ID: nht87-2.95

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 09/18/87

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: J. Douglas Hand -- General Motors Legal Staff

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

ATTACHMT: 10/15/87 letter from Erika Z. Jones to G.T. Doe (Std. 208; Std. 216); 2/5/87 letter from G.T. Doe to Erika Z. Jones (occ 176)

TEXT:

J. Douglas Hand, Esq. Legal Staff General Motors Corporation P.O. Box 33122 Detroit, MI 48232

This responds to your letter seeking an interpretation of Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR S571.208). Specifically, you asked whether General Motors Corporation (GM can be deemed the manufacturer of passenger cars produced by Lotus Car s Limited (LCL) for the purposes of S4.1.3.5, the manufacturer attribution provisions of Standard No. 208. After we received your letter, you made us aware of certain changed circumstances. In your letter, you stated that GM did not own the entity that w as the exclusive importer of Lotus Vehicles, and that GM owned 96 percent of LCL. Subsequently, you have told us that GM wholly owns the companies that import and market Lotus vehicles in the United States and that GM wholly owns LCL. This letter of inte rpretation is based on the GM -Lotus corporate relationship described in this letter. To the extent that the description in this letter differs from the description set forth in your August, 1986 letter, if reflects our understanding of the change circum stances. Our conclusion is that, since GM sponsors the importation, distribution, and marketing of these cars, GM may be considered the manufacturer of cars produced by LCL for the purposes of standard No. 208.

You explained that LCL is a part of Group Lotus, a United Kingdom company that provides engineering services to various motor vehicle manufactures and produces fewer than a thousand passenger cars a year. Group Lotus is a wholly-owned subsidiary of GM, a lthough LCL designs, builds, and certifies its cars without GM's advice. Approximately 200 Lotus Performance Cars, Limited Partnership (LPC), a wholly-owned subsidiary of GM. Lotus cars are marketed and distributed in the United States by Lotus Cars USA, Inc., another wholly-owned subsidiary of GM. Hence, GM owns the company that designs and assembles these cars, and GM owns the companies that import and market the vehicles.

Section 102(5) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1391(5)) defines "manufacturer" as many person engaged in the manufacturing or assembling of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, including any person importing motor ve hicles or motor vehicle equipment for resale." Under this definition, both LCL and LPC are statutory manufacturers of Lotus passenger cars. LCL designs and assembles the cars, and has filed a designation of agent for service of process with this agency, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1399(e). By filing a designation of agent, LCL has acknowledged that it is offering its cars for importation into the United State. LPC imports those cars into the United States.

Section S4.1.3.5 of Standard No. 208 sets forth provisions for instances in which passenger cars have more than one statutory "manufacturer." That section provides that the manufacturers may execute an express written contract to specify the manufacturer s to which the cars shall up attributed. In the absence of such a contract, S4.1.3.5.1(a) provides that imported passenger cars will be attributed to the importer. Since there is no such contract in this instance, application of this provision means that the Lotus passenger cars, which are produced in the United Kingdom, would be attributed to LPC, the GM subsidiary which imports the cars into the United States.

In the April 11, 1985, proposal to establish attribution requirements in the case of vehicles that have more than one statutory "manufacturer" (50, FR 14589), NHTSA stated that it considers the statutory definition of "manufacturer" to be sufficiently br oad to include sponsors, depending on the circumstances. See 50 FR 14596. The agency stated that if a sponsor contracts for another manufacturer to produce a design exclusively for the sponsor, the sponsor may be considered the manufacturer of those vehi cles, applying basic principles of agency law. On the other hand, the agency stated that the mere purchase of vehicles for resale by a company which also is a manufacturer of motor vehicles does not make the purchaser the manufacturer of those vehicles.

Applying these principles to your case, we conclude that GM sponsors the importation of the Lotus vehicles. Both LCL, the actual assembler, and LPC, the actual importer, are wholly-owned subsidiaries of GM. By itself, GM's ownership of both the producer and importer of these care might not be sufficient to establish that GM was the sponsor of these vehicles for the purposes of Standard No. 208. In addition, however, another GM wholly-owned subsidiary distributes and markets the vehicles in the United St ates. GM coordinates the activities of all these subsidiaries. Since GM wholly owns the actual producer of these vehicles and is actively involved in the importation, distribution, and marketing of these vehicles, we believe that GM should be considered to sponsor the importation of the Lotus vehicles. Accordingly, GM rather than LPC, may be considered the importer and manufacturer of these vehicles.

If you have any further questions, please let me know.

Sincerely.

Erika Z. Jones

Chief Counsel

August 29, 1986 Erika Z. Jones, Esq. Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 Seventh Street, S.W. Washington, DC 20590

Dear Ms. Jones:

Re: Interpretation of Multiple Manufacturer

Provision of FMVSS 208 Phase-In

This letter is written to request an interpretation of S4.1.3.5 of FMVSS 208. As you will recall, this portion of the standard provides that where more than one manufacturer is involved in the production of a passenger car, the manufacturers are permitte d to determine between or among themselves, by express written contract, which of them shall be deemed the manufacturer of the vehicle for purposes of meeting the phase-in requirements of FMVSS 208. In the absence of such an agreement, domestic passenger cars produced by more than one manufacturer are attributed to the manufacturer marketing the vehicles, and imported ones are attributed to the manufacturer importing them.

The specific subject matter of the interpretation we are requesting in this letter was discussed at a meeting held at the NHTSA on August 27, 1986. Messrs. Wood, Oesch, and Vinson of your staff represented the agency; Mr. R. F. Humphrey of General Motors Washington Office and I represented GM; and Mr. G. E. Atkin represented Lotus Cars Limited. After a discussion of the issues involved, the members of your staff suggested that a written request for interpretation would be appropriate. This letter is a r esult of that suggestion. The facts comprising the issue we are concerned with, and our specific request for an interpretation of the phase-in provisions of FMVSS 208, are as follows.

Lotus Cars Limited (Lotus) is part of Group Lotus, a United Kingdom firm that provides engineering services to various motor vehicle manufacturers and itself produces several hundred passenger cars each year. Lotus passenger cars are imported into the Un ited States under a contract between Lotus and Lotus Performance Cars (LPC), an American limited partnership. The contract gives LPC the exclusive right to distribute Lotus passenger cars in the United States, and LPC is the importer of record of Lotus p assenger cars. GM has recently purchased substantially all of the shares (approximately 96 percent) of Group Lotus. Neither GM nor Lotus owns any interest in LPC.

Of the somewhat less than 1,000 passenger cars produced by Lotus each year, approximately 200 are imported into the United States. In light of this fact, the phase-in requirements of FMVSS 208, which would obligate Lotus to install passive restraints on approximately 20 vehicles in model year 1987, 50 vehicles in 1988, and 80 vehicles in 1989, can be seen to impose an inordinate financial burden on Lotus.

The multiple manufacturer provision of FMVSS 208 was promulgated to give manufacturers the flexibility to deal with the uncertainties and anomalies created by the phase-in scheme for passive restraint requirements. In furthering this purpose, we believe that the agency should use reasonable flexibility in its interpretation of statutory and regulatory terms and definitions, viewing the business arrangements between manufacturers so as to fulfill the intent of the multiple manufacturer provision.

It is clear that Lotus, the designer and producer of Lotus passenger cars, is a manufacturer of those cars under the Safety Act and safety standards. It is also clear that LPC, the importer of Lotus passenger cars, is a statutory manufacturer. The interp retation we request from the agency is that General Motors, by virtue of its nearly total ownership of Lotus, may also be deemed a manufacturer of Lotus passenger cars for purposes of the multiple manufacturer provision of FMVSS 208.

Because it owns 96 percent of the shares of Group Lotus (an ownership level which will reach 100 percent within the foreseeable future), GM has a substantial and abiding concern in the long-term viability of Lotus, a concern that extends to the extraordi nary difficulties imposed upon Lotus by the phase-in provisions of the passive restraint rule. By permitting GM to substitute its vehicles for those of Lotus in determining compliance with the phase-in requirements, the NHTSA would do no violence to the language or spirit of the Safety Act, which is expansive enough to encompass the changing business relation-ships among manufacturers. The agency would also be fulfilling the intent of the multiple manufacturer provision of FMVSS 208, and would be rectif ying a particularly egregious example of the kind of inequity implicitly recognized by the adoption of the multiple manufacturer provision. Finally, this interpretation would not result in any reduction in the number of vehicles required to be equipped w ith passive restraints during the phase-in period. For all these reasons, we ask that the NHTSA issue the interpretation of the multiple manufacturer provision of FMVSS 208 that we have requested.

The other issue discussed during the August 27 meeting was the situation of Lotus in the event that the agency finds itself unable to concur with the interpretation of FMVSS 208 that I have outlined above. Lotus has concluded that if the agency is unable to issue our requested interpretation, Lotus finds it necessary to file a petition for exemption from the first year of the phase-in requirements of FMVSS 208 (that is, the requirement that 10 percent of the vehicles produced by each manufacturer during the period September 1, 1986 through September 1, 1987 be equipped with passive restraints). We are therefore enclosing with this letter a petition by Lotus for exemption from those requirements, as prescribed in 49 CFR Part 555. If the NHTSA is able to render the interpretation of FMVSS 208 that we have requested, the enclosed petition will be moot, and in that case, GM and Lotus request that the agency disregard the petition. If, however, the agency does not issue the interpretation we have requested above, Lotus requests that the agency act upon the enclosed petition and determine Lotus' entitlement to an exemption as expeditiously as possible.

If you have any questions about our request for an interpretation of FMVSS 208, please direct them to me. If the enclosed petition is not rendered moot by your interpretation of FMVSS 208, and you have any questions about the petition, please direct them to Mr. Graham Atkin of Lotus. Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely, J. Douglas Hand JDH: kt Attorney

Enclosure

ID: nht87-2.96

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 09/18/87 EST

FROM: ERIKA Z. JONES -- NHTSA CHIEF COUNSEL

TO: JAMES R. THOMPSON -- VICE PRESIDENT OF MARKETING, DUTCHER MOTORS, INC.

TITLE: NONE

TEXT: This letter responds to your inquiry concerning classifying a vehicle, the "TransiTaxi," which your company manufactures. You inform us that although in 1985 you classified this vehicle as a bus, you now have a question whether this is a proper classifi cation. You state that you use Ford truck components in your vehicle design, and describe your vehicle as larger than the Ford Bronco.

You state further that if you must classify this vehicle as a "passenger car," you would find it "financially impossible to go through the crash-testing procedures required." You ask us to consider issuing either an interpretation or an exemption, cite y our maximum annual production of only 500 units as a factor, and offer to bring a "demonstrator" vehicle to Washington. You enclose specifications with your correspondence that say the standard "TransiTaxi" seats a maximum of seven passengers.

First, please understand that under our certification requirements (49 CFR 567) for the vehicle safety standards, a manufacturer initially determines a vehicle's type using the definitions set out in 49 CFR @ 571.3, and certifies that the motor vehicle c omplies with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to that type. However, a manufacturer's classification does not bind the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).

Under @ 571.3, a "'Bus' means a motor vehicle with motive power, except a trailer, designed for carrying more than 10 persons." Since your vehicle is designed to carry a maximum of seven passengers, it appears that your vehicle is not a bus.

Your specifications indicate your use of design elements associated with a truck chassis. For example, the front twin I-beam suspension (coil springs) is designed for trucks, and the ground clearances and curb weight more nearly match truck specificatio ns than for other types of

motor vehicles. NHTSA concludes, therefore, that you are building your "Transitaxi" on a truck chassis.

Because you build this vehicle on a truck chassis and design it to carry 10 persons or less, it appears that your vehicle is a "multipurpose passenger vehicle" as that term is defined in 49 CFR @ 571.3, Definitions. Once a proper classification for your vehicle has been determined, it is your responsibility under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act and agency regulations, to certify that each vehicle you manufacture meets any standard applicable to it on the date of manufacture. A multip urpose passenger vehicle must meet crash tests under some applicable standards.

If in the past you have sold motor vehicles without certifying that they meet the standards that apply to that type, or if your certification is improper because your vehicles fail to meet applicable standards, the law would require you to conduct a vehi cle notice-and-recall campaign and make your vehicles comply.

A manufacturer of 10,000 vehicles or less per year may petition the agency for a temporary exemption from any safety standard if complying with the standard would cause the manufacturer substantial economic hardship. If NHTSA were to grant a petition su ch as this, the manufacturer must make a good faith effort during the exemption period to bring the vehicle into compliance. However, if the agency were to grant an exemption, that grant would not cure past failures to comply. Given your production vol ume, you may wish to consider petitioning for an exemption. I enclose a copy of 49 CFR Part 555 which sets out the exemption procedures.

Sending NHTSA the information that Part 555 requires to support an exemption petition will give the agency what it needs to make an informed judgment of the petition's merits. Therefore, it is unnecessary for you to bring the vehicle here for a demonstr ation.

Although it appears from the attachments to your letter that you are purchasing separate components instead of incomplete vehicles (See 49 CFR @ 568.3) from Ford, we note that many small manufacturers producing special vehicles use incomplete vehicles pu rchased from a large manufacturer like Ford. To facilitate certification by the small manufacturer (called a "final stage manufacturer" by Part 568) of the completed vehicles, Part 568 requires the incomplete vehicle manufacturer to supply a document wi th each incomplete vehicle. The incomplete vehicle manufacturer can be particularly helpful by stating either that the vehicle, when completed, will conform to a safety standard if no alterations are made to identified components, or that the vehicle, w hen completed, will conform if the final stage manufacturer meets specific conditions regarding the completion process.

The final stage manufacturer would still have to certify compliance with any applicable standard not listed in the incomplete vehicle manufacturer's document. Whether Ford, who apparently sells you components instead of incomplete vehicles, may assist i n the certification process is a matter which our regulations do not address. You may wish to take up the matter with that company.

Finally, if you wish to certify your Transitaxi as a bus, you may wish to consider using a larger chassis suitable for completion with the requisite seating capacity.

I hope you find this information helpful.

Enclosure

ID: nht87-2.97

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 09/18/87

FROM: TERRY B. QUINN -- HEHR INTERNATIONAL, CORPORATE DIRECTOR OF QUALITY

TO: ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 05/31/88 FROM ERIKA Z JONES TO TERRY E QUINN; REDBOOK A32, STANDARD 205; LETTER DATED 10/16/86 FROM ERIKA Z JONES TO EDWARD T. FENNELL

TEXT: Dear Sir:

We are hereby requesting a letter ruling regarding the matter of proper identification of safety glazing materials to be used in over-the-road vehicles.

Hehr International Inc. is a prime glazing material manufacturer in that we temper glazing material used in vehicular windows produced by our (and other) companies.

Please reference 49 CFR 571.205 S6.1: "Each prime glazing material manufacturer ... shall mark glazing materials manufactured by him in accordance with Section 6 of ANS Z26."

Please reference American National Standard Z26.1-1983 Section 6 (Sentence 2): "They shall also be marked with the manufacturer's distinctive designation or trademark."

Our problem is this: We have a prospective customer for our tempered glass who will use it in windows which are competitive with those we build. This prospect naturally does not wish to have his competitor's name on the glazing etch of his windows. The question is: May Hehr International Inc. sell tempered glass without the distinctive designation or trademark (The Hehr Logo) and remain in compliance with the law? All other provisions as to certification and marking will continue to be complied with , of course.

Your early response to this question would be most appreciated.

ID: nht87-2.98

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 09/21/87

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Diane K. Steed; NHTSA

TO: The Honorable Bill Nelson

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: The Honorable Bill Nelson U.S. House of Representative 2404 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, DC 20515-0912

Dear Mr. Nelson:

Thank you for your letter on behalf of your constituent, Mr. Glenn Gourley, who questions the effectiveness of safety belts and opposes the safety belt use law enacted by the State of Florida.

During the past decade, 470,000 persons have died on American highways. Each year, an estimated 300,000 are injured seriously enough to require hospital treatment. These traffic deaths and injuries have resulted in an annual cost to society of approximat ely 57 billion dollars resulting from such costs as emergency medical services, long-term medical care and rehabilitation, worker's compensation, welfare payments, and lost tax revenue.

Numerous analyses have shown that safety belts reduce fatalities by 40-50 percent and reduce serious injuries by 45-55 percent. I have enclosed copies of a safety belt fact sheet and several pamphlets we have published explaining how and why safety belts are so effective. Because of the extensive body of evidence about the effectiveness of safety belts, the United States Supreme Court has said, "We start with the accepted ground that, if used, seatbelts unquestionably would save many thousands of lives and would prevent tens of thousands of crippling injuries.

In an effort to protect their citizens by substantially reducing vehicle-related deaths and injuries, and to reduce the financial burden on their taxpayers, 29 State and the District of Columbia have enacted safety belt use laws. I have also enclosed an occupant protection fact sheet. This sheet reports that among front seat occupants, safety belts saved about 2,200 lives in 1985, and 1750 of those lives were saved in States that have safety belt laws. I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions on this subject, please let me know.

Sincerely,

Diane K. Steed

Enclosures

Mr. Glenn Gourley 25434 Antler Street Christmas, Florida 32709

Dear Mr. Gourley:

Thank you for your letter opposing a mandatory seatbelt law. I have taken the liberty of forwarding a copy of your letter to the Department of Transportation, so that they may review and respond to your concerns. I will contact you again when I receive a reply. I appreciate your taking the time to share your thoughts with me. Sincerely,

BN:mr

ID: nht89-2.47

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: JULY 27, 1989

FROM: LARRY S. SNOWHITE -- MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS, GLOVSKY AND POPEO

TO: STEPHEN P. WOOD, ESQ. -- ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED JANUARY 25, 1990 TO LARRY S. SNOWHITE, MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS, GLOVSKY AND POPEO, FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD, NHTSA; REDBOOK A35; VSA 1397 (A)(2)(A); STD. 108

TEXT: On behalf of our clients, ATAT Technology Ltd. ("ATAT") and CTS Corporation, we respectfully request that you determine that the sale into the aftermarket as well as aftermarket installation of the Advanced Brake Light Device ("ABLD") manufactured by ATAT (or of any other device performing as does the ABLD) would not violate the statutes administered by, or regulations of, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

Specifically, we are requesting this determination for a device, the ABLD or a similar device demonstrating comparable performance, that consists of a sensor attached to the accelerator pedal that senses the rate at which the foot releases the acceler ator pedal. This signal is transmitted to a processor unit, which determines whether the brake lights should be turned on, and the duration of the illumination until the brake is applied. The ABLD is set so that the brake light will go off unless the b rake is applied within one second of the ABLD's activation, which based on experimentation and observation provides sufficient time for the brake pedal activation of the stop lights while avoiding misleading signals (if NHTSA considers that a different i nterval is consistent with applicable law and regulations, ATAT is prepared to modify the interval to meet an alternative NHTSA performance standard.)

It is our belief that the ABLD, and any similar device, holds out the promise of avoiding significant numbers of rear-end accidents and of reducing the seriousness of rear-end accidents that do occur. As the ABLD does not compromise,

render inoperative, in whole or in part, or impair the effectiveness of the mandated brake light system, we believe that on neither legal nor public policy grounds should NHTSA object to aftermarket sales of the ABLD.

This question was previously considered in a Memorandum dated March 7, 1988 addressed by Erika Jones to the Associate Administrator for Research and Development. In our view, that Memorandum was based on inadequate information concerning the mandated brake and brake light systems, the ABLD's performance and ABLD's potential contribution to safety -- inadequacies for which ATAT was responsible and which it now seeks to correct. In the intervening months, additional studies have been conducted and AT AT has marshaled relevant research materials. This new information is presented in the enclosed submissions.

The March Memorandum expressed concern that installation of the ABLD could create a noncompliance with Standard 108 and thereby presumptively run afoul of the anti-tampering provisions of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 1397. In this regard, w e understand that the threshold question is, does the ABLD render inoperative, in whole or in part, a device or element of design installed in compliance with Standard 108. A related determination is whether, under S4.1.3, it "impairs the effectiveness of lighting equipment required" by Standard 108.

This is a factual determination. And we believe that as a matter of fact the ABLD does not render the brake light system inoperative or impair its effectiveness.

First, the ABLD does not prevent the brake light system (the stoplamp and the CHMSL) from being activated and operating when the brake is applied. The ABLD is consistent with the operation of the brake light system, and arguably enhances it. The ABL D clearly and unambiguously indicates "the intention of the operator of a vehicle to stop or diminish speed by braking." SAE Standard J586d,2.1. Stop Lamps. The brake light is illuminated if the driver releases the accelerator at a rate greater than a predetermined minimum -- a minimum which reflects a very high probability that the release will be followed by an "emergency" brake application. If the brake is applied within one second, the brake light remains illuminated. Certainly this is consisten t with the definition of a Stop Lamp and with the operation of the brake light system.

There will be circumstances in which the brake will not be engaged after the ABLD is activated. In this case, the brake light will remain illuminated only for one second. As the enclosed material documents, this is not a phenomenon unique to, or agg ravated by, the ABLD. Illuminations of the brake lights for one second or less occur frequently during

normal driving without the ABLD. As is described in the enclosed submissions, in everyday driving it is not uncommon for the brake lights to be illuminated briefly even though the service brakes are not activated. The performance of the ABLD adds margi nally to the total number of illuminations of the brake lights for less than one second. Thus, ABLD-caused short-duration illuminations do not convey an intent or signal that is inconsistent or contradictory of the signal sent by the standard brake ligh t system. And they do signal an at least momentary "intention of the operator to stop or diminish speed by braking"

Activation of the ABLD does illuminate the stoplamps by means other than the application of the service brakes. While S4.5.4 prohibits the CHMSL being activated by means other than the application of the service brake, there is no comparable prohibit ion on the stoplamps themselves being activated by means other than the application of the service brakes. The ABLD would activate the stoplamp and CHMSL simultaneously. And it is our understanding that the CHMSL provision is an inadvertent hold-over f rom a rule, S4.5.11(b), that allowed the CHMSL to be activated by the hazard warning system for passenger cars manufactured on or after August 1, 1984 until September 1, 1986. Accordingly, while the installation of the ABLD as OEM technically would be i nconsistent with a literal reading of S4.5.4, this should not be considered an "impairment" such as to bar aftermarket sales and installation of the ABLD.

As previously noted, both the trigger point for the activation of the ABLD and the interval during which the ABLD illuminates the brake lights are subject to adjustment. The trigger and interval chosen reflect ATAT's studied judgment as to what will succeed in order to send a signal in those cases in which a signal is appropriate and minimize the incidence of misleading signals. Part of the basis for this judgment is set out in the attached submissions.

ATAT would appreciate an opportunity to meet with appropriate NHTSA staff in order to discuss this request so as to assure that you are in a position to respond to the request based on the fullest available information. As you will immediately see, t he enclosed submissions are the result of considerable work and ATAT would also welcome the opportunity to respond to questions about them.

As you know, ATAT is an Israeli company. This creates special logistical difficulties in communicating with NHTSA. A representative of ATAT will be in the United States on

August 1-4. We believe that it would be in the mutual interest of ATAT and NHTSA to meet during these dates.

Thank you for your consideration.

Enclosure

ID: nht89-2.48

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: July 28, 1989

FROM: Anne M. Kennedy -- Customer Relations Representative, Volkswagen United States, Inc.

TO: Emory L. Lariscy -- President, Lariscy Enterprises, Inc.

TITLE: Re #89026684

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 9-4-90 from P.J. Rice to E.J. Lariscy (A36; Std. 108; Std. 124; Std. 301); Also attached to letter dated 8-28-89 from E.L. Lariscy to G. Shifflett (OCC 3910) with Patent Application for Vehicle Safety Light Assembly (gr aphics omitted); Also attached to letter dated 7-14-89 from J.M. Mundy to E. Lariscy; Also attached to letter dated 7-14-89 from J.M. Staples to E.L. Lariscy; Also attached to letter dated 8-8-89 from L. Baer to E.L. Lariscy

TEXT:

Thank you for your recent letter, concerning Vehicle Safety Light Assembly. Please be assured we appreciate the information in your letter, since it is through communications of this nature that changes and/or improvements can be brought about where it appears they are needed most. Your commentary will be called to the attention of all concerned parties.

We have taken the liberty of forwarding the information contained in your letter to our Product Planning Department. You should be hearing directly from them.

Thank you once again for taking the time to write and for giving us the opportunity to review and comment.

ID: nht89-2.49

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 07/31/89

FROM: STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL

TO: RICHARD J. STROHM

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 11/09/87 FROM RICHARD J. STROHM TO EDWARD JETTNER -- NHTSA; FMVSS 207; OCC 1362; LETTER DATED 10/07/87 FROM RICHARD J. STROHM TO CHEVROLET DIVISION; 1987 CHEVROLET CAPRICE, 1G1BL51H0HX163146, 9000 MILES

TEXT: Dear Mr. Strohm:

This responds to your letter, referred to me by Mr. Edward Jettner of this agency, which asked the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to authorize the adjustment of the front seat in your Chevrolet Caprice by your automobile dealer. I regret the delay in responding.

Your letter and enclosure explained that you would like your dealer to move back the front bench seat in your newly-purchased vehicle to give you more leg room. You stated that the front seat in your new vehicle is mounted closer to the front of the vehi cle than the seat in your former car had been, and that you were more comfortable with the latter seat placement. You said that you contacted a customer service representative and that he told you Chevrolet is prohibited by law from moving the seat. Yo u asked how Chevrolet can obtain authorization to make the desired adjustments. Federal law does not directly prohibit your dealer from adjusting the seat; it does, however, indirectly set limits on the modifications.

By way of background, NHTSA is authorized by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. Manufacturers m ust certify that their new vehicles and equipment conform to all of our safety standards applying to their product. If a new vehicle is modified before its first sale to a consumer, the person making the modification would have to certify that the vehic le, as altered, continues to comply with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards. Moving back a seat on a new vehicle could affect compliance with Standard No. 207, Seating System, Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection, and No. 210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages. A dealer is not prohibited from making changes in the seat position as long as the modified seat and related safety components continue to perform in the manner required by the applicable standards.

Your situation involves the modification of a vehicle after its first sale to a consumer. While our safety standards apply only to new vehicles, there are some statutory restrictions on modifications of

this type. If a vehicle is modified after its first sale, then @ 108(a)(2)(A) of the Vehicle Safety Act would apply. That section provides, in pertinent part:

No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an ap plicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard . . .

Your dealer is not prohibited by @ 108(a)(2)(A) from making the seat adjustment if the adjustment can be made without rendering inoperative your vehile's compliance with any applicable Federal safety standard. It may be that the dealer you contacted has determined that it cannot move the seat rearwards without rendering inoperative a component or element of design now in compliance with the Federal safety standards.

The prohibition of @ 108(a)(2)(A) only applies to commercial businesses, not to individuals. Thus, under Federal law, vehicle owners may themselves make any modifications to their vehicles. They must, however, comply with any applicable State laws limi ting modifications.

If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact us.

Sincerely,

ID: nht89-2.5

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 06/16/89

FROM: TAKAYOSHI CHIKADA -- MANAGER OF AUTOMOTIVE LIGHTING ENGINEERING CONTROL DEPT. STANLEY ELECTRIC

TO: RICHARD L. VAN IDERSTINE -- SAFETY STANDARDS ENGINEER

TITLE: REVISION OF FMVSS NO.108 (DOCKET NO.85-15 NOTICE 8)

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER 08/23/89 FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA TO TAKAYOSHI CHIKADA; REDBOOK A34[3]; STANDARD 108

TEXT: Dear Mr. Van Iderstine,

We thank you very much for your kind cooperation during our stay in the U.S. for SAE Lighting Committee Meeting.

We would like have your advice concerning interpretation of new FMVSS No. 108 (Docket No.85-15 Notice 8).

1. The requirement of S7.7.5.1.a) was not applied to replaceable type headlamp by previous FMVSS No.108. Please give us your advice whether this requirement will also be applied to the replaceable bulb type headlamps which are already manufactured accor ding to the previous FMVSS No.108.

2. The requirement of S7.7.5.1.b) need to quote SAE J580 b "Sealed Beam Headlamp Assembly" by previous FMVSS No. 108 and the expression seem to be slightly different from new S7.7.5.1.b). Please advice us whether the requirement of "0.1 in. max." is cond itioned when headlamp is being pushed or after said force is removed.

3. How should we prove the confirmation to the requirement of S7.7.2.2? We think the combinations of Horizontal and Vertical angle within the aim range will be so huge and it is not practicable to test for all combinations.

4. It is acceptable to set up initial "0" point of S7.7.5.2.a).2) not mechanically but photometrically?

Please give us your advice by return facsimile.

We thank you very much in advance.

Yours faithfully,

ID: nht89-2.50

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 07/31/89

FROM: STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL

TO: BUTLER DERRICK -- UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: TEXT OF THE RULING BY THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT UPHOLDING THE STATE'S LAW REQUIRING SEAT BELT USE BY DRIVERS AND FRONT SEAT PASSENGERS IN AUTOMOBILES; DATED 10/01/86; LETTER DATED 07/11/89 FROM BUTLER DERRICK -- CONGRESS TO STEVE WOOD -- NHTSA

TEXT: Dear Mr. Derrick:

Thank you for your July 11, 1989 letter on behalf of one of your constituents in South Carolina, asking whether mandatory safety belt use laws are constitutional. I am pleased to have this chance to provide you with the following information.

Before addressing your specific question, I would like to emphasize that effectively enforced State laws requiring the proper use of safety belts offer our best opportunity to save lives today at virtually no cost to the consumer. We recognize that a saf ety belt use law requires an action that many people do not take voluntarily. However, all traffic laws involve some restraint on individual behavior. Most are accepted without a second thought: we drive on the right side of the road, instead of the le ft, we stop for red lights, and we obey speed limits. In many cases, the failure of motorists to obey these traffic laws will have an impact on motorists besides the violator.

The same is true when motorists fail to wear safety belts. Automobile accidents have many victims -- family, friends, employers, and taxpayers -- all of whom bear some measure of the human and economic cost. During the past decade, 470,000 persons have died on American highways. Each year, an estimated 300,000 are injured seriously enough to require hospital treatment. These traffic injuries and deaths have resulted in an annual cost to society of $ 57 billion, including such costs as workman's comp ensation, welfare payments and lost tax revenues. Because of the substantial societal burden imposed by vehicle-related deaths and injuries, we believe that State legislatures have more than adequate justification to impose the relatively small intrusio n on individual liberties that results from mandatory safety belt use laws.

The constitutionality of State mandatory use laws has been upheld by the courts of three different States, Illinois, Nebraska, and New York. I have enclosed a copy of the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion on this issue (Illinois v. Kohrig, decided Octobe r 1, 1986). The Supreme Court of the United States dismissed an appeal from the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Kohrig, on the grounds that it did not present a substantial Federal question. This dismissal suggests that the[Illegible Words]

You also stated that your constituent believes that the Supreme Court has declared laws requiring the use of motorcycle helmets to be unconstitutional.

This belief is inaccurate. Page 7 of the enclosed Kohrig decision lists 35 different State and Federal cases that have held that State laws requiring the use of motorcycle helmets are a valid exercise of a State's powers and not unconstitutional. That list shows that the Supreme Court has affirmed a lower court decision that the Massachusetts motorcycle helmet use law was a constitutional exercise of a State's power (Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277, aff'd, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972)). Additionally, the Supreme Court has refused to review decisions by State Courts in Lousiana, Massachusetts, Washington, and Wisconsin upholding the constitutionality of State motorcycle helmet use laws. There are no Supreme Court decisions suggesting that State motorcycle helmet use laws are unconstitutional exercises of the State's power.

I hope this information is helpful. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any further questions or need some additional information on this subject.

Sincerely,

ENCLOSURE

ID: nht89-2.51

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 07/31/89

FROM: W. MARSHALL RICKERT -- MVA

TO: CONSTANCE A. MORELLA -- HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 11/29/89 ESTIMATED, FROM JEFFREY R. MILLER -- NHTSA TO JOHN D. DINGELL -- HOUSE; REDBOOK A34; STANDARD 205; LETTER DATED 09/22/89 FROM JOHN D. DINGELL -- HOUSE TO JEFFREY R. MILLER; LETTER DATED 08/25/89 FROM CONSTANCE A. MORELLA -- HOUSE TO NORMAN Y. MINETA -- HOUSE; LETTER DATED 07/08/88 FROM ERIKA Z. JONES -- NHTSA TO NORMAN D. SHUNWAY -- CONGRESS; STANDARD 205; LETTER DATED 11/01/88 FROM ERIKA Z. JONES -- NHTSA TO BEVERLY B. BYRON -- HOUSE; STANDARD 205

TEXT: Dear Congresswoman Morella:

I am writing in response to your letter of July 6, 1989, regarding Katherine M. Dante's letter to you requesting assistance in obtaining a waiver to permit tinted windows on her automobile. You may recall that Mrs. Dante suffers from a skin disease c alled Vitaligo, and has been advised to avoid exposure to the sun's rays.

Unfortunately, the Motor Vehicle Administration has limited authority under present Federal law and regulations to waive standards for window tinting. Title 15, Section 1397(a) of the U.S. Code provides the standards for light transmittance permitted in a new vehicle's window glazing. That Section also makes it a violation of federal law for a car manufacturer, distributer, dealer or repair business to "render inoperative" the glazing installed in the new vehicle. Thus, after the new car is sold, a used car dealer or motor vehicle repair business cannot add tinting to a vehicle which would result in a light transmittance level which did not meet the federal standards for durability and opacity.

Current federal law does not allow for any medical exemptions from this prohibition. Federal law does not, however, prohibit an individual from applying window tinting to his or her own vehicle, even if such application results in a light transmittan ce level which does not conform with the federal standard. Maryland's regulations, however, do prohibit an individual from applying any tinting to a vehicle.

I am informed by my staff and the State Police that there are no window tinting products currently on the market which, when applied, would still meet the federal standard. I am attaching two explanations of this law - one from my counsel and one con tained in a letter from the Chief Counsel, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, to Congresswoman Beverly Byron.

It seems to me there are two things that can be done. On the State level I will explore with the State Police the possibility of amending Maryland's regulation to allow an individual to apply tinting to his or her own vehicle for medical reasons. Ho wever, I believe that federal law should also be amended to allow a motor vehicle repair business to apply tinting which does not conform with federal standards if the tinting is needed for medical reasons. I frankly do not know how difficult it is to a pply tinting, but it seems ludicrous to state that an individual can apply tinting, but that that individual cannot hire someone else to apply it.

I hope my explanation and suggestions are helpful. Mrs. Dante is not alone in her frustration with this law. I intend to do all I can to provide for a medical waiver, but I think it is going to take a joint Federal/State effort to accomplish this g oal. I would be happy to pursue this further with you.

With kindest personal regards.

Sincerely,

Attachments

The abortion issue is now gone beyond "Right to(Illegible Word) It now threatens our Basic Bill of Rights and the Constitutes who is to say that in the future the table would be turned and mandatory abortions for population control, ie. China would be law. I urge you to side with "Freedom of Choice" and protect our Democracy.

2) Tinted Glass on Motor Vehicles

In the state of Maryland, the law states that only RV, Trucks, Vans, Mini Vans, Limo's are legally allowed to have tinted glass. This I find confusing. The operators of these Vehicles have to visualize traffic conditions the same as the operator of a passenger car. The MVA reason for permitting the tinted glass on the above vehicles, is that they posses a Rear View mirror on the passenger side of the Vehicle. As you are well aware this option is very easily attainable on a passenger car also.

I was informed that the statute stems from a federal law passed in early 1960's, however each state has the ability to ammend this statute. With current advances in technology since 1960's, both in the tinted films, and(Illegible Word) tint manufactu red into the glass, The Visual acuity is unaltered. Tinted glass decreases harmful Ultra Violet Rays, that cause glare for and heat within the automobile. This is especially noticed on those Hot, Humid, Washington D.C. Days, especially for passengers ( Illegible Word) in 3rd seats of STATION wagons. I feel there is no reason why passenger cars should be excluded from possessing tinted glass as long as it meets current industry specifications and the vehicle is properly equiped.