searches

You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.

Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”). 

Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”

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NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search



Displaying 9651 - 9660 of 16514
Interpretations Date
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ID: nht81-2.49

Open

DATE: 07/17/81

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Department of Transportation; Michigan

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your March 30, 1981 letter pertaining to the mounting of an old school bus body on a new chassis. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has stated that such a mounting constitutes the manufacture of a new motor vehicle and must comply with all applicable safety standards in effect at the time of that manufacture. This statement comes from previous agency interpretations of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act and from the rationale underlying the provisions of section 571.7(e) of our regulations. You state that section 571.7(e) applies only to trucks and, accordingly, has no application to school buses.

The agency has had a longstanding position that a vehicle combining an old body and new chassis is a new vehicle. This position was developed and applied long before the proposal of section 571.7(e) in May 1975. See, for example, the enclosed 1972 letter of interpretation and the discussion of pre-proposal interpretations in the enclosed copy of the May 1975 proposal.

The codification in section 571.7(e) of the agency's position as regards trucks did not alter its simiar position as regards other vehicle types. I am enclosing a 1978 interpretation stating that school buses will be treated under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act in the same fashion as trucks are under section 571.7(e). The reason for this interpretation is the similarity of the practice of manufacturing school buses and trucks on new truck chassis. Accordingly, the agency has applied the same rationale in determining those vehicles, e.g., buses, that are to be considered newly-manufactured.

In light of these existing interpretations and in the interest of safety, the agency is retaining its position that vehicles using old bodies and new chassis be treated as newly manufactured vehicles.

ENCLS.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

March 30, 1981

Roger Tilton, Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Dear Mr. Tilton:

The State of Michigan is in the grips of a financial crisis which is now threatening the children of this State through the local school's inability to provide new school buses to replace those which have reached the end of their life expectancy.

New school bus purchases are off by about 75% due to budget constraints which have also reduced the State's assistance to the school district from 68% during the last reimbursement period to an expected 30% for the 80-81 fiscal year. In this State, we turn over 1,900 school buses each year.

As a means to provide safe, dependable and economical school bus transportation, the local school districts are contemplating rehabilitation of these older school buses.

Rebuilding an old school bus is easy and economically rewarding. However, there are many old school bus bodies (approx. 20% or 350 each year) that would better serve the fleet if they were mounted on new chassis.

We, in the State of Michigan, are fully aware of previous interpretation of Part 571.7(e) of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards which relates to combining new and used components. The interpretations which are printed for all who ask, come from Joan Claybrook's office and from Frank Berndt do not say one shall not put an old school bus body on a new chassis, BUT that when an old school bus body is placed on a new chassis, the entire re-manufactured vehicle must comply with all of the FMVSS's in effect on the date of re-manufacture. The interpretation leads us to Part 571.7(e).

The Part 571.7(e) relates to "TRUCKS" and does not address "BUS" or school bus. Since there is "TRUCK" listed in definitions, Part 571.3 and the word "BUS" is also in definitions Part 571.3; we contend that 571.7(e) does not apply to Bus or School Bus since 571.7(e) does not refer to "BUS" in its content.

We do not accept the interpretation provided by Joan Claybrook or Frank Berndt. We completely understand that by allowing these used buses manufactured prior to April 1, 1977 to wash out of the system that in a few years the only buses on the road will be those which were manufactured in compliance with 220, 221, & 222.

The Part 571.7(e) also tells us that the re-manufactured truck must meet the current FMVSS "unless the engine, transmission, and drive axle(s) (as a minimum) of the assembled vehicle are not new, and at least two of these components were taken from the same vehicle." Therefore, if we in Michigan make these drive line changes we do not have a re-manufactured truck and we can continue to use a pre April 1, 1977 school bus body which still does not meet 220, 221, & 222; while mounted on a post April 1, 1977 chassis.

I submit to you that your office, NHTSA, is saying that we may not put a pre April 1, 1977 school bus body on a post April 1, 1977 chassis unless the body is updated to meet the post April 1, 1977 FMVSS 220, 221, & 222, OR instead of updating the body, we may install a used engine, transmission, and rear end in the new chassis; two of those three components must come from the same used vehicle.

Your interpretation is illogical and seemingly does not apply where school buses are concerned. We respectfully request a new interpretation keeping in mind that it is President Reagan's philosophy that those Federal Regulations which are non-productive, yet require great expense in order to comply; are Regulations with which we need to deal.

The State of Michigan, the State Department of Education, and I personally feel bound to comply with Federal Law; however, we do not feel bound to comply with an interpretation which smacks of pressure from the manufacturers and dealers who are in the business to sell new bodies.

We eagerly await your response.

Larry Louderback, Safety Specialist Pupil Transportation

cc: PHIL O'LEARY - SAFETY & TRAFFIC PROG; MR. WEINHEIMER - MICH. SCH. BD. ASSOC.; MR. TEBBE - UNION CITY SCH. DIST.; SENATOR DON RIEGLE; ROD LAMORE - GRAND RAPIDS STATE POLICE; DREW LEWIS - TRANS. SEC.; NHTSA

ID: nht81-2.5

Open

DATE: 03/17/81

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Thiele Incorporated

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

NOA-30

Mr. Ted Thiele Thiele Incorporated P.O. Box 188 111 Spruce Street Windber, PA 15963

Dear Mr. Thiele

This is in response to your letter forwarding your firm's vehicle identification numbering system and requesting confirmation that it complies with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 115 -Vehicle identification number.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) does not give advance approval of a manufacturer's compliance with motor vehicle safety standards or regulations, as it is the manufacturer's responsibility under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act to ensure that its vehicles comply with the applicable safety standards. However, my office has reviewed your proposed system. Based on our understanding of the information which you have provided, your system apparently complies with Standard No. 115.

Sincerely,

Frank Berndt Chief Counsel

January 28, 1981

Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc. 400 Commonwealth Drive Warrendale, PA 15096

Attention: Leo P. Ziegler, Jr.

Gentlemen:

We are enclosing copy of our coding system to be used in our trailer identification numbers. We will not begin to use this system until we have your approval.

Yours truly,

THIELE, INCORPORATED

Ted Thiele

TT:rr cc: N. F. Erickson, NHTSA?DOT

ID: nht81-2.50

Open

DATE: 07/22/81

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: British Standards Institution

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your letter of June 8, 1981, concerning Standard No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies. You are correct that my letter of June 1, 1981, on the abrasion test procedure of the standard should have referred to section 5.1(d), instead of to section 5.2(d).

You also suggested that in the process of clarifying the standard's abrasion requirements, the agency should consider possible modifications to sections 4.2(e) and (f) of the standard. In the process of reviewing the abrasion test requirements, the agency will also examine those other sections to determine what changes should be made.

Finally, you raised the issue of whether the standard, as with other national and international standards, should have a requirement that conditioned webbing must retain a certain percentage of its unconditioned strength and must also meet the minimum strength requirement for unconditioned webbing. The agency is not aware of any data indicating that our current conditioned strength requirements are insufficient.

Sincerely,

ATTACH.

JUNE 8, 1981

F Berndt -- U.S. Department Transportation, National Highway Traffic Administration

Dear Mr Berndt

Many thanks for your letter dated 1 June 1981 regarding abrasion testing to FMVSS 209. However, should Section 5.2 (d), when it occurs, read 5.1 (d)?

I understand your reasoning for the clarification, however, should this be extended to cover Sections 4.2 (e) and 4.2 (f)?

In most of the National and International specifications which we test to the strength after conditioning must be above a certain percentage of its unconditioned strength and also above the minimum required strength of the webbing. You are permitting the use of webbing that might, after abrasion, fall below your minimum strength requirement. Do you have any comments on this?

I look forward to receiving a prompt reply to the first paragraph. Yours sincerely

J E BINGHAM -- SENIOR TEST ENGINEER, MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY COMPONENTS SECTION, BRITISH STANDARDS INSTITUTION

ID: nht81-2.6

Open

DATE: 03/20/81

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Boyd, Payne, Gates & Farthing

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

MARCH 20, 1981 NOA-30

Mr. Charles E. Payne Boyd, Payne, Gates & Farthing Virginia National Bank Building Suite 1240 One Commercial Place Norfolk, Virginia 23510

Dear Mr. Payne:

This responds to your recent letter concerning the problem plaintiffs' lawyers in civil cases have in obtaining certain data from foreign manufacturers of automobiles. Your letter specifically asked if there are any Federal safety standards concerning the crashworthiness of automobile seats. You state that the Department of Transportation informed you by letter that there are no such standards.

This is incorrect. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 207, Seating Systems (49 CFR 571.207), specifies performance requirements for vehicle seats in passenger cars and other vehicles. The standard requires passenger seats to be able to withstand forces equal to twenty times the weight of the seat without collapsing. This is a static test in which the force is applied directly to the seat. The standard does not, however, require a dynamic crash test of vehicles to determine seat integrity, such as the tests used by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety cited in your letter. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, as amended 1974 (15 U.S.C. 1381, et seq.), Toyota Motor Company is required to certify that its vehicles comply with Safety Standard No. 207. I am enclosing a copy of the standard for your information.

Please contact Hugh Oates of my office if you require any further information (202-426-2992).

Sincerely,

Frank Berndt Chief Counsel Enclosure

March 5, 1981

Frank Berndt, Esquire Chief Counsel U.S. Department of Transportation 400 7th Street S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Mr. Berndt:

Congressman Bill Whitehurst forwarded to you my recommendation concerning legislation or regulations aimed at forcing foreign manufacturers of mechanical products imported into this country, to file for record with your agency certain data accessable to private litigants. You sent him a reply letter dated February 18th and he sent me a copy.

Your letter was informative and helpful. I would even agree that the regulations that you referred to are of some help. However, I do not think they truly meet the problem.

A news release issued by the Department of Transportation reported that foreign imports were notably less safe than their American counterpart automobiles. I also have in my possession in connection with litigation I am now pursuing against Toyota, data from various organizations around the country which data discloses that occupant safety and crashworthiness are of little concern to those who manufacture their cars and ship them into our country from abroad. The same data also diclosed that American manufacturers, on the other hand, have by-in-large, done very well in comparison to the foreign manufacturers in the area of crashworthiness and occupant safety.

I believe that most attorneys who practice products liability litigation will agree that the greatest single impetus for improved crashworthiness and occupant safety of American automobiles has been our system of tort liability, and the effectiveness of our courts and plaintiff's counsel in bringing to light defects and unsafe designs in automobiles.

Apparently however, most notably our Japanese friends have by-in-large not been subjected to the same examination by litigation of their design concepts and practices with respect to occupant safety. I for one am convinced, as are a good many of my colleagues at the plaintiff's bar, that part of the reason for this is the substantial difficulty of gaining access to files and records of the foreign manufacturers. This same difficulty was a subject of an in depth investigative reporting effort by "60 Minutes" last year. Perhaps you are aware of it.

The problem has not been an inability to gain in personam jurisdiction over the foreign manufacturers. That is the easiest part of it. However, once they are in court, they have proven very adroit at using every conceivable tool to preclude production for examination by plaintiff's experts of such things as design specifications, computer simulation data, and films of crash testing. Their excuses include the language barrier, the transoceanic legistics and communications probIems, as well as the "We are a multi-national corporation with warehouses full of documents, and it is impossible to locate what you want" excuse.

I believe that if the Japanese and Germans, whose cars are the principal culprits, were forced by the spector of substantial civil liability quickly and efficiently imposed, they would build their cars with the crashworthiness and occupant protection equal to American cars. I also dare say that if they had to do so, they could not market their cars at a price competitive to American makes.

While I appreciate the intent of the regulations you cite which require all automobiles imported to be certified to meet the Department of Transportation safety standard, that program does not appear to have yet begun to prove effective. One reason is that the Department of Transportation safety standards are by no means comprehensive. In particular, with respect to the suit I now have against Toyota, the Department of Transportation has advised me by letter J that there is no safety standard currently in existence with respect to the crashworthiness and design safety of passenger seats. The decedent, whom I epresent, died as a result of his seat collapsing upon moderate rear end impact making it possible for his upper torso, neck and head to be whipsawed, and in turn resulting in a fatal injury to the brain stem. It is with somewhat bitter irony that I refer you to report A-4650.01, dated November 1973, issued by General Environments Corporation and prepared for the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. That report and others like it cite over and over again that upon moderate impact from the rear, the seats of most of the foreign imports collapsed, exposing the occupant to serious and avoidable risk injury, whereas the same testing done on American makes shows a dramatically lower incidence of seat failure.

If I have been misinformed, and if there truly is a Department of Transportation safety standard concerning the crashworthiness of automobile seats, I would appreciate a copy of such standard. Also, if there is such a standard I should like to report that I have serious reason to believe that Toyota automobiles manufactured between 1973 and 1979 do not meet anyones safety standard with respect to the design of their seats, and especially the bucket seats.

I appreciate your time and attention to this letter and its intent.

Yours very truly,

BOYD, PAYND, GATES & FARTHING

Charles E. Payne

CEP:wjb

cc: Mr. James Kelly

ID: nht81-2.7

Open

DATE: 03/20/81

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: W. Roger Fry, Esq.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

NOA-30

W. Roger Fry, Esq. Rendigs, Fry, Kiely & Dennis 900 Central Trust Bank Tower Fourth & Vine Streets Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

Dear Mr. Fry:

This responds to your January 23, 1981, letter concerning tires used with multipiece rims. Specifically, you asked if this Department has considered whether tires should have a warning concerning use with mismatched multipiece rim assemblies.

We have not considered this question, nor have our studies of multipiece rim explosions considered the tires involved. The agency has determined through its investigations that mismatched multipiece rim assemblies are dangerous. These mismatched assemblies are highly prone to explosive separation, regardless of the nature of the tire mounted on them. Accordingly, our efforts have been directed toward labeling requirements for rim components (see the enclosed copy of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 120) in an effort to reduce the incidence of mismatched multipiece rim assemblies. There are no labeling requirements for tires which specifically warn against use with mismatched multi-piece rim assemblies.

Per your request, I have enclosed a copy of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 119, New Pneumatic Tires for Vehicles Other Than Passenger Cars (99 CFR S 571.119). Section S6.5 of this standard specifies the marking requirements for these tires. This standard took effect on March 1, 1975, and the enclosed copy represents the requirements which were applicable from that date to December 31, 1975.

This regulation does somewhat restrict the markings a manufacturer may put on the sidewall of its tires. For instance, the manufacturer cannot list more than one size designation (S6.5(c)) or more than one maximum load rating for single and dual loads (S6.5(d)). However, a manufacturer is free to include safety information in addition to that specified in section S6.5. Thus, a manufacturer might choose to print on the sidewall of its tires that the tires should only be used with a specified rim size or type. Such an additional warning need not be approved by this agency. In fact, this agency does not offer advance approval that a tire's markings comply with the requirements of Standard 119. It is the manufacturer's responsibility to determine that its tires are in compliance with applicable safety standards and to certify that compliance.

If you have any further questions or need further information on this matter, please feel free to contact Mr. Stephen Kratzke of my staff at (202) 426-2992.

Sincerely,

Frank Berndt Chief Counsel

Enclosures

January 23, 1981

United States Dept. of Transporation National Highway Safety Administration Washington, D.C. 20591

Gentlemen:

I am involved in a matter in which I represent the manufacturer of a truck tire which was on a vehicle when a multi-piece rim suddenly came off and critically injured someone in the immediate vicinity of the tire and rim. The rim had been assembled, in some manner with incompatible parts from different manufacturers, which parts combined both two-piece and three-piece rim assembly parts.

My question of you surrounds the tire itself. Has the Department addressed the question of whether or not the tires shou1d have any kind of warning regarding use with either mismatched multi-piece rim assemblies, or multi-piece rim assemblies generally?

I would be very interested in seeing your regulations and requirements governing data which is to be legible on the tire itself, auch as tire size, maximum air pressure and identifying marks. Could you send me your regulations which we in force in 1975?

Do your regulations restrict the printing on tires to the specific items covered in your regulations, or is a tire manufacturer free to add and delete other messages?

Must "other messages" be approved by you?

Have your studies of injuries with multi-piece rim assemblies included consideration of the tires themselves? If so, to what extent?

Thank you very much for any help you are ab1e to give me on this.

Very truly yours,

RENDIGS, FRY, KIELY & DENNIS

W. Roger Fry

WRF:rst

ID: nht81-2.8

Open

DATE: 03/24/81

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: International Traders

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your February 17, 1981, letter in which you requested information from this agency concerning "the grading standards applicable to truck tires." We have issued Uniform Tire Quality Grading Standards (49 Code of Federal Regulations @ 575.104) for passenger car tires which specify labeling information concerning the tire's treadwear, traction and heat resistance. However, these grading standards apply only to passenger car tires and, therefore, would not be applicable to the truck tires you purchase.

There are, however, performance requirements applicable to truck tires, set forth in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 119 (49 Code of Federal Regulations @ 571.119), a copy of which is enclosed. The manufacturer of the truck tire must certify that the imported tire complies with the requirements of this standard by labeling the symbol "DOT" on the sidewall of the tire, according to the requirement of section S6.5(a) of the enclosed standard. This information may not be especially helpful to your company in comparing the price quotations, since every tire must have this certification to be legally imported into the United States.

Should you need any further information concerning the requirements applicable to truck tires, please feel free to contact Mr. Stephen Kratzke of my staff at (202) 426-2992.

Sincerely,

ATTACH.

INTERNATIONAL TRADERS

February 17, 1981

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration -- Chief Counsel

Dear Sir:

We are in the process of gathering quotations for the import of truck tires for resale to heavy hauling trucking companies in the United States. We would appreciate receiving from you the grading standards for these tires.

If you have any forms that are necessary for us to complete for you, please send these as well.

Thank you.

Very truly yours, Rusty D. Hitch

ID: nht81-2.9

Open

DATE: 03/25/81

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Koito Manufacturing Co., Ltd.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of February 12, 1981, asking whether the placement of a clear lens cover in front of a motorcycle headlamp would be permissible under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108.

SAE Standard J580 (both a and b versions) Sealed Beam Headlamp Assembly is incorporated by reference in Tables I and III of the standard as one of the standards pertaining to headlamps for use on passenger cars, trucks, buses, and multipurpose passenger vehicles. Paragraph 5.2 of J580 states that, "When in use, a headlamp shall not have any styling ornament or other feature, such as a glass cover or grill, in front of the lens."

The principal referenced SAE material for motorcycle headlamps is J584a Motorcycle Headlamps. As options, both J584 and S4.1.1.34 of Standard No. 108 allow, in effect, a motorcycle to be equipped with one half of any sealed beam system permissible on four-wheeled motor vehicles. We therefore view the prohibition of J580 as applicable to use of any sealed beam headlamp, regardless of the type of vehicle on which it is installed.

Paragraph S4.1.3 of Standard No. 108 forbids the installation of additional equipment "that impairs the effectiveness of lighting equipment required" by Standard No. 108. Because of moisture accumulation, discoloration, cracks, etc., a glass or plastic cover might tend over a period of time to diminish or distort the headlamp beam. This is of particular concern with reference to the unsealed headlamps implicity permitted by SAE J584 because of the tendency of the reflector to deteriorate with age.

The agency therefore has concluded that no motorcycle headlamp may have a glass shield in front of it when in use.

ID: nht81-3.1

Open

DATE: 07/26/81

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Truck Body and Equipment Association

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your January 19, 1981, letter making several comments about the agency's plan to modify Standard No. 221, School Bus Body Joint Strength, as it applies to maintenance access panels in school buses. I want to apologize for the delay in responding to your letter which was inadvertently combined with another agency action.

First, you disagree with an agency statement that manufacturers have taken advantage of the existing maintenance access panel exemption from the standard's requirements. The agency's concern arises from several types of practices. Several manufacturers have produced buses with panels that have no wiring or other mechanisms behind them requiring maintenance. Other manufacturers have declared almost the entire rear walls of their buses as access panels. We believe that this is beyond the scope of the exemption of maintenance access panels from the standard's requirements.

Second, you ask several questions about supporting data for the standard and our planned modification of the standard. The agency is gathering information at this time and will make that data public when and if a rulemaking notice is issued.

Finally, you refer to unspecified agency statements relating to enforcement issues of noncomplying buses. We are unable to respond to this series of questions, because we are not immediately familiar with the correspondence to which you refer. If you could be more specific in your reference and in your questions, we would be happy to respond to you. If the correspondence to which you refer is from our Enforcement office, you might want to direct your inquiry to them.

SINCERELY,

School Bus Manufacturers Institute

January 19, 1981

Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Dear Sir:

The School Bus Manufacturers Institute, SBMI, which represents manufacturers who produce the majority of all school buses is concerned over certain interpretive rulemaking actions and unfounded criticism that have recently appeared in NHTSA correspondence.

First, in a letter of December 19, 1979 (NOA-30), NHTSA states, in paragraph two, that is has "discovered through its compliance testing that most school bus manufacturers have been taken advantage of the maintenance access panel exemption from the Standard."

The SBMI objects strenuously to the implications of this statement, that "most school bus manufacturers" have in some underhanded or dishonest manner sought to evade their obligations to fulfill a legal and moral obligation, by cheapening or changing their bus structures to take advantage of a "loop hole" in the standard. The true facts of the matter are as follows:

1. The NHTSA was requested to join with members of the industry in interpreting the design requirements of school buses to meet the directives of the various Standards. The NHTSA declined, stating that this was not their function, but that the bus manufacturers should interpret the Standards and in good faith build their vehicles accordingly.

2. The bus manufacturers then did, in good faith, change the design of their school buses to the extent necessary to meet the requirements of the Standards as they saw them but retaining the best design features where possible. In most cases, the existing access panels were retained from the original bus configurations that had been arrived at over years of building school buses to meet requirements for safe, economical and maintainable school transportation. These access panels are in almost all cases, clearly visible and need no compliance testing to determine that they are exempt from the applicable Standards. Their status may be determined by visual observation in most cases.

3. Currently, the NHTSA has decided, after 2 1/2 - 3 years of examining school buses, that they are in disagreement with the interpretation of most school bus manufacturers regarding access panel design. They have expressed the opinion that these access panels compromise the structural integrity of school buses, and have a potential for injury to occupants in the event of a wreck. Although this opinion is contrary to the great bulk of experience in school bus transportation, they have stated their intent to change or limit the exemption status of these panels as found in FMVSS 221.

In light of these facts, the SBMI denies that any of its members have attempted to take advantage of or get any special benefit from the exemption granted in FMVSS 221 for access panels in school buses. We do not deny that further changes in bus body structure can be made, but we seriously question that substantial benefit would be realized.

The NHTSA is reminded of the excellent safety record compiled by school buses, which may have been enhanced to some degree, recently, through compliance with Standards 220, 221 and 222. School buses have been built under the requirements of these standards since April, 1977. We would believe at this time that some of these vehicles have been involved in accidents, and some of these accidents have no doubt been investigated by or at request of the NHTSA. Therefore, the SBMI feels that the following questions are in order:

1. What evidence has NHTSA seen to cause or support its contention that current configurations of access panels do significantly reduce the structural integrity of school bus bodies, in the range of wreck situations that such bodies may reasonably be expected to withstand?

2. What evidence has NHTSA seen to cause or support its contention that current access panels make the bus body more hazardous for occupants in the range of wreck situations that such bodies may reasonably be expected to withstand?

3. What wreck environments, in terms of impact speeds, g-loadings, etc., has the NHTSA contemplated as the basis for FMVSS 221?

Finally, in other correspondence NHTSA has stated that certain planned designs were not in compliance with specific standards and would not qualify for exemption. However, NHTSA, using "selective enforcement", would not "find" them in noncompliance.

1. What will be the NHTSA position if such vehicles are involved in accidents causing injury, grave injury or loss of life?

2. In the event of accident of such vehicles, how will the manufacturer's liability be effected by NHTSA's finding in-advance that such design plans are in noncompliance?

3. Does NHTSA intend to rectify such a ruling by future rulemaking?

4. Does NHTSA have the moral prerogative and legal authority to apply "selective enforcement" procedure, regardless of how worthy the cause may be, to cases that are clearly in noncompliance?

5. Is NHTSA certain that a reasonable alternative cannot be found that would be in compliance?

Your timely consideration of these matters, which represent the majority view of the SBMI members, is respectfully requested for future guidance.

Berkley C. Sweet President TBEA

ID: nht81-3.10

Open

DATE: 08/25/81

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Ford Motor Company

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

AUG 25 1981 NOA-30

Roger E. Maugh, Director Automotive Safety Office Environmental and Safety Engineering Staff Ford Motor Company The American Road Dearborn Michigan 48121

Dear Mr. Maugh:

This responds to your letter of July 31, 1981, to Hugh Oates of my staff requesting an interpretation concerning Safety Standard No. 210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages. You ask whether you are correct in your belief that the requirements of paragraph S4.3.1.1 of the standard apply to the seat belt anchorages used in your planned 1982-model Continental passenger cars rather than the requirements of paragraph S4.3.1.2.

Paragraph S4.3.1 of the Standard specifies location requirements for the seat belt anchorages for Type 1 seat belt assemblies and the pelvic portion of Type 2 seat belt assemblies. Paragraph S4.3.1.1 applies in those installations in which the seat belt does not bear upon the seat frame, and the requirements of paragraph S4.3.1.2 apply in installations in which the seat belt does bear upon the seat frame. On the 1982 Continental passenger cars, the buckle end of the seat belt assembly passes through a "console support structure" which is connected to the bottom of the seat frame. However, you contend that since the console support structure is not a structural component of the seat frame, the seat belt does not bear upon the seat frame and, consequently, that paragraph S4.3.1.1 applies.

Your interpretation of paragraphs S4.3.1.1 and S4.3.1.2 is correct. The phrase "bears upon the seat frame" as used in paragraph S4.3.1.2 refers to seat belt assemblies in which the seat belt presses or rests directly on the main structural frame of the seat. As illustrated in the photographs supplied in your letter, the seat belt in the 1982-model Continental passenger cars does not bear upon the structural seat frame. Rather, the belt rests on the console support frame which is not a necessary structural component of the main seat frame, but is merely attached to the seat frame at the bottom on the inboard side. Since the seat belt is located to the side of the seat frame and does not bear upon the structural seat frame itself, the requirements of paragraph S4.3.1.1 apply to the location of the seat belt anchorages used in the 1982 Continental passenger cars rather than the requirements of Paragraph S4.3.1.2.

We note that the console support frame could easily have been attached to the transmission tunnel rather than to the seat frame. In that case, the seat belt obviously would not bear upon the seat frame. However, with such a design, the frame supporting the belt would not move with the seat, and the driver could have problems reaching the belt and positioning it properly when the seat is in certain positions. The design of the passenger seat and seat belt assembly in the 1982 Continental is very desirable because attachment of the console support frame to the seat makes the seat belt very accessible in all seat positions. The fact that the console was attached to the seat frame for convenience purposes does not mean that the console is part of the seat frame within the meaning of S4.3.1.2.

The original intent of the location requirements of FMVSS 210 was to enhance belt performance with acceptable belt comfort and convenience. The specific requirements that are the subject of this interpretation were intended to ensure that belts would not develop excessive slack if a seat structural member bent or failed during a crash, and to reduce the likelihood that the lap belt would move into the abdominal area during a crash. We trust that Ford has adequately tested the configuration that is proposed here to ensure proper performance in a crash situation.

Please contact this office if you have further questions.

Sincerely,

Frank Berndt Chief Counsel

July 31, 1981

Hugh F. Oates, Jr., Esq. Office of Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 Seventh Street, S. W. Washington, D. C. 20590

Dear Mr. Oates:

This letter is to request concurrence in Ford Motor Company's view that compliance to section S4.3 "Location" of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 210 properly should be evaluated under subsection S4.3.1.1 for passenger seats of a new design being introduced in 1982 model Continental passenger cars. The applicability of subsection S4.3.1.1, rather than subsection S4.3.1.2, of Standard No. 210 was discussed between Ford personnel and you and Mr. R. Hitchcock of the Administration in Dearborn yesterday. At that time you were shown the new seat design and told why we believe it presents the possibility that a compliance tester might erroneously conclude that it should be evaluated against the criteria of subsection S4.3.1.2. If anchorage locations of these vehicles were to be evaluated under that subsection, rather than subsection S4.3.1.1, the location specifications could not be met.

The potential for misunderstanding arises, we believe, out of the fact that the bottom of the seat frame has connected to its inboard side a console support structure through which the inboard (buckle) end of the seat belt assembly passes. The console support structure is intended to provide a base for a "mini-console" that is to be installed on the inboard side of each half of a split bench seat. It is not a structural member of the seat frame and therefore, in our opinion, the fact that the inboard end of the belt would bear on the structure of the console support should not result in the anchorage locations being evaluated under the criteria of subsection S4.3.1.2 which apply only to installations in which the "...belt bears upon the seat frame...".

As may be seen from sketches provided by the Administration to contractors evaluating compliance to Standard No. 210 (Attachment A), the routing of the seat belts contemplated by the drafters of the standard as "bearing upon the seat frame" involve configurations wholly unlike that in question. Moreover, routing the inboard end of the seat belt assembly through a console support structure that moves with the seat frame has the salutary effect of helping to best position the belt and improving belt accessibility, no matter what position the seat is adjusted to. Ford could obviate all risk of misapplication of subsection S4.3.1.2 to the new seat design by physically modifying the console support so that the inboard end of the seat belt would not bear upon its structure, but only on the trim cover. For the reasons discussed above, we respectfully submit that we should not be required to do so.

Furnished for your reference are Attachment B which depicts the lower seat frame for the 1982 Continental, Attachment C, the console support and its cover, Attachment D, the untrimmed console support attached to the seat frame, and Attachment E, a finished seat assembly.

In order to avoid needless misunderstanding about the compliance of these seat belt assemblies to the anchorage location provisions of Standard No. 210 after production commences in mid-August, I should appreciate receiving the Administration's prompt confirmation of our analysis of the applicability of subsection S4.3.1.1 to the newly designed seat and console assembly, or your expression of any grounds on which the Administration may disagree with that analysis. Sincerely

Roger E. Maugh

Attachments

ID: nht81-3.11

Open

DATE: 08/28/81

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Sigma Six Inc.

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your July 29, 1981, letter asking whether a three-wheeled vehicle would be classified as a motorcycle for purposes of complying with the motor vehicle safety standards.

The term "motorcycle" is defined in our regulations as "a motor vehicle with motive power . . . designed to travel on not more than three wheels in contact with the ground" (Volume 49, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 571.3). Since your vehicle is designed to travel on three wheels, it would be classified as a motorcycle for purposes of complying with the safety standards. The agency plans no major rulemaking at this time that would change the definition of motorcycle or the standards with which these vehicles comply.

SINCERELY,

29 July 1981

Office of the General Counsel Department of Transportation NHTSA

Dear Sirs:

We wish to obtain information on the proper procedures to obtain certification of a specialty vehicle for manufacture in the United States.

I have attached some of the sales literature describing the vehicle. I have previously talked with the rulemaking and compliance personnel at NHTSA in an attempt to clarify the problems that may be encountered.

The "Ant" is a three wheel vehicle and is currently manufactured in Britain. It is certified in the UK under category N[1], "Vehicles used for the carriage of goods and having a maximum weight not exceeding 3.5 metric tons". It is also certified for French import.

In my discussion with the rulemaking section I was told that three wheeled vehicles are currently classed as a motorcycle, however, they were under review for possible changes to the rules. The classification required to be met and any changes being made could have a major impact on the investment required to properly set up the manufacturing facility to insure that all applicable FMVSS standards are met in the vehicle engineering and manufacturing practices and procedures.

The investors are currently planning a production rate of 1000 per year in two years with a possible expansion to 5000 per year in five years.

Your attention to our problem and assistance in obtaining a solution is appreciated.

Sigma Six Inc.

Marshall Zaun President

Sales Literature Omitted.

Request an Interpretation

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The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590

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